Full opinion text
ORDER JOAN N. ERICKSEN, District Judge. In a Report and Recommendation dated August 15, 2012, the Honorable Janie S. Mayeron, United States Magistrate Judge, recommended that several defendants’ motions to dismiss be granted. The Court construed a motion filed by John Westley as objections to the Report and Recommendation. Michael Tilson Thomas, the City of Miami Beach, and Max Sklar responded. The Court has conducted a de novo review of the record. See D. Minn. LR 72.2(b). Based on that review, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation [Docket No. 107]. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. Defendant Michael Tilson Thomas’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) [Docket No. 6] is GRANTED. The Complaint as to Thomas is dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 2. Defendant Victoria Sigler’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 11] is GRANTED. The Complaint as to Sigler is dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 3. Defendants City of Miami Beach and Max Sklar’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.CivJP. 12(b)(2) [Docket No. 21] is GRANTED. The Complaint as to City of Miami Beach and Max Sklar is dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 4. Defendants Steven P. Kalka and Silver Hill Financial, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint and/or for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 60] is GRANTED. All claims in the Complaint against Steven P. Kalka are dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE. All claims against Silver Hill Financial pertaining to fraud in the inducement (and associated claims of breach of contract, breach of a fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment) related to Westley’s guaranty of the purchase and financing of the Property are barred under the doctrine of res judicata and are dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. Any purported claims against Silver Hill Financial under OSHA, TILA, FERA, the “Federal UCC,” the “Federal UBC,” wire and mail fraud statutes (18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 18 U.S.C. § 1343), and USERRA are dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. The remaining claims against Silver Hill Financial pertaining to “Federal Civil Rights,” RICO, the ADA, and the FCRA are dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION JANIE S. MAYERON, United States Magistrate Judge. The above matter came on before the undersigned upon Defendant Michael Til-son Thomas’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) [Docket No. 6]; Defendant Victoria Sigler’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket No, 11]; Defendant City of Miami Beach and Max Sklar’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) [Docket No. 21]; and Defendants Steven P. Kalka and Silver Hill Financial, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint and/or for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 60]. Plaintiff John D. Westley appeared pro se. Lowell J. Noteboom, Esq. and Andrew W. Davis, Esq. appeared for defendants City of Miami Beach, Max Sklar and Michael Tilson Thomas; John S. Garry, Esq. and Mark S. Dunn, Esq. appeared on behalf of defendant Victoria Sigler; and Kelly S. Hadac, Esq. appeared on behalf of defendants Steven P. Kalka and Silver Hill Financial. These motions have been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation by the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), (B) and Local Rule 72.1(c). I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff John D. Westley has brought an action against James Robert Mann, Mitchell P. Korus, Steven P. Kalka, Max Sklar, Wayne M. Pathman, Dylan Pukel, Judge Victoria Sigler, Jennifer Viciedo Ruiz, Michael Thomas Tilson, Silver Hill Financial, and the City of City of Miami Beach. According to the Complaint, all of these defendants reside in Florida. See Complaint [Docket No. 1], pp. 1-3. Westley asserted that the basis for venue in the District of Minnesota was that he permanently resides in Minnesota; the facts alleged in the Complaint “primarily occurred thru Federal Wire transfers and United States Postal Service Money Orders originating in the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court of Minnesota;” Westley has been barred from pursuing legal claims in Florida courts; “Defendants and their related agents are attempting to collect a fraudulently obtained judgment against Plaintiffs personal property located in Minnesota;” he was “unlawfully detained by Florida law authorities under the direction of Florida courts due to local public corruption, bias and prejudice designed to prevent public equal protection access sought in Florida civil courts for relief and restitution;” and “the records for the facts alleged in Complaint are stored and filed in Minnesota and kept by the State of Minnesota.” Id., p. 4. The gravamen of Westley’s complaint is that he guaranteed a loan by Silver Hill Financial to AFTEF for the purchase of property located in Miami Beach, Florida that had been bought by AFTEF from Bayview Lincoln Road LLC, and for which Silver Hill Financial took a mortgage to secure the loan. Since the purchase of the property, Westley claims that AFTEF and he have been deprived of their use of the property through the acts of all of the defendants. The particulars of the dispute, as set forth in his Complaint, are as follows: From November 2007 through January 2008, defendants Mann, Korus, Kalka and Silver Hill Financial, via emails, mailings and telephone phone calls to Westley in Minnesota, conspired to fraudulently induce Westley to personally guarantee AFTEF’s purchase of property and related deed rights for Condominium Units 270 and 800 of 605 Lincoln Road, Miami Beach, Florida (“the Property”) from Bay-view Lincoln Road, LLC by Special Warranty Deed dated January 10, 2009, which was recorded in Miami-Dade County Florida. Complaint, ¶ 7. The property was not marketable, usable or accessible in violation of “FILA, FERA, OSHA, ADA and UBC regulations.” Id. Westley had a legal and equitable interest in the Property and was damaged by the negligent acts, breaches of contract, neglect of fiduciary responsibilities, fraudulent misrepresentations and misleading acts of defendants Mann, Korus, Kalka and Silver Hill Financial in violation of federal law and regulations, who were unjustly enriched in violation of “TILA, FERA, RICO & UCC laws and Federal Mail & Wire Fraud regulations.” Id. Further, defendants Mann, Korus, Kalka and Silver Hill Financial and their representative agents required Westley and AFTEF to obtain acceptable long term tenants for the Property, and incorporated the long term rental agreement into the mortgage terms and loan closing documents provided to Westley for the Property. Id. ¶ 8. Prior to entering into the lease, defendants Mann, Korus, Kalka and Silver Hill Financial and their representative agents made negligent, false and misleading representations to Westley and the tenants regarding the Property and use of the Property to induce Westley and other tenants into signing the long term rental agreement