Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge: Plaintiffs Steven J. Phillips and Marie Condoluci (the “Parent Plaintiffs”), suing individually and on behalf of their infant daughter, T.C.P. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), bring this action against the County of Orange, Jamie Seali-Decker, in her individual and official capacity (the “County Defendants”), the Goshen Central School District Board of Education (the “School District” or the “District”), Mary Kay Jankowski, in her individual and official capacity (the “School District Defendants”), the Village of Goshen, and Andrew Scolza, in his individual and official capacity (the “Village Defendants”) (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs also claim that the County of Orange, Village of Goshen, and the School District are liable for conspiracy to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated here in, Defendants’ motions are granted in part and denied in part. I. Background A. Facts The Court assumes the following facts, as alleged in the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), to be true for purposes of deciding the pending motions. On or about October 30, 2009, Theresa Falletta (“Falletta”), the mother of one of T.C.P.’s friends, was in Plaintiffs’ home. (TAC ¶¶ 35, 38.) Falletta observed a picture of T.C.P. in a mermaid costume hanging on Plaintiffs’ refrigerator, in which T.C.P. was wearing a bikini top and a full length mermaid tail. (Id. ¶¶ 39-40.) Falletta inquired where Plaintiffs had bought the costume and how much it had cost, indicating that she wanted one for her daughter as well. (Id. ¶¶ 42-44.) Falletta worked part-time as an officer manager for the Hopewell Presbyterian Church (the “Church”) in Thompson Ridge, New York, and was a member of the Church. (Id. ¶¶ 45-46.) The Church ran a preschool, and thus was provided with a special, unlisted number for mandated reporters of suspected child abuse provided by the State Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (“SCR”). (Id. ¶ 47.) On or about November 2, 2009, Falletta told Robin J. Hogle (“Hogle”), her co-worker and the Church’s pastor, that she was upset to have learned that Phillips, who is Jewish, had been ordained as a minister by the Universal Life Church to perform a wedding ceremony. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 49-50.) She said that this offended her “as a Christian.” (Id. ¶ 50.) She then told Hogle that Plaintiffs had “inappropriate, provocative photos” of T.C.P. on their refrigerator — referring to the photos of T.C.P. in the mermaid costume — and that Phillips had described the photos as art. (Id. ¶ 51.) For unknown reasons, Hogle apparently interpreted this comment to mean that Plaintiffs had nude pictures of T.C.P. on their refrigerator. (Id. ¶ 52.) Falletta also told Hogle that T.C.P. went to the school nurse a lot for no reason, and that Phillips spoke about her body inappropriately and slept with her, while Condoluci slept with their younger daughter, R.S.C.P. (Id. ¶ 53.) She further expressed concern that T.C.P. was being sexually abused by Phillips and that Condoluci was aware of the abuse and doing nothing. (Id. ¶ 54.) Hogle had received training from the Church to report all suspicions of child abuse to the SCR, though she did not receive training on the standard of “reasonable cause” to suspect abuse, or on whether she should call the number for mandated reporters or the state’s general hotline. (Id. ¶¶ 55-56.) On November 3, 2009 at 8:46 a.m., Hogle called the SCR using the special unlisted telephone number for use only by mandated reporters. (Id. ¶¶ 57-58.) However, neither T.C.P., Phillips nor Condoluci had appeared before Hogle in her professional capacity, and thus according to Plaintiffs, she was not a “mandated reporter.” (Id. ¶¶ 59-60.) Hogle told the SCR that she had learned from “close Mends” of Plaintiffs that Plaintiffs have “nude pictures” of T.C.P. on their refrigerator, which they referred to as “art,” and that Phillips spoke inappropriately about T.C.P.’s body and slept with her. (Id. ¶ 62.) Hogle also reported that Plaintiffs’ “close Mends” had told her that T.C.P. visits the school nurse a lot and that these Mends had “ongoing concerns” about sexual abuse for “about 3 months.” (Id. ¶63.) She further stated that these close Mends had witnessed specifics, had confronted Plaintiffs, and may have more details that Hogle could not divulge. (Id. ¶ 64.) She, however, refused to reveal Falletta’s name, and Plaintiffs claim that this information would have been required of a mandated reporter. (Id. ¶ 66.) Although the SCR officials initially told Hogle that they did not believe there was sufficient evidence to take a report, one was nonetheless taken from the call, containing allegations that Phillips was suspected of sexually abusing T.C.P. and that Condoluci was an inadequate guardian because of knowledge of the alleged abuse. (Id. ¶¶ 67, 69.) Plaintiffs maintain that the allegations are false, that Hogle’s statements were nothing more than her hearsay account of someone else’s concerns, and that her statements did not amount to reasonable cause to suspect child abuse. (Id. ¶ 68.) The report made to the SCR was immediately transferred to the County of Orange Department of Social Services, Child Protective Services (“CPS”). (Id. ¶ 72.) The report was made on election day, so T.C.P.’s school and Child Protective Services were both closed. (Id. ¶ 73.) An after-hours County caseworker, Susan Hughes (“Hughes”) followed up on the report and spoke to Hogle, who informed her that T.C.P. and R.S.C.P. were not in immediate danger. (Id. ¶¶ 74-80.) Hughes’ supervisor, Karen Smith (“Smith”), decided that CPS would follow up on the report the following day, and no further action was taken on the report on November 3, 2009. (Id. ¶¶ 79-80, 83.) Pursuant to New York Social Services Law § 423(6), a social services district may establish a multidisciplinary team to investigate reports of suspected child abuse, and members of this team shall include representatives from CPS, law enforcement, and the district attorney’s office. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.) On November 4, 2009, CPS, in conjunction with the Village of Goshen Police Department, launched an investigation into the allegations against Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶¶ 84-86.) The investigation was assigned to Defendants ScaliDecker, a CPS employee, and Scolza, a police officer with the Village of Goshen. (Id.) Plaintiffs claim that Scali-Decker and Scolza believed that the call had come from a mandated reporter pursuant to § 413, and that neither contemplated contacting Phillips or Condoluci, attempted to corroborate any of the statements made in the report, or considered whether the report contained reasonable cause to suspect that T.C.P. was abused. (Id. ¶¶ 87-92.) Scali-Decker then called Hogle, who told her that a close friend of the family had approached her stating that she had concerns about the family for “years,” and repeated the other statements that she had made when she made her initial telephone call to the SCR. (Id. ¶¶ 96, 99, 104, 106.) Hogle also told Scali-Decker that she was not aware of T.C.P. acting out