Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION SUE L. ROBINSON, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff MobileMedia Ideas, LLC (“MobileMedia”) filed a patent infringement complaint against Apple Inc. (“Apple”) on March 31, 2010,. alleging infringement of fourteen of its patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 6,070,068 (“the '068 patent”), 6,253,075 (“the '075 patent”), RE39231 (“the '231 patent”), 5,737,394 (“the '394 patent”), 6,427,078 (“the '078 patent”), 6,441,828 (“the '828 patent”), 6,549,942 (“the '942 patent”), 6,393,430 (“the '430 patent”), 6,002,390 (“the '390 patent”), 6,446,080 (“the '080 patent”), 6,760,477 (“the '477 patent”), 7,313,647 .(“the '647 patent”), 7,349,012 (“the '012 patent”), and 5,915,239 (“the '239 patent”). (D.I. 1) On July 16, 2010, MobileMedia amended its complaint to assert infringement of two additional patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 6,725,155 (“the '155 patent”) and 5,490,170 (“the '170 patent”). (D.I. 8) Subsequently, Apple answered and asserted affirmative defenses of, inter alia, non-infringement, invalidity, unenforceability, failure to state a claim, “waiver, laches and/or estoppel,” prosecution history estoppel, and lack of standing. (D.I. 10 at ¶¶ 114-23) On March 2, 2012, Apple filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that MobileMedia lacked standing to sue for infringement of the patents-in-suit. The court denied the motion. (D.I. 441) Discovery closed on May 4, 2012. (D.I. 225) On April 4, 2012, the parties stipulated to dismiss the claims and counterclaims related to the '390 patent and the '647 patent. (D.I.- 263) On April 25, 2012, MobileMedia deferred four patents (the '080, '477, '012, and '239 patents) for a later phase, leaving ten patents-in-suit. Currently remaining before the court are several summary judgment motions: Apple’s motions for summary judgment of invalidity and non-infringement (D.I. 305; D.I. 328); and MobileMedia’s motions for summary judgment of no invalidity and for partial summary judgment bn Apple’s affirmative defenses of estoppel, waiver, and prosecution history estoppel (D.I. 300; D.I. 329). Apple also filed a motion to strike MobileMedia’s newly proposed claim constructions and claim terms, and both parties filed motions to strike portions of expert reports and declarations. (D.I. 265, 377, 414) The court has jurisdiction over these matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338. II. BACKGROUND A. The Parties MobileMedia is a Delaware LLC with its principal place of business in Chevy Chase, Maryland. (D.I. 8 at ¶ 1) It obtained the patents-in-suit in January 2012 from Nokia Capital, Inc. and Sony Corporation of America pursuant to two Patent Purchase Agreements. (D.I. 228, ex. D; ex. G) Apple Inc. is a California corporation with its principal place of business in Cupertino, California. (D.I. 10 at ¶ 2) It designs, manufactures, markets, and sells the accused products. (Id.) B. The Patents-in-Suit The ten remaining patents-in-suit relate to a variety of technologies in information processing, computing, mobile phones, and media player devices. The '068, '075, and '231 patents relate to technology for rejecting, silencing, and merging incoming second calls on mobile telephones already connected to a first call. The '078 and '394 patents relate to changeable keys and cameras, respectively, on mobile devices. The '828 patent teaches a device that changes display orientation so that the display image is always upright. The '155 patent relates to a method and apparatus for obtaining navigation guidance. The '170, '942, and '430 patents pertain to multimedia — the '170 patent is for compressing and expanding audio data, the '942 patent is for portable audio storage and playback, and the '430 patent relates to audio and video playlists. Apple has moved for summary judgment of non-infringement of all of the asserted claims of all ten patents-in-suit. (D.I. 328) The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment regarding the validity of all of the asserted claims of eight (excluding the '231 and '430 patents) of the patents-in-suit. (D.I. 305; D.I. 329) Presented with the variety of technology underlying the ten patents-in-suit, the court will provide a more detailed description of the technologies when discussing each patent in the context of the summary judgment issues. C. The Accused Products MobileMedia alleges that various Apple products infringe thirty claims of the ten patents-in-suit. Specifically, it alleges that Apple’s iPhone 3G, iPhone 3GS, and iPhone 4 products (collectively, “iPhones” or “accused iPhones”) infringe claims 1, 7, 8, 23, and 24 of the '068 patent, claims 5, 6, and 10 of the '075 patent, claims 2, 3, 4, and 12 of the '231 patent, claims 1, 2, 3, 8, and 73 of the '078 patent, and claim 18 of the '394 patent. It also alleges that Apple’s iPhone 3G, iPhone 3GS, iPhone 4, iPad WiFi, iPad WiFi + 3G, iPad 2 WiFi, iPad 2 WiFi + 3G, iPod classic, iPod nano, iPod touch, and iPod shuffle infringe claims 17 and 18 of the '828 patent, claims 1 and 5 of the '430 patent, and claim 49 of the '170 patent; that Apple’s iPhone 3G, iPhone 3GS, iPhone 4, iPad WiFi, iPad WiFi + 3G, iPad 2 WiFi, and iPad 2 WiFi + 3G infringe claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the '155 patent; that Apple’s iPhone 3G, iPhone 3GS, iPhone 4, iPad WiFi, iPad WiFi + 3G, iPad 2 WiFi, iPad 2 WiFi + 3G, iPod nano, and iPod touch infringe claims 1, 6, and 8 of the '942 patent; and that Apple’s iPod classic infringes claim 1 of the '942 patent. In summary: Patent(s)-in-Suit CIaim(s)-at-Issue Accused Products ' The '075 patent 5, 6,10 The '231 patent 2, 3, 4,12 iPhone 3G, iPhone 3GS, iPhone 4 The '068 patent 1, 7, 8, 23, 24 The '394 patent 18 _The '078 patent_1, 2, 3, 8, 73_ iPhone 3G, iPhone 3GS, iPhone 4, The '828 patent 17,18 iPad WiFi, iPad WiFi + 3G, iPad 2 WiFi, iPad 2 WiFi + 3G, The '430 patent 1,5 iPod classic, iPod nano, iPod touch, iPod shuffle_The '170 patent 49_ iPhone 3G, iPhone 3GS, iPhone 4, iPad WiFi, iPad WiFi + 3G, The '155 patent 1,2,4,5 iPad 2 WiFi, iPad 2 WiFi + 3G_,_ iPhone 3G, iPhone 3GS, iPhone 4, iPad WiFi, iPad WiFi + 3G, iPad 2 WiFi, iPad 2 WiFi + 3G, The '942 patent 1 iPod classic, iPod nano, iPod touch_ iPhone 3G, iPhone 3GS, iPhone 4, iPad WiFi, iPad WiFi + 3G, iPad 2 WiFi, iPad 2 WiFi + 3G, The '942 patent 6,8 iPod nano, iPod touch_ III. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence' of a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A party asserting that a fact cannot be — or, alternatively, is — genuinely disputed must demonstrate such, either by citing to “particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for the purposes of the motions only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B). If the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmovant must then “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court will “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is spine metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita,. 