Full opinion text
ORDER & REASONS ELDON E. FALLON, District Judge. Before the Court are the following four motions: (1) Taishan Gypsum Co. Ltd’s (“TG”) Renewed Motion to Vacate the Default Judgment and Dismiss the Complaint in Germano v. Taishan Gypsum Co., Ltd., Case No. 09-6687 (R. Doc. 13490); (2) TG’s Renewed Motion Pursuant to Rules 55(c) and 12(b)(2) to Vacate the Entry of Default and Dismiss This Action in The Mitchell Co., Inc. v. Knauf Gips KG, Case No. 09-4115 (R. Doc. 13566); (3) TG and Taian Taishan Plasterboard Co., Ltd.’s (“TTP”)(colleetiVely “Taishan” or “Taishan Entities”) Motion Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) to Dismiss the Complaint in Gross v. Knauf Gips KG, Case No. 09-6690 (R. Doc. 13590); and (4) TG and TTP’s Motion Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) to Dismiss the Complaint in Wiltz v. Beijing New Building Materials Public Ltd., Co., Case No. 10-361 (R. Doc. 13591). Extensive discovery was conducted in preparation for the motions, followed by lengthy briefing and an evidentiary hearing with oral arguments. The Court has now reviewed the parties’ arguments, the relevant evidence, and the applicable law, and it is ready to rule. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. BACKGROUND.........................................................829 A. The MDL Litigation.................................................829 B. The Knauf Entities..................................................830 C. The Taishan Entities................................................831 II. TG’S RENEWED MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT & DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN GERMANO..........................834 A. Present Motion & Summary of the Parties’ Positions ..................834 1. TG’s Motion.....................................................834 2. The PS’s Responses in Opposition..................................835 a. Response to the Motion........................................835 b. Global Memorandum..........................................835 S. TG’s Reply ......................................................835 B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction...................836 1. Standard of Review...............................................836 2. Applicable Law ..................................................836 3. Personal Jurisdiction Over a Foreign Defendant.....................837 b. Virginia’s Long-Arm Statute......................................837 a. Subsection (A) (2)-Contracting to Supply Services.................839 b. Subsections (A)(b) & (A)(5)-Tortious Injury & Breach of Warranty..................................................840 5. Due Process Clause...............................................841 6. Minimum Contacts...............................................841 a. Specific Personal Jurisdiction..................................842 b. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Specific Personal Jurisdiction................................................842 c. Effect of J. McIntyre on the Specific Personal Jurisdiction Analysis...................................................846 d. Fifth Circuit’s Interpretation of Specific Personal Jurisdiction.....848 7. TG’s Minimum Contacts in Germano...............................849 a. TG’s Lack of Physical Contacts in Virginia......................849 b. TG’s Nationwide Contacts .....................................849 c. TG’s Virginia Contacts........................................851 d. TG has Sufficient Minimum Contacts with Virginia for Specific Personal Jurisdiction................................854 8. Cause of Action Arises From Forum Minimum Contacts..............857 9. Fair Play & Substantial Justice....................................858 a. Burden onTG................................................859 b. Virginia’s Interest ............................................859 c. Plaintiffs’Interest ............................................860 d. Judicial System’s Interest............................'..........860 e. States ’ Shared Interest.........................................860 f. The Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Over TG is Fair & Reasonable.................................................860 10. Imputation of Contacts Between TG & TTP..........................861 C. The Court’s Ruling on Vacating the Default Judgment.................862 1. Applicable Law ..................................................862 2. Personal Jurisdiction.............................................863 3. Excusable Neglect................................................863 b- Other Reason That Justifies Relief..................................864 a. Failure to Serve ..............................................864 b. Failure to State a Claim Under the VCPA.......................864 III. TG’S RENEWED MOTION TO VACATE THE ENTRY OF DEFAULT & DISMISS THE ACTION IN MITCHELL ..............................865 A. Present Motion & Summary of the Parties’ Arguments.................865 1. TG’s Motion.....................................................865 2. The PSC’s Response ..............................................865 3. Mitchell’s Response...............................................865 b- Certain Florida Homebuilders’ Amicus Curiae Response..............865 5. The Banner Entities ’ Response.....................................866 6. TG’s Reply ......................................................866 B. The Court’s Ruling on TG’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.......................................................866 1. Standard of Review...............................................866 2. Applicable Law ..................................................866 3. Personal Jurisdiction Over a Foreign Defendant.....................867 b- Imputing TTP’s Forum Contacts to TG for Purposes of Personal Jurisdiction...................................................867 a. Piercing the Corporate Veil ....................................867 b. Applicable Law...............................................867 c. Facts Regarding the Relationship Between TG & TTP.............869 d. Agency and/or Alter Ego Exists Between TG & TTP...............872 5. Florida’s Long-Arm, Statute.......................................874 a. Subsection (a)-Business in the State.............................874 i. Applicable Law.........................................874 ii. The Parties’Arguments.................................875 iii. Facts Regarding Taishan’s Florida-Related Business........875 iv. Taishan’s Florida-Related Business Satisfies Subsection (a) of the Florida Long-Arm Statute ....................881 b. Subsection (b)-Tortious Activity in the State......................882 c. Subsection (j)-Causing Injury in the State.......................883 6. Due Process Requirements for Specific Personal Jurisdiction......... 