Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GEORGE B. DANIELS, District Judge. Pro se plaintiff Devin Keitt (“Keitt”) brings this action alleging claims under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794 et seq., the Equal Education Opportunities Act (“EEOA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1986. Keitt alleges these claims against the City of New York, the Department of Correction (“DOC”), the Department of Education (“DOE”), the Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”), Mayor Bloomberg (“Bloomberg”), and Dora Schriro, the Commissioner of the DOC (“Schriro”) (collectively, the “City Defendants”), as well as the State of New York, the Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS”), the State Education Department (“SED”), Brian Fischer, Commissioner of DOCS, (“Fischer”), Mark Bradt, former Superintendent of Elmira Correctional Facility (“Bradt”) and employees of Elmira Correctional Facility Douglas Reynolds (“Reynolds”), B. Fusco (“Fusco”), V. Livermore (“Livermore”), and T. Lepowski (“Lepowski”) (collectively, the “State Defendants”). Keitt alleges that the defendants failed to accommodate his dyslexia in the public school system through 1998, and in education programs offered in (1) juvenile detention facilities from 1995-97, (2) Rikers Island facilities- operated by DOC beginning in 1998, and (3) various state facilities operated by DOCS. He also alleges that the defendants failed to accommodate his dyslexia in disciplinary proceedings and retaliated against him for filing grievances regarding alleged failures to accommodate his dyslexia in both educational programs and disciplinary proceedings during his detention at the Elmira Correctional Facility (“Elmira”) in Chemung County, New York. Finally, Keitt challenges Elmira’s policy that requires prisoners who have not obtained a high school diploma or its equivalency to attend adult basic education programs or else forfeit their ability to participate in other programming. Keitt seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief. Both the City and State Defendants moved to dismiss Keitt’s IDEA, EEOA, ADA, Rehabilitation Act and Section 1983 claims. The City Defendants also moved to dismiss Keitt’s claims under Sections 1981, 1985, and 1986. The State Defendants moved to sever the remaining claims arising at Elmira and to transfer those claims to the Western District of New York. Keitt opposed the motions to dismiss, sever, and transfer, and brings a motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. All defendants oppose the motion to amend. This Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman for her Report and Recommendation (“Report”). Magistrate Judge Freeman recommended that this Court (1) dismiss all claims against the City Defendants; (2) dismiss all claims against the State Defendants under the EEOA, the IDEA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (3) dismiss all claims against the State Defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act which arose prior to Keitt’s incarceration at Elmira in 2006; (4) deny dismissal of Keitt’s Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims for damages arising out of his incarceration at Elmira against the individual State Defendants, in their personal capacities, but dismiss as moot his claim for injunctive relief, without prejudice to Keitt reasserting that claim if he is granted leave to plead claims arising out of his current incarceration at Attica; (5) deny dismissal of Keitt’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims arising out of his incarceration at Elmira, to the extent he seeks compensatory but not punitive damages, against the State of New York and DOCS, as well as the individual State Defendants in their official capacities, but dismiss as moot his request for injunctive relief, without prejudice to Keitt reasserting those claims, if he is granted leave to plead claims arising out of his current incarceration at Attica; (6) deny the State Defendants’ motion to sever the claims arising at Elmira as moot; (7) grant the State Defendants’ motion to transfer the remaining claims to the Western District of New York; and (8) deny Keitt’s motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint without prejudice to renew in the Western District of New York. The Court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations set forth within the Report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When there are objections to the Report, the Court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which objections are made. Id.; see also Rivera v. Barnhart, 423 F.Supp.2d 271, 273 (S.D.N.Y.2006). The district judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). It is not required, however, that the Court conduct a de novo hearing on the matter. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). Rather, it is sufficient that the Court “arrive at its own, independent conclusions” regarding those portions to which objections were made. Nelson v. Smith, 618 F.Supp. 1186, 1189-90 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (quoting Hernandez v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5th Cir.1983)). When no objections to a Report are made, the Court may adopt the Report if “there is no clear error on the face of the record.” Adee Motor Cars, LLC v. Amato, 388 F.Supp.2d 250, 253 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (citation omitted). In her report, Magistrate Judge Freeman advised the parties that failure to file timely objections to the Report would constitute a waiver of those objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The State Defendants filed an objection to Magistrate Judge Freeman’s recommendation to deny defendant Fischer’s motion to dismiss. They argue that Keitt did not adequately plead that Fischer was personally involved in any violation of Keitt’s constitutional rights. This Court considered the Report in light of the objection and finds the objection to be without merit. As to those recommendations to which no objection was made, there is no clear error on the face of the record. The Report is adopted in its entirety. I. EEOA Claims Magistrate Judge Freeman properly concluded that Keitt failed to state a claim under the EEOA because he only alleged that he was denied educational opportunities because of his dyslexia and not because of his race, color, sex, or national origin. II. IDEA Claims Magistrate Judge Freeman properly concluded that Keitt’s IDEA claims are time-barred. Keitt’s IDEA claims accrued at the latest when he reached the age of 21 in 2002. Because Keitt has not alleged any basis for tolling the three year statute of limitations, Keitt’s IDEA claims would be untimely after 2005. . III. Section 1981 Claims Magistrate Judge Freeman properly concluded that Keitt failed to state a claim under section 1981. To state a claim under Section 1981, a plaintiff must allege that (1) plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned the rights to “make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and the full and equal benefits of all laws and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property.” See Brown v. City of Oneonta, New York, 221 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir.2000). Keitt has failed to allege discrimination on the basis of race and with respect to the' making of a