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348; see also Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Service, 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir.2005) (stating party opposing summary judgment “must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment,” a factual dispute is genuine where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (stating entry of summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial”). A. Claim Construction Claim construction is a matter of law. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc). Claim construction focuses on intrinsic evidence — the claims, specification and prosecution history — because intrinsic evidence is “the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). Claims must be interpreted from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Claim construction starts with the claims, id. at 1312, and remains centered on the words of the claims throughout. Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2001). In the absence of an express intent to impart different meaning to claim terms, the terms are presumed to have their ordinary meaning. Id. Claims, however, must be read in view of the specification and prosecution history. Indeed, the specification is often “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. A means-plus-function limitation recites a function to be performed rather than structure or materials that perform the function, and such a limitation, therefore, must be construed “to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶6 (1994); Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Industries, Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1307-8 (Fed.Cir.1998). For an accused structure to literally infringe a means-plus-function limitation, “the accused structure must either be the same as the disclosed structure or be an ‘equivalent,’ i.e., (1) perform the identical function and (2) be otherwise insubstantially different with respect to structure.” Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., Inc., 208 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed.Cir.2000). “[Structures may be ‘equivalent’ for purposes of section 112, paragraph 6 if they perform the identical function, in substantially the same way, with substantially the same result.” Id. B. Infringement A patent is infringed when a person “without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States ... during the term of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). To prove direct infringement, the patentee must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that one or more claims of the patent read on the accused device literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. See Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 261 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2001). A two-step analysis is employed in making an infringement determination. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed.Cir.1995). First, the court must construe the asserted claims to ascertain their meaning and scope. See id. Construction of the claims is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed.Cir.1998). The trier of fact must then compare the properly construed claims with the accused infringing product. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 976. This second step is a question of fact. See Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed.Cir.1998). “Direct infringement requires a party to perform each and every step or element of a claimed method or product.” BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2007). “If any claim limitation is absent from the accused device, there is no literal infringement as a matter of law.” Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1247 (Fed.Cir.2000). If an accused product does not infringe an independent claim, it also does not infringe any claim depending thereon. See Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed.Cir.1989). However, “[o]ne may infringe an independent claim and not infringe a claim dependent on that claim.” Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed.Cir.2007) (quoting Wahpeton Canvas, 870 F.2d at 1552) (internal quotations omitted). A product that does not literally infringe a patent claim may still infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if the differences between an individual limitation of the claimed invention and an element of the accused product are insubstantial. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 24, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997). To establish indirect infringement, a patent owner has available two theories: active inducement of infringement and'contributory infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) & (c). To establish active inducement of infringement, a patent owner must show that an accused infringer “knew or should have known [its] actions would induce actual infringements.” DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed.Cir.2006). To establish contributory infringement, a patent owner must show that an accused infringer sells “a component of a patented machine ... knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.” Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 365 F.3d 1054, 1061 (Fed.Cir.2004) (quoting 35 U.S,C. § 271(c)). Liability under either theory, however, depends on the patent owner having first shown direct infringement.- Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed.Cir.1993). When an accused infringer moves for summary judgment of non-infringement, such relief may be granted only if one or more limitations of the claim in question does not read on an element of the accused product, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. See Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2005); see also TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2002) (“Summary judgment of non-infringement is ... appropriate where the patent owner’s proof is deficient in meeting, an essential part of the legal standard for infringement, because such failure will render all other facts immaterial.”). Thus, summary judgment of non-infringement can only be granted if, after viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, there is no genuine issue as to whether the accused product is covered by the claims (as construed by the Court). See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1304 (Fed.Cir.1999). C. Invalidity 1. Anticipation Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), a person shall be entitled to a patent unless an application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent ... or a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent. A claim is anticipated only if each and every limitation as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed.Cir.1987). A single prior art reference may expressly anticipate a claim where the reference explicitly discloses each and every claim limitation. However, the prior art need not be ipsissimis verbis (i.e., use identical words as those recited in the claims) to be expressly anticipating. Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 716 (Fed.Cir.1984). A single prior art reference also may anticipate a claim where one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood each and every claim limitation to have been disclosed inherently in the reference. Continental Can Co. USA Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed.Cir.1991). The Federal Circuit has explained that an inherent limitation is one that is necessarily present and not one that may be established by probabilities or possibilities. Id. That is, “the mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” Id. The Federal Circuit also has observed that “inherency operates to anticipate entire inventions as well as single limitations within an invention.” Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm. Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2003). Moreover, recognition of an inherent limitation by a person of ordinary skill in the art before the critical date is not required to establish inherent anticipation. Id. at 1377. Even if the prior art discloses each and every limitation set forth in a claim, such disclosure will not suffice under 35 U.S.C. § 102 if it is not enabling. In re Borst, 52 C.C.P.A. 1398, 345 F.2d 851, 855 (1965). “Long ago our predecessor court recognized that a non-enabled disclosure cannot be anticipatory (because it is not truly prior art) if that disclosure fails to ‘enable one of skill in the art to reduce the disclosed invention to practice.’ ” Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citations omitted). The patentee bears the burden to show that the prior art reference is not enabled and, therefore, disqualified as relevant prior art for an anticipation inquiry. Id. at 1355. An anticipation inquiry involves two steps. First, the court must construe the claims of the patent in suit as a matter of law. Key Pharm. v. Hercon Lab. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed.Cir.1998). Second, the finder of fact must compare the construed claims against the prior art to determine whether the prior art discloses the claimed invention. Id. The burden of proof rests on the party asserting invalidity and can be met only by clear and convincing evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 2242, 180 L.Ed.2d 131 (2011) (“We consider whether [35 U.S.C.] § 282 requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence. We hold that it does.”). 2. Obviousness “A patent may not be obtained -... if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Obviousness is a question of law, which depends on underlying factual inquiries. Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary sMll in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406, 127 S.Ct. 1727, 167 L.Ed.2d 705 (2007) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966)). “[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418, 127 S.Ct. 1727. Likewise, a defendant asserting obviousness in view of a combination of references has the burden to show that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field had a reason to combine the elements in the manner claimed. Id. at 418-19, 127 S.Ct. 1727. The Supreme Court has emphasized the need for courts to value “common sense” over “rigid preventative rules” in determining whether a motivation to combine existed. Id. at 419-20, 127 S.Ct. 1727. “[A]ny need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” Id. at 420, 127 S.Ct. 1727. In addition to showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to attempt to make the composition or device, or carry out the claimed process, a defendant must also demonstrate that “such a person would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed.Cir.2007). . A combination of prior art elements may have been “obvious to try” where there existed “a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there [were] a finite number of identified, predictable solutions” to it, and the pursuit of the “known options within [a person of ordinary skill in the art’s] technical grasp” leads to the anticipated success. Id. at 421, 127 S.Ct. 1727. In this circumstance, “the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103.” Id. A court is required to consider secondary considerations, or objective indicia of nonobviousness, before reaching an obviousness determination, as a “check against hindsight bias.” See In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1079 (Fed.Cir.2012). “Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.” John Deere Co., 383 U.S. at 17-18, 86 S.Ct. 684. “Because patents are presumed to be valid, see 35 U.S.C. § 282, an alleged infringer seeking to invalidate a patent on obviousness grounds must establish its obviousness by facts supported by clear and convincing evidence.” Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 441 F.3d 963, 968 (Fed.Cir.2006) (citation omitted). In conjunction with this burden, the Federal Circuit has explained that, [w]hen no prior art other than that which was considered by the PTO exanu iner is relied on by the attacker, he has the added burden of overcoming the deference that is due to a qualified government agency presumed to have properly done its job, which includes one or more examiners who are assumed to have some expertise in interpreting the referenees and to be familiar from their work with the level of skill in the art and whose duty it is to issue only valid patents. PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1304 (Fed.Cir.2008) (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed.Cir.1984)). IV. DISCUSSION For each of the ten patents-in-suit, the court will discuss the background technology, any necessary claim construction on summary judgment, and any infringement and invalidity issues on summary judgment. A. The '068 Patent 1. Technology The '068 patent, titled “Communication Terminal Device and Method for Controlling a Connecting State of a Call into a Desired Connection State upon a Predetermined Operation by a User,” was issued on May 30, 2000. It claims a foreign application priority date of March 19, 1996. A reexamination certificate was issued March 6, 2012, cancelling claims 17-22 and 27-32, amending several claims, and adding claims 33-57. The patent teaches a communication terminal device in which “the connecting state of a call can certainly and easily be controlled without learning troublesome operating methods .... ” ('068 patent, abstract) Conventionally, a variety of functions are available to a telephone user if, during a call in progress, the user receives an incoming call from a third party. “For instance, [the user may suspend] the call in progress ... and [connect with] a newly received call ..., or disconnect! ] the call presently