Full opinion text
ORDER (1) PERMANENTLY ENJOINING DEFENDANTS FROM ENFORCING HRS § 11-358 AS-APPLIED TO SPECIFIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFA-PAC, A COMMITTEE MAKING ONLY INDEPENDENT CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES: AND (2) UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY, AS CHALLENGED, OF PROVISIONS OF HRS §§ 11-302, 355 & 391 J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs Jimmy Yamada (“Yamada”), Russell Stewart (“Stewart”), and A-l ALectrician, Inc. (“A-l”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed this action in August 2010, challenging the constitutionality of several Hawaii campaign finance laws in the wake of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), which (among other matters) invalidated limitations on amounts of corporate independent campaign expenditures. In October 2010, the court addressed most of Plaintiffs’ challenges at a preliminary-injunction stage of the proceedings, and issued two comprehensive Orders granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See Doc. Nos. 71, 91; Yamada v. Kuramoto, 744 F.Supp.2d 1075 (D.Haw. 2010) (“Yamada I ”); and Yamada v. Kuramoto, 2010 WL 4603936 (D.Haw. Oct.29, 2010) (“Yamada II”). Campaign finance law has continued to evolve since then, and the record in this action has been further developed. The court now faces the same, or similar, issues on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. Where appropriate, the court draws upon and incorporates parts of Yamada I and Yamada II in ruling on the current Cross Motions. Citizens United held that limitations on independent campaign expenditures violate the First Amendment because no sufficient government interest justifies suppressing corporate independent speech. 130 S.Ct. at 913. Applying that logic, Courts of Appeals subsequently invalidated restrictions on amounts of contributions to organizations that make only independent campaign expenditures. See, e.g., Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1121-22 (9th Cir.2011) (upholding injunction against enforcement of San Diego ordinance limiting fundraising of independent political committees); Wisc. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 154-55 (7th Cir.2011) (holding campaign contribution limit unconstitutional as applied to organizations that engage only in independent expenditures for political speech). Likewise, Yamada I preliminarily enjoined enforcement of Hawaii Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 11-358 as applied to Yamada’s and Stewart’s then-proposed contributions to Aloha Family Alliance-Political Action Committee (“AFA-PAC”) — an entity that engages in solely independent expenditures. See 744 F.Supp.2d at 1087. This Order now makes that injunction permanent. Citizens United also embraced disclosure and transparency in elections — organizations that engage in independent campaign spending can do so freely, but should also do so openly. Although disclosure requirements “may burden the ability to speak ... they impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities and do not prevent anyone from speaking[.]” 130 S.Ct. at 914 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.” Id. at 916. Accordingly, Yamada II upheld (again, at the preliminary injunction phase) Hawaii campaign finance laws that enable and require disclosure of certain activities that, for example, have the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of candidates. See 2010 WL 4603936, at *20 (finding Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed in their challenges to requirements now codified at HRS §§ 11-302 and 391). This Order now confirms that, as challenged, Hawaii’s noncandidate committee, expenditure, and advertisement requirements in HRS §§ 11-302 and 391 are constitutional. Finally, Citizens United did not address whether campaign contributions directly to candidates may be limited, and did not change the principle that such restrictions may be justified to prevent corruption or its appearance. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154-55, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003). This Order (addressing an issue not previously pursued by Plaintiffs) upholds Hawaii’s ban on direct campaign contributions by government contractors set forth in HRS § 11-355, as applied to A-l, given A-l’s past and proposed donations to candidates and its status as a government contractor. Hawaii’s “pay-to-play” ban in § 11-355 is constitutional as applied to A-1. In sum, based on the following, the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART. II. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Plaintiffs’ First Amended Verified Complaint, Doc. No. 24 (“FAC”), seeks declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and challenges the constitutionality of five Hawaii campaign finance laws (or sets of laws) that regulate Plaintiffs’ actual or proposed activities. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenge Hawaii’s: (1) restrictions on contributions to noncandidate committees (HRS § 11-358), (2) “noncandidate committee” and related “expenditure” definitions (HRS § 11-302), (3) “electioneering communication” disclosure requirements (HRS § 11-341), (4) disclaimer-language requirements for an “advertisement” (HRS § 11-391), and (5) ban on contributions to candidates by government contractors (HRS § 11-355). The FAC was verified by Yamada and Stewart (as individuals), by A-l (through Yamada, as Al’s chief executive officer), and by AFA-PAC (through its Chair Andrew Gerakas). FAC at 59-60. Defendant Michael Weaver is the current Hawaii Campaign Spending Commission (“the Commission”) chairperson. Defendants Dean Robb, Calmentina Gomes, and G. William Snipes are current members of the Commission. All Defendants are sued in their official capacities as Commission members. FAC ¶ 23; Defs.’ Mot. at 2 n. I. Because the FAC was verified, the court treats it as an affidavit. See, e.g., Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1116 (“A verified complaint may be treated as an affidavit, and, as such, it is evidence that may support injunctive relief.”) (citations omitted). Yamada also submitted declarations, and testified at a preliminary injunction hearing on October 1, 2010 (both individually and as A-l’s representative). Stewart and Gerakas also testified and submitted declarations. Given the FAC’s verified allegations, testimony at the October 1, 2010 hearing, and the evidence most recently submitted with the Cross Motions, the court finds the facts as described below are essentially undisputed. That is, the parties agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and that the court should decide the legal issues based upon the Cross Motions. Yamada and Stewart are Hawaii residents. As individuals, they each sought to contribute $2,500 to AFA-PAC before the 2010 general election. FAC ¶ 7. Doing so, however, would have exceeded the $1,000 per election contribution limitation contained in HRS § 11-358. In October 2010, after the court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of § 11-358 as to their proposed contributions, they both contributed $2,500 to AFA-PAC. And they both seek to contribute $2,500 