885 7. Taishan’s Minimum Contacts With Florida.........................885 8. Cause of Action Arises From Forum Minimum Contacts..............888 9. Fair Play & Substantial Justice....................................889 C. The Court’s Ruling on Vacating the Preliminary Default...............889 1. Applicable Law ..................................................890 2. Personal Jurisdiction.............................................890 3. Excusable Neglect................................................890 L Other Reason That Justifies Relief-Failure to Serve..................890 D. Adverse Inference Against Taishan ...................................891 IV.TG & TTP’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN GROSS.........892 A. Present Motion & Summary of the Parties’ Positions ..................892 1. Taishan’s Motion.................................................892 2. PSC’s Response..................................................892 3. Interior Exterior’s Response........................................892 Jp. Taishan’s Reply..................................................893 B. The Court’s Ruling on TG’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.......................................................893 1. Standard of Review...............................................893 2. Applicable Law ..................................................893 3. Personal Jurisdiction Over a Foreign Defendant.....................893 Jp. Imputing TTP’s Forum Contacts to TG.............................893 a. Piercing the Corporate Veil ....................................893 b. Applicable Law...............................................894 c. TTP’s Minimum Contacts are Imputable to TG...................895 5. Louisiana Long-Arm Statute......................................896 6. Due Process Requirements for Specific Personal Jurisdiction..........896 7. Minimum Contacts...............................................897 a. Taishan’s Minimum Contacts..................................897 i. Taishan Lacks Physical Contacts With Louisiana............897 ii. Taishan’s Nátionwide Contacts ...........................898 iii. Taishan’s Louisiana-Related Contacts.....................898 b. Taishan has Sufficient Minimum Contacts With Louisiana to Satisfy Due Process.........................................899 8. Cause of Action Arises From or Relates to Minimum Contacts.........901 9. Fair Play & Substantial Justice....................................902 V. TG & TTP’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN WILTZ..........903 VI. CONCLUSION..........................................................903 I. BACKGROUND A MDL Litigation The present litigation arises from alleged property damage and personal injuries sustained as a result of the presence of Chinese-manufactured drywall in homes and other buildings in a number of states, During approximately. 2005 to 2008, hundreds-of-millions of square feet of gypsum wallboard manufactured in China (“Chinese drywall”) were exported to the United States, primarily along the East Coast and Gulf South, as a result of an exceptionally high demand for building supplies in the aftermaths of Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, as well as a general new-housing boom. The Chinese drywall was then installed in newly-constructed and reconstructed properties. After installation of this drywall, owners and occupants of the properties began noticing unusual odors, blackening of silver and copper items and components, and the failure of appliances, including microwaves, refrigerators, and air-conditioning units. Some also experienced health problems, such as skin and eye irritation, respiratory issues, nose bleeds, and headaches. As a result, these property owners began filing suit in both state and federal courts against those involved with Chinese drywall, including the installers, homebuilders, suppliers, importers, exporters, and manufacturers, as well as their insurers and sureties. On June 15, 2009, 626 F.Supp.2d 1346 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit.2009), this Court was designated as the transferee court for all federal cases involving Chinese-manufactured drywall, creating Multi-District Litigation 2047 (the “MDL”). See (R. Doc. 1). Since the inception of MDL 2047, over three years ago, hundreds of lawsuits involving thousands of plaintiffs and defendants, have been filed and the cases consolidated before this Court. The Court has worked to oversee and manage this complex litigation, including: presiding over numerous regularly-scheduled hearings and monthly status conferences, which are attended by hundreds of counsel; vetting and appointing counsel to steering committees (plaintiff, defendant, homebuilder, installer, insurer), mediators, special masters, and a pro se curator; communicating and coordinating with state and federal judges who preside over related Chinese drywall litigation; issuing 26 pretrial orders which govern procedure in the MDL, as well as countless orders and minute entries; maintaining a public MDL website; presiding over ten bellwether trials and proceedings, as well as issuing detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law; facilitating numerous settlement negotiations and mediations; monitoring the pilot remediation program; and managing the 15,000-plus record documents filed into the litigation. See Case No. 09-md-2047. The Chinese drywall at issue was largely manufactured by two groups of defendants: (1) the Knauf Entities, and (2) the Taishan Entities. The litigation has focused upon these two entities and their downstream associates, and has proceeded on separate tracks for the claims against each group as described as follows. B. Knauf Entities The Knauf Entities are German-based, international manufacturers of building products, including drywall, whose Chinese subsidiary, Knauf Plasterboard (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. (“KPT”), manufactured and sold its Chinese drywall in the United States. The Knauf Entities are named defendants in numerous cases consolidated with the MDL litigation and litigation in state courts. The Knauf Entities first entered their appearance in the MDL litigation on July 2, 2009. See (R. Doc. 18). On November 2, 2009, in Pretrial Order No. 17, KPT agreed to a limited waiver of service. See (R. Doc. 401). On March 15-19, 2010, the Court presided over a bellwether trial in Hernandez v. Knauf Gips KG, Case No. 09-6050, involving a homeowner’s claims against KPT for defective drywall. See (R. Doc. 2713). For purposes of the trial, KTP stipulated that its Chinese drywall “emits certain reduced sulfur gases and the drywall emits an odor.” Id. The Court found in favor of the plaintiff family in Hernandez, issued a detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, see id., and entered a Judgment in the amount of $164,049.64. See (R. Doc. 3012). Thereafter, on October 14, 2010, the Knauf Entities entered into a pilot remediation program with the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (“PSC”) in the MDL. This program was largely based upon the remediation protocol formulated by the Court in Hernandez. The Knauf pilot remediation program is ongoing and is in the process of remediating 2,000 homes containing KPT Chinese drywall. At the Court’s urging, the parties began working together to monetize this program and make it available to a broader class of plaintiffs. On December 20, 2011, the Knauf Entities and the PSC entered into a global, class Settlement Agreement (“Knauf Settlement Agreement”), which is designed to resolve all Knauf-related, Chinese drywall claims. See (R. Doc. 12061-5). This Agreement is the most significant step thus