talking and connect with the newly received call, or includ[e] the call received among the present call and talk with two parties at the same time, ... or disconnect! ] the call received and ... continue talking with the present call.” (Id, col. 1:22-28) The user executes one of these call controls by performing a predetermined operation. (Id, col. 1:29-30) For example, the Global System for Mobile Communications (“GSM”) has a set of standards under which pressing the “2” key then the “send” key suspends the call in progress and connects with the call received; pressing the “1” key then the “send” key disconnects the call in progress and connects with the call received; pressing the “3” key then the “send” key switches the call into a three-way call; and pressing the “0” key then the “send” key disconnects the call received and continues the call in progress. (Id, col. 1:31-38) According to the '068 patent, “these operating methods of call controls are very difficult to learn for the user, and often cause erroneous operations.” (Id, col. 1:49-51) The '068 patent relates to an invention that allows the user to easily control the connecting state of a call. (Id, col. 1:62-66) The invention provides a “control means” for displaying the “processing items” available and controlling the call into the connecting state that the user selects. (Id, col. 2:3-7) Claims 1, 7, 8, 23, and 24 are at issue. Reexamined claim 1 teaches: 1. A communication terminal device for controlling a connecting state of a call into a desired connecting state upon a predetermined operation by a user, comprising: display means for displaying processing items available to the user relative to a call; input means for selecting and determining a desired processing item out of said processing items displayed on said display means; and control means for controlling displaying of the processing items available to the user relative to a present call and to an incoming call on said display means and controlling the present call and the incoming call into a respective connecting state corresponding to the processing item selected and determined by the operation of said input means by a user, wherein said control means controls said display means to display said processing items on said display means when only a single predetermined operation key of said input means is pushed by the user. Claim 7 limits claim 1 to a control means that controls the display means “to display a list of said processing items available to the user....” (Id., col. 17:33-35) Claim 8 was amended to be independent during reexamination and incorporates the limitations of claims 1 and 7, except that it does not require that “only a single” predetermined key is pushed by the user: the “control means controls said display means to display said processing items on said display means when a predetermined operation key of said input means is pushed by the user.” Claims 23 and 24 were also rewritten during reexamination to be independent. Claim 23 teaches a method claim similar to claim 1 but in “step” form. (Id., col. 18:30-45) Claim 24 incorporates the limitations of claim 23, adding “wherein when a processing for one call is determined by said step of selecting and a processing for another call is naturally determined, said step of controlling said processing items includes listing only processing items available to said one call on said display.” 2. Claim Construction a. “[Processing items available to the user” MobileMedia asserts that “processing items available to the user” should be construed simply as “call handling actions available to the user.” (D.I. 239-1 at 10) Apple avers that the term should be restricted to “all actions available to the user for controlling the connecting state of a present call and of an incoming call.” (Id.) Apple’s construction of the term inappropriately adds language of reexamined claims 1, 6, 8, 13, and 15, which provides processing items that are available “relative to a present call and to an incoming call.” However, the term “processing items available to the user” is used in a different context in reexamined claims 23 and 24, which refer to processing items available “relative to the call on a display.” The processing items must simply allow the user to control the connecting state of a call. ('068 patent, col. 2:10-12) Therefore, it is under certain limiting claim language, not the term by itself, that the processing items must be available relative to a present call and an incoming call. In addition, Apple’s proposed construction requiring that “all actions available to user” be displayed introduces an unnecessary limitation to the term. While the specification mentions one embodiment where “all of processings available to the call are listed and itemized” (id., col. 5:57-59), the term is not so limited in the context of the claim language. Accordingly, the court construes “processing items available to the user” to mean “actions available to the user for controlling a call into a desired connecting state.” b. “[I]ncoming call” MobileMedia urges that the court construe “incoming call” to mean “a ringing or newly received call,” while Apple proposes a narrower construction, “a call is requesting a connection with the communication terminal but has not yet been connected with the communication terminal.” (D.I. 239-1 at 12) The court adopts Apple’s claim construction for “incoming call,” that is “a call that is requesting a connection with the communication terminal but has not yet been connected with the communication terminal.” The specification of the '068 patent describes an embodiment where the call control screen may be called up “even after the call has been controlled once.” ('068 patent, col. 12:49-52) In this embodiment, the connection times of one connected call and another held call are both displayed on the device, and the user may choose an operation such that “the processing is determined and the call talking is held and the call waiting is connected.” (IcL, col. 12:53-13:51) However, the specification describes these calls as “re-, ceived” or “connected” calls, not “incoming” calls. Accordingly, an incoming call is distinct from a newly received or connected call. c. “[D]isplay means for displaying processing items available to the user relative to a call” The § 112 ¶ 6 function of “display means for displaying processing items available to the user relative to a call” is “displaying processing items available to the user relative to a call.” The. corresponding structure is the “liquid crystal display” (“LCD”), or equivalents thereof. (IcL, col. 3:9-13, figs. 1, 2) d. “[A] list of said processing items” / “listing said processing items” The court construes “a list of said processing items/listing said processing items” to mean that “the processing items are grouped together in an orderly fashion.” The patent’s reference to “matrix” in the specification is not technically correct, so it is a distinction without a difference. (Id., col. 8:67, 13:4, fig. 10B) There are really only three processing items, not six, shown in figure 10B. Each row is one processing item'available to the user, even though the action in relation to each of two calls is displayed in two columns. (Id.) Thus, the use of the word “matrix” in the specification should not dictate claim construction. 