Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER MARK S. DAVIS, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION The patent infringement action before the Court was brought by Plaintiffs W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc., and Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc., (collectively “Gore”), against defendants Medtronic, Inc., Medtronic USA Inc., and Medtronic Vascular Inc., (collectively “Medtronic”). The patent-in-suit claims a method of making a tubular intraluminal stent graft. A five-day bench trial was held in February 2012. This Opinion and Order addresses and resolves all remaining motions and merits determinations and constitutes the Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). II. BACKGROUND A. Procedural Background On September 3, 2010, Gore filed this suit against Medtronic, alleging infringement of Gore’s United States Patent No. 5,810,870 (“the '870 patent”), entitled “Intraluminal Stent Graft.” United States Patent No. 5,810,870 (filed on June 7,1995) (issued on September 22, 1998), Joint Exhibit (“JX”) 1. The '870 patent claims a “tubular intraluminal graft in the form of a tubular diametrically adjustable stent having a tubular covering of porus expanded polytetrafluoroethylene which is less than 0.10mm thick.” '870 patent at Abstract. Gore alleges that Medtronic’s Talent Abdominal Stent Graft, the AUI components to the Talent Abdominal Stent Graft, and the Talent Thoracic Stent Graft infringe claims 12, 16, and 19 of the '870 patent, which are directed to methods of making a tubular intraluminal stent graft. Medtronic moved to dismiss the Complaint on November 19, 2010, and on April 20, 2011 the Court issued an opinion denying Medtronic’s motion to dismiss and granting Gore leave to amend the Complaint. ECF No. 40. On October 25, 2011, this Court conducted a hearing pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996), and issued an Opinion and Order on December 16, 2011, construing the eight disputed claim terms. See W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Medtronic, Inc., 834 F.Supp.2d 465 (E.D.Va. 2011). Subsequently, on February 3, 2012, this Court issued an Opinion and Order denying Gore’s Motion to Dismiss Medtronic’s inequitable conduct counterclaim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Medtronic, Inc., 850 F.Supp.2d 630 (E.D.Va.2012). The bench trial in this case commenced on February 13, 2012. On February 17, 2012, after final arguments had concluded, the Court took all outstanding issues under advisement and ordered preparation of a transcript of trial proceedings so that it could carefully consider the merits of the case. B. Witnesses at Trial During the five-day bench trial, all parties were provided the opportunity to present evidence. On the claim of infringement against Medtronic, Gore first called Dr. James Lewis, Bench Trial Transcript at 98, ECF No. 175, Dr. David J. Myers, Tr. at 146, and Mr. Wayne House, Tr. at 226, all of whom are listed inventors on the '870 patent. Gore also called Dr. Joel Berry, Tr. at 288, who was offered as an expert in stent grafts and the methods of manufacturing stent grafts. The Plaintiff also submitted a number of witnesses through deposition testimony: • Mr. Treavor Greenan—a former engineer with World Medical who helped design the Talent stent graft. Tr. at 283. • Mr. Richard Thomas—a former Medtronic employee who testified about the design and development of the Talent product. Tr. at 284. • Mr. Gene Park—a former Medtronic employee who testified as to the Talent product’s design and development. Tr. at 285. • Mr. Mark Spreeman—a Medtronic employee who testified about the FDA process for the Talent device. Tr. at 286. • Mr. Pedro Vargas—a Medtronic employee who testified about the manufacturing of the Talent device as well as the import/export process for the device. Tr. at 286. Gore also offered Dr. Ace Baty, Tr. at 432, a Gore employee who testified as to the competitive market of stent grafts and the relationship between W.L. Gore and Gore Enterprise Holdings. Last, Dr. Jeffery Stec, Tr. at 505, was offered by Gore as an expert on the issue of damages. As a rebuttal witness, Gore later called Dr. Frank Veith, Tr. at 1040, and offered him as an expert in vascular surgery, endovascular procedures and stent grafts. In response to Gore’s infringement case, Medtronic offered Dr. Gary Loomis, Tr. 630, as an expert in the area of medical devices and materials for such devices, intraluminal devices, stents, grafts, and methods of making stents and grafts. Dr. Loomis offered his opinion of non-infringement as well as his opinion on the issue of obviousness. Medtronic also offered two fact witnesses through Mr. Roberto Flores, a Medtronic Mexico employee who testified as to the import/export process for the Talent device, Tr. 906, and Dr. Kweli Thompson, Tr. 930, the Vice President of Marketing for Medtronic’s endovascular therapies business who testified to the competitive market for the Talent device. Additionally, Medtronic called Dr. Christopher Zarins, Tr. 1077, as an expert in the clinical use of stent grafts and vascular grafts for the treatment of aortic aneurysms. Last, Dr. Vince Thomas was offered as Medtronic’s damages expert, Tr. 1004. Having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and hear the testimony of witnesses testifying live at trial, the Court has made certain credibility determinations, as well as determinations relating to the appropriate weight to accord the testimony. Such determinations are set forth below where relevant. III. FINDINGS OF FACT The Court’s findings of fact are not limited to those in this section, but also include any credibility determinations or other determinations that appear below. Many of the Findings of Fact are substantiated with citations to testimony or documentary evidence or a combination thereof; however, such citations are not meant to be exhaustive authority for the finding. Some of the findings are based on the record or inferences from the record which are not cited. All proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law inconsistent with those set forth herein are rejected. A. The '870 patent and claims As noted above, the '870 patent was issued on September 22, 1998 and names David J. Myers, James D. Lewis, Wayne D. House, and Karl E. Schwarz as inventors. Stipulation of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 150 at 10, ¶ 8. The '870 patent issued from U.S. Patent Application No. 479,931 (“the '931 application”) which was filed on June 7, 1995. Id. at ¶ 9. The '931 application was a divisional application from U.S. Patent Application No. 109,214 (“the '214 application”) which was filed on August 18, 1993 and resulted in U.S. patent No. 5,735,892 (“the '892 patent” or “the parent patent”). Id. at ¶ 10. Both the '870 patent and the '892 parent patent contain the same specification. Loomis Direct, Tr. 635, ECF No. 177. The asserted claims in this action are claims 12, 16 and 19 of the '870 patent. ECF. No 150 at ¶ 1. Claims 16 and 19 depend from independent claim 15. Loomis Direct, Tr. 645:13-17, ECF No. 177. The asserted claims are methods of making a tubular intraluminal graft and are set out below: 12. A method of making a tubular intraluminal graft comprising: a) selecting at least one tubular, diametrically adjustable stent having an exterior surface, a luminal surface and a wall, and having a multiplicity of openings through the wall of the stent; b) affixing a tubular covering to the exterior surface of the tubular, diametrically adjustable stent, said covering being less than 0.10 mm thick and said tubular covering having an exterior surface, a luminal surface and a seam extending from the exterior surface through to the luminal surface of the tubular covering. 