Full opinion text
ORDER G. MURRAY SNOW, District Judge. Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 265), Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 271), Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 333), and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Certification of Issue for Interlocutory Appeal. (Doc. 334). For the reasons stated below, each motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part, and both other motions are denied. BACKGROUND On November 7, 2008, at approximately 12:20 pm, David Hulstedt (“David”) called 9-1-1. Operator Christina Trott of the Scottsdale Police Department (“SPD”) answered. David told Operator Trott that he had “an emergency here” and that “I need to have Janet Napolitano come to my house.” (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 1). In the background, Trott could hear David’s two-year-old daughter, D.H., crying. Trott asked David the nature of his emergency, whether he was armed, and whether he was hurting the child, but David refused to answer and instead hung up the phone. Trott issued a call for an “unknown problem” at David’s address. (Id. at 2). She designated the call as level one out of nine levels used by SPD. Level one, the highest designation available to SPD operators, is usually reserved for bank robberies or rapes, and is a higher priority, for example, than a home invasion in progress. (Doc. 272-1, Ex. C). After notifying dispatch of the issue, Trott telephoned the number back. David’s father, Walter Hulstedt (“Walt”), answered, but spoke only briefly before David came on the line and once again asked for the Governor to be sent to his house. David’s mother, Janice Hulstedt (“Janice”) then came on the line. Apparently unaware that David had called 9-1-1, Janice seemed surprised that the police had called her house. As Trott spoke with Janice, D.H. could be heard crying in the background, and at least one of the men could be heard shouting. Janice stated that the baby was crying because they “[pjrobably need[] to change the diaper ... and we’ve been screaming.” (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 4). After being questioned further by Trott, Janice explained that the family had just returned from the doctor, that they were having a family “indifference,” and that David was having “a nervous breakdown.” (Id. at 4-6). Janice spoke calmly but with a slightly nervous tone. Although Janice answered all of Trott’s questions, Trott suggested that she was being evasive and was not providing accurate information. For example, after Janice mentioned her son David, Trott stated that Janice “said there was nobody there but you and your husband,” although Janice had in fact made no such statement. (Id. at 5). Janice confirmed that the baby was safe, and acknowledged that David’s behavior was abnormal. (Id. at 7-8). David took the phone back, stated that he was holding the baby, and asked that the Attorney General be sent to his house. He then hung up the phone. (Id.). Multiple police officers, including Sergeant Jason Stumpf, Officer Wendy Field, and Officer Michael Hertko, began to respond to the call. The transcripts of conversations between officers over SPD radio frequencies demonstrate that those officers had been told that someone was asking for the Governor, a baby was screaming in the background, and that “[n]obody’s answering the call taker’s questions as far as what’s going on there.” (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 9). Officer Field was the first to arrive on the scene; by the time she was there, Trott had called the house again and reached Walter. Walter sounded anxious, stated that David was holding the baby, and that he needed “to take a pill so I can-don’t have a heart attack.” (Id. at 13). Trott instructed Walt and Janice to leave the house and speak to the officers. Walt and Janice obeyed her instruction, leaving D.H. alone inside with David. They were in contact with officers outside the house by approximately 12:32 pm. (Id. at 16). Officer Hertko entered the covered garage area of the home. David opened the door leading from the house to the garage; he was holding D.H. as he did so. (Doc. 272-1, Ex. B at 19-21). As described by Officer Hertko, David was cradling D.H. against his chest. (Doc. 266-1, Ex. A-3, Ex. 186-87). According to Hertko, the child was moving around while David held her and did not appear to be in distress. (Doc. 266-4, Ex. N at 9). David again asked for public officials to come to his house, and, when officers attempted to engage him, he reentered the home in a manner described alternately as “running” or “hurriedly retreating.” (Doc. 272-1, Ex. B at 27). He opened the door and shouted at Officer Hertko a number of times, at least once without D.H. present. (Doc. 266-4, Ex. N at 6). At 12:34, Officer Hertko stated over the radio that it “looks like we’re going to have a barricade situation.” (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 16). During this period, Janice and Walt had been speaking to officers on the scene. Walt had informed Officer Field that a firearm was hidden in the house, but that David did not know where, and that there was no ammunition in the house. (Doc. 272-1, Ex. D). Walt further told Officer Field that David had earlier threatened to throw D.H. out a window if Walt did not come over to him. (Doc. 272-1, Ex. D at 57). At 12:36, Officer Hertko transmitted over SPD radio that, “prior to our arrival, he threatened to drop the child out of a window.... In dialogue with the police on the scene, he’s merely stated that he wants the Attorney General ... and made no threats towards us or the child, although he is still holding the child and inside the residence somewhere.” (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 18). Other officers continued to arrive on the scene, including Lieutenant Francis O’Halloran, who served as incident commander and who had established control by 1:07 pm. (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 16). One group of officers, led by Sergeant James Dorer, established an inner perimeter, in which officers were up against the wall of the house, including Officer Field and at least two others. (Doc. 267-3, Ex. BB at 9). Officer Field was equipped with a Taser and the other officers were equipped with “breaching” equipment sufficient to take down a door. (Doc. 267, Ex. S at 10). The inner perimeter, alternately referred to as the “crisis team,” was prepared, “if we got any indication that he was hurting the child,” to “force entry and go to do a crisis rescue.” (Id. at 19). An outer perimeter was established and led by Sergeant Stumpf. (Doe. 267-3, Ex. BB at 9). During this period, David’s brother, Plaintiff W. Eric Hulstedt, also arrived on the scene. Sergeant Stumpf contacted David’s psychiatrist, Dr. Koelsch, who informed him that David had been treated for anxiety and paranoid schizophrenia. (Doc. 270-2, Ex. JJJ at 72). Family members and Sergeant Stumpf spoke to Lt. O’Halloran, informing him that David had been advised by his minister the day before to go to the hospital, and had seen his doctor that morning. (Doc. 267-3, Ex. BB at 6). According to Lt. O’Halloran, although various information was being transmitted over the radio, including David’s