to AFA-PAC again in 2012. Pis.’Mot. Exs. 3-4. AFA-PAC is a Hawaii registered non-candidate committee that makes only “independent expenditures.” It does not contribute directly to candidates, and does not coordinate spending for political speech with candidates or political parties. FAC ¶ 8. Gerakas confirmed at the preliminary injunction hearing that he is chairman of AFA-PAC, and that it “operates like any other independent political action committee.” Transcript of Oct. 1, 2010 Hearing (“Tr.”) at 11. AFA-PAC was created in July 2010, and was formed to “influence passage of legislation that supports traditional marriage, the right to life against such things as physician-assisted suicide, and, promoting the issue of life in our community.” Id. AFA-PAC is “committed to endorsing and financially supporting candidates, no matter what their party affiliation, who will stand up in the public square for Hawaii’s families.” FAC Ex. l. Its goal is to “identify, endorse and elect county, state, and federal officials who favor policies that strengthen and nourish Hawaii’s families.” Id. It asks people to “register to vote” and make contributions to AFA-PAC so that “[mjonies will be used to support candidates who share and reflect our values.” Id. Defendants have not challenged Gerakas’s testimony that AFA-PAC makes only independent expenditures. A-l is an electrical contractor that is “often a government contractor” — it previously worked as a contractor for State organizations, provides services for past jobs, and expected to have State contracts in the near future when Plaintiffs filed the FAC in September 2010. FAC ¶¶ 11-12. And, as of December 2011, A-l in fact had State contracts. Pis.’ Mot. Exs. 5-7. A-l is registered as a noncandidate committee, FAC ¶¶ 9-10, but no longer wants to face burdens such as registration and record-keeping associated with such a classification. Id. ¶ 28. A-l wants to make (and has made) contributions to candidates, and has run advertisements that identify candidates, but wants to do so without including a disclaimer otherwise required by Hawaii law. According to Yamada, A-l “wants to make contributions, while it is a government contractor, to candidates — like those to whom it contributed in 2010 — who do not decide whether A-l receives contracts and who do not oversee the contracts.” Pis.’ Mot. Ex. 5 ¶ 7. A-l is not connected with any political candidate or political party, nor with any political committee. A-l did not form a distinct noncandidate committee to register with the Commission. Rather, it registered itself (as a noncandidate committee) with the Commission “many years ago” pursuant to direction it received from the Commission. FAC ¶ 10; Tr. 30, 35, 37. A-l contends it need not comply with noncandidate committee requirements because it does not have “the major purpose of nominating or electing a candidate or candidates for state or local office in Hawaii.” FAC ¶27. Yamada states that “[political advocacy is not one of A-l’s reasons for existing,” and that political advocacy “is not a ‘priority’ for A-l, in the sense that it does not ‘take precedence’ over A-l’s business activities.” Pis.’ Mot. Ex. 5 ¶¶ 11-12. It “reasonably fear[ed] that if it [did] its 2010 speech as a noncandidate committee, it [would] have to continue complying with noncandidatecommittee burdens[.]” FAC ¶ 28. It also reasonably fears having to comply with burdens associated with noncandidate committee status, and with burdens associated with making electioneering communications. Tr. 60. Thus, A-l seeks a declaration that it need not comply with noncandidate committee burdens, and may lawfully terminate its registration. A-l contributed $20,100 in total to fourteen different State office candidates before the September 18, 2010 primary election. Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 2. The FAC also states that A-l wanted to make nine separate $250 contributions to Hawaii State-legislative candidates before the 2010 general election. FAC ¶ 11. As of September 3, 2010, A-l had also contributed $12,500 to the Hawaii Republican Party. Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 2. Further, as of September 13, 2010, A-l had contributed $1,000 to AFA-PAC. Tr. 65; see also Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 3. And, by October 19, 2010 (for the November 2010 general election), A-l contributed an additional $18,000 in total to thirty-one candidates for State office. Defs.’ Mot. Exs. 4-5. Although the amounts are not specified, it seeks to contribute to “several Hawaii state-legislature candidates ... again in 2012.” Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 5 ¶4. During the 2010 election cycle, A-l published three newspaper advertisements identifying candidates. They ran in the Honolulu Star-Advertiser immediately before, and the day of, the 2010 primary election — on September 16, 17, and 18, 2010. Tr. 51, 55; FAC Exs. 14, 15, & Doc. No. 119-1 (substituting FAC Ex. 16). Yamada testified that the advertisements cost “roughly $3,000 each,” Tr. 63, and later attested that A-l spent “more than $2,000 on these ads.” Pis.’ Mot. Ex. 5 ¶ 9. According to Yamada, “[t]he ads have clearly identified candidates for state office and refer to “PEOPLE WE PUT INTO OFFICE” and “THE REPRESENTATIVES WE PUT INTO OFFICE”[.]” Id. All three advertisements state that they are “paid for by A-l A-Lectrician, Inc.,” and contain disclaimer language “published without the approval and authority of the candidate,” as required in HRS § 11-391(a)(2)(B). A-l did not want to include the disclaimer language, and does not want to add disclaimers to future advertisements. FAC ¶ 40; Tr. 60, 63-64. Although Yamada indicates that “it is too early for A-l to plan similar speech for September or October 2012,” Pis.’ Mot. Ex. 5 ¶ 10, Plaintiffs also assert that “[i]n materially similar situations in the future, Plaintiffs intend to engage in speech materially similar to all of the speech at issue in this action, such that Hawaii law will apply to them as it does now.” Pis.’ Concise Statement of Facts ¶ 19 (citing FAC ¶ 50). More specifically, Yamada attests that A-l will engage in such speech in September or October 2012 and will buy no more than three ads, the number it purchased in 2010. They will be similar in size to those A-l purchased in 2010. Like A-l’s previous ads, this speech will cost more than $2000 in the aggregate, will have a clearly identified candidate or candidates for state office, and will refer to “PEOPLE WE PUT INTO OFFICE” and “THE REPRESENTATIVES WE PUT INTO OFFICER]” Pis.’ Reply, Attachment One (Yamada Deck ¶ 7, Jan. 6, 2012). Yamada considers A-l’s advertisements to be “issue ads.” Tr. 59-60. Specifically, Yamada testified that the purpose of the advertisements was to express opinions regarding the loss of freedom in the United States. Tr. 62. Yamada explained that he included the name of a candidate (Blake Oshiro) as “an example of how we have lost our freedom.... [T]he issue is not against Blake or any particular person — I [also] mentioned [candidate] Calvin Say— but it’s against leaders in our community that the people need to look up to.... I think something needs to be done.” Tr. 62-63. B. The Challenged Provisions of Hawaii Campaign Finance Law As summarized above, Plaintiffs challenge five sets of Hawaii campaign finance laws: (1) restrictions on contributions to noncandidate committees; (2) “noncandidate committee” and related “expenditure” definitions; (3) “electioneering communication” disclosure requirements; (4) disclaimer-language requirements for an “advertisement”; and (5) a ban on contributions to candidates by government contractors. The provisions are detailed as follows (with certain key terms and phrases at issue in this action emphasized in bold and italics): 1. Limitations on Contributions to Noncandidate Committees Yamada’s and Stewart’s contributions to AFA-PAC implicate HRS § 11-358, which provides: No person shall make contributions to a noncandidate committee in an aggregate amount greater than $1,000 in an election. This section shall not apply to ballot issue committees. (Emphasis added.) The corresponding term “noncandidate committee” is defined in HRS § 11-302 (which defines many terms in HRS Ch. 11), and that definition in itself is challenged, as set forth next. 2. The Definitions of “Noncandidate Committee” and “Expenditure” Section 11-302 defines a “noncandidate committee” as follows: “Noncandidate committee” means an organization, association, party, or individual that has the purpose of making or receiving contributions, making expenditures, or incurring financial obligations to inñuence the nomination for election, or the election, of any candidate to office, or for or against any question or issue on the ballot; provided that a noncandidate committee does not include: (1) A candidate committee; (2) Any individual making a contribution or making an expenditure of the individual’s own funds or anything of value that the individual originally acquired for the individual’s own use and not for the purpose of evading any provision of this part; or (3) Any organization that raises or expends funds for the sole purpose of producing and disseminating informational or educational communications that are not made to inñuence the outcome of an election, question, or issue on a ballot. (Emphasis added.) In turn, § 11-302 defines “expenditure” to mean: (1) Any purchase or transfer of money or anything of value, or promise or agreement to purchase or transfer money or anything of value, or payment incurred or made, or the use or consumption of a nonmonetary contribution for the purpose of: (A) Inñuencing the nomination for election, or the election, of any person seeking nomination for election or election to office, whether or not the person has filed the person’s nomination papers; (B) Inñuencing the outcome of any question or issue that has been certified to appear on the ballot at the next applicable election; or (C) Use by any party for the purposes set out in subparagraph (A) or (B)[J (Emphasis added.) Although a “noncandidate committee” must comply with several other provisions in HRS Ch. 11, A-l does not challenge any of those particular provisions as unconstitutional. Rather, A-l characterizes its challenge as one to the noncandidate committee definition itself, arguing that the law imposes unconstitutional burdens such that A-l should not have to register at all. It understands that if an organization is properly a noncandidate committee, then that status comes with acceptable burdens. (As an example, AFA-PAC is a noncandidate committee that makes only independent expenditures.) A noncandidate committee must (1) register with the Commission by filing an organizational report as set forth in § 11-323 (including (a) designating a name and address, (b) disclosing a chairperson, treasurer, and officers, (c) requiring “depository institution” account information, and (d) providing names and addresses of contributors who contributed an aggregate amount of more than $100); (2) have a treasurer as set forth in § 11-324, who shall keep records regarding contributions; (3) comply with reporting requirements set forth in § 11-335, which include schedules disclosing aggregate contributions of over $100, expenditures, receipts, and assets; and (4) comply with other requirements limiting, regulating, or prohibiting contributions — such as prohibitions on receiving false-name contributions (§ 11-352), anonymous contributions (§ 11-353), government contractor contributions (§ 11-355), and foreign corporations (§ 11-356). A-l describes these noncandidate committee requirements collectively as “burdensome” and “onerous” as a matter of law. Pis.’ Mot. at 54 n. 39. 3. Electioneering Communications If A-l does not have to register as a noncandidate committee, it could still be subject to certain requirements if it makes “electioneering communications.” A-l thus challenges the constitutionality of these requirements in the alternative. These electioneering-communication disclosure requirements may be implicated because A-l has published, and desires to publish, newspaper advertisements that mention candidates. Specifically, if a person makes an “advertisement” that is an “electioneering communication” it must comply with requirements set forth in HRS § ll-341(a) (and related terms), as follows: [e]ach person who makes a disbursement for electioneering communications in an aggregate amount of more than $2,000 during any calendar year shall file with the commission a statement of information within twenty-four hours of each disclosure date provided in this section. In turn, “electioneering communication” means: any advertisement that is broadcast from a cable, satellite, television, or radio broadcast station; published in any periodical or newspaper; or sent by mail at a bulk rate, and that: (1) Refers to a clearly identifiable candidate; (2) Is made, or scheduled to be made, either within thirty days prior to a primary or initial special election or within sixty days prior to a general or special election; and (3) Is not susceptible to any reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. HRS § ll-341(c) (emphasis added). “Electioneering communication” shall not include communications: (1) In a news story or editorial disseminated by any broadcast station or publisher of periodicals or newspapers, unless the facilities are owned or controlled by a candidate, candidate committee, or noncandidate committee; (2) That constitute expenditures by the disbursing organization; (3) In house bulletins; or (4) That constitute a candidate debate or forum, or solely promote a debate or forum and are made by or on behalf of the person sponsoring the debate or forum. Id. And § 11-302 defines “advertisement” as: ... any communication, excluding sundry items such as bumper stickers, that: (1) Identifies a candidate directly or by implication, or identifies an issue or question that will appear on the ballot at the next applicable election; and (2) Advocates or supports the nomination, opposition, or election of the candidate, or advocates the passage or defeat of the issue or question on the ballot. (Emphasis added.) 