far towards global resolution of all Chinese drywall claims. In addition to the Knauf Settlement Agreement, numerous defendants in the chain-of-commerce with the Knauf Entities have entered into class settlement agreements, the effect of which settles almost all of the Knauf Entities’ chain-of-commerce litigation. These additional class action settlement agreements involve the following defendants and in most cases, their insurers: Interior Exterior Building Supply, LP (“Interior Exterior”); the Banner Entities; L & W Supply Corp. and USG Corp.; and a group of numerous home-builders, installers, suppliers. See (R. Does. 10033-3, 12258-3, 13375-2, 14404-2). The Court has granted preliminary approval to all of the foregoing settlement agreements which are the subject of the final fairness hearing set for November 2012. C. Taishan Entities The second group of manufacturer defendants in the litigation and the defendants who are challenging personal jurisdiction in the present motions, are the Chinese-based Taishan Entities, namely, Taishan Gypsum Co. Ltd. (“TG”) and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Taian Taishan Plasterboard Co., Ltd. (“TTP”)(collectively “Taishan” or “Taishan Entities”). As discussed below, the course of the litigation involving the Taishan Entities has not followed the same trajectory or enjoyed the same measure of success as that involving the Knauf Entities. As an alleged manufacturer of Chinese drywall which has been installed in plaintiffs’ properties, Taishan is a named defendant in numerous cases in both the MDL litigation and litigation filed in state courts. The Court’s inquiry for purposes of the present motions pertains to four cases in the MDL in which Taishan has been served, entered an appearance, and in two of these cases, subjected to default judgment proceedings. These four cases are: Germano v. Taishan Gypsum Co., Ltd., Case No. 09-6687; The Mitchell Co., Inc. v. Knauf Gips KG, Case No. 09-4115; Gross v. Knauf Gips KG, Case No. 09-6690; and Wiltz v. Beijing New Building Materials Public Ltd., Co., Case No. 10-361. The Court will briefly discuss each of these cases as they pertain to Taishan before detailing the overall course of the MDL litigation involving the claims against Taishan. Germano has served as the main vehicle for the MDL litigation involving Taishan, particularly TG, all of which will be discussed in greater detail below. Germano was filed originally in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia as a Virginia class action against TG by the owners of homes located in Virginia which allegedly contain TG-manufactured Chinese drywall. See (R. Docs. 1-1, 1-2)(Case No. 09-6678). On August 3, 2009, TG was served. See (R. Doc. l-7)(Case No. 09-6687). Germano was then transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and consolidated with the MDL litigation on October 13, 2009. (R. Doc. l)(Case No. 09-6678). Thereafter, the class was expanded to a nationwide class. See (R. Doc. 470)(Case No. 09-md-2047). Mitchell was originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida as a class action on behalf of home-builders in the states of Louisiana, Georgia, Texas and Florida who used drywall manufactured by TG for the construction, repair, or remodeling of properties, and who, as a result, incurred expenses associated with repair or replacement of this drywall and/or other property damaged by the drywall, and/or incurred liability for property damages. See (R. Doc. l-l)(Case No. 09-4115). On May 8, 2009, service was executed on TG. See (R. Doc. 52)(Case No. 09-md-2047). Shortly thereafter, Mitchell was transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana and consolidated with the MDL litigation. See (R. Doc. l)(Case No. 09-4115). Gross and Wiltz were both filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana and consolidated with the MDL litigation as nationwide class actions by property owners whose homes contain Taishan-manufactured Chinese drywall. See (R. Doc. 1)(Case No. 09-6690); (R. Docs. 1, 1-1)(Case No. 10-361). Taishan was served or entered an appearance in both cases. See (R. Docs. 2140, 2141, 2553); (R. Docs. 7408, 7409). The cases are distinguishable by the fact that Gross involves claims against “indeterminate defendants” who have allegedly concealed their identity and are allegedly responsible for the Chinese drywall in plaintiff class members’ properties. See (R. Doc. l)(Case No. 09-6690). Wiltz, on the other hand, is a more typical class action filed on behalf of property owners against Taishan as a result of the damage caused by the presence of Taishan’s drywall in their properties. See (R. Docs. 1, 1-1)(Case No. 10-361). The first issues in the MDL litigation involving Taishan arose when TG failed to timely answer or otherwise enter an appearance in Mitchell and Germano, although TG had been properly served in each case. See (R. Doc. 52); (R. Doc. 1-7)(Case No. 09-6687). As a result, the Court entered preliminary defaults against TG in both of these cases. See (R. Docs. 277, 487). After affording TG more than a reasonable amount of time to answer or enter an appearance, the Court moved forward with an evidentiary hearing in furtherance of the Preliminary Default in Germano on the claims of 14 intervening plaintiffs (the “Intervening-Plaintiffs”). See (R. Doc. 502, 1223, 1258, 2380). Following this hearing, which occurred on February 19 and 20, 2010, the Court issued detailed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law. See (R. Doe. 2380). On May 11, 2010, the Court issued a Default Judgment against TG in Germano, in favor of the Intervening-Plaintiffs, in the amount of $2,609,129.99. (R. Doc. 3031). On the last day to timely do so, June 10, 2010, TG filed a Notice of Appeal of the Default Judgment in Germano. (R. Doc. 3670). On this same day, TG also entered its appearance in Germano and Mitchell. See (R. Doc. 3668). After TG entered its appearance in the MDL, it quickly sought to have the Default Judgment in Germano and the Preliminary Default in Mitchell vacated for lack of personal jurisdiction, as well as on procedural grounds. See (R. Docs. 5436, 5583). However, because of the pending appeal, this Court was without jurisdiction to address any motions filed by TG. See (R. Doc. 5504). Accordingly, TG sought and was granted by the Fifth Circuit, a stay of its appeal to allow this Court to provide an indicative ruling on TG’s motions to vacate the preliminary default and default judgments. See (R. Doc. 5649). In response, this Court issued an order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1 to allow it to consider TG’s motions. See (R. Doc. 6101). In the fall of 2010, the Court directed the parties to commence the personal jurisdiction discovery necessary to resolve TG’s motions to vacate. Sometime after the initial discovery, the parties agreed to expand the discovery beyond the Germano and Mitchell cases to other cases in which Taishan been served, including Gross and Wiltz. Formal personal jurisdiction discovery of Taishan began in October 2010, see e.g. (R. Docs. 5839, 5840), and continued over the year-and-a-half leading up to the filing of the present motions. Discovery has included the production of both written and electronic documents, as well as depositions of Taishan’s corporate