15. A method of making a tubular intraluminal graft comprising: a) selecting at least one tubular, diametrically adjustable stent having an exterior surface, a luminal surface and a wall, and having a multiplicity of openings through the wall, said tubular, diametrically adjustable stent having a collapsed diameter and an enlarged diameter wherein said enlarged diameter is at least 1.5 times the collapsed diameter, wherein said tubular, diametrically adjustable stent has been diametrically adjusted to the enlarged diameter; b) affixing a tubular covering to the tubular, diametrically adjustable stent; and c) collapsing the tubular, diametrically adjustable stent to about the collapsed diameter wherein the tubular covering is affixed to the exterior surface of the tubular, diametrically adjustable stent. 16. A method according to claim 15 wherein said tubular covering is less than about 0.10 mm thick. 17. A method according to claim 16 wherein said tubular covering is of porous expanded PTFE. '870 Patent, col. 10, JX 1. After the Markman hearing, the Court concluded the following definitions applied to the eight disputed terms: “stent” means “elongated members forming a substantially cylindrical and rigid structure;” “wall” means “a substantially cylindrical plane defined by the structure of the stent;” “multiplicity of openings”: “multiplicity” means “two or more” and “opening” requires no construction and was given its plain and ordinary meaning; “covering” needed no construction and was given its plain and ordinary meaning to one of skill in the art. However, the Court expressly refused to limit the covering material only to ePTFE; “affixing” needed no construction and was given its plain and ordinary meaning. However, the Court refused to limit the term “affixing” to any particular method; “seam extending from the exterior surface through to the luminal surface of the tubular covering” needed no construction and was given its plain and ordinary meaning. However, the Court expressly refused to limit this phrase to a seam created by an overlap; “has been diametrically adjusted to the enlarged diameter” needed no construction and was given its plain and ordinary meaning; “luminal surface” means “interior surface.” Markman Opinion, ECF No. 92, W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Medtronic, Inc., 834 F.Supp.2d 465 (E.D.Va.2011). B. The Specification The specification of the '870 patent explains that the intraluminal stent graft described has a number of potential uses, including but not limited to “maintain[ing] patency after an occluded vessel has been re-opened” and “repairing] aneurysmal vessels, particularly aortic arteries.” '870 patent at col. 1:33-41, JX 1. The specification of the '870 patent describes four embodiments of the invention, each of which has both a stent and at least one covering with the stent. Id. at col. 4-8. In Example 1, a nitinol wire stent, meeting the limitations of “tubular, diametrically adjustable stent having an exterior surface, a luminal surface and a wall, and having a multiplicity of openings through the wall of the stent” is selected and then a covering of ePTFE is subsequently affixed to both luminal and exterior surfaces of the stent. Id. at col. 4:51-54. Figure 1 of the patent shows a side-view of the nitinol wire stent described in Example 1 and Figure 4 shows a cross-sectional view of Example 1 where a covering has been affixed to both the exterior and luminal surfaces of the stent. '870 patent, Figure 1 & 4. In Example 2, a nitinol wire stent (see Figure 1 above), meeting the limitations of “tubular, diametrically adjustable stent having an exterior surface, a luminal surface and a wall, and having a multiplicity of openings through the wall of the stent” is selected and then a covering of ePTFE is subsequently affixed to the luminal surface only. '870 patent at col. 6:15-19. Figure 5 of the '870 patent shows a cross-sectional view of an example of the invention with a covering only on the luminal surface of the stent: '870 patent, Figure 5, Example 3 of the specification describes selecting a commercially available balloon-expandable Palmaz stent meeting the limitations of “tubular, diametrically adjustable stent having an exterior surface, a luminal surface and a wall, and having a multiplicity of openings through the wall of the stent” that has an ePTFE covering affixed to the exterior surface. This exterior covering and seam is depicted in Figure 6 of the patent. A picture of the commercially available Palmaz stent (showing the number 1 in the bottom left corner of the image) described in Example 3 is also depicted below: '870 patent, Figure 6; Def. Demonstrative Exhibit 1, ECF No. 186 at 14. Last, Example 4 describes a braided stainless steel wire stent (a wire is first given a coating and then is braided into a stent) meeting the limitations of a “tubular, diametrically adjustable stent having an exterior surface, a luminal surface and a wall, and having a multiplicity of openings through the wall of the stent” which is then given a ePTFE covering on the exterior surface of the stent only. Thus, the specification describes various types of stents that can be used with the invention and that would meet the requirements of being “tubular,” “diametrically adjustable,” “having an exterior surface, a luminal surface and a wall, and having a multiplicity of openings through the wall of the stent.” C. The Accused Products Gore accuses the methods of making two Medtronic products: the Talent Abdominal Stent Graft and the Talent Thoracic Stent Graft. The Talent Abdominal Stent Graft is approved for the endovascular treatment of abdominal aortic aneurysms. The Talent Abdominal Stent has various sizes; Gore specifically alleges that the method of making two Talent Abdominal components infringes claims 12, 16 and 19 of the '870 patent: (1) Talent Abdominal Bifurcated stent graft and (2) Talent Abdominal Aorto-Uni Iliac (“AUI”) stent graft. Either the Bifurcated or the AUI can serve as the primary stent graft used for treating abdominal aortic aneurysms. The Talent Thoracic stent grafts are approved to treat thoracic aortic aneurysms. The Talent Thoracic stent graft consists of a: 1) Proximal Main, 2) Distal Main, 3) Proximal Extension, and 4) Distal Extension; each having various sizes. The accused manufacturing process for making all of the Talent Thoracic stent grafts is the same. Either the Proximal Main or the Distal Main components can serve as the primary component of the Talent Thoracic stent graft. Gore offered an infringement analysis for the Proximal Main and the Distal Main collectively as the “Thoracic Main Component.” Thus, in summary, Gore accuses three Talent manufacturing processes: 1) Process for making the Talent Bifurcated Component 2) Process for making the Talent AUI Component 3) Process for making the Thoracic Main Component D. Accused Product Manufacturing Process The manufacturing processes for the accused Talent products is undisputed, see stipulation ECF No. 173, and is set out in Medtronic’s Premarket Approval (“PMA”) submissions to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). JX4-JX11. The manufacturing process involves eight steps as set out in the protocols. 