Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER LEONARD DAVIS, District Judge. Before the Court are the parties’ post-trial motions. Having considered the parties’ written submissions and oral arguments, the Court: DENIES Samsung’s Renewed Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law that: (1) Samsung Does Not Infringe Any Claim of the Patents-in-Suit; (2) the Asserted Claims of the Patents-in-Suit are Invalid; (3) Samsung is Not A Willful Infringer; and (4) the Damages Award was Improper (Docket No. 1025, “JMOL”); DENIES Samsung’s Motion Under Rule 52 for Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Indefiniteness (Docket No. 1026, “Mtn Fact And Law”); DENIES Samsung’s Motion for New Trial Under Rule 59 Based on Material Errors in Evidentiary Rulings (Docket No. 1027, “New Trial Mtn”); GRANTS-IN-PART Fractus S.A.’s Motion for Enhanced Damages and Attorneys’ Fees (Docket No. 1028, “Enhanced Damages Mtn”); DENIES Fractus S.A.’s Motion for Permanent Injunction, and SEVERS Fractus’s request for an Ongoing Royalty into a separate action (Docket No. 1030, “injunction Mtn”); and GRANTS Fractus, S.A.’s Motion for Prejudgment Interest and Bill of Costs (Docket No. 1032, “Interest and Costs Mtn”). Contents BACKGROUND................................................................812 SAMSUNG’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.................813 JMOL Standard.............................................................813 Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Literal Infringement......................813 Applicable Law..............................................................813 Claim Construction: Multilevel Structure and Polygon ...........................814 Infringement: Clearly Visible and Individually Indistinguishable ..................814 Infringement: Closed, Planar Polygons of the Same Type with the Same Number of Sides ..........................................................816 Conclusion: Literal Infringement..............................................818 Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents.................................................................818 Applicable Law..............................................................819 Doctrine of Equivalents: Sufficiency of the Evidence.............................819 Doctrine of Equivalents: Vitiation.............................................820 Conclusion: Doctrine of Equivalents...........................................821 Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Invalidity................................821 Invalidity: Written Description................................................822 Applicable Law..............................................................822 Analysis....................................................................822 Invalidity: Enablement ......................................................823 Applicable Law..............................................................824 Analysis....................................................................824 Invalidity: Anticipation.......................................................825 Applicable Law..............................................................825 Analysis....................................................................825 Invalidity: Obviousness ......................................................827 Applicable Law..............................................................827 Analysis....................................................................827 Conclusion: Invalidity........................................................828 Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Willfulness...............................828 Willfulness: Objectively High Likelihood.......................................828 Willfulness: Known or Obvious................................................829 Conclusion: Willfulness ......................................................830 Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Damages ................................830 Damages: Applicable Law....................................................830 Damages: Fraetus’s Model...................................................831 Damages: Samsung’s Post-Trial Arguments....................................833 Damages: Entire Market Value Rule ..........................................833 Damages: 10% Apportionment................................................835 Damages: Substantial Evidence of Reasonable Royalty Rate......................836 Damages Alternative Request: Remittitur or New Trial..........................837 Conclusion: Samsung’s Rule 50 Motions........................................838 Samsung Rule 52 Motion For Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.....838 Conclusion on Samsung’s Rule 52 Motion.......................................839 Samsung Rule 59 Motion For a New Trial for Errors in Evidentiary Rulings..........839 Applicable Law..............................................................839 Cohen Correspondence.......................................................839 Closing Argument...........................................................841 Conclusion: Samsung Rule 59 Motion For a New Trial for Errors in Evidentiary Rulings .......................................................844 Fractus’s Motion for Enhanced Damages and Attorneys’ Fees.......................844 Applicable Law..............................................................845 Background.................................................................846 Enhanced Damages Factor 1: Copying.........................................847 Enhanced Damages Factor 2: Investigation and Good Faith Belief of No Liability...............................................................847 Enhanced Damages Factor 3: Conduct During Litigation.........................848 Enhanced Damages: Remaining Factors.......................................851 Exceptional Case............................................................852 Conclusion: Enhanced Damages and Attorneys’ Fees............................852 Fractus’s Motion for Permanent Injunction or Ongoing Royalty.....................852 Permanent Injunction........................................................852 Permanent Injunction: Applicable Law.........................................852 Permanent Injunction: Irreparable Injury and Monetary Damages................853 Permanent Injunction: Balance of Hardships and Public Interest..................854 Conclusion: Permanent Injunction.............................................854 Ongoing Royalty ............................................................854 Conclusion: Ongoing Royalty.................................................855 Fractus’s Motion for Prejudgment Interest, Post Judgment Interest, and Bill of Costs ................................................................855 Prejudgment Interest........................................................855 CONCLUSION.................................................................856 BACKGROUND Fractus, S.A.’s (“Fractus”) filed suit on May 5, 2009, alleging that Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC, Samsung Electronics Research Institute, and Samsung Semiconductor Europe GmbH (collectively “Samsung”); LG Electronics, Inc., LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., and LG Electronics Mobilecomm