representatives, with each type of discovery proceeding in a parallel fashion. This discovery has not been without trials and tribulations, requiring close supervision by the Court. The Court has presided over regularly-scheduled status conferences to keep the parties on track, and conducted hearings and issued rulings to resolve numerous discovery-related disputes. See e.g. (R. Docs. 7136, 7511). The first Taishan depositions were held in Hong Kong on April 4-8, 2011. See (R. Docs. 8296, 8297). Thirteen attorneys traveled to Hong Kong and deposed the following three Taishan witnesses: (1) Jia Tongchun, General Manager, Director of Board of Directors, and five-percent owner of TG; (2) Peng Wenglong (a.k.a. Frank Clem), Manager of Foreign Trade Department of TG in 2005, salesperson at TTP from 2006-07, and current Manager of Foreign Trade Department at TG; and (3) Zhang Jianchun, Secretary of TG and TTP. See id. Upon return to the United States, several motions were filed seeking to schedule a second round of Taishan depositions as a result of problems during the depositions and seeking discovery sanctions against Taishan. See (R. Docs. 8685, 8695, 8755, 8758, 8768, 8792, 8805). Taishan opposed these motions. See (R. Docs. 8841, 8842). The Court, after reviewing the transcripts from the depositions, concluded that the “depositions were ineffective because of disagreement between interpreters, counsel, and witnesses, translation difficulties, speaking objections, colloquy among counsel and interpreters, and in general ensuing chaos.” See (R. Doc. 9107). Accordingly, the Court ordered the parties to move forward with further written discovery and to schedule a second-round of Taishan depositions, but this time with knowledgeable and prepared witnesses, a single translator, and Court supervision. See id. The parties complied with the Court’s orders and met regularly with the Court to resolve their further discovery disputes. See (R. Docs. 9524, 10092, 9649, 9944, 10007, 10216, 10269, 10799, 11175, 10804, 11138, 11192, 11326). The Court scheduled the second round of Taishan depositions for the week of January 9, 2012, in Hong Kong. See (R. Docs. 10804, 11138, 11192). The Court appointed a Federal Rule of Evidence 706 expert to operate as the sole interpreter at the depositions. See (R. Doc. 11533). Counsel for the interested parties and Judge Fallon traveled to Hong Kong for these depositions. The following witnesses were deposed or re-deposed: (1) Peng Wenglong (a.k.a. Frank Clem); (2) Jia Tongchun; (3) Che Gang (a.k.a. Bill Cher), Manager of International Trading for Taishan, salesperson at TG from 2001-06 and 2009-12, and salesperson at TTP from 2006-07; (4) Peng Shiliang, General Manager and Chairman of Board of Directors of TTP from 2006-09, employee of TTP, and Plant Manager of TG from 2009-12; and (5) Fu Tinghuan, Supervisor at TG, Deputy General Manager at TG, and Director of TTP. Because the Court was present at the depositions, objections were ruled upon immediately and the majority of problems which plagued the first round of depositions were absent. Also, the Court was able to observe the comments, intonation, and body language of the deponents. Upon return from Hong Kong, the parties informed the Court that minimal further discovery was necessary before briefing could be submitted on Taishan’s personal jurisdiction challenges. In April 2012, TG and TTP filed the present motions. Responses in opposition were filed by the PSC, Interior Exterior, the Banner Entities, and Certain Florida Homebuilders, (R. Docs. 14202, 14204, 14209, 14216, 14356, 14372, 14390, 14392, 14391-4), with other parties joining in these motions, including the State of Louisiana (collectively the “Respondents”). Prior to the hearing, evidentiary objections were raised by Taishan, which the Respondents addressed. On June 29, 2012, over three years since the creation of MDL 2047, and after a year-and-a-half of personal jurisdiction discovery on Taishan, the Court presided over a hearing on Taishan’s motions. The Court coordinated its hearing with Judge Joseph Farina of the 11th Judicial Circuit Court of Florida, who had a similar motion involving Taishan’s challenge to personal jurisdiction. The Court will now address and rule-upon the motions filed by Taishan in Germano, Mitchell, Gross, and Wiltz. II. TG’S RENEWED MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT & DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN GERMANO The first Motion addressed by the Court is TG’s Renewed Motion to Vacate the Default Judgment and Dismiss the Complaint in Germano. (R. Doc. 13490). A. Present Motion & Summary of the Parties’ Positions 1. TG’s Motion TG raises four arguments in support of its Motion. First, TG argues that the Default Judgment should be vacated and the claims against it dismissed because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it in Germano. As a threshold matter, TG argues that Virginia and Fourth Circuit law governs the question of personal jurisdiction. Next, TG argues that plaintiffs are unable to satisfy Virginia’s long arm statute, as is required for personal jurisdiction, because TG did not transact business in Virginia and it does not regularly do or solicit business in Virginia. Finally, TG argues that plaintiffs are unable to satisfy the due process requirements of personal jurisdiction because: (1) plaintiffs cannot establish that TG had minimum contacts with Virginia; (2) plaintiffs cannot establish that their causes of action arose out of or resulted from TG’s contacts with Virginia; and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdiction over TG would be unreasonable and offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Second, TG argues that the Default Judgment should be set aside because plaintiffs failed to serve the pleadings upon which the Default Judgment was based, specifically the motion for intervention and the Second Amended Complaint. Third, TG argues that the Default Judgment should be set aside on the grounds of excusable neglect. In support, TG alleges: its default was not willful; vacating the judgment will not prejudice the plaintiffs; it has a meritorious defense; it will incur significant financial losses if the default stands; and it acted expeditiously to vacate the default. Fourth, TG argues that the Complaint fails to state a claim under the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (“VCPA”). 