Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER SPATT, District Judge: Presently before the Court is a motion for a preliminary injunction filed by the Plaintiffs to enjoin the implementation of Nassau County Local Law No. 8-2012, also known as Clerk Item No. 315-2012, asserting that it violates the Plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional rights secured by Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution (the “Contracts Clause”), as well as other state statutory provisions. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for a preliminary injunction is granted. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background The Plaintiff Danny Donohue is the elected statewide president of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (the “CSEA”), which represents approximately 295,000 employees and retirees throughout the State of New York. The Plaintiff Jerry Laricchiuta is the elected President of the CSEA Nassau Local 830, a subdivision of the CSEA, which represents approximately 7,000 employees of Nassau County (the “County”). The Plaintiff John Jaronczyk is the elected president of the Nassau County Sheriffs Correction Officers Benevolent Association, Inc. (“COBA”), which represents County Sheriffs Department employees serving in the civil service titles of Correction Officer, Correction Corporal, Correction Sergeant, Correction Lieutenant, Correction Captain and employees serving in investigative ranks. The Plaintiff James Carver is the president of the Police Benevolent Association of the Police Department of the County of Nassau, Inc. (the “PBA”), which is the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all uniformed police officers employed by the County. The Plaintiff Gary Learned is the president of the Superior Officers Association Police Department, County of Nassau, Inc. (the “SOA”), which is the exclusive collective bargaining representative for the unit consisting of Superi- or Officers ranging from Sergeant through Assistant Chief of the County Police Department. Finally, the Plaintiff Glenn Ciccone is the president of the Detectives’ Association, Inc. of the Police Department of the County of Nassau (the “DAI”), which is the exclusive collective bargaining representative for the unit consisting of Detectives employed by the County. There are three sets of plaintiffs in this consolidated action — the Donohue Plaintiffs, the Jaronczyk Plaintiffs, and the Carver Plaintiffs. For purposes of this Order, the Court will refer to these three sets of plaintiffs collectively as the “Plaintiffs”, “bargaining units”, or “unions”, unless otherwise specified. The Defendants are the County of Nassau, the Nassau County Legislature (the “Legislature”), Edward Mangano, in his official capacity as County Executive of Nassau County, Peter Schmitt, in his official capacity as Presiding Officer of the Nassau County Legislature, and George Maragos, in his official capacity as Nassau County Comptroller. “While the named Defendants differ in part as to each case due to the different groups of public employees represented as Plaintiffs in [each of the consolidated] matters, the object of the preliminary injunction motions and the arguments made in support of those motions are broadly the same.” Donohue v. Paterson, 715 F.Supp.2d 306, 312 (N.D.N.Y.2010). Thus for purposes of this Order, the Court will refer to the various defendants in all three consolidated actions collectively as the “Defendants”. In the three consolidated actions, the Plaintiffs are public employee organizations within the meaning of Section 201 of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act, Civil Service Law § 200 et seq. (the “Taylor Law”), as well as officers from these organizations. “[T]o promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between government and its employees and to protect the public by assuring, at all times, the orderly and uninterrupted operations and functions of government,” Article 14 sets forth the rights of employee organizations, and the procedures governing their relations with the State as an employer. See N.Y. Civ. Ser. Law § 200. Donohue, 715 F.Supp.2d at 313. The manifestation of this working relationship between the County government and its employees is their negotiated contractual agreements. The Plaintiffs are parties to a number of various collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) with the County, which set forth the terms and conditions of their employment. In particular, the terms of the CBAs generally include salaries, wages, employee benefits such as medical insurance, and hours of work. In each of the three Complaints in the present case, the Plaintiffs take care to describe the relevant background information that is specific to their bargaining unit’s negotiation history. Several of the unions describe the concessions that they have made throughout the past few years, in order to meet the demands of the previous County Executive. On April 30, 2012, the County Executive Edward Mangano (“Mangano” or the “County Executive”) proposed Local Law No. 8-2012 — also known as Clerk Item No. 315-2012 (“LL 315-12”) — which was submitted to the County Legislature for approval. LL 315-12 explains the background of the law, in a section entitled “Legislative Intent”, as follows: Nassau County is currently embroiled in a fiscal crisis which has seriously jeopardized its ability to finance the payment of tax certiorari settlements and judgments. This crisis is particularly acute because the inability of the County to finance the payment of those settlements and judgments has resulted in economic hardship for many of the County residents and businesses who are owed refunds pursuant to those settlements and judgments. (LL 315-12 § 1.) The legislation goes on to refer to the historical background of the law. In particular, it states that the County Executive had submitted a multi-year financial plan, approved by the Nassau County Interim Finance Authority (“NIFA”), which included provisions for transitional financing of tax refunds. However, in order to secure bonding to finance the payments under this plan, a bipartisan super-majority vote of the County Legislature was required pursuant to the New York Local Finance Law. Thus, despite the “clear need to raise funds to finance the payment of these refunds,” the law states that “certain Legislators have steadfastly refused to approve any bonding absent a quid pro quo.” (LL 315-12 § 1.) This set of circumstances has supposedly led to a conundrum for Mangano and the County. Because the Legislature failed to approve the bonding to cover the payment of these settlements and judgments, “the individuals and businesses who are owed refunds are entitled to ask a court to order the execution of those judgments and settlements by levying against the County’s bank accounts ... [which] would result in widespread chaos throughout the County.” (LL 315-12 § 1.) Thus, in light of this economic problem, the County Executive took action to provide for the financing necessary for the payment of the tax certiorari refunds owed by the County. The action he took was the creation and proposal of LL 315-12. The provision currently at issue in this suit is Section 2, entitled “Action by the County Executive”. It states, in pertinent part, that: (A) Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, the County Executive, upon the issuance of an Executive Order invoking this Local Law, shall be authorized to take any action he deems necessary, including but not limited to, the following actions in order to create forty-million-dollars in savings for the County. 