Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER HARRY D. LEINENWEBER, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Before the Court is Defendant U.S. Soccer Federation’s Petition to Confirm an Arbitral Award; Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Expert Opinion of Rodney Fort; and Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Antitrust, RICO, and State Law Claims. For the reasons stated herein, the arbitral award is confirmed; Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied; Defendants’ Motions to Exclude and for Summary Judgment on the Antitrust claim are granted; and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the RICO and State Law Claims is granted in part and denied in part. II. BACKGROUND A. Parties and Related Entities Due to the size and complexity of this case, the following background is necessarily incomplete. Nonetheless, the Court provides a brief summary of the case, generally noting where there is a significant dispute (such a notation does not, however, constitute a ruling on what is or is not properly disputed under Local Rule 56.1). Plaintiff ChampionsWorld was formed in 2000 by Carmelo “Charlie” Stillitano (“Stillitano”), its CEO throughout its existence. From 2001 through 2005, ChampionsWorld organized and promoted soccer matches between prominent international men’s professional soccer teams, played (with a few exceptions) on U.S. soil. The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”) is the international governing body for soccer, and is responsible for such international competitions as the World Cup. FIFA is not a party to this litigation. Defendant United States Soccer Federation, Inc. (“USSF”) is a membership organization. USSF is the FIFA National Association member for the United States, and claims to have held that role since the early 20th century. It is a member of the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (“CONCACAF”), and is the national governing body for soccer recognized by the United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”). USSF is governed by a National Council comprised of elected representatives from USSF’s constituent groups, and also has a Board of Directors, similarly comprised. USSF maintains that its sanction is required for any match played on U.S. soil involving foreign, FIFA-affiliated teams; it also charges substantial sanctioning fees. Defendant Major League Soccer, LLC (“MLS”) is the Division I professional men’s soccer league based in the United States, and a member of USSF. It has an unusual structure for a sports league, with a joint Board of Governors and several investor-operators responsible for various teams (the parties sometimes refer to these as the MLS “owners.”) For additional history, see Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 47-55 (1st Cir.2002). In 2002, a group consisting of most of the MLS investors formed Soccer United Marketing (SUM), a marketing and promotion entity which now, among others, represents MLS and USSF. A few more introductions are in order. Sunil Gulati (“Gulati”) is, since 2006, President of USSF. Before that, he was USSF Vice President, and is the President of Kraft Soccer, evidently the company through which the Kraft family became MLS investors and operators of the New England Revolution MLS team. Gulati frequently represented the Kraft family and/or Kraft Soccer at MLS and SUM proceedings. Don Garber (“Garber”) is the MLS Commissioner and CEO of SUM; he also sits on USSF’s Board of Directors. Garber and Gulati communicated fairly often about soccer matters. Charles “Chuck” Blazer (“Blazer”) is a FIFA Executive Committee member, and was at all relevant times CONCACAF General Secretary. B. Background 1. Historical Background In 1975, Pres. Gerald Ford formed a Commission on Olympic Sports. The Commission’s final report noted, among other things, that: (a) USSF became affiliated with FIFA in 1913; (b) unlike the other sport governing bodies, USSF’s members included amateur and professional leagues; and (c) USSF derived income from fees relating to “Foreign Games/ Tours.” That report was delivered to Congress before the passage of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978. (The Act was amended in 1998 and renamed the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, and is now codified at 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501, et seq.) As part of its successful bid to host the 1994 FIFA Men’s World Cup, USSF agreed to facilitate the development of a Division I professional soccer league in the United States. USSF selected Major League Professional Soccer, Inc. (“MLPS”) (later to become MLS) from among three applicants to become that league (and to become a USSF member). Alan Rothenberg (“Rothenberg”), then-President of USSF, was involved in developing and founding MLPS, although Mark Abbott (“Abbott”) (MLS’s 30(b)(6) witness and current President) testified that Rothenberg did not participate substantively in selecting MLPS. Plaintiff contends that process was not genuinely competitive. MLS was formed in 1995, and played its inaugural season the following year. It appears that the World Cup Organizing Committee lent $5 million to MLPS to get the league running (that loan was later assumed by MLS). After the World Cup, surplus funds, as well as the right to collect on that loan, were transferred to the newly-formed United States Soccer Foundation (“Foundation”). (The parties dispute how independent the Foundation is from USSF.) Instead of repaying the loan in cash, MLS entered into an arrangement whereby the Foundation incrementally forgave the loan in exchange for marketing benefits such as sponsorship placement on an MLS team’s jersey and the right to use MLS’s marks. See Abbott Dep. 77:11-80:23. Plaintiff disputes that the loan was ever truly repaid. USSF has repeatedly stated its support for MLS (and the women’s professional leagues), and that the leagues’ success is important to the good of soccer in the United States. USSF has helped fund stadium development for certain MLS teams (though, Defendants contend, only in exchange for fair consideration). USSF also helped fund Project 40, which has been described in different ways throughout the record, but appears to have been intended to support aspiring professional soccer players. 2. The Background of This Dispute From 1996 to 2002, MLS promoted over 40 matches between FIFA-affiliated National or club teams, but the games were generally not as well attended as Plaintiffs, nor did they necessarily feature the same caliber teams. After its founding, SUM considered acquiring all or part of ChampionsWorld several times, but talks failed. SUM created SUM International to promote high-caliber international matches, noting in a memorandum that “leaving the field open to ChampionsWorld and other promoters will prove extremely damaging to SUM and MLS.” PL’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of RICO Facts, Ex. EE, at Bates No. MLS 044641-643. For all or nearly all of ChampionsWorld’s matches, Plaintiff entered into contracts or “match agreements” with USSF. The agreements set forth, among other things, Plaintiffs agreement to pay a fee and post a performance bond in return for USSF’s agreement to sanction the match. Although ChampionsWorld eventually went bankrupt, some of its games were successful in drawing large crowds and high gross gate receipts. In 2003, ChampionsWorld’s average attendance at U.S. matches was 45,427, and it paid an average sanctioning fee of over $200,000 per match. USSF claims that it has been sanctioning international games, and charging sanctioning fees, since the early 20th century; Plaintiff objects to USSF’s historical evidence and argues that USSF’s bylaws did not impose sanctioning fees on nonUSSF members until 1999. In any event, USSF’s general sanctioning fee is an amount calculated as follows: • 5.25% of the gross gate receipts for matches involving one foreign club team; • 9% of the gross gate receipts for matches involving two foreign club teams; • 11.25% of the first $200,000, and then 15% of the remaining gross gate receipts for matches involving any country’s national team (“a National Team”). See, e.cj., Pl.’s Resp. To Def.’ Statement of Antitrust Facts, Ex. OOO. (The actual percentages appear to have varied over time.) Promoters are responsible for these fees, regardless of whether they are members of USSF. Throughout its existence, Plaintiff questioned whether USSF had authority to sanction its games and charge these fees. Although the parties hotly dispute when the policy originated, at all relevant times USSF gave a “discount” to promoters of international matches who put on matches as a part of a doubleheader with an MLS game; that is, the sanctioning fee due for the international match was calculated based on 50% of the gross gate receipts of the doubleheader event (rather than the ordinary 100% of gross gate receipts). (The parties dispute whether the discount applied only to MLS games.) Some of ChampionsWorld’s games were doubleheaders. Similarly, USSF claims that it has required promoters to put up “performance bonds” (to ensure payment of sanctioning fees) for decades. Again, Plaintiff contends that USSF rules did not require fees (and therefore, bonds) from non-members before 1999. USSF requires bonds in the greater of: • $3,750 per foreign club team per game; • $25,000 for any game involving a National Team; or • an estimate of the anticipated percentage payments that will be due to USSF, CONCACAF and FIFA after the match. The estimate is in the sole discretion of the Federation. See id. The bond amount could also vary depending on the number of games at issue. Plaintiff disputes that all promoters have had to post such bonds. Plaintiff points out that MLS teams benefit from using a collective “blanket bond” of $50,000, and notes several other incidences of USSF issuing fee waivers (for example, to Nike as part of a Licensing Agent Agreement; the parties dispute whether that waiver was assigned later, with the rest of the Agreement, to SUM.) SUM undisputedly paid sanctioning fees to USSF. USSF contends that its staff members made decisions regarding fee and bond amounts independent of anyone at MLS. Plaintiff disputes this, claiming that Defendants worked together to run it out of business, and pointing to communications from or relating to individuals like Gulati, who have overlapping connections to SUM, MLS, and USSF. At all relevant times, FIFA charged a fee of 2% of the gross receipts for any match between two National Teams of FIFA members (less a deduction for certain taxes and fees). Similarly, for matches played in its territory, CONCACAF has charged a fee of: 2% of the gross receipts (again, less a deduction) for matches between two National Teams, and 2% of the gross receipts for international club team matches. Under the ChampionsWorld-USSF match agreements, USSF was responsible for the fees payable to FIFA, CONCACAF, and any state associations. In 2001 and 2002, USSF set the bond amounts for ChampionsWorld’s matches at the base bond level. Plaintiff was late in “closing out” its financial obligations for every game in 2002 and 2003; Plaintiff does not dispute this, but contends that it is essentially irrelevant, pointing to testimony from USSF employees that late fees are generally not collected. In 2003, USSF set performance bonds for all but one of Plaintiffs matches higher than the base bond amount — most often, at $100,000. At Plaintiffs request, USSF significantly reduced the bond requirements for some of Plaintiffs 2003 games. In 2003, in support of Stillitano’s application to become a FIFA-licensed match agent, USSF Secretary General Dan Flynn wrote a letter stating that ChampionsWorld had consistently submitted required paperwork and fees to USSF and to the participating teams, that USSF had never received any complaints regarding Stillitano, and calling his track record with USSF “impeccable.” See Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot for RICO Summ. J. Ex. N. In 2004, USSF set ChampionsWorld’s performance bonds above the base amount (evidently for every game) — generally, $75,000, and did not agree to reduce them. Plaintiff paid the 2004 bonds in a single $675,000 payment, which, it contends, was at USSF’s insistence. Plaintiff contends that Chuck Blazer objected to Plaintiff not being allowed to meet that bond amount with a letter of credit, as USSF rules allegedly permit. ChampionsWorld did not pay the balance of the fees owed for its 2004 matches. ChampionsWorld suffered substantial losses during its existence, filed for bankruptcy in January 2005, and ceased doing business in May 2005. Plaintiff relies heavily on a series of emails and communications, mostly between, among others, Gulati, Garber, Abbott, and Kraft Soccer’s Brian O’Donovan, to demonstrate that, e.g., MLS and/or SUM improperly sought special breaks on sanctioning fees; MLS and/or SUM could use USSF’s structure, contacts, and/or members to their benefit; MLS and/or SUM affiliates were improperly consulted regarding Plaintiffs sanctioning fee and bond amounts; or that they were gleefully plotting Plaintiffs demise. Needless to say, Defendants contest many of these documents’ admissibility, as well as the conclusions that Plaintiff draws from them regarding who spoke on behalf of whom, and whether or not the discussions were appropriate. The Court will discuss the admissibility of these various documents as necessary, below. For some undisclosed period of time, USSF provided MLS and/or SUM with an international games report — that is, a report of upcoming international games promoted by other promoters. USSF’s Tom King maintained, however, that the information was provided to any promoter that asked, and was given to other promoters verbally. 3. Procedural Background Plaintiff’s Complaint originally brought claims sounding in antitrust (Counts I through III), civil RICO (Counts IV and V), and contract, along with related doctrines (Count VI through Count X). a. Arbitration Proceedings FIFA has a standing committee called the Players’ Status Committee (the “PSC”), which acts as its dispute resolution body. See FIFA Statutes, § 34, 49 (2011). The PSC is the designated arbiter listed in the Match Agent Regulations (“MARs”), to which (as set out in this Court’s May 2007, opinion) ChampionsWorld became bound when Stillitano applied to become a FIFA-licensed match agent. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) is an arbitral court headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland. When arbitrating FIFA-related disputes, the CAS applies FIFA’s statutes and regulations and, secondarily, Swiss law. PSC decisions are appealable to the CAS. On May 4, 2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 980 (N.D.Ill.2007), this Court granted the Defendants’ Motion to Stay this action pending arbitration before the PSC. That November, Plaintiff filed a claim for arbitration against Defendants, which included its antitrust and RICO claims. FIFA rebuffed the arbitration request, in part because only individuals (not corporations) may participate in FIFA’s dispute resolution process. In September 2008, USSF instituted an arbitration action against Stillitano, limited to whether FIFA’s rules authorized USSF to: (1) sanction games such as Plaintiff’s, (2) charge sanctioning fees and a performance bond, and (3) notify FIFA if a match agent refused to pay the fees or bonds. The original petition also asked (4) whether USSF, FIFA and/or CONCACAF had to return any sanctioning fees to Stillitano. Plaintiff objected to that arbitration, and the matter was submitted to the PSC for its determination of its own jurisdiction. The PSC determined that it had jurisdiction over USSF’s petition. Plaintiff appealed that conclusion to the CAS, which affirmed the PSC’s conclusion with regard to first three questions (but not the fourth), and noted that the PSC’s jurisdiction was limited to interpreting FIFA’s Statutes and regulations. The case was returned to the PSC for a ruling on the merits. The PSC subsequently found that under FIFA’s statutes and regulations: • USSF has the authority to require matches between foreign national or club teams on U.S. soil to be sanctioned by it; • USSF has the right to charge sanctioning fees for such matches and require the posting of a bond securing those fees; and • USSF has the right to notify FIFA if a FIFA-licensed match agent refuses to pay its sanctioning fees or post performance bonds in connection with such games. The PSC concluded that all of these principles have applied at least since 2001, even though FIFA’s statutes only explicitly recognized members’ sanctioning authority over club games played on their territory since 2004. Plaintiff appealed the merits decision to the CAS, which subsequently affirmed the PSC’s ruling as a reasonable interpretation of FIFA’s statutes and regulations. It held that USSF had the authority to sanction and charge sanctioning fees for foreign national team or club matches played on U.S. soil, and to notify FIFA regarding delinquent match agents. In a procedure uncommon in U.S. courts, Plaintiff had to name FIFA (as the entity of which the PSC is a part) as a respondent in its appeal; FIFA submitted briefs and arguments to the CAS panel. Plaintiff evidently did not appeal the CAS decision to the Swiss Supreme Court. USSF has now moved to confirm the arbitral award. b. Litigation Proceedings On July 21, 2010, the Court denied Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings regarding Counts I through IX, and dismissed Count X without prejudice. In that ruling, the Court found as a matter of law that the Ted Stevens Act does not grant USSF authority to govern professional soccer in United States, “except to the extent necessary for USSF to govern the participation of professional players in the Olympic Games and related events — USSF is not entitled to an exemption from the antitrust laws regarding professional soccer, except to [that extent].” ChampionsWorld LLC v. U.S. Soccer Federation, 726 F.Supp.2d 961, 975 (N.D.Ill.2010). On September 14, 2011, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Counts II, III, and IV (its Sherman Act Section 2 and USSF RICO Enterprise claims). Accordingly, the only remaining counts are Counts I, V, and VI-IX. III. LEGAL STANDARD The bulk of this opinion is devoted to summary judgment; other applicable legal standards will be set out in the relevant sections. The Court applies the ordinary summary judgment standard. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court discusses the extent of the parties’ compliance with Local Rule 56.1 below. IV. DISCUSSION A. Standing Plaintiff consistently objects that Defendants use the term “FIFA Affiliate Exhibition Matches” to distort the issues, insisting that USSF’s policies purported to govern a match involving any foreign soccer-playing entity, not merely those affiliated with FIFA members. See, e.g., Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to USSF’s Pet. to Enforce CAS Ruling 7; PL’s Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. For RICO Summ. J. 2. Defendants note that all of Plaintiffs games did involve FIFA affiliates, and objects that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge its policy as applied to other matches. See, e.g., USSF’s Opp’n to PL’s Mot. For Partial Summ. J. 6-7 & n. 5. (USSF raised the issue in a footnote, and Plaintiff does not appear to have directly responded. Standing, however, is jurisdictional, and not waivable.) 1. Contract Claims The Court agrees that, at least with regard to the contract claims, Plaintiffs claims are predicated on its relationship with USSF, and USSF’s authority over Plaintiffs matches. Plaintiff may well agree. See PL’s Reply in Supp. of its Mot. For Partial Summ. J. 1 (“To prevail ... USSF must show that it had authority to charge its own sanctioning fees upon professional soccer matches promoted by ChampionsWorld between 2001 and 2004.”) 2. RICO Claim Under RICO, a plaintiff has standing if it has suffered: “(1) an ‘injur[y] in [its] business or property’ (2) ‘by reason of (3) the defendants’ ‘violation of section 1962.’ ” RWB Services, LLC v. Hartford Computer Group, Inc., 539 F.3d 681, 685, 687 (7th Cir.2008) (noting also that plaintiffs must be injured by at least one predicate act, but that courts should examine the injury in the context of the entire RICO violation to assess the requisite causation.). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Plaintiffs RICO liability theory is premised on the claim that USSF falsely claimed exclusive sanctioning authority over foreign professional soccer matches played in the United States, and then demanded fees and bonds in unjustifiable and discriminatory amounts calculated in part to drive Plaintiff out of business. To the extent that Plaintiffs business was injured by reason of this alleged racketeering activity, it is only in relation to games that Plaintiff promoted or tried to promote. See PL’s Opp’n to Defs.’s Mot. for RICO Summ. J. 26 (noting that Plaintiff suffered RICO harm: (1) in paying the sanctioning fees and bonds, and (2) because the alleged misconduct was intended to (and did) drive its investors away.) Plaintiff has conceded that all of its matches involved FIFA affiliates, and not argued that it has broader standing. Furthermore, Plaintiff has made little, if any, genuine effort to establish a violation of § 1962 beyond the context of FIFA-affiliate matches — including whether such matches occur, of USSF actually sanctions them. Although this is a closer question, absent such an explanation, the Court concludes that Plaintiff can only establish standing to challenge USSF’s conduct as it pertains to FIFA-affiliated matches. 3. Antitrust Claims Antitrust standing is not jurisdictional, and need not be addressed at this juncture. Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir.1994). B. USSF’s Petition to Enforce the Arbitral Award USSF has petitioned under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention” or “Convention”) for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral decision in CAS 2010/A/2241 (Charles Stillitano v. United States Soccer Federation (USSF) & Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) ). Thomson Dec. Ex. A (hereinafter, “2011 CAS Ruling”). Plaintiff objects that: (a) the decision falls outside of the Convention; (b) venue in this Court is improper; and (c) several defenses to enforcement under the Convention apply. The Convention is enacted into U.S. law as Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). 