Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ORLANDO L. GARCIA, District Judge. Petitioner Manuel Garza,- Jr., filed this federal habeas corpus action pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 challenging his October, 2002 Bexar County conviction for capital murder and sentence of death. For the reasons set forth hereinafter, petitioner is entitled to neither federal habeas corpus relief nor a Certificate of Appealability from this Court. I. Background A. The Offense in Petitioner’s Own Words There is no legitimate doubt as to the events of February 2, 2001 that resulted in the death of San Antonio Police Officer John “Rocky” Riojas. Within hours of his arrest on February 4, 2001, petitioner gave a voluntary, written statement in which he gave two, slightly different, accounts of how he fatally shot officer Riojas while violently resisting an otherwise lawful arrest on outstanding warrants. Two days later, on February 6, 2001, petitioner gave a second written statement concerning his fatal shooting of officer Riojas. In this second statement, in addition to furnishing additional background information, petitioner gave a third, more elaborate, account of his fatal shooting of officer Riojas which, in pertinent part, states as follows: After I called Gilbert, I was walking back to the apartments and I seen the cop. The cop was in a marked car but without the lights. The car had the San Antonio Police Department markings on it so I knew he was a cop. I walked across the street and I saw the cop go by and I saw the cop make a U-turn. I knew the cop was gonna stop me because I was wearing all black. I knew the cop was gonna arrest me because I knew I had outstanding warrants. I knew I had an MTR for Escape and some other warrants for Burglary of a Vehicle and warrants for possession of marijuana. The cop stopped me when he got out of his car about two feet from his car. The cop asked me to come to him and he asked me if I lived there and I told him no. The cop asked me my name and I gave him a fake name of Manuel Garcia. Once I gave him the fake name I seen the cop look towards his car, he was still standing by his door and I thought at that point that the cop was gonna check on me. I knew he’d find out about the warrants and I didn’t want to go to jail so I just ran. Right before I ran the cop told me to put my hands on the car. I knew that that was it and I ran. I never put my hands on the cop’s car. I gave the cop the false name so he wouldn’t find the warrants. I had my wallet but my wallet had a fake ID in it under another name. As I started running the cop was telling me to stop. I just wanted to get away. I knew I was gonna go to jail and I didn’t want that. Who wants to be in jail? The cop was on my ass chasing me. The cop was close to me the whole time. He only told me to stop once though. I continued to run through the apartments until I got by some mailboxes. I finally stopped running because I was tired. The cop was right there and he grabbed my right hand and he punched me in the mouth. I grabbed the cop in a hug and I put both my arms around him and we started wrestling and we both fell to the ground. When we fell to the ground I was on the bottom and the cop was on top of me. I was on my back and the cop was on top of me his stomach to me. We started rolling around on the ground fighting. I was getting the officer on the ground and the officer was getting me on the ground. I was fighting so hard with the officer that the next day my whole body hurt. I was so sore I couldn’t hardly move. I don’t recall if we were saying anything or not. Finally I seen the officer get his gun out. I was on my back on the ground and the officer was kneeling over me and he had his hand on me holding me down and I saw the officer pulling his gun. When the officer pulled his gun out. I was able to get my hands on his gun. I was able to twist around and the cop fell on his back. I had my hand on his gun and he had his hand on the gun and the gun was out in front of us. I had my left hand on his gun and the cop had his gun in his right hand. I grabbed the cop’s right wrist with my right hand and I grabbed the gun in my left hand. I was pulling forward with my left hand and pulling the cops right hand back away from the gun. The cop was trying to hold me down but he was trying to keep his gun too. I had a better angle and position and I was able to pull the gun out of the cop’s hand. I was able to crawl away a few feet and I got up on my knees. The cop came up behind me and he reached around and he grabbed my arm that had the gun in it. I still had the gun in my left hand and the cop was still trying to get the gun. I wanted to get away and the cop was holding me to where I had to reach over and the gun was pointing his way over my right shoulder- and the gun went off as the cop was grabbing it. When I pulled the trigger the cop’s body was against mine. When the gun went off I couldn’t hear nothing. My face didn’t burn but my ear hurted bad in the inside. My ear was ringing so bad that when the guy that took me home was trying to talk to me I couldn’t hear him. After I shot the cop fell right down. I only fired one shot. I didn’t fall but he did. I got up and I never even looked at the cop. I ran back into the apartments to where I was at before. I think I went to Albert’s first but I know I went to Tonya’s. I want to say to the media and to the officer’s family and everybody out there that this wasn’t intentional and I truly think this was the cop’s fault. I don’t see why he wanted to pull out his gun. I want to say to the judge and the jury to please do justice and please have mercy on me and give me the benefit of the doubt. I don’t think I should get death or life in prison. I think I deserve something under that. I need a lot of help