1. relieve from duty any duty [sic] employees represented by a collective bargaining unit for one day per week [ (“furloughing”) ] • 2. embargo County funds 3. modify any County contracts 4. freeze base and supplemental wages for County employees 5. reduce or eliminate employer contribution to employee benefits 6. sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of any and all real and personal property owned by the County including, but not limited to, vehicles, buildings, land, computers, and heavy machinery 7. close or restrict hours of operation of any County facility 8. reduce or eliminate any County operated program or service whose continuing existence is not mandated by State or Federal law 9. shutter, reduce, or eliminate any County agency or department whose continuing existence is not mandated by State or Federal law 10. reduce or eliminate assistance to Towns, Cities and Villages within the County 11. any action not enumerated in this list but otherwise authorized pursuant to State, Federal or County law (LL 315-12 § 2.) Any savings realized from these actions would be utilized solely for the purpose of financing tax certiorari judgments and settlements. On May 21, 2012, LL 315-12 was scheduled for a vote of the full legislature. However, the Plaintiffs claim that only 18 of the 19 County Legislators were present in the Legislative Chamber for the day’s proceedings. According to the Plaintiffs, it was announced that Legislator Dennis Dunne was in another room in the building and would be participating from that location. The Plaintiffs allege that throughout the day’s proceedings, Presiding Officer Peter Schmitt began discussions with regard to LL 315-12 and County Attorney John Ciampoli spoke on the subject. Presiding Office Schmitt then supposedly announced “We’re going to conclude this hearing and I’m not calling a vote today”, and that the Legislature would vote on this law at another time. However, according to the allegations in the Complaint, at the conclusion of all other business, on May 21, 2012, Presiding Officer Schmitt called for a vote on LL 315-12 without permitting public comment. At that time, all nine Democratic members of the County’s legislature, constituting the Legislative Minority, allegedly refused to participate in the vote and then exited the Legislative chambers in protest. The nine remaining members of the Legislature — the Republicans and part of the Legislative Majority — voted in favor of passing LL 315-12. In addition, Presiding Office Schmitt counted Legislator Dunne as the tenth affirmative vote in favor of LL 315-12. B. Procedural History On May 22, 2012, the day following the legislative vote, three separate actions were filed in this Court — 12-CV-2568 (the Donohue Plaintiffs); 12-CV-2569 (the Jaronczyk Plaintiffs); and 12-CV-3066 (the Carver Plaintiffs) — all stemming from the above described “passage” of LL 315-12. The Plaintiffs asserted multiple causes of action for violations of (1) the Contract Clause, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) the New York State Constitution, Article I, § 17 and Article 14, § 2(c); (3) the New York State Municipal Home Rule Law, § 10; (4) Article 7 of the Public Officers Law, entitled the Open Meetings Law, §§ 103-04; (5) General Construction Law, § 41; and (6) Nassau County Charter, § 152. With regard to the relief sought, the Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that certain portions of LL 315-12 violate the above mentioned constitutional and statutory provisions, and the entry of a permanent injunction to enjoin the County Executive from taking any further action to implement or enforce the unconstitutional portions of LL 315-12. In addition, they sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The Court held a hearing on that day, May 22, 2012, and learned that LL 315-12 had not yet been signed into law by the County Executive. Thus, because of concerns about ripeness, this Court denied the request for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction without prejudice, with leave to renew if, and when, the County Executive either signed LL 315-12 into law or took no action with regard to bill for a specified period of time, either of which event would render the law effective. On or about June 18, 2012, County Executive Mangano officially signed LL 315-12 into law. On June 19, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed a second motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. On June 20, 2012, the Court held a second hearing. At this time, the Court consolidated the three cases on the record, bearing case number 12-CV-2568. In addition, the Court set a briefing schedule, based upon a representation by the Defendants that no executive orders would be issued pursuant to LL 315-12 until the Court issued a decision on the motion for preliminary injunctive relief. Thus, the motion for a temporary restraining order has been essentially converted into a motion for a preliminary injunction. See Hedges v. Obama, No. 06 Civ. 0589, 2012 WL 1721124, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012) (converting a motion for a temporary restraining order into a motion for a preliminary injunction during a conference with the court). Finally, the Court granted permission for the Minority Caucus of the Legislature to file an amicus curiae brief, which it did on July 19, 2012. The Minority Caucus consists of Minority Leader Kevan Abrahams and Legislators Wayne H. Wink, Jr., Robert Troiano, Carrié Solages, Joseph Scannell, Judi Bosworth, Judy Jacobs, Delia Deirggi-Whitton, and David Denenberg (collectively the “Minority Caucus” or “amicus”). The Defendants urge the Court to strike the amicus brief because it is twenty-five pages in length, despite being a “reply” brief in connection with the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. However, the Court rejects this argument and will consider the entirety of the amicus brief. II. DISCUSSION Broadly, the Plaintiffs claim that LL 315-12 authorizes the County Executive to take actions that will diminish the actual and negotiated salaries and benefits received by the thousands of employees covered under the relevant CBAs, and that the impact of these impairments will be widespread and irreparable. The Plaintiffs argue in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction that this law renders the agreements between the unions and the County unenforceable, and thus virtually obliterates the authority and position of the unions as bargaining representatives. There are specific portions of LL 315-12 that undoubtedly apply to the Plaintiff unions and thus are at issue in the present case, such as the County Executive’s power to (1) “relieve from duty any duty employees represented by a collective bargaining unit for one day per week”; (2) “modify any County contracts”; (3) “freeze base and supplemental wages for County employees”; and (4) “reduce or eliminate employer contribution to employee benefits”. (LL 315-12, § 2(A)(1), (3)-(5).) However, there are other portions of the law that the Plaintiffs do not challenge and do not appear to be in