Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RICHARD D. ROGERS, District Judge. This order decides motions to dismiss filed in two eases which have been consolidated and assigned to this court. Both cases are brought by the National Credit Union Administration Board and assert violations of federal and state securities statutes involving the sale of residential mortgage-backed securities certificates. I. NCUAB v. RBS Securities, et al., Case No. 11-2340 A. Introduction The complaint in this case involves 29 residential mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) certificates. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 8 and Table 1 at pp. 3-6. It alleges violations of § 11 and § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 111 (a)(2), and Article 5 of the Kansas Uniform Securities Act, K.S.A. 17-12a509. Plaintiff is suing in its capacity as the liquidating agent of the U.S. Central Federal Credit Union (“U.S. Central”). Plaintiff is the managing authority of the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) which is an independent agency of the United States Government charged with regulating federal credit unions. According to the complaint, U.S. Central was a federally-chartered corporate credit union. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 12. Prior to being placed into conservatorship by plaintiff on March 20, 2009, U.S. Central was the largest corporate credit union in the United States. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. On October 1, 2010 plaintiff placed U.S. Central into involuntary liquidation. Id. at ¶ 14. As liquidating agent, plaintiff succeeded to the rights, titles, powers and privileges of U.S. Central and may sue on its behalf. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786(h)(8), 1787(b)(2)(A), 1766(b)(3)(A), 1789(a)(2). B. Mortgage securitization This case involves the business of mortgage securitization which was described in In re Lehman Brothers Securities and Erisa Litigation, 800 F.Supp.2d 477, 479 (S.D.N.Y.2011) as follows: In a mortgage securitization, mortgage loans are acquired, pooled together, and then sold to a trust which in turn issues certificates to purchasers who become the beneficiaries of the trust and who then receive distributions from the trustee from the cash flow generated by the pool of mortgages and in accordance with the specifications of the rights of the respective classes of certificate holders set out in the trust instrument. The following terms have been used by the parties and are used in this opinion. An “originator” is an entity that processes the borrower’s loan application and makes the loan in exchange for a mortgage. The entity that purchases a pool of mortgage loans is the “depositor.” The entity, often referred to as a “trust,” which securitizes the loans and issues securities backed by the loan pools is the “issuer.” The issuer establishes classes of certificates, referred to as “tranches,” which are portions of a MBS which may have different levels of credit protection and, therefore, different credit ratings. Credit protection may be accomplished by subordination where, for instance, one tranche will be paid before the other tranches. Over collateralization is another form of credit enhancement, where the pool of loans serving as collateral for a tranche has a principal balance which exceeds the principal balance of the tranche security issued by the trust. A tranche may also be designed so that the interest income exceeds the monthly liabilities owed to the certificate purchasers. Each tranche receives a credit rating from a rating agency before it is sold. This process is explained in a report by the Office of the Inspector General for the NCUA: A key step in the process of creating and ultimately selling [a MBS] is the issuance of a credit rating for each of the tranches issued by a trust. The arranger of the [MBS] initiates the ratings process by sending the credit rating agency a range of data on each of the loans to be held by the trust (e.g., principal amount, geographic location of the property, credit history and FICO score of the borrower, ratio of the loan amount to the value of the property and type of loan: first lien, second hen, primary residence, secondary residence), the proposed capital structure of the trust and the proposed levels of credit enhancement to be provided to each [MBS] tranche issued by the trust. A lead analyst at the rating agency is assigned responsibility for analyzing the loan pool, proposed capital structure, and proposed credit enhancement levels, and for ultimately formulating a ratings recommendation for a rating committee. The credit rating for each rated tranche indicates the credit rating agency’s view as to the creditworthiness of the debt instrument. Creditworthiness is assessed in terms of the likelihood that the issuer would default on its obligations to make interest and principal payments on the debt instrument. Doc. No. 67, Exhibit 44 at p. 6. A corporate credit union, such as U.S. Central, is restricted by regulation to acquiring only highly rated securities. Id. Depositors must file registration statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding the sale of the certificates. The registration statements are accompanied by prospectus and prospectus supplements (referred to as “offering documents”). These documents explain the details of the offerings for each trust and describe the characteristics of the mortgages that supply the income for the certificates. Federal securities laws provide for liability when there are false and misleading statements in these documents. C. MBS offerings involved in this case U.S. Central is alleged to have purchased MBS certificates from the following offerings: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF16 (3 certificates); Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-3 (1 certificate); Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-D (2 certificates); Harbor View 2006-10 (2 certificates); Harbor View 2006-11 (1 certificate); Harbor View 2006-12 (2 certificates); Harbor View 2006-14 (1 certificate); Harbor View 2006-SB1 (1 certificate); Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-HSA2 (1 certificate); IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR35 (1 certificate); IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR6 (1 certificate); Luminent Mortgage Trust 2006-2 (1 certificate); Luminent Mortgage Trust 2007-1 (1 certificate); Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-1 (1 certificate); NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2006-5 (3 certificates); Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-WF2 (1 certificate); Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT1 (1 certificate); Harbor View 2006-6 (2 certificates); Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2006-3 (1 certificate); Wachovia Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-ALT1 (1 certificate). D. Identification and status of the defendants There are eleven defendants listed in the complaint. One defendant, RBS Securities, Inc. (“RBS”), formerly known as Greenwich Capital Markets, Inc., allegedly acted as a seller and/or underwriter of MBS certificates purchased by U.S. Central. The other ten defendants have been labeled “issuer defendants” because they allegedly issued certain MBS purchased by U.S. Central. These defendants are: Greenwich Capital Acceptance, Inc.; Financial Asset Securities Corp.; Fremont Mortgage Securities