contract or any of the other' enumerated activities under the statute. IV. Section 1983, 1985 and 1986 Claims A. Claims Arising Before Keitt’s Incarceration at Elmira Magistrate Judge Freeman properly concluded that Keitt’s Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims arising out of his time in the public school through 1998, in juvenile detention facilities from 1995-97, in DOCS incarceration from September 2, 2000 to September 10, 2003, or in Rikers Island prior to April 20, 2006 are time-barred. The statute of limitations for Section 1983 and 1985 claims is three years. See Paige v. Police Dept. of Schenectady, 264 F.3d 197, 199 n. 2 (2d Cir.2001). The statute of limitations for Section 1986 claims is one year. See id. As Keitt did not commence this action until June 2009 and did not allege facts sufficient to toll the statute of limitations of those claims, Keitt’s claims for the time periods addressed above are untimely. B. Claims Arising During Keitt’s Incarceration at Elmira 1. Claims Against Fischer Magistrate Judge Freeman properly concluded that the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss Keitt’s Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims against Fischer should be denied. A supervisory official may be deemed to have personal involvement where he failed to remedy a constitutional wrong after learning of a violation through a report or appeal. Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir.1995). Courts in the Southern District have found that personal involvement is sufficiently pled where the grievant “alleges an ongoing constitutional violation such that the supervisory official who reviews the grievance can remedy it directly.” See Burton v. Lynch, 664 F.Supp.2d 349, 360 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (quoting Vega v. Artus, 610 F.Supp.2d 185, 198 (N.D.N.Y.2009)); Braxton v. Nichols, No. 08 Civ. 8568, 2010 WL 1010001 at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2010). Keitt alleges that (1) he repeatedly gave Fischer complete details of the failures at Elmira to accommodate Keitt’s disability; (2) Fischer had “full knowledge” of the refusal to accommodate from both grievances and disciplinary appeals; (3) Fischer has upheld every decision denying plaintiff accommodation; and (4) Fischer failed to take action to remedy the ongoing violation. Thus, Keitt sufficiently pled that Fischer was personally involved in the alleged ongoing violation of Keitt’s constitutional rights. 2. Claims Against the Remaining State Defendants Magistrate Judge Freeman properly concluded that Keitt’s Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims against the State of New York and its agencies are barred by the 11th Amendment. Here, where there has been no waiver of immunity by the state or abrogation of immunity by Congress, the 11th Amendment bars suit against a state and its agencies in federal court. Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 69-70 (2d Cir.2001). Magistrate Judge Freeman also properly concluded that Keitt’s claims for damages against the individual State Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the 11th Amendment. When a state official is sued for damages in his official capacity, the suit is deemed to be one against the state. Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 529 (2d Cir.1993). Magistrate Judge Freeman properly concluded that Keitt’s Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims be permitted to proceed to the extent Keitt is seeking damages, including punitive damages, from defendants Fischer, Fusco, Bradt, Liver-more, and Lepowski, in their personal capacities. The 11th Amendment does not bar actions for damages against state officials in their personal capacities. Id. Keitt’s transfer to Attica does not moot his action for monetary damages for harm allegedly suffered during his prior incarceration at Elmira. In addition, Keitt has alleged “conscious wrongdoing” or “callous indifference” as to at least some of the individual defendants, as required for punitive damages. Magistrate Judge Freeman properly concluded that Keitt’s claims for injunctive relief against defendants Liver-more and Lepowski be dismissed as moot. Because Keitt is no longer at Elmira, where Livermore and Lepowski are employed, “the relief can no longer be given [and] is no longer needed.” Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 702 F.2d 380, 386 (2d Cir.1983). Magistrate Judge Freeman properly concluded that Keitt’s claim for injunctive relief against Bradt be dismissed sua sponte as moot, without prejudice to Keitt’s reasserting such a claim with regard to his present treatment at Attica, should Keitt be granted leave to amend his pleading to include claims arising from his current incarceration there. Because Keitt’s claims for injunctive relief are based upon Bradt’s conduct at Elmira, that relief is currently no longer available or necessary. V. ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims A. Claims Arising Before Keitt’s Incarceration at Elmira Magistrate Judge Freeman properly concluded that Keitt’s claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act arising out of his time in the public school through 1998, in juvenile detention facilities from 1995-97, in DOCS incarceration from September 2, 2000 to September 10, 2003, or in Rikers Island prior to April 20, 2006 are time-barred. The statute of limitations on these claims is three years. As Keitt did not allege facts sufficient to toll the statute of limitations for any of these claims, and did not file his Complaint until June 22, 2009, Keitt’s ADA and Rehabilitation Claims for the time period addressed above are untimely. B. Claims Arising During Keitt’s Incarceration at Elmira Magistrate Judge Freeman properly concluded that Keitt’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims related to his incarceration at Elmira against the State of New York, DOCS, as well as Fischer, Bradt, Reynolds, Fusco, Livermore, and Lepowski in their official capacities be permitted to proceed, but only to the extent Keitt seeks compensatory damages and not punitive damages. Keitt has sufficiently alleged that at least some of the accommodations he sought at Elmira would allow him to overcome obstacles to his meaningful participation in existing programs and existing educational services, without fundamentally altering the programs. Keitt also has alleged sufficient discriminatory animus against him on account of his alleged disability by the State Defendants in their official capacities to state a claim for a Title II violation which is not barred by the 11th Amendment. See Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98 (2d Cir.2001). Keitt’s Rehabilitation Act claims are not barred by the 11th Amendment because New York has waived sovereign immunity with respect to those claims. See Degrafinreid v. Ricks, 417 F.Supp.2d 403, 414 (S.D.N.Y.2006). However, punitive damages “may not be brought under § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,” and thus are improper. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 190, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002). Magistrate Judge Freeman properly concluded that Keitt’s claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act against the State Defendants in their individual capacities must be dismissed. Individuals in their personal capacities are not proper defendants on claims brought under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.2009). Magistrate Judge Freeman properly concluded that Keitt’s claims for injunctive relief under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act against Lepkowski and Livermore be dismissed as moot because Keitt is no longer housed at Elmira. Magistrate Judge Freeman also properly determined that Keitt’s claims for injunctive relief against Bradt be dismissed sua sponte as moot without prejudice to Keitt’s reassertion of such claims, should he be granted leave to plead claims arising out of his current incarceration at Attica. As currently pled, Keitt’s claims against Bradt and requests for injunctive relief similarly only concern Keitt’s incarceration at Elmira. VI. State Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Magistrate Judge Freeman properly concluded that Keitt’s remaining claims arising at Elmira, which are not dismissed by this Court, should be transferred to the Western District of New York. Proper venue lies in the district where Keitt was incarcerated. The totality of the circumstances strongly favors transfer of all of the claims not dismissed by this Court “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). VII. Keitt’s Motion to Amend Magistrate Judge Freeman properly concluded that Keitt’s request for leave to amend his complaint with respect to the City Defendants be denied, with prejudice. All of Keitt’s claims against the City Defendants are time-barred and thus an amendment with respect to these claims would be futile. See, e.g., Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir.2002). Magistrate Judge Freeman also properly determined that Keitt’s request for leave to amend his complaint with respect to the State Defendants be denied without prejudice to renew, upon transfer of this action to the Western District of New York. Because this Court is granting the State Defendants’ motion to transfer the remaining claims to the Western District of New York, it would serve the interests of judicial economy to allow the court in that District to consider the viability of any proposed new claims. Conclusion This Court adopts the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. The City Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in its entirety. The State Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART, AND DENIED IN PART, consistent with this opinion. The State Defendants’ motion to sever is DENIED as moot. The State Defendants’ motion to transfer to the Western District of New York is GRANTED. Keitt’s motion for leave to amend is DENIED without prejudice to renew in the Western District of New York. SO ORDERED. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff Devin Keitt (“Keitt”), currently incarcerated in Attica Correctional Facility (“Attica”) and acting pro se, brings this action under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794 et seq., and the Equal Education Opportunities Act (“EEOA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. He also asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his rights under the First, Eighth and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution, and claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,1985 and 1986. Keitt names the City of New York and three of its agencies (the Department of Correction (“DOC”), the Department of Education (“DOE”) and the Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”)), as well as Mayor Bloomberg (“Bloomberg”) and Dora Schriro, the Commissioner of DOC (“Schriro”) (collectively “the City Defendants”). Keitt also names the State of New York and two of its agencies (the Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS”) and the State Education Department (“SED”)), as well as Brian Fischer, Commissioner of DOCS (“Fischer”); Mark Bradt, former Superintendent of Elmira Correctional Facility (“Bradt”); and four additional Elmira employees (Douglas C. Reynolds (“Reynolds”), B. Fusco (“Fusco”), Y. Livermore (“Livermore”), and T. Lepkowski (“Lepkowski”)) (collectively “the State Defendants”). The City and State Defendants are collectively referred to herein as “Defendants.” Keitt alleges that he is dyslexic and that Defendants failed to accommodate his disability in the public school system through 1998, and in education programs offered in (a) juvenile detention facilities from 1995-97, (b) Rikers Island facilities operated by DOC beginning in 1998, and (c) various state facilities operated by DOCS. Keitt also alleges that, during his detention at the Elmira Correctional Facility (“Elmira”) in Chemung County, New York, Defendants failed to accommodate his dyslexia in disciplinary proceedings and retaliated against him for filing grievances regarding alleged failures to accommodate his dyslexia in both educational programs and disciplinary proceedings. Finally, Keitt challenges Elmira’s policy requiring prisoners who have not obtained a high school diploma or its equivalency to attend adult basic education programs (even if such programs are wholly unsuitable without reasonable accommodations) or else forfeit their ability to participate in other programming. Keitt seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief. This matter is before me on motions by both the City (Dkt. 33) and State Defendants (Dkt. 35) to dismiss the IDEA, EEOA, ADA, Rehabilitation Act and Section 1983 claims in the Amended Complaint. The City Defendants also move to dismiss the claims under Sections 1981, 1985 and 1986. The State Defendants move to sever the remaining claims arising at Elmira and to transfer such claims to the Western District of New York. Keitt opposes the motions to dismiss and brings a motion (Dkt. 49) for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. All Defendants oppose the motion to amend. For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that the motions to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part, the motion to sever the claims arising at Elmira be denied as moot because these are the only remaining claims, the motion to transfer to the Western District be granted as to the remaining claims, which are against only State Defendants, and the motion to amend be denied without prejudice to Keitt’s renewal of his request for leave to amend in the transferee court. TABLE OF CONTENTS BACKGROUND................................................................429 A. Factual Background..................................................429 1. Keitt’s Time in Public School and in Juvenile Detention................429 2. Detention in City (DOC) and State (DOCS) Facilities..................430 B. Procedural Background...............................................431 DISCUSSION..................................................................432 I. Motions to Dismiss.......................................................432 A. Applicable Legal Standards...........................................432 B. EEOA Claims.......................................................433 C. IDEA Claims........................................................434 1. Exhaustion......................................................434 2. Statute of Limitations.............................................436 a. Applicable Limitations Period..................................436 b. Accrual of Keitt’s Claims ......................................437 c. Potential Tolling..............................................438 D. Section 1981 Claims..................................................440 E. Section 1983,1985 and 1986 Claims.....................................441 1. Statute of Limitations.............................................441 a. Applicable Limitations Period..................................441 b. Accrual of Keitt’s Claims ......................................441 i. Claims Arising Out of Public School Attendance............442 ii. Claims Arising Out of Juvenile Detention..................442 in. Claims Arising Out of Initial Period of State Incarceration........................................442 iv. Claims Arising Out of Detention in City Facilities (Rikers Island)................................. 