in any way. and that she had interacted with T.C.P. when she was in a week-long bible camp with the Church over the summer. (Id. ¶ 101.) Scali-Decker confirmed with Hogle that the report taken by SCR was accurate as to what Hogle was told by Plaintiffs’ friend. (Id. ¶ 105.) Hogle still refused to provide Falletta’s name, and Scali-Decker urged Hogle to have Plaintiffs friend (Falletta) contact her. (Id. ¶¶ 98,107-09.) Scali-Decker then called T.C.P.’s school, Seotchtown Avenue Elementary School, to confirm that T.C.P. was present in her kindergarten class. (Id. ¶¶ 110-11.) Plaintiffs highlight that Scali-Decker made no attempt to corroborate the details from the call, for example by asking whether anyone at the school was concerned about T.C.P., or whether she frequently visited the school nurse. (Id. ¶¶ 112-17.) ScaliDecker, Scolza, and Smith held a case conference and determined that T.C.P. would be interviewed at her school regarding the allegations. (Id. ¶ 118.) Plaintiffs claim that no effort was made to determine whether the report contained reasonable cause to suspect that T.C.P. had been abused, and that no one involved in the investigation considered contacting the Parent Plaintiffs to get their permission to interview T.C.P. or obtaining a court order to interview her pursuant to Family Court Act § 1034. (Id. ¶¶ 119-21.) Plaintiffs further allege that no other course of action was contemplated because it was protocol to always interview the child first— without parental consent or a court order — when allegations of sexual abuse had been made, regardless of whether the report created reasonable cause to suspect actual abuse. (Id. ¶ 125.) Plaintiffs also contend that this protocol was established so that the County and Village could interview children before parents were aware that a report of suspected abuse had even been filed, as parents must be notified of the report within seven days. (Id. ¶ 126.) On November 4, 2009, at approximately 11:49 a.m. Scali-Decker and Scolza arrived at T.C.P.’s school and showed their identification to school authorities. (Id. ¶ 127.) Defendant Jankowski, the school social worker, went to T.C.P.’s kindergarten class and removed her for questioning. (Id. ¶ 130.) Neither Jankowski nor any other school district employee attempted to determine whether parental consent had been acquired, nor did anyone inquire as to the nature of the allegations. (Id. ¶¶ 137-38.) As she removed T.C.P. from her classroom, Jankowski inquired of T.C.P.’s teacher whether she had any reason to believe that T.C.P. had been abused, and the teacher indicated that she did not. (Id. ¶¶ 132-33.) Plaintiffs allege that Jankowski did not relay this information to Scolza and Scali-Decker. (Id. ¶ 134.) Neither Jankowski nor any other school official had any cause to believe that T.C.P. was abused, and the School District did not inform Scali-Decker and Scolza that T.C.P. had shown no signs of abuse. (Id. ¶¶ 131, 139.) Plaintiffs allege that the School District’s policy only requires that an employee check the identification of the CPS and law enforcement officers, and have a School District employee present, before allowing for an in-school interview of any student suspected of abuse, regardless of the student’s age. (Id. ¶¶ 140-41.) This policy allows for such interviews without parental consent or a court order. (Id.) Plaintiffs further claim that the School District’s policy does not provide for employees to determine whether there are exigent circumstances to justify such an interview, or whether there is even reasonable cause to believe the child has been abused. (Id.) Jankowski escorted T.C.P. to the assistant principal’s office to be questioned by Scolza and Scali-Decker. (Id. ¶ 135.) Upon arriving at the office, Jankowski told T.C.P. that she “had to” answer questions that would be asked by Scolza and ScaliDecker, and Scali-Decker told T.C.P. that the interview was “like a test.” (Id. ¶¶ 142, 144.) Jankowski remained in the office, with the door closed, during the questioning. (Id. ¶ 143.) At no time did anyone offer to T.C.P. to call her parents or tell her she was free to leave and not answer the questions. (Id. ¶¶ 145-46.) T.C.P. was questioned until approximately 12:30 p.m. about various topics, including: (1) whether her parents ever fight; (2) which parent bathed her and how; (3) the family’s sleeping arrangements; (4) whether her parents ever spanked her; (5) whether she had ever been alone; (6) whether she had her own room; (7) what types of magazines, movies, and television she watched with her parents; (8) whether either of her parents ever touched her inappropriately; and, lastly (9) whether there were any nude pictures of her in the home. (Id. ¶¶ 150, 155-58.) None of T.C.P.’s answers indicated that she had been abused or maltreated in any way. (Id. ¶ 161.) Plaintiffs allege that when conducting interviews of a child during an abuse investigation, it is County and Village policy to use a scripted set of questions that probes into all matters of home life, regardless of the nature of the accusations, and regardless of whether the child’s answers dispel the suspicion of abuse. (Id. ¶¶ 162-64.) After the interview was conducted, Scali-Decker and Scolza spoke to Jankowski about the allegation that T.C.P. visited the school nurse often, and the school nurse confirmed that she had no concerns about T.C.P., and that T.C.P. did not visit her often for unknown reasons. (Id. ¶ 165-66.) After the interview, Jankowski asked Scolza and Scali-Decker whether they were planning to notify T.C.P.’s parents about the questioning, and they responded that they would. (Id. ¶ 167.) Plaintiffs claim that they never would have consented to two strangers— one of them male — interviewing T.C.P. about intimate matters in school without them present. (Id. ¶ 168.) At approximately 2:15 p.m., Scali-Decker went to Plaintiffs’ residence, but no one was home. (Id. ¶ 169.) Scali-Decker left her card in the front door of Plaintiffs’ house, with a handwritten note on the back to contact her. (Id. ¶ 170.) At 2:42 p.m., Scali-Decker called Plaintiffs’ residence, but there was still no one at home. (Id. ¶ 171.) At about 3:00 p.m., Phillips arrived home and found Scali-Decker’s card and immediately called her, but was unable to reach her. (Id. ¶¶ 172-74.) Phillips then contacted Condoluci, and the two frantically attempted to reach Scali-Decker, finally reaching her about an hour later at approximately 4:00 p.m. (Id. ¶¶ 175-78.) During this conversation, the Parent Plaintiffs first became aware that a report of child abuse had been made against them to the SCR and that T.C.P. had been questioned in school. (Id. ¶ 179.) Scali-Decker refused to reveal the nature of the allegations to the Parent Plaintiffs during their phone conversation, because it was protocol to have a law enforcement officer present when those allegations were revealed, only stating that someone had claimed that there were “inappropriate pictures” on Plaintiffs’ refrigerator. (Id. ¶¶ 180-82.) The Parent Plaintiffs also were told that Scali-Decker and her “partner” (who she did not reveal was a Village police officer) would “have to” observe their two-year-old daughter, R.S.C.P., and interview both of