Corp.; Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II, Inc.; IndyMac MBS, Inc.; NovaStar Mortgage Funding Corp.; Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc.; Lares Asset Securitization, Inc.; Saxon Asset Securities Co.; and Wachovia Mortgage Loan Trust, LLC. Defendant Saxon has been voluntarily dismissed from this case. Doc. No. 43. Defendant Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss, but has since filed for bankruptcy and proceedings against it are subject to a bankruptcy stay. Defendant Lares has not filed an answer or a motion to dismiss as of this time. E. Counts of the complaint There are twelve counts in the complaint. The first ten counts of the complaint allege violations of § 11. Count 11 alleges violations of § 12(a)(2). Count 12 alleges violations of the Kansas Uniform Securities Act, K.S.A. 17-12a509. Defendant RBS is sued in each count of the complaint. The other defendants are charged in single counts with violations of § 11. F. Pending motions This case is before the court upon motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) filed on behalf of or joined in by all named defendants, except: defendant Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II, Inc.; defendant Saxon (now dismissed) and defendant Lares. These are: Doc. No. 53-Motion to dismiss by defendant Nomura Home Equity Loan Inc.; Doc. No. 58-Motion to dismiss count ten by defendant Wachovia Mortgage Loan and Trust; Doc No. 59-Motion to dismiss count two by defendant Fremont Securities Corporation; Doc. No. 63-Motion to dismiss and motion to strike by defendant NovaStar Mortgage Funding Corporation; and Doc. No. 66-Motion to dismiss by defendants RBS Securities, Inc., Financial Asset Securities Corporation, and Greenwich Capital Acceptance, Inc.-joined in by defendant IndyMac MBS, Inc. (Doc. No. 70). There is a motion to strike which is part of the motion to dismiss filed by defendant NovaStar. Doc. No. 63. That motion shall be discussed and decided in the context of the motions to dismiss. The docket also shows requests to take judicial notice of various materials. Doc. Nos. 65 and 68. These requests shall be granted. G. Elements of plaintiff’s claims As explained in In re Morgan Stanley Information Fund Securities Litigation, 592 F.3d 347, 358 (2nd Cir.2010), § 11 and § 12(a)(2) “impose liability on certain participants in a registered securities offering when the publicly filed documents used during the offering contain material misstatements or omissions.” Section 11 applies to registration statements, and § 12(a)(2) applies to prospectus materials and oral communications. Id. The elements of a § 11 claim are: 1) purchase of a registered security either directly from the issuer or in the aftermarket; 2) defendant’s participation in the offering as set forth in § 11; and 3) the registration statement contained an untrue statement of material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. Id. at 358-59. The elements of a § 12(a)(2) claim are quite similar. These elements are: 1) purchase of a registered security from a “statutory seller”; 2) the sale was effectuated by means of a prospectus or oral communication; and 3) the prospectus or oral communication included an untrue statement of material fact or omitted a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. Id. at 359. “[Plaintiffs bringing claims under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) need not allege scienter, reliance, or loss causation.” Id. “Materiality” depends upon “whether the defendants’ representations, taken together and in context, would have misled a reasonable investor.” Id. at 360 (interior quotations and citations omitted). Materiality is considered a mixed question of law and fact which is rarely decided upon a motion to dismiss. Id. As mentioned, plaintiff alleges a violation of K.S.A. 17-12a509 by defendant RBS. This statute makes a person liable to the purchaser of a security if that person sold the security “by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission ... [of] a material fact necessary in order to make a statement made, in light of the circumstances under which it is made, not misleading, the purchaser not knowing the untruth or omission and the seller not sustaining the burden of proof that the seller did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable care, could not have known of the untruth or omission.” K.S.A. 17-12a509(b). This language is essentially the same as that in § 11 and § 12(a)(2). Cf., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 111 (a)(2). H. 12 (b)(6) standards “The legal sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law.” Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir.2009) cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1148, 130 S.Ct. 1142, 175 L.Ed.2d 973 (2010). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quotation omitted). The court must not “weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but ... assess whether the plaintiffs complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” Cohan v. New Mexico Dept. of Health, 646 F.3d 717, 724 (10th Cir.2011) (interior quotations omitted). The motions to dismiss in this case challenge whether plaintiff has stated a timely claim and a plausible claim. If plaintiff has stated a timely claim, then the court must consider what “plausible” means for the purposes of this case. The Supreme Court has stated that plausibility requires that the allegations of a complaint should “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting the elements of the claims, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and “allo[w] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit has recently commented: plausibility refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’ ” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Further, we have noted that “[t]he nature and specificity of the allegations required to state a plausible claim will vary based on context.” Kansas Penn, 656 F.3d at 1215; see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”). Thus, we have concluded the Twombly/Iqbal standard is “a middle ground between heightened fact pleading, which is expressly rejected, and allowing complaints that are no more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, which the Court stated will not do.” Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.2012). Along with these comments, the Tenth Circuit stated that Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement of a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, is still alive and that special pleading rules are not required for specific types of cases unless they are expressly set forth in the Federal Rules. Id. at 1191-92. The Second Circuit has commented that there may be more than one plausible interpretation from a set of allegations and that, at the 12(b)(6) stage of a case, the court is not allowed to pick one plausible interpretation over another even if the court believes actual proof of the facts alleged may be improbable. Anderson News, L.L.C. v. American Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 184-85 (2d Cir.2012). As mentioned, defendants raise'a statute of limitations challenge in this case. This is appropriate for consideration upon a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). The court’s focus, however, should be upon whether the allegations in the complaint show that relief is barred by the statute of limitations, not whether there is an absence of allegations showing compliance with the statute of limitations. See id. (complaint need not include facts defeating affirmative defense of administrative exhaustion). When deciding a motion to dismiss, the court may consider documents referred to in the complaint if there is no dispute as to the documents’ authenticity. Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098. The court may also consider any matter subject to judicial notice without converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment. See Staehr v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 424-25 (2d Cir.2008); Pace v. Swerdlow, 519 F.3d 1067, 1072 (10th Cir.2008). I. Allegations in the complaint The complaint alleges that in 2006 and 2007 U.S. Central purchased 29 MBS certificates issued by defendants and underwritten and sold by defendant RBS in reliance upon offering documents which contained untrue statements of material fact or omitted material facts. These alleged untrue statements or omissions largely relate to conformity with the mortgage underwriting standards by the originators of the mortgages which were pooled and served as collateral for the MBS purchased by U.S. Central. Plaintiff alleges that the originators systematically disregarded underwriting standards for the loans underlying the MBS in this case. It should be noted that the originators either are not defendants in this case or, if they are defendants, it is not for their actions as loan originators. As just mentioned, the complaint alleges that while the offering documents represented that certain underwriting guidelines were followed, in fact the mortgage originators “systematically abandoned the stated underwriting guidelines.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 6. This is alleged to have made the MBS “significantly riskier than represented in the [ojffering [documents.” Id. According to the complaint, “a material percentage of the borrowers whose mortgages comprised the [MBS] were all but certain to become delinquent or [in] default shortly after origination.” Id. The alleged result was a loss of cash flow from the principal and interest payments which were the collateral for the MBS and a loss of value in the MBS purchased by U.S. Central. The complaint quotes a report from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) as stating that “[t]he quality of the underwriting process ... is a major determinant of subsequent loan performance.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 95. All but six of the MBS identified in the complaint were rated triple-A at the time of purchase by U.S. Central. Five were rated double-A-plus. One was rated double-A. According to the complaint, by 2009 and 2010, most of the securities’ ratings had dropped to below investment grade. Doc. No. 1, Table 4 at pp. 17-18. The complaint alleges that at the time U.S. Central purchased the MBS, it was not aware of the untrue statements or omissions of material facts in the offering documents. Doe. No. 1, ¶ 56. The complaint further alleges that if U.S. Central “had known about the Originators’ pervasive disregard of underwriting standards contrary to the representations in the Offering Documents-U.S. Central would not have purchased” the MBS. Id. According to the complaint, the offering documents reported zero or near zero delinquencies and defaults at the time of the offerings (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 64), but default and delinquency rates surged in the months after the MBS were offered. “As of May 2011, nearly half (45.73%) of the mortgage collateral across all of the [MBS] that U.S. Central purchased was in delinquency, bankruptcy, foreclosure, or was [real estate owned], which means that a bank or lending institution own[ed] the property after a failed sale at a foreclosure auction.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 66, see also Table 5 at pp. 21-29. Plaintiff asserts that these rates of early payment default evidence “borrower misrepresentations and other misinformation in the origination process, resulting from the systematic failure of the Originators to apply the underwriting guidelines described in the Offering Documents.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 69. Plaintiff cites a November 2008 Federal Reserve Board study which “attributed the rise in defaults, in part, to ‘[deteriorating lending standards,’ and posits that ‘the surge in early payment defaults suggests that underwriting ... deteriorated on dimensions that were less readily apparent to investors.’ ” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 70. This link is suggested in the OCC report referenced earlier which observed that: “The quality of underwriting varies across lenders, a factor that is evidenced through comparisons of rates of delinquency, foreclosure, or other loan performance measures across loan originators.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 95. Plaintiff further alleges that many loan originators for the MBS at issue in this case had high “originate-to-distribute” or “OTD” percentages (Doc. No. 1, Table 6 at p. 81) and that this meant they were more likely to disregard underwriting standards because they profited from selling (or “distributing”) the loans and after selling the loans did not bear the risk of borrower default. Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 73-74. The link between the OTD mode of mortgage lending and the disregard of underwriting standards is discussed elsewhere in the complaint. Benjamin Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, is quoted as stating: “In retrospect, the breakdown in underwriting can be linked to the incentives that the originate-to-distribute model ... created for the originators.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 103. In addition, a report of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) is quoted as linking the OTD model to weakening underwriting standards “particularly ... with respect to the verification of the borrower’s income, assets, and employment for residential real estate loans ...” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 107. According to the complaint, the alleged systematic disregard of underwriting standards is shown by the actual loss records of the MBS. Plaintiff asserts: “[t]he actual losses to the mortgage pools underlying the [MBS] U.S. Central purchased have exceeded expected losses so quickly and by so wide a margin that a significant portion of the mortgages could not have been underwritten as represented in the Offering Documents.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 76. The complaint explains that “[e]xpected loss is a statistical estimate of the total cumulative shortfall in principal payments on a mortgage pool over its 30-year life, expressed as a percentage of the original principal balance of the pool, based on historical data for similar mortgage pools.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 79. It is a factor used to determine the amount of credit enhancement needed to attain a desired credit rating. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 80. The complaint reasons that the actual loss rate of the MBS certificates U.S. Central purchased, which led to the failure of credit enhancement methods to ensure triple-A performance of triple-A MBS, substantiates the alleged abandonment of underwriting standards. Doc. No. 1, ¶89. The complaint further contends that the collapse of the credit ratings for the MBS U.S. Central purchased is evidence of the originators’ “systematic disregard of underwriting guidelines.