contention, such as the County Executive’s power to “sell lease, or otherwise dispose of any and all real and personal property owned by the County including, but not limited to, vehicles, buildings, land, computers, and heavy machinery”. (LL 315-12, § 2(A)(6).) This Decision will only address the provisions of LL 315-12 to the extent that they modify the CBAs and other contractual employment agreements between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. Therefore, the Court will take no position on any provisions in LL 315-12 to the extent that they do not affect the Plaintiffs’ contractual rights. The issues presented by the present motion are myriad and complex. The Court will first address any questions as to jurisdiction, and will then proceed to assess the substantive merits of the motion for a preliminary injunction. A. Stay Requested by the Defendants As an initial matter, on August 10, 2012, the Defendants wrote a letter to the Court requesting a stay of the case while they pursue a course of action, which, if successful, would render moot the issues before the Court. “Specifically, Defendants are examining a method to address and resolve the County’s liability for over $40 million in tax certiorari judgments that would have no contractual impairment on Plaintiffs.” (Docket Entry No. 39.) Each set of Plaintiffs subsequently wrote a response to the Court, vehemently opposing any such request. In their August 10, 2012 communication to the Court, the Defendants do not provide any specificity as to the “method” they are investigating to obtain the necessary funding, nor do they state any sort of time period in which they can accomplish such a task. In light of the finding of irreparable harm explored below, the Court is not satisfied that an indefinite stay of the case based solely on the County’s vague search for other options is the appropriate course of action. Even if the County refrains from taking any action pursuant to LL 315-12, the existence of the law instigates an irreparable harm by itself. The entire premise underlying the preliminary injunctive relief requested here is to avoid the furtherance of this harm. To grant a stay and defer enforcement of the law would be plainly contradictory to that goal and thus may pose further injury to the Plaintiffs. Moreover, to deny the stay would likely not injure the Defendants in any way. If, as the Defendants state, they are acting in furtherance of resolving the County’s liability for more than $40 million in tax certiorari judgments in a way that would have no contractual impairment on the Plaintiffs, then there is one simple solution — they can repeal LL 315-12. Alternatively, as explained below, if the County obtains a certification issued by the Office of Legislative Budget Review that the $40 million in savings have been achieved, the law will automatically expire, thus rendering the present case moot. (LL 315-12, § 2(B).) The Defendants have had ample time to pursue either of these options, and will continue to have the time to do so even after the issuance of this Decision and Order. Therefore, the Court declines the Defendants’ request to stay the present case and will proceed to rule on the Plaintiffs’ motion. B. Mootness The next threshold issue that the Court must address prior to reviewing the substantive merits of the case is mootness. See Aladdin Capital Holdings, LLC v. Donoyan, 438 Fed.Appx. 14, 15 (2d Cir.2011) (“We must first address whether we have Article III jurisdiction and resolve an issue of mootness.”); see also United States v. Miller, 263 F.3d 1, 4 n. 2 (2d Cir.2001) (“[A] federal court may not ... decide a case on the merits before resolving whether the court has Article III jurisdiction.”). In short, the amicus asserts that the County has decided to use existing cash reserves to pay the outstanding tax certiorari judgments at issue. Accordingly, because the sole purpose of the law has already been fulfilled, the amicus contends that the Court need not address the constitutionality of LL 315-12’s provisions. “Mootness is a doctrinal restriction stemming from the Article III requirement that federal courts decide only live cases or controversies.” In re Zarnel, 619 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir.2010). Under the doctrine of mootness, a court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction when “the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1951, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, for a federal court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a case, “it is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit was filed---- The parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Knaust v. City of Kingston, 157 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990)) (internal citation and quotations omitted), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1131, 119 S.Ct. 1805, 143 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1999); see Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992) (“It has long been settled that a federal court has no authority to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the preliminary and essential inquiry is whether the relief sought by the Plaintiffs is no longer needed, so as to make the present case moot. See Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 702 F.2d 380, 386 (2d Cir.1983) (“The hallmark of a moot case or controversy is that the relief sought can no longer be given or is no longer needed.”); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir.1993) (“Accordingly, a ease that is ‘live’ at the outset may become moot ‘when it becomes impossible for the courts, through the exercise of their remedial powers, to do anything to redress the injury.’ ”) (quoting Alexander v. Yale, 631 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir.1980)). LL 315-12 is undoubtedly clear in that the County Executive may take any action he deems necessary, but only for the express purpose of achieving $40 million in savings in order to pay outstanding judgments for real property tax refunds, commonly known as “tax certiorari judgments”. LL 315-12 provides that “[a]ny savings realized pursuant to the authorities granted by this Local Law shall be used solely to finance tax certiorari judgments and settlements.” Moreover, the law explicitly states that the “authorities granted” under the law “shall expire upon a certification issued by the Office of Legislative Budget Review that forty-million dollars in savings have been achieved.” (LL 315-12, § 2(B).) The mootness issue was not raised by any of the parties, but rather by the amicus Minority Counsel. In the amicus papers, the Minority Counsel asserts that this entire dispute is moot because the purpose of LL 315-12 — saving $40 million to satisfy outstanding tax certiorari judgments — has been fulfilled. The Minority Counsel bases this factual assertion on a transcript from the June 18, 2012 legislative session. From this, it concludes that the County Executive has decided to pay the outstanding tax judgments using a pool of money referred to as “the unallocated and undesignated fund balance.” In response, the Defendants first argue that this is an issue that cannot be properly raised by the amicus curiae. However, the Court need not reach the legal question of whether this mootness argument raised through the vehicle of an amicus brief