3. Direct infringement MobileMedia has accused Apple’s iPhones of infringing claims 1, 7, 8, 23, and 24 of the '068 patent. Specifically, the product feature at issue is the scenario and display when a user taps the “Hold Call + Answer” icon to control the connecting state of multiple calls, a scenario that the parties call the MultipleCallConnected User Interface (“MultipleCallConnected UI”). (D.I. 364 at 21) Because the court finds that limitation lc of the patent is not practiced by this product feature and claims 7 and 8 incorporate the same limitation, the iPhones do not infringe claims 1, 7, and 8 of the '068 patent. According to testimony by both parties’ experts, the iPhones display several icons, including a “Swap” icon, “Merge Calls” icon, and “End” icon, when a user taps the “Hold Call + Answer” icon. (D.I. 331 at A1191-93; D.I. 335 at ex. A; D.I. 365 at M677-78) MobileMedia’s theory of infringement accuses only the scenario when the “Swap,” “Merge Calls,” and “End” icons are displayed in response to the user tapping the “Hold Call + Answers” icon— in other words, when the display changes with action from the user. (D.I. 332 at 32-33) The dispute over the infringement of claims 1, 7, arid 8 is two-fold: whether the “Hold Call + Answer” icon is a single “predetermined operation key” according to limitation Id and whether the “Swap,” “Merge Calls,” and “End” icons are “processing items available to the user relative to a present call and to an incoming call” according to limitation lc. Each party points to its claim construction for its position. The court finds that limitation lc, which requires, in relevant part, that “processing items [be] available to the user relative to a present call and to an incoming call,” is dispositive. The “Swap,” “Merge Calls,” and “End” icons are “processing items available to the user” under the court’s construction of that term. However, the language of limitation lc restricts the processing items to ones that are available to the user “relative to a present call and to an incoming call.” An “incoming call,” as construed, is a call that is requesting a connection but has not yet been connected. Therefore, for purposes of limitation lc, the processing items must be available to a first connected call and a second call that is requesting a connection but has not yet been connected. The undisputed facts show that the “Swap,” “Merge Calls,” and “End” icons are available relative to two already-connected calls — one active and one on hold— rather than one connected call and one “incoming call.” Because the second call being held in the MultipleCallConnected UI scenario is not an “incoming call” pursuant to the construction of that term, the iPhones do not practice limitation lc. Dependent claim 7 and reexamined claim 8 both include the same limitation of processing items available to the user relative to a present call and to an incoming call, so they are similarly not infringed. Therefore, Apple’s iPhones do not infringe claims 1, 7, and 8 of the '068 patent. Claims 23 and 24, however, do not include the limitation that the processing items be available “relative to a present call and to an incoming call.” They only require that the processing items are available to the user “relative to the call on a display.” The “Swap,” “Merge Calls,” and “End” icons are processing items available to two already-connected calls that are shown on the display. (See D.I. 330 at 30) As such, those icons read onto the limitation “displaying processing items available to the user relative to the call on a display,” and the court must address the parties’ other contentions regarding infringement of claims 23 and 24. The parties do not dispute that the “Hold Call + Answer” icon displayed on the iPhones is a “predetermined selection operation.” The only issue for purposes of infringement is whether that icon constitutes a “single” predetermined selection operation; Apple avers that it does not. Apple’s argument is relevant to claim 23 but not claim 24 because claim 24 does not include language requiring a “only a single” predetermined selection operation. MobileMedia’s expert, Dr. Meldal, asserts that the grid area above the “Hold Call + Answer” icon meets the limitation for a single predetermined selection operation. (D.I. 335 at ex. A, ¶ 181; D.I. 365 at M680) Whether the “Hold Call + Answer” icon constitutes “only a single” predetermined selection operation, therefore, is a question of fact that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Finally, with respect to claims 23 and 24, Apple argues that the iPhones do not display the accused processing items in a “list,” as required by both claims. (D.I. 412 at 18-19) The court has construed “a list of said processing items/listing said processing items” to mean “the processing items are grouped together in an orderly fashion.” Apple has argued that the accused processing items are displayed in a 3-by-2 matrix, “with no singular or linear relationship.” (D.I. 412 at 18) However, the undisputed facts show that the icons are arranged in an orderly fashion and meet the “list” limitation, as construed. In light of the foregoing, the court denies summary judgment of non-infringement of claims 23 and 24. Summary judgment of non-infringement of claims 1, 7, and 8 is granted. 4. Invalidity MobileMedia claims, and Apple does not dispute, a March 19, 1996 priority date for the '068 patent, based on foreign filing. (D.I. 323 at 15; D.I. 324 at A6) Apple asserts that all of the asserted claims of the '068 patent are invalid for anticipation and obviousness in light of a video that the parties call the Orbitor Video, publicly available by December 1992. (D.I. 323 at 15-16; D.I. 324 at A316-18) The parties agree that the Orbitor Video discloses a communication terminal device that displays processing items like “Hold,” “Actions,” and “Hang Up” and controls the call into the corresponding connecting state. (D.I. 324 at A716) Rather, they dispute whether the Orbitor Video discloses an LCD display as the “display means” and whether the Orbitor Video discloses claim limitation Id, “wherein said control means controls said display means to display said processing items on said display means when only a single predetermined operation key of said input means is pushed by the user.” Because limitation Id is dispositive, the court:does not determine whether the Orbitor Video discloses an LCD display or whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the display to be an LCD. According to both parties’ proposed constructions of “to display said processing items on said display means when a predetermined operation key is