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 92. Virtually all of the MBS certificates were triple-A at issuance; they have since been downgraded to well below investment grade. Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 90-91 and Table 4. The complaint buttresses its allegations of shoddy underwriting practices by the originators of the mortgages for the MBS in this case with statements from various authorities: “a host of financial institutions ... knowingly originated, sold, and securitized billions of dollars in high risk, poor quality home loans. These lenders were not the victims of the financial crisis; the high risk loans they issued became the fuel that ignited the financial crisis.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 96 (quoting a Senate staff report on “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis”). “mortgage fraud ‘flourished in an environment of collapsing lending standards.’ ” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 99, (quoting the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (“FCIC”) report). “Many mortgage lenders set the bar so low that lenders simply took eager borrowers’ qualifications on faith, often with a willful disregard for a borrower’s ability to pay.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 101 (quoting FCIC report). “at the point of origination, underwriting standards became increasingly compromised. The best-known and most serious case is that of subprime mortgages, mortgages extended to borrowers with weaker credit histories. To a degree that increased over time, these mortgages were often poorly documented and extended with insufficient attention to the borrower’s ability to repay.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 103 (quoting Benjamin Bernanke). In addition to these general comments regarding the subprime mortgage industry, the complaint includes allegations regarding ten individual mortgage originators who contributed mortgages to some, but not all, of the MBS at issue in this case. Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 110-234. These originators are: American Home Mortgage Investment Corporation; Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.; First National Bank of Nevada; Fremont Investment & Loan; Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.; IndyMac Bank; Option One Mortgage Corporation; NovaStar Mortgage, Inc.; Silver State Mortgage Company; and Washington Mutual Bank (“WaMu”). By the court’s count, these entities originated mortgages for 20 of the 29 certificates alleged in this complaint. The complaint draws statements from prospectus supplements for the MBS offerings at issue in this case and alleges that they are examples of material untrue statements. Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 257-316. The following is a representative sample: “American Home’s underwriting philosophy is to weigh all risk factors inherent in the loan file, giving consideration to the individual transaction, borrower profile, the level of documentation provided and the property used to collateralize the debt. These standards are applied in accordance with applicable federal and state laws and regulations. Exceptions to the underwriting standards may be permitted where compensating factors are present ...” Doc. No. 1, ¶271 (quoting HarborView 2006-6 Prospectus Supplement at S-96). “In determining the adequacy of the mortgaged property as collateral for a mortgage loan, an appraisal is made of each property considered for financing or, if permitted by the underwriting standards, the value of the related mortgaged property will be determined by the purchase price of the mortgaged property, a statistical valuation, or the stated value. In most cases, the underwriting standards of Residential Funding as to the mortgage loans originated or purchased by it place a greater emphasis on the creditworthiness and debt service capacity of the borrower than on the underlying collateral in evaluating the likelihood that a borrower will be able to repay the related mortgage loan.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 281 (quoting Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-HSA2 Prospectus Supplement at S-38). “Countrywide Home Loans’ underwriting standards are applied by or on behalf of Countrywide Home Loans to evaluate the prospective borrower’s credit standing and repayment ability and the value and adequacy of the mortgaged property as collateral. Under those standards, a prospective borrower must generally demonstrate [his] ... ‘debt-to-income’ ratios are within acceptable limits.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 289 (quoting Luminent Mortgage Trust 2006-2 Prospectus Supplement at S-39-40). “The mortgage loans have been originated generally in accordance with the following underwriting standards established by WMMSC or underwriting guidelines established by WaMu. The following is a summary of the underwriting standards or guidelines generally applied by WMMSC or WaMu and does not purport to be a complete description of the underwriting standards of WMMSC or WaMu. Such underwriting standards or guidelines generally are intended to evaluate the prospective borrowers credit standing and repayment ability and the value and adequacy of the mortgaged property as collateral.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 292 (quoting Luminent Mortgage Trust 2007-1 Prospectus Supplement at S-32). “Exceptions to underwriting standards are permitted in situations in which compensating factors exist. Examples of these factors are significant financial reserves, a low loan-to-value ratio, significant decrease in the borrower’s monthly payment and long-term employment with the same employer.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 286 (quoting IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR35 Prospectus Supplement at S — 69). “Option One Underwriting Guidelines require a reasonable determination of an applicant’s ability to repay the loan. Such determination is based on a review of the applicant’s source of income, calculation of a debt service-to-income ratio based on the amount of income from sources indicated on the loan application or similar documentation, a review of the applicant’s credit history and the type and intended use of the property being financed.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 310 (quoting Soundview 2007-OPT1 Prospectus Supplement at S-73). “All of the Mortgage Loans have been purchased by the sponsor from various banks, savings and loan associations, mortgage bankers and other mortgage loan originators and purchasers of mortgage loans in the secondary market, and were originated generally in accordance with the underwriting criteria described in this section.