is proper, because there is sufficient evidence before the Court to find that its factual premise is fatally flawed and thus, mootness does not yet taint the instant case. Although the amicus has been unable to produce a certification issued by the Office of Legislative Budget Review stating that the savings have been achieved — nor does it claim one exists — it maintains that this requirement has been fulfilled for all intents and purposes. As mentioned above, this assertion is based upon a legislative session that took place on June 18, 2012, the same day that LL 315-12 went into effect. At that time, County Budget Director Eric Naughton stated on the record that “the County has roughly 92 million in undesignated fund balance” at its disposal. (See Clines Deck, Ex. B, at 82-83.) Thus, at this session, it was determined that a $43 million entry would be made in the County’s books. Maurice Chambers, the Director of the Legislative Budget review, stated that: “The 92 million is what we have in reserves; that’s real money. The 43 million is just an entry to recognize the 43 million liability for tax certs, which ultimately will be taken out of the fund balance.” (Id., at 110.) However, the Court agrees with the Defendants that the transcript of the June 18, 2012 legislative session makes clear that there has been no actual transfer of money to pay for the outstanding judgments. This dialogue does not indicate that the County planned to actually use the reserves to pay the tax certiorari judgments. Rather, it appears to the Court that the discussion was merely about how to properly account for these judgments on the County’s books. In fact, Budget Director Naughton stated that “[w]e are transferring the money to the treasurer’s office so the comptroller’s office can book and accrual for tax certs.” (Id. at 67.) Frank Moroney, the Deputy Comptroller, also stated at the session that “[wje’re transferring this because it appears as though there is going to be a deficit, and it has to be assigned to the proper place, and that would be to tax certioraris.” (Id. at 70.) According to the Defendants, the only thing they determined was that for accounting purposes for the 2011 budget, the Office of Legislative Budget Review set up an appropriation line in the 2011 budget, which did not previously contain any budgeted line for the payment of certioraris, to allow a deficit for the 2011 budget to be recognized as a deficit due to the tax certiorari liabilities. (Ciampoli Reply Aff. at ¶¶ 10-14 & Ex. A. at 60-65, 85.) Furthermore, even if this somewhat unclear language were to indicate an intention to use the undesignated fund balance to pay the real property tax refunds, this expressed desire alone would be insufficient for the Court to find either that the purpose of the law has been met or that the certification has, for all intents and purposes, been satisfied. The County Legislature did eventually pass Resolution No. 103-2012, filed as Clerk Item No. 350-12. (See Clines Deck, Ex. C.) According to the amicus, this documentation authorizes a board transfer to the general fund in the amount of $43,092,437. Also, the amicus has presented evidence that shows that the transfer is reflected in the County’s “NIFS” financial system, as it contains an entry for the $43,092,437 for “year end tax accrual”. (See Clines Deck, Ex. D.) However, with reasonable certainty, these documents may not actually evidence anything more than an accounting maneuver by the County for budgetary concerns. At this juncture, it does not suffice for the Court to find that the $43 million “debt” of the County has been satisfied, so that any determination as to LL 315-12 is moot. Therefore, at this time, the Court finds that there are no concerns of mootness to preclude a determination of the instant motion for a preliminary injunction. Of course, mootness is an argument that can be raised throughout the litigation. Irish Lesbian and Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 648 (2d Cir.1998) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) requires a court to consider impediments to subject matter jurisdiction at any time during the course of a litigation.... The Federal Rules place the duty to enforce barriers such as mootness on the courts, and our rule is that courts may sua sponte ask the parties to address any exception to mootness that may apply.”); see Fox v. Board of Trustees, 42 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1994) (explaining that the issue of mootness is one of subject matter jurisdiction that may be raised at any time). Thus, if the approximate $40 million is secured through another avenue and if a certification is received so that LL 315-12 expires, the case would most certainly qualify as moot. However, that is not the situation presently before the Court. C. As to Abstention The next relevant inquiry is whether the abstention doctrine precludes the Court from granting the Plaintiffs the preliminary injunctive relief they seek. On or about June 8, 2012, the Jaronczyk set of Plaintiffs — specifically SOBA and Jaronczyk — filed an action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Nassau County, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on the claim that LL 315-12 is void pursuant to state and local laws. This case, as well as the motion for injunctive relief, is still pending. {See Docket Entry No. 37). Thus, the Defendants argue that this Court should abstain from the entire action, because the Plaintiffs can plausibly raise both their federal and state law claims in the state court venue. “The Court has described three considerations that prompt abstention in the face of broad-based challenges to state statutes: (1) that a federal court will interpret state law without having the benefit of a state court interpretation which may come at a later time and be at odds with the federal court interpretation; (2) that the federal court decision may encompass matters as to which there is no real case or controversy; and (3) that the domestic policies of a state may be unnecessarily obstructed when a state court is impeded from interpreting and applying the state’s statutes.” Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hurlbut, 585 F.3d 639, 646-47 (2d Cir. 2009). Underneath the umbrella of the broad theory of abstention are several doctrinal strands. There is one particular abstention doctrine that is relevant in the instant case — the Younger abstention doctrine, which prohibits federal courts from interfering with ongoing state proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). The Jaronczyk Plaintiffs incorrectly focus on Pullman abstention, which prohibits federal courts from resolving a federal constitutional issue when a state court’s clarification of ambiguous state law might make the federal court’s constitutional ruling unnecessary. See R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). However, Pullman is not applicable in the instant case because resolution of the federal issue — namely, the Contracts Clause in the United State Constitution — does not depend on any construction of the state laws at issue. See, e.g., United Fence & Guard Rail Corp. v. Cuomo, 878 F.2d 588, 596 (2d Cir.1989) (finding Pullman inapplicable, in part because there was no state law issue raised in the state case the disposition of which would alter, modify, or moot the federal constitutional issue raised in the instant matter); Sherman v. Town of Chester, No. 01 Civ. 8884, 2001 WL 1448613, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2001) (holding that Pullman abstention was inapplicable to substantive due process claim challenging town’s moratorium on development, noting that “[t]he resolution of the federal question does not ‘depend’ on the resolution of ... whether the Town acted ultra vires under [the New York Home Rule Law] in enacting the [challenged restriction]”). Different from Pullman, “[t]he Younger abstention rule refers to the principle of federalism that ‘a federal court may not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding in the absence of special circumstances suggesting bad faith, harassment or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate.’ ” Pathways, Inc. v. Dunne, 329 F.3d 108, 113-14 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Kirschner v. Klemons, 225 F.3d 227, 233 (2d Cir.2000)). The principles enunciated in Younger have been expanded to civil proceedings. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 594, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975); see also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 2377, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) (“the basic concern — that threat to our federal system posed by displacement of state courts by those of the National Government — is also fully applicable to civil proceedings in which important state interests are involved.”). In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to noneriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.” 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982) (citing Moore, 442 U.S. at 423, 99 S.Ct. at 2377). Notably, in the “interests of comity and federalism,” the Younger abstention doctrine requires federal courts to abstain from jurisdiction “whenever federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.” Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237-38, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Younger abstention “does not apply when a plaintiffs federal claims cannot be presented in pending state proceedings.” Tellock v. Davis, No. 02 Civ. 4311, 2002 WL 31433589, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2002) (citing Kirschner, 225 F.3d at 233). Younger is not based upon an Article III requirement, but instead is a “prudential limitation on the court’s exercise of jurisdiction grounded in equitable considerations of comity.” Spargo v. New York State Com’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir.2003); see Benavidez v. Eu, 34 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir.1994) (“Younger abstention is not jurisdictional, but reflects a court’s prudential decision not to exercise jurisdiction which it in fact possesses.”) (emphasis in original); Schachter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 36 n. 1 (2d Cir.1978) (per curiam) (“Younger abstention goes to the exercise of equity jurisdiction, not to the jurisdiction of the federal district court as such to hear the case.”). The rationale behind Younger was set forth by the Second Circuit in Spargo v. New York State Com’n on Judicial Conduct: “Our Federalism” in its ideal form, as the Supreme Court explained in Younger, strives towards a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. In recognition of this balance of interests, Younger generally prohibits courts from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings so as to avoid unnecessary friction. Giving states the first opportunity ... to correct their own mistakes when there is an ongoing state proceeding serves the vital purpose of reaffirming] “the competence of the state courts” and acknowledging the dignity of states as co-equal sovereigns in our federal system. 351 F.3d at 75 (internal quotations and citations omitted). With this doctrinal framework in mind, the Second Circuit has instructed that “Younger abstention is mandatory when: (1) there is a pending state proceeding, (2) that implicates an important state interest, and (3) the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity for judicial review of his or her federal constitutional claims”. Id. Unfortunately, the Jaronczyk Plaintiffs’ treatment of this issue — the only set of Plaintiffs that initiated a parallel state court action against these Defendants concerning LL 315-12 — is quite terse. Initially it appears that every requirement under Younger is met in the instant case. First, there is no question that there is an ongoing state court proceeding pending in Nassau Supreme Court by this particular set of plaintiffs. Although technically the federal case was initiated prior to the state court action, the present motion for injunctive relief was brought simultaneously with a motion for injunctive relief in the state court action. The principles of Younger apply in full force so long as the state proceedings are begun “before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court.” Hawaii Housing Auth., 467 U.S. at 238, 104 S.Ct. at 2328 (quoting Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2291-2292, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975)); see also Greening v. Moran, 953 F.2d 301, 304-05 (7th Cir.1992) (“That the putative state defendant managed to get the federal suit under way first is inconsequential.”). No proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place if the case has not progressed beyond the “embryonic stage”, and thus Younger may be applicable here. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 238, 104 S.Ct. at 2328 (quoting Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2566-67, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975)). Second, there are important state interests implicated by the present ease; namely, the process by which the County Legislature passes legislation and specifically whether LL 315-12 passes state constitutional muster. New York has established a comprehensive statutory scheme to govern the legislative process and it has a strong interest in promoting the fairness and legality of this system. See, e.g., State of Nev. v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 453 (9th Cir.1989) (“Nevada’s complaints regarding cooption of state resources must be resolved in the legislative process; it is that process which protects the fundamental interests of the states.”). As to the third factor, there is no doubt that the federal constitutional claims can be raised in the state court proceeding. The New York State supreme courts afford the Plaintiffs an opportunity to raise their constitutional Contracts Clause claims. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) (reasoning that where it is “abundantly clear that appellees had an opportunity to present their federal claims in the state proceedings ... [n]o more is required to invoke Younger abstention”); Spargo, 351 F.3d at 81 (“In sum, while Spargo may prefer a federal forum, he may pursue his constitutional claims in state proceedings, and therefore, the District Court should have abstained.”); see also 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1279 (11th Cir.2003) (concluding that “[i]n determining whether the state remedies are adequate ... the relevant question is not whether the state courts can do all that Plaintiffs wish” but rather whether plaintiffs may pursue their federal claims in state proceedings) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert, denied sub nom. Reggie B. v. Bush, 540 U.S. 984, 124 S.Ct. 483, 157 L.Ed.2d 376 (2003). Nevertheless, while it appears that Younger should apply in the instant case so that this Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction, there are two major wrinkles that the Court must necessarily address. The first issue is that only the Jaronczyk set of Plaintiffs are currently pursuing an action in state court with regard to LL 315-12. The Plaintiffs not involved in the pending state court proceeding — the Donohue and Carver Plaintiffs — essentially argue that they should not have to face the consequences of the third set of plaintiffs filing a state court action. In other words, they argue that Younger does not permissibly extend to their claims because they are not a party to the ongoing state court proceeding. These other Plaintiffs cry out that they should not be penalized as to their choice of forum because of a questionable strategic decision made by a similar yet separate party. The fact that the Donohue and Carver Plaintiffs are not a party to the state court action is relevant, but not dispositive. Kunz v. N.Y. State Com’n on Judicial Conduct, 356 F.Supp.2d 188, 193 (N.D.N.Y.2005); see Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975) (warning that while plaintiffs should not “automatically be thrown into the same hopper for Younger purposes,” there may plainly “be some circumstances in which legally distinct parties are so closely related that they should all be subject to the Younger considerations which govern any one of them”). Generally, “where the plaintiff in a federal action is not a party to the state proceeding, Younger concerns about federal adjudication do not arise.” Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171, 177 (3d Cir.1987) (citing Doran, 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561); see Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F.Supp. 106, 119 (N.D.N.Y.1988), aff'd on other grounds, 866 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1989) (“As a general proposition, abstention is mandated under Younger only when the federal plaintiff is actually a party to the state proceeding; the doctrine does not bar non-parties from raising constitutional claims in federal court, even if the same claims are being addressed in a concurrent state proceeding involving similarly situated parties.”) (citation omitted). However, “in certain circumstances, Younger may apply to the claims of third-parties who are not directly involved in any pending state proceeding.” Spargo, 351 F.3d at 82; see also Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., L.P. v. Miller, 280 F.3d 874, 881-82 (8th Cir.2002) (“It is not a prerequisite to Younger abstention that the federal plaintiffs also be defendants in the action pending in state court.”). Parties that are “too closely related should be treated as one party for Younger purposes.” Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, P.A., 811 F.2d 171, 177 (3d Cir.1987); see Blackwelder, 689 F.Supp. at 119 (“An exception to this rule comes into play when ‘legally distinct parties are so closely related that they should all be subject to the Younger considerations which govern any one of them.’ ”) (quoting Doran, 422 U.S. at 928, 95 S.Ct. at 2566). Whether parties should be treated the same for purposes of the Younger analysis is not a straightforward inquiry. The Court must assess whether “the plaintiffs’ interests are so inextricably intertwined that direct interference with the state court proceeding is inevitable, [such that] Younger may extend to bar the claims of plaintiffs who are not party to the pending state court proceeding.” Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 82 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that the plaintiffs’ federal claims are essentially derivative so that the court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims, even though not all plaintiffs are involved in the state court action); Parties have been found to be closely related in two different contexts: “(1) an employer’s federal suit when its employees assert identical interests in state court; and (2) cases in which federal plaintiffs are closely related to state defendants in terms of ownership, control and management.” Id. at 178. See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348-49, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975) (finding the interests of two employees of a movie theater to be intertwined with that of the owners in connection with a state obscenity statute). Cf. Doran, 422 U.S. at 928, 95 S.Ct. at 2566 (finding that three separate bar owners had similar business interests but were otherwise “unrelated in terms of ownership, control, and management,” so that Younger did not apply). Although it is unlikely that the three sets of Plaintiffs here are so inextricably intertwined that they would be treated as the same party for purposes of Younger abstention, the second wrinkle in this case allows the Court to avoid even addressing the issue. This is because regardless of which set of Plaintiffs initiated the state court action, if the Court finds that the parallel state court proceeding is remedial, not coercive, it is possible that Younger abstention would simply not apply- “In the paradigm situation calling for Younger restraint, the state defendant brings a federal action challenging the statute [which is simultaneously being applied against him].” Fernández v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 851 (1st Cir.1978); see, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (federal plaintiff seeking to enjoin state plaintiff from enforcing judgment against him); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) (federal plaintiffs seeking to enjoin state proceedings against them for child abuse). As noted by the Sixth Circuit, “Younger cases generally have a common procedural posture”. Devlin v. Kalm, 594 F.3d 893 (6th Cir.2010). In the typical Younger case, the federal plaintiff is a defendant in ongoing or threatened state court proceedings seeking to enjoin continuation of those state proceedings. Moreover, the basis for the federal relief claimed is generally available to the would-be federal plaintiff as a defense in the state proceedings. Crawley v. Hamilton County Comm’rs, 744 F.2d 28, 30 (6th Cir.1984). This is not the situation presented by the case at bar. Rather, putting aside the issue of the other two sets of plaintiffs not seeking state court relief, the parallel state and federal civil actions were initiated by the same private party. Consequently, the Court faces the thorny issue of whether this is the type of case that warrants abstention under Younger. In particular, the Court must determine whether the state proceeding is “the type of proceeding to which Younger applies,” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989), which normally means “state criminal prosecutions” or “civil enforcement proceedings,” id. at 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506. In the Younger context, a number of federal courts, as well as legal commentators, have focused on the distinction between state remedial actions and coercive actions. The dichotomy largely stems from a footnote found in the Supreme Court