1) Talent Stent Graft Kitting The first protocol followed in the manufacturing process is MI 143, entitled Talent Stent Graft Kitting. JX 10. This process takes place in Mexico. The kitting process starts by having the operator “select,” on a computer program, which Talent device is to be built. Id. at MED0063877. This software then provides the operator with a bill of materials. Id. at MED0063877. The operator then gathers the necessary components listed on the bill of materials required to build the device. Id. at MED0063878-79. The components include the graft material, which is cut from a roll and inspected, the nitinol Z-shaped rings, referred to as “springs,” that comprise the stent components, the support spring material, the suture material, and the marker bands. Id. These components are all placed into an appropriately labeled zip-lock bag or other container which will then be assigned to a production line. Id. at MED0063878-80. The process described in MI 145 is the same for all Talent stent graft components. Id. at MED0063874. 2) Graft Sizing, Cutting and Seaming The second protocol followed in the manufacturing process is MI 135, entitled Graft Sizing, Cutting and Seaming. JX 4. In this step, the operator takes inventory of the components and inspects the graft material from the zip-lock bag. Id. at MED00638885. The operator then determines the location (internal or external) of the spring areas for sizing and seaming, which is provided in the chart on MED0063887. The operator cuts the graft material, either manually or using a machine, into the appropriate shape for the device to be built. Id. at MED006388-97. The operator then folds the graft material into a tubular shape and sews the appropriate edges of material together with sutures, forming a hollow tube with a seam where the edges of material have been sewn together. Id. The integrity of the graft material following this process is inspected, as well as the diameter and length of the constructed tube. Id. 3) External Spring Suture—Talent Abdominal Stent Graft The next protocol followed in the manufacturing process, MI 137, only applies to the Talent Abdominal Stent Graft and is entitled External Spring Suture. JX 5. The process for manufacturing the Talent Thoracic Stent Graft does not follow the MI 137 protocol, because all the springs in the Talent Thoracic Stent Graft components are located internal to the graft covering. The operator first places a spring sewing mandrel into the graft material and then positions a component referred to as a “double spring,” which is comprised of two Z-shaped nitinol rings connected by a straight nitinol wire (“connecting bar”), onto the exterior surface of the graft tube. Id. at MED00637907-08. The connecting bar is then sewn to the graft material using locking stitches. Id. at MED00637909. Next, the double springs are sewn. Id. The operator then sews any single springs to the exterior of the graft tube, proceeding from the proximal end of the stent graft to the distal end. Id. at MED0063911. Last, the external bare spring is attached. Id. at MED0063912. The operator then inspects the external springs to ensure proper connecting bar orientation, stitch density, graft material integrity, graft diameter, graft length, and spring placement. Id. at MED0063914-15. 4) Internal Spring Suture The next protocol followed in the manufacturing process of the Talent Abdominal and Thoracic Stent Grafts is MI 138, entitled Internal Spring Suture. JX 6. This step involves sewing the internal springs to the interior of the graft tube. Id. at MED0063923-29. The type and number of springs sewn inside the graft material varies depending upon which component the operator is assembling. Id. For straight and tapered grafts, the double spring is compressed and inserted into the graft material. Id. at MED0063923. Once the spring is placed in the appropriate position within the graft material, the compression is released and the proximal spring of the double spring is sewn to the graft material. Id. at MED0063923-24. The remaining single springs are then sewn in descending order. Id. The distal spring of the double spring will be the last spring of the graft to be sewn. Id. For the Bifurcated grafts, a tapered spring is placed inside the graft material first, then sewn. Id. at MED0063925. The stub leg (the smaller spring of the tapered spring) is sewn first. Id. The larger spring of the tapered spring is sewn next. Id. After the tapered spring is placed within the graft material of the Bifurcated component and sewn, the double spring is then placed inside the graft material. Id. The bare spring of the double spring is then sewn. Id. Below are images of the different springs discussed and utilized in the manufacturing process for the three accused devices; these images are taken from the Defendants proposed findings of fact, ECF No. 186 at 14, and are representative of what was discussed and displayed during the trial. 5) Stent Graft Edge Finish The next step in the accused method of manufacturing the Talent stent grafts is MI 140, which is the stent graft edge finishing. JX 7. The operator cuts and heats the edges of the graft material so that they can form the appropriate shape, called “end configuration.” Id. at MED0063934-37. When finished, the operator inspects the constructed stent graft to ensure proper end configuration, graft material integrity, graft length, and label. Id. at MED0063938-39. 6) Marker Band Forming and Attachment The next protocol followed in the manufacturing process of the Talent stent grafts is MI 140, entitled Marker Band Forming and Attachment. JX 8. The operator cuts and shapes radiopaque wires into figure-eight shapes and sews them to the graft material. Id. at MED0063945-54. When finished, the operator inspects the stent graft for proper band position, marker band stitching, graft material integrity, and knot suture integrity. Id. at MED0063955-56. 7) Cutting and Attaching Support Springs The next step in the accused method of manufacturing the Talent stent grafts is MI 143, entitled Cutting and Attaching Support Spring. JX 9. The operator cuts and shapes Z-shaped nitinol wire into springs referred to as “support springs,” and sews the support springs to the edge of the graft material at the proximal end of the device. Id. at MED0063961. When finished, the operator inspects the stent graft for proper support spring integrity, graft material integrity, and label. Id. at MED0063965-66. 