4. Disclaimer Requirements in Advertisements A-l next challenges the requirement to include a “disclaimer” on advertisements. The requirement is set forth in HRS § 11— 391(a)(2), which provides (with the challenged disclaimer language emphasized): (a) Any advertisement shall contain: (1) The name and address of the candidate, candidate committee, noncandidate committee, or other person paying for the advertisement; and (2) A notice in a prominent location stating either that: (A) The advertisement is published, broadcast, televised, or circulated with the approval and authority of the candidate; provided that an advertisement paid for by a candidate, candidate committee, or ballot issue committee does not need to include the notice; or (B) The advertisement is published, broadcast, televised, or circulated without the approval and authority of the candidate. (b) The fine for violation of this section, if assessed by the commission, shall not exceed $25 for each advertisement that lacks the information required by this section, and shall not exceed an aggregate amount of $5,000. (Emphasis added.) 5. Contribution Ban by Government Contractors Finally, A-l challenges the constitutionality of Hawaii’s ban on direct campaign contributions by government contractors. The challenged statute reads: (a) It shall be unlawful for any person who enters into any contract with the State, any of the counties, or any department or agency thereof either for the rendition of personal services, the buying of property, or furnishing of any material, supplies, or equipment to the State, any of the counties, any department or agency thereof, or for selling any land or building to the State, any of the counties, or any department or agency thereof, if payment for the performance of the contract or payment for material, supplies, equipment, land, property, or building is to be made in whole or in part from funds appropriated by the legislative body, at any time between the execution of the contract through the completion of the contract, to: (1) Directly or indirectly make any contribution, or promise expressly or impliedly to make any contribution to any candidate committee or noncandidate committee, or to any candidate or to any person for any political purpose or use; or (2) Knowingly solicit any contribution from any person for any purpose during any period. (b) Except as provided in subsection (a), this section does not prohibit or make unlawful the establishment or administration of, or the solicitation of contributions to, any noncandidate committee by any person other than the state or county contractor for the purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or the election of any person to office. (c) For purposes of this section, “completion of the contract” means that the parties to the government contract have either terminated the contract prior to completion of performance or fully performed the duties and obligations under the contract, no disputes relating to the performance and payment remain under the contract, and all disputed claims have been adjudicated and are final. HRS § 11-355. C. Procedural Background Plaintiffs initially filed this action on August 27, 2010. They followed with the FAC on September 3, 2010, Doc. No. 24, and an Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Doc. No. 25. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the preliminary injunction on October 1, 2010, and issued Yamada I on October 7, 2010, preliminarily enjoining enforcement of § 11-358 as applied to Yamada’s and Stewart’s then-proposed contributions to AFA-PAC. Doc. No. 71. Defendants appealed that preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but withdrew the appeal after Thalheimer was released. Doc. No. 113. Meanwhile, on October 12, 2010, the Ninth Circuit issued a key opinion, Human Life of Washington, Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1477, 179 L.Ed.2d 302 (2011), which addressed several of the issues involved in this action. After receiving supplemental briefing regarding Human Life, the court issued Yamada II on October 29, 2010, denying the remaining issues pursued in the preliminary injunction Motion. Doc. No. 91. Thereafter, the challenging entity in Human Life (represented by the same law firm that represents Plaintiffs in this action) filed a writ of certiorari, seeking Supreme Court review. Given Human Life’s importance to this action, the parties agreed to stay this case pending Supreme Court action on the writ of certiorari. Doc. No. 97. After the Supreme Court denied the writ, the stay was lifted on June 16, 2011. Doc. No. 115. Accordingly, the parties filed Cross Motions for Summary Judgment on all issues on December 5, 2011. Doc. Nos. 125 & 126. On December 19, 2011, Oppositions were filed, Doc. Nos. 129 & 130, followed by Replies on January 6, 2012. Doc. Nos. 132 & 133. The court heard the Cross Motions on February 6, 2012. The parties also filed various Notices of Uncited or Supplemental Authority, including relevant argument or responses. See Doc. Nos. 134,135,139, 140, 142, 143, 145, 147 & 148. The court has reviewed and considered all written submissions and oral arguments, and now issues this Order ruling on the constitutionality of the provisions, as challenged by Plaintiffs. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Rule 56(a) mandates summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Broussard v. Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley, 192 F.3d 1252, 1258 (9th Cir.1999). “A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir.2007) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548); see also Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir.2004). “When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56[ (a) ] its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts [and] come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citation and internal quotation signals omitted); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (stating that a party cannot “rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading” in opposing summary judgment). “An issue is ‘genuine’ only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact finder could find for the non-moving party, and a dispute is ‘material’ only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” In re Barboza, 545 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir.2008) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). When considering the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences on behalf of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; see also Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.2008) (stating that “the evidence of [the nonmovant] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” (citations omitted)). IV. DISCUSSION The court first addresses whether Plaintiffs have standing to make their claims, and then (satisfied that Plaintiffs have standing) analyzes the claims on their merits. A. Standing Although Defendants’ Motion does not challenge Plaintiffs’ standing, at the preliminary injunction phase Defendants questioned whether Plaintiffs had standing to challenge the electioneering communications and advertisement definitions (and the court addressed those arguments, and standing more generally, in Yamada II). The court reiterates its analysis here, based on an updated record, because the court has an independent duty to address jurisdiction and standing “even when not otherwise suggested.” See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (citation omitted); see also Bernhardt v. Cnty. of L.A., 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Fjederal courts are required sua sponte to examine jurisdictional issues such as standing.”) (citations omitted). “Article III restricts federal courts to the resolution of eases and controversies.