about how to do life. I wasn’t raised right. B. Indictment On April 11, 2001, a Bexar County grand jury indicted petitioner in cause no. 2001-CR-1877 on a single Count of capital murder, to wit, intentionally and knowingly causing the death of officer Riojas by shooting Riojas with a deadly weapon, i.e., a firearm, while Riojas was in the lawful discharge of an official duty and petitioner knew Riojas was a police officer. C. Appointment of Defense Counsel The state trial court appointed attorneys Raymond E. Fuchs and Edward Camara, Jr. as counsel for petitioner. On July 11, 2002, attorney Fuchs filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for petitioner. The state trial court granted said motion. On July 19, 2002, the trial court appointed attorney Vincent D. Callahan as counsel for petitioner. Petitioner filed both an unsuccessful objection in the trial court and an unsuccessful mandamus action in a state appellate court challenging the ex parte the substitution of attorney Fuchs with attorney Callahan. In re Manuel Garza, 2002 WL 1856712 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, August 14, 2002). D. Guilt-Innocence Phase of Trial The guilt-innocence phase of petitioner’s capital murder trial commenced October 15, 2002. 1. The Prosecution’s Case In addition to petitioner’s statements excerpted above, the prosecution presented testimony from (1) various law enforcement personnel regarding communications officer Riojas had with other officers immediately before his fatal shooting and the evidence collected following the discovery of officer Riojas’ body immediately after the fatal shooting, (2) a pair of civilian eyewitnesses to the fatal shooting, (3) two acquaintances of the petitioner regarding petitioner’s appearance and conduct immediately after the fatal shooting, (4) the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Riojas’ body, (5) petitioner’s brother-in-law and sister regarding petitioner’s disposition of the murder weapon and petitioner’s behavior and statements in the days after the murder, (6) a forensic serologist regarding the presence of DNA consistent with Riojas on petitioner’s clothing and a necklace found at the crime scene, (7) a firearms examiner regarding the safeties and trigger pull on Riojas’ Glock police pistol, (8) the San Antonio Police Detective who took petitioner’s written statements, (9) a pair of San Antonio Police Officers who witnessed petitioner make post-arrest threats against other officers. 2. The Defense’s Case The defense called (1) a civilian employee of the San Antonio Police Department who testified, at the time petitioner executed his first written statement, the petitioner said his shooting of Riojas had been accidental, (2) a trace evidence analyst regarding the absence of gunshot residue on petitioner’s jacket/trench coat, (3) an acquaintance of petitioner who saw petitioner the evening of the fatal shooting, (4) a second trace evidence analyst regarding the presence of gunshot residue on Riojas’ clothing, (5) a friend of petitioner who was stopped by officer Riojas days before the fatal shooting and asked about petitioner’s whereabouts, (6) a friend of petitioner who witnessed the beginning of the confrontation between petitioner and officer Riojas (but not the fatal shooting) and who had also been questioned by Riojas in the days before the fatal shooting regarding petitioner’s whereabouts, and (7) a former BCADC inmate who once overheard petitioner screaming “help me, help me,” while both were in custody. 3. The Verdict On October 24, 2002, after deliberating less than three hours, petitioner’s jury returned its verdict, finding petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of capital murder. E. Punishment Phase of Trial The punishment phase of petitioner’s capital murder trial commenced on October 25, 2002. 1. The Prosecution’s Evidence The prosecution presented police officers and lay witnesses who testified regarding a wide variety of crimes committed by petitioner, both as a juvenile and adult, including (1) the February 20, 1995 attempted burglary of an apartment, (2) the April 2, 1995 theft of a motor vehicle and an ensuring vehicle chase, (3) the May 6, 1995 attempted burglary of a vehicle, (4) the October 19, 1995 theft of a motor vehicle, (5) the November 9, 1995 burglary of a habitation, (6) the November 18, 1995 theft of a motor vehicle, (7) the February 21, 1996 theft of a motor vehicle, (8) the February 29, 1996 burglary of a habitation, (9) the October 10, 1997 arrest of petitioner on a youth commission warrant, at which time petitioner was found on school property in the possession of three knives and a screwdriver, (10) the October 20, 1997 search of petitioner’s bedroom at his uncle and aunt’s home during which search police found a wealth of stolen property and a Glock pistol and two loaded magazines, (11) petitioner’s December 24, 1997 escape from a juvenile halfway house, (12) petitioner’s December 29, 1997 theft and burglary of a motor vehicle, (13) petitioner’s December 31, 1997 to January 1, 1998 theft of a motor vehicle and the ensuing high speed chase and crash of the stolen vehicle, (14) petitioner’s January 29, 1999 theft of a vehicle and destruction of the football field at petitioner’s former high school, (15) petitioner’s January 30, 1999 burglary of a vehicle, (16) petitioner’s theft and burglary of a vehicle on March 5, 1999, (17) petitioner’s theft and burglary of a vehicle on April 15, 1999, (18) petitioner’s May 5, 1999 theft of a pair- of expensive tennis shoes from a department store, (19) petitioner’s July 1, 1999 unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and the ensuing high speed chase through a residential community, (20) petitioner’s July 6, 2000 escape from custody following arrest and the extensive