2. The PSC’s Responses in Opposition The PSC filed both a specific Response in opposition to TG’s Motion (R. Doc. 14202) and a Global Memorandum of law in opposition to all four of Taishan’s motions. (R. Doc. 14209). The Court will now summarize each. a. Response to the Motion The PSC first addresses TG’s personal jurisdiction arguments. As a threshold matter, the PSC argues that the Court must apply Virginia’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause, as informed by the law of the Fifth Circuit, in determining whether there exists personal jurisdiction over TG. It then argues that TG, based upon its Virginia contacts, is subject to personal jurisdiction under Virginia’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. Second, the PSC argues that the Court previously and correctly ruled that jurisdiction over TG was accomplished by proper service of the First Amended Complaint. Third, the PSC argues that TG is not entitled to have the Default Judgment vacated on the basis that plaintiffs allegedly failed to state a claim under the VCPA, since the claims against TG which support the Default Judgment include a number of non-VCPA allegations. Fourth, the PSC argues that TG has not shown excusable neglect in its failure to timely respond to the Default Judgment. b. Global Memorandum The PSC’s Global Memorandum addresses the issue at the center of all four of Taishan’s motions, personal jurisdiction. Therein, the PSC first argues that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over TG because it purposefully sold its drywall products to customers in the United States with the expectation that these products would be delivered to Virginia, Florida, Louisiana, and other states. According to the PSC, these activities constitute sufficient “minimum contacts” in the personal jurisdiction context. The PSC contends that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 180 L.Ed.2d 765 (2011), does not change this conclusion. Finally, the PSC argues the exercise of personal jurisdiction over TG comports with the due process requirements of fair play and substantial justice. The second section in the PSC’s Global Memorandum argues for the imputation of TTP’s forum contacts to TG for purposes of personal jurisdiction on the basis that, pursuant to Chinese law, the corporate personalities of TG and TTP are commingled. In support of this argument, the PSC presents the opinions of three Chinese legal experts. Third, the PSC argues that its right to pursue the entities upstream to Taishan, namely China National Building Materials Group Corp. (“CNBM”) and Beijing New Building Material Group Co. Ltd. (“BNBM”), should be preserved since the PSC was precluded from taking any discovery from these entities. 3. TG’s Reply TG filed a Reply in further support of its Motion. (R. Doc. 14572). TG expands upon the arguments in its original briefing. It argues that plaintiffs fail to demonstrate by preponderance of the evidence that this Court possesses specific personal jurisdiction over it pursuant to the Virginia long-arm statute or due process. TG interprets J. McIntyre as supporting its position that its contacts with Virginia are insufficient for personal jurisdiction. It also argues, citing to its own Chinese law expert, that TTP’s contacts cannot be imputed to TG for purposes of personal jurisdiction. TG accuses plaintiffs of relying upon inadmissible hearsay evidence. B. The Court’s Ruling on TG’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction As noted, TG seeks dismissal of the claims against it in Germano on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction. See (R. Doc. 13490). 1. Standard of Review Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) provides a right to dismissal of claims against a defendant when personal jurisdiction is lacking. “When a nonresident defendant presents a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the district court’s jurisdiction over the nonresident. The court may determine the jurisdictional issue by receiving affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any combination of the recognized methods of discovery.” Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir.1985)(citing Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir.1985)). When a court hears a Rule 12(b)(2) motion without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only present a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. See Walk Haydel & Assocs., Inc. v. Coastal Power Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 235 (5th Cir.2008). When there is an evidentiary hearing, however, the plaintiff is held to the higher standard of preponderance of the evidence. See id. (citing Brown v. Slenker, 220 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir.2000)). The Fifth Circuit “has never explicitly laid out the criteria necessary to constitute a ‘full evidentiary hearing,’ ” Kwik-Kopy Corp. v. Byers, 37 Fed.Appx. 90, at *4 (5th Cir. May 9, 2002), but has concluded for purposes of an evidentiary hearing, “both parties must be allowed to submit affidavits and to employ all forms of discovery, subject to the district court’s discretion and as long as the discovery pertains to the personal-jurisdiction issue.” Walk Haydel & Assocs., Inc., 517 F.3d at 242. The distinguishing factor between a mere hearing and an “evidentiary hearing” is the presentation of evidence “beyond the written materials.” See Kwik-Kopy Corp., 37 Fed.Appx. at *4 (quoting Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.1977)). The Court finds that the hearing on the present Motion falls into the evidentiary hearing category, because the Court is relying on evidence representing the full extent of personal jurisdiction discovery and depositions. This conclusion requires plaintiffs to establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. 2. Applicable Law As noted, Germano was originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, within the Fourth Circuit, and then transferred to the MDL Court seated in the Eastern District of Louisiana, within the Fifth Circuit, for consolidated and coordinated pretrial proceedings. See Case No. 09-6687. The parties agree that for purposes of determining personal jurisdiction in Germano, the applicable substantive law is the law of Virginia, but they disagree as to whether Fourth Circuit or Fifth Circuit law applies as federal law. Thus, before beginning any personal jurisdiction analysis, the Court must determine the applicable law. The Court concludes that as the MDL transferee court, it is obliged to apply, consistent with the parties’ own positions, the substantive state law of the transferor court, Virginia law, and the federal law of its own circuit, the Fifth Circuit. This conclusion is overwhelmingly supported by both the jurisprudence and legal scholarship. See In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 391 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir.2004); Murphy v. F.D.I.C., 208 F.3d 959, 965 (11th Cir.2000); Bradley v. United States, 161 F.3d 777, 782 n. 4 (4th Cir.1998); Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir.1994); Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40-41 (2d Cir.1993); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (C.A.D.C.1987); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 861 F.Supp.2d 756, 759-60 (E.D.La.2012); In re BP S’holder Derivative Litig., 2011 WL 4345209, at *12 (S.D.Tex. Sept. 15, 2011)(citing In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 659 F.Supp.2d 504, 517 (S.D.N.Y.2009)); Various Plaintiffs v. Various Defendants, 856 F.Supp.2d 703, 707-08 (E.D.Pa.2012); Briggs v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 2012 WL 975875, at *1 n. 1 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 13, 2012); Floyd v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 2012 WL 975639, at *1 n. 1 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 8, 2012); Aikins v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 2011 WL 6415117, at *1 n. 1 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 9, 2011); In re Hydroxycut Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 810 F.Supp.2d 1100, 1106 (S.D.Cal.2011); In re DirecTV Early Cancellation Litig., 738 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1074 (C.D.Cal.2010); In re Zicam Cold Remedy Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 797 F.Supp.2d 940, 941 (D.Ariz.2011); Hinds Cty., Miss. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 708 F.Supp.2d 348, 366 n. 11 (S.D.N.Y.2010); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F.Supp.2d 397, 430 (E.D.N.Y.2009); In re Conagra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litg., 2009 WL 799422, at *1 (N.D.Ga.2009); 15 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, Joan E. Steinman, Catherine T. Struvel, and Vikram David Amar, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3866 (3d ed.2009); Daniel A. Richards, An Analysis of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation’s Selection of Transferee District and Judge, 78 Fordham L.Rev. 311, 316 (2009). This conclusion is also consistent with the Court’s dicta earlier in the litigation. See In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 767 F.Supp.2d 649, 656 n. 2 (E.D.La.2011). Accordingly, the Court now addresses Fifth Circuit federal law and Virginia state law on personal jurisdiction. 3. Personal Jurisdiction Over a Foreign Defendant It is axiomatic under Fifth Circuit law that a federal district court sitting in diversity may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if: (1) the long-arm statute of the forum state creates personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir.2010) (citing Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir.1999)); Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 270 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 335 (5th Cir.1999)); Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 445 F.3d 809, 812 (5th Cir.2006) (quoting Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278 (5th Cir.1997)); Ouazzani-Chahdi v. Greensboro News & Record, Inc., 200 Fed.Appx. 289, 291 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir.2002)); Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir.1993). The Court now addresses each of these requirements in turn. A Virginia’s Long-Arm Statute In Germano, the Court is obliged to apply Virginia’s long-arm statute under the first prong of the personal jurisdiction inquiry. The Virginia long-arm statute provides in relevant part, A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person’s: 1. Transacting any business in this Commonwealth; 2. Contracting to supply services or things in this Commonwealth; 3. Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this Commonwealth; 4. Causing tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this Commonwealth; 5. Causing injury in this Commonwealth to any person by breach of warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this Commonwealth when he might reasonably have expected such person to use, consume, or be affected by the goods in this Commonwealth, provided that he also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this Commonwealth.... Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-328.1. The Virginia Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he purpose of our ‘long arm statute’ is to assert jurisdiction, to the extent permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States, over nonresidents who engage in some purposeful activity in Virginia.” Danville Plywood Corp. v. Plain & Fancy Kitchens, Inc., 218 Va. 533, 534, 238 S.E.2d 800 (1977)(citing Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 456, 164 S.E.2d 703 (1968)); Caldwell v. Seaboard S.R., Inc., 238 Va. 148, 153, 380 S.E.2d 910 (1989); John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., Inc., 211 Va. 736, 740, 180 S.E.2d 664 (1971). Virginia’s long-arm statute is a “single-act statute requiring only one transaction in Virginia to confer jurisdiction on our courts.” Nan Ya Plastics Corp. U.S.A. v. DeSantis, 237 Va. 255, 260, 377 S.E.2d 388 (Va.1989); Danville Plywood Corp., 218 Va. at 534-35, 238 S.E.2d 800; I.T. Sales, Inc. v. Dry, 222 Va. 6, 9, 278 S.E.2d 789 (1981). “ ‘[T]he statutory inquiry [of the Virginia long arm statute] necessarily merges with the constitutional [due process] inquiry, and the two inquiries essentially become one.’ ” Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 261 (4th Cir.2002)(quoting Stover v. O’Connell Assocs., Inc., 84 F.3d 132, 135-36 (4th Cir.1996)). Once the Virginia long-arm statute is satisfied, the question simply becomes “whether the defendant has sufficient ‘minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)); Processing Research, Inc. v. Larson, 686 F.Supp. 119, 121 (E.D.Va.1988). The Court’s first task in its personal jurisdiction analysis, thus, is to determine whether TG’s activities fall into one of the enumerated categories of the Virginia long-arm statute. TG argues that plaintiffs are unable to satisfy Virginia’s long-arm statute because: (1) it did not transact business in Virginia, (2) it did not contract to supply things in Virginia, and (3) it does not regularly do or solicit business in Virginia. See (R. Docs. 13490, 14572). Plaintiffs counter, arguing that TG is subject to personal jurisdiction under the Virginia long-arm statute because TG entered into multiple contracts with Venture Supply, a Virginia company, for the purchase and sale of thousands of sheets of defective Chinese drywall, earning TG hundreds of thousands of dollars. (R. Doc. 14202). According to plaintiffs, these facts satisfy subsections (A)(2), (4), and (5) of the Virginia long-arm statute; thus, the Court now addresses these subsections of the statute. a. Subsection (A)(2) — Contracting to Supply Services Pursuant to subsection (A)(2) of the Virginia long-arm statute, “[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person’s____ [contracting to supply services or things in this Commonwealth.” Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-328.1(A)(2). In order for subsection (A)(2) to apply, the court must conclude that either the defendant made a contract in the forum or contracted to perform obligations in the forum. Richard v. Ivy Grp. Int’l, Inc., 2011 WL 1814929, at *6 (E.D.Va. May 11, 2011)(citing Promotions, Ltd. v. Brooklyn Bridge Centennial Comm., 763 F.2d 173, 175 (4th Cir.1985)). In determining whether the consummation of a contract provides personal jurisdiction under subsection (A)(2), courts are to consider: (1) where the contract was negotiated and executed, (2) who initiated the contact, (3) the extent of the communications, both telephonic and written, and (4) where the obligations of the parties under the contract were to be performed. Decision Insights, Inc. v. Quillen, 2005 WL 2757930, at *5 (E.D.Va. Oct. 21, 2005)(quoting Affinity Memory & Micro, Inc. v. K & Q Enters., 20 F.Supp.2d 948, 952 (E.D.Va.1998)). The Court will now examine the evidence pertaining to the factors of subsection (A)(2). TG entered into two contracts for the sale of its drywall with Venture Supply, Inc., a Norfolk, Virginia company. See (Russ M. Herman Aff. Exs. 1, 80, 81, May 7, 2012); (Frank Spano Decl. Ex. 8, Apr. 2, 2012); (R. Doc. 14215-2, p. 30, 33-34); (R. Docs. 13490, pp. 7-10; 14572). Contractual negotiations occurred over the telephone, through email, and in-person in China. See (Spano Decl. Ex. 1 (Jia