442 c. Potential Tolling..............................................443 2. Remaining Section 1983,1985 and 1986 Claims.......................444 a. Adequacy of Pleading.........................................444 b. 11th Amendment Immunity and Available Relief, Under Sections 1983,1985 and 1986 ................................. 447 i. Damages..............................................447 ii. Injunctive Relief.......................................448 F. ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims ....................................450 1. Statute of Limitations.............................................450 a. Applicable Limitations Period..................................450 i. Title II of the ADA.....................................450 ii. Rehabilitation Act......................................451 b. Accrual of Keitt’s Claims and Unavailability of Tolling.............452 2. Remaining ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims.......................452 a. Adequacy of Pleading.........................................452 b. Potential Immunity and Available Relief Under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act..........................................454 i. 11th Amendment Immunity as to ADA....................454 ii. 11th Amendment Immunity as to Rehabilitation Act ........455 iii. Damages..............................................456 iv. Injunctive Relief.......................................457 II. MOTION TO SEVER AND TRANSFER CLAIMS ARISING AT ELMIRA.............................................................458 A. Section 1404(a) Standards.............................................458 B. Transfer Considerations in This Case...................................459 III. KEITT’S MOTION TO AMEND...........................................460 A. Rule 15(a) Standards.................................................460 B. Proposed Amendments...............................................461 1. Proposed Modification of Claims Directed to City Defendants..........461 2. Proposed New Claims Directed to Existing or Newly-Named State Defendants....................................................462 CONCLUSION.......................... ......................................462 BACKGROUND A. Factual Background The facts summarized herein are primarily taken from Keitt’s Amended Complaint, and are taken as true for purposes of Defendants’ motions to dismiss. {See infra, at 13.) 1. Keitt’s Time in Public School and in Juvenile Detention Devin Keitt was born on February 25, 1981. {See Keitt’s Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”), dated 1995 (Am. Compl., Ex. 1).) When he was nine years old, his mother took him to a clinical psychologist, who purportedly diagnosed him with dyslexia. (See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 33, 47, 225 (alleging that he was first diagnosed at Public School 118).) According to Keitt, the psychologist recommended various learning aids, including books on tape, large print books, a tape recorder, and readers. {See id. at ¶ 57.) Keitt was placed in a special education classroom in Public School 118, in Queens County, New York, for third grade. {See Complaint, dated June 22, 2009 (“Compl.”) (Dkt. 2) at ¶ 63; Am. Compl. at ¶ 47.) Tests and other materials were read to him, but he was not given extended time to complete tests or permitted to circle multiple choice answers. {See Am. Compl. at ¶ 58.) At some point, Keitt transferred to Intermediate School 231, in Queens. {See Compl. at ¶ 78.) Thereafter, in 1995, when he was in eighth grade, Keitt’s mother enrolled him in the private Lowell School, also in Queens. {See Am. Compl. at ¶ 62; Compl. at ¶¶ 82-83.) After a school break, Keitt did not return to the Lowell School because he was arrested. {See Am. Compl. at ¶ 64.) From August 10, 1995 until February 1997, Keitt was detained in various juvenile detention centers, including the Spofford Detention Center, Tryon Division for Youth, Allen Residential Center, Adirondack Wilderness Challenge and others. {See id. at ¶ 90.) Keitt attended class throughout this 18-month period, allegedly without any accommodations for his dyslexia. {See id. at ¶ 93.) Keitt asserts that he had a second grade reading comprehension level at the time of his release in 1997. {See id. at ¶ 94.) After his release from the juvenile detention centers, Keitt attended Springfield High School, where he was placed in a special education classroom for six months. {See id. at ¶ 65.) While he was attending Springfield High School, Keitt’s mother suffered a stroke and was not able to advocate for him. {See id. at ¶ 67.) Keitt alleges that, in high school, he was again not provided with accommodations, and he further alleges that he was harassed by other students, who called him “stupid,” “dumb,” and “retard.” (Id.) Keitt eventually stopped attending school. (See id.) 2. Detention in City (DOC) and State (DOCS) Facilities In 1998, not long after he left Springfield High School, Keitt was arrested and detained in a facility operated by DOC. (See id. at ¶ 103). Further, Keitt alleges that he has been detained in DOC facilities at Rikers Island, including the Robert N. Davoren Complex (“RNDC”), the Eric M. Taylor Center (“EMTC”), and the George R. Vierno Center (“GRVC”), for much of the past decade, “from late 1998 to the present.” (Id.) At these facilities, he purportedly “was not provided reasonable appropriate accommodations at any time,” but, nevertheless, was “required to attend Standard/Basic educational classes.” (Id. at ¶ 104). According to DOCS administrative records, though, Keitt was in state custody from September 28, 2000, until he was released to parole on September 10, 2003. While Keitt was again arrested by New York City police on at least June 8, 2005, see Keitt v. City of New York, No. 09 Civ. 5663(PKC)(DF), 2010 WL 3466175, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2010) (Report & Recommendation), adopted by 2010 WL 3466079 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2010), and thus was presumably held in City custody for a period thereafter, it further appears that Keitt was taken into state custody for a second time on April 20, 2006, following a conviction and sentencing. Indeed, Keitt has presumably been in the state DOCS systern continuously since then, given that the sentence he received on April 4, 2006, was an aggregate term of 23 years’ imprisonment. See People v. Keitt, 60 A.D.3d 501, 875 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1st Dep’t 2009). The Amended Complaint does not include any allegation as to when Keitt was transferred to Elmira, although