them. (Id. ¶¶ 183, 187.) Plaintiffs assert that it was protocol in all investigations regarding suspected child abuse to interview the parents and observe their other children, regardless of whether the investigation to that point had dispelled the suspicion of abuse. (Id. ¶ 184.) The Parent Plaintiffs claim that they feared that if they did not consent to the interview and observation, Scali-Decker and Scolza would return to T.C.P.’s school to question her again, or attempt to “seize” R.S.C.P. from her preschool, and that they therefore consented to “protect their children from the trauma of further seizures at the hands of Scolza and [Scali-]Decker.” (Id. ¶¶ 189-90.) On November 5, 2009, the Parent Plaintiffs brought their two-year-old daughter R.S.C.P. to the County’s Department of Social Services office in Goshen. (Id. ¶ 191.) While Plaintiffs were in the waiting area, Scali-Decker received a phone call from Falletta, who refused to provide her name. (Id. ¶¶ 193-94.) Falletta stated that she was a close friend of the family, because her daughter was good friends with T.C.P., and that she was the source of the information provided to Hogle. (Id. ¶¶ 196-97.) Falletta further stated that she was hesitant to identify herself, out of concern that she would “have an issue with Phillips and Condoluci” and out of fear of confrontation with the family, contradicting her earlier statements to Hogle that she had confronted Phillips with her concerns of abuse. (Id. ¶¶ 198-99.) She stated that T.C.P. is “very smart” and that she had no knowledge of T.C.P. ever acting out sexually, or disclosing inappropriate actions by her father. (Id. ¶¶ 200-01.) Falletta further told Scali-Decker that T.C.P. slept every other night with Phillips, and that the parents took turns sleeping with R.S.C.P., again contradicting her earlier statements. (Id. ¶ 202.) She also stated that Phillips made comments, as a “joke” that people think that he is a sexual predator, that she once observed Phillips put on his turn signal to turn into a nude bar when he had T.C.P. and Falletta’s daughter in his car, and that another anonymous person got a “sick feeling” from Phillips and would not leave his child alone with Phillips. (Id. ¶¶ 203, 205, 209.) When Scali-Decker asked Falletta about the “nude pictures” of T.C.P., Falletta told her that there were pictures of T.C.P. in a mermaid costume hanging on the refrigerator, and that the costume looked like it came from “Frederick’s of Hollywood.” (Id. ¶¶ 211-12.) Falletta also told ScaliDecker that Condoluci had approached her and asked if Falletta thought that Phillips acted inappropriately, and Falletta should have raised her “concerns” then, but had not. (Id. ¶ 213.) Falletta also stated that Condoluci had called her upset that T.C.P. had been questioned in school, and when Condoluci asked Falletta if she had made the call to the SCR, Falletta denied it. (Id. ¶¶ 217-18.) Plaintiffs claim that Condoluci also asked Falletta if she made any statements to anyone that could have caused the call to the SCR, which Falletta denied. (Id. ¶¶ 219-20.) Plaintiffs state that by this point, Scali-Decker should have known that Falletta was unreliable, because two of the statements she made to Hogle — about the nude photo and the school nurse — had already been proven false. (Id. ¶ 195.) After finishing the call with Falletta, Scali-Decker came to the waiting room and asked Phillips to accompany her alone, stating that is was protocol to interview the parents separately. (Id. ¶¶ 221-22.) Phillips was brought to an interview room with Scali-Decker and Scolza, with the door closed, and no one informed him that Scolza was a police officer. (Id. ¶¶ 224-25.) Scolza explained the allegations to Phillips, who was outraged, and who denied vehemently all allegations of wrongdoing. (Id. ¶¶ 226-36.) After this, ScaliDecker brought Condoluci and R.S.C.P. into the room, and again did not identify Scolza as a police officer. (Id. ¶¶ 237-38.) The first thing that Scali-Decker and Scolza asked Condoluci was whether anybody “had it in for them.” (Id-¶ 239.) Condoluci denied that either of her children was abused or neglected in any way, and denied any inappropriate language or sexual acts in her home. (Id. ¶ 241.) Condoluci, an attorney, also complained that T.C.P. had been questioned without any attempt to gauge the credibility of the anonymous caller or the caller’s source, or any attempt to notify Plaintiffs or obtain their consent. (Id. ¶¶ 240, 242.) Scali-Decker responded, saying that “we do it all the time” and that it was “protocol” to not contact parents or obtain consent before going to a school to interview a child. (Id. ¶ 243.) Scolza stated that the rationale for this “protocol” was to avoid difficulties in the investigation arising from having children coached by their parents, and that innocent parents should not be concerned when their children are questioned without consent because “they have nothing to hide.” (Id. ¶¶ 244-45.) Scali-Decker asked to see the pictures of T.C.P. in the mermaid costume, which Plaintiff showed to her. (Id. ¶¶ 246-47.) Scali-Decker first asked where Plaintiffs had purchased the costume. (Id. ¶ 248.) Then, Scali-Decker noted that all of T.C.P.’s private parts were covered, that she looked happy in all the photos, and that the photos did not appear provocative or inappropriate in any way. (Id. ¶¶ 249-50.) Scali-Decker also asked if Plaintiffs slept with their children, noting before they could answer, “who doesn’t,” and that sleeping with your children “doesn’t mean anything.” (Id. ¶¶ 252-53.) Condoluci answered that both she and Phillips slept with the children. (Id. ¶ 254.) During the interview, Scali-Decker and Scolza observed R.S.C.P. (Id. ¶ 255.) Once the interview and observation session was concluded, at approximately 11:45 a.m., Plaintiffs were told that a home inspection was “required.” (Id. ¶¶ 256, 260.) Plaintiffs claim that it was protocol in all sexual abuse investigations to conduct a home inspection, regardless of whether the report created reasonable cause to suspect abuse, and regardless of whether the investigation to that point had dispelled any suspicion of abuse. (Id. ¶257.) Scolza then handed Condoluci his business card with the County seal on it, identifying him as an “Investigator” for the Orange County Department of Social Services, but at no point during the investigation did he identify himself as a police officer. (Id. ¶¶ 258-59.) The home inspection was scheduled for the following day, November 6, 2009, at 2:00 p.m. (Id. ¶ 260.) Plaintiffs claim that they feared that if they did not consent to the home inspection, Scali-Decker and Scolza would attempt to remove the children from their home, or would attempt to interview T.C.P. without their authorization again. (Id ¶¶ 261-62.) Immediately after their meeting with CPS, the Parent Plaintiffs went to Scotch-town Avenue Elementary School, where they met with Melissa Lawson, the school’s vice-principal, and Jankowski. (Id ¶¶ 263-64.) The Parent Plaintiffs complained to Lawson and Jankowski that the school had not contacted them regarding T.C.P.’s questioning, to which Lawson responded that it was school policy to let CPS decide whether or not parents are notified, and that