8) Talent Test Plan for Stent Grafts The final step in the manufacturing process of the Talent stent grafts is QI 226, entitled Talent Test Plan for Stent Grafts. JX 11. This protocol outlines the inspection procedures performed on the completed stent grafts. Id. at MED0170367-81. After completing the QI 226 protocol, the completed Talent stent grafts are shipped from Medtronic’s manufacturing facilities in Mexico to a separate location for loading into a delivery system and packaging. E. Import/Export Process In submissions to the FDA, Medtronic lists “Medtronic Inc.” as the manufacturer, having a principal place of business in Minneapolis, MN. Premarket Approval (“PMA”) 2006 Submission, PX69 at MED0058611; PMA 2007, PX70 at MED0019723. In listing its “Manufacturing Facilities and Specification Developer,” Medtronic listed both “Medtronic Vascular,” with manufacturing locations in Santa Rosa and Windsor CA, and “Medtronic Mexico,” with its manufacturing location in Tijuana, Mexico. PMA 2006 at MED0058611-12; PMA 2007 at MED0019723. From 2004 until present, the Talent stent grafts were manufactured in Mexico by Medtronic Mexico. PX 765, Depo. Vargas Tr. at 1. The manufacturing location of the Talent stent-grafts has not changed during the relevant time periods in this suit. However, what has changed is the location where the completed Talent stent grafts are assembled into a delivery system. From 2004 until April 2008, the completed Talent stent grafts were shipped to the United States for insertion into a device delivery system. PX 134; PX 765, Depo. Vargas Tr. at 1; R. Flores Direct, Tr. 916— 917. Specifically, the products were shipped via a local freight company from Tijuana to San Diego, California. R. Flores Direct, Tr. 916-917. Once the product arrived in San Diego and had FDA approval, UPS would send the product next day to the Santa Rosa, CA facility. Id. During that same time period, after insertion into the delivery system, the Talent stent-grafts with the delivery systems were shipped outside of the United States for eventual sale and use in foreign countries as the Talent stent grafts were not approved for sale or use in the United States. From June 2008 until December 2008, the Talent stent grafts were still being shipped into the United States, to Santa Rosa, CA, for insertion into a delivery system. However, during that same time period, the Talent stent graft had received FDA approval, and so some Talent stent grafts with delivery systems remained in the United States for sale and others were still shipped out to foreign countries for sale. In January 2009, the location where the Talent stent grafts were inserted into the delivery system began to transition from the United States to Galway, Ireland. PX 765, Depo. Vargas Tr. at 1. Starting in August of 2009 and until present, Medtronic Ireland inserts all completed Talent stent-grafts into delivery systems in Gal-way, Ireland prior to the products’ eventual sale and use. PX 765, Depo. Vargas Tr. at 1. From January 2009 through the date of trial, all completed Talent stent grafts were shipped from Mexico, to Galway, Ireland via UPS. However, since 2009, once the products are given to UPS in Mexico, they are first routed into the United States before eventually being flown to Galway, Ireland. PX 765, Depo. Vargas Tr. at 2; R. Flores Direct, Tr. 908, ECF No. 179. Specifically, a UPS truck picks up the products from the Medtronic Mexico facility in Tijuana and drives them to the Tijuana Airport. DX091 at MED0481742; R. Flores Direct, Tr. 908. The products are then flown to Ontario, California. Next, from California, the products are flown to Louisville, Kentucky. From Kentucky the products are flown to Cologne, Germany, where the product is then moved to Dublin, Ireland and Shannon, Ireland before eventually arriving in Galway, Ireland. Id. F. Contentions related to Direct Infringement Medtronic’s (non-invalidity-related) theory of the case focuses on undermining Gore’s proof with respect to three requirements of the '870 patent: (1) Medtronic contends that its process of bagging the components for the Talent stent into a “kitting bag,” does not constitute “selecting” a stent as required by Step A of claims 12 and 15; (2) Medtronic contends that Gore has not shown that the steps of claims 12 and 15 are performed sequentially as required by the patent because a “stent” with all the characteristics required by Step A is not formed and selected before the “affixing” step takes place; (3) Medtronic contends that even if the Court finds the steps are performed sequentially in Talent’s manufacturing process, Talent’s products do not meet the claim language because: a. The Talent product does not meet the Court’s construction of “stent”, and b. The Talent product does not contain a “seam extending from the exterior surface through to the luminal surface.” Additionally, Medtronic argues that a portion of Plaintiffs claims must fail under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) based on the fact that the named defendants did not actually “import” the product into the United States. G. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Gore’s expert, Dr. Berry, proposed that a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention with respect to the technical field of the intraluminal stent graft '870 patent would: 1) have a degree in mechanical or biomedical engineering AND at least 5 years of experience in both developing and making stents or stent grafts; OR 2) be a physician with at least three years of experience in both developing and making- stents or stent grafts and in the endovascular placement of stent grafts. Dr. Berry Direct, Tr. 298-97, EOF No. 176. Dr. Berry also noted that this person may also work in collaboration with other scientists and or physicians who have experience making and using stents and stent grafts. Id. Medtronic’s expert, Dr. Loomis, proposed that a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention with respect to the technical field of the intraluminal stent graft '870 patent would have: 1) a degree in biomedical, mechanical, or chemical engineering, polymer chemistry or material science; 2) knowledge of the vascular system of mammals; and 3) 3-5 years’ experience in intravascular device design and methods of making intravascular devices, including knowledge of stents and materials suitable for covering stents. Dr. Loomis Direct, Tr. at 639:2-9, EOF No. 177. The Court chooses to adopt Dr. Berry’s proposed standard for a person of ordinary skill in the art. The Court chooses Dr. Berry’s standard both because it is a bit more rigorous than Dr. Loomis’ and because the Court finds the required experience to be more directly on point with the stent graft issues of this particular patent. However, all of the Court’s factual findings and legal conclusions would remain the same even if the definition of Medtronic and Dr. Loomis were adopted. Thus, the relatively minor differences in the definitions propounded by Gore and Medtronic have no material effect on the analysis or ultimate conclusions in this matter. IV. Evidentiary Issues During the bench trial, both parties made oral motions for judgment on partial findings pursuant to Rule 52(c). Tr. 1035. Rule 52(c) reads: If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a nonjury trial and the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue. The court may, however, decline to render any judgment until the close of the evidence. A judgment on partial findings must be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 52(a). Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 52(c). Thus, Rule 52(c) permits a judge to enter judgment as a matter of law on partial findings once “a party has been fully heard on an issue.” Id. “To grant JMOL under Rule 52(c), a district judge must weigh the evidence and resolve credibility.” Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed.Cir.2000). “A judgment on partial findings is made after the court has heard all the evidence bearing on the crucial issue of fact.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro 52(c), Advisory Committee Notes 1991. Consistent with the terms of Rule 52(c), the Court exercised its discretion to reserve judgment on the motions during trial. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 52(c) (“The court may, however, decline to render any judgment until the close of the evidence.”). The Court now concludes that the best course of action is to render a judgment based on all the evidence, testimony, and applicable law. Accordingly, the Rule 52(c) motions are DENIED. V. INFRINGEMENT DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW A. Burden of Proof and Legal Standards The infringement analysis is a two-step process—the first step is proper construction of the relevant claims, and the second step is a comparison of those claims to the accused product or method. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed.Cir.2009); see also, Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2011) (“First the Court determines the scope and meaning of the patent claims asserted, and then the properly construed claims are compared to the allegedly infringing device.”). To prove infringement, a plaintiff must prove the presence of each and every claim element or its equivalent in the accused method or device. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1301 (Fed.Cir.2011). Specifically, “[t]o infringe a method claim, a person must have practiced all steps of the claimed method.” Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1317 (Fed.Cir.2009). Furthermore, infringement is a question of fact reviewed for substantial evidence, Id. (citing Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2008)), and the patent owner bears the burden of proving any such infringement by a preponderance of the evidence. See e.g., Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1310 (Fed.Cir.2005); Carroll Touch Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Systems, Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed.Cir. 1993). To satisfy this standard, a patent owner need not offer “definite” proof of infringement, but instead must demonstrate that “infringement was more likely than not to have occurred.” Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1341 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citing Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 261 F.3d 1329,1336 (Fed.Cir.2001)). 1. Literal Infringement Literal infringement exists if any one of a patent’s asserted claims covers the alleged infringer’s product or process. See Markman v. Westview Instr., 517 U.S. 370, 374, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). However, literal infringement requires that the accused method contain each limitation of the asserted claim exactly; any deviation from the claim will preclude a finding of literal infringement. Litton Sys. Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1454 (Fed.Cir.1998); Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1211 (Fed.Cir.1998). Proof of any such literal infringement may be based on direct or circumstantial evidence. See Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed.Cir.2009) (“A patentee may prove infringement by any method of analysis that is probative of the fact of infringement ... and circumstantial evidence may be sufficient ....”) (citations and internal quotes omitted). 2. Doctrine of Equivalents Under the doctrine of equivalents, “a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.” Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997) (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 70 S.Ct. 854, 94 L.Ed. 1097 (1950)). Such a finding requires a showing that “the difference between the claimed invention and the accused product or method was insubstantial or that the accused product or method performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way with substantially the same result as each claim limitation of the patented product or method.” AquaTex Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Solutions, 479 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed.Cir. 2007). Thus, the doctrine of equivalents prevents an accused infringer from avoiding liability for infringement where its product has only minor or insubstantial differences from the claimed invention but retains the invention’s essential identity. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 564 (Fed.Cir.2000), overruled on other grounds, 535 U.S. 722, 122 S.Ct. 1831, 152 L.Ed.2d 944 (2002). Otherwise, “to permit imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.” Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc., 266 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2001). There are two tests commonly used to analyze infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The first test is often referred to as the “function-way-result” test and “asks whether an element of an accused product ‘performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result’ as an element of the patented invention.” American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 651 F.3d 1318, 1338 (Fed.Cir. 2011). The second way to prove infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is to show that the differences between the claimed element and the corresponding infringing element are “insubstantial.” See e.g., Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 467 F.3d 1370, 1382 (Fed.Cir.2006); Honeywell Intern. Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1139 (Fed.Cir.2004). Proof of such equivalency may be made “through testimony of experts or others versed in the technology; by documents, including texts and treatises; and of course, by the disclosures of the prior art.” Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 (Fed. Cir.1995) (quoting Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609, 70 S.Ct. 854). The Federal Circuit has explained that to support a finding under the doctrine of equivalents: [A] patentee must ... provide particularized testimony and linking argument as to the ‘insubstantiality of the differences’ between the claimed invention and the accused device or process, or with respect to the function, way, result test when such evidence is presented to support a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Such evidence must be presented on a limitation-by-limitation basis. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567 (Fed.Cir.1996); see also American Calcar, 651 F.3d 1318, 1338-39. However, the doctrine of equivalents is a limited doctrine. It was “designed to protect inventors from unscrupulous copyists and unanticipated equivalents” and should not be applied so broadly that it becomes “the second prong of every infringement charge, regularly available to extend protection beyond the scope of the claims[J” Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed.Cir.1984). Further, the doctrine should never be used to vitiate a claim term because potential competitors should be able to rely upon the language of the patent claims. Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v. Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 206 F.3d 1408, 1416 (Fed. Cir.2000). The burden is on the patent owner to provide, on a limitation-by-limitation basis, particularized testimony or evidence of the insubstantiality of the differences or the satisfaction of the function-way-result test. Texas Instrs. Inc., 90 F.3d at 1567. 3. Direct Infringement under Section 271(a) Gore has brought this action for infringement under both 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a) and 271(g), the two U.S. statutes governing direct infringement. 271(a), the general direct infringement statute, covers “any patented invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). In contrast, Section 271(g) is specific to the importation or sale of a “product which is made by a process patented in the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). A U.S. patent grants to the patentee “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). Thus, “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). A claim for direct patent infringement under Section 271(a) requires, as an element of the claim, proof that the infringing activity took place in the United States. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2005) (emphasis added). The Patent Act of 1952 defines United States as “the United States of America, its territories and possessions.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(c). Medtronic argues that they did not directly infringe Gore’s method claims, as they did not make, use, offer for sale, or sell the claimed methods “within” the United States. Specifically, Defendants argue that they did not directly infringe under the “make” or “use” prongs, because they did not make or use the patented methods “within the United States.” In analyzing the Defendant’s contention, the first prong to consider is the “make” or “use” prong of 271(a). The concept of “use” of a patented method or process is fundamentally different from the use of a patented system or device. In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2002) (recognizing “the distinction between a claim to a product, device, or apparatus, all of which are tangible items, and a claim to a process, which consists of a series of acts or steps...: [A process] consists of doing something, and therefore has to be carried out or performed.”). The Federal Circuit has noted: Because a process is nothing more than the sequence of actions of which it is comprised, the use of a process necessarily involves doing or performing each of the steps recited. This is unlike use of a system as a whole, in which the components are used collectively, not individually. We therefore hold that a process cannot be used “within” the United States as required by section 271(a) unless each of the steps is performed within this country. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d at 1318 (emphasis added). Thus, a finding of direct infringement under the “make” or “use” prong of Section 271(a) is precluded by the fact that the accused products are largely manufactured in Mexico and thus each step of the patented process is not performed “within” the United States. However, the Court must also consider direct infringement under Section 271(a) pursuant to the “sells” or “offers to sell” prong. The Federal Circuit’s 2005 NTP opinion left open the question of whether method claims can be infringed under the “sells” and “offers to sell” prongs of Section 271(a), though commenting in dicta that “the legislative history of § 271(a) indicated Congress’s understanding that method claims could be directly infringed only under the ‘use’ prong of § 271(a).” NTP, 418 F.3d at 1320. In Ricoh, the Federal Circuit again left open the question, but did make clear that if a method claim could be infringed under the “sell” prong, then the seller must sell the performance of the method or process itself in order for the sale to be actionable as direct infringement under 271(a). Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed.Cir.2008) (holding that a party that sells or offers to sell software containing instructions to perform the patented method does not infringe the patent under § 271(a)). However, the Ricoh court agreed that since a “process” or method refers to a sequence of events, “the concept of a sale or offer of sale to the actual carrying out of a sequence of actions is ambiguous.” Id. In summary, the Federal Circuit has never found a method claim to infringe the “sells” or “offers to sell” prong of Section 271(a), though it has never directly addressed the issue despite the dicta noted above. Therefore, it remains unclear whether a difference exists between selling the “performance of a method” and selling a final product that encompasses a method of making that product. See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 128 S.Ct. 2109, 2117, 170 L.Ed.2d 996 (2008) (“[A] patented method may not be sold in the same way as an article or device, but methods nonetheless may be ‘embodied’ in a [final] product....”); WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 869 F.Supp.2d 793, 799, 2012 WL 1436455, *5, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57927, *17 (S.D.Tex. Apr. 25, 2012) (noting that, under 271(a), had the defendant put forth evidence that plaintiff was not actually “offering to perform” the method claim, but was only “selling the products themselves” summary judgment for non-infringement would have been appropriate). Gore put forth no evidence during trial to assist the Court in analyzing this prong other than the conclusory fact, upon which both parties appear to agree, that the Medtronic Talent products were sold in the United States beginning in December of 2008. Last, Section 271(a) also states infringement can occur if the accused infringer “imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (emphasis added). The “imports” prong of Section 271(a) is in many ways similar to the “sells” prong in that it is unclear whether Congress intended this prong to apply to method claims. The Federal Circuit in NTP again left open the possibility that a method claim could be infringed under the “imports” prong of 271(a): Like the sell and offer to sell provisions discussed supra, the question of whether a method claim can be infringed by importation is a difficult one conceptually. The legislative history cited with respect to the sell and offer to sell provisions indicates that Congress did not consider the “import” prong of section 271(a) to apply to method claims. However, we need not decide that broad issue. NTP, Inc., 418 F.3d at 1321 (emphasis added). Earlier this year, the Federal Circuit came much closer to deciding the issue left open in NTP. In Zoltek, the court in dicta stated that “[t]itle 35 U.S.C. Section 271(a) does not protect against the importation of products made by a patented process, but § 271(g) states that ‘[whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer.’ ” Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1322 (Fed.Cir.2012) (emphasis added). The Zoltek court’s statement seems to make clear that while 271(a) may protect against infringement through importation of a product or apparatus patented in the United States, it does NOT protect against the importation of a product into the United States that is patented only by a process or method claim. However, while 271(a) does not appear to offer importation protection to method or process claims, 271(g) clearly does. Moreover, because Gore has only argued infringement under 271(g), which provides the same relief as 271(a), it is unnecessary for the Court to also consider importation infringement under 271(a). Thus, the only remaining avenue left open under 271(a) for infringement is the “sale” or “offer for sale” of the products within the United States. Since the Federal Circuit appears to have concluded that this prong does not apply to method claims, and since the law is currently unclear as to whether selling a final product within the United States would even qualify as the “sale” or “performance” of a method claim, it appears the proper course is for this Court to consider infringement only under 271(g). 4. Direct Infringement under Section 271(g) The Court is now left to consider the issue of infringement under Section 271(g). Section 271(g) reads: Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent. In an action for infringement of a pro- ' cess patent, no remedy may be granted for infringement on account of the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate remedy under this title for infringement on account of the importation or other use, offer to sell, or sale of that product. A product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made after— (1) it -is materially changed by subsequent processes; or (2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (emphasis added). Thus, the relevant question is whether Medtronic can be said to have imported into the United States or to have offered to sell, sold, or used “within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States” and thus can be found to have infringed 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). Section 271(g) requires two separate inquiries. First, a,patentee must establish that an accused infringer imported* sold or used a product made by a method or process falling within the scope of a claim in the patent. See Novo Nordisk of North America, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 77 F.3d 1364, 1367-68 (Fed.Cir.1996). Thus, “271(g) requires importation or sale of the product of a patented process practiced abroad, before infringement can be established...." Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2009). Second, if the patentee proves that the process literally infringes the patent, the Court must then determine whether the “materially changed” exception of Section 271(g) applies. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) <“A product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made after—(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or (2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product”). “This exception is in place because product is not “made by” a patented process as required by 271(g) if the product was (a) materially changed by later processes, or (b) the product is only a trivial' or nonessential part of another product.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 82 F.3d 1568, 1571-73 (Fed.Cir.1996). This exception requires the Court to consider whether there is a “real difference between the product imported, offered for sale, sold or used in the United States and the products produced by the patented process.” BioTechnology General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1560 (Fed.Cir.1996); Eli Lilly, 82 F.3d at 1573 (“To determine whether the ‘materially changed’ provision applies, the court must look to the substantiality of the change between the product of the patent process and the product that is being imported.”). However, no facts are currently before the Court that could support applying this “exception” to 271(g) and no argument was made by Medtronic that they believed this exception should be applied. Therefore, the Court must focus on the first inquiry— whether Gore has established that Medtronic imported, sold or used a product made by a method or process falling within the scope of a claim in the patent. B. Step One—Term Construction Before the Court looks at the issue of importation and sale under 271(g), the Court will first decide if Medtronic’s Talent devices are made by a method or process that falls within the scope of one of the claims at issue. However, in the process of conducting the bench trial, it became clear to the Court that the parties disagreed as to the legal meaning of several key claim terms and that resolution of these terms could have a significant impact on infringement. Although it appears such claim construction could have occurred during the Markman hearing, in order for the Court to make its factual findings, it must take a side trip and construe the legal meaning of these disputed terms before specifically analyzing Medtronic’s method of manufacturing the three accused Talent products. Under this first step of claim construction, reference is made to the intrinsic evidence of record, which includes the language of the claim itself and other issued claims, the patent specification, and the prosecution history. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995). Words in a claim will be given their ordinary or accustomed meaning in view of the specification to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316-1317 (Fed. Cir.2005). “The inquiry into how a person of ordinary skill in the art understands a claim term provides an objective baseline from which to begin claim interpretation.” Id. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. “In examining the specification for proper context, however, this court will not at any time import limitations from the specification into the claims.” CollegeNet, Inc. v. ApplyYourself, Inc., 418 F.3d 1225, 1231 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citing Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1326 (Fed.Cir.2002)). 1. Comprising The first issue the Court addresses pertains to the meaning of the term “comprising” and whether the recited steps in claims 12 and 15 must be performed in sequential order. Claims 12 and 15 both begin with the phrase, “a method of making a tubular intraluminal graft comprising:”, before the claim goes on to list the required steps. '870 patent at claim 12 & 15, JX 1. It is well established that the transitional term “comprising” is a “term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997); see also Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The transition ‘comprising’ in a method claim indicates that the claim is open-ended and allows for additional steps.”). The use of the term “comprising” suggests that additional unrecited elements or method steps are not excluded. CollegeNet, Inc. v. ApplyYourself Inc., 418 F.3d 1225, 1235 (Fed.Cir.2005); see also Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2009) (“In the patent context, the term ‘comprising’ is well understood to mean ‘including but not limited to.’ ”). However, while “comprising” permits additional elements not required by a claim, it “does not remove the limitations that are present.” Power Mosfet Techs., L.L.C. v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396, 1409 (Fed.Cir.2004). During trial, it appeared both parties agreed that, consistent with this ease law, the comprising claims allow additional steps to be added in between the recited steps. Dr. Loomis Cross, Tr. at 818:25-819:7. “[Although a method claim necessarily recites the steps of the method in a particular order, as a general rule the claim is not limited to performance of the steps in the order recited, unless the claim explicitly or implicitly requires a specific order.” Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed.Cir.2008) (citing Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342-43 (Fed.Cir.2001)) (emphasis added). “The specification or prosecution history may also require a narrower, order-specific construction of a method claim in some cases.” Id. Thus this Court must look to the claim language, the specification and the prosecution history to decide whether there is support for limiting the patented method steps to a specific order. See Al-tiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2003) (noting that first the court must look to “the claim language to determine if, as a matter of logic or grammar, [the steps] must be performed in the order written” and if not, then second the court looks to “the rest of the specification to determine whether it directly or implicitly requires such a narrow construction”). In this case the Court finds that the plain language of claim 12 and claim 15 clearly implies that Step A has to be performed before Step B. Step B instructs the maker to “affix” the covering “to the tubular, diametrically adjustable stent”, clearly referring to the stent just “selected” in Step A. '870 patent, claim 12 & 15 (emphasis added); Dr. Loomis Direct, Tr. 642-643; see also, Mantech Envtl. Corp. v. Hudson Envtl. Servs., 152 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed.Cir.1998) (holding that “the sequential nature of the claim steps is apparent from the plain meaning of the claim language and nothing in the written description suggests otherwise”). Additionally, the plain language of Step C in claim 15 similarly implies that Step B must be performed before Step C. Step C states “collapsing the tubular, diametrically adjustable stent to about the collapsed diameter,” also clearly referring to the stent on which the covering was just affixed in Step B. '870 patent, claim 15 (emphasis added); Dr. Loomis Direct, Tr. 644 (noting Step C has the same “antecedent basis” that requires Step C occur after Step A and Step B). Thus, the Court finds that although both claim 12 and 15 use the term “comprising,” which allows additional steps to be performed, the steps that are recited must still be performed sequentially, in the order in which they are claimed. Because claim 16 and 19 depend from claim 15, the same sequencing of steps applies to those claims as well. Dr. Loomis Direct, Tr. 645:6-17. 2. Selecting Step A of claims 12 and 15 both read: “selecting at least one tubular, diametrically adjustable stent having an exterior surface, a luminal surface and a wall, and having a multiplicity of openings through the wall ....” '870 at 12, 15 (emphasis added). Although the term “selecting” was not construed at the Markman stage of litigation, a key dispute at trial was whether Medtronic’s process of bagging the components necessary to make the various Talent devices was enough to satisfy the “selecting” requirement found in Step A of claims 12 and 15. Gore’s expert, Dr. Berry, explained that since, after the term “selecting,” the claim language goes on to list specific physical characteristics of a stent, it was important for him to look at the physical characteristics of the final Talent products in addition to the method of making the devices in order to analyze whether a stent with the appropriate characteristics was “selected.” Dr. Berry Direct, Tr. at 310:2-25. Dr. Berry went on to opine that the actual “selecting” process took place when the Medtronic operator “selects” the intended Talent device through a computer program and then bags all the components necessary to actually build the device. Id. at 324:20. Dr. Berry supported his opinion with Medtronic’s Kitting Protocol which instructs the operator to “select the required device” and then to follow the progression of the related work order and collect all the items that go into the final product, placing them in a bag or kit. MI145 Kitting Protocol, JX 10. Thus, once all the various components have been placed in the kitting bag, it is at this time that Dr. Berry says Medtronic’s manufacturing process has “selected” a stent with the various characteristics listed in claim 12 and 15 of the '870 patent. Id. at 329:3-5; Kitting bags, DX88-DX90. Alternatively, if this Court finds that the kitting process does not literally constitute “selecting” according to the claim language, Dr. Berry argues that the limitation is still met under the doctrine of equivalents. In Dr. Berry’s opinion, the selecting and collecting of the Talent components for a particular device kit has the same function as if you select a fully formed stent device. Id. at 333-34. Dr. Berry stated that the kit is functionally the same thing as a finished stent product because according to the Medtronic work order placed inside the kit, those components will eventually be built, following specific instructions, into a particular, specifically selected, stent device. Id. at 335: 1-19. In contrast, Medtronic’s expert, Dr. Loomis, opined that Medtronic’s kitting process for its Talent products does not satisfy the “selecting” requirement of claims 12 and 15 of the '870 patent. Dr. Loomis Direct, Tr. at 650:10. Dr. Loomis supports this opinion by stating that the claim language requires “physical selection of [the] stent” to which the covering from Step B is going to be affixed. Id. However, according to Dr. Loomis, the kitting bag merely contains a series of parts and does not contain a fully formed stent as described in Step A. Id. As mentioned earlier, both parties agree that the language of claims 12 and 15 requires Step A be performed before Step B. In Dr. Loom-is’s opinion the “selecting” step as described in the claim is never met in Medtronic’s manufacturing process because the covering is affixed to the double spring before a “stent” is ever formed. Id. at 660:13-16. Thus Step B is occurring before Step A. Furthermore, in Dr. Loomis’ opinion, a stent as described in Step A is never formed during Medtronic’s process of manufacturing the Talent products. Because the individual springs and the double springs are never attached to each other in any way, and they are only connected by the graft material, Dr. Loomis argues such a method of manufacturing could never meet the requirements of “stent” as used in the '870 patent. Id. at 662:3-12. However, on cross, Dr. Loomis conceded that Medtronic’s manufacturing process begins when a user goes to the computer and selects “the process [to make a specific product] and the listing of all the components necessary to practice that process.” Dr. Loom