Keitt did file a notice with the Court on October 23, 2009 that he had been transferred there. See Keitt v. City of New York, No. 09 Civ. 5663 (Dkt. 10). Keitt alleges generally that he was denied reasonable accommodations in the education program at Elmira. (See Am. Compl. at ¶ 219.) More specifically, he claims that Lepkowski, the education supervisor at Elmira, failed to accommodate his dyslexia. (See id. at ¶¶ 261-64.) While he was at Elmira, Keitt grieved his claim that his dyslexia was not being accommodated in the education program he was attending. (See Am. Compl. at ¶ 220.) Superintendent Bradt’s response to Keitt’s grievance stated that Keitt had alleged that, as “a dyslexia disabled prisoner, [he was] being denied necessary accommodations to participate in the [Adult Basic Education] program” and that his “grievance [was] denied [due] to age limitations.” (Id., Ex. 4 (Superintendent Bradt’s response, dated January 27, 2010, to Keitt’s grievance).) Keitt also submitted a request for accommodation under the ADA, seeking extended time for tests, to be permitted to circle multiple choice answers (rather than completing corresponding responses), to use notes from other students, and to have a reader, books on tape, or materials with large print. (See id. at Ex. 2). Reynolds allegedly denied the requested accommodation on the ground that Keitt had failed to establish that he was dyslexic. (See id. at ¶ 225.) Beyond claiming that his dyslexia was not reasonably accommodated, Keitt also alleges that certain correction officers threatened to make false disciplinary reports because of his requests for accommodations. (See id. at ¶ 244.) In particular, Keitt directs such allegations at Fusco, who was his teacher in an adult basic education program at Elmira. (See id. at ¶ 268.) Although Keitt allegedly informed Fusco that he required accommodations because of his dyslexia, Fusco purportedly threatened to issue Keitt a misbehavior report for failing to complete assignments and falsely claimed that Keitt created disturbances in the program. (See id. at ¶ 269.) On May 28, 2010, Keitt was issued a misbehavior report,' which Keitt claims was false. (See id. at ¶ 245.) Keitt alleges that he has learned that “staff ha[d] been instructed to issue him a misbehavior report at every opportunity.” (Id. at ¶ 230.) He further alleges that he “was compelled” to sign out of the adult basic education program. (See id. at ¶ 270.) Thereafter, because Keitt was not attending school and did not have a general education degree (“G.E.D.”), Livermore, who was a member of the Program Committee at Elmira, allegedly refused to allow Keitt to attend Elmira’s strength/fitness program. (See id. at ¶ 274.) Keitt alleges that he was unable to defend himself adequately on the May 28, 2010 disciplinary charges because he could not read the notice of the charges against him or explain his defenses, and he was found guilty. (See id. at ¶ 245.) He seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief, requiring DOCS and its employees to provide accommodations to dyslexic prisoners at disciplinary hearings. (See id. at ¶ 248.) On or about October 21, 2010, after he filed the Amended Complaint, Keitt was transferred to Attica. He remains there, as of this date, and seeks to add claims about his treatment there, in his proposed Second Amended Complaint. B. Procedural Background Keitt filed his original Complaint on June 22, 2009. (See Compl., at 51.) The Court issued an Order on October 7, 2009, directing Keitt to amend his Complaint, which named more than 100 defendants and asserted claims arising in 16 different facilities, the majority of which are not in this district. (See Order, dated October 7, 2009 (Dkt. 3).) After several requests for extensions of time, Keitt submitted an Amended Complaint, which he apparently signed on June 28, 2010. (Dkt. 10.) Keitt also filed two actions in the Northern District of New York, one of which raises claims about the denial of reasonable accommodations for his dyslexia in facilities within that district. The City Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), on grounds that: (1) the EEOA does not apply; (2) Keitt fails to state a claim under Section 1981; (3) Keitt’s claims under the IDEA, Section 1983, Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA are barred by his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies under the IDEA or are untimely; (4) city agencies are not suable entities; (5) Keitt fails to state a claim against City Defendants under Sections 1985 and 1986; and (6) Keitt fails to state a claim for procedural due process or for a violation of the ADA. (See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, dated Jan. 11, 2011 (Dkt. 34) (“City Defs. Mem.”).) The State Defendants move to dismiss on grounds that: (1) the claims against the State of New York and it agencies are barred by the 11th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as are the claims for damages against individual officers in their official capacities; (2) the claims for injunctive relief against Elmira Officers Livermore and Lepkowski in their official capacities are moot because Keitt was transferred to Attica; (3) Keitt fails to state a claim under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act; (4) the claims against Commissioner Fischer should be dismissed for lack of personal involvement; (5) punitive damages are not available; and (6) the remaining claims should be severed and transferred to the Western District of New York. (See Memorandum of Law in Support of State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and to Sever and Transfer Venue, dated Jan. 11, 2011 (Dkt. 36) (“State Defs. Mem.”).) Keitt opposes both motions to dismiss and the motion to sever and transfer. Keitt also moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, but does not explain in the moving papers what changes he seeks to make in his pleading. (See Plaintiffs Motion to Amend[] the Complaint, dated Mar. 14, 2011 (Dkt. 49) (“PLMot.”).) The proposed Second Amended Complaint appears to add four new Attica defendants for claims arising after Keitt’s transfer to that facility. (See id., attaching Proposed Section Amended Complaint (“Prop.2d Am. Compl.”).) It also includes claims against two new Elmira defendants for failing to accommodate Keitt’s disability in disciplinary proceedings in June and July 2010. Keitt also re-identifies Bradt in the caption of the proposed Second Amended Complaint as Superintendent of Attica, where this defendant is now employed, rather than as Superintendent of Elmira, where he had been employed at the time this case commenced. Finally, Keitt adds allegations that Defendants acted with “bad faith and gross misjudgment.” Both the State and City Defendants oppose the motion to amend. (Dkts. 57, 58.) DISCUSSION I. MOTIONS TO DISMISS A. Applicable Legal Standards Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss a claim on the ground that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. In deciding such a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000); see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (“[I]t is well established that, in passing on a motion to dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader.”). In resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), however, a district court may consider evidence outside the pleadings. See Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113 (citing Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir.1986)). Moreover, where subject matter jurisdiction is contested, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See id. A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when it is not “legally sufficient” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Kopec v. Coughlin, 922 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir.1991). In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] as true all factual statements alleged in the complaint and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir.2007). Though the Court will construe a pro se plaintiffs pleadings liberally and “interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest,” Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994), the plaintiff is still required to comply with all “relevant rules of procedural substantive law.