requests for the Governor and his alleged threat earlier in the day to throw D.H. out the window if his father did not approach, “none of that made sense with what was going on,” and it was not clear to Lt. O’Halloran who had been the source for what information. (Doc. 267-3, Ex. BB at 14). On more than one occasion, David exited or partially exited the house and spoke to the officers. On these occasions, he asked either for the Governor or the Attorney General, as before, or for family members. Sergeant Dorer stated over the radio that David had stated “he wants to talk to his dad, wants to talk to the Attorney General, et cetera.” (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 34). Officer Daniel Antrim and Officer William Hathaway, who served as hostage negotiators, made contact with David over the phone at approximately 1:25 pm. (Doc. 313-2, Ex. L-2). The negotiators were supervised by Sergeant Larry Marmie. Officer Antrim spoke directly to David, while Officer Hathaway spoke to Officer Antrim, and occasionally reported on the negotiation’s progress over the police radio system. (Doc. 313-2, Ex. L-2). David frequently hung up on Officer An-trim, who continued to call him back. At five minutes into one of their conversations, David stated that he was not going to answer the phone unless his brother Eric was sent into the house. (Doc. 313-2, Ex. L-2 at 2). While the negotiators were talking with David, his family members, including his parents, his brother Eric, and Eric’s wife Sara Hulstedt, were also in contact with David by telephone. (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 47). David stated that he believed the police were not interested in his safety, were only present to protect D.H., and were planning to shoot him. (Id.). At some point before 1:37 pm, David told Officer Antrim that he would “pile-drive” his daughter into the ground if his brother Eric was not sent into the house. (Doc. 313-2, Ex. L-2 at 4). Officer Antrim whispered “pile-drive” to Officer Hathaway, who broadcast “Subject made a comment about pile driving the child,” over the radio at 1:37 pm. (Doc. 313-1, Ex. L-2 at 4; Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 47). Three minutes later, Lt. O’Halloran radioed the inner perimeter, as follows: “He said that if his brother doesn’t come in, he’s going to pile-drive his three-year-old daughter into the ground.” (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 48). Eric was not sent into the house, and no further threats were broadcast over the police radio. Lt. O’Halloran then made a call for a SWAT team. (Doc. 267-3, Ex. BB at 29). Lt. O’Halloran decided that having family members speak to David, as David had requested, would “not help resolve the scene at all” and ordered officers to confiscate the family members’ cell phones. (Doc. 267-3, Ex. BB at 34). Sergeant Richard Slavin, who had previously contacted Operator Trott to determine the location of the incident, responded to the call for SWAT team members. (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 43, 51). He reached the vicinity of the house at 1:51 pm, but was still at least a few blocks away from the house itself. (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 53). Once the family members’ cell phones had been confiscated, Officer Antrim continued to speak to David over the telephone, stating that “we’re working on getting your brother but you do know as well as I do that this is not a real common practice to send someone into a home like that.” (Doc. 313-2, Ex. L-2 at 5). After fifteen minutes of negotiation, David apparently once again expressed concern that the police were there to shoot him. Officer An-trim continued to negotiate, and learned more about David’s anxiety and his medication. (Doc. 313-2, Ex. L-2 at 8). Five minutes later, David told the negotiation team that he was ready to leave the house. (Doc. 313-2, Ex. L-2 at 14). When Sgt. Slavin, who was still putting on his SWAT team gear, heard over the radio that the subject was going to leave the house, he “started running down towards the command post.” (Doc. 269, Ex. PP at 144). When Sgt. Slavin reached the command post, he told the officers there that he wanted to go to the scene, obtained directions from them, and continued running towards the house. (Id.). Sgt. Slavin had heard the previous radio transmissions, but was not aware of any operational plan, did not know how many officers were on the scene, and did not know if any officers had firearms at the ready or deployed. (Doc. 266-3, Ex. L-3 at 169-70). He made the decision to go to the scene on his own, passing through residential yards containing vegetation and cacti to reach the house. (Id.). At 1:59 pm, Sgt. Marmie broadcast over the SPD radio that David “says he’s coming out but he won’t say how.” (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 55). David exited the house at approximately 2:02 pm, more than half an hour after negotiations had begun, and more than twenty minutes after Lt. O’Halloran had broadcast that David had threatened to pile-drive D.H. if Eric were not let into the house. (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 56). He carried D.H. over his right shoulder, with her belly down and her head facing forward. (Doc. 268-1, Ex. HH at 3) When he exited, the officers near the door were speaking to him, and according to Sgt. Smith they were “telling him put his hands up, to come out.” (Doc. 268-1, HH at 3). Sgt. Dorer heard the officers giving “loud, precise, verbal commands,” but at his deposition could not state the contents of those commands. (Doc. 266, Ex. D at 77:12-14). After David came out of the house he asked officers to back away so that he could walk to the street and see his father, and officers did back away to some degree. (Doc. 268-1, Ex. HH at 4). Sgt. Dorer believed that if the officers backed away, David would have “an avenue of escape,” so he did not retreat. (Id. at 39). By the time David left the house, there were twelve officers in the inner perimeter, some of whom were equipped with less-than-lethal force options such as Tasers. (Doc. 314-5, Ex. W at 18-20). Sgt. Slavin continued to run towards the house from the command post up the street. (Doc. 266-3, Ex. L-3 at 169-70). Sgt. Smith attempted to talk with David once David came out of the house. (Doc. 268, Ex. GG at 18-19). Smith had a Taser, but did not feel it would be proper to use it, because “[y]ou don’t know with certain people exactly what that could do to that, cause a muscle contraction, and force the child down.” (Doc. 268, Ex. GG at 20). David walked a few feet down the path. He made eye contact with Sgt. Dorer, who had moved from the side of the house to a position directly between the street and the front door, and who had his rifle pointed at David. (Doc. 267, Ex. S at 48; Doc. 266-1, Ex. D at 131-132). Once he made eye contact with Sgt. Dorer, David turned, with D.H. over his head, and started walking back towards the house. (Id.). At some point after David turned around with D.H. over his head, Sgt. Slavin, who was now near the house, shouted “Put that child down!” (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 56). Sgt. Dorer aimed his rifle at the small of David’s back and fired twice. Sergeant Slavin