9 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Article 1(1) of the Convention provides that it applies: to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought .... [and to] arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought. Convention Art. I, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330. Its implementing legislation, however, limits the Convention’s applicability. Lloyd’s London v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 571, 577 (7th Cir.2007) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 202). Section 202 defines a Convention award as: An ... arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial .... An ... award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states. Id. Because the various entities’ relationships are integral to this discussion, the Court pauses summarize them (as relevant here, and very generally) as follows: Stillitano, USSF, and ChampionsWorld are or were U.S. citizens; FIFA is Swiss. As relevant here, only ChampionsWorld and USSF are parties to this litigation. The agreement under which this Court compelled arbitration (under Chapter 1 of the FAA) is Stillitano’s match agent application to FIFA. (This Court ruled previously that ChampionsWorld was bound by that agreement due to its relationship to Stillitano, and found that USSF could enforce the agreement essentially because it was an intended beneficiary thereof.) Because arbitration before the PSC can only involve individuals (not corporations), this Court ruled in 2008 that Stillitano, though not a party, could arbitrate on Plaintiffs behalf. In its petition here, USSF argued that the relevant relationship arises out of the commercial contracts between Plaintiff and USSF (that Stillitano executed as CEO and, in some cases, a FIFA-licensed match agent), and that the award is foreign and/or has a reasonable relation to a foreign country because: (a) FIFA was a named respondent in the CAS proceeding; (b) the seat of arbitration was Switzerland; and (c) the CAS panel said that it would apply FIFA statutes and, eomplementarily, Swiss law. See Pet. 4. Plaintiff appears to agree that this dispute and award arise out of a commercial contractual relationship between it and USSF, but strenuously objects that neither the parties’ relationship nor the arbitral award is foreign enough to bring the award within the Convention. Plaintiff argues, in part, that FIFA’s participation in the CAS proceeding — defending its ruling as the arbiter below — does not make the award arise “out of such a relationship.” PL’s Mem. in Opp’n to Pet. 12. In essence, Plaintiff claims that FIFA’s appearance before the CAS is not a sufficient (or at least, not the correct) “relationship” to bring the CAS ruling within the Convention. In its reply, USSF raised several alternative arguments for the first time, including that the award also arose from a relationship (as opposed to an award) not entirely between U.S. citizens, because FIFA had issued the match agent license. Further, USSF argued, the Court can enforce the award pursuant to Chapter 1 of the FAA, or under the doctrine of issue preclusion (regardless of whether the award is confirmed). See id. at 6-7 n. 7 & 8. The Court sought briefing from Plaintiff in response to these new arguments, see DKT 430, which is now complete. I. Applicability of New York Convention Although the parties do not express it as such, they seem to construe the second sentence of § 202 differently, giving the phrase “which is entirely between citizens of the United States” different modifiers. If it modifies “an agreement or award,” Defendant’s construction is plausible — the CAS “award” is arguably “between” the parties and FIFA. If it modifies “such a relationship,” however, the commercial relationship identified in the first sentence of § 202 must have included FIFA or another foreign entity to bring the award within the Convention. (USSF partially adopted the “relationship” construction in its reply, as noted above.) It is unsurprising that courts need not often distinguish between the two constructions, and even use them interchangeably. Compare, e.g., Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP Invs., Inc., 107 F.3d 476, 482 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that the Convention applies to “any arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a [commercial] legal relationship ... provided only that if the relationship is entirely between U.S. citizens, it must involve performance abroad or have some other reasonable relation with a foreign country.”) (internal quotations omitted, emphasis added); with Jain v. de Mere, 51 F.3d 686, 689 (7th Cir.1995) (“Chapter 2 mandates that any commercial arbitral agreement, unless it is between two United States citizens, involves property located in the United States, and has no reasonable relationship with one or more foreign states, falls under the Convention.”) (emphasis added). The Court finds that the construction in Lander comports most closely with the statutory language and the rule of the last antecedent. Furthermore, Lander involved, as here, enforcement of an arbitral award. See also Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1440-41 (11th Cir.1998) (noting that § 202 excludes “those awards that arise out of ... a commercial relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United Statesf.]”) (Internal alterations omitted). But cf. Nomanbhoy v. Vahanvaty, No. 11 C 2456, 2011 WL 6736052, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 21, 2011) (noting that the parties “dispute whether the Award has a reasonable relation to foreign state” and concluding that where the parties and dispute were domestic but the arbitration occurred abroad, the award fell within art. 1(1), but outside of § 202.). This construction — whereby art. 1 of the Convention is limited by § 202, which focuses on the parties’ relationship — helps to reconcile two sets of cases: those which find the parties’ relationship or dispute insufficiently foreign to warrant arbitration or enforcement of an award (like Nomanbhoy and the salvage cases, such as Jones v. Sea Tow Svcs., 30 F.3d 360 (2d Cir.1994)), on the one hand, with cases which stress that an award is “nondomestic” under art. 1 if it is “made within the legal framework of another country, e.g., pronounced in accordance with foreign law [or involves foreign parties.]” See, e.g., Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir.1983). Accordingly, the Convention - applies if (a) a non-U.S. citizen is a party to the commercial relationship, or (b) the relationship involves property, performance, or enforcement abroad or “some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.” There appears to be no dispute that the relationship never contemplated performance abroad. With that in mind, the Court turns to the parties’ arguments as to whether the USSF-ChampionsWorld commercial relationship involved a foreign party. USSF argues that FIFA was “integral” to the “relationship giving rise to the arbitration” in that it issued Stillitano’s match agent license and thus was party to the arbitration agreement. Rep. in Supp. of Pet. 3. Plaintiff rejoins, in essence, that the USSF-ChampionsWorld