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 732, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) (citation omitted). “To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Id. at 732-33, 128 S.Ct. 2759 (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997)). “[A] claimant must present an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged behavior; and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling.” Id. at 733, 128 S.Ct. 2759 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). “[T]he injury required for standing need not be actualized. A party facing prospective injury has standing to sue where the threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct.” Id. at 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759 (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). “Courts have long recognized that ‘[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.’” Cal. Pro-Life Council v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir.2003) (citation omitted). Constitutional challenges alleging freedom of speech violations require a less exacting review of standing. “In an effort to avoid the chilling effect of sweeping restrictions, the Supreme Court has endorsed what might be called a ‘hold your tongue and challenge now1 approach rather than requiring litigants to speak first and take their chances with the consequences.” Ariz. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965) (recognizing the “sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression,” in permitting a pre-enforcement action involving the First Amendment) and Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d 729, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1996) (“That one should not have to risk prosecution to challenge a statute is especially true in First Amendment eases[.]”)). “Thus, ‘when the threatened enforcement effort implicates First Amendment rights, the inquiry tilts dramatically toward a finding of standing.’ ” Ariz. Right to Life, 320 F.3d at 1006 (quoting LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir.2000)). Applying these standards, Yamada and Stewart have standing to challenge § 11-358. They desired to and eventually made contributions to AFA-PAC that exceeded the statutory limitations, giving rise to an actual controversy. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 732-33, 128 S.Ct. 2759. If § 11-358 is constitutional as applied, they could have been subject to administrative fines or misdemeanor criminal prosecution. See HRS § ll-410(a)(l) (providing for possible fines up to $1,000 per occurrence, or three times the amount of unlawful contribution) & § ll-412(a) (“Any person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally violates any provision of this part shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”). And they indicate a legitimate desire to make similar contributions in 2012. A favorable ruling would allow them to make further contributions to AFA-PAC in 2012 without violating the law. Davis, 554 U.S. at 732-33, 128 S.Ct. 2759. Similarly, A-l has standing to challenge the “noncandidate committee” and “expenditure” definitions, “advertising” requirements, and contribution restrictions by government contractors. A-l is presently registered as a noncandidate committee, but has a good faith basis for believing it should not have to register, giving rise to an actual controversy. See id. If A-l ceases registration, either by affirmatively withdrawing from registration or by failing to comply with various reporting requirements (because it believes it no longer needs to register), but engages in campaign-related activities, it could subject itself to possible fines or actions. See HRS §§ ll-410(a)(l) & ll-412(a). A-l need not actually violate the statutes to challenge their terms. See, e.g., Cal. Pro-Life Council, 328 F.3d at 1094; Bland, 88 F.3d at 736-37. There is enough of an “injury,” particularly in the First Amendment context, to allow it to seek a declaratory judgment so that, if successful, it can cease registration without fear of fine or prosecution. That is, a favorable ruling would allow A-l to cease registration without violating the law. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 732-33,128 S.Ct. 2759. As to its challenge to the disclaimer provisions for an “advertisement,” even if A-l already published the advertisements with the disclaimers does not mean A-l faces no injury. A-l sought, and seeks, a declaration that it need not include disclaimer language in the future. Tr. at 60. And it challenges those statutes facially as well. A-l does not have to publish the advertisements without the disclaimer language (and risk a fine or other enforcement action) in order to give itself standing. See Bland, 88 F.3d at 736-37. Again, a favorable ruling will enable A-l to publish its advertisements without the disclaimer language and without fear of violating the law. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 732-33, 128 S.Ct. 2759. Finally, A-l has standing to challenge HRS § 11-355. It is presently a government contractor. It has made substantial contributions to candidates in the past (presumably, while not a contractor), and seeks to make future contributions while it is a contractor. It need not violate the statute to challenge its terms. See Bland, 88 F.3d at 736-37. A favorable ruling would allow it to make contributions as a contractor without violating the law. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 732-33, 128 S.Ct. 2759. B. Section 11-358’s Contribution Limitation to Noncandidate Committees The court first addresses Hawaii’s $1,000 per-election limitation on contributions to noncandidate committees in § 11-358. In this regard, Yamada I preliminarily enjoined Defendants from enforcing § 11-358 as to Yamada’s and Stewart’s proposed contributions to AFA-PAC. See 744 F.Supp.2d at 1087. Yamada I relied primarily on Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 392, 178 L.Ed.2d 146 (2010), and SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C.Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 553, 178 L.Ed.2d 371 (2010), which both held that contribution limitations to organizations that make only independent campaign expenditures are invalid. Defendants appealed Yamada I to the Ninth Circuit, but withdrew the appeal after the Ninth Circuit reiterated that such contribution limitations are invalid. See Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1121-22. The Seventh Circuit has since also held the same. See Barland, 664 F.3d at 154-55. And the Ninth Circuit recently applied the same rationale in striking a Washington state law that limited contributions to recall committees, which by definition also do not coordinate or prearrange their independent expenditures with candidates. See Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 866-67 (9th Cir.2012). Given the strength of Plaintiffs’ position, Defendants do not oppose Plaintiffs’ Motion to the extent it challenges § 11-358 as applied to Yamada’s and Stewart’s contributions to AFA-PAC. That is, Defendants agree that, given binding precedent, the court should make permanent the preliminary injunction entered in Yamada I. In doing so here, the court incorporates and updates some of its analysis from Yamada I, which is important not only for analyzing § 11-358, but also for analyzing the other challenges to follow. 