with AFTEF, including representations that the premises had the required Certificate of Occupancy, property access or a Certificate of Use, and was rented and occupied by Sony Music Disco, Inc., pursuant to a recorded lease and the Declarations of Condominium. Id. In fact, Mann, Korus, Kalka and Silver Hill Financial and their representative agents never obtained the required Certificate of Occupancy, property access or a Certificate of Use in violation of “Federal Uniform Building Codes, OSHA commercial property regulation standards, ADA, TILA and FERA federal laws.” Id. From November 2007 through January 2008, defendants Mann, Korus, Kalka and Silver Hill Financial unjustly enriched themselves in violation of “TILA, FERA, RICO and UCC” and harmed Westley through fraudulent and misleading emails and mailings to Westley in Minnesota that provided tax records, documents and information regarding $117,000 in property fee payments for City of Miami Beach Concurrency Fees made to Senior Planner Henry Johnson in order to obtain Westley’s personal guarantee. Id., ¶ 9. After the purchase of the Property, defendants Sklar and the City of Miami Beach informed Westley that the payments were not received and Johnson was subsequently convicted of embezzlement and solicitation of bribes as a public official. Id. Mann, Korus, Kalka, Sklar, the City of Miami Beach and Silver Hill Financial negligently violated contractual, fiduciary and administrative duties causing financial harm and damage to Westley. Id. At the closing of the purchase of the Property, Westley was fraudulently induced by defendants Mann, Korus, Kalka and Silver Hill Financial to personally wire $10,000 from his Wells Fargo account in St. Paul, Minnesota to defendant Silver Hill Financial for property tax escrows, title insurance coverage, legal costs, condominium assessments, closing expenses and real estate agent fees. Id., ¶ 10. These actions violated “TILA, FERA, RICO and Federal UCC wire and mail fraud regulations.” Id. In February and March 2008, defendants City of Miami Beach, Sklar, and representative agents realized that Westley and the tenants of the Property were doing business with African Americans, Haitians and Muslims on the premises and informed Westley that the Property could not be accessed and used because the $117,000 payment, described above, had not been paid to the City of Miami Beach. Id., ¶ 11. Defendants Mann, Korus, Kalka, Sklar and the City of Miami Beach conspired for racially and religiously motivated reasons to deny Westley his First Amendment freedom of association rights to employ and conduct business on the Property with African Americans, Haitians and Muslims and thereby, violated “RICO, FILA, FERA, Federal Civil Right protections and UCC regulations.” Id. The Property, for which the loan was personally guaranteed by Westley, included access and use of the eighth floor and rooftop of the building and sidewalk frontage on the Property. Id., ¶ 12. However, these sites were unjustly taken away and leased by defendants Sklar and the City of Miami Beach and their representative agents to third parties in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. Defendants Mann, Korus, Kalka, Sklar and the City of Miami Beach retaliated against Westley for providing information and ongoing cooperation to Federal Department of Justice officials and FBI agents regarding Miami Beach public corruption and illegal acts by local banks, real estate interests and law firms. Id. From January 2008 through September 2010, defendants Thomas and Korus complained to defendants Sklar and the City of Miami Beach about Muslims, Haitians and African Americans accessing and using the Property. Id., ¶ 13. Defendants Sklar, City of Miami Beach, Thomas and their representative agents had joint business and financial arrangements in the adjoining City Center New World Symphony property. Id. Due to racial prejudice and religious bigotry, defendants Sklar, Korus, City of Miami Beach, Thomas and their representative agents wanted to remove the Muslims, Haitians and the African Americans from the Property as they were involved in Westley’s special events and the tenants’ broadcasting shows, and routinely worked on the premises, which directly competed with defendants Thomas, the City of Miami Beach and their representative agents for local events and venue bookings. Id. Due to racial bigotry and religious prejudice, defendants Sklar, the City of Miami Beach, Thomas and their representative agents believed and claimed that Westley’s minority, African American, Haitian, and Muslim business associates devalued the surrounding City Center and New World Symphony property. Id. Beginning in February 2008, Westley corresponded with defendants Mann, Korus, Kalka, Silver Hill Financial, Sklar and the City of Miami Beach requesting that the ADA access, life, safety and fire protection deficiencies for the Property be immediately brought into compliance with all federal OSHA standards, ADA access laws, Uniform Building Codes, and fire, life and safety regulations. Id., ¶ 14. These defendants were non-responsive to this correspondence “in violation of TILA, FERA, OSHA, ADA and UCC regulations and contractual, fiduciary and administrative professional obligations.” Id. Mann informed Westley that he and defendant Korus were protected from local liability of the enforcement of federal laws and regulations because they were having sexual relations with Miami Dade County judges, court officers and government officials. Id. Korus further claimed to have special class protections against the enforcement of federal laws and regulations based on the protection provided by a local banking real estate syndicate and the co-campaign manager of the City of Miami Beach May- or, Matti Bower. Id. In addition, defendants Mann, Korus, Kalka, Silver Hill Financial, Sklar and the City of Miami Beach refused to comply with the regulations to further prevent property access and association with Westley’s African American, Haitian and Muslim business associates, thereby tortuously interfering with Westley’s business interests and unjustly enriching themselves in violation of “Federal Civil Rights protections, TILA, FERA, OSHA, RICO, UCC and Federal Mail Wire fraud regulations.” Id. From May 2008 through September 2010, Westley and his related business interests made several workplace safety inquiries and life, safety and public health complaints. Id., ¶ 15. From July through September 2008, AFTEF and Westley paid defendants Pukel and Pathman retainers through interstate commerce transactions and United States Postal Service mailings, in order to cure the federal UBC, OSHA and ADA deficiencies in the Property and to obtain acknowledgement of the $117,000 payment to City of Miami Senior Planner Johnson. Id. Defendants Pathman, Pukel, Sklar and the City of Miami Beach then conspired to obstruct ongoing federal law enforcement investigations by discouraging and preventing Westley and his related business interests from cooperating with DOJ officials and FBI agents, and conspired to extort additional fees and further unjust enrichment payments from Westley and AFTEF. Id. In October 2008, Westley