relationship is between domestic entities and related to soccer matches played in the United States. It is too domestic to fall within the Convention, Plaintiff argues, because its foreign elements are too incidental; FIFA never signed the contracts and was largely inactive in the parties’ relationship. Courts, it notes, have found that mere agreements to arbitrate internationally or apply foreign law are insufficient to trigger the Convention. See Pl.’s Resp. to Court’s Questions 7-8. Plaintiff analogizes this case to ones in which courts have found that, e.g., having an international parent company does not invoke the Convention, and points out that USSF evidently allowed Plaintiff to put on a significant number of matches before Stillitano became a FIFA-licensed match agent. Id. The Court notes that the USSF-ChampionsWorld contracts do refer to FIFA— for example, noting that the USSF would be responsible for fees owed to FIFA, and requiring Plaintiff to ensure that the games were played in accordance with FIFA rules. See, e.g., Pl.’s Statement of Facts in Support of Partial Summ. J., Ex. V, at Bates Nos. CW14242, 14244. Plaintiff is correct that FIFA certainly was not a signatory to these contracts. Nonetheless, as USSF points out, Plaintiff at some point found it necessary to have Stillitano become a licensed match agent. The Court also notes that FIFA is clearly acknowledged in the contracts as a relevant governing entity that directly profited from certain matches. FIFA did issue the match agent license, but it also had a broader stake in this relationship. Thus, Plaintiffs reliance on the USSF-ChampionsWorld contracts to prove FIFA’s irrelevance is misplaced; the relevant commercial relationship was not, in fact, “entirely between citizens of the United States.” Furthermore, although Defendants do not make this argument, the Court’s conclusion that the award falls under the Convention is buttressed by the fact that the parties’ relationship also bore a reasonable relation to foreign states through FIFA, its members, and their affiliated teams. Frankly speaking, this is a close case. In the end, however, it is unlike Nomanbhoy or the salvage cases, where the parties’ only connection to any foreign country was the seat of arbitration or their choice of law. FIFA was an interested party throughout — as reflected by the parties’ contracts and Stillitano’s match agent status. The very nature of Plaintiffs business was bringing foreign, FIFA-affiliated soccer teams to play matches in the U.S. This is not a case where, as Plaintiff argues, the relationship is insufficiently “foreign” to warrant enforcement under the Convention (but too foreign to be enforced under Chapter 1 of the FAA.) Lest the Court be accused of rendering an unfairly crabbed interpretation of the statute, it notes that while the arbitration was conducted in New York, the award was rendered in Switzerland. Furthermore, FIFA was a party to the Match Agent Application that triggered the arbitration, and did participate in the CAS arbitration, albeit due to a procedural quirk. Accordingly, even under the alternative construction of the statute, the Convention governs. The Court turns next to Plaintiffs objections to venue and defenses under the convention. 2. Venue 9 U.S.C. § 204 makes enforcement of a Convention award appropriate in the jurisdiction where, “save for the arbitration agreement an action or proceeding with respect to the controversy between the parties could be brought[.]” USSF argues that because the USSF-ChampionsWorld contracts’ forum selection clause designated this district, “save for” the arbitration agreement, the suit would have proceeded here. Plaintiff objects that the forum selection clause cannot control because this Court lacks jurisdiction over Stillitano and the contracts are not personally imputable to him. Plaintiff purports to resurrect, on his personal behalf, all arguments in its previous brief opposing the motion to compel arbitration. PL’s Opp’n to Pet. 13 n. 7. It proposes no alternate venue. USSF argues that the Court has jurisdiction over Stillitano, who sought Chicago-based USSF’s help to get his match agent license, and that Stillitano is bound to the contracts as a party “closely related” to Plaintiff. USSF’s Rep. in Supp. of Pet. 6. & n. 7. Moreover, it argues that Plaintiffs counsel represented him in arbitration, presenting the same arguments there as here. Id. at 6. Finally, USSF notes (correctly) that this Court ruled in 2008 that Stillitano could arbitrate on behalf of both himself and Plaintiff. Id. Neither party’s cited cases are directly on point. The Court is inclined to agree that Plaintiffs jurisdiction-based objections miss the mark. USSF is not trying to enforce the arbitral award against Stillitano personally; the procedural history of this case, untidy as it is, makes clear that Stillitano arbitrated on Plaintiffs behalf because it, as a corporation, could not. The arbitration arose out of the dispute over the requirements of the match agreements — which contained a forum selection clause, making venue proper here. Hence, this is the proper Court to confirm the award. 3. Convention Defenses There are a limited number of defenses to enforcement under the Convention. See Convention Art. V. Plaintiff relies on three, arguing that: (a) Stillitano was “unable to present his case” due to USSF’s alleged discovery violations; (b) the arbitral procedure “was not in accordance with the laws of the country where the arbitration took place” because review was not de novo; and (c) enforcement of the CAS decision would violate public policy. The Court addresses each in turn. a. Ability to Present the Case Plaintiff argues that Stillitano could not adequately present his case in arbitration because USSF withheld critical evidence. An arbitral award will not be enforced if the challenging party shows that “he was not given a meaningful opportunity to be heard as our due process jurisprudence defines it” — at least “adequate notice, a hearing on the evidence, and an impartial decision by the arbitrator.” Generica Ltd. v. Pharm. Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123, 1130 (7th Cir.1997). Nonetheless, parties to arbitration should not expect full judicial proceedings. Id. Arbiters are not bound to hear all of the proffered evidence; vacating an award is proper only when the exclusion of relevant evidence “actually deprived a party of a fair hearingf.]” Slaney v. Intern. Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 592 (7th Cir.2001). Plaintiff argues that Stillitano could not adequately present his case because USSF concealed proof that it “did not purport to impose sanctioning fees upon non-members of USSF until 1999” — specifically that it failed to disclose its pre-1999 bylaws and policies until after arbitration. PL’s Resp. To Pet. 14. Accordingly, Plaintiff argues, Stillitano was precluded from disproving USSF’s claim “that it has supposedly ‘always’ understood and embraced FIFA’s statutes and regulations as independently mandating USSF’s exercise of sanctioning authority over ‘all’ promoters of international games.” Id. USSF contends that the objection is a red herring, because Plaintiff never requested the pre-1999 bylaws through discovery or the arbitration document request procedures. Furthermore, USSF argues that discovery of new evidence after an arbitral proceeding does not violate due process if the evidence is not central to the arbitration. USSF stresses that the key question was USSF’s authority under FIFA’s statutes and regulations, not USSF’s rules or beliefs. In Genérica, a party was not “unable to present its case,” despite restrictions on its ability to cross-examine an important witness. This was so because the arbiter did not consider the issue raised by the challenging party to be central to its ruling, and gave the witness’ testimony less weight in light of the restrictions. Id. at 1130-31. In Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, the Fifth Circuit similarly faced a claim that a Convention award should not be enforced because one party withheld material information (about the existence of an insurance policy). Karaha Bodas, 364 F.3d 274, 306-07 (5th Cir.2004). Although that party did not argue that it unable to present its case, the court’s analysis is instructive. It began from the premise that courts may refuse to enforce a Convention award if a party gave perjured evidence or procured the award by fraud. Id. at 306. On the facts before it, however, the court found no evidence that the withholding party deliberately misled the arbitral tribunal, and noted that the challenging party had not pressed the issue when it arose during arbitration or in seeking discovery. Id. at 307. The court accordingly found that the failure to disclose did not violate public policy or preclude enforcement of the award. Id. As discussed in Section IV(C)(2) below, Plaintiffs specific discovery requests did not clearly encompass the pre-1999 materials, nor did its general request for relevant documents put USSF on notice of a need to produce them — at least until it actually had them and recognized their relevance. Although Plaintiff claims that USSF deliberately delayed in obtaining these materials from its own Hall of Fame Archives, it offers no further evidence of willfulness. (Indeed, given that Defendants rely extensively on the documents, it seems unlikely that they withheld them for fear that they were too damaging.) More significantly, the Court agrees with USSF that its bylaws were not central to the CAS Ruling. Indeed, both the PSC and CAS repeatedly explained that their holdings were limited to what FIFA’s statutes and regulations provided from 2001 onward. See, e.g., 2011 CAS Ruling 24-26, ¶¶ 10.19-10.26. Therefore, evidence regarding USSF’s actual sanctioning practices pre-2000 would have been minimally relevant. The Court notes that based on this record, the CAS’s only discussion of USSF’s bylaws appears to be in the “factual background” section of its first ruling— which simply notes that USSF’s bylaws state that it exclusively governs men’s professional soccer in United States, and that all professional soccer matches therefore require its approval and payment of any sanctioning fee. 2009 CAS ruling, 3 at ¶ 3.4. This hardly demonstrates that USSF’s pre-2000 bylaws would have been central to the CAS panel’s second decision, as to what, if any, authority FIFA granted USSF beginning in 2001. Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that USSF’s failure to obtain these documents before arbitration deprived Stillitano of a fair hearing on the issues that the CAS panel actually decided. b. CAS Disregarded Its Own Standard of Review The CAS explained it standard of review as follows: although the CAS reviews appeals de novo, sporting federations are afforded broad discretion when interpreting their own statutes and regulations. Accordingly, the panel will not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the PSC unless the PSC’s judgment was “manifestly erroneous or plainly inconsistent with the clear wording of the regulations, or was rendered in violation of a party’s fundamental right policy.” 2011 CAS ruling at 24, ¶ 10.18 (citing CAS precedent). Plaintiff argues that the arbitral procedure was “not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took placet,]” Convention art. V(l)(d), because the CAS acknowledged that under Swiss law it had to conduct a de novo review, but under “any kind of legitimate de novo review, there is no way the FIFA ruling could have been affirmed.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Pet. 14. Specifically, Plaintiff objects, the CAS Ruling rendered the 2004 amendment to the FIFA statutes (which added explicit authorization to sanction international club games) “a nullity” and improperly concluded that FIFA’s interpretation of its own pre-2004 regulations was not “manifestly erroneous[.]” Id. at 15. Plaintiff points to nothing other than the CAS Ruling to indicate that de novo review in the ordinary sense was required either by CAS precedent, rules, or Swiss law. (Indeed, if it violated Swiss law, one might expect Stillitano to have appealed to the Swiss Supreme Court.) Instead, it merely asserts that any kind of rigorous review would have rejected the PSC’s decision. Plaintiff cannot shoehorn its true complaint — that the PSC and CAS rulings are wrong — into an objection that the arbitral procedure defied Swiss law (at least not without citing Swiss law or other applicable authority). c. Public Policy Finally, Plaintiff argues that enforcement in this ease would be contrary to U.S. public policy. See Convention art. V(2)(b). This is so, Plaintiff argues, because “[ejverything about this process offends basic notions of fairness to Stillitano.” Id. Plaintiff points to this Court’s previous discovery opinion, arguing that USSF and FIFA routinely and improperly engaged in private discussions about the arbitration. Plaintiff neglects to mention that in that opinion this Court rejected Plaintiffs allegations that USSF had tampered with the arbitration or was otherwise guilty of egregious misconduct. See, ChampionsWorld LLC v. U.S. Soccer Federation, 276 F.R.D. 577, 586 (2011). (The CAS likewise rejected Plaintiffs allegations of impropriety. See 2011 CAS Award, 21 ¶ 10.5.) Furthermore, USSF’s merely arguing that FIFA’s participation in the arbitration brought the award within § 202 does not demonstrate any manifest unfairness. The Court finds that enforcing the award would not violate the public policy of the United States. The award is accordingly confirmed. 4. Applicability of Chapter 1 Of the FAA Having concluded that the CAS award falls within the Convention and rejected Plaintiffs claimed defenses, the Court need not address USSF’s alternate argument that the award is enforceable under Chapter 1 of the FAA. 5. Collateral Estoppel Similarly, the Court need not address Defendant’s argument that, even if unconfirmed, the award would bind ChampionsWorld through issue preclusion. That said, the Court must still make the case-by-case determination of what weight to give the award. Arbitration rulings impinging on certain federal statutory rights are not given preclusive effect. See, e.g., Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 854 (7th Cir.2012) (noting that arbitration rulings lack preclusive effect in later Title VII litigation). Some courts have given arbiter’s findings estoppel effect in, e.g., subsequent RICO litigation. See Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir.1985) (giving preclusive effect to an arbiter’s findings in a later RICO case, where the RICO claims were based on issues “[t]he determination of [which] was directly within the scope of the contractual arbitration clause and the arbitrators’ expertise.”). Accordingly, the Court turns to the parties’ collateral estoppel arguments. Because this, a federal court, confirmed the award, the federal common law of preclusion applies. See Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 689 (7th Cir.2012). For collateral estoppel to apply: “(1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior action, (2) the issue must have been actually litigated, (3) the determination of the issue must have been essential to the final judgment, and (4) the party against whom estoppel is invoked must be fully represented in the prior action.