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 295 (quoting Nomura HELT, Series 2007-1 Prospectus Supplement at S — 108). Plaintiff also alleges that some defendants are liable for material false statements regarding the operation of reduced documentation programs, loan-to-value ratios, and credit enhancement policies. These allegations, however, are linked to plaintiffs claim that the originators systematically disregarded underwriting standards. J. Judicial notice materials This section of the opinion describes or takes quotations from some of the material submitted for judicial notice. Most of the material noted in this section relates to the statute of limitations question of whether a reasonably diligent investor should have been put on notice in 2006 and 2007 of facts which would lead to the discovery of a plausible claim. As explained in more detail later in this opinion, defendants contend that this case was untimely filed because a reasonable investor would have had knowledge of facts sufficient to file a claim before March 20, 2008, which is a critical date for determining the timeliness of plaintiffs federal claims. Trading in mortgage-backed securities halted in mid-2007. Doc. No. 67, Ex. 1, Report of the Office of Inspector General of the NCUA, at p. 1 n. 2. As of December 31, 2007, many of U.S. Central’s securities had lost money, particularly the investments in MBS. Id. at p. 14. In July 2008, U.S. Central’s external auditor required an additional adjustment to “Other Comprehensive Income (loss)” as of December 31, 2007, increasing the number from $1.1 billion to $1.5 billion. Id. at p. 3. A May 2007 examination was the first time Office of Corporate Credit Unions examiners commented on the subprime MBS held by U.S. Central. Id. at p. 25. The report noted that the subprime mortgage sector had begun experiencing deterioration. Id. U.S. Central enhanced its monitoring procedures to identify problem securities. Id. The examination report further noted that management’s monitoring efforts became more significant in July 2007 as rating agencies downgraded or issued a negative outlook on one thousand structured securities with sub-prime collateral. We determined U.S. Central did not own any of these specific securities but did own 10 senior tranches of securities where subordinate tranches were downgraded .... The examination report concluded that: “U.S. Central’s investment function remains conservative with the portfolio consisting primarily of the highest rated marketable securities.” Id. An FBI report on financial crimes in May 2005 and numerous reports in the press from 2006 documented increasing risk in the subprime mortgage market because of pervasive and growing mortgage fraud, widespread inflated valuations, loose underwriting standards, and growth of atypical mortgages including risky ones that did not require down payments or income documentation. Doc. No. 67, Ex. Nos. 22, 23, 24. A Wall Street Journal article dated October 9, 2006 noted that some loan originators were “tightening their underwriting standards” and that companies were suing lenders that they claimed passed on bad mortgages that quickly defaulted. Doc. No. 67, Ex. 25. The article stated that it was unclear whether the recent downturn in the mortgage market was “finetuning” or the “beginning of a more serious shakeout.” Id. In late 2006 and early 2007, press reports documented a surge in foreclosures and mortgage delinquencies. Doc. No. 67, Ex. Nos. 27, 28, 29. This reflected loans made under lowered standards. Doc. No. 67, Ex. 29 at p. 2. It was reported that: “In many cases these loans are ‘so bad right off the bat’ and so far beyond the borrower’s ability to pay that giving the borrower more time to pay or restructuring the loan wouldn’t help.” Id. at p. 3. It was also reported in December 2006 that Standard & Poor’s Corporation put one deal backed by loans issued by Fremont General Corporation’s mortgage unit on credit watch for possible downgrade and said it could take similar action on deals from several other issuers. Id. A Standard & Poor’s representative was quoted as stating: “We are monitoring very, very closely the portfolios of all the subprime issuers ... It’s an industrywide trend.” Id. But, readers were told that some investors were more at risk than others. Because of the way mortgage-backed securities are structured, investors who buy investment-grade securities aren’t likely to be hurt if losses are close to expectations. But if losses on the underlying mortgages substantially exceed expectations, some investors who buy the riskiest slices of subprime securities are likely to rack up losses.... Because the underlying loans have gotten riskier, credit-rating agencies are telling issuers of mortgage-backed bonds to set aside more money to cover losses than they did three years ago in order to get a AAA rating for their bonds. Id. A January 26, 2007 New York Times article, as well as other press reports in 2006, documented the collapse of several mortgage lenders and the lowering of lending standards by subprime lenders, drawing the concern of banking regulators. Doc. No. 67, Ex. Nos. 30, 31, 32, 33, 34. According to a December 2006 article in The Economist, sometimes the underwriting standards were “waived altogether.” Doc. No. 67, Ex. 34, p. 2. The article estimated that 40% of the MBS issued in the first half of 2006 were linked to sub-prime loans. Id. Some mortgage lenders failed in 2006 and others were being sold, including Option One Mortgage (a loan originator for an offering in this case). Id. On the other hand, in the last half of the year, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns had all bought mortgage lenders, and Lehman Brothers had purchased several in the previous three years. Id. According to testimony given to the Senate Committee on Banking on February 7, 2007, the subprime mortgage market was “a quiet but devastating disaster” because it was “widely recognized” that lenders had become too lax in qualifying applicants for subprime loans. Doc. No. 67, Ex. 35, pp. 1-2. The following comments were also part of the testimony: “Especially troubling is the practice of qualifying borrowers without any verification of income, not escrowing property taxes and hazard insurance, and failing to account for how borrowers will be able to pay their loan once the payment adjusts after the teaser period expires.” Id. at p. 2. “Subprime lenders have virtually guaranteed rampant foreclosures by approving risky loans for families while knowing that these families will not be able to pay the loans back.” Id. “[M]any subprime lenders have been routinely abdicating the responsibility of underwriting loans in any meaningful way.” Id. at p. 14. “[Ujnderwriting standards in the sub-prime market have become extremely loose in recent years, and analysts have cited this laxness as a key driver in foreclosures.” Id. “Fitch recently noted that ‘loans underwritten using less than full documentation standards comprise more than 50% of the subprime sector....’ ‘Loc-doc’ and ‘no-doc’ loans originally were intended for use with the limited category of borrowers who are self-employed or whose income are otherwise legitimately not reported on a W-2 tax form, but lenders have increasingly used these loans to obscure violations of sound underwriting practices.” Id. at p. 15. With more specific reference to entities identified in the complaint in this case, the FDIC issued a press release on March 7, 2007 announcing that it had issued a cease and desist order against Fremont Investment and Loan. Doc. No. 67, Ex. 42. According to the press release, the FDIC found: “that the bank was operating without effective risk management policies and procedures in place in relation to its subprime mortgage and commercial real estate lending operations. The FDIC determined, among other things, that the bank had been operating without adequate subprime mortgage loan underwriting criteria, and that it was marketing and extending subprime mortgage loans in a way that substantially increased the likelihood of borrower default or other loss to the bank.” Id. When this cease and desist order was proposed, Fremont announced that it intended to exit its subprime residential mortgage business. Doc. No. 