ease of Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986), which stated that: The lower courts have been virtually uniform in holding that the Younger principle applies to pending state administrative proceedings in which an important state interest is involved.... The application of the Younger principle to pending state administrative proceedings is fully consistent with Patsy [v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982) ], which holds that litigants need not exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing a § 1983 suit in federal court. Unlike Patsy, the administrative proceedings here are coercive rather than remedial, began before any substantial advancement in the federal action took place, and involve an important state interest. Id., 477 U.S. at 627 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. at 2723. Thus, based upon this language, “some courts [in determining whether to abstain,] evaluate whether the federal plaintiff is involved in a ‘coercive’ state proceeding, in other words a state-initiated enforcement action in which the plaintiff does not have a choice to participate, or a ‘remedial’ proceeding in which the plaintiff initiated an option to seek a remedy for the state’s wrongful action.” Eric Turner, Comment, You Say Remedial, I Say Coercive, Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off: Why the Remedial/Coercive Distinction Is Not Critical in Younger Abstention, 49 Washburn L. J. 629, 641 (2010). One district court case from the Third Circuit has defined the dichotomy between remedial and coercive proceedings as follows: “In remedial state proceedings, the plaintiff is attempting in both state and federal courts to vindicate a wrong inflicted by the state; in coercive state proceedings, the federal plaintiff is the state court defendant, and the state proceedings were initiated to enforce a state law.” Remed Recovery Care Ctrs. v. Twp. of Worcester, No. 98 Civ. 1799, 1998 WL 437272, at *3 (E.D.Pa. July 30, 1998) (citations omitted). The circuits are not uniform in their application of the remedial/coercive distinction in the abstention context. As one commentator has noted, circuits disagree not only about whether the coercive-remedial distinction matters, but also how to tell the difference. Turner, supra, at 641. Nevertheless, many circuits that have addressed the issue have found the distinction to be a crucial one, especially when the remedial nature of the state court proceeding is apparent. For instance, the Third Circuit and its district courts have consistently held that federal courts should abstain under Younger only when the state proceedings are “coercive”, rather than “remedial”. See O’Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 791 n. 13 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Dayton, 477 U.S. at 627 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 2718); see also Wyatt v. Keating, 130 Fed.Appx. 511, 514 (3d Cir.2005); Smolow v. Hafer, 353 F.Supp.2d 561, 572 (E.D.Pa.2005); Antonelli v. New Jersey, 310 F.Supp.2d 700, 711-12 (D.N.J.2004) (“Abstention is only proper when the state court proceeding is a coercive action instituted by the state”). Precedent from the Seventh Circuit also appears to advise against application of Younger in the circumstances the Court currently faces. See Beary Landscaping, Inc. v. Ludwig, 479 F.Supp.2d 857, 867 (N.D.Ill.2007) (“Because the State has not initiated any proceeding against the plaintiffs in the instant suit, that factor cuts in favor of proceeding, as opposed to abstaining, here.”). In Nader v. Keith, 385 F.3d 729 (7th Cir.2004), the Seventh Circuit emphasized that an important consideration concerning the applicability of Younger abstention is whether the State has initiated prior enforcement proceedings against the plaintiffs, or whether, as is the situation in the instant case, the plaintiffs are simply pursuing parallel relief in both state and federal fora. Id. at 732 (collecting cases); accord, e.g., SSDD Enterprises, Inc. v. Village of Lansing, No. 95 Civ. 6064, 1997 WL 176576, at *5 n. 13 (N.D.Ill. April 4, 1997) (“Younger abstention typically arises where a party has an action filed against him in state court to enforce an ordinance or statute, and he commences suit in federal court challenging the legislation’s constitutionality.”) (collecting cases). The Third and Seventh Circuits are not alone in adhering to this legal application. See, e.g., Devlin v. Kalm, 594 F.3d 893, 895 (6th Cir.2010); Dukes v. Maryland, No. 11 Civ. 876, 2011 WL 4500885, at *4 (D.Md. Sept. 27, 2011) (“The Fourth Circuit has twice reiterated that the distinction between remedial and coercive administrative proceedings is relevant to determining whether abstention is appropriate.”); Moore v. Medows, No. 07 Civ. 631, 2007 WL 1876017, at *5-6 (N.D.Ga. June 28, 2007) (finding Younger abstention unwarranted where the plaintiff initiated a remedial challenge to a state administrative order reducing skilled nursing care hours covered by Medicaid). Most recently, the Tenth Circuit fully explored the remedial/coercive distinction and developed a structured approach for lower courts to incorporate the distinction into the traditional three-part Younger inquiry. See generally Brown ex rel. Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882 (10th Cir.2009). Also, the First and Ninth Circuits expressly require a state-initiated action to show the existence of a coercive proceeding. See Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 522 (1st Cir.2009); San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir.2008). The Second Circuit has not expressly ruled on this issue, but any inferences drawn from its opinions appear to indicate that the distinction is one that is valid. Compare Bethphage Lutheran Serv., Inc. v. Weicker, 965 F.2d 1239 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Moreover, under Younger ... and its progeny, abstention is appropriate to avoid federal court interference with pending state “coercive” proceedings.”) with Univ. Club v. City of N.Y., 842 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir.1988) (“Union League contends that because the commission’s proceedings are civil rather than criminal, they are ‘remedial’ rather than ‘coercive’. This argument has no merit ... We have little difficulty concluding that the commission proceedings here are coercive in nature; indeed, that is precisely what Union League is concerned about.”). Moreover, at least one district court in this Circuit has explicitly embraced it. See, e.g., OMYA Inc. v. Vermont, 80 F.Supp.2d 211, 215 (D.Vt.2000). In OMYA the District Court of Vermont highlighted that “the Younger line of cases uniformly involves state actions brought by the state against the federal plaintiff.” Id. at 215. The OMYA court went on to note that a “notably different procedural posture” presented itself in that case: Here, OMYA has brought suit in state court challenging the legality of the permit restrictions placed on it by the Environmental Board. Defendants have admitted that there is no pending threat of prosecution or enforcement in this case. The Younger line of cases is solely concerned with preventing Defendants in state court from circumventing state prosecution or enforcement by way of federal judicial intervention. Id. at 216. Thus, the Court “declined to extend Younger to cases that involve proceedings in state court which were initiated by the federal Plaintiff.” Id. But see Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hurlbut, No. 08 Civ. 7192, 2009 WL 604430, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. March 9, 2009) (“In addition, the fact that the proceedings are between private parties does not preclude abstention, as the state has an interest here that goes beyond its interest as adjudicator of wholly private disputes.