pushed by the user,” claim limitation Id requires an action from the user for the device to display processing items. (D.I. 239-1 at 11) The parties also agree that the Orbitor Video discloses the feature that “when the Orbitor device is on a call and receives an incoming second [call], it displays processing items such as Answer,’ with no action required from the user.” (D.I. 332 at 32; D.I. 375 at 16-17) (emphasis added) The Orbitor Video, therefore, cannot anticipate claim limitation Id. Apple claims, in the alternative, that the Orbitor Video renders the limitation obvious. Without providing support, Apple avers that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have found it obvious to add the minimal feature of pushing a predetermined operation key to trigger the display of processing items.” (D.I. 323 at 20) Such a conclusory assertion is insufficient to raise a question of fact and is not helpful to the court’s invalidity analysis. Apple devotes the remainder of its discussion of obviousness to arguing that MobileMedia’s position on validity conflicts with its position on infringement and that, if the court were to accept MobileMedia’s infringement theory, “the Orbitor Video discloses the same functionality and anticipates” the limitation. (See D.I. 323 at 19; D.I. 375 at 16-17) The court, however, does not find that MobileMedia’s infringement position conflicts with its position on validity. MobileMedia has made it clear that it is not accusing Apple’s iPhones of infringing under a scenario where there is no action required from the user but, rather, when certain icons are displayed on the iPhones in response to user action. (D.I. 332 at 32-33) There being no genuine issue of fact, the court finds that the Orbitor Video neither anticipates nor renders obvious claim limitation Id of the '068 patent. Because dependent claim 7 is dependent from claim 1 and claims 8, 23, and 24 incorporate limitation Id, the court finds that none of the asserted claims of the '068 patent are invalid. The court grants MobileMedia’s motion for no invalidity. B. The '075 Patent 1. Technology The '075 patent, titled “Method and Apparatus for Incoming Call Rejection,” was issued on June 26, 2001 and claims priority to a provisional application filed May 19, 1998. An ex parte reexamination certificate was issued on March 20, 2012. The reexamination resulted in cancellation of claims 1-4, amendment of claims 10, 13, and 14, and confirmation of claims 5-9, 11-12, and 14. The '075 patent relates to call processing techniques for rejecting incoming calls in cellular telecommunications systems. ('075 patent, col. 1:15-16) Conventionally, “wireless telecommunications systems are made up of a series of base stations connected to landline telecommunications networks----” (Id., col. 1:31-33) These base stations communicate by base station controllers and can establish radio frequency (“RF”) communications channels with remote mobile phones. (Id., col. 1:34-37) When a person attempts to call a mobile phone user who is in the geographic coverage area of the wireless system, “the base station acts as an intermediary by [sending a call alert to] the mobile via at least one RF channfel.” (Id., col. 2:1-3) Thereafter, the base station waits for a fixed time period, or a ringing cycle, to receive a response from the mobile device. (Id., col. 2:3-6) If the mobile phone user answers the call, the mobile phone (or “mobile”) sends a response to the base station, which sets up a connection over an existing or new RF channel. (Id., col. 2:13-18) If the user does not answer the call, “the base station releases the call by terminating the call alert to the mobile and signaling to the caller that the mobile is unavailable.” (Id., col. 2:7-10) According to the '075 patent, the wireless telecommunications system did not provide users the option to reject calls immediately on demand, so a user must either have powered off the mobile phone or allowed the. phone to ring through the entire ringing cycle. (Id., col. 2:86-53) To address this need, the '075 patent teaches a method and apparatus that allow a user of a mobile communications device to automatically or manually reject calls. (Id., col. 3:32-47) During reexamination, independent claim 1 and claims 2 through 4, which were dependent from claim 1, were rejected, so the reexamined patent only relates to the rejection of incoming calls while the device is “in communication with a first calling station,” or already connected to a first call. (See id., claims 10, 15) In one embodiment, the apparatus comprises an input actuator, a rejection memory, and a message processor. • (Id. at col. 3:57-59) The- user can preprogram caller identification information into the rejection memory, ánd incoming calls are thereafter automatically compared to that memory to determine which calls should be rejected. (Id., col. 3:59-61) The preprogrammed list of callers in rejection memory may contain “wild card” characters or partial entries to reject entire groups of callers. (Id., col. 5:21-27) Alternatively, the user may manually trigger transmission of the rejection message from the device. (Id., col. 6:30-49) Once either an automatic or manual determination is made to reject an incoming call, the message processor “immediately transmitís]” a rejection message to the base station to release the call. (Id., col. 4:1-5) Claims 5, 6, and 10 are at issue. Claim 5 and reexamined claim 10 teach a method and apparatus, respectively, for automatically rejecting an incoming call to a mobile phone while the phone is connected to a first calling station. The claims are reproduced below: 5. A method of rejecting an incoming call to a mobile phone, said mobile phone having a transceiver circuit for transmitting and receiving transmissions to and from a remote transceiver, said mobile phone in communication with a first calling station via the remote transceiver on a communication channel in a wireless system, said method comprising the steps of: receiving at the mobile phone, a transmission from the remote transceiver signifying that there is an incoming call; determining at the mobile phone if said incoming call is to be rejected; and transmitting from the mobile phone a rejection message to the remote transceiver in response to a determination being made, during' said step of determining,-that said incoming call is to be rejected, said rejection message comprising at least one information element indicating to the wireless system that the wireless system is to immediately release the incoming call on the communication channel between the mobile phone and remote transceiver. 