67, Ex. 41. The Wall Street Journal reported in January 2007 that IndyMac Bancorp, Inc. had been hit by rising delinquencies in its main Alt-A mortgage portfolio. Doc. No. 67, Ex. 27, p. 2. The same article reported that NovaStar stock had dropped more than 30%. Id. The Wall Street Journal also reported in October 2006 that Option One Mortgage Corp. had to repurchase bad loans causing its parent, H & R Block, Inc., to record a loss. Doc. No. 67, Ex. 26. The parties have submitted other materials for judicial notice by the court. These include: complaints containing allegedly similar allegations in lawsuits filed in 2007 and 2008; prospectuses and prospectus supplements; and financial data regarding defendant NovaStar. K. Statute of limitations/repose — the positions of the parties and the rulings of the court There are two deadlines for filing Securities Act claims under § 11 and § 12(a)(2). Both deadlines must be satisfied. These deadlines are set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 77m, which is Section 13 of the Securities Act. The first deadline mentioned in § 13 is one year after the date of discovery or after the date when discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence. The second deadline, which is considered a statute of repose, requires that “[i]n no event” shall a §11 action be brought “more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public,” or a § 12(a)(2) action be brought “more than three years after the sale.” There is a two-year limitations period and a five-year period of repose for the claims plaintiff alleges under Kansas law. K.S.A. 17-12a509(j)(2). The parties’ arguments in this matter focus almost completely upon the timeliness of plaintiffs federal law claims. Plaintiff filed this case on June 20, 2011. The certificates in question in this case were offered and sold to U.S. Central in 2006 and 2007 — well more than three years before this case was filed. But plaintiff was not appointed conservator or liquidator of U.S. Central until March 20, 2009 and, therefore, had little or, as defendants allege, no time to assess whether to bring the claims it brings here, unless the time to do so was extended. Plaintiff contends that its time to bring the claims in this case was extended under 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14)(A) (“the extender statute”). Defendants claim that the federal claims are untimely filed: 1) as a matter of statutory construction of § 13 and the extender statute; and 2) as a failure of pleading as regards the one-year limitations period. Plaintiff argues that the extender statute provides the statutory basis for avoiding defendants’ limitations and repose arguments and that plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to survive a timeliness challenge under Rule 12(b)(6). 1. Dismissal is not warranted as a matter of statutory construction a. The extender statute applies to the federal and state statutory claims advanced by plaintiff The extender statute reads as follows: (14) Statute of limitations for actions brought by [the National Credit Union Administration Board as] conservator or liquidating agent (A) In general. Notwithstanding any provision of any contract, the applicable statute of limitations with regard to any action brought by the Board as conservator or liquidating agent shall be— (i) in the case of any contract claim, the longer of — (I) the 6-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or (II) the period applicable under State law; and (ii) in the case of any tort claim, the longer of — (I) the 3-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or (II) the period applicable under State law. (B) Determination of the date on which a claim accrues for purposes of subparagraph (A), the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run on any claim described in [§ 1787(b)(14)(A) ] shall be the later of-(i) the date of the appointment of the Board as conservator or liquidating agent; or (ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues. 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14). Defendants contend that the extender statute only lengthens the time for filing state tort and contract claims, not federal and state statutory actions such as plaintiffs claims in this case. The court believes, however, that the extender statute applies to the claims raised by plaintiff for the followings reasons. First, the statutory language is broad. “In general,” it states, “any action” brought by plaintiff is covered by the provisions of the extender statute. The term “any action” should be read to include statutory claims, not just the tort and contract claims mentioned later. The Supreme Court has stated that “ ‘[r]ead naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ ” Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219, 128 S.Ct. 831, 169 L.Ed.2d 680 (2008) (quoting U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997)). In various cases, the Court has followed an expansive construction even though the context or legislative history of the statute was cited in favor of a narrower meaning. For example, in Ali, the Court construed a statutory exception to the general waiver of sovereign immunity which applied to: claim[s] arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer. The Court found that “any other law enforcement officer” included Bureau of Prisons officers, even though such officers are not involved in the collection of tax or customs duties and are not considered customs or excise officers. Similarly, in Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 588-89, 100 S.Ct. 1889, 64 L.Ed.2d 525 (1980), the Court held that the Clean Air Act provision authorizing direct Court of Appeals review of “any other final action” by the EPA reached any action by the EPA Administrator and not just final actions for which there had been notice and hearing as reflected in specifically enumerated provisions that preceded the language “any other final action.” Also, in Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032, the Court held that a provision prohibiting sentencing a defendant who used or carried a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime to a term concurrent to “any other term of imprisonment” meant any other state or federal term of imprisonment, not any “federal” term of imprisonment. It should be noted further that the introductory language of the extender statute does not limit its scope to certain claims, rather it states that the statute relates to the limitations period for “actions” brought by plaintiff. Nor does the statute ever refer to “state tort claims” or “state contract claims.” The second reason to apply the extender statute to plaintiffs statutory claims is that analogous statutes have been applied to statutory claims. A similar extender statute covering actions brought by the conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was held to apply to Securities Act claims in Federal Housing Finance Agency v. USB Americas, Inc., 858 F.Supp.2d 306, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y.2012). The extender statute for the FDIC, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14), was held to apply to a state statutory fraudulent transfer action brought by the agency as a receiver for a bank. FDIC v. Zibolis, 856 F.Supp. 57, 61 (D.N.H.1994). Before that extender statute was passed, the statute of limitations governing claims by federal liquidation agencies like plaintiff was 28 U.S.C. § 2415. See FDIC v. Hudson, 673 F.Supp. 1039, 1041 (D.Kan.1987). Section 2415 is somewhat similar to the extender statute in this case in that it refers expressly to contract and tort actions, but does not mention actions pursuant to statute. Nevertheless, § 2415 has been applied to statutory claims. E.g., U.S. v. Deluxe Cleaners & Laundry, Inc., 511 F.2d 926, 929 (4th Cir.1975) (claim brought by United States pursuant to the Service Act of 1965); United States v. P/B STCO 213, 756 F.2d 364, 375 (5th Cir.1985) (action to recover pollution clean-up costs under Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321); U.S. v. Sunoco, Inc., 501 F.Supp.2d 641, 648-50 (E.D.Pa.2007) (action brought under Pennsylvania Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act). Defendants argue for a contrary result on the basis of Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993) and the doctrine of expressio unis est exclisio alterius. We disagree. Leatherman concerned the pleading requirements of FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a) and 9(b). The Court held that Rule 9(b)’s requirement that fraud and mistake be pleaded with particularity meant that other subjects did not need to be pleaded with particularity, but could be pleaded in accordance with Rule 8(a)’s requirement of a short and plain statement. We believe the extender statute presents a different situation because it states “in general” that “any action brought by the Board as conservator or liquidating agent” is covered by two categories of limitations periods— not that the extender statute applies to tort and contract claims and, by expressio unis est exclisio alterius, no other claim. Defendants also argue, in effect, that construing the term “any action” to include not just tort and contract claims, but also state and federal statutory claims, is contrary to the maxim of statutory construction which disfavors repeals or amendments by implication. See National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 663-64, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 168 L.Ed.2d 467 (2007). Defendants assert that conformity with the plain language of the extender statute does not require its application to federal and state statutory claims brought by plaintiff as a conservator, so such a construction should be avoided since it contradicts the limitations periods set forth in § 13. This contention leads back to the language and the purpose of the extender statute. Congress provided that the statute applies to “any action” brought by plaintiff as conservator. Consistent with this language and the purpose of the statute (as discussed later in this opinion), the court believes that the limitations periods set forth in § 13 are extended under the restricted circumstances present in this case. If this construction has the effect of shortening the limitations period for some federal statutory actions brought by plaintiff, it should be remembered that the apparent role of the extender statute is to permit plaintiff, operating in the capacity as a conservator, a practical but fixed amount of time to bring an action. If this result varies in some instances from the limitations provisions governing most parties, it does not seem like a “perverse” or “absurd” result as argued by some defendants. Doc. No. 62, p. 16; Doc. No. 111, p. 10 (originally Doc. No. 27 in Case No. 11-2649); Doc. No. 88, p. 12. Defendants also assert that if Congress intended federal law claims to be covered by the extender statute, then it would have said so. The court’s position is that Congress did say so when it stated that “in general” the “statute of limitations for any action brought by” plaintiff as a conservator or liquidating agent is that set forth in the provisions of the extender statute. b. The extender statute applies to the “statute of repose” provisions of § IS of the Securities Act Defendants also contend that the extender statute does not impact statutes of repose, as opposed to statutes of limitations. The three-year deadline in § 13 should be considered a statute of repose since it operates without regard to the date of injury or date of discovery. See, e.g., McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 779-80 (9th Cir.2008) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2825, 174 L.Ed.2d 552 (2009) (citing cases which distinguish statutes of limitations and repose). The statute of repose in § 13 states that “in no event” shall an action be brought more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public for purposes of § 11 or for purposes of § 12(a)(2) more than three years after the sale. 15 U.S.C. § 77m. The court believes this is a question of statutory construction. It is not clear that Congress meant to exclude the three-year deadline from the operation of the extender statute. In the face of this ambiguity, the extender statute should be construed in favor of the government and in conformity with its apparent purpose. The extender statute states that it applies to “the applicable statute of limitations with regard to any action.” It is not clear whether Congress meant “statute of limitations” to include “statute of repose.” The terms “statute of limitations” and “statute of repose” are often conflated. E. g., U.S. v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (statutes of limitations are statutes of repose); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136, 58 S.Ct. 785, 82 L.Ed. 1224 (1938) (“the statute of limitations is a statute of repose”); McCann v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 663 F.3d 926, 932 (7th Cir.2011) (referring to the Supreme Court in Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 130 S.Ct. 1784, 176 L.Ed.2d 582 (2010) using the term “statute of limitations” generieally to include statutes of repose); Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 939 F.2d 1420, 1434 n. 17 (10th Cir.1991) (“[although the two concepts differ, the terminology has become interchangeable”); Lopardo v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 548 F. Supp.2d 450, 459-61 (N.D.Ohio 2008) (historically under federal law statutes of limitations were considered to be a subset of or alternative term for statutes of repose — the divergence in the definitions of the terms appears to have originated in state law); see also, Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 187, 117 S.Ct. 1984, 138 L.Ed.2d 373 (1997) (“repose” is a “basic objective ... that underlies limitations periods”); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 270, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (“the application of any statute of limitations would promote repose”). The Supreme Court combined the same terms in its discussion of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 362, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991). The Court in one paragraph refers to the “3-year period of repose” in § 9(e) of the 1934 Act and § 13 of the 1933 Act and in the next paragraph refers to the 1- and 3-year structure in those sections as the “more appropriate statute of limitations” for a § 10(b) claim. Id. Congress has referred to statutes of repose as statutes of limitations. Titles and headings of statutes may be consulted to clarify the meaning of statutes. Almendarez-Torres v. U.S., 523 U.S. 224, 234, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Here, it is noteworthy that the title of § 13 of the Securities Act is “Limitations of actions” even though its provisions set forth (in the same paragraph) a one-year “statute of limitations” and a