U.S.A., Inc. (collectively “LG”); Research in Motion Ltd. and Research in Motion Corporation (collectively “RIM”); Pantech Wireless, Inc. and Pan-tech, Co., Ltd. (collectively “Pantech”); Kyocera America, Inc., Kyocera Wireless Corp., Kyocera Communications, Inc., and Kyocera Corporation (collectively “Kyocera”); Palm, Inc. (“Palm”); High Tech Computer Corp. and HTC America, Inc. (collectively “HTC”); Sharp Corporation and Sharp Electronics Corp. (collectively “Sharp”); UTStarcom Inc., UTStarcom Telecom Co., Ltd., and Personal Communications Devices Holdings, LLC (collectively “UTStarcom”); and Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd. and Sanyo North America Corp. (collectively “Sanyo”) infringe U.S. Patent Nos. 7,015,868 (“the '868 Patent”); 7,123,-208 (“the '208 Patent”), 7,148,850 (“the '850 Patent”), 7,202,822 (“the '822 Patent”), 7,312,762 (“the '762 Patent”), 7,394,-432 (“the '432 Patent”), 7,397,431 (“the '431 Patent”), 7,411,556 (“the '556 Patent”), and 7,528,782 (“the '782 Patent”). All Defendants except Samsung settled prior to trial. See Docket Nos. 1100, 1083, 1009, 955, 894, 562, 551, 487, 461, 407, 254, 179,144, 93, 72. Fractus proceeded to trial on May 16, 2010, and asserted four patents: the '868, '208, '431 and '432 Patents (collectively “Patents-in-Suit”). The Patents-in-Suit belong to the “multilevel” patent family (“MLV”), which also includes the '782 Patent. The MLV Patent family generally claims antennas made of “multilevel structures.” The inventor’s coined the term “multilevel” to describe the structural configuration of the claimed antennas. The '432 Patent derived from a divisional application, in which the parent application issued as the '431 Patent. The '432 Patent is a continuation of the '208 Patent, which in turn, is a continuation of the '868 Patent. The '782 Patent is a continuation of the '431 Patent. The MLV Patents explain that multilevel structures are generally characterized by their shape. '868 Patent at 2:32-33. The claimed invention relates to a specific geometric design of antennas with two main advantages: multiband operation and/or small size. Id. at 1:13-16. One configuration of a multilevel structure is depicted in Figure 3.1: Fractus asserted seven (7) claims at trial: claims 26 and 35 of the '868 Patent; claims 7 and 12 of the '208 Patent; claims 14 and 30 of the '431 Patent; and claim 6 of the '432 Patent. Fractus alleged that fifty-one (51) different models of Samsung cell phones contained infringing internal, multiband antennas. Fractus further alleged that Samsung -willfully infringed the Patents-in-Suit both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents. Fractus requested damages, interest and costs, enhanced damages, attorneys’ fees, and an injunction. Samsung denied infringement and alleged that the asserted claims are not enabled, lack a proper written description and are invalid as anticipated and/or obvious. Fractus’s case went to the jury on all alleged questions. After a five day trial, the jury found the Patents-in-Suit valid, Samsung liable for willful infringement, and awarded total damages of $23,129,321. Docket No. 999, “Jury Verdict.” SAMSUNG’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW JMOL Standard Judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate when “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R. Crv. P. 50(a). “The grant or denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law is a procedural issue not unique to patent law, reviewed under the law of the regional circuit in which the appeal from the district court would usually lie.” Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2008). The Fifth circuit “uses the same standard to review the verdict that the district court used in first passing on the motion.” Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d 695, 699 (5th Cir.1995). Thus, a jury verdict must be upheld, and judgment as a matter of law may not be granted, unless “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find as the jury did.” Id. at 700. The jury’s verdict must be supported by “substantial evidence” in support of each element of the claims. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. United Space Alliance, 378 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir.2004). A court reviews all evidence in the record and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party; however, a court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, as those are solely functions of the jury. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, “only if the evidence points so strongly and so overwhelmingly in favor of the nonmoving party that no reasonable juror could return a contrary verdict.” Int’l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281, 296 (5th Cir.2005). Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Literal Infringement Samsung first contends that Fractus failed to present substantial evidence that each accused antenna literally infringes the Patents-in-Suit. See JMOL at 6-14. Applicable Law To prove infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or its equivalent in the accused device. Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed.Cir.1985). Determining infringement is a two-step process: “[fjirst, the claim must be properly construed, to determine the scope and meaning. Second, the claim, as properly construed must be compared to the accused device or process.” Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc., 659 F.3d 1121, 1129 (Fed.Cir.2011) (citing Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1993)). “A determination of infringement is a question of fact that is reviewed for substantial evidence when tried to a jury.” ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2007). Claim Construction: Multilevel Structure and Polygon The parties’ primary dispute at trial revolved around two terms used in the Patents-in-Suit: (1) “multilevel structure” and (2) “polygon.” For the sake of clarity and context, the Court provides a brief explanation of the two terms and the Court’s relevant constructions. Given that the inventors coined the term “multilevel structure,” the Court discerned its constructions from the intrinsic evidence and the inventors’ lexicography. Docket No. 526, “Claim Construction Order” at 8. The Court relied on specific portions of the MLV specification and provided a construction of “multilevel structure” based on those passages read in context of the entire specification and prosecution history. Id. at 8-9. Ultimately, the Court construed “multilevel structure” as: a structure for an antenna' useable at multiple frequency bands with at least two levels of detail, wherein one level of detail , makes up another level. These levels of detail are composed of polygons (polyhedrons) of the same type with the same number of sides (faces) wherein most of the polygons (polyhedrons) are clearly visible and individually distinguishable and most of the polygons (polyhedrons) having an area of contact, intersection or interconnection with other elements (polygons or polyhedrons) that is less than 50% of the perimeter or area. Id. at 18-19. The parties also extensively briefed and contested the meaning of “polygon” throughout this litigation. The Court initially adopted the classic definition of polygon with a minor modification consistent with a peculiarity defined in the MLV patents. In particular, the