also fired twice, within seconds of shouting “Put that child down!” (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 57). Of the four shots fired, three hit David: one hit him in the lower back, one in the right buttock, and one in the back of his right shoulder. According to Dr. Philip Keen, the shot in the small of his back and his buttock were fired from one direction, while the shot that hit his shoulder was fired from another. (Doc. 270-2, Ex. HHH, at 13). According to diagrams of the house on which they indicated their positions, when Sgts. Dorer and Slavin fired their weapons, Sgt. Dorer was approximately 34 feet from David and Sgt. Slavin was 96 feet from him. (Doc. 269-4, Ex. AAA). The Pospisil video captures the twelve seconds up to and including the shooting, and then records the scene after the shooting. (Doc. 269-3, Ex. YY-1, “Pospisil video”). Parties agree that the video does not, however, capture David from the moment he leaves the house. At the start of the video, David is holding D.H., who appears lethargic, on his right shoulder. He lifts D.H. up over his head and walks down the path towards the front of his house. His legs are not visible at all times, but he appears to take four or five steps forwards, turn around, and take two or three steps back towards the house before he is shot. D.H. falls headfirst from his arms onto the concrete path. Pospisil moves the camera after the first shot, so the recording does not capture the impact of D.H. hitting the ground, but the video shows her falling face first on her right side. At no point does David make any move to rear back and throw D.H. to the ground. Once he lifts her above his head, at four seconds into the video, he keeps her there until his is shot, at twelve seconds into the video. He drops D.H. and begins to fall at the first shot; D.H. is ahead of him in midair when the second shot is fired. (Pospisil video). Neither Sgt. Slavin nor Sgt. Dorer warned David that they would shoot him if he did not comply with their commands, and both of them shot him in the back as he was walking away from them and towards the house. (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 57, Pospisil video). Sgt. Dorer, when asked if he ever perceived at any particular moment that David was going to “pile-drive” D.H., responded, “I did not.” (Doc. 267, Ex. S at 44). Instead, he shot David “to prevent him from going back into the house.” (Id. at 43). When David was shot, he released D.H. as he collapsed and she fell forward onto the concrete walkway from a height of approximately six feet. (Pospisil video). After David fell, officers converged on D.H. and David. (Pospisil video). Sgt. Dorer and Sgt. Slavin approached David on the ground; Sgt. Dorer ordered him handcuffed and Sgt. Slavin “ordered him to be dragged away from the scene.” (Doc. 269, Ex. PP at 145). Officer Deven Fellows and Officer Marcos Garcia handcuffed David and dragged him approximately 400 feet to where the medics were stationed. (Doc. 266-2, Ex. E at 136). The officers held David under his arms with his face pointed downward, so that his bare knees were in contact with the asphalt and gravel. The dragging resulted in “gaping wounds in David’s knees” that required extensive medical attention. (Doc. 270-2, Ex. HHH). Immediately after the shooting, Sgt. Dorer asked Sgt. Slavin to form a search team and sweep the house. Sgt. Slavin and other officers entered the house. (Doc. 266-6, Ex. R at 171). Some time later, Sgt. Smith and Sgt. Marmie also entered the house; they later stated that they entered to look for medications that David or D.H. might have ingested during the standoff. (Doc. 266-2, Ex. H-19 at 152). Between eight and thirteen minutes after the shooting, and after the search of the house was .complete, Officer Daniel Greene stated over the radio that he had seen blood coming out of D.H.’s left ear prior to the shooting. (Doe. 313-1, Ex. B at 61). He further stated that David held D.H. until she was only two feet over the ground before dropping her. (Id.). No other officer, during or after the incident, reported seeing any blood coming out of either of the child’s ears. Officer Greene’s statements were repeated over the police radio by others, including Operator Trott. (Id. at 63). Officer Brooke Scritchfield repeated Officer Greene’s statements to medical officials treating D.H. (Doc. 29 ¶ 108). Officer Mark Clark issued a press release on the day of the shooting that repeated Officer Greene’s statements. (Doc. 29 ¶ 100). David was treated for three gunshot wounds, one to his lower back, one to his right buttocks, and one to his right shoulder. (Doc. 270-2, Ex. HHH, at 13). He was rendered a T10 paraplegic by the shot to the lower back and has been fitted with a catheter and colostomy bag. (Doc. 270-2, Ex. HHH at 3). In addition, the dragging resulted in “deep abrasions” to both kneecaps. (Id.). D.H. was treated by paramedics and air evacuated to Phoenix Children’s Hospital (PCH), where she was diagnosed with a “temporal skull fracture on the right” with “the fracture line extended to the medial aspect of the temporamandibular joint cavity with the widening of the suture entering into the right eustachian tube.” (Doc. 29 ¶ 28). No injury to the left side of her face was ever documented. Detective Hugh Lockerby prepared an affidavit in .support of a search warrant. (Doc. 318-4, Ex. FFFF at 9). A search warrant was obtained and executed that night. (Id. at S-B-0 003405). Plaintiffs’ complaint contains nine claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seven supplemental claims under Arizona state law. (Doc. 28). In Claim One, Plaintiffs allege that Officer Dorer and Officer Slavin violated David Hulstedt’s Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him when they shot him. In Claim Two, they allege that Officer Fellows and Officer Garcia violated David Hulstedt’s Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force when they handcuffed him and dragged him across the asphalt, that Sgt. Dorer is liable for ordering that David be handcuffed, and that Sgt. Slavin is liable for ordering the officers to drag David to the ambulance. Counts Three through Six, along with certain allegations in Count Seven, have already been dismissed on the pleadings by the original judge in this matter. (Doc. 182). In the remaining portions of Claim Seven, Plaintiffs allege that officers searched the Hulstedt home in violation of the Fourth Amendment after the shooting, and that Det. Lockerby procured a search warrant for the home through judicial deception. In Claim Eight, Plaintiffs allege that Lt. O’Halloran, Sergeant Scott Smith, Sergeant Dorer, and Sergeant Slavin bear supervisory responsibility under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for directing their subordinates to act in ways that deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. Claim Nine(a) argues that the City is liable based on two theories of municipal liability: a failure to train officers and a ratification of the officers’ decisions by the Chief of Police. The remaining claims arise under Arizona state tort law. Claim Nine(b) is for Battery against Sgt. Slavin, Sgt. Dorer, Officer Fellows, Officer Garcia, and the City. Claim Ten is for Negligence by Sgt. Dorer, Sgt. Slavin, Det. Lockerby, and the City. Claim Eleven is for Negligence against Operator Trott and the City of Scottsdale. Claim Twelve is for Defamation against Officer Greene, Det. Locker-by, Officer Scritchfield, and the City. Claim Thirteen is for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) against Sgt. Slavin, Officer Scritchfield, Officer Clark, Officer Greene, Det. Lockerby, Officer Fellows, Officer Garcia and others. Claim Fourteen is for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress against Sgt. Slavin and Sgt. Dorer, and Claim Fifteen is for Loss of Consortium against Sgt. Slavin and Sgt. Dorer. Defendants move for summary judgment on every claim. (Doc. 271). Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on Claim One, Claim Two, the remaining portion of Claim Seven, Claim Nine(a), Claim Nine(b), and Claim Ten. (Doc. 265). DISCUSSION I. Legal Standard Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Substantive law determines which facts are material and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “A fact issue is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). When the non-moving party “bear[s] the burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then summary judgment is appropriate.” Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). When the record contains a “videotape capturing the events in question,” and that videotape “quite clearly contradicts the version of the story told by” one party, the court need not adopt that party’s version of the facts, but should instead rely on the facts as presented in the recording. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769,167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). II. Analysis Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S.Code provides a cause of action for persons who have been deprived their constitutional rights by persons acting under color of law. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights” but only provides a cause of action “for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). When a plaintiff seeks to recover damages for an excessive force claim, “[t]he validity of the claim must then be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard which governs that right, rather than to some generalized ‘excessive force’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Furthermore, “all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force — deadly or not — in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Id. (emphasis in original). The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In making this determination, a court asks whether “the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right” and “whether the right was clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (abrogated in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)). For a right to be clearly established for the purposes of qualified immunity, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” and therefore “it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (emphasis deleted). A. Claim One: Fourth Amendment (excessive force) — Sgt. Dorer and Sgt. Slavin Defendants claim that even with all questions of fact resolved against them, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Alternately, they claim that they are protected from suit by qualified immunity for any Fourth Amendment violation they did commit. Plaintiffs likewise move for summary judgment, and claim that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity even when issues of facts are resolved in their favor. In Fourth Amendment claims, courts evaluate both the merits and the question of qualified immunity objectively. See, e.g., Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614, 119 S.Ct. 1692 (nothing that whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity depends upon the “objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken”). Nevertheless, since “reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct,” the examinations must be conducted separately. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Both sides have moved for summary judgment, and the motions cannot be resolved without considering disputed facts in the light most favorable to each. As both parties conceded at the hearing, however, there are relatively few disputed issues of fact here-most of what was broadcast over the police radio was recorded and has been transcribed, and the shooting itself was videotaped. Those facts that remain in dispute will be noted during the analysis. 1. Merits The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment applies to local law enforcement through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). “[Ajpprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Analyzing a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim requires “careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (internal quotations omitted). Traditionally, this balancing is conducted in three steps. First, a court must evaluate the “the type and amount of force inflicted.” Espinosa v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir.2010). Second, the court considers the government’s interest in using force, relying upon “(1) the severity of the crime; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officers’ or public’s safety, and (3) whether the suspect was resisting arrest or attempting escape.” Id. Having determined the force used and the government’s interest in using force, the court then “balance^] the gravity of the intrusion on the individual against the government’s need for that intrusion.” Miller v. Clark Cty., 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir.2003). In addition to the major Graham factors, the Ninth Circuit has noted a number of other factors relevant to a Graham analysis. Courts must consider whether reasonable officers would have been aware that the suspect is an “emotionally distraught individual” as opposed to “an armed and dangerous criminal,” Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1282 (9th Cir.2001); see also Glenn v. Washington Cty., 673 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir.2011) (holding that the fact that “[the victim]’s family did not call the police to report a crime at all, but rather to seek help for their emotionally disturbed son” was relevant to a Graham analysis). Before using force, officers must consider whether they might injure innocent bystanders in addition to the targets of the force. See Boyd v. Benton Cty., 374 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they threw a “flash-bang” grenade into “an apartment where it was believed that there were up to eight people, most of whom were unconnected to , the robbery and many of whom were likely asleep”). Further, although officers are not required to use the absolute minimum force necessary to subdue a suspect, before using force they must consider “the availability of alternative methods of capturing or subduing a suspect.