three-year “statute of repose.” Another example comes from the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 where, according to the Ninth Circuit, the term “statute of limitations” in § 309 also means “statute of repose.” McDonald, 548 F.3d at 780-81. In cases involving ambiguous limitations provisions impacting actions brought by the government, courts generally construe those provisions in favor of the government. FDIC v. Former Officers and Directors of Metropolitan Bank, 884 F.2d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir.1989) (citing Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 391, 104 S.Ct. 756, 78 L.Ed.2d 549 (1984)). This long-established principle was reiterated in BP America Production Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 95-96, 127 S.Ct. 638, 166 L.Ed.2d 494 (2006): “when the sovereign elects to subject itself to a statute of limitations, the sovereign is given the benefit of the doubt if the scope of the statute is ambiguous.” This maxim supports the application of the extender statute to the repose period in § 13. Defendants argue that the reference in the extender statute to the “date the claim accrues” indicates that the statute only applies to the statute of limitations, not the statute of repose, because the term “accrual” or “accrues” characterizes a statute of limitations as opposed to a statute of repose. See McCann, 663 F.3d at 932 (observing that the starting gate in statutes of limitations is usually expressed as the date on which such claim accrues). This argument does not outweigh the other reasons to hold that the extender statute applies to the statute of repose provisions in § 13. Further, as Judge Posner notes in McCann, Congress may not necessarily be relied upon to use consistent terminology. Other statutes of repose have been construed as being subject to supposedly incompatible concepts of notice and equitable tolling. See SEC v. Wyly, 788 F.Supp.2d 92, 114-15 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (holding that section 21A of the Exchange Act barring SEC actions against insider trading more than five years “after the date of purchase or sale” is subject to the discovery rule); U.S. v. Uzzell, 648 F.Supp. 1362, 1366-68 (D.D.C.1986) (False Claims Act’s provision requiring suit within 6 years “from the date of violation” is subject to equitable tolling). Also, it seems consistent with the purpose of the extender statute (as discussed below) and the language used in § 13 (which refers to limitations periods, not repose) that the extender statute extend both time limitations stated in § 13, instead of just one. Defendants also argue that statutes of repose are “substantive” not procedural devices which should be “tolled” or extended by the extender statute. We do not accept this analysis. As the Court recognized in Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Co., 380 U.S. 424, 426-27, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 13 L.Ed.2d 941 (1965): “The basic question to be answered in determining whether ... a statute of limitations is to be tolled, is one of legislative intent whether the right shall be enforceable after the prescribed time. Classification of such a provision as ‘substantive’ rather than ‘procedural’ does not determine whether or under what circumstances the limitation period may be extended.” (Interior quotation and citation omitted). This point was reiterated in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 559, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974): “the mere fact that a federal statute providing for substantive liability also sets a time limitation upon the institution of suit does not restrict the power of the federal courts to hold that the statute of limitations is tolled under certain circumstances not inconsistent with the legislative purpose.” We acknowledge that in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Olson, 768 F.Supp. 283 (D.Ariz.1991) the court held that an analogous extender statute did not apply to a state statute of repose governing the time to file deficiency actions. The court held that the statutory repose period was a “[substantive time limit” that was “binding on the federal government.” Id. at 285. Because the court did not discuss and may not have considered whether Congress intended the extender statute to apply to statutes of repose, the court chooses not to follow the conclusion stated in Olson. c. The court’s construction of the extender statute is consistent with the general purpose of the legislation When this court engages in statutory construction, we may consider the overriding goals Congress sought to achieve through the legislation. See Wright v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 451 F.3d 1231; 1234 (10th Cir.2006) (the task of statutory construction is to interpret the words of the statute in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve). “In order to determine congressional intent, we must examine the purposes and policies underlying the limitation provision, the Act itself, and the remedial scheme developed for the enforcement of the rights given by the Act.” Burnett, 380 U.S. at 427, 85 S.Ct. 1050. Obviously, a construction of the extender statute which increases the opportunity of plaintiff to bring, actions to recover money on behalf of the government would be consistent with the general purposes of the Congress in establishing the powers of the NCUA. See 12 U.S.C. § 1766 (listing powers of the NCUA Board); see also SMS Financial v. ABCO Homes, Inc., 167 F.3d 235, 242 n. 21 (5th Cir.1999) (addressing Congress’ resolve with the Federal Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) to strengthen enforcement powers of Federal regulators of depository institutions and citing the Congressional Record for the proposition that extending the limitations periods will “significantly increase the amount of money that can be recovered by the Federal Government through litigation” and “preserv[e] to the greatest extent permissible by law claims that would otherwise have been lost due to the expiration of hitherto applicable limitations periods”); cf. USB, 858 F.Supp.2d at 315-17 (addressing the purposes of act establishing the regulator and conservator of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in construing the extender provisions which are part of that act); but see, Anixter, 939 F.2d at 1435 (discussing the legislative history of § 13 and noting it was understood that the three-year repose period was absolute). d. Effect of the extender statute Plaintiff filed the complaint in this case on June 20, 2011. The three-year repose period does not bar plaintiffs claims because the MBS certificates in this case were sold within three years of March 20, 2009, when plaintiff became the conservator of U.S. Central. The extender statute gives plaintiff three more years from March 20, 2009 to file suit. There is a five-year statute of repose under K.S.A. 17 — 12a509(j). Defendant RBS is the only defendant alleged to have violated this Kansas statute. There is no argument by defendant RBS that the five-year period of repose bars plaintiffs state law claims. 2. Dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is not warranted on the basis of the pleadings before the court except for plaintiff’s claims as to the Fremont certificates If the one-year statute of limitation period in § 13 or the two-year statute of limitation period in K.S.A. 17-12a509(j) expired prior to March 20, 2009, then plaintiffs federal claims, governed by