Tongchun Dec. ¶¶ 26, 27, Aug. 15, 2010); Ex. 3 (Peng Wenlong Dep. 366:10-370:8, 519:6-17, Apr. 7, 2011); Ex. 5 (Gang Che Dep. 60:8-22, Jan. 11, 2012); Ex. 9); (Herman Aff. Exs. 44; 70; 71; 72 (Samuel Porter Dep. 28:2-6, 130:1-6, 345:1-15, 346:17-347:8, Dec. 16, 2009); 73, 74; 75; 76; 78). The communications between TG and Venture were regular and relatively extensive during the time period the parties were engaged in a business relationship. See id. The first contract was executed via fax in Virginia and the second was executed in person, in China. See (Herman Aff. Exs. 80, 81); (Decl. Spano Ex. 6 (Dep. Tinghuan Fu Ex. 3, Jan. 10, 2010)); (R. Docs. 14202, pp. 10-11; 14215-2, p. 34; 14572, p.). Phillip Perry of Tobin Trading, Inc., on behalf on Venture, initiated contact with TG in November 2005. See (Spano Deck Ex. 1 (Tongchun Dec. ¶ 26); Ex. 3 (P. Wenglong Dep. 519:6-17)); (Herman Aff. Ex. 72 (Porter Dep. 28:2-6)). The obligations under the contracts were to be performed by TG in China where it manufactured the drywall and shipped it F.O.B. to Venture at a Chinese port. See (Herman Aff. Exs. 80, 81). This evidence renders a decision under subsection (A)(2) difficult. Because the contract negotiations and communications involving the Venture-TG contracts oecurred in both China and Virginia and one contract was executed in Virginia and the other in China, these facts do not favor or oppose Virginia as the forum. The remaining two factors — who initiated the contact and the obligations under the contract — -however, are China-based, leaving the Court to conclude that the facts do not sufficiently support the application of subsection (A)(2) to TG in Germano by a preponderance of the evidence. This conclusion is bolstered by a case cited by TG, Frizzell v. Danieli Corp., No. CL09-5120, 2010 WL 8697177 (Va.Cir.Ct, Dec. 22, 2010), in which the court held that subsection (A)(2) of the Virginia long-arm statute did not apply to a manufacturer, even though it assisted in shipping its products to the forum state and may have known that the products were going to the forum state, because it sold its products F.O.B. outside of the forum. Similarly, in Processing Research, Inc. v. Larson, 686 F.Supp. 119, 122 (E.D.Va.1988), the Eastern District of Virginia held that a contract entered into outside of Virginia to supply an aircraft outside of Virginia did not satisfy subsection (A)(2) simply because the aircraft was purchased by a Virginia plaintiff, the tort involving the aircraft occurred in Virginia, and the nonresident defendant profited off the sale. This case further suggests subsection (A)(2) is inapplicable. Thus, the Court must consider the remaining provisions of the Virginia long-arm statute to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists over TG in Germano. b. Subsections (A)(1) & (A)(5)— Tortious Injury & Breach of Warranty Subsections (A)(4) and (A)(5) of the Virginia long-arm statute prove more favorable for the plaintiffs. Under subsection (A)(4) of the Virginia long-arm statute, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who causes tortious injury in the State by an act or omission outside the State if the defendant “regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this Commonwealth.” Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-328.1(A)(4). Under subsection (A)(5), a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who causes injury in the State by breach of warranty, express or implied, made in the sale of goods outside of the State, if he might reasonably have expected the injured person to “use, consume, or be affected by the goods in [the State], provided that [the defendant] also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in [the State].” Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-328.1(A)(5). It does not appear that TG disputes that the plaintiffs allege its drywall caused “tortious injury” or breached warranties in Virginia. See (R. Docs. 13490, p. 14; 14572, p. 8). However, TG does dispute that it “regularly does or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in [Virginia],” a requirement for both subsections (A)(4) and (A)(5) of the Virginia long arm statute. See id. Plaintiffs rely on the latter part of this requirement — “derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered” — in support of their argument. See (R. Doc. 14202, p. 11). They note and TG admits that it obtained $724,800.00 in revenue from the two Venture Supply contracts. See id.; (R. Doc. 13490, p. 15 n. 18). The difference of opinion lies in whether this amount constitutes “substantial revenue.” See id. The jurisprudence demonstrates “a trend toward liberal construction of ‘substantial revenue’ provisions.” Ajax Realty Corp. v. J.F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818, 822 (4th Cir.1972). “Although percentage of total sales may be a factor to be considered, it cannot be dispositive, for a small percentage of the sales of a [corporate] giant may indeed prove substantial in an absolute sense. On the other hand, it is difficult to identify an absolute amount which ipso facto must be deemed ‘substantial.’ ” Id. In the limited jurisprudence on the issue, it has been held that revenues of $37,000 and $25,000 constituted “substantial” revenues for purposes of the Virginia long-arm statute, but that $13,955 was not substantial. See id.; compare Gordonsville Indus., Inc. v. Am. Artos Corp., 549 F.Supp. 200, 203 (W.D.Va.1982). Upon review of this jurisprudence and giving due consideration to the fact that these cases are decades old, the Court finds that TG incurred substantial revenues for purposes of subsections (A)(4) and (A)(5). Certainly $724,800 is substantial revenue when compared to $37,000 and $25,000, and although it may only represent a small percentage of TG’s total sales revenue, see (R. Doc. 13490, p. 15 n. 18), percentage is not a dispositive factor and the trend is to broadly construe the substantial revenue requirement. Further, TG or its affiliates have derived over 8.5 million dollars from its drywall sales in the United States, and its drywall has been found in thousands of homes in the United States. See (Herman Aff. Ex. 1 Amend.). Because the Court finds that personal jurisdiction exists over TG pursuant to the Virginia long-arm statute, specifically subsections (A)(4) and (A)(5), it is next necessary to address the second requirement for personal jurisdiction, whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause. 5. Due Process Clause “The Due Process Clause ‘operates to limit the power of a State to assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.’ ” Ouazzani-Chahdi, 200 Fed.Appx. at 291 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)); Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Ca., 480 U.S. 102, 109, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)(citing Kulko v. Ca. Superior Court., 436 U.S. 84, 91, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978)). A court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant is consistent with due process only when: (1) that defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing minimum contacts with the forum state; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Paz, 445 F.3d at 813 (quoting Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Corp., 253 F.3d 865, 867 (5th Cir.2001)); Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir.2010)(citing Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir.2002)); Ouazzani-Chahdi, 200 Fed.Appx. at 291 (quoting Revell, 317 F.3d at 470); Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc., 9 F.3d at 418 (citing Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154). The limits of the Due Process Clause “have been substantially relaxed over the years .... largely attributable to a fundamental transformation in the American economy.