MLV specifications allow for the possibility of a polygon with curved sides. See id. at 26-27. Accordingly, the Court construed “polygon” as “a closed plane figure bounded by straight lines, further including circles and ellipses.” Id. Months later, Defendants filed a motion to clarify the claim construction order due . to a dispute between the parties regarding the scope of the claims and the proper understanding of the term “polygon.” See Docket No. 901. The Court clarified its prior reasoning and construed polygon as: “a closed plane figure bounded by straight sides, further including circles and ellipses, where a portion of a circle or ellipse is counted as one side.” Id. at 6. Infringement: Clearly Visible and Individually Indistinguishable Samsung contends that Fractus failed to present substantial evidence that each accused antenna is composed of “clearly visible and individually distinguishable” polygons. JMOL at 7. Specifically, Samsung argues that: (1) Fractus’s infringement expert, Dr. Stuart Long, resorted to an elaborate and complicated “polygon decomposition method” to identify polygons (in the accused products), that should otherwise be immediately visible upon inspection (Id. at 8-10; Docket No. 1063, “JMOL REPLY” at 4-5); and (2) Samsung’s antennas are continuous pieces of stamped or plated metal, therefore, they are not composed of individual polygons (JMOL at 7-8). Samsung asserts that a “clearly visible and individually distinguishable” polygon in a multilevel structure must, in large part: resemble the figures in the MLV patents; be immediately recognizable upon visual inspection; and have boundaries free of contact. See JMOL at 10. Samsung presented much the same arguments at trial. See, e.g., 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 135:24-142:5. As an initial matter, “drawings in a patent need not illustrate the full scope of the invention.” Arlington Industries, Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1254 (Fed.Cir.2011) (citing MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed.Cir.2007) (“[pjatent coverage is not necessarily limited to inventions that look like the ones in the figures. To hold otherwise would be to import limitations onto the claim from the specification, which is fraught with danger.”)); see also Gart v. Logitech, Inc. 254 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“[t]hese drawings are not meant to represent ‘the’ invention or to limit the scope of coverage defined by the words used in the claims themselves.”). Further, the jury rejected Samsung’s position regarding how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the “clearly visible and individually distinguishable” requirement based on extensive testimony and evidence presented by Fractus via one of its technical experts, Dr. Long. Dr. Long presented a thorough infringement analysis of the accused Samsung antennas based on: (1) physical analysis of the antennas (5/18/2011 a.m. TT at 134:7-139:4); (2) Samsung product materials and user manuals (id. at 135:16-24); (3) Samsung test data (id. at 136:6-22) and (4) independent simulations of Samsung phones (id. at 137:2-138:6). Dr. Long also specifically testified regarding the “clearly visible and individually distinguishable” requirement consistent with the Court’s, and the MLV patents’, guidance. 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 22:12-29:6. Dr. Long explained that a clearly visible and individually distinguishable polygon must have less than 50% of its perimeter connected to another polygon. Id. at 24:8-25:6. Dr. Long’s testimony is consistent with the guidance provided in the MLV patents. See id. at 24:14-29:6; see also '868 Patent at 3:24-29 (“[i]n multilevel geometry most of these elements are clearly visible as their area of contact intersection or interconnection (if these exist) with other elements is always less than 50% of their perimeter.”). Dr. Long then provided a step-by-step analysis of how to identify polygons in the accused antennas. Dr. Long’s analysis begins by identifying the “feed point.” Id. at 33:23-35:2. Dr. Long explained that the “feed” is the point on the antenna which the cell phone circuitry is attached and is a logical starting point given that the current is injected into the antenna at this point. Id. at 34:1-17. He further explained how to find the feed point in a particular antenna. Id. at 34:18-35:2 (“A. Oftentimes, it’s in the ... specifications ... we get from the cell phone manufacturer ... ”). Dr. Long next identified the first polygon that is electromagnetically connected to the feed point. Id. at 35:4-22. After identifying the first polygon, Dr. Long then tracked the longest current path from the feed point and sequentially identified the polygons along that path according to the guidance provided in the MLV patents. Id. at 35:23-39:7. Dr. Long repeated the previous steps of identifying the next longest current path and attendant polygons until all polygons were identified. Id. at 39:8^11:4. Following identification, Dr. Long analyzed each of the polygons to determine which had 50% of their perimeters free as required by the MLV patents. Id. at 41:6-43:2. Consistent with this definition, if more than half of the polygons had 50% of their perimeters free, Dr. Long determined that the antenna contained a multilevel structure. Id. at 43:3-44:9. Dr. Long analyzed each of the accused antennas using the above described methodology and Fractus presented this analysis to the jury. Id. at 45:7-46:2; 60:16-72:16; PX-385; PX-387; PX 421. Based on the foregoing, Fractus presented substantial evidence for the jury to find that the accused antennas included clearly visible and individually distinguishable polygons. Samsung further contends that because its antennas are composed of continuous pieces of stamped or plated metal instead of individual metal polygon elements, they are not composed of “clearly visible and individually distinguishable” polygons. JMOL at 7-8. The MLV patents explicitly indicate that the- claimed antennas may be constructed from metal or conducting material consisting of a single piece of metal. See, e.g., '868 Patent at 5:58-6:3. Fractus also presented testimony and evidence that particular software packages allow an antenna designer to construct an antenna by drawing polygons on a single piece of metal and predicting the current paths on the antenna surface. 