the school’s responsibilities were limited to checking identification and ensuring that a school employee is present during the questioning of any child. (Id ¶¶ 265-66.) Lawson also stated that Plaintiffs could place a letter in T.C.P.’s file indicating that T.C.P. was not to be spoken to by anyone other than school personnel without a parent’s prior written consent. (Id ¶ 267.) Plaintiff Condoluci sent such a letter to be filed at T.C.P.’s school the following day, and Daria Murphy, the school’s principal, acknowledged receipt of the letter and told Condoluci that the school would comply with her request. (Id ¶¶ 268-70.) On November 6, 2009, at 2:30 p.m., Joe LaSusa, a senior CPS caseworker, arrived at Plaintiffs’ home to conduct the home inspection. (Id ¶ 271.) LaSusa observed Phillips and Condoluci interacting with R.S.C.P. and walked around the downstairs of the house. (Id ¶¶ 273-74.) He would not divulge Hogle’s name as the person who made the call to the SCR, only stating that the report had come from a “mandated reporter.” (Id ¶ 276.) Condoluci inquired about the questions that had been asked of T.C.P. during the in school interview, and LaSusa would not give her any details, stating only that T.C.P. gave good answers to the questions and that there was a “whole series of questions” routinely asked by caseworkers investigating abuse. (Id ¶¶ 277-78.) Phillips told LaSusa that he had previously had a discussion with “friends” about art, and where he mentioned that many people regard Anne Geddes’ naked pictures of babies as “art.” (Id ¶ 280.) In response, LaSusa warned Phillips to be more careful, stating that there are many “small-minded” people in Orange County. (Id ¶ 281.) LaSusa repeated that it was CPS policy to question children in school without parental authorization, regardless of the nature of the allegations. (Id ¶ 282.) LaSusa insisted on seeing the bedrooms in the house — stating, “with allegations like these, I need to see the bedrooms” — and had Plaintiffs explain the family’s sleeping arrangements. ■ (Id ¶¶ 283-84, 286-90.) Plaintiffs again claim that they feared that their children would be removed or seized if they did not comply by showing LaSusa the bedrooms and answering his questions about their sleeping arrangements. (Id ¶ 285.) Plaintiffs informed LaSusa that a note had been placed in T.C.P.’s school that she was not to be questioned at school again, and LaSusa stated that he would pass the information on to Scali-Decker. (Id ¶¶ 291-92.) On November 9, 2009, Scali-Decker and Smith held a case conference, and they determined that the case should be closed as “unfounded,” and Scali-Decker informed Scolza that the case would be closed. (Id ¶¶ 296-97.) On November 13, 2009, the report was officially deemed unfounded, and the case was administratively closed by the County. (Id ¶ 298.) Even after the case was closed, Hogle still refused to have her name revealed to Phillips or Condoluci. (Id. ¶ 299.) On November 9, 2009, Condoluci delivered a letter to Scali-Decker and Scolza, explaining the impact the investigation had on their family, and requesting that the case be referred to the District Attorney’s office for prosecution of the mandated reporter’s source of information under New York Penal Law § 240.50(4). (Id. ¶ 300.) Scali-Decker told Condoluci to direct all questions about criminal matters to the District Attorney’s office or to Scolza. (Id. ¶ 301.) Upon reviewing the case, the District Attorney’s office determined that no charges could be brought against Falletta under N.Y. Penal Law § 240.50(4), because Hogle was in fact not a mandated reporter under N.Y. Social Services Law § 413. (Id. ¶¶ 302-03.) Plaintiffs allege that this was the first time that ScaliDecker, Smith, Scolza, and LaSusa became aware that Hogle was not a mandated reporter. (Id. ¶ 305.) Plaintiffs claim that the CPS investigation had deep, long-lasting, and devastating effects on the family, and that it “drove a wedge into the family that eroded the family’s solidarity internally and impaired the family’s ability to function as a unit.” (Id. ¶¶ 306-07.) Because of T.C.P.’s young age, the Parent Plaintiffs were not able to talk with her openly about the questioning, which caused them to feel “emotionally distant” from their daughter. (Id. ¶ 308.) The Parent Plaintiffs were unable to sleep regularly or eat for a period of time following the investigation. (Id. ¶ 310.) Condoluci often became nauseous upon thinking of her daughter being questioned about intimate details of her life at school, and the Parent Plaintiffs would often “burst into tears and cr[y] for hours after their children went to sleep.” (Id. ¶¶ 311-12.) Phillips started only running errands late in the evening, not wanting to see people because he felt as though people were looking at him as a pedophile. (Id. ¶ 313.) The Parent Plaintiffs removed T.C.P. from the School District and are sending her to a private school to ensure her safety and well being, as well as the protection of their constitutional rights. (Id. ¶ 316.) Further, the Parent Plaintiffs claim that their interactions with their children became guarded for about six months, for fear of misinterpretation by others. (Id. ¶ 318.) Condoluci claims that she still feels nauseous when thinking about the “totally unwarranted invasion of her family’s constitutional rights because none of the defendants knew what ‘reasonable cause to suspect abuse meant’ nor did they know the definition of a mandated reporter.” (Id. ¶ 315 (emphasis omitted).) B. Procedural History Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint, against the County of Orange and the Goshen Central School District Board of Education, on January 13, 2010. (Dkt. No. 1.) Upon leave of the Court, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on March 24, 2010, adding the Individual Defendants, in their individual and official capacities, causes of action claiming violations of procedural and substantive due process, and a Fourth Amendment claim. (Dkt. No. 16.) Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint, once again upon leave of the Court, on May 7, 2010, adding the Village of Goshen as a Defendant. (Dkt. No. 23.) Defendants filed motions to dismiss on June 9, 2010, and June 10, 2010. (Dkt. Nos. 26, 28, 33.) While the motions were pending, on October 12, 2010 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Camreta v. Greene, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 456, 178 L.Ed.2d 285 (2010), which addressed some of the legal issues of this case, and held oral argument in the case on March 1, 2011. On the same day, the Court issued an Order denying Defendants’ motions without prejudice, citing the potential impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Greene on this case. (Dkt. No. 44.) Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that the issue presented in Greene was moot, and vacated the portion of the Ninth Circuit’s decision holding that in-school interviews of children in the absence of probable cause or parental consent violated the Fourth Amendment. Camreta v. Greene, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 2035-36, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011). The Court then granted Plaintiffs leave to file a Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 49), which Plaintiffs filed on June 17, 2011, (Dkt. No. 51). The Village Defendants and the School District Defendants filed their motions to dismiss on September 2, 2011. (Dkt. Nos. 57, 60.) The County Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on September 6, 2011. (Dkt. No. 65.) The Court held oral argument on May 4, 2012. II. Discussion A. Standard of Review “On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint, the court must accept a plaintiffs factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiffs] favor.” Gonzalez v. Caballero, 572 F.Supp.2d 463, 466 (S.D.N.Y.2008); see also Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir.2008) (“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “In adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). Instead, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” id., and that “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” id. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. If a plaintiff “ha[s] not nudged [his/her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [his/her] complaint must be dismissed.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged— but it has not ‘show[n]’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))). B. Analysis Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, and that the County of Orange, Village of Goshen, and Goshen Central School District engaged in a conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They seek to hold Defendants liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In Plaintiffs’ first cause of action, they allege that all Defendants violated T.C.P.’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures when she was interviewed at school. (Id. ¶¶ 368-84.) In their second cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants violated T.C.P.’s, Phillips’, and Condoluci’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches through their interview of T.C.P. (Id. ¶¶ 385-96.) Plaintiffs’ third cause of action is brought against the Village Defendants and County Defendants and alleges that the interview of the Parent Plaintiffs at CPS was an unreasonable search in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. (Id. ¶¶ 397-409.) In the fourth cause of action, brought against the County of Orange, the Parent Plaintiffs allege that the home visit by LaSusa constituted an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 410-20.) Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action alleges that all Defendants violated the Parent Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by interviewing T.C.P. without their consent or a court order, and in the absence of emergency circumstances. (Id. ¶¶ 421-26.) In Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action, they allege that all-Defendants violated T.C.P.’s, Phillips’, and Condoluci’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based on the interview of T.C.P. (Id. ¶¶ 427-31.) In their seventh cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that the Village Defendants and County Defendants violated the Parent Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights based upon the interview at CPS and the observation of R.S.C.P. (Id. ¶¶ 432-35.) In Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action, they claim that the County of Orange violated the Parent Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights during the home visits by LaSusa. (Id. ¶¶ 436-39.) Finally, in their ninth cause of action, Plaintiffs claim that the Village of Goshen, the County of Orange, and the Goshen Central School District engaged in a conspiracy to violate their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on the interview of T.C.P. (Id. ¶¶ 440418.) 1. Fourth Amendment a. T.C.P.’s in-school interview i. Seizure Claim Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ interview of T.C.P. at her school violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiffs argue that the interview of T.C.P. was a “seizure” by Jankowski, Scali-Decker, and Scolza, and that such seizure was not justified because there was no “reasonable cause” to suspect abuse at the time T.C.P. was seized. (TAC ¶¶ 377, 380.) “[T]he Fourth Amendment applies in the context of the seizure of a child by a government agency official during a civil child-abuse or maltreatment investigation.” Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 762 (2d Cir.2000). The threshold question, therefore, is whether the in-school interview of T.C.P. constituted a “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (noting that “the antecedent question” in a Fourth Amendment inquiry is whether the governmental conduct in question constituted a search or seizure). Only if the action continued a “seizure” does the Court then analyze whether the seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) (ending the Fourth Amendment inquiry after determining that the contested police action did not constitute a search). Not every encounter between a private citizen and government officials constitutes a seizure, and the relevant assessment is of the “overall coercive effect of police [or state official] conduct.” Dejesus v. Vill. of Pelham Manor, 282 F.Supp.2d 162, 168 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A ‘seizure,’ triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections occurs only when government actors have, ‘by means of physical force or show of authority, ... in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’ ” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (second alteration in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Further, a seizure occurs where, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Kia P., 235 F.3d at 762 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Factors that have been found relevant in determining whether a seizure has occurred include: ‘threatening presence of several officers; the display of a weapon; physical touching of the person [by] the officer; language or tone indicating that compliance with [the] officer was compulsory; prolonged retention of a person’s personal effects, such as airplane tickets or identification; and a request by an officer to accompany him to the police station or a police room.’ ” Dejesus, 282 F.Supp.2d at 169 (quoting United States v. Lee, 916 F.2d 814, 819 (2d Cir.1990)). Courts should also consider the age of the person being questioned because “ ‘whether the person being questioned is a child or an adult’ ” is “relevant” to whether a person would feel free to leave. United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1505 n. 6 (10th Cir.1994); see also Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir.2005) (noting that plaintiffs “encounter” with police officers should be viewed “through the eyes of a reasonable sixteen-year-old”). Defendants first argue that T.C.P. was never “seized” during the course of the in-school interview, noting that the Second Circuit has never held that such an interview constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and citing Williams v. Jurow, No. 05-CV-6949, 2007 WL 5463418 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2007), which found no Fourth Amendment violation where a doctor examined a child in a hospital setting following a court order, because no • removal of custody occurred. (Village Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss (“Village Defs.’ Mem.”) 11; Sch. Dist. Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss (“Sch. Dist. Defs.’ Mem.”) 9; Cnty. Defs.’ Mem. of Law (“Cnty. Defs.’ Mem.”) 17.) Defendants heavily rely on the Jurow court’s statement that “because plaintiff does not allege that [her son] was removed from her control, there can be no Fourth Amendment violation.” 2007 WL 5463418, at *15, adopted in relevant part by 2008 WL 4054421 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 28, 2008). However, taken in the context of that case, this statement simply meant that the plaintiff stated no seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes in that case, not that a removal from custody is a prerequisite for a child abuse investigation to result in a violation of the child’s Fourth Amendment rights. Lower courts within the Second Circuit have held that a deprivation of custody constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See Estiverne v. Esernio-Jenssen, 833 F.Supp.2d 356, 375-76 (E.D.N.Y.2011) (finding that there was an issue of fact as to whether parents were free to take their child from hospital, and thus allowing Fourth Amendment seizure claim to go forward); E.D. ex rel. V.D. v. Tuffarelli, 692 F.Supp.2d 347, 366 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“The removal of a child, even on a temporary basis, may constitute a ‘seizure’ for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unlawful search and seizure.”), aff'd, 408 Fed.Appx. 448 (2d Cir.2011). However, the Court has been unable to locate any precedent within the Second Circuit addressing whether an in-school interview of a child by CPS workers constitutes a seizure, such that the child can state a valid Fourth Amendment claim. Therefore, the Court will analyze Plaintiffs’ allegations about the questioning to determine whether in fact T.C.P. could have felt free to leave and decline to answer the questions posed by Scali-Decker and Scolza. Defendants contend that they committed no coercive acts as to T.C.P. during the course of her interview, and that thus she was never “seized.” (Cnty. Defs.’ Mem. 16-17.) Plaintiffs, on the other hand, claim that T.C.P., a five-year-old child, could not have felt free to leave the Assistant Principal’s office after being escorted there for questioning by three adults, especially where the door was shut, and she was told that she had to answer the questions. (Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“PL’s Mem.”) 29-30.) In further support of this point, Plaintiffs rely on Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492 (7th Cir.2003), which involved an in-school interview of a child by child protective services caseworkers and a law enforcement officer. In concluding that the interview constituted a seizure of the child under the Fourth Amendment, the Heck court noted that where a child is escorted by a school official to a room and interviewed by caseworkers, with a uniformed police officer present, for twenty minutes, “no reasonable child would have believed that he was free to leave [the interview].” Heck, 327 F.3d at 510. The Seventh Circuit is not alone in this view. Several other circuits have held that an in-school interview a child for the purpose of investigating the student’s conduct constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In Stoot v. City of Everett, the Ninth Circuit relied on Heck to hold that an in-school interview of a fourteen-year-old suspected of committing child abuse constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 582 F.3d 910, 918 (9th Cir.2009). Similarly, the Third Circuit has held that a student was seized where he was removed from class and detained in the school’s administrative offices for several hours following his questioning by the assistant principal to investigate allegations that he improperly touched a female student. See Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146-47 (3d Cir.2005). The Fourth Circuit also has held that the in-school questioning of a student constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See Wofford v. Evans, 390 F.3d 318, 325 (4th Cir.2004) (holding that student who was held in the principal’s office for questioning based on a suspected disciplinary violation was seized for Fourth Amendment analysis). In a slightly different context, the Tenth Circuit has held that a student who was confronted in school by a state social worker and a police officer, who demanded that she leave her mother’s care to reside with her father, was seized during the encounter. See Jones, 410 F.3d at 1226-27. And, there are numerous other lower courts which have held or assumed that an in-school interview of a child to investigate allegations of parental abuse can constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Lane v. Milwaukee Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 10-CV-297, 2011 WL 5122615, at *5 (E.D.Wis. Oct. 28, 2011) (assuming that in-school interview of child in public school— to investigate allegations that child was abused by the parents — was seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes); Loftus v. Clark-Moore, No. 09-CV-14019, 2009 WL 1956319, at *3 (S.D.Fla. July 07, 2009) (concluding that “viewing the available facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, [the] Court cannot find as a matter of law at this stage that there are no circumstances consistent with the facts as pled that constitute an unreasonable seizure [of the child during in-school interview by caseworkers investigating her family] in violation of the Fourth Amendment”); cf. Word of Faith Fellowship, Inc. v. Rutherford Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 329 F.Supp.2d 675, 687 (W.D.N.C.2004) (holding that questioning of child in DSS vehicle outside of child’s private school without parental consent constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure). But see Picarella v. Terrizzi, 893 F.Supp. 1292, 1301 (M.D.Pa. 1995) (holding that in-school questioning of student by administrators when there is “reason to believe” that child has been abused is not per se Fourth Amendment violation, and that no constitutional violation occurred in that case). And, as noted, at least one court has stressed the need to look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the interview of the child constituted a seizure. See Jones, 410 F.3d at 1226 (noting the importance of considering the “totality of the circumstances,” taking into account the degree of coercion used by the officers as well as the interviewee’s age). Examining the circumstances surrounding T.C.P.’s interview, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible claim that T.C.P. was seized during her in-school interview. Even though the Third Amended Complaint does not make clear whether Scolza was in uniform at the time of the interview, Plaintiffs have alleged that T.C.P. was removed from her class by a school administrator, taken to a room with three adults with the door