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.1983). Any “[cjonclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 337 (2d Cir.2006). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiffs complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim “has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Keitt filed his motion to amend prior to the Court’s issuance of a decision on Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Accordingly, to the extent the Court finds any deficiencies in the original pleading, the Court will also consider whether the proposed amendment cures the defects, and whether the amendment should thus be permitted. B. EEOA Claims All Defendants move to dismiss Keitt’s claims under the EEOA for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. (See City Defs. Mem. at 16-17; State Defs. Mem. at 13.) The EEOA provides that “[n]o State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex or national origin.” 20 U.S.C. § 1703. This statute was “intended to ‘specify appropriate remedies for the orderly removal of the vestiges of the dual school system.’ ” Lopez v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 668 F.Supp.2d 406, 415 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (quoting United States v. City of Yonkers, 96 F.3d 600, 620 (2d Cir.1996)). In his Amended Complaint, Keitt alleges that he has been denied educational opportunities because of dyslexia, not because of his “race, color, sex or national origin,” as required to state a claim under the EEOA. 20 U.S.C. § 1703. I therefore recommend granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss Keitt’s claims under the EEOA. C. IDEA Claims All Defendants move to dismiss Keitt’s claims that he did not receive a free, appropriate public education, in violation of the IDEA, on the ground that Keitt failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. (See City Defs. Mem. at 13-15; State Defs. Mem. at 13.) Defendants further contend that the IDEA subjects any other federal statutory claim seeking relief available under the IDEA to the same administrative exhaustion requirement; they therefore also move to dismiss Keitt’s ADA, Rehabilitation Act and Section 1983 claims for failure to exhaust his IDEA remedies. (See id.; see also Cave v. E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir.2008) (dismissing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, which sought relief available under the IDEA, where plaintiff failed to exhaust IDEA remedies).) All Defendants argue, in the alternative, that Keitt’s IDEA claims should be dismissed as time-barred. (See City Defs. Mem. at 11-12; State Defs. Mem. at 12-13.) 1. Exhaustion Congress enacted the IDEA “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free, appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services,” Somoza v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 538 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir.2008), and included procedural safeguards that enable parents and students to challenge the local educational agency’s decisions, Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195, 197 (2d Cir.2002). The IDEA also requires states to establish procedures whereby parents may, among other things, present a complaint “with respect to any matter relating to the ... provision of a free appropriate public education to [their] child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A). New York’s administrative review system involves two steps: a review of the child’s IEP by an impartial hearing officer, N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1), and an appeal to a state review officer, who may modify any decision made by the impartial hearing officer. Piazza, Jr. v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 777 F.Supp.2d 669, 678-79 (S.D.N.Y.2011). Generally, a plaintiff must exhaust both steps to bring a civil action under the IDEA or under any other statutory claim seeking relief available under the IDEA. See Coleman v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 503 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir.2007) (prospective plaintiffs must await a “final” agency decision before they have the right to sue). A plaintiff should not be excused from the exhaustion requirement when “administrative review would further the goals of developing facts, making use of available expertise, and promoting efficiency.” J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 112-13 (2d Cir.2004). The IDEA’S exhaustion requirement does not apply, however, “in situations in which exhaustion would be futile.” Coleman, 503 F.3d at 205. The futility exception covers cases in which a plaintiff demonstrates that “adequate remedies are not reasonably available or that the wrongs alleged could not or would not have been corrected by resort to the administrative hearing process.” Id. at 205. For example, the futility exception applies where “parents were not notified of the available due process remedies,” Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir.2002), the local or state education agency was itself acting contrary to law, Heldman ex rel. T.H. v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 159 (2d Cir.1992), or the defendant is alleged to have committed a “systemic” violation of the IDEA, Cave, 514 F.3d at 249. Plaintiffs have also been allowed to avoid the exhaustion requirement when the complaint alleges that a school has failed to implement services that were clearly stated in an IEP. Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 489 (2d Cir.2002). It is clear from the face of the Amended Complaint that Keitt has not exhausted IDEA administrative remedies. (See, e.g., Am. Compl. at ¶ 32 (“[I]t is clear [that his mother] did not know the rights of her son and allowed the [p]ublie [sjchool [s]ystem to go so many years without providing her son with reasonable accommodations.”).) When a complaint, on its face, reflects that it could not be amended to allege that the plaintiff satisfied the exhaustion requirement, failure to exhaust is a proper ground for a motion to dismiss. See Levine v. Greece Central Sch. Dist., No. 09-910-cv, 2009 WL 3765813, at *2 (2d Cir.2009). Given that it is clear from the Amended Complaint that Keitt has not exhausted his IDEA administrative remedies, the IDEA claims must be dismissed for failure to exhaust, unless an exception to the exhaustion requirement applies. See J.S., 386 F.3d at 112 (holding that plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the futility exception applies). Keitt contends in his opposition to the City’s motion that the futility exception to the exhaustion requirement applies because neither he nor his parents were notified of IDEA administrative procedures. (Pl.