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-93, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)(internal citations omitted). The Court will now address the due process requirements in turn, beginning with minimum contacts. 6. Minimum Contacts “The ‘constitutional touchstone’ of the inquiry to determine if personal jurisdiction can be exercised is whether the defendant ‘purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum state.’ ” Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 271 (quoting Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 108-09, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987)); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154). There exist two types of minimum contacts: those that give rise to specific personal jurisdiction and those which give rise to general jurisdiction. Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir.2010) (citing Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.1994)); Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 271; Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir.2002); Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc., 9 F.3d at 418. Only specific personal jurisdiction is alleged by plaintiffs. See (R. Doc. 14209, p. 7). Specific jurisdiction exists when “ ‘the defendant has “purposefully directed” his activities at residents of the forum ... and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.’ ” Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir.2010) (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)); Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 271 (quoting Nuovo Pignone, SpA v. STORMAN ASIA M/V, 310 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir.2002)). The Court now addresses the applicable law for specific personal jurisdiction. a. Specific Personal Jurisdiction For specific personal jurisdiction to attach, “[t]he non-resident’s purposefully directed activities in the forum must be such that he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum state.” Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174). Specific personal jurisdiction requires a sufficient nexus between the non-resident’s contacts with the forum and the cause of action. Id. at 378-79 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)). A defendant who purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state invokes the benefits and protections of the forum’s laws. Id. at 379 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)). “The ‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be hauled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.” Id. (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174). The activities of a defendant are not measured by quantity, but rather quality as “[a] single act by the defendant directed at the forum state ... can be enough to confer personal jurisdiction if that act gives rise to the claim being asserted.” Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc., 9 F.3d at 419. In order for the Court to make a proper decision on specific personal jurisdiction over TG in Germano, it will place the matter in perspective by reviewing the relevant Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit jurisprudence. b. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Specific Personal Jurisdiction The Court begins its review of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on specific personal jurisdiction with the decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). World-Wide Volkswagen was a products liability case filed in Oklahoma and involved personal injuries sustained by plaintiffs while operating their vehicle, which was purchased in New York and while being driven to Arizona, was involved in an accident in Oklahoma. See id. at 288, 100 S.Ct. 559. Two of the defendants, the New York vehicle distributor and the New York vehicle dealer, objected to personal jurisdiction in the Oklahoma court. See id. at 288-89, 100 S.Ct. 559. The Supreme Court agreed with these defendants and held that personal jurisdiction was lacking, because the defendants: (1) carried on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma, (2) they closed no sales in Oklahoma, (3) they performed no services there, (4) they availed themselves of none of the privileges or benefits of Oklahoma law, (5) they did not solicit business in Oklahoma either through salespersons or advertising reasonably calculated to reach the State, and (6) they did not regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or residents or serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market. See id. at 295, 100 S.Ct. 559. The Court noted in support of its holding, “[i]n short, respondents seek to base [personal] jurisdiction on one, isolated occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New York to New York residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing through Oklahoma.” Id. During its analysis, the Court distinguished the facts before it from a situation in which “[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.” Id. at 298, 100 S.Ct. 559. This statement spawned what is now referred to as the “stream-of-commerce” doctrine, which has been applied and explained in subsequent cases. The Supreme Court next addressed specific personal jurisdiction in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). Burger King involved a suit by a Florida fast-food restaurant franchisor against a Michigan-based franchisee alleging breach of franchise obligations and trademark infringement in a Florida district court. See id. at 464-68, 105 S.Ct. 2174. With regard to specific personal jurisdiction the Court remarked, [W]here the defendant ‘deliberately’ has engaged in significant activities within a State, or has created ‘continuing obligations’ between himself and residents of the forum, he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there, and because his activities are shielded by ‘the benefits and protections’ of the forum’s laws it is presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well. Id. at 475-76, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (internal citations omitted). The Court further noted that personal jurisdiction “may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum State .... [since] it is an escapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines,” and concluded “[s]o long as a commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.” Id. at 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174. With regard to contract-related contacts with the forum, the Court stated, If the question is whether an individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum, we believe the answer is clearly that it cannot.... It is these factors-prior negotiations and contempla