10. In a mobile communications device, apparatus in communication with a first calling station for selectably rejecting an incoming call, said apparatus comprising: a transceiver operable to send and receive transmissions to and from a remote transceiver in a wireless system on a communication channel, said transceiver for receiving a transmission signifying that an incoming call is being attempted; and a control processor coupled to said transceiver, said control processor for determining if said incoming call is to be rejected and, in response to a positive determination, said control processor for outputting a rejection message to said transceiver for transmission to said remote transceiver, wherein said rejection message comprises at least one information element indicating to the wireless system that the wireless system is to immediately release the incoming call on the communication channel between the mobile communications device and remote transceiver. Dependent claim 6 teaches the method of claim 5, “wherein the mobile phone includes an actuator operable by a user for inputting a manual input to the mobile phone.” 2. Claim Construction a. “[Rjejection message” The court construes “rejection message” as “a single communication sufficient to cause the base station to ‘immediately release the incoming call.’ ” Even if there are multiple communications leading up to the “release,” there ultimately is only one message from the user that communicates the decision to “reject.” ('075 patent, col. 6:6-9) The term “rejection message” is always singular in the patent. Given the above, the general rule that “a” or “an” can indicate plural, see Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2008), does not apply in this context. b. “[T]he wireless system is to immediately release the incoming call on the communication channel between the mobile phone and the remote transceiver” The court construes “the wireless system is to immediately release the incoming call on the communication channel between the mobile phone and the remote transceiver” as follows: “the wireless system must, without requiring any additional action by or communication from the mobile phone, ‘release the incoming call on the communication channel between the mobile phone and remote transceiver.’” The specification describes this step of the method not in temporal terms but in terms of what the base station does upon receipt of the rejection message. ('075 patent, col. 6:10-19) That is, the base station sends a release message to the mobile phone over the communication channel. (Id.) Therefore, the “immediately release” language only indicates that the wireless system ' does not require any additional action by or communication from the mobile phone. c. “Actuator” The parties dispute whether “actuator” must be a mechanical device or whether it can simply be “a thing that actuates.” (D.I. 239-1 at 1) Apple takes the former position and MobileMedia the latter. (Id.) The court does not adopt either party’s proposed construction and construes “actuator” instead as “functional element that controls the flow of energy.” The drawings and specification do not limit “actuator” to a mechanical input. For instance, in figure 4 of the '075 patent, the manual input is simply labeled as “user interaction 422.” The only reference to this user interaction provides: “If the user decides to manually reject the call, a manual rejection input can be activated as shown in block 422. This manual rejection input is detected as shown at 615.” ('075 patent, col. 10:59-11:9) (emphasis added) Elsewhere in the specification, it provides that the user indicates a call rejection “by, for example, pressing a button on keypad 112 or some other available input actuator.” (Id., col. 6:30-42) Given that claim 6 is a method (not an apparatus) claim, there is no support for the suggestion that an actuator must be a mechanical device. 3. Direct infringement MobileMedia has accused Apple’s iPhones of infringing the '075 patent. The relevant basic functionality of these products is not in dispute. (D.I. 330 at 7; D.I. 364 at 6) According to both parties, to decline an incoming second call while on a first call, a user can tap “decline” or “ignore” on the touchscreen of one of the accused products. (D.I. 330 at 7) The phone and cellular network then exchange a series of messages before the incoming call is released: (1) a “disconnect” request is sent from the phone to the network base; (2) a “release message” is sent from the network base to the phone; and (3) an incoming call is released by the network after the base receives a “release complete” message from the phone. (Id.) Apple asserts that the accused iPhones do not infringe any of the asserted claims of the '075 patent. Apple contends that (1) the “disconnect” message does not constitute a “rejection message” because it directs the wireless system to initiate procedures to release an incoming call, rather than cause a base station to “immediately release” that incoming call; (2) its users, not Apple itself, practice the step of “determining” if an incoming call is to be rejected; and (3) for claim 6, the touch screen icons on the iPhones are not “actuators.” (D.I. 330 at 8-17) Given the undisputed facts and claim construction, the court finds that the iPhones practice the limitation of claims 5, 6, and 10 for “determining [at the mobile phone] if said incoming call is to be rejected,” as well as the “actuator” limitation of claim 6. The parties have agreed that the “determining” limitation should be construed as “determining or deciding [at the mobilei phone] if the incoming call is to be rejected, wherein there is a choice to reject or not reject the incoming call.” (D.I. 239-1 at 1) Neither the construed term nor any language in the '075 patent requires a user to perform the “determining” step, as Apple argues. Claims 5 and 10 teach automatic rejection of a second incoming call; claim 10 even explicitly calls for a control processor to perform the “determining” step. According to the specification, “[t]he determination occurs when the mobile phone compares the caller ID information ... to information stored in rejection memory.... If a match is detected, the mobile phone transmits a rejection message to the base station .... ” ('075 patent, col. 9:18-23) Additionally, the court’s construction of “actuator” renders Apple’s arguments requiring a mechanical or push-button component moot. As such, the iPhones’ touch screen practices the “actuator” limitation of claim 6. The court thus focuses on Apple’s assertion that each accused rejection message of the iPhone is not a “rejection message,” as that term is used in the patent, because it directs the wireless system to initiate procedures to release an incoming call rather than cause a base station to “immediately release” that incoming call. (D.I. 330 at 8-17) MobileMedia argues that the “disconnect” message, the “release complete” message, and the entire exchange of messages each constitute rejection messages. (D.I. 364 at 7) In addition, MobileMedia avers that there is one more way, besides the exchange of messages, for the accused iPhones to release a call: a “disconnect” message allegedly causes a timer to start and, if the timer expires before the base station receives any additional communication from the phone, then the call control