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Certainly, this distinction is one that has been criticized. See Turner, supra (“Whether a proceeding is remedial or coercive should not be an all or-nothing, either-or question but rather one of degree relevant for measuring the state’s interest.... Proceedings necessary for the vindication of important state policies encompass remedial proceedings in which the state defends its policies against allegations of wrongdoing”); Taylor G. Selim, Note, Remedial and Coercive Administrative Proceedings Under Younger: The Tenth Circuit’s Test in Brown v. Day, 2010 BYU L.Rev. 267 (2010). In addition, the fact that not every Circuit is in line with this thinking is an important consideration. Compare Alleghany Corp. v. Haase, 896 F.2d 1046, 1053 (7th Cir.1990) (finding the distinction matters in a decision to hear the federal suit), and Gordon v. E. Goshen Twp., 592 F.Supp.2d 828, 842 (E.D.Pa. 2009) (declining to apply Younger abstention on the ground that plaintiffs’ state case was a remedial action in a case involving residents seeking an injunction to stop an ordinance from allowing deer hunting with a bow in township) with Alleghany Corp. v. McCartney, 896 F.2d 1138, 1145 (8th Cir.1990) (finding distinction does not matter in decision to abstain). Nonetheless, whether looking at the initiating party or the underlying nature and substance of the proceedings, the state court action here is clearly remedial. See Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882, 896 (10 Cir. 2009) (Tymokovich, J., dissenting) (“By making the distinction turn on the underlying nature and substance of the administrative proceedings, we can ensure Younger abstention applies only to proceedings — like criminal prosecutions — of paramount importance to the state.”). The Court finds that this is not the type of parallel state court proceeding for which a federal court must abstain under Younger. See Devlin, 594 F.3d at 895 (“Accordingly, Younger does not prevent the federal court from ruling on Devlin’s claims in the present suit because Devlin is the plaintiff in both the federal and state proceedings, and Devlin does not seek to enjoin the state proceedings or otherwise use the federal court to shield him from state enforcement efforts.”). “The jurisdictional sword that sustains federal rights should not be swiftly sheathed simply because a concurrent parallel attack has been mounted in the state courts.” United Fence & Guard Rail Corp. v. Cuomo, 878 F.2d 588, 595 (2d Cir.1989). In sum, because the state court action initiated by the Jaronczyk Plaintiffs is remedial, the Court finds that Younger abstention is not applicable to the instant case. D. Supplemental Jurisdiction In the alternative, the Defendants contend that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims that are asserted in both this case and the case before the Nassau County Supreme Court. Federal courts are, of course, courts of limited jurisdiction. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), which codified the earlier doctrine of pendent jurisdiction: The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if— (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. Here, the Court finds that both (1) and (4) are applicable, so that the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. When the “state claim turns on novel or unresolved questions of state law, especially where those questions concern the state’s interest in the administration of its government, principles of federalism and comity may dictate that these questions be left for decision by the state courts”. Seabrook v. Jacobson, 153 F.3d 70, 72 (2d Cir.1998); see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) (“Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.”). Regardless of whether a particular set of plaintiffs have instituted a state court action, the Court finds significant reasons to avoid making a determination as to novel and complex state law questions concerning the New York State Constitution, the Municipal Home Rule Law, the Public Officers Law, the Open Meetings Law, and the General Construction Law. Putting aside the clear constitutional question, what remains is a dispute as to the proper application of various nuanced New York statutes. See Brooklyn Heights Ass’n v. Nat’l Park Service, 818 F.Supp.2d 564, 572 (E.D.N.Y.2011); Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 754 (2d Cir.2001) (“[T]he state law claims should be dismissed so that state courts can, if so called upon, decide for themselves whatever questions of state law this case may present.”). The particular state law claims asserted in this consolidated case turn on whether LL 315-12 is inconsistent with the Taylor Law, as well as whether its enactment violated the state Open Meetings Law, General Construction Law, and Nassau County Charter. The Court finds that these claims raise novel and complex questions of state law that are better left for the state court system to resolve, and thus declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Seabrook v. Jacobson, 153 F.3d 70, 71 (2d Cir.1998) (“In consideration of all the factors outlined below, [including] that the remaining state law claim turned on a novel and complex issue involving the interpretation of state statutes concerning the administration of state government and the balancing of important state policies, we conclude that the District Court should have dismissed, rather than retained supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim.”); Garcia ex. rel Marin v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 627 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1209 (E.D.Cal.2009) (“The Ninth Circuit has found it proper to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) in situations where the scope of a state legislative enactment is unknown ... or when the application of a state statute is a question of first impression.”) (citing Lovell by & through Lovell v. Poway Unifed Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 374 (9th Cir.1996) and Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 927 (9th Cir.2001)). Baines v. Masiello, 288 F.Supp.2d 376, 396 (W.D.N.Y.2003) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under (c)(3), but noting that “considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness to the litigants, and comity owed to the state courts favor having the remaining factual and legal issues as to whether the City’s enactment of Local Laws Nos. 8 and 13 comply with the relevant state and municipal laws determined in the state forum.”); Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir.1993) (“In light of the discretion afforded to district courts in making § 1367(c)(3) determinations, and the well established policy considerations militating against federal court involvement in state election disputes arising under state law, we hold that the district