and AFTEF, through defendant Pukel, commenced a legal action in Miami Dade Circuit Court before defendant Sigler to obtain compliance with federal OSHA workplace laws, ADA access requirements, fire, life and safety codes and public health regulations. Id., ¶ 16. Defendants Sigler, Sklar, Path-man and the City of Miami Beach caused Westley monetary harm by conspiring to: (1) intimidate and harass Westley’s legal representation; (2) deny him access to public courts; (3) willfully prevent access to places of employment due to racial bigotry and religious prejudices; (4) endanger the life, safety and welfare of Westley and African American, Haitian and Muslim associates; (5) cause the breach of contracts and fiduciary responsibilities; and (6) obstruct justice by discouraging further cooperation with federal authorities and ongoing criminal investigations. Id. On November 4, 2008, defendants Sklar and the City of Miami Beach ordered local police, acting as “organized muscle” on their behalf and on the behalf of defendants Korus, Mann, Kalka and Silver Hill Financial, to forcibly break up an assembly at the Property in which Westley was participating and shut down the live broadcasts from the Property exposing governmental corruption, real estate banking fraud and local racism. Id., ¶ 17. Westley was physically removed from the property. Id. Based on these facts, defendants Sklar, City of Miami Beach, Mann, Korus, Path-man, and Sigler conspired to violate Westley’s rights to freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of assembly, and their actions caused monetary damage to Westley. Id. From March 2008 through September 2010, to mitigate damages and in the interests of the public welfare and life safety, Westley, AFTEF, and tenants and were forced to contribute over $400,000, including the money and time required to comply with the Uniform Building Code, ADA access requirements, OSHA standards and Certificates of Occupancy and Certificates of Use. Id., ¶ 18. Once Westley complied with these standards, defendants Sklar, City of Miami Beach, Korus, Ruiz, and Thomas issued building permits to third parties that authorized and resulted in the destruction of the improvements, which resulted in the illegal seizure of private property without just compensation in violation of his Fifth Amendment protections and in violation of “RICO statutes, ADA law and OSHA whistleblower protections.” Id. Defendants Korus, Ruiz and their representative agents had armed guards placed on the Property preventing Westley from having access to the Property, forcing him to obtain a court order in June 2010, at a great expense to himself, in order to regain access. Id., ¶ 19. Defendants Pukel, Ruiz, Sklar, Sigler, the City of Miami Beach, and their agents then conspired to deny further access to civil courts by Westley and his related business interests, causing him financial damage. Id. From January 2011 to the present, defendants Pukel, Ruiz, Sklar, Sigler, and the City of Miami Beach conspired to deny access to Westley, AFTEF and minority associates legal claims in local civil courts in order to obstruct justice and to cover up public corruption and their personal RICO liability exposure. Id., ¶ 20. Additionally, defendants Pukel, Ruiz, Sklar, Sigler, and the City of Miami Beach, and their representative agents, have repeatedly refused to return documents, records, plans and files requested from Westley by federal law enforcement authorities. Id. Further, defendants Ruiz, Sklar, Sigler, and the City of Miami Beach, and their representative agents, tortuously interfered in Westley’s representation by attorney, George M. Tavares, by sabotaging Tavares’s employment while in medical treatment. Id. Due to defendants’ illegal acts, Westley was displaced from his place of employment and denied access to the Property. This conduct violated “Civil Rights, OSHA, TILA, RICO, USERRA, and OSHA Federal law and regulation[s].” Id. Without access to the Property, weddings, broadcast shows and other fundraising events could not be held at the Property, resulting in monetary damages. Id. ¶ 21. As the result of Defendants Mann, Korus, Kalka, Silver Hill Financial, Sklar and the City of Miami Beach’s misrepresentations regarding the existence of certificates of occupancy and use for the premises; their negligence and endangerment preventing safe access and use of the Property; and all defendants’ racial bias and religiously discriminatory acts, Westley and his related business interests suffered financial loss and damage to reputation. Id. ¶22. In addition, “[defendants’ conspiracy and violations of Federal Civil Rights protections, OSHA, UBC fire[,] life [and] safety protections, ADA law, RICO statutes caused Plaintiff and related business interests financial loss and damage to reputations.” Id. Finally, Westley claimed that his personal wire information, financial and banking records provided to defendants Mann, Korus, Kalka, and Silver Hill Financial, were used for identity theft, false reporting, and credit fraud in violation of Federal Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and Federal Wire Fraud statutes. Id. ¶ 23. Westley seeks monetary damages from all defendants. Id., Request for Relief. This case comes before the Court on motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by defendants Thomas, Sigler, the City of Miami Beach, Sklar and Kalka for lack of personal jurisdiction; and by defendant Silver Hill Financial on its Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and its Rule 56 motion for summary judgment for failure to state a claim against it as a matter of law. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may move to dismiss claims for lack of jurisdiction over the person. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). To defeat a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the nonmoving party need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. See K-V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach & CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir.2011) (citation omitted); see also Pecoraro v. Sky Ranch for Boys, Inc., 340 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir.2003) (citing Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq Telecomm. (PTE), Ltd., 89 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir.1996)). For the purposes of a prima facie showing, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Pecoraro, 340 F.3d at 561 (citing Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc., 89 F.3d at 522). In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), a court may consider materials outside of the pleadings. See Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 543 (8th Cir.1998); see also K-V Pharm. Co., 648 F.3d at 592 (“Although the evidentiary showing required at the prima facie stage is minimal, the showing must be tested, not by the pleadings alone, but by the affidavits and exhibits supporting or opposing the motion.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The party seeking to establish the court’s in personam jurisdiction carries the burden of proof, and the burden does not shift to the party challenging jurisdiction.” Epps v. Stewart Inform. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir.2003) (citations omitted). To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), litigants must properly plead their claims under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and meet the principles articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This pleading requirement does not require detailed factual allegations. Martin v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 710 F.Supp.2d 875, 886 (D.Minn.2010) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). On the other hand, a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Thus, to “survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). As the Supreme Court explained in Iqbal: Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. [Iqbal v. Hasty ] 490 F.3d [143] at 157-158 [ (2d Cir.2007) ]. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50. Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam). Nevertheless, “‘[t]hough pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.’ ” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004); see also Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.1985) (rejecting “merely general and conclusory allegations,” and requiring that a “pro se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its conclusions.”). When we say that a pro se complaint should be given liberal construction, we mean that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. That is quite different, however, from requiring the district court to assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint. Stone, 364 F.3d at 915. Consequently, a court “will not supply additional facts, nor will [it] construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded.” Id. (quoting Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir.1989)). Summary judgment under Rule 56 is proper if, drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Unigroup, Inc. v. O’Rourke Storage & Transfer Co., 980 F.2d 1217, 1219 (8th Cir.1992). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that the material facts in the case are undisputed. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dep’t of Fire & Safety Servs., 224 F.3d 735, 738 (8th Cir.2000). If the moving party has carried its burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Krenik v. County of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir.1995). “The nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must show through the presentation of admissible evidence that specific facts exist creating a genuine issue for trial.” Minn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Swenke, 2003 WL 21521755, at *1 (D.Minn. July 2, 2003) (citations omitted). The non-moving party “must substantiate his allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in [their] favor based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” Wilson v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 62 F.3d 237, 241 (8th Cir.1995). Summary judgment is appropriate where the material facts are not in dispute, and the court need only apply the law to the facts in the record. See Eisenrich v. Minneapolis Retail Meat Cutters, 282 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1080-81 (D.Minn.2003) (citing Oldham v. West, 47 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir.1995)). III. ANALYSIS A. Personal Jurisdiction under Minnesota’s Long-Arm Statute In deciding whether personal jurisdiction exists in this suit, this Court must determine if the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate under Minnesota’s long-arm statute and whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction complies with the requirements of due process. See Stanton v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 340 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir.2003) (citation omitted). Minnesota’s long-arm statute, in pertinent part, provides: a court of this state with jurisdiction of the subject matter may exercise personal jurisdiction over any foreign corporation or any nonresident individual, or the individual’s personal representative, in the same manner as if it were a domestic corporation or the individual were a resident of this state. This section applies if, in person or through an agent, the foreign corporation or nonresident individual: (1) owns, uses, or possesses any real or personal property situated in this state; or (2) transacts any business within the state; or (3) commits any act in Minnesota causing injury or property damage; or (4) commits any act outside Minnesota causing injury or property damage in Minnesota, subject to the following exceptions when no jurisdiction shall be found: (i) Minnesota has no substantial interest in providing a forum; or (ii) the burden placed on the defendant by being brought under the state’s jurisdiction would violate fairness and substantial justice. Minn. Stat. § 543.19, Subd. 1. However, “because the Minnesota long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the maximum limit consistent with due process, a court in Minnesota need only evaluate whether the requirements of due process are satisfied.” MGR, Inc. v. Resolution Graphic Resources, Inc., No. Civ. 03-3247 (DWF/SRN), 2003 WL 22161585, at *2 (D.Minn. Sep. 15, 2003) (citing Weasels, Arnold & Henderson v. Nat’l Med. Waste, Inc., 65 F.3d 1427, 1431 (8th Cir.1995)); see also St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Lifecare Intern., Inc., 250 F.3d 587, 591 (8th Cir.2001) (citing same); AGinformationData, LLC v. Integrated Solutions Grp., Inc., NO. CIV. 11-3673 (DWF/JSM), 2012 WL 1517237, at *2 (D.Minn. April 30, 2012) (citing same). Due process requires that a defendant have the necessary “minimum contacts” with a forum state such that “maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (citations omitted). Contacts with the forum state must be “more than random, fortuitous, or attenuated, such that summoning the defendant would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Pecoraro, 340 F.3d at 561. “These ‘contacts’ are sufficient when ‘the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that it should reasonably anticipate being hauled into court there,’ and the ‘reasonable anticipation’ requirement is satisfied if the defendant has engaged in some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Travel Tags, Inc. v. Digital Replay, Inc., No. Civ. 02-4276 (MJD/JGL), 2003 WL 22145272, at *3 (D.Minn. Sept. 15, 2003) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); Worldr-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)). “Minimum contacts must exist either at the time the cause of action arose, the time the suit is filed, or within a reasonable period of time immediately prior to the filing of the lawsuit.” Pecoraro, 340 F.3d at 562. The Eighth Circuit has developed the following test for analyzing whether sufficient minimum contacts exist for personal jurisdiction: (1) the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of the contacts; (3) the relationship of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of [the forum