(City) Opp. at 15.) In particular, Keitt alleges in his Amended Complaint that “it is clear [that his mother] did not know the rights of her son” (Am. Compl. at ¶ 32), that “there is nothing to support that she was given educational options for her son” (id. at ¶ 33), and that “[i]t is clear that plaintiff’s mother was not aware of [Keitt’s] rights under the ... I.D.E.A.” (id. at ¶ 62). He further alleges that “plaintiff [and] his mother were not informed of their rights and the D.O.E.’s obligations to them.” (Id. at ¶ 77; see also id. at ¶ 207 (“State educators failed to ... properly inform plaintiff and his parent of their rights concerning his education.”).) The Amended Complaint thus alleges that neither Keitt nor his parents were notified of available remedies for alleged violations of the IDEA, and the Court accepts these factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss. Jaghory v. New York State Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir.1997). The Second Circuit has excused the ex-háustion requirement in such circumstances because the failure “to notify plaintiffs of their procedural rights under the IDEA ‘deprived [them] of the opportunity to take advantage of the procedural safeguards offered by the statute.’ ” See Weixel, 287 F.3d at 149 (citing Quackenbush v. Johnson City Sch. Dist., 716 F.2d 141, 147 (2d Cir.1983)). Accordingly, accepting as true, at this stage of the litigation, Keitt’s allegations that Defendants failed to provide notice of the procedural safeguards available under the IDEA, Keitt has satisfied his burden of demonstrating that the futility exception to the exhaustion requirement applies. I therefore recommend denying Defendants’ motions to dismiss Keitt’s IDEA claims as unexhausted. I also recommend denying, for the same reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss as unexhausted his claims under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act and Section 1983. 2. Statute of Limitations Keitt’s IDEA claims are, however, subject to dismissal as time-barred, as discussed below. a. Applicable Limitations Period Prior to July 2005, the IDEA did not specify a limitations period. Courts therefore borrowed the most analogous state statute, which some district courts had concluded was the one-year limitations period contained in Section 297(5) of the N.Y. Human Rights Law. See Somoza, 538 F.3d at 114 n. 7 (collecting cases). The IDEA was amended in 2004 to include a two-year statute of limitations that became effective in July 2005, Piazza, 777 F.Supp.2d at 681 n. 7 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C)), although the law is unsettled as to whether the two-year statute of limitations in the amended IDEA can be applied to claims that arose before the effective date, see Somoza, 538 F.3d at 114 n. 7. The City Defendants contend that a one-year limitations period applies to Keitt’s IDEA claims because these claims accrued before the statute was amended (see City Defs. Mem. at 11), while the State Defendants contend that the two-year limitations period applies (see State Defs. Mem. at 13 (“the IDEA has a two-year deadline”)). By its express terms, however, the two-year period now in Section 1415(f)(3)(C)' governs only the timé to request an administrative due process hearing. See Piazza, 777 F.Supp.2d at 686-87. It is therefore inapplicable to the situation where a plaintiff is excused from the administration exhaustion requirement because of futility and brings an action directly in federal court. See id. at 688-89 (noting that “the IDEA is silent” regarding the limitations period governing unexhausted IDEA claims brought directly in federal court). Where a federal statute is silent, a court generally supplies the statute of limitations from the most closely analogous state statute. Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 414, 125 S.Ct. 2444, 162 L.Ed.2d 390 (2005). Contrary to the authority cited by the City Defendants, however, “[cjourts in the Second Circuit considering IDEA claims that are permissibly unexhausted have [applied] a three-year statute of limitations borrowed from N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2),” which governs “an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute.... ” Piazza, 777 F.Supp.2d at 689 (collecting cases). A three-year limitations period would also apply to the extent Keitt is bringing his IDEA claim under Section 1983. See Quackenbush v. Johnson City Sch. Dist., 716 F.2d 141, 147 (2d Cir.1983) (finding right of action for IDEA violations to be available under Section 1983, where plaintiff has been denied procedural safeguards and there is no final administrative decision). b. Accrual of Keitt’s Claims In the Amended Complaint, Keitt alleges that Defendants violated the IDEA by failing to provide him with an appropriate education: (1) in the public schools through 1998; (2) in juvenile detention facilities from 1995-97; (3) at city-operated facilities at Rikers Island, where he was incarcerated at various times beginning in 1998; and (4) in state facilities operated by DOCS where he was incarcerated from 2000-03, and again beginning in 2006. “An IDEA claim accrues on the date that a plaintiff or his parent ‘knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint.’ ” Somoza, 538 F.3d at 114 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B)). Keitt’s argument that his claims accrued at the time of “discovery that [he had] grounds for such a suit” (Pl.(City) Opp. at ¶ 5), must be rejected because accrual of the statute of limitations does not depend on plaintiffs knowledge of the law, but rather on a plaintiffs knowledge of the injury. See Fairley v. Collins, No. 09 Civ. 6894(PGG), 2011 WL 1002422, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2011) (holding that a plaintiffs ignorance about his ability to file a lawsuit is not sufficient to delay the accrual of the statute of limitations) (citing Ormiston v. Nelson, 117 F.3d 69, 72 n. 5 (2d Cir.1997)); see also Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir.1980) (holding that federal claims accrue “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury”); Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 871 (2d Cir.1994) (explaining that the inquiry about the date of accrual “focuses on the date of the complained-of act”). The City Defendants contend that all of Keitt’s claims accrued in 1995 when his mother removed him from public school and enrolled him in the private Lowell School because she “knew or had reason to know” that he was being denied an appropriate education at that point. (See City Defs. Mem. at 9-10 (“Plaintiffs IDEA claims accrued when Plaintiff was fourteen (14) years old, as it is clear from the Amended Complaint that Plaintiffs mother knew or had reason to know” that “special education services were allegedly being denied to Plaintiff’).) This may be true as to any IDEA claim arising at the public school from which Keitt was withdrawn in eighth grade. The City Defendants fail to establish, however, that Keitt’s other IDEA claims — which arose in juvenile facilities between 