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 703 (9th Cir.2005). Even these factors, however, do not merely present additional items to consider during a multi-factor test — at its most basic, Graham asks a court to determine whether an officer’s actions were reasonable, and “the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). Although it will conduct a Graham analysis, the Court is mindful that the core of Graham is reasonableness, and as the Supreme Court has noted in another Fourth Amendment context, “[E]very Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon á ‘reasonableness’ determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S, 806, 817, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (emphasis added). Among those relevant factors here was the fact that the officers were present at the scene principally to protect D.H.’s safety. (See Doc. 267-3, Ex. BB at 7 (“[Tit’s always a big deal whenever a baby’s involved with police officers, and we were involved.”)). A reasonable officer would have only shot David, regardless of other concerns, if it was likely that by doing so he would prevent David from causing D.H. more harm than she would suffer resulting from the shot. As the Ninth Circuit has emphasized, a Graham analysis takes into account “the totality of the facts and circumstances in the particular case.” Blanford v. Sacramento Cty., 406 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir.2005). The fact that the officers were present at the scene to protect D.H. remains a consideration in the Court’s analysis as it considers the Graham factors. The Graham factors will therefore not be applied in a vacuum, but with an eye towards how they relate to each other, and how they relate to the underlying question of whether a reasonable officer in either Sgt. Slavin or Sgt. Dorer’s position would have fired at David. a. Type and Amount of Force Used There is no dispute of fact that both officers used deadly force when they shot David. The use of a firearm as deadly force is governed specifically by Gamer and its progeny. An officer may shoot a felony suspect “to prevent escape” so long as “the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.” Blanford, 406 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694). When a suspect is not attempting to escape, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that an officer may not fire “unless, at a minimum, the suspect presents an immediate threat to the officer or others.” Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1201 (9th Cir.1997) (emphasis added). Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court have noted that even when circumstances dictate that an officer may use a firearm, “whenever practicable, a warning must be given before deadly force is employed.” Harris, 126 F.3d at 1201 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12, 105 S.Ct. 1694). The Ninth Circuit has defined the warning required before using force — even force that does not qualify as deadly force — as a “warning of the imminent use of such a significant degree of force.” Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1285. Mere commands, absent a statement that force will be used if the command is ignored, have not been found to constitute adequate warning. In Garner itself, the officer “called out ‘police, halt’ and took a few steps toward” Garner, and the Supreme Court nevertheless found it necessary to note that officers must instead give a “warning” before using deadly force. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 3, 105 S.Ct. 1694. Further, in Lehman v. Robinson, 228 Fed.Appx. 697 (9th Cir.2007) (judgment vacated by Robinson v. Lehman, 552 U.S. 1172, 128 S.Ct. 1219, 170 L.Ed.2d 52 (2008) reaffirmed by Lehman v. Robinson, 346 Fed.Appx. 188 (9th Cir.2009)), officers ordered a suspect to drop a knife, without warning him that they would shoot if he did not comply, and he did not do so. The Ninth Circuit found that the officers violated the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights when they then shot him, in part because they fired “without any ‘warning of the imminent use of such a significant degree of force.’ ” Id. at 700 (quoting Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1285). See also Daniels v. Cty. of Ventura, 228 Fed.Appx. 669, 670 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that a shooting violated the Fourth Amendment when officers ordered man armed with a knife to drop it and he did not, because the officer “did not warn [the victim] that he would shoot”). Recently, the Ninth Circuit found that officers who ordered members of a crowd to disperse before firing projectiles filled with oleoresin capsicum (“OC”) powder had not issued sufficient warning when there was no evidence that the officers had stated “that force would be used against [the members of the crowd] if they did not behave in a particular manner.” Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 883 (9th Cir.2012). b. The Government’s Interest in Using Force Under Graham, the government’s interest in using force is to be “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Officer An-trim correctly summarized the government’s interest in using force as a reasonable officer would have perceived it when he told David that “we’re here to ensure the safety of your child, sure of course that’s one of our major concerns, but yours as well too because you’re under a lot of stress right now.” (Doc. 313-2, Ex. L-2 at 6). Defendants do not claim that David was placing himself in imminent harm sufficient to justify the use of force. Nor would a reasonable officer, considering all of the circumstances, have perceived that David presented an immediate threat to anyone other than D.H. at the time he was shot. At that moment, David was holding D.H. above his head with both hands and walking slowly back towards the house, and he was unarmed. The government’s interest in using force was limited almost exclusively to protecting D.H.’s safety; the use of force itself instead resulted in harm to D.H. Because Graham is a holistic test, other factors, such as the use of alternative means of force, officers’ knowledge of David’s mental state, and the chance that using force would harm others will be considered in tandem with the traditional factors. i. Severity of the Crime Prior to the officers’ arrival, David had threatened to drop D.H. out a window, and this threat had been relayed over the radio before most of them arrived on the scene. (Doc. 272-1, Ex. D at 57). After the barricade was established, David threatened to “pile-drive” D.H., and this threat was broadcast to other officers. (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B 47). Officers who heard this threat could reasonably believe that he had committed a crime by threatening D.H. The totality of the circumstances in which this threat was made, however, included the facts that David was closely monitored after making the threat and took no action to carry out the threat. (Doc. 267 at 19). As the Ninth Circuit has noted, “the mere commission of prior crimes does not justify the use of deadly force.” Haugen v. Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir.2003) (overturned on qualified immunity grounds by Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004)) (collecting cases in which prior crimes included participation in a major narcotics ring, assault, violent assault of a police officer, and firing a gun). David’s threats against D.H., standing alone, do not justify the use of deadly force under the circumstances. ii. Imminent Harm Whether or not David posed an “immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others” is “the most important single element of the three specified factors” of the Graham test. Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir.1994) (emphasis added). When he was shot, David was not armed and was walking away from police officers. He was holding his daughter above his head and thus was not otherwise free to use his hands. He was not looking at police but walking slowly back towards his house. When David was in such a posture, no reasonable officer could have believed that David posed a threat to the police or to the general public. The only potential threat David posed was to D.H. herself. Officers were aware that David had threatened D.H. earlier. However, a reasonable officer could not have concluded from that threat alone that David posed an immediate threat to D.H. sufficient to shoot David when he emerged from the house twenty minutes later. Time had elapsed, and the officers had coaxed him out of the house through substantial negotiation. David’s demand had not been met, and neither Sgt. Dorer nor Sgt. Slavin had any evidence that he had hurt D.H. as a result. Sgt. Dorer’s team had been monitoring the house, ready to force entry if there was any indication that David had injured D.H., and they had not done so. (Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 32,37). Moreover, David was not the only threat to D.H.’s safety. A reasonable officer would perceive, as both Sgt. Dorer and Officer Smith testified they did perceive, that by using force against David a police officer would virtually ensure that D.H. would be dropped to the concrete. (Doc. 266-1, Ex. D-29 at 210:17-19). Firing at David also created the risk that D.H. herself would be shot. A reasonable officer would have considered the imminent harm and risk of harm that firing would cause D.H., and would not have fired unless he perceived that by doing so he was preventing an even greater harm. No reasonable officer could have perceived that David was making any physical preparation to pile drive his daughter into the ground, and the danger that such an act posed to D.H. was therefore not “immediate.” Harris, 126 F.3d at 1201. Sgt. Dorer stated that he did not perceive David make any move to throw or “pile-drive” D.H. at any particular moment. (Doc. 267, Ex. S. at 44). The videotape further indicates that David took no action that could be reasonably construed as an effort to throw D.H. to the ground. (Pospisil video). Instead, David walked slowly up the path, stopped, turned around, and started walking slowly back towards his house. Moreover, Sgt. Dorer was crouched and was aiming his scoped rifle at David’s lower back. He had both eyes open so that he, in his own words, could “pereeiv[e] with my left eye, everything else” going on at the scene, including the actions of the other officers. (Doc. 266-1, Ex. D at 134:4-5). Had David taken any action that suggested he was about to throw D.H., Sgt. Dorer was in a position to respond immediately. A reasonable officer would have perceived that the only immediate — as opposed to the generalized — threat that David posed to D.H.’s safety was the threat that he would drop her. In addition, as noted above, by firing the officers themselves posed a threat to D.H., the very person they were acting to protect. Reasonable officers in Sgt. Slavin and Sgt. Dorer’s positions would have had an interest in using force to protect D.H.’s safety. There was a danger, considering David’s erratic behavior, that he could drop or throw D.H., but the video confirms that David never took any action to throw her. (Pospisil video). Moreover, firing at David itself presented an immediate threat to D.H.’s safety that must be taken into account when the Graham factors are balanced below. iii. Resisting or Attempting to Evade Arrest David was not resisting the officers or attempting to evade arrest in such 'a way as to increase significantly the government’s interest in using force. The Ninth Circuit has held that a suspect who fled police, but was cornered in a scrapyard, was not fleeing or attempting to escape officers because “in a more precise sense his flight had terminated, at least temporarily, in the scrapyard.” Chew, 27 F.3d at 1442. In Smith v. City of Hemet, the Ninth Circuit found that a suspect had not actively resisted arrest or attempted to flee when he had refused to take his hands out of his pockets, re-entered his house when ordered not to, and refused to submit to being handcuffed, because “it does not appear that [his] resistance was particularly bellicose or that he showed any signs of fleeing the area.” 394 F.3d at 703. The Ninth Circuit has recently reiterated that “active resistance is not to be found simply because of a failure to comply with the full extent of an officer’s orders.” Nelson, 685 F.3d at 882. David was slowly walking back towards his house while holding D.H. over his head. David’s house was surrounded by armed police officers who had instituted a barricade. Of course, David was attempting to leave the front yard where he was exposed, and the government had some interest in keeping him in an exposed area. Defendants claim that David was resisting arrest because he disobeyed orders to put the child down, but do not deny that officers also ordered him to put his hands up, and cannot manufacture noncompliance by giving contradictory orders. (Doc. 268-1, Ex. HH at 2; Doc. 313-1, Ex. B at 56). David’s behavior was, if anything, more compliant than that of the suspects in Chew and City of Hemet. Although the officers had some interest in maintaining David’s position in the front yard, he was not actively resisting arrest or attempting to escape sufficient to provide the government with a substantially greater interest in using force against him. c. Balancing of Interests i. Sgt. Dorer Resolving all disputes of fact in his favor, no reasonable officer would have fired when Sgt. Dorer did. The government had an interest in using some force to apprehend David for the crime it alleges he committed. It had an interest in using force to prevent him from dropping D.H. It had some interest in preventing him from entering the house. None of these interests, alone or combined, justified.using deadly force. Considering “the facts and circumstances confronting” Sgt. Dorer, it was not reasonable to use deadly force against David to protect D.H. from the mere possibility that he may harm her after returning to the house. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Any such threat was only speculative and did not present near the immediacy that the law requires. See Harris, 126 F.3d at 1201. The only arguable reason to fire — preventing David from throwing D.H. to the ground' — cannot justify this shooting because no evidence suggests that David was in “immediate” danger of throwing the girl. Harris, 126 F.3d at 1201. Sgt. Dorer perceived no such threat, and as discussed below in conjunction with Officer Slavin, no reasonable officer would have done so. By firing, Sgt. Dorer substituted the purely speculative risk that David would harm D.H. in the house, or that he may throw her, with the certainty that she would fall to the ground and the risk that she herself would be shot. As the Ninth Circuit recently noted in a case where it found officers had violated a man’s Fourth Amendment rights by shooting him with a beanbag shotgun to prevent him from injuring himself, “in cases like this one the ‘solution’ could be worse than the problem.” Glenn v. Washington Cty., 673 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir.2011). When the interest in using force is balanced against the fact that by firing, Sgt. Dorer caused the only truly immediate harm that D.H. faced, no reasonable officer would have fired, ii. Sgt. Slavin Sgt. Slavin also acted unreasonably. Sgt. Slavin provided the following description of what he claimed he saw: [H]e had the child above his head, with her back resting on the top of his head.... [H]e kinda had his — her—[it] looked like the small of her back right in the center of his head, and that she was kind of slumping over the sides.... I immediately yelled to him, “You put that kid down. You put her down.” And upon saying that, he pressed her up so that his arms were fully extended, elbows locked out.... [I] brought my rifle up, aimed it at him. And at that point, what it appeared to me was that he started to rear back, almost as if he were going to throw her forward.... And he — it looked to me like he was about to throw her. And that’s the instant I decided to fire. (Doc. 269, Ex. PP at 145). This statement is “utterly discredited” by the video evidence. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769. In fact, David held D.H. securely by the torso, with her belly, not her back, facing his head. David had already lifted the child over his head before Sgt. Slavin issued his order to put the child down, so he did not lift the child in response to that order. At no point does David heave her, press out his arms, or make any move to throw her. (Pospisil video). David was holding her securely and steadily and walking away when Sgt. Slavin shot, hitting David once and missing with his other shot. (Id.). To the extent that Sgt. Slavin may claim that he was merely mistaken about what he saw, such a mistake was not reasonable given his recent arrival on the scene and the totality of the circumstances. See Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Not all errors in perception or judgment, however, are reasonable.”). A reasonable officer in Sgt. Slavin’s position would have perceived exactly what a reasonable officer in Sgt. Dorer’s position would have perceived, although from farther away. A reasonable officer in Sgt. Slavin’s position would have perceived that shooting David would certainly cause D.H. to fall. Moreover, a reasonable officer in Slavin’s position would have perceived that firing at David from nearly ninety feet away presented a risk of hitting D.H. Sgt. Slavin substituted the risk that D.H. would be thrown to the ground with the certainty that she would fall to the ground. He further created a substantial risk that she would be shot, and Defendants have pointed to no place in the record where he took any action to mitigate that risk. Like Sgt. Dorer, Sgt. Slavin’s is a case in which “the ‘solution’ could be worse than the problem.” Glenn, 673 F.3d at 872. iii. Both Officers Defendants, relying on a particular definition of “pile drive” for which they offer no support, argued at the hearing that it would have taken no more preparatory movement for David to throw D.H. to the ground than it would have to drop her. (Hearing at 16:52:10-18). This position is simply not reasonable. A reasonable officer would have understood David’s earlier threat as a threat to throw D.H. to the ground, and to carry out such a threat David would have had to make some preparatory movements. Defendants contend that a reasonable officer could have perceived that David posed an imminent threat to D.H. sufficient to use deadly force against him merely because he had threatened her earlier and he was holding her in the air. (Hearing at 17:00:01). The previous threat alone, however, could not be reasonably construed as creating an immediate threat twenty minutes later. Officers may consider the impact of previous actions under Graham, but the fact that a suspect was previously armed or had previously issued threats is not decisive. See Robinson v. Solano Cty., 278 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002) (the fact that a suspect had earlier shot neighbor’s dog with a shotgun is “insufficient to justify the intrusion on Robinson’s personal security”). The Ninth Circuit has found that a detainee’s threat to rip out an officer’s throat and kill him provided a “lack of provocation” for officers to shove him against a wall minutes later when he struggled under their control.’ Cotton v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 286 Fed.Appx. 402, 404 (9th Cir.2008). David’s earlier threat can be considered part of the totality of the circumstances that Sgt. Dorer perceived, but it did not create an immediate danger that continued for over twenty minutes until David was shot. Were the earlier threat and the fact that David was holding the girl over his head sufficient to justify the use of deadly force, officers could have shot David the moment that he came out of the house. One cannot pay “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of [this] particular case” and still conclude that the officers were free to fire at David and D.H. as soon the negotiators had coaxed him out of his front door. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, (Doc. 313-2, Ex. L-l at 6). To the extent that the officers were justified in using some force to protect D.H. from David, they had to consider, among the facts and circumstances confronting them, that when David was holding D.H. above his head, they were sure to harm the very person whose protection authorized the use of force by shooting him. See Boyd, 374 F.3d at 779. As noted above, the officers’ key interest was protecting D.H., and reasonable officers would have balanced the extent to which they were causing and preventing harm to her before firing. No reasonable officer would ensure that she would be harmed, and risk that she would be killed, in order to protect her, unless by doing so the officer could prevent an immediate risk of even greater harm. The fact that the officers used deadly force in such circumstances only compounds its unreasonableness. Moreover, officers were aware that David was in some sort of mental crisis, and under such circumstances “the governmental interest in using such force is diminished by the fact that the officers are confronted, not with a person who has committed a serious crime against others, but with a mentally ill individual.” Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1283. Even had the shooting been otherwise justified, both officers fired without issuing a warning although such a warning was “feasible,” which alone would merit summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Garner when using a firearm is justified, “whenever practicable, a warning must be given before deadly force is employed.” Harris, 126 F.3d at 1201. Defendants have claimed that Sgt. Slavin’s order to “put that child down,” issued seconds before he shot David, qualified as a warning that he would use deadly force if David did not comply. (Hearing at 17:02:41). The plain language of Gamer and Harris, in addition to clearly established Ninth Circuit law, do not support that argument. As discussed at length above, an order, even when issued by an armed officer, does not constitute a “warning.