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 347 F.3d 197, 201-02 (7th Cir.2003). The party against whom the ruling is to be enforced must have had a chance to fairly present its claim. See Snider v. Consolidation Coal Co., 973 F.2d 555, 559 (7th Cir.1992). USSF argues that the Ruling is fully preclusive. See Defs.’ Mot. For RICO Summ. J. 15 n. 13. Plaintiff, unsurprisingly, disagrees. First, Plaintiff argues that the CAS award is essentially irrelevant, because the CAS determined that FIFA’s rules, in a vacuum, authorized USSF to exercise the challenged authority — not the critical question of whether USSF was “ever vested with the original sanctioning authority over non-members in the first instance[.]” Pl.’s Resp. to Court’s Questions 1. Plaintiff contends that because the CAS did not consider that question or Plaintiffs evidence related to it, the CAS award cannot bar this Court from ruling in Plaintiffs favor. Id. Plaintiff further contends that none of the elements necessary for issue preclusion are met here. As discussed above, the Court concludes that ChampionsWorld was represented by Stillitano and its own counsel in the arbitration proceedings. The Court also notes that the CAS panel wrote a comprehensive opinion setting forth the parties’ arguments and its own reasoning and conclusions. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 361 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that preclusive effect is inappropriate when arbiter fails to explain its findings or follow reliable procedures.) The Court turns to the remaining considerations. a. Identity of Issues First, as noted above, Plaintiff argues that the issues presented to this Court and CAS are different, because CAS never determined whether USSF has “original authority” to sanction all professional games or charge fees to non-members. If an issue presented in the arbitration is not the same as the issue presented in later litigation, collateral estoppel does not apply. See, e.g., Coleman, 667 F.3d at 854 (collateral estoppel did not apply where arbiter determined that an employee did not constitute a true threat, and the court had to determine whether the employer genuinely believed that she did.) For reasons discussed below in Section IV(D)(2), the Court disagrees that Plaintiffs is the legally operative inquiry. (Indeed, the Court implicitly rejected that argument, which was raised in Plaintiffs briefing on the stay in favor of arbitration, in denying Plaintiffs request to lift the stay in 2008. See Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to Continue Stay, DKT 104, 9-10.). More importantly, however, Plaintiffs argument that the CAS Ruling is not dispositive of all issues does not mean that the ruling is not preclusive as to the issues the panel did decide. In deciding to continue the stay pending arbitration in 2008, this Court specifically noted the risk of inconsistent rulings regarding the effect of FIFA’s rules on USSF’s authority. That central issue, the Court noted, is “intertwined through all of Plaintiffs seven claims.” Championsworld, LLC v. U.S. Soccer Federation, No. 06 C 5724, 2008 WL 4861522, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 7, 2008). Despite Plaintiffs arguments to the contrary, even a cursory review of the complaint shows that one issue squarely presented here is whether FIFA does or can authorize USSF to take the challenged actions. Plaintiff next argues that the issues are not identical, because “the CAS award was issued under Swiss law[,]” and where an issue has been tried in another jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit permits retrial. Plaintiffs cited authority, however, stands for the more general proposition that “the same general legal rules” must govern both cases and “both cases [must be] indistinguishable as measured by those rules.” Wasau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. United Plastics Grp. Inc., No. 04 C 6543, 2010 WL 538544, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 10, 2010) (quoting 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4425 (2d ed.2002)). However, Plaintiff has identified no point at which the CAS applied anything other than FIFA’s statutes and regulations. Nor has it identified any differing rule that this Court would apply in determining the scope of USSF’s authority under FIFA’s rules. This is simply not a case where a party must be permitted to relitigate an issue because the legal standards that apply are entirely different in, for example, Illinois than in California. Cf. Boomer v. AT & T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 422 n. 10 (7th Cir.2002). The Court therefore finds that the issue to be precluded (USSF’s authority under FIFA rules) is the same one squarely decided by the arbitration panel, under the same framework that would be applied by this Court. Cf. Slaney v. Intern. Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 590, 594 (7th Cir.2001) (essentially applying issue preclusion to bar state law claims, because examining the plaintiffs claims would require assessing the accuracy of the Convention arbitral ruling.). b. Opportunity to Litigate Fully Plaintiff next argues that collateral estoppel is inappropriate because Stillitano could not fully and fairly present his case, including certain critical evidence: the CAS was not concerned with the extensive evidence concerning USSF’s false construction of “authority” premised fundamentally upon the Ted Stevens Act. The CAS ruled that such matters of U.S. law were outside the scope of arbitration. Therefore, the important presentation made by ChampionsWorld to this Court concerning USSF’s history of relying upon the Ted Stevens Act, and never upon FIFA alone, as USSF’s source of vesting authority, was never litigated before the CAS (or, for that matter, before FIFA). Nor was Chuck Blazer’s important testimony part of the CAS’s consideration (Mr. Blazer testified in this case over three months after the parties filed their submissions and records with the CAS). Pl.’s Resp. To Court’s Questions, 14 (cross-reference and emphasis omitted). Plaintiff further argues again that Stillitano was hampered by USSF’s late disclosure of its pre-2000 bylaws and policies. Whether important evidence was unavailable in the original proceeding is important in determining whether collateral estoppel is appropriate. Butler v. Stover Bros. Trucking Co., 546 F.2d 544, 551 (7th Cir.1977). As explained above, however, the evidence relating to USSF’s historical rules and bylaws was tangential to the CAS Ruling. Therefore, Plaintiffs inability to present that evidence does not make it unjust to apply collateral estoppel here. As to whether Stillitano had the opportunity to present additional relevant information such as Chuck Blazer’s testimony and USSF’s reliance on the Ted Stevens Act, Plaintiff again fails to explain why this information is important to the limited inquiry undertaken by the CAS. The Court recognizes that the CAS did not determine whether and by whom USSF was “originally vested” with authority over all professional soccer in United States. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs argument does not demonstrate that, for the questions the CAS did answer, that it was precluded from introducing critical evidence. Whether or not, for example, USSF actually charged sanctioning fees in the years before 2001 was, at best, marginally relevant. As for Blazer’s testimony, the Court assumes that Plaintiff finds his testimony important for the same reasons it gives in the summary judgment briefing — its claim that he established that FIFA vests no new authority in its members, even vis-avis other members. The Court has thoroughly reviewed the provided transcript excerpts, however, and finds that Plaintiffs generalizations and inferences from Blazer’s testimony cannot be supported. Blazer testified that: 1. “[Pjeople apply to be [FIFA] members. We don’t go around the world and say ah, there’s a country that’s not affiliated, let’s go pick someone to run it. Not our job. Our job is people decide that they want to voluntarily belong to our organization, they apply, we look to see whether or not they’re qualified and whether they meet the standards; and if they do, then the Congress decides ultimately to grant membership.” Blazer Dep., Pl.’s Statements of Material Fact, Ex. H, 96:7-17. 2. In determining whether a group is qualified to join CONCACAF and ultimately FIFA, an important consideration is whether or not it already regulates the highest level of soccer played in that country. See, e.g., id. at 84:7-85:23; 88:10-94:18. 3. Several times, when a national government has tried to “do away with” a FIFA member and replace it with another governing body, FIFA suspended the country and its member until the issue was resolved. Blazer emphasized that FIFA determines its own membership and considers government interference improper. Id. at 99:8-103:17. 4. From FIFA’s perspective, a member would have authority over a hypothetically unregulated element of soccer in that it is “the only body that would have the right to advance the team from their organization to the world championship, so therefore they have authority with regard to the organization of it. Whether or not they choose to organize it and whether someone else organizes it is another matter entirely.” Id. at 84:9-24. 5. FIFA authorizes its members to belong to continental confederations such as CONCACAF. FIFA lets confederations elect members to FIFA’s body, and designates them to identify, e.g., regional champions. Id. at 58:12-61:4. It was up to the individual FIFA members, however, to form the confederations in the first instance, and therefore CONCACAF’s ‘authority’ over its members is dependent on their joining it. See id. at 61:6-66:4. The logical leap from this testimony to Plaintiffs conclusion is simply too great, even if the Court draws every reasonable inference in Plaintiffs favor. That aside, however, Plaintiff fails to explain why Blazer’s deposition was not taken until after submissions to the CAS were complete (especially given the length of discovery in this case), or whether it tried to bring the testimony to the CAS’s attention after it was obtained. Absent such information, the Court has difficulty concluding that Stillitano was unfairly prevented from fully and fairly litigating claims actually before the CAS. Accordingly, the Court finds that it would not be fundamentally unfair to apply collateral estoppel in this case, despite the narrower class of evidence that Stillitano was able to present. The effect of this issue preclusion on Plaintiffs claims is discussed below. C. Evidence Before the Court Obviously, the evidentiary issues and disputes vary motion to motion. Nonetheless, there are many repeating themes, and so a few brief notes are in order. Ultimately, many of the parties’ proposed facts are irrelevant to the Court’s decisions on summary judgment. “Therefore it makes little sense to address each paragraph individually. The more efficient course is to attempt to determine the relevant material facts for summary judgment from the agreed statements and resolve any factual disputes according to the appropriate summary judgment standard.” McGrath v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 07 C 1519, 2008 WL 4531373, at *3 (N.D.Ill. April 29, 2008). Each side accuses the other of including too much in its Local Rule 56.1 statements. The Court notes that violations on both sides were myriad, but declines to strike the responses on that basis. However, statements that are disputed by only: general denials, citations to attorney argument (or whole briefs), or citations to evidence not provided to the Court are deemed admitted. See Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B), (C). Although the Seventh Circuit has stated that a party must offer admissible evidence at summary judgment, see Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir.2009), the more precise statement is that it must offer “evidentiary material which, if reduced to admissible evidence,” could carry its burden at trial. U.S. ex rel. Yannacopoulos v. Gen. Dynamics, 652 F.3d 818, 823 (7th Cir.2011). 1. Annual Meeting Transcripts Both parties challenge each other’s use of transcripts from USSF annual meetings. The Court notes that many of those records are offered for non-hearsay purposes. See Wielgus v. Ryobi Technologies, Inc., No. 08 C 1597, 2012 WL 2277851, at *5 (N.D.Ill. June 18, 2012). Furthermore, the transcripts include some official statements by USSF officers and employees, and portions may be admissible as records of regularly conducted activity. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D); Wielgus, 2012 WL 2277851 at *4 (noting that meeting minutes generally fall -within the exception). Specific uses are addressed as necessary below. 2. Holaday and Howard Declarations, with Exhibits The Court now turns back to the dispute over USSF’s late production of its Constitution, Association Rules and Regulations, and Administrative Rulebooks dating from 1933 through 1997. These documents are offered through the declarations of Ted Howard and James Holaday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 provides that: “[i]f a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), [it] is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion ... unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” It also permits alternative or additional sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). In considering whether and what sanctions are appropriate, the Court considers: (1) the prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the evidence is offered; (2) the ability of the party to cure the prejudice; (3) the likelihood of disruption to the trial; and (4) the bad faith or willfulness involved in not disclosing the evidence at an earlier date. David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir.2003). According to his declaration, Ted Howard was once the Executive Director of the now-defunct men’s professional North American Soccer League (the “NASL”). During his time with NASL, Howard served on USSF’s National Council, and on its International Games Committee (from roughly 1984 through 1998). Since 1998, he has been the Deputy Secretary General of CONCACAF. Attached to Howard’s declaration are all or part of the USSF’s Administrative Rule Book for certain years spanning 1975-1997. Also included are the Internationa