1. Level of Scrutiny Since Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), the Supreme Court has distinguished between restrictions on contributions to candidates and restrictions on expenditures for political speech. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 180 L.Ed.2d 664 (2011); Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1117. Although campaign contribution limitations “operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 612, contribution limitations generally “entail[ ] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.” Id. at 20, 96 S.Ct. 612. And so, the court analyzes the constitutional validity of campaign contribution limitations by applying “closely drawn scrutiny.” Under this test, “[cjontribution limitations are permissible as long as the Government demonstrates that the limits are ‘closely drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently important [government] interest.’” City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 691 (quoting Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 247, 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006)) (other citation omitted); see also Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1117-18. Unlike contributions, expenditure limitations directly inhibit speech. See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 910 (“[A]n independent expenditure is political speech[.]”). “Expenditure limitations may restrict the breadth and depth of political dialogue and they ‘preclude[ ] most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents, the original basis for recognition of First Amendment protection of the freedom of association.’ ” City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 692 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22, 96 S.Ct. 612) (other citation omitted). As a result, limitations on campaign expenditures must pass strict scrutiny — they are valid only if narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. Id. 2. The Government Interest Therefore, the court’s First Amendment analysis of campaign finance provisions starts by examining the possible government interests justifying a limitation, whether it be an expenditure or contribution limitation. If there is no valid interest (whether it needs to be “compelling” or “sufficiently important”), the court need not reach whether a regulation is “narrowly tailored” or “closely drawn” to that interest. And Citizens United largely answers that question here. Although Citizens United struck down an expenditure (and not a contribution) limitation, its discussion of valid government interests provides direct insight in analyzing whether § 11-358’s contribution limitation can constitutionally apply to limit Yamada’s and Stewart’s contributions to AFA-PAC. “The Supreme Court has concluded that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.” City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 694 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Citizens United rejected (by overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990)) an “antidistortion” interest — the government’s preventing the “corrosive and distorting effects [in elections] of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 130 S.Ct. at 903 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391). Although Citizens United reiterated that “ensuring] against the reality or appearance of [quid pro quo ] corruption” could justify certain limits on direct contributions, id. at 908, it concluded that “[n]o sufficient government interest justifies limits on the political speech of ... corporations.” Id. at 913 (emphasis added). That is, no interest can justify limits on amounts of independent corporate campaign expenditures. However specifically defined by statute, an independent expenditure is not coordinated with a candidate or a candidate’s campaign. It is neither prearranged nor done at the suggestion of a candidate. It is “independent.” Citizens United therefore reasoned that such independent expenditures could not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption. Id. at 908-09. Under Citizens United, even if independent expenditures could lead to “influence” or “access,” it does not follow that “corruption” exists — “[t]he appearance of influence or access ... will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.” Id. at 910. Therefore, a government interest in preventing the reality or appearance of corruption cannot justify limiting amounts of independent expenditures for political speech, even by a corporate entity. Id. at 913. Courts after Citizens United have addressed the next logical question: whether contribution limitations to organizations that make only independent campaign expenditures are valid — precisely the situation with § 11-358 and Yamada’s and Stewart’s contributions to AFA-PAC. As analyzed in Y amada I, City of Long Beach applied Citizens United’s rationale — that an anti-corruption interest cannot apply where only independent expenditures are involved — and specifically held that there is no legitimate government interest in restricting contributions to organizations that engage only in independent spending. See 744 F.Supp.2d at 1083 (citing City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 696-99). Under such precedent, prevention of corruption or its appearance cannot justify limiting campaign contributions if those contributions can lead only to independent campaign expenditures. See City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 699 (concluding that “the City’s anti-corruption rationale does not support the [City’s campaign reform act’s] limitations on contributions”). Further, as mentioned above, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the logic of City of Long Beach in Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1121-22, and, most recently, in Farris, 677 F.3d at 866-67. And the District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits agree. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694-95 (“In light of the Court’s holding [in Citizens United ] as a matter of law that independent expenditures do not corrupt or create the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption.”); Barland, 664 F.3d at 154 (“[T]he anticorruption rationale cannot serve as a justification for limiting fund-raising by groups that engage in independent spending on political speech.”). Although the government can still limit contributions made directly to candidates or parties, “the need for contribution limitations to combat corruption or the appearance thereof tends to decrease as the link between the candidate and the regulated entity becomes more attenuated.” City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 696. If the organization receiving contributions truly engages in only independent expenditures, the link is not only attenuated — it is broken. Under the logic of this precedent, an anti-corruption or appearance of corruption rationale is nonexistent. It follows that contribution limitations to such organizations violate the First Amendment. Section 11-358 limits the amount of contributions a person can make to a noncandidate committee. If that noncandidate committee makes only independent expenditures — as is true with AFA-PAC — then, under Citizens United, Hawaii cannot limit those expenditures. Yamada’s and Stewart’s contributions to AFA-PAC can only lead to independent expenditures. The record contains no evidence contradicting AFA-PAC’s assertion that it “operates like any other independent political action committee.” There is “no basis on which to conclude that [AFA-PAC] ha[s] the sort of close relationship with candidates that supports a plausible threat of corruption or the appearance thereof.” City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 698. Therefore, § 11-358 is unconstitutional as applied to Yamada’s and Stewart’s contributions to AFA-PAC. Defendants are permanently enjoined from enforcing § 11-358’s contribution limitation in that situation. C. The Noncandidate Committee and Expenditure Definitions A-l next challenges Hawaii’s definitions in § 11-302 of “noncandidate committee” and “expenditure” — primarily taking issue with their incorporation of the terms “to influence” or “for the purpose of influencing,” and a perceived requirement that a committee must have a campaign-related “major purpose” before being subject to such regulation. A-l challenges the definitions both facially and as-applied to its activities. It contends that the terms are “unconstitutionally vague, and therefore overbroad.” FAC ¶ 72. Although courts “have traditionally viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar doctrines,” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983), A-1 makes conceptually distinct overbreadth and vagueness arguments. See FAC at 42-44; Pis.’ Mot. at 30-32, 34 (distinguishing A-l’s over-breadth and vagueness challenges). Therefore, the court first separately addresses A-l’s overbreadth and vagueness arguments, and then analyzes whether the definitions survive a First Amendment challenge under an “exacting scrutiny” test. 1. Overbreadth A-l argues that, in an electoral context, government may not constitutionally regulate an organization’s speech unless it is “unambiguously [campaign] related.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612. The definitions are problematic, it reasons, because they rely on the term “to influence” — they regulate organizations having “the purpose of ... making expenditures ... to influence ” the election of a candidate (where “expenditure” is then defined as including payments “for the purpose of ... influencing ” an election). According to A-l, the term “influencing” is overbroad because it can reasonably be read to reach a significant amount of non-campaign-related speech (ie., pure issue discussion), imposing regulatory burdens such as registration, reporting, and disclosure, implicating the First Amendment. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77, 96 S.Ct. 612 (“It is the ambiguity of this phrase [ (“for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of candidates” in federal statutes) ] that poses constitutional problems.”). Buckley addressed the concern that a Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) definition of a “political committee” — referring to expenditures “for the purpose of influencing” a federal election — was unconstitutionally “vague.” Id. at 79, 96 S.Ct. 612. And, although Buckley formulated its analysis in terms of “vagueness,” “there are hints in Buckley that the constitutional basis for the Court’s concern lay more in overbreadth — i.e., that statutes that reached issue discussion might be deemed to regulate impermissibly a substantial amount of speech protected by the First Amendment[.]” Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 53 (1st Cir.2011) (citing cases), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1635, 182 L.Ed.2d 233 (2012). “[T]he dividing line between issue discussion and express advocacy, as it evolved, came to be associated more strongly with First Amendment overbreadth analysis than with due process vagueness concerns.” Id. (footnote omitted). In applying the doctrine of “constitutional avoidance,” Buckley narrowly construed the terms as follows: To fulfill the purposes of [FECA] [the words “political committee”] need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate. Expenditures of candidates and of “political committees” so construed can be assumed to fall within the core area sought to be addressed by Congress. They are, by definition, campaign related. Id. (emphasis added). And “to insure that the reach ... is not impermissibly broad,” Buckley also narrowly construed “expenditure” (defined in terms of “for the purpose of influencing”) so as “to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Id. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612 (emphasis added). Given Buckley, A-l argues that Hawaii’s definition of a noncandidate committee unconstitutionally imposes “political committee” status, with its accompanying burdens, on organizations that engage in only limited political activity (ie., do not have the “major purpose” of which is political advocacy). The premise is that government constitutionally can only require an organization to register as a “political committee” if that organization is “under control of a candidate” or has the nomination or election of candidates (political advocacy) as its major purpose. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79, 96 S.Ct. 612. If so, A-1 argues, Hawaii’s noncandidate committee definition is too broad; it impermissibly regulates organizations that do not meet the “major purpose” test and thus “sweeps up” and regulates organizations that only advocate “issues” outside a campaign-related context, and thereby violates the First Amendment. But Human Life (decided after this action was filed) rejected this very argument. The Ninth Circuit rejected a bright line rule that “unless the sole major purpose of a group is political advocacy, any regulation of that group will automatically be too burdensome[.]” 624 F.3d at 1009. The narrowing constructions the Supreme Court applied in Buckley “defined the outer limits of permissible political committee regulation.” Id. at 1010 (quoting N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 327 (4th Cir.2008) (Michael, J., dissenting)). Organizations often have more than one “major” or “primary” purpose, and the First Amendment does not categorically prohibit government from imposing disclosure requirements — such as those accompanying noncandidate committee status— on such groups. Id. at 1011. See also McKee, 649 F.3d at 59 (“We find no reason to believe that this so-called ‘major purpose’ test, like the other narrowing constructions adopted in Buckley, is anything more than an artifact of the Court’s construction of a federal statute.... The [Supreme] Court has never applied a ‘major purpose’ test to a state’s regulation of [political action committees.]”). Indeed, Citizens United rejected the contention that “disclosure requirements must be limited to speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy.” 130 S.Ct. at 915 (emphasis added). “Given the Court’s analysis in Citizens United, and its holding that the government may impose disclosure requirements on speech, the position that disclosure requirements cannot constitutionally reach issue advocacy is unsupportable.