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 12, 105 S.Ct. 1694; Harris, 126 F.3d at 1201; Lehman, 228 Fed.Appx. at 700; Daniels, 228 Fed. Appx. at 670. No warning was issued. A warning is not required when it is not “feasible,” but the Ninth Circuit has held that this exception “contemplates a narrow class of cases, such as where the suspect has opened fire, or pointed a gun at vulnerable targets.” Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359, 372 (9th Cir.2011), vacated as moot by Idaho v. Horiuchi, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.2001). It has further held that “[v]erbal warnings are not feasible when lives are in immediate danger and every second matters.” Estate of Martinez v. City of Federal Way, 105 Fed.Appx. 897, 899 (9th Cir.2004). When a suspect does not pose an immediate threat to the lives of officers or others, a warning is feasible. See, e.g., Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 854 n. 6 (11th Cir.2010) (holding that when an officer ordered an armed man to “put down the gun,” he did not issue a “warning” under Gamer, but he was justified in firing because “such a warning might easily have cost the officer his life”). Defendants do not argue that it was not feasible to issue a warning. As noted above, eight seconds before he was shot, David calmly raised D.H. above his head and walked forward, then turned around. He took no sudden action in this period that suggests warning him would not have been feasible or practicable. The officers were in no danger. As discussed above, the video confirms that any danger that David would throw the girl to the ground was not immediate. Both officers shot David in the back without warning him that they were about to use deadly force. Even were the shootings otherwise reasonable, Plaintiffs would be entitled to summary judgment based solely on the fact that the officers used deadly force without issuing warnings. Defendants argue that the case is controlled by Blanford v. Sacramento Cty., 406 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.2005). In Blanford, officers responded to a 9-1-1 call about a man armed with a two-and-a-half foot sword walking through a residential neighborhood. The officers ordered him to drop the sword, and warned him that they would shoot him if he did not. Id. at 1116. Instead of dropping the sword, the man turned to the officers, raised the sword, and growled. Id. Blanford then tried and failed to enter a house through its front door. When he could not open the door, he turned the corner of the house towards a gate that would have given him access to the house. Id. The officers fired at him and struck him, but after he was shot, he continued to flee, escaping through the side gate before he was shot again. Id. Blanford again turned away from the officers and into a yard before he was shot a third time. Id. When discussing whether Blanford was attempting to escape, the Ninth Circuit wrote that his conduct “manifested a continuing intent to evade [the officers’] authority and enter a private residence” while carrying a dangerous weapon. Blanford, 406 F.3d at 1118. The Ninth Circuit found that Blanford was a fleeing felony suspect who “poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others” and that the shooting was justified under Gamer. Blanford, 406 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694). David was substantially less resistant to the police than Blanford, and police were aware that he was walking towards his own unoccupied home. The officers in Blanford issued “warnings that they would shoot if he did not comply.” Blanford, 406 F.3d at 1116. Moreover, nothing in Blanford suggests that the officers posed a harm to third parties or brought about the harm they were seeking to prevent by firing, as did the officers here. The Ninth Circuit has written that summary judgment is rare in cases of police misconduct, because “police misconduct cases almost always turn on a jury’s credibility determinations.” Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir.2002) (emphasis added). This case is an exception to that general caution. Almost everything the officers heard was recorded and transcribed, and the shooting itself was recorded on video. The officers fired at an unarmed man who was walking away from them. Although he had issued threats against D.H. earlier, nothing he did after walking outside would suggest to a reasonable officer that he was placing D.H. in imminent danger of suffering any more harm than falling to the ground. By shooting David, the officers caused the very harm that a reasonable officer could believe that David posed to D.H. Considering “the totality of the facts and circumstances in the particular case,” no reasonable officer could have believed that shooting David without warning, while he calmly walked back towards his house with D.H. over his head, was a proper means of protecting D.H.’s safety. Blanford, 406 F.3d at 1115. d. Disputed Issues of Fact The parties dispute whether David lifted D.H. over his head in response to officers’ commands to put his hands up. Sgt. Smith stated that he heard officers tell David to put his hands up, but is imprecise about the timing of the orders. (Doc. 268-1, HH at 3). A witness, McKenzie Gilles, told an interviewer that she heard officers order “put your hands up” immediately before the shooting. (Doc. 317-1, Ex. FFF-1 at 15). Any reasonable officer who heard other officers commanding David to raise his arms could have concluded that David was complying with that command when he lifted D.H. over his head. Second, the parties dispute whether it was feasible to Taser David or seek to physically restrain him rather than shoot him. According to Officer Fellow’s placement of officers equipped with Tasers on a diagram of the house at his deposition, one was within 20 feet of David as he walked forward out of the house before turning around, and another was slightly closer. (Doc. 266-2, Ex. E, Ex. 229). The effective outer range of a Taser is 25 feet, though the preferred range is under 15 feet. (Doc. 313-2, Ex. EEE). Sgt. Smith stated that he did not use his Taser because he was concerned that David would thereby drop and injure D.H. (Doc. 268, Ex. GG at 20). Sgt. Dorer and Sgt. Slavin did not have access to less-than-lethal force themselves. The Ninth Circuit has held that Tasers constitute “an intermediate, significant level of force,” but they may be deployed with a significantly lower government interest than firearms. Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir.2010). Because even if these two facts were resolved by a jury in favor of the Defendants, they would not have rendered the shooting reasonable given the other facts that are not in dispute, neither of them prevents summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. They are, however, sufficient to defeat Defendants’ summary judgment motion. In considering the Defendants’ motion, the