search leading to petitioner’s re-arrest on outstanding warrants, (21) petitioner’s burglary of a vehicle on October 16, 2000, (22) petitioner’s October 31, 2000 arrest on charges of driving while under the influence, without a valid driver’s license or proof of insurance, and possession of marijuana, (23) petitioner’s burglaries, with others, of several vehicles in the same apartment complex on November 29, 2000 and the ensuing high speed chase that led to petitioner’s arrest and subsequent written confession that he had burglarized three vehicles, (24) petitioner’s January 9, 2001 burglary of a vehicle, and (25) petitioner’s second burglary on January 24, 2001 of one of the same vehicles he had burglarized on November 29, 2000. The prosecution also presented documentary evidence establishing the petitioner had been convicted on separate occasions of multiple charges of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, as well as charges of theft, escape, evading arrest, theft, criminal mischief, resisting arrest, and unlawfully carrying a weapon. A copy of petitioner’s juvenile conviction records was also admitted into evidence, along with a complete copy of petitioner’s Texas Youth Commission file. A San Antonio Police Officer testified that, following petitioner’s arrest on February 4, 2001, he observed petitioner displaying a cocky demeanor and saw petitioner make a slashing gesture across his neck and flashing gang signs. 2. The Defense’s Evidence Petitioner’s uncle (the brother of petitioner’s mother) testified, in pertinent part, that (1) he was close to petitioner while petitioner was young, (2) petitioner was a good student in elementary school, (3) petitioner’s mother was “always a good mother,” (4) petitioner’s father was sent to prison and was never around when petitioner was growing up, (5) petitioner continued to do well in school even after his father went to prison, (6) petitioner’s father died from an overdose of heroin after being released from prison, (7) he never saw petitioner’s father use drugs in front of petitioner or the other children, (8) petitioner was not trying to impress people or imitate his father by stealing cars, (9) he heard a little bit about abuse by petitioner’s father, (10) petitioner’s mother was a good person who raised her children correctly, made sure her children had food when they were hungry and a roof over their heads, (11) petitioner had “every advantage from his mother that a child could have,” (12) he was proud of his sister’s efforts to raise her children, and (13) he had been to prison himself but was the only adult male in petitioner’s life other than petitioner’s father. Petitioner’s older sister testified, in pertinent part, that (1) their mother was good but their father was not good, (2) their father was very abusive toward their mother, (3) their father was verbally and physically abusive toward her and petitioner, (4) their father sexually abused her when she was seven years old and the petitioner was “poisoned” when she told petitioner what their father had done to her, (5) their father went to prison twice when they were growing up and did not live with their family after he was released the second time, (6) petitioner had to repeat the seventh grade but was a good student, (7) petitioner had no adult male role models, (8) two or three relatives of their mother went to prison, all of their father’s brothers went to prison, but their mother has never been to prison, (9) their father died of a drug overdose and petitioner took his death very hard, (10) petitioner was very peaceful when in custody in the Texas Youth Commission and in state prison, (11) petitioner knows the difference between right and wrong and would not be a danger to society if given a sentence of life imprisonment, and (12) she had no knowledge regarding the details of petitioner’s criminal record. Petitioner’s mother testified, in pertinent part, that (1) she was eighteen when petitioner was born, (2) their family moved at least once a year because petitioner’s father was using drugs, (3) petitioner’s father did drugs (heroin) in front of their children, (4) petitioner’s father was not a good provider or a good husband and was physically abusive toward their children, striking petitioner often, (5) petitioner’s father went to prison four or five times, (6) petitioner was hurt when his father was released from prison but did not live with their family, (7) petitioner had to repeat the seventh grade but was a good student, (8) petitioner began acting out and hurting himself when his father died, (9) petitioner wanted more than she could furnish or provide, (10) petitioner was peaceful when incarcerated and would not be a danger to society if imprisoned, (11) petitioner attended a lot of elementary schools, (12) she had no knowledge of petitioner using drugs, and (13) she filed a formal complaint with Child Protective Services after she learned her husband had sexually abused their daughter. 3. The Verdict On October 29, 2002, after deliberating just over two and a half hours, the jury returned its verdict at the punishment phase of petitioner’s capital murder trial, finding (1) beyond a reasonable doubt there was a probability the petitioner would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society and (2) taking into consideration all the evidence, including the circumstances of the offense and the petitioner’s character and personal moral culpability, there were not sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed. The state trial court imposed sentence in accordance with the verdict. F. Direct Appeal Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence, asserting six points of error. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed petitioner’s conviction and sentence in an unpublished opinion. Garza v. State, AP 74,467, 2005 WL 395442 (Tex.Crim. App. February 16, 2005). Petitioner did not thereafter seek certiorari review of his conviction or sentence from the United States Supreme Court. G. First State Habeas Corpus Proceeding On October 25, 2004, petitioner filed his first state habeas corpus application, urging thirteen claims therein. The state habeas trial court held an evidentiary hearing in petitioner’s first state habeas corpus proceeding on March 24, 2008, March 31, 2008, and April 23, 2008 during which the parties presented the testimony of petitioner’s paternal uncle Raul Gonzales, Jr., clinical psychologist Dr. Jack Ferrell, petitioner’s co-counsel at trial — attorney Ed Camara, sociologist Dr. Katherine Allen, and petitioner’s lead trial counsel — attorney Vincent D. Callahan. In an Order issued September 22, 2008, the state habeas trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended that petitioner’s first state habeas corpus application be denied. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the trial court’s findings and conclusions and denied state habeas relief in an unpublished order. Ex parte Manuel Garza, WR-70,797-01, 2008 WL 5245545 (Tex.Crim.App. December 17, 2008). H. Initial Proceedings in this Court On December 16, 2009, petitioner Sled his original petition for federal habeas corpus relief in this Court, along with a voluminous set of exhibits thereto. Docket entry nos. 11-12. On January 7, 2010, petitioner filed a motion to stay, requesting abeyance of proceedings in this Court to permit petitioner to return to state court and exhaust state habeas corpus remedies on a variety of new claims and new evidence never previously presented to any state court. Docket entry no. IS. This Court granted that request in an Order issued February 18, 2010. Docket entry no. 17. I. Second State Habeas Corpus Proceeding On June 17, 2010, petitioner filed his second state habeas corpus application. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed petitioner’s second state habeas corpus application “as an abuse of the writ without considering the merits of the claims.” Ex parte Manuel Garza, WR 70,797-02, 2011 WL 4826968 (Tex.Crim. App. October 12, 2011). J. Return to this Court On January 26, 2012, petitioner filed his amended federal habeas corpus petition together with all of the voluminous documents he had attached to his second state habeas corpus application. Docket entry nos. 29-30. On March 26, 2012, respondent filed his answer to petitioner’s amended petition, arguing in part that petitioner had procedurally defaulted on a portion of petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims by failing to raise same in the state courts until petitioner’s second state habeas corpus proceeding. Docket entry no. 31. II. Standard of Review Because petitioner filed his federal habeas corpus action after- the effective date of the AJEDPA, this Court’s review of petitioner’s claims for federal habeas corpus relief is governed by the AEDPA. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 1918, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001). Under the AEDPA standard of review, this Court cannot grant petitioner federal habeas corpus relief in this cause in connection with any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, unless the adjudication of that claim either: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on ah unreasonable determination of'the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S.Ct. 1432, 1438, 161 L.Ed.2d 334 (2005); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Supreme Court has concluded the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(1) have independent meanings. Bell v. Cone, 535-U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1850, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant relief if (1) the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or (2) the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. at 141, 125 S.Ct. at 1438; Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16, 124 S.Ct. 7, 10, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ our clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases’ or it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.’ ”). A state court’s failure to cite governing Supreme Court authority does not, per se, establish the state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law: “the state court need not even be aware of our precedents, ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decisions contradicts them.’ ” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. at 16, 124 S.Ct. at 10. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant relief if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner’s case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. at 141, 125 S.Ct. at 1439; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2534-35, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). A federal court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 132-33, 130 S.Ct. 665, 673, 175 L.Ed.2d 582 (2010) (“A federal habeas court can only set. aside a state-court decision as ‘an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law,’ § 2254(d)(1), if the state court’s application of that law is ‘objectively unreasonable.’ ”); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 520-21, 123 S.Ct. at 2535. The focus of this inquiry is on whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable; an “unreasonable” application is different from a merely “incorrect” one. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (“The question under the AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold.”); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 520, 123 S.Ct. at 2535; Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 641, 123 S.Ct. 1848, 1853, 155 L.Ed.2d 877 (2003) (“it is the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied that case to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner”). As the Supreme Court has recently explained: Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court “must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Bobby v. Dixon, — U.S.-,-, 132 S.Ct. 26, 27, 181 L.Ed.2d 328 (2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.-, -, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786-87, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011)). Legal principles are “clearly established” for purposes of AEDPA review when the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of Supreme Court decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision establish those principles. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660-61, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 2147, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) (“We look for ‘the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.’ ”); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1172, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). The AEDPA also significantly restricts the scope of federal habeas review of state court fact findings. Section 2254(d)(2) of Title 28, United States Code, provides federal habeas relief may not be granted on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in the state courts unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S.Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010) (“[A] state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. at 1522 (“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”). Even if reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the factual finding in question (or the implicit credibility determination underlying the factual finding), on habeas review, this does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s factual determination. Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. at 300-01, 130 S.Ct. at 849; Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42, 126 S.Ct. 969, 976, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006). In addition, Section 2254(e)(1) provides a petitioner challenging state court factual findings must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the state court’s findings were erroneous. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-74, 127 S.Ct. at 1939-40 (“AEDPA also requires federal habeas courts to presume the correctness of state courts’ factual findings unless applicants rebut this presumption with ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ”); Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338-39, 126 S.Ct. 969, 974, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (“State-court factual findings, moreover, are presumed correct; the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ”); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2325, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (“[W]e presume the Texas court’s factual findings to be sound unless Miller-El rebuts the ‘presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.’ ”); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). It remains unclear at this juncture whether Section 2254(e)(1) applies in every case presenting a challenge to a state court’s factual findings under Section 2254(d)(2). See Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. at 300-01, 130 S.Ct. at 849 (choosing not to resolve the issue of Section 2254(e)(l)’s possible application to all challenges to a state court’s factual findings); Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. at 339, 126 S.Ct. at 974 (likewise refusing to resolve the Circuit split regarding the application of Section 2254(e)(1)). However, the deference to which state-court factual findings are entitled under the AEDPA does not imply an abandonment or abdication of federal judicial review. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. at 240, 125 S.Ct. at 2325 (the standard is “demanding but not insatiable”); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1041, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“Even in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review. Deference does not by definition preclude relief.”). Finally, in this Circuit, a federal habeas court reviewing a state court’s rejection on the merits of a claim for relief pursuant to the AEDPA must focus exclusively on the propriety of the ultimate decision reached by the state court and not evaluate the quality, or lack thereof, of the state court’s written opinion supporting its decision. See Maldonado v. Thaler, 625 F.3d 229, 239 (5th Cir.2010) (federal habeas review of a state court’s adjudication involves review only of a state court’s decision, not the written opinion explaining the decision), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 124, 181 L.Ed.2d 46 (2011); St. Aubin v. Quarterman, 470 F.3d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir.2006) (holding Section 2254(d) permits a federal habeas court to review only a state court’s decision and not the written opinion explaining that decision), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 921, 127 S.Ct. 2133, 167 L.Ed.2d 869 (2007); Amador v. Quarterman, 458 F.3d 397, 410 (5th Cir.2006) (holding the same), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 920, 127 S.Ct. 2129, 167 L.Ed.2d 866 (2007); Pondexter v. Dretke, 346 F.3d 142, 148 (5th Cir.2003) (holding the precise question before a federal habeas court in reviewing a state court’s rejection on the merits of an ineffective assistance claim is whether the state court’s ultimate conclusion was objectively reasonable), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1045, 