closed, told that she “had to” answer their questions, and that the examination was “like a test.” (TAC ¶¶ 135, 142-144.) Plaintiffs further allege that at no time did any of T.C.P.’s interviewers offer to call her parents, or let her know that she was free to decline their questioning. (Id. ¶¶ 145-46.) Under these circumstances, a reasonable five-year-old child would not have thought she was free to leave or decline the adults’ questioning. Therefore, Plaintiffs have stated a claim that T.C.P. was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Jones, 410 F.3d at 1227 (noting that “[a] reasonable high school student would not have felt free to flaunt a school official’s command, leave an office to which she had been sent, and wander the halls of her high school without permission”); Heck, 327 F.3d at 510 (finding that where eleven-year-old boy was removed from his class and questioned by a police officer and two caseworkers “for twenty minutes about intimate details of his family life,” he was “ ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because no reasonable child would have believed that he was free to leave”). Having made the threshold determination that the interview of T.C.P. was a seizure, the Court next examines whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the seizure was unreasonable, and thus in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Heck, 327 F.3d at 510 (“Having concluded that the defendants ... seized John Doe, Jr., we must now ‘evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999))). The Second Circuit has not yet determined what standard applies in the context of child abuse investigations to determine whether the seizure of a child is reasonable. See Estiverne, 833 F.Supp.2d at 376 (“The Second Circuit has yet to decide definitively the appropriate standard by which to assess the reasonableness of a seizure in the context of a child abuse investigation.”). This inquiry is further complicated by the fact that the Second Circuit cases addressing the reasonableness of a child’s seizure have all involved situations where the child was physically removed either from the school or from the parents’ custody, and thus have not addressed what standard should apply where the seizure did not result in a deprivation of custody. In Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 603 (2d Cir.1999), where the child was taken from school and brought to a hospital for a medical examination, the Court applied the “probable cause” standard, noting that the term “probable cause” is generally descriptive of what seizures are reasonable where no warrant (or in the abuse investigation context, a court order) has been obtained. Id. at 603. However, Tenenbaum left open the possibility that in certain circumstances, the “less stringent reasonableness requirement” could apply where, for example, the law of probable cause and the warrant established in the criminal setting would impose intolerable burdens or make a child abuse investigation impracticable. Id. at 603-04. The Tenenbaum Court thus declined to decide, for example, “whether case workers ever have ‘special needs’ that would permit them to base a removal of a child on information from an anonymous source contrary to ordinary probable cause jurisprudence.” Id. at 604 n. 15. The Tenenbaum Court also explicitly noted that the “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement could apply in child abuse investigations, and thus a child may be removed from school absent al consent or a court order “where information possessed by a state officer would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that a child is subject to the danger of abuse if not removed from school before court authorization can reasonably be obtained.” Id. at 605. Likewise in Kia P., the Second Circuit declined to decide which standard for determining whether a seizure was “reasonable” should apply in cases where the state seizes a child in order to prevent abuse or neglect. 235 F.3d at 762 (declining to address whether the seizure “requires probable cause, or whether it is subject to a less stringent reasonableness requirement due to the special needs of child protection agencies, or whether [it] must be justified by exigent circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 173 (2d Cir.2003) (declining to address “the question whether in the context of the seizure of a child by a state protective agency the Fourth Amendment might impose any additional restrictions above and beyond those that apply to ordinary arrests”). The Parties have not cited, nor has the Court found, any district court decisions in the Second Circuit which have explicitly applied the less stringent “reasonableness” analysis in the context of the seizure of a child suspected of abuse without a court order or consent. See, e.g., Estiverne, 833 F.Supp.2d at 375-76 (noting that the Second Circuit has yet to decide definitively the standard by which to assess the reasonableness of a seizure in the context of a child abuse investigation, and deciding that an issue of fact as to reasonableness would exist regardless of whether “probable cause” or the more lenient “reasonable person” standard would apply); Renaud v. Mattingly, No. 09-CV-9303, 2010 WL 3291576, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2010) (holding that there was probable cause to remove the children); Pezzenti v. Capaldo, No. 03-CV-419, 2004 WL 2377241, at *4-5 (D.Conn. Sept. 23, 2004) (finding that probable cause supported removal of child without a court order); Hollenbeck v. Boivert, 330 F.Supp.2d 324, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying motion to dismiss where plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that ACS lacked probable cause to remove the children from their custody and alleged that no exigent circumstances existed to warrant removal). Regardless of whether the traditional “probable cause” standard or a “less stringent reasonableness requirement” applies, Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to state a claim that T.C.P.’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Plaintiffs have adequately pled that Defendants lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to suspect abuse at the time TCP was interviewed. Plaintiffs first allege that Hogle’s report, although it lacked sufficient facts to create a reasonable suspicion of abuse, was passed on to CPS and acted upon because N.Y. Social Services Law § 422(2)(b) provides that certain calls from mandated reporters “shall constitute a report” of abuse and are to be transmitted for investigation. (TAC ¶¶ 1Y, 70.) Although Hogle called the phone number specifically reserved for mandated reporters, Plaintiffs allege that the contents of her call should have alerted Defendants that she was not making the call as a mandated reporter. She had no firsthand knowledge of the suspected abuse and alleged no interaction with Plaintiffs in her professional capacity — requirements for a mandated reporter — and she related information from an anonymous source whom she refused to reveal. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 61-69, 95-109.) Plaintiffs allege that the contents of Hogle’s call alone were not sufficient to create probable cause or reasonable suspicion of abuse, let alone any bona fide concern that T.C.P. was in immediate danger. Furthermore, according to Plaintiffs, Defendants’ own policies also reveal that they did not consider whether the call created probable cause or reasonable suspicion before interviewing T.C.P., as Plaintiffs allege that the County and Village have a policy of immediately interviewing children — without consent or a court order — when a report is made of suspected sexual abuse, regardless of whether the report created reasonable cause to suspect abuse. (Id. ¶ 125.) Plaintiffs also claim that the School District has a policy of allowing children to be interviewed by CPS without inquiring whether parental consent had been obtained, or whether the CPS workers had sufficient cause to believe the child was abused. (Id. ¶¶ 137-38, 140-41.) Therefore, Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to plausibly raise an issue as to whether probable cause existed to believe that T.C.P. was abused, or whether it was reasonable for Defendants to believe she had been abused under the circumstances. ii. Search Claim Plaintiffs allege in their second cause of action that T.C.P.’s in-school interview constituted a search which violated T.C.P.’s, Phillips’, and Condoluci’s Fourth Amendment rights. (TAC ¶¶ 385-96.) Plaintiffs claim that they have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home life, and that the “interrogation” of T.C.P., which elicited intimate details regarding their home life, intruded on this expectation of privacy. (Pis.’ Mem. 32-33.) It is well settled in that “ ‘Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted.’” Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 601 n. 13 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969)). Although parents can bring Fourth Amendment claims on behalf of their minor children, they do not have standing to assert Fourth Amendment claims on their own behalf based on a violation of their child’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. (noting that the district court held that the parents could not assert a Fourth Amendment claim in their own behalf based on the state’s treatment of their daughter, an issue that was not challenged on appeal). Numerous courts, both in the Second Circuit and elsewhere, have held that parents cannot allege that their own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an unlawful search or seizure of their child. See, e.g., Kia P., 235 F.3d at 758 (“[L]ike the parental plaintiffs in Tenenbaum, Kia P. do[es] not have — or at least no longer allege[s] — cognizable Fourth Amendment claims based on her [daughter’s] ... removal” (alterations in original)); E.D., 692 F.Supp.2d at 366 (“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights that cannot be asserted vicariously, but may be brought on behalf of a child by a parent”); Hollenbeck, 330 F.Supp.2d at 334 n. 10 (same); see also Konstantelos v. Ploehn, No. 09-CV-6476, 2011 WL 651435, at *9 & n. 4 (C.D.Cal. Feb. 11, 2011) (dismissing pro se plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims arising out of in-school interview of their son because son was not a party to the action, and “Plaintiffs have not made clear how the alleged actions violated [their] Fourth Amendment rights”); Holmes v. City of Flagstaff, No. 09-CV-8156, 2010 WL 2889934, at *3 (D.Ariz. July 21, 2010) (dismissing Fourth Amendment claim based on in-school search of plaintiffs son because plaintiff did not allege that he personally was searched or seized); Reguli v. Guffee, No. 08-CV-0774, 2009 WL 425020, at *10 (M.D.Tenn. Feb. 19, 2009) (dismissing pro se plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claims based on the removal and interrogation of one of her children from her public school, because plaintiffs own rights were not violated), aff'd, 371 Fed.Appx. 590 (6th Cir. 2010). These cases seem to foreclose the ability of Parent Plaintiffs to claim that the interview of T.C.P. violated their own right to be free from unreasonable searches. However, courts have reasoned that it is “at least theoretically possible for a parent to establish standing to bring a Fourth Amendment claim based on the search of a child, [though] the parent must ‘allege her own distinct injuries’ as a result of the [search] to demonstrate standing to bring such a claim.” Belinda K. v. Cnty. of Alameda, No. 10-CV-5797, 2011 WL 2690356, at *7 (N.D.Cal. July 8, 2011) (quoting J.B. v. Washington Cnty., 127 F.3d 919, 928 (10th Cir.1997)). Plaintiffs have alleged that the interview of T.C.P. violated their legitimate expectation of privacy in intimate, family matters, and thus have at least alleged a personal injury arising from the interview. The question remains, however, whether the interview of T.C.P. was in fact a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. “[A] a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33, 121 S.Ct. 2038. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has instructed that “[w]hen the Fourth Amendment was adopted, as now, to search meant [t]o look over or through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by inspection; as, to search the house for a book; to search the wood for a thief.” Id. at 33 n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation- marks omitted). This definition of “search” implies a physical inspection and does not suggest that the questioning of an individual should constitute a “search” as the term is understood in the Fourth Amendment context. Plaintiffs have provided no authority to support their claim that an interview can constitute a search. The Court finds instructive that the cases that have addressed whether in-school interviews of children during child abuse investigations violate the Fourth Amendment have analyzed the children’s Fourth Amendment claims in the context of illegal seizure, not illegal search. See, e.g., Stoot, 582 F.3d at 918 (holding that in-school interview of student suspected of committing abuse was a seizure); Jones, 410 F.3d at 1226 (holding that in-school confrontation with student constituted a seizure); Jefferson v. Cnty. of Napa, No. 03-CV-5031, 2007 WL 4410412, at *3, *6 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 14, 2007) (finding that in-school interview was not a seizure because the school gave valid consent); Word of Faith Fellowship, 329 F.Supp.2d at 687 (analyzing whether interviews of children conducted in CPS vehicles outside of their school constituted searches or seizures, and determining that they were seizures under the Fourth Amendment). But see Lane, 2011 WL 5122615, at *5 (assuming that interview of student at school was both a search and a seizure). In Heck, the Seventh Circuit determined that the in-school interview of the child constituted an unlawful seizure, and that the investigation conducted by caseworkers on private school grounds constituted an unreasonable search involving the school’s property. 327 F.3d at 513 (noting that because the school and the student had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the private school’s premises, “the defendants’ warrantless search of the school and seizure of the child are presumptively unreasonable”). Here, Pl