state] in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience or inconvenience to the parties. K-V Pharm. Co., 648 F.3d at 592 (quoting Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir.2010)). While the first three factors are of primary importance, and the last two factors are secondary, courts must look at look at all of the factors and the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether personal jurisdiction exists. Id. at 592-93; see also Minn. Min. and Mfg. Co. v. Nippon Carbide Indus. Co., Inc., 63 F.3d 694, 697 (8th Cir.1995) (citations omitted). The third factor differentiates between specific and general jurisdiction. See Digi-Tel, 89 F.3d at 523 n. 4; see also Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Food Movers Intern., Inc., 607 F.3d 515, 518 (8th Cir.2010) (“Personal jurisdiction may be established by general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction, and the third factor-relation of the cause of action to the eontacts-distinguishes between the two.”) (citation omitted). Specific jurisdiction is proper “only if the injury giving rise to the lawsuit occurred within or had some connection to the forum state, meaning that the defendant purposely directed its activities at the forum state and the claim arose out of or relates to those activities.” Johnson, 614 F.3d at 795 (citing Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 586 (8th Cir.2008), citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)); see also Epps, 327 F.3d at 648 (citations omitted) (“When a cause of action arises out of or is related to a defendant’s contacts with the forum state, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is one of specific jurisdiction.”). Conversely, “[g]eneral jurisdiction exists where the contacts between the defendant and the forum state are continuous and systematic even if there is no relationship between the contacts and the cause of action.” Johnson v. Woodcock, 444 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir.2006) (quotation omitted); see also Johnson, 614 F.3d at 794 (quoting Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir.2004)) (“A court obtains general jurisdiction ‘against a defendant who has “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state, even if the injuries at issue in the lawsuit did not arise out of the defendant’s activities directed at the forum.’ ”). The Court now applies these principles to the motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by defendants Thomas, Sigler, the City of Miami Beach, Sklar and Kalka. B. Defendant Michael Tilson Thomas’s Motion to Dismiss Defendant Thomas is the Music Director of the San Francisco Symphony, located in San Francisco, California, as well as the Founder and Artistic Director of the New World Symphony, America’s Orchestral Academy, in Miami Beach, Florida. See Thomas Deck, ¶¶ 1, 2. Thomas is a permanent resident of and domiciled in the State of Florida. Id., ¶ 3. Thomas attested that he had never heard of Westley until learning of the Complaint, had not visited Minnesota in approximately twenty years, and had no contact with Minnesota at the time of the alleged conduct described in this lawsuit, or at the time this lawsuit was filed in late December 2011. Id., ¶¶ 4, 5. On these facts, Thomas argued that no general jurisdiction exists because he has had no contacts in Minnesota, and the only allegations against him in the Complaint relate to conduct that did not occur in Minnesota, thereby negating any finding of specific jurisdiction. See Thomas’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) [Docket No. 8], pp. 7-8. Westley countered that since 2007, Thomas has had continuous ongoing business relationships in Minnesota sufficient for a finding a personal jurisdiction, via the sale of his products through Minnesota retailers. See Plaintiff Response Memorandum to Defendant Michael Thomas Til-son Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 40], pp. 5-6; see also Unsworn Declaration of Plaintiff Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1746 [Docket No. 41], ¶ 6 (“I have personally witnessed Defendant Tilson’s and Miami City Center New World Symphony products being marketed and sold within Minnesota retail outlets within this forum.”). In reply, Thomas submitted that he has not been involved in the marketing, distribution, or retail sale of New World Symphony products or any other music products in Minnesota. Defendants’ Joint Reply Memorandum in Support of Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint (“Thomas/CMB/Sklar Reply”) [Docket No. 47], p. 4; Declaration of Richard Koenigsberg (“Koenigsberg Decl.”) [Docket No. 48], ¶ 4. According to Koenigsberg: Thomas does not receive income directly from retail sales within Minnesota of New World Symphony products or other orchestral products with which he is associated. Tilson Thomas receives an advance fee as part of his contract with a given record label. Income including any royalties received by Tilson Thomas is provided by the record label pursuant to record label contracts, and is not attributable to retail sales in any given state. Such income is attributable to the state in which the musical recording is made. See Koenigsberg Decl. ¶ 5. In any event, Thomas asserted that Westley is attempting to assert general jurisdiction under a “stream of commerce” theory that has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit. See Thomas/CMB/Sklar Reply, pp. 5-7 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011); Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F.3d 589 (8th Cir.2011)). In analyzing the five factors discussed in K-V Pharm. Co., the Court finds that Westley has not met his burden of making a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. First, Thomas has had no direct contact with Minnesota. He is a music and artistic director in San Francisco and in Miami Beach. Further, he is a resident of Florida, has not been to Minnesota for many years, and had no direct contact with Minnesota during the period of the operative facts of the Complaint or as the date it was filed. The fact that a record label may distribute in many states, including Minnesota, New World Symphony products (for which Thomas is the conductor) or other orchestral products, is exactly the type of “random,” “fortuitous,” and “attenuated” contacts that are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Thomas. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174. As to the third factor, the Court finds that there is no specific jurisdiction over Thomas given there are no allegations that Westley’s claims against him arise out of or are related to Minnesota. See Johnson, 614 F.3d at 795. The factual basis of the claims against Thomas are that because of his alleged bigotry, he and others attempted to preclude Westley from having access to and using the Property located in Miami Beach, and destroyed improvements made to the Property. See Complaint, ¶¶ 13, 18. These alleged actions arose in Florida, and the resulting harm is to or from the denial of the use of the Property located in Florida. In short, none of the allegations against Thomas have anything to do with Minnesota. As for general jurisdiction, the Court notes, “[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile .... ” Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2853. As stated previously, Westley relies on Thomas selling his music through retail stores in Minnesota. Here, the evidence is that Thomas has no involvement in the marketing, distribution, or retail sale of New World Symphony products or any other music products within Minnesota. See Koenigsberg Deck, ¶ 4. Thomas has a contract with a record label that distributes the music for sale. Id., ¶ 5. Even assuming that Thomas had an expectation that the record label would distribute his music to many states, including Minnesota, that connection alone is an insufficient basis to support a finding of general jurisdiction. As the Eighth Circuit has explained: [W]e have been willing to recognize a variant of “stream-of-commerce” jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer that “ ‘pours its products’ into a regional distributor with the expectation that the distributor will penetrate a discrete, multi-State trade area,” Vandelune v. FB Elevator Components Unlimited, 148 F.3d 943, 948 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting Barone [v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co.], 25 F.3d [610] at 615 [ (8th Cir.1994) ]). Because Viasystems’ causes of action do not arise out of the distribution of St. Georgen’s products in Missouri, there is no dispute that Viasystems must use this “stream of commerce” theory to support general, rather than specific, jurisdiction. However, when our circuit’s decision in Bar-one established the variant of “stream-of-commerce” jurisdiction on which Via-systems now seeks to rely, we were careful to note that “stream of commerce” jurisdiction is “a type of specific jurisdiction (as opposed to general jurisdiction).” Barone, 25 F.3d at 612. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently clarified that placing products in “the stream of commerce” is “[a] connection so limited between the forum and the foreign corporation [that it] is an inadequate basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction.” Goodyear, — U.S. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 2851, 180 L.Ed.2d at 803. The Court rejected “the sprawling view of general jurisdiction” that would make “any substantial manufacturer or seller of goods ... amenable to suit, on any claim for relief, wherever its products are distributed.” Id. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 2856, 180 L.Ed.2d at 809. Our precedent and the Supreme Court’s decision in Goodyear make clear that even if a foreign corporation “ ‘pours its products’ into a regional distributor with the expectation that the distributor will penetrate a discrete, multi-State trade area,” Vandelune, 148 F.3d at 948 (quoting Barone, 25 F.3d at 615), this connection alone is “so limited” that it “is an inadequate basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction.” See Goodyear, — U.S. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 2851, 180 L.Ed.2d at 803. See Viasystems, Inc., 646 F.3d at 597. Thus, the mere distribution of music for sale through a record label is an insufficient basis for this Court to find that general jurisdiction exists over Thomas in Minnesota. As to the secondary factors relating to jurisdiction, while in some circumstances, “Minnesota has an obvious interest in providing a local forum in which its residents may litigate claims against nonresidents,” Northrup King Co. v. Compania Productora Semillas Algodoneras Selectas, S.A., 51 F.3d 1383, 1389 (8th Cir.1995), Minnesota has little interest in providing its citizens a forum for a dispute that has no connection to the state. Further, although witnesses reside in both Minnesota and Florida, where the events central to the case against Thomas deal with the Florida Property and its use, it would clearly be inconvenient to drag a Florida defendant and Florida witnesses to Minnesota. Thus, the fourth and fifth factors bearing on the determination of personal jurisdiction do not weigh in favor of jurisdiction in Minnesota. Based on this Court’s examination of the factors for jurisdiction and the totality of the circumstances, it finds that Thomas’s motion to dismiss for a lack of personal jurisdiction should be granted and the Complaint against Thomas should be dismissed without prejudice. C. Defendant Victoria Sigler’s Motion to Dismiss Defendant Judge Sigler is presently a seated judge for the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Circuit Court in and for MiamiDade County, Florida. See Sigler Decl., ¶ 1. Judge Sigler presided over All for Earth Foundation, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, Local Case No.2008-66434-CA-01/ State Case No. 13-2008-CA-066434-0000-01, and 605 Lincoln Rd Office Condo Assn., Inc. v. All for Earth Foundation, Local Case No.2009-73005-CA-01/State Case No. 13-2009-CA-073005-0000-01. Id., ¶ 2. Judge Sigler has not visited Minnesota nor had any contact with Minnesota at the time of the alleged conduct described in this lawsuit, or at the time this lawsuit was filed in late December, 2011. Id., ¶ 3. Judge Sigler argued that Westley’s claims against her are barred under the doctrine of judicial immunity given that he is suing her based on her actions as a judge. See Memorandum of Law In Support Of Defendant Victoria Sigler’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 33], pp. 5-6. In addition, Judge Sigler contended that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over her since she is a judge seated in Miami-Dade County, Florida; she had no contacts with Minnesota, either at the time of the conduct alleged in the Complaint or at the time the suit was filed in December of 2011; and the alleged actions by her occurred in Florida, with no nexus to Minnesota. Id. at pp. 7-8. Westley asserted that under the Due Process Clause, jurisdiction is appropriate, as Judge Sigler has had continuous ongoing contacts with AFTEF and him throughout the litigation in the MiamiDade County court system. See Plaintiff Response Memorandum to Defendant Victoria Sigler Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 44], p. 9. In addition, Westley argued that since 2008, the Miami-Dade County Court case fees for matters before Judge Sigler were billed to and paid from this forum by AFTEF and him and therefore, she had an ongoing quantifiable employment benefit from Westley’s court cases. Id. pp. 7-9. Further, Westley claimed that Judge Sigler and her representative agents conspired to obtain payments from him and AFTEF in this forum and then refused to provide purchased public services and records to protect her personal interests and relationships. Id., p. 9. Westley also asserted that jurisdiction in Minnesota is appropriate because Minnesota contains the majority of documents and records in this case. Id. Westley argued that general jurisdiction exists because Judge Sigler conducted unspecified business and public affairs in Minnesota; and specific jurisdiction exists as Judge Sigler and representative agents had direct contacts with AFTEF and Westley in this forum relating to the cause of action in this case. Id., p. 10. Judge Sigler replied that she has nothing to do with the payment of court fees and costs, which are handled by the Miami-Dade County Clerk of Court. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Victoria Sigler’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 46], pp. 2-3. As a starting point, “[m]inimum contacts are ‘defined by the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, not by the defendant’s contacts with residents of the forum.’” Telex Communications, Inc. v. Sanomed Medizintechnik, GmbH, No. Civ. 02-298 ADM/AJB, 2002 WL 31398725, at *5 (D.Minn. Oct. 22, 2002) (citing West American Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 676, 679 (Minn.1983), citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-55, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)) (emphasis in original); see also Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651, 655 (8th Cir.1982) (finding that defendant’s contacts with the forum state are relevant for personal jurisdiction, not defendant’s contacts with a resident). Consequently, the fact that Westley, a Minnesota resident, paid filing fees to a court in Florida where Judge Sigler is seated and she presided over cases involving Westley, does not amount to contacts with Minnesota. Further, the fact that the majority of documents and records in this case may be housed in Minnesota has nothing to do with Judge Sigler’s contacts with Minnesota. Thus, the Court finds that Judge Sigler had no contacts with Minnesota. While Westley argued that specific jurisdiction exists because Judge Sigler and her representative agents had direct contacts with AFTEF and Westley in this forum relating to the cause of action in this case, the Complaint says otherwise. The only allegations in the Complaint regarding Judge Sigler’s conduct are as a judge in Florida concerning the Florida Property. See Complaint, ¶¶ 16, 17, 19-20. As such, the Court finds that the requirements for specific jurisdiction are not met. Likewise, Westley cannot meet his burden to show that general jurisdiction exists as to Judge Sigler based on unsubstantiated and conclusory assertions that she conducted unspecified business and public affairs in the State of Minnesota. The only competent evidence before the Court is that Judge Sigler has had no contact with Minnesota, and therefore, a finding of general jurisdiction is not appropriate. With regards to the secondary factors, for the same reasons articulated by this Court in connection with Thomas’s motion to dismiss, neither factor weighs in Westley’s favor. In summary, based on this Court’s examination of the factors for personal jurisdiction and the totality of the circumstances, it finds that Judge Sigler’s motion to dismiss for a lack of personal jurisdiction should be granted and the Complaint against Judge Sigler should be dismissed without prejudice. D. Defendant City of Miami Beach and Max Sklar’s Motion to Dismiss The City of Miami Beach is a municipality located in Miami-Dade County, State of Florida. See Unsworn Declaration of Richard Lorber Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 [Docket No. 24] (“Lorber Deck”), ¶ 3. Defendant Sklar was at all times material to the Complaint, the Tourism & Cultural Development Director for the City of Miami Beach. See Sklar Deck, ¶ 2. Sklar attested that he is a permanent resident of and is domiciled in Florida, he has never personally visited Minnesota, and he had no contact with Minnesota at the time of the alleged conduct described in the Complaint, or at the time this lawsuit was filed in December 2011. Id, ¶¶ 3-5. Both the City of Miami Beach and Sklar argued that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them on the basis that they have had no contacts with Minnesota. See Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(B)(2) [Docket No. 23], pp. 7-8. They also asserted that Minnesota has little interest in providing a forum for the claims against them, where the acts at issue occurred in Florida and it would be burdensome for a municipality to have to defend this action in Minnesota. Id., p. 8. Westley opposed the motion, contending that personal jurisdiction over the City of Miami Beach and Sklar was appropriate because while in ownership and possession of the Property from 2008-2010, Westley and AFTEF received Miami Beach and Dade County Property Tax notices and levies in Minnesota, which were paid from Minnesota, and that additional payments were billed to and made from Minnesota to the City of Miami Beach for building permits, inspections and fees. See Plaintiff Response Memorandum to Defendants Max Sklar & City Of Miami Beach Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 45], pp. 6-7; Westley Deck, ¶ 2; Unsworn Declaration of Charles Ibanez Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1746 [Docket No. 42] (“Ibanez Miami/Sklar Deck”), ¶ 2; Unsworn Declaration of Duncan Ross Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1746 [Docket No. 43] (“Ross Deck”), ¶ 2. In addition, Westley asserted in his memorandum that from 2008 to present, Sklar, the City of Miami Beach and Thomas have maintained a public-private business partnership at the City Center New World Symphony property, which is used to promote and sell New World Symphony and Thomas’s products sold through Minnesota-based retailers and outlets. Id., p. 6. As a result, because Sklar and the City of Miami Beach are profiting from this business in Minnesota, and they have had continuous, ongoing, and substantial business relationships with Minnesota retailers, their contact with Minnesota is continuous and systematic. Id., pp. 8-10. Further, Westley argued that because of Sklar and the City of Miami Beach’s actions, he has been subjected to an adverse personal guarantor deficiency judgment that has negatively affected his credit reports within Minnesota. Id., pp. 6, 10. Westley also claimed that Sklar, as Tourism Development Director for the City of Miami Beach, markets and provides information directly to travel agents within Minnesota. Id., p. 8. In their reply, Sklar and the City of Miami Beach asserted that the declarations submitted by Westley regarding unspecified “payments and correspondence” are deficient as an evidentiary matter, and Westley cannot meet his burden of proof to establish this Court’s personal jurisdiction over them. See Thomas/CMB/Sklar Reply, p. 8. However, even if the allegations were true, Sklar and the City of Miami Beach maintained that isolated and sporadic correspondence and other communications between them and Westley, located in Minnesota, are insufficient to establish that they purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Minnesota. Id., pp. 9-10. As to the assertions that Sklar and the City of Miami Beach are conducting business in Minnesota, they claimed that Westley’s bald assertions are false, have no evidentiary support, and they are devoid of any detail that would allow the Court to assess the nature, quality, or frequency of the contacts. Id., p. 11. They also claimed that any retail stream of commerce theory to establish general jurisdiction fails for the same reasons as argued in support of Thomas’s motion to dismiss, and that Sklar’s alleged provision of information to travel agents in Minnesota does not amount to the requisite continuous and systematic general business contacts necessary for a finding of general jurisdiction. Id., pp. 11-12. Sklar and the City of Miami Beach reiterated the burden of having to defend this case in Minnesota, located over 3000 miles away from their domicile. Id., p. 12. Based on the record before this Court, it finds that neither Sklar nor the City of Miami Beach have any direct connection to Minnesota. As a general matter, to the extent that Sklar and the City of Miami Beach sent mail to Westley or communicated with him by telephone, “ ‘[cjontact by phone or mail is insufficient to justify exercise of personal jurisdiction under the due process clause.’ ” Woodcock, 444 F.3d at 956 (quoting Porter v. Berall, 293 F.3d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir.2002)); see also Digi-Tel, 89 F.3d at 523 (“Although letters and faxes may be used to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction, they do not themselves establish jurisdiction.”); Toro Co. v. Advanced Sensor Tech., No. 08-248 (DSD/SRN), 2008 WL 2564336, at *3 (D.Minn. June 25, 2008) (finding that even “relatively large” amounts of electronic communication, without more, does not establish jurisdiction). Moreover, in this case, the correspondence, mailed payments and other communications all dealt with the Florida Property and had nothing to do with Minnesota, except that the owner of the property is a Minnesota non-profit organization and the guarantor of the loan for the purchase of the Property is a Minnesota resident. This Court finds that such contacts are not germane to whether this Court has personal jurisdiction over Sklar and the City of Miami Beach. Further, even if this Court accepted Westle/s assertions that because of Sklar and the City of Miami Beach’s actions in Florida, a judgment was obtained against him in a Florida Court that negatively affected his credit reports within Minnesota, such an effect does not amount to the type of contact with Minnesota required for personal jurisdiction. It is the intentional contact with the forum state and not the incidental effect of an action outside the state that is relevant to this determination. See Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A. v. Lowe’s Companies Inc., No. CIV. 01-1548 (PAM/JGL), 2002 WL 534888, at *2 (D.Minn. March 29, 2002) (finding that “it is clear that Lowe’s did not direct any actions toward Minnesota and therefore could not have intended to cause harm in Minnesota.... Wells Fargo overlooks the requirement that, in order for personal jurisdiction to lie, the nonresident defendant must have purposely directed activities toward the forum state.”) (citing Oriental Trading Co. v. Firetti, 236 F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir.2001)). The balance of the Complaint alleged that Sklar and the City of Miami Beach conspired, for racially and religiously motivated reasons, to deny Westley’s First Amendment freedom of association right to employ and conduct business on the Property; took away his access and use of the eighth floor and rooftop of the building and sidewalk frontage on the Property; had communications with Westley regarding the need to bring the Property into compliance with state and federal regulations; attempted to prevent Westley from having access to the Property; attempted to obstruct a federal investigation; conspired to deny him access to Florida courts; used police to break up an assembly at the Property; issued building permits to third parties that authorized and resulted in the destruction of the improvements made to the Property; and precluded fundraisers from taking place on the Property. See Complaint, ¶¶ 11,12,14-21. All of these alleged activities bear on the Property located in Florida and actions taken in Florida that resulted in alleged harm to Westley related to this Florida Property. None of them relate to Minnesota. On these “facts,” the Court finds that specific jurisdiction over Sklar and the City of Miami Beach in Minnesota is lacking. As to general jurisdiction, as this Court determined with regards to Thomas, Westley has provided no evidence that Sklar or the City of Miami Beach took affirmative actions to market or sell music in Minnesota, and jurisdiction cannot be premised on a “stream of commerce” theory. In addition, despite Westley’s unsubstantiated allegation that Sklar provides information to travel agencies in Minnesota, this fact, even if true, cannot establish general personal jurisdiction over Sklar because there is no factual basis to conclude that Sklar’s domicile was Minnesota or that Sklar or his employer, the City of Miami Beach, could be “fairly regarded as at home” in Minnesota. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2846 at 2853-54, 2855-57; see generally, Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Maples Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir.1996) (“Simple commercial contacts, unrelated to [plaintiff]’s claims are insufficient to establish [general] personal jurisdiction.”). Finally, there is no evidence before the Court that either Sklar or the City of Miami Beach maintain any presence in Minnesota or that they are authorized to do business in Minnesota; there is no evidence that they have agents or employees in Minnesota or for that matter have any connection to Minnesota; there is no evidence of any contractual relationship between these defendants and the travel agencies; there is no evidence that these defendants have any control over what the travel agents in Minnesota do with the information provided to them; and there is no evidence that the marketing information was directed at Minnesota tourists, as opposed to being a part of nation-wide advertising. See Elayyan v. Sol Melia, SA 571 F.Supp.2d 886, 899 (N.D.Ind.2008) (citing Szakacs v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., 644 F.Supp. 1121, 1124-25 (N.D.Ind.1986)) (“General jurisdiction cannot be based on nationwide advertising alone.”). In other words, the “occasional acts” of providing information to independent travel agents in Minnesota may be sufficient to render Sklar or the City of Miami Beach answerable in Minnesota to actions relating to these actions, but it is not sufficient to make them answerable “to matters unrelated to the forum connections.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A, 131 S.Ct. 2846 at 2853 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318, 66 S.Ct. 154). Neither Sklar nor the City of Miami Beach could reasonably have anticipated being haled into court in Minnesota based on the fact that information regarding the City of Miami Beach is provided to Minnesota travel agents. Such actions do not amount to continuous or systematic contacts necessary for a finding of general jurisdiction. As to the secondary factors, for the reasons previously stated, neither weigh in favor of personal jurisdiction. For all of these reasons, this Court reaches the inescapable conclusion that Sklar and the City of Miami Beach’s motion to dismiss for a lack of personal jur