124 S.Ct. 2160, 158 L.Ed.2d 736 (2004); Anderson v. Johnson, 338 F.3d 382, 390 (5th Cir.2003) (holding a federal habeas court reviews only a state court’s decision and not the opinion explaining that decision); Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc) holding a federal court is authorized by § 2254(d) to review only a state court’s decision and not the written opinion explaining that decision), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1104, 123 S.Ct. 963, 154 L.Ed.2d 772 (2003). III. Rembval of Lead Trial Counsel A. The Claim In his first claim for relief in his amended petition herein, petitioner argues the state trial court’s “removal” over petitioner’s objection of petitioner’s original lead trial counsel practically on the eve of voir dire violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. B. State Court Disposition Petitioner presented a primarily state-law version of this same complaint to the Texas Court of criminal Appeals as point of error number one in his direct appeal. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected this state-law argument on the merits. Garza v. State, 2005 WL 395442, at *1~*2. Petitioner re-urged the same arguments, relying upon both state and federal constitutional authorities, as his first ground for relief in his first state habeas corpus application. The state habeas trial court concluded petitioner had procedurally defaulted on this new claim, to the extent this claim was different from petitioner’s similar complaint on direct appeal (i.e., relied upon federal authorities), by failing to present the new legal theories underlying this claim on direct appeal. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted these conclusions when it denied relief in petitioner’s. first state habeas corpus proceeding. Ex parte Manuel Garza, 2008 WL 5245545, at *1. Petitioner presented an even more federalized version of this same complaint in his second state habeas corpus application. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed this application under state writ — abuse principles. Ex parte Manuel Garza, 2011 WL 4826968, at *1. C. Applicable Federal Law “The [Sixth] Amendment guarantees defendants in criminal cases the right to adequate representation, but those who do not have the means to hire their own lawyers have no cognizable complaint so long as they are adequately represented by attorneys appointed by the courts. ‘A defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford.’ ” Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 2652, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989) (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988)). “Whatever the full extent of the Sixth Amendment’s protection of one’s right to retain counsel of his choosing, that protection does not go beyond ‘the individual’s right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance of .... counsel.’ ” Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. at 626, 109 S.Ct. at 2652. “A defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person’s money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are the only way that that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his choice.” Id. The right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2565, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). The constitutional standard for determining whether a criminal defendant has been denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, was announced by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. To satisfy the first prong of Strickland, i.e., establish that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, a convicted defendant must show that counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-91, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1511, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). In so doing, a convicted defendant must carry the burden of proof and overcome a strong presumption that the conduct of his trial counsel falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-66. Courts are extremely deferential in scrutinizing the performance of counsel and make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S.Ct. at 2536 (holding the proper analysis under the first prong of Strickland is an objective review of the reasonableness of counsel’s performance under prevailing professional norms which includes a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from the perspective of said counsel at the time). “No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.” Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 7, 130 S.Ct. 13, 16, 175 L.Ed.2d 255 (2009); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. It is strongly presumed counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. To satisfy the “prejudice” prong, a convicted defendant must establish a reasonable probability that, but for the objectively unreasonable misconduct of his counsel, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. at 2542; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Id. In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), decided the same day as Strickland, the Supreme Court held a presumption of prejudice similar to that recognized in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), arises in three narrow circumstances: first, when a criminal defendant is completely denied the assistance of counsel; second, when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing; and finally, where the circumstances are such that even competent counsel very likely could not render effective assistance. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047. As examples of the latter two situations, respectively, the Supreme Court cited the denial of effective cross-examination in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (defendant was denied the opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution’s key witness for bias), and the incendiary circumstances surrounding the trial of the so-called “Scottsboro Boys” addressed in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (no individual attorney was appointed to represent the defendants and trial proceeded after a volunteer attorney from another state appeared on the first day of trial but confessed he had not had an opportunity to prepare for trial). United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-61, 104 S.Ct. at 2047-48. In a footnote, the Supreme Court recognized the continuing efficacy of its earlier holding in Cuyler, presuming prejudice where a defendant establishes an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel’s performance. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 661 n. 31, 104 S.Ct. at 2048 n. 31. In Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-96, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1851, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002), the Supreme Court reiterated that the second exception to the requirement of Strickland “prejudice” it had envisioned in Cronic was limited to situations in which defense counsel completely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 697-98, 122 S.Ct. at 1851-52 (holding complaints about trial counsel’s waiver of closing argument at the punishment phase of trial and failure to adduce mitigating evidence insufficient to create a presumption of prejudice absent a showing trial counsel completely failed to challenge the prosecution’s ease throughout the sentencing proceeding). Simply put, garden variety ineffective assistance claims of the nature asserted by petitioner herein do not warrant application of the presumption of prejudice recognized in Cronic. The presumption of prejudice recognized in Cronic does not apply where the defendant complains of merely shoddy or poor performance by his trial counsel; for a defendant to be entitled to such a presumption, his attorney’s failure must be complete. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 697, 122 S.Ct. at 1851 (holding the presumption applicable only when counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing); United States v. Griffin, 324 F.3d 330, 364, 364 (5th Cir.2003) (“When the defendant complains of errors, omissions, or strategic blunders, prejudice is not presumed; bad lawyering, regardless of how bad, does not support the per se presumption of prejudice.”); Riddle v. Cockrell, 288 F.3d 713, 718 (5th Cir.2002) (holding “constructive denial of counsel” sufficient to support a presumption of prejudice arises only when counsel was absent from the courtroom, there was an actual conflict of interest, or there was official interference with the defense), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 953, 123 S.Ct. 420, 154 L.Ed.2d 300 (2002); Mayo v. Cockrell, 287 F.3d 336, 340 n. 3 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding the same), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 975, 123 S.Ct. 443, 154 L.Ed.2d 332 (2002); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 344 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001) (holding the same), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1120, 122 S.Ct. 2347, 153 L.Ed.2d 174 (2002); Gochicoa v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 278, 284 (5th Cir.2000) (“ ‘A constructive denial of counsel occurs in only a very narrow spectrum of cases where the circumstances leading to counsel’s ineffectiveness are so egregious that the defendant was in effect denied any meaningful assistance at all.’ We have found constructive denial in cases involving the absence of counsel from the courtroom, conflicts of interest between defense counsel and the defendant, and official interference with the defense; and have stated that constructive denial will be found when counsel fails to subject the prosecution’s case to any meaningful adversarial testing.” (citations and footnote omitted)). D. AEDPA Analysis & De Novo Review of Federal Claims 1. The Undisputed Facts Petitioner was represented at all times relevant to his capital murder charge by two court-appointed trial attorneys. One of those attorneys, Ed Camara, was appointed in February, 2001 and represented petitioner throughout petitioner’s trial court proceedings. Attorney Raymond Fuchs, also appointed in February, 2001, was granted permission to withdraw from petitioner’s representation on July 11, 2002. The state trial court appointed attorney Vincent D. Callahan to represent petitioner (and replace attorney Fuchs) on July 19, 2002. A Jackson v. Denno hearing on petitioner’s motion to suppress and a hearing on other pretrial motions was held on August 29, 2002, during which both attorneys Callahan and Camara represented petitioner. General voir dire of the jury venire took place the following date, i.e., on August 30, 2002, again with both attorneys Camara and Callahan representing petitioner. Individual voir dire commenced September 16, 2002 and continued thereafter, once more with both attorneys Callahan and Camara representing petitioner. Save for the period between July 11 and July 19, 2002, petitioner was represented at all times relevant to petitioner’s capital murder trial by two court-appointed attorneys. Attorney Camara continuously represented petitioner from February, 2001 (more than six weeks prior to petitioner’s indictment) throughout petitioner’s capital murder trial. Thus, at no point during the trial court capital murder proceeding against petitioner was petitioner denied legal representation. 2. State Law Claims Do Not Warrant Federal Habeas Relief Insofar as petitioner’s first