5/17/2011 p.m. TT at 15:21-16:19 (testimony of Dr. Carlos Puente regarding IE3D software); 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 15:19-18:22 (testimony of Dr. Long regarding IE3D software). As such, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that the accused antennas composed of a continuous piece of metal contain “clearly visible and individually distinguishable” polygons. Infiingement: Closed, Planar Polygons of the Same Type with the Same Number of Sides Samsung also contends the individual polygons identified by Dr. Long run afoul of the Court’s construction of the terms “multilevel structure” and “polygon.” JMOL at 10. As previously explained, the Court found that the proper construction of “polygon” is “a closed plane figure bounded by straight sides, further including circles and ellipses, where a portion of a circle or ellipse is counted as one side.” Docket No. 901 at 6. Samsung challenges Dr. Long’s polygon identification in four ways. First, Samsung argues that Dr. Long ignored the actual contour of the accused antennas, which include various holes, bump-outs and bends. JMOL' at 10-13. Samsung contends, had Dr. Long followed the actual geometry of the accused antennas, the resulting polygons would not form a multilevel structure composed of polygons of the same type with the same number of sides as required by the Court’s construction. Id. Second, Samsung asserts that by identifying polygons with internal “holes,” Dr. Long’s shapes ran afoul of the Court’s construction requiring “a closed plane figure.” Id. Third, Samsung argues that Dr. Long ignored bends in the antennas, violating the planar requirement of the Court’s construction of the term “polygon.” Id. at 12-13. Last, Samsung argues that Dr. Long conflated the separate requirements that a multilevel structure be made of polygons of the same type, with the same number of sides. Id. at 13-14. Regarding Samsung’s first argument, Fractus provided substantial evidence that small discontinuities and mounting holes on the accused antennas do not allow the antennas to escape the purview of the MLV claims. Dr. Long testified that when determining the number of sides or type of polygon, minor discontinuities do not materially impact the claimed functionality of the polygonal antennas. Dr. Long based his analysis on the basic shape of the antennas and on the current flow and electromagnetic characteristics of the antenna. 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 45:7-46:2; 60:16-72:16; PX-385; PX-387; PX-421. Based on that analysis, and other evidence, Dr. Long concluded that minor irregularities around the periphery, and mounting holes within the identified polygons, which are solely necessary for mechanical mounting reasons, may be properly discounted for purposes of identifying a functional multilevel structure and its component polygons. 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 54:22-59:22. Dr. Long’s testimony was buttressed by Samsung’s own testimony that small irregularities and mounting holes do not affect the performance of the antenna when included for purely mechanical purposes, e.g., mounting the antenna or fitting an antenna around the other components in a cell phone. Id. at 56:22-57:14 (Dr. Long reading Samsung engineer deposition testimony). Dr. Long, however, did not arbitrarily ignore all discontinuities in the accused antennas. Dr. Long testified that any irregularity that affected the electromagnetic performance of the antenna was properly counted as a side of a polygon. Id. at 58:7-11. As such, Fractus presented substantial evidence — and the jury accepted — that small irregularities and mounting holes within the accused antennas that do not materially alter the basic shape, and that fail to affect the antenna’s functional performance, are not relevant to identifying an infringing multilevel structure. Samsung next argues that Dr. Long identified polygons containing “holes,” thus violating the Court’s claim construction that polygons be “closed.” JMOL at 11-12. As an initial matter, neither party asked the Court to further construe polygon regarding the “closed” requirement. Additionally, Fractus presented substantial evidence that small mounting holes, within closed boundary polygons, do not affect the electromagnetic properties of the antenna; therefore, the holes may be ignored for purposes of identifying a polygon. 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 54:25-56:8. Dr. Long testified that holes are used for the purely mechanical reason of attaching the antenna to the phone and holding it in place. Id. Indeed, Samsung’s own engineer corroborated Dr. Long’s testimony that the mounting holes have little effect on the performance of the antenna. Id. at 56:22-57:14. Accordingly, the jury was presented with substantial evidence that a polygon with an internal hole that does not affect the performance of the antenna maybe considered a “closed” figure. Third, Samsung contends that despite the Court’s claim construction requiring a polygon to be a closed plane figure, Dr. Long identified “non-planar” figures as polygons. JMOL at 12-13. Specifically, Samsung contends that Dr. Long included as polygons portions of the accused antennas that have “bends” in the metal and are not flat, ie. planar. Id. However, as Dr. Long testified, the MLV patents allow for the possibility of a polygon positioned on a curved surface. See '868 Patent at 5:46-54. (“[i]n general, the multilevel structure forms part of the radiative element characteristic of said configurations, such as the arm, the mass plane or both in a monopole, an arm or both in a dipole, the patch or printed element in a microstrip, patch or coplanar antenna; the reflector for an [sic] reflector antenna, or the conical section or even antenna walls in a horn type antenna. It is even possible to use a spiral type antenna configuration in which the geometry of the loop or loops is the outer perimeter of a multilevel structure.”); see also 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 46:3-23. Dr. Long also testified, and provided evidence, that people of skill in the art routinely refer to curved surfaces as “planar.” 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 46:3-49:1; PX-213. Samsung’s counsel, and many of its witnesses — who described Samsung’s antennas as “planar inverted-f antennas,” despite those antennas including curved surfaces and mounting holes — confirmed Dr. Long’s testimony. Id. at 49:5-50:13; 5/19/2011 p.m. TT at 81:21-82:13. As such, the jury was presented substantial evidence that the “bent” accused antennas were sufficiently “planar” to support a finding of infringement. Last, Samsung argues that Dr. Long improperly conflated the separate requirements that a multilevel structure be made of polygons (1) of the same type and (2) with the same number of sides. JMOL at 13-14. For example, Samsung contends that Dr. Long treated two four-sided figures as the “same type” of polygon, despite them not both being “rectangles.” Fractus presented evidence that the MLV patents do not require that polygons with the same number of sides be restricted to a specific “species” of polygon. For example, the MLV specification describes multilevel structures made up of triangles, without explicitly requiring a particular species of triangle (e.g. right triangle, equilateral triangle, etc.). See '868 Patent at 2:32-36; 4:44-48. Indeed, claim 6 of the '868 Patent explicitly refers to “four-sided polygons” as a single type. '868 Patent at 10:9-13 (“6. The antenna according to claim 1, wherein said at least one multilevel structure is formed by polygon of a single type, selected from the group consisting of four-sided polygons ... ”). Fractus presented substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that Samsung’s antennas are made of multilevel structures composed of polygons of the same type with the same number of sides. Conclusion: Literal Infringement Fractus presented substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and the Court will not disturb the jury’s verdict regarding literal infringement. Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents The jury also found that Samsung infringed all seven asserted claims of the Patents-in-Suit under the doctrine of equivalents (DOE). See Jury Verdict. Samsung contends that Fractus failed to provide the necessary evidence to prove that the accused antennas infringe under the DOE. JMOL at 14. In particular, Samsung contends that Dr. Long failed to identify specific differences between Samsung’s antennas and the polygons he identified, and merely expressed a general conclusion that any structural differences between the geometry of the accused antennas and the identified polygons could be ignored. Id. at 14-15. Samsung further argues that finding equivalence between Dr. Long’s identified polygons and the geometric requirements of a “multilevel structure” vitiates the limitation. Id. at 15-18. Applicable Law To support a finding of infringement under the DOE, a patentee must either: (1) demonstrate an insubstantial difference between the claimed invention and the accused product or method; or (2) satisfy the function, way, result test. AquaTex Industries, Inc. v. Techniche Solutions, 479 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed.Cir.2007) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 70 S.Ct. 854, 94 L.Ed. 1097 (1950)). A patentee must provide particularized testimony and linking argument as to the insubstantiality of the differences between the claimed invention and the accused device or process on a limitation-by-limitation basis. Id. at 1328 (quoting Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567 (Fed.Cir.1996)). A patentee should typically provide particularized testimony from a qualified expert describing the claim limitations and establishing that those skilled in the art would recognize the equivalents. Id. at 1329. However, the expert is not required to “re-start his testimony at square one when transitioning to a doctrine of equivalents analysis.” Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed.Cir.2007). Instead, an expert may explicitly or implicitly incorporate his earlier testimony into the DOE analysis. Id. Doctrine of Equivalents: Sufficiency of the Evidence Samsung focuses its attack on Dr. Long’s testimony and alleges that he failed to provide a basis for his conclusions that the actual antennas were insubstantially different from the polygons he identified. Docket No. 1025 at 14-15. Samsung contends that Dr. Long merely provided conclusory testimony regarding why he ignored the bumps, notches and holes in the accused antennas when identifying the claimed “polygons.” Id. at 15. In addition to the evidence on literal infringement, Fractus presented substantial evidence that should a claimed polygon element not literally be met due to the existence of holes, bumps, notches, etc., the accused antennas infringe under the DOE because the differences between the claimed polygon and accused antennas are insubstantial. Regarding holes, Dr. Long testified that small mounting holes in some of the polygons have little impact on the electromagnetic characteristics of the accused antennas. 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 54:25-56:8. Other • witnesses confirmed Dr. Long’s analysis that small mounting holes do not affect the electromagnetic performance of antennas in cell phones. Dong-Hawn Kim, a Samsung employee who works in the company’s antenna research and development group, testified that small mounting holes have little effect on the performance of cell phone antennas and are merely used for mounting. 5/17/2011 p.m. TT at 129:14-130:13; 5/20/2011 a.m. TT at 112:5-11. Samsung’s expert, Dr. Steven Best, also confirmed Dr. Long’s testimony that small holes in the antennas have little effect on the performance of the antenna. 5/19/2011 p.m. TT at 83:12-83:21 (“[n]ow, the other aspect of this design that’s very important is that fact that — you know, Dr. Long mentioned yesterday that the holes within the antenna design really don’t significantly affect the electromagnetic performance. And for the most part, that’s true.”). Accordingly, the jury was presented with substantial evidence that the accused antennas, which may have internal holes, are insubstantially different than the . claimed polygons without holes. Dr. Long also provided testimony that polygons placed on a smoothly curved surface were not substantially different than a polygon on a flat plane. 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 46:3-28 (“[t]hat all of the polygons that I have identified are planar, or they’re not substantially — they are insubstantially different from planar polygons.”). Dr. Long explained that the Patents-in-Suit allow for the possibility of polygons on curved surfaces (id. at 46:8-23) and that others of skill in the art define a plane to include curved surfaces. Id. at 46:24-48:1. Also, Dr. Long explained that a multilevel structure may need to be placed on a curved surface to fit within a particular cell phone, but it was not substantially different than placing it on flat surface because it would have little effect on the electromagnetic performance of the phone. See id. at 47:13-17; 53:23-54:24; 131:10-20. Dr. Long supported his testimony with similar testimony from antenna engineers working for Kyocera and HTC. See id. at 46:24-49:2. Therefore, Fractus presented substantial evidence that a polygon with a smoothly curved surface is insubstantially different from a polygon with a flat surface. Regarding bumps or notches on the periphery of the accused antennas, Dr. Long provided testimony that these minor features are included for mechanical reasons and do not affect the electromagnetic performance of the antenna. Id. at 57:15-58:14. Dr. Long’s assertion that there is an insignificant difference between the claimed polygons and antennas with small bumps and notches was confirmed by testimony from other antenna engineers. LG’s corporate witness on technical issues testified that small “protrusions” are included for mechanical purposes and have little effect on the performance of a cell phone antenna. Id. at 58:18-59:12. As such, Fractus presented the jury with substantial evidence to support a finding that a polygon with a small bump or notch on its periphery was insubstantially different than a polygon with a straight perimeter. Doctrine of Equivalents: Vitiation Samsung further contends that even if Fractus had presented requisite testimony on the DOE, Fractus’s effort was futile because application of the DOE in this case vitiates the “multilevel structure” limitation. JMOL at 15. While no formula exists for determining whether a theory of equivalents vitiates a claim element, the Federal Circuit has instructed courts to view the totality of the circumstances and “determine whether the alleged equivalent can be fairly characterized as an insubstantial change from the claimed subject matter without rendering the pertinent limitation meaningless.” Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed.Cir.2005). Samsung argues that the geometric requirements of the “multilevel structure” are important — if not the most important — feature. Therefore, a finding of equivalence between the geometric requirements and the polygons identified by Dr. Long vitiate the multilevel structure limitation. Samsung relies heavily on Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154 (Fed.Cir.1998) and MHL Tek, LLC v. Nissan Motor Co., 691 F.Supp.2d 698 (E.D.Tex.2010) (Ward, J.) (overruled on other grounds by MHL TEK, LLC v. Nissan Motor Co., 655 F.3d 1266 (Fed.Cir.2011)) to support its position. Id. at 16-18. Both cases apply the “all elements rule where application of the doctrine of equivalents would vitiate a shape limitation.” MHL, 691 F.Supp.2d at 706. In Tronzo, the relevant claims were drawn to a hip implant with a cup having “a generally conical outer surface” also described as a “hemispherical cup.” Tronzo, 156 F.3d at 1156. Tronzo’s expert testified that any shape cup would be equivalent to the conical limitation in the claims. Id. at 1160. The Federal Circuit held that allowing any shape to be equivalent to the “conical limitation” would impermissibly write out the limitation. Id. Similarly, in MHL, the relevant claims were drawn to a tire pressure monitor with a “cylindraeeous housing.” MHL, 691 F.Supp.2d at 701. Much like the expert in Tronzo, MHL’s experts testified that the accused devices’ shapes were largely irrelevant to a finding of infringement under the DOE, so long as they functioned in substantially the same way. Id. at 707. Judge Ward held that such a result would vitiate the “cylindraeeous housing” limitation because MHL’s experts “either discount [the] shape limitation or expand the coverage of ‘cylindraceous’ so broadly that ... it covers all realistic housing shapes.” Id. Unlike the experts in Tronzo and MHL, Dr. Long did not testify that any shape can satisfy the geometric requirements of the claimed “multilevel structure.” Dr. Long further did not wholly disregard the actual shape of the accused antennas. As previously explained, Dr. Long identified polygons in the accused antennas only after consideration of all of the inconsequential features that have no impact on the electromagnetic properties of the antennas. Dr. Long conducted a detailed analysis regarding the bumps, notches, holes and bends and testified that if and only if they have little impact of the functionality and current flows of the accused antennas, they may be discounted. See, e.g., 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 57:15-59:22. Dr. Long conducted an analysis of the effect of small bumps and notches and presented testimony that these minor differences are provided for mechanical reasons and are insubstantially different from a straight side. Id. When the small discontinuities did affect antenna performance, Dr. Long counted them as a side of the polygon. Viewing the evidence as a whole, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, Fractus identified four-sided quadrilaterals, in some instances with small bumps or notches on the periphery. Fractus did not wholly ignore the shape of the accused antennas and contend that any shape may satisfy the multilevel structure requirements. Likewise, Dr. Long provided explicit testimony and evidence as to why polygons with small bends or internal mounting holes may also be considered because these features do not affect the electromagnetic performance of the accused antennas. Therefore, Fractus’s application of the DOE does not vitiate the multilevel structure limitation. Conclusion: Doctrine of Equivalents Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict regarding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and that Fractus’s theory does not vitiate the multilevel structure limitation. As such, the Court will not disturb the jury’s verdict regarding infringement under the doctrine of. equivalents. Furthermore, based on the foregoing, Samsung’s JMOL regarding non-infringement is DENIED. Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Invalidity Samsung contends that that the asserted claims of the Patents-in-Suit are invalid: (1) due to a lack of an adequate written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1; (2) due to lack of enabling disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1; and (3) as anticipated, or rendered obvious, by U.S. Patent No. 6,140,975 (“Cohen Patent” or “the '975 Patent”) under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 103(a). JMOL at 18-32. Each argument is addressed in turn. Invalidity: Written Description Samsung contends that the MLV specifications lack any reference to a multilevel, multiband antenna for use in a portable communication device or handset. Id. at 21. Applicable Law Patents are presumed valid and overcoming this presumption requires clear and convincing evidence. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2010) (en banc). Written description is a requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112, which provides in relevant part: The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same. 35 U.S.C § 112 ¶ 1 (2006). The written description of a patent “must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (Fed.Cir.1991)). “In other words, the test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. Determining whether the inventor had “possession” of the claimed subject matter requires “an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification.” Id. The disclosure in the written description must describe an invention such that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention. Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2011) (quoting Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351). The level of detail required largely depends on the nature of the claims and the complexity of the technology. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. However, the written description requirement “does not demand either examples or an actual reduction to practice; constructive reduction to practice that in a definite way identifies the claimed invention can satisfy the [requirement].” Id. at 1352 (citing Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366-67 (Fed.Cir.2006)). A “mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed invention is not” sufficient. Centocor, 636 F.3d at 1348 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed.Cir.1997)). “A determination that a patent is invalid for failure to meet the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 is a question of fact” and the “jury’s determinations of facts related to compliance with the written description requirement [are reviewed] for substantial evidence.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1355 (quoting PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chem. Co., 304 F.3d 1235, 1243 (Fed.Cir.2002)). Analysis After review of the record, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict regarding written description. Samsung’s expert on invalidity, Dr. Best, provided only brief and conclusory testimony regarding the written description requirement. See, e.g., 5/19/2011 p.m. TT at 154:11-156:12; 5/20/2011 a.m. TT at 49:15-52:1. Specifically, Dr. Best testified that, based on his reading of the specifications, there was no disclosure that the inventors “had actually put an antenna in a cell phone, designed an antenna to work at cell phone frequencies, described antenna dimensions for a cell phone antenna, or an actual cell phone design.” 5/19/2011 p.m. TT at 155:10-155:14. Dr. Best further confirmed Samsung’s counsel’s statement that the Patents-in-Suit allegedly do not describe “how to get the antennas to work in a cell phone.” Id. at 155:15-20. Finally, Dr. Best testified that the specifications do not explain how to make the disclosed multilevel structures into a multiband antenna. 