1995-97, in high school in 1998, or in various Rikers Island facilities intermittently beginning in 1998 — accrued in 1995, before Keitt had even entered such facilities. In 1995, neither Keitt nor his mother “knew or had reason to know” that he would be denied an appropriate education when he later entered such facilities. The City Defendants argue, in the alternative, that all of Keitt’s IDEA claims accrued at the latest in 2002, the year he reached the age of 21; the State Defendants also make this argument. (See City Defs. Mem. at 11; State Defs. Mem. at 12). Keitt was born on February 25, 1981, and thus he reached the age of 21 on February 25, 2002. (See Am. Compl., Ex. 1). “New York law requires the DOE to provide educational services for children with disabilities until they receive a high school diploma or complete the school year following their twenty-first birthday.” So-mom, 538 F.3d at 113 n. 6 (citing N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(5)). “Under New York law, a child is ‘no longer entitled to the protections and benefits of the [IDEA] after the age of twenty-one and does not have a right to demand a public education beyond [that] age.’ ” Id. Thus, Defendants are correct that Keitt’s IDEA claims accrued at the latest at the end of the school year in 2002, the year he reached the age of 21. Having concluded that Keitt’s IDEA claims accrued at the very latest at the end of the school year in 2002 and that a three-year statute of limitations applies, Keitt’s IDEA claims would be untimely after 2005. Thus, as Keitt’s Complaint should be considered to have been filed on June 22, 2009, his IDEA claims are untimely, unless tolling of the limitations period is available. c. Potential Tolling In opposing the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint as untimely, Keitt contends that, “[e]ven if the [P]laintiff knew that his constitutional rights were violated while in the DOCS, there [were] no policies and/or procedures in place to [e]nsure Plaintiff [was] afforded a reasonable accommodation to participate in the law library....” (PI. (State) Opp. at ¶ 7.) The Court construes this as an allegation that Keitt is entitled to equitable tolling. Under federal law, a litigant seeking to invoke equitable tolling must establish that: (1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005). Keitt’s argument fails for at least two reasons. First, even assuming that DOCS policies with respect to dyslexic individuals could be considered an extraordinary circumstance, Keitt fails sufficiently to allege that DOCS policies caused the untimeliness of his Complaint. See, e.g., Harper v. Ercole, 648 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir.2011) (explaining that a “court may conclude that such causation is lacking where the identified extraordinary circumstances arose and concluded early within the limitations period”). Here, Keitt’s IDEA claims accrued at the latest in 2002, and Keitt does not allege that he was in DOCS custody throughout the period when he could have brought these claims. Moreover, DOCS administrative records reflect that Keitt was released from DOCS custody in September 2003, and was not taken into DOCS custody again until April 2006. DOCS policy therefore did not cause the untimeliness of his Complaint because, even if he was in DOCS custody until 2003, Keitt was released years before the statute of limitations for filing his IDEA claim expired. Second, Keitt does not allege that he actually sought to file his IDEA claims while he was in DOCS custody, but, rather, only that, had he known that he had valid legal claims and thus had tried to file (which he did not), he would have been stymied by DOCS policies. Keitt’s allegations regarding DOCS policies are therefore insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy his burden on equitable tolling. Keitt also has no basis for invoking tolling under state law. “[F]ederal courts must borrow a state’s tolling rules unless to do so ‘would defeat the goals of the federal statute at issue.’ ” M.D. v. Southington Bd. of Educ., 334 F.3d 217, 224 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539, 109 S.Ct. 1998, 104 L.Ed.2d 582 (1989)). New York law provides for equitable tolling where a defendant “wrongfully deceived or misled the plaintiff in order to conceal the existence of a cause of action.” Kellogg v. Office of the Chief Med. Exam’r of the City of New York, 6 Misc.3d 666, 791 N.Y.S.2d 278, 283 n. 2 (Sup.Ct. Bronx Co.2004). Whether this is treated as a doctrine of equitable estoppel or equitable tolling, the essence of the doctrine is that serious misconduct by the defendant should estop the defendant from relying on the statute of limitations. See Keitt, 2010 WL 3466175, at *9. Keitt has not identified any fraud, misrepresentation or deception by any defendant that prevented him from bringing his IDEA claims. He has therefore failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable tolling under this doctrine of New York law. The Court also considers whether Keitt is entitled to statutory tolling. New York has codified the circumstances under which a limitations period may be tolled. See, e.g., N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 204(a) (where commencement of an action has been stayed by court order), id. at § 204 (where a dispute has been submitted to arbitration but is ultimately determined to be nonarbitrable), id. at § 207(3) (where the defendant is outside New York at the time the claim accrues), id. at § 208 (where the plaintiff is disabled by infancy or insanity), id. at § 210 (upon the death of a plaintiff or defendant). There is a conflict among the Circuits as to whether minority tolling provisions should be applied to the IDEA. Piazza, 777 F.Supp.2d at 691 n. 19. Yet, in any event, because Keitt was not a minor during the period he seeks to toll, the minority tolling provision in Section 208 does not assist him. Nor can Keitt successfully invoke the “insanity” provision of Section 208, which extends only to “those individuals who are unable to protect their legal rights because of an over-all inability to function in society.” McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Am., 55 N.Y.2d 543, 548, 450 N.Y.S.2d 457, 435 N.E.2d 1072 (1982). The state courts have construed this provision narrowly, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate an extremely high degree of incapacity to invoke the provision. See, e.g., Burgos v. City of New York, 294 A.D.2d 177, 742 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (1st Dep’t 2002) (plaintiff who suffered “dementia and psychotic disorder” “due to multiple medical conditions” that existed for many years and were permanent failed to establish a sufficient inability to function under Section 208); Dumas v. Agency for Child Development-New York City Head Start, 569 F.Supp. 831, 833 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (diagnosis of “schizophrenia, paranoid; chronic with acute exacerbation” did not result in tolling because disability “was not of the severe and incapacitating nature contemplated by the tolling statute”). Keitt has not come close to showing that his claimed dyslexia rendered him unable to function in society, within the meaning of Section 208, and, indeed, this Court has previously concluded otherwise. See Keitt, 2010 WL 3466175, at *7-9. Finally, courts in this Circuit have bee