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1016. In essence, after Citizens United, the “unambiguously campaign related” standard from Buckley — including its “major purpose” test — articulates only a safe harbor (from a regulatory perspective). “Buckley left room for legislative judgment ... so long as the resulting regulation does not prohibit a substantial amount of non-electoral speech.” Leake, 525 F.3d at 327 (Michael, J., dissenting). Stated another way, that some issue advocacy may fall within a disclosure requirement is not necessarily fatal to the regulation itself. Government may impose reasonable disclosure requirements, but must be careful to avoid “sweeping into its purview groups that only incidentally engage in [political] advocacy” or “only occasionally engage[ ] in activities on behalf of political candidates and whose central organizational purpose is issue advocacy.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1011 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). For, as reiterated in Human Life, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that “speakers possess an inviolable First Amendment right to engage in [issue advocacy].” Id. at 1016 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 190, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 913). “[I]mposing disclosure obligations on communicators engaged in issue advocacy is not per se unconstitutional.]” Id. Rather, the more fundamental question is whether a regulation burdening such speech satisfies the appropriate level of scrutiny — a question the court addresses after considering Al’s vagueness challenge. 2. Vagueness A-l also attacks the terms “for the purpose of influencing” and “to influence” as unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. “A law is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited, or is so indefinite as to allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 555 (9th Cir.2004)). Nevertheless, “[m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for ‘[i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.’ ” Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975) (per curiam) (quoting Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 286, 65 S.Ct. 666, 89 L.Ed. 944 (1945)). “[PJerfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). That is, “[t]he touchstone of a facial vagueness challenge in the First Amendment context ... is not whether some amount of legitimate speech will be chilled; it is whether a substantial amount of legitimate speech will be chilled.” Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1152 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976)). A-l’s vagueness challenge to the term “influence” is similar to that discussed above regarding overbreadth — the term “raise[s] serious problems of vagueness” in that it has the “potential for encompassing both issue discussion and advocacy of a political result.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76-77, 79, 96 S.Ct. 612; see also McKee, 649 F.3d at 65 (“Conceivably falling within the meaning of ‘influence’ are objectives as varied as advocacy for or against a candidate’s election; championing an issue for inclusion in a candidate’s platform; and encouraging all candidates to embrace public funding. Without more context, we believe the intended meaning of ‘influence’ to be uncertain enough that a person of average intelligence would be forced to guess at its meaning and modes of application.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In opposing A-l’s argument, Defendants — in their briefing and again during oral argument — ask the court to apply a “narrowing gloss” to the term “influence.” Specifically, they request the court to construe the meaning of “influence” to communications or activities that constitute express advocacy or its functional equivalent. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612; McKee, 649 F.3d at 66-67. It is not clear to the court that such a narrowing construction is necessary, given Citizens United’s rejection of the view that disclosure requirements must be limited to express advocacy or its functional equivalent. Nevertheless, to avoid any lingering vagueness doubts, the court addresses Defendants’ request to apply a “narrowing gloss.” Initially, the court rejects A-l’s argument that the court in this situation should not adopt a narrowing construction of a state statute (as opposed to a federal provision). Federal courts may use such a narrowing gloss if such a construction is “reasonable and readily apparent.” See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) (“[Federal courts are without power to adopt a narrowing construction of a state statute unless such a construction is reasonable and readily apparent.’’) (emphasis added). “When federal courts rely on a ‘readily apparent’ constitutional interpretation, plaintiffs receive sufficient protection from unconstitutional application of the [state] statute, as it is quite likely nonparty prosecutors and state courts will apply the same interpretation.” Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 932 (9th Cir.2004). Moreover, “[i]n evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a federal court must ... consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered.” Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494, n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)). Here, Defendants encourage the court to apply a narrowing gloss, and offer convincing arguments why such a construction is “reasonable and readily apparent.” See White v. City of Norwalk, 900 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990) (adopting narrow construction of an ordinance to avoid constitutional concerns, concluding that the ordinance was “readily susceptible” to the interpretation presented by the City’s counsel during the litigation) (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480-84, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988)). The term “to influence” in the challenged State statutes is “reasonably and readily” interpreted to refer to express advocacy or its functional equivalent for two reasons. First, Hawaii’s campaign statutes were substantially re-codified and revised in 1979, in form and terminology similar to the current provisions. See Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 10 (setting forth Act 224, 1979 Haw. Sess. L.). And Hawaii specifically enacted Act 224 in 1979 in reaction to (and to conform, in large part, with) Buckley. See Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 11 (providing Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 78, in 1979 House J. 1137, 1140). Hawaii’s Legislature was “mindful of’ Buckl