5/20/2011 a.m. TT at 51:16-23. As an initial matter, because the written description requirement does not require examples or an actual reduction to practice (Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351), Dr. Best’s testimony that the specifications do not disclose that the inventors “had actually put an antenna in a cell phone” or “designed an antenna to work at cell frequencies” is irrelevant to this issue. Additionally, while Fractus did not present explicit rebuttal evidence on the issue of written description, it did present contrary evidence regarding all of the relevant issues raised by Dr. Best. For example, one of the inventors testified that Figure 4.7 disclosed a multiband antenna. 5/17/2011 a.m. TT at 146:11— 147:25. Additionally, Dr. Long testified on cross examination that the MLV specifications teach how to make small, multiband antennas that would be small enough to fit inside a cell phone. 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 163:20-164:11. Dr. Long also testified that Figure 11, as disclosed in the specification, was small enough to fit inside a cell phone. 5/19/2011 a.m. TT at 25:24-28:12. Fractus presented ample evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and the jury was free to weigh the competing evidence and determine that Fractus’s was more reliable — even absent an explicit rebuttal case. Nevertheless, Fractus presented evidence and testimony that the written description discloses the claimed invention to the extent necessary to reasonably convey to the person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventors possessed the claimed invention. Invalidity: Enablement Samsung argues that the MLV specifications do not enable the full scope of the invention. JMOL at 24-26. Much like its argument regarding written description, Samsung argues that the MLV specification fails to disclose internal cell phone antennas; therefore, the specification cannot enable one of skill in the art to design and build an internal cell phone antenna. JMOL at 24-25. Samsung further asserts that up to three years after the filing of the patents, Fractus had never developed an internal cell phone antenna. Id. at 26. Applicable Law In addition to the written description requirement, 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 also requires that the “specification must enable those skilled in the art to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.” ReedHycalog UK, Ltd. v. United Diamond Drilling Servs., Inc., 2009 WL 1011730, at *10 (E.D.Tex. April 15, 2009) (Davis, J.) (citing Harris Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 114 F.3d 1149, 1155 (Fed.Cir.1997)). Enablement is a highly factual inquiry, and the jury is instructed to consider several factors in determining whether undue experimentation is needed to practice a claimed invention. These factors include: (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary; (2) the amount of direction or guidance disclosed in the patent; (3) the presence or absence of working examples in the patent; (4) the nature of the invention; (5) the state of the prior art; (6) the relative skill of those in the art; (7) the predictability of the art; ' and (8) the breadth of the claims. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed.Cir.1988). Not all of the Wands factors need be considered, only those relevant to the facts of the case. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1216 (Fed.Cir.1991). Analysis After a thorough review of the record, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict regarding enablement. Samsung’s only evidence at trial regarding enablement was Dr. Best’s conclusory testimony that the MLV specification does not enable internal cell phone antennas. See 5/19/2011 p.m. TT at 156:13-157:11. Samsung failed to address any of the Wands factors during trial and again ignores them in post-trial briefing. Samsung failed to provide any analysis or explicitly describe any shortcomings in the disclosure. Based on Samsung’s evidence presented at trial, the jury was free to find that Samsung had not met its burden in demonstrating a lack of enablement. Additionally, Dr. Long explained during trial that the MLV specification provides a person of ordinary skill the requisite instructions to build an internal cell phone antenna. 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 163:13-164:6. Dr. Long further testified that antennas for cell phones must be designed around other components and that the flexible design guidelines in the MLV specification are more helpful than specific dimensions of shape and size. 5/18/2011 a.m. TT at 140:9-141:23. Dr. Long also testified that the MLV specification discloses two working examples in Figures 8 and 11. 5/19/2011 a.m. TT at 27:23-28:16; 31:21-32:7. Importantly, Dr. Long testified that these working examples would provide the necessary framework and concrete examples to a person of ordinary skill in the art to create small, multiband antennas for cell phones. 5/18/2011 a.m. TT at 140:8-142:4. Some experimentation may be necessary to practice a claimed invention, but so long as the experimentation is not “unduly extensive,” the jury’s rejection of Samsung’s evidence was not improper. See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1984). Fractus was not required to prove the enablement of its claims. The jury was free to resolve the factual disputes presented, based on Samsung’s brief evidence of non-enablement, in Fractus’s favor— especially given Samsung’s high burden to provide clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of validity. Fractus presented ample evidence to contest Samsung’s scant evidence regarding enablement. As such, the Court will not overturn the jury’s finding that Fractus’s claims are enabled. Invalidity: Anticipation Samsung contends that there was no legally sufficient basis for the jury to have found that the Cohen Patent does not anticipate the asserted claims of the MLV patents. JMOL at 27. Samsung contends that Dr. Best identified each and every claim limitation of the asserted claims in the Cohen Patent, with one exception— claim 30 of '431 patent. Id. Applicable Law A patent claim is invalid as anticipated if the claimed invention was known or used by others in this -country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention by the applicant. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). Anticipation requires the presence in the prior art of each and every limitation of the claimed invention. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoffman-LA Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1366 (Fed.Cir.2009). Analysis Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict regarding anticipation. The jury may have relied on any number of issues to determine that Samsung failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Cohen Patent anticipated the MLV asserted claims. Namely, Fractus presented testimony and evidence during trial that the Cohen Patent failed to disclose: (1) multilevel structures composed of polygons; (2) polygons of different sizes; and (3) antennas that are useable at multiple frequency bands. Additionally, the jury may have simply disregarded Dr. Best’s testimony. Dr. Best relied heavily on Figure 7C-1 of the Cohen Patent which teaches a “Minkowski Island” antenna. 