entity of the network releases the connection. (Id. at 9-10) MobileMedia argues that the release can occur through the timer without requiring any additional action by, or communication from, the mobile phone. (Id. at 10) Apple, in its reply brief, disputes MobileMedia’s timer theory as unsupported and contends that, even if it were the case, it would not practice the limitation of “immediately” releasing the incoming call. (D.I. 412 at 8) According to the construction of “rejection message,” the “disconnect message” constitutes a rejection message. Therefore, the “rejection message” limitation is practiced. It is less clear whether the incoming call is “immediately released.” The undisputed facts show that one way an incoming call to the accused iPhones can be released is for an exchange of messages to take place after the “disconnect” message is sent. This does not meet the “immediately release” limitation, as construed, because it requires additional communication from the iPhones. MobileMedia’s timer theory, however, may meet the “immediately release” limitation, depending on how it works with the “disconnect message.” Apple disputes how the release functions and how it would fit the claim limitations. (D.I. 412 at 8) The iPhones’ ability to release calls after the expiry of a timer, therefore, raises a question of fact regarding whether the iPhones practice the “immediately release” limitation. In light of the foregoing, the court denies Apple’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement of claims 5, 6, and 10 of the '075 patent. 4. Invalidity MobileMedia claims, and Apple does hot dispute, a priority date of May 7, 1998 for the '075 patent based on a related provisional application. (D.I. 323 at 25) Apple asserts as prior art two GSM documents— GSM 04.08 and GSM 04.83 (collectively, “the GSM documents”) — and the '068 patent, which is also a patent-in-suit. (Id.) GSM 04.08 pertains to “[m]obile radio interface layer 3 specification,” and GSM 04.83 pertains to call waiting and call hold services. (D.I. 324 at A289, A312) Both were published in February 1995. (Id.) The '068 patent was issued May 30, 2000 from an application filed March 17, 1997 and claims priority to a March 19, 1996 foreign application. (JA 109-29) During reexamination of the '075 patent, the examiner rejected the asserted claims in light of a draft version of GSM 04.08 because the draft version of GSM 04.08 “describes a method for selectively rejecting an incoming call to a mobile phone.” (JA4797) To overcome rejection, MobileMedia explained that, while the draft version of GSM 04.08 discloses a method of rejecting an incoming call, it does not disclose the method for rejecting a second incoming call on a mobile phone that is already in communication with a first calling station; it explained and amended its claims accordingly. (JA4806, JA4876-78, JA4882-84, JA4893-94, JA4906) MobileMedia agrees that the draft version of GSM 04.08 and the GSM 04.08 document asserted as prior art are similar in all material respects. (D.I. 332 at 38) Thus, GSM 04.08 also discloses selectively rejecting a first incoming call to a mobile phone. Meanwhile, GSM 04.83 discloses a scenario when a mobile phone that is in communication with a first calling station receives a second incoming call. (D.I. 324 at A315) MobileMedia characterizes the scenario that GSM 04.83 discloses ,as a “call waiting” feature. (D.I. 332 at 38) Apple details how all of the limitations of the asserted claims are allegedly present in the two GSM documents. (D.I. 323 at 30-34) MobileMedia purports generally that there are genuine disputed facts, including (1) “whether the prior art discloses a choice to reject or not reject an incoming call,” and (2) “whether GSM 04.08 discloses sending [the] rejection message when the mobile phone is in communication with a first calling station.'” (D.I. 332 at 38) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) It then goes on to state, without proffering any further support, that “even the combination of these [GSM documents] does not disclose the claimed inventions. Nowhere in the two references is there a disclosure of a mobile phone transmitting a rejection message to reject an incoming call when that mobile phone is already in communication with a first calling station.” (Id. at 39) (internal quotation marks omitted) These assertions do not raise genuine factual disputes. First, the PTO examiner on reexamination found that the method and apparatus taught in claims 1 through 4 for rejecting a first incoming call were anticipated by the draft of GSM 04.08. (D.I. 385 at JA 4797-98) This finding necessarily included the limitation .of “determining” whether or not to reject an incoming call, the same limitation as in the asserted claims. In fact, GSM 04.08 discloses a user choice to reject or not reject an incoming call: “if the mobile user wishes to refuse the call, a RELEASE COMPLETE message shall be sent with cause # 21 ‘call rejected.’ ” (D.I. 324 at A301, § 5.2.2.3.1) Second, neither party asserts that “GSM 04.08 discloses rejecting an incoming call when the mobile phone is in communication with a first calling station.” GSM 04.08 and GSM 04.83, whether viewed as one anticipatory reference or in combination with ordinary skill in the art, allegedly invalidate the asserted claims. GSM 04.08 discloses sending a rejection message, and GSM 04.83 discloses the “call waiting” scenario when a user in communication with a first calling station receives a second incoming call. Accordingly, the GSM documents together disclose all of the limitations of the asserted claims of the '075 patent. The only remaining issues, upon which the parties focus in their briefing, are (1) whether it would be appropriate to view the documents as one anticipatory reference, or (2) alternatively, whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would find it obvious to combine them, alone or with the '068 patent. a. Anticipation It would be inappropriate for the court to view GSM 04.08 and GSM 04.83 as one reference; therefore, the '075 patent is not anticipated. Section 1.1 of GSM 04.83 states that, when a mobile station is already on a first call and receives a second incoming call, “the network and the mobile station shall act in accordance with ... GSM 04.08.” (D.I. 324 at A315) Apple avers that this language constitutes an explicit incorporation by reference of GSM 04.08 into GSM 04.83. (D.I. 323 at 28) When faced with multiple GSM documents, however, the Federal Circuit has held that “the GSM standard is not a single reference.” Kyocera Wireless Corp., 545 F.3d at 1351. The Court reasoned that the various GSM documents “were authored by different subsets of authors at different times” and have separate titles and page numbering. Id. Consequently, “[e]ach specification, though part of the greater GSM standard, stands as a separate document in its own right.” Id. “This court has been clear that in order for one document to incorporate another do