5/19/2011 p.m. TT at 131:19-133:1. Dr. Long, however, repeatedly testified that the antenna in Figure 7C-1 was actually a “wire antenna” and not composed of “polygons” of conductive material as required by the MLV claims. See, e.g., 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 154:6-155:1 (“A. No. The wire is shaped like, you know, the outside piece of a polygon ... we have a wire that’s in the shape of a — of a four-sided figure there, but that’s not the same as a polygon. A polygon means ... that whole inside structure is a conducting material. Here it’s just a wire.”) (emphasis added); see also 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 155:2-157:11. Indeed, Fractus presented evidence that Dr. Best referred to- the antennas in the Cohen Patent as “wire antennas” prior to this litigation. During cross-examination, Dr. Best conceded that' he had written an article discussing a simulation he conducted of the Cohen Minkowski antennas in which he referred to the antennas as “wire antennas.” See PX-225; 5/20/2011 a.m. TT at 67:7-69:14. Dr. Best also conceded that his simulations of the Cohen antennas, which were presented to the jury, all entailed wires or printed circuits lacking conductive material inside the wire perimeter. See, e.g., 5/20/2011 a.m. TT at 66:5-69:17; 35:25-37:11. Dr. Long álso testified that the Cohen Patent does not disclose “polygons” because it is a wire antenna. While Dr. Long conceded that the Cohen Patent discloses that the Minkowski Island antennas may be fabricated on a printed circuit, he also explained to the jury why the printed circuits in the Cohen Patent lack conductive material inside the printed wire. In turn, Dr. Long asserted that because the “printed wire” lacked conductive material inside the perimeter of the wire, it could not be composed of “polygons.” For example, Dr. Long explained that the printed wires in the Cohen Patent merely approximate the boundary of a “polygon,” however because the material inside the wire trace is not conductive, it is not the same as the MLV Patent limitations. 5/18/2011 p.m. TT at 154:9-157:12. Based on the foregoing, the jury may have reasonably determined that the Cohen Patent does not disclose multilevel structures composed of polygons. The asserted claims of the '868 and '208 Patents also require that “not all of the [polygons] have the same size.” See, e.g., '868 Patent at 9:62-63. Dr. Best, in testifying that this limitation was met, merely stated, “[i]f we examine the Cohen antenna on the right, we see that, in fact, the rectangles do not have the same [size].” 5/19/2011 p.m. TT at 141:5-142:3. However, one of the inventors of the MLV Patents testified that even if the Cohen Patent disclosed polygons, the Minkowski island that Dr. Best relied upon was made of polygons of the same size; therefore, not disclosing a multilevel structure. 5/17/2011 p.m. TT at 85:24-86:25. Furthermore, upon causal inspection of Figure 7C-1, as Dr. Best directed, the so-called polygons appear to all have the same size. Therefore, given Dr. Best’s conclusory testimony on this point, the MLV Patent inventor’s testimony, and the actual, figure in the Cohen Patent, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the Cohen Patent did not anticipate the MLV patents. Additionally, the parties presented the jury with conflicting evidence regarding whether the Cohen Patent disclosed antennas useable at multiple frequency bands and other limitations of the MLV patents. See, e.g., 5/19/2011 p.m. TT at 137:17-139:7; 152:14-153:19; 5/20/2011 a.m. TT at 44:9-20 (Dr. Best testimony that Cohen discloses multiband antennas); PX-252 at 73-77 (former defendant Kyocera PTO prosecution of a patent distinguishing Cohen as not giving “instructions to one skilled in the art for designing a multiple-frequency antenna.”); 5/17/2011 p.m. TT at 85:2-9; 87:4-9; 90:3-21 (Dr. Puente testimony that Cohen does not disclose antennas operating at multiple frequency bands.). The jury was free to either disbelieve Dr. Best’s testimony regarding this issue, or resolve the factual dispute in Fractus’s favor given the contradictory evidence presented. Finally, then jury could have concluded that Dr. Best lacked credibility and discounted his testimony altogether. Fractus presented evidence to the jury that the inventor of the Cohen Patent, Dr. Nathan Cohen, publicly questioned Dr. Best’s understanding of the technology at issue. See, e.g., 5/20/2011 a.m. TT at 12:17-22 (“Q. [ ] This is how Dr. Cohen described you [, Dr. Best]: He is clearly wrong. For anyone to say this, they cannot have a good handle on understanding mutual coupling, resonance, ohmic loss, radiation resistance, and field strength. A. That’s what he says, yes.”); see also PX-417 at 22, 65-67, 69, 130-131 (excerpts of online discussion between Dr. Cohen and Dr. Best, wherein Dr. Cohen accuses Dr. Best of inaccurate statements, etc.). Additionally, Dr. Best’s trial testimony included inaccuracies that Fractus revealed under cross-examination. See, e.g., 5/20/2011 a.m. TT at 33:12-37:4 (testimony of Dr. Best that in a demonstrative of the Cohen Figure 7C-1 antenna, he removed the outer non-conductive material, but not the inner non-conductive material, which arguably made it more likely to resemble the MLV patent figures); id. at 38:9-41:6; id. at 67:7-70:24. The jury may have discounted Dr. Best’s opinion as unreliable because of these inaccuracies or misstatements in his testimony. Based on the foregoing, and a thorough review of the record evidence in this case, the jury reasonably found that Samsung failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the MLV patents are anticipated by the Cohen Patent. Invalidity: Obviousness Samsung contends that, to the extent any limitation was explicitly missing from the Cohen Patent, it would have been obvious to one of skill in the art. JMOL at 30-32. Applicable Law Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying findings of fact. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed.Cir.2009). Obviousness is based on several factual inquiries: “(1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness, if any.” Id. Analysis The parties do not appear to dispute that the evidence established that a person of ordinary skill in the art is someone with a Ph.D., master’s degree, or bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering with two to five years of relevant antenna design experience. JMOL at 30. The only explicit obviousness testimony or evidence that Samsung presented was directed at claim 30 of the '431 Patent. See 5/19/2011 p.m. TT at 151:9-22. Dr. Best, however, merely stated that while the Cohen Patent did not explicitly anticipate claim 30 of the '431 Patent, it renders it obvious. Id. Based on such scant evidence, a reasonable jury may have determined that Samsung failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the Cohen Patent renders claim 30 of the '431 Patent obvious. After review of the record and drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict regarding obviousness. Dr. Best did not provide an explicit obviousness analysis regarding each of the asserted claims, but merely concluded that the limitations or claims were “anticipated or at least obvious.” See, e.g., 5/19/2011 p.m. TT at 144:9-16; 147:14-21. Such conclusory testimony regarding obviousness failed to provide the jury with an understanding of why a person of ordinary skill would have found the limitations obvious. See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2008) (holding “some kind of motivation must be shown from some source, so that the jury can understand why a person of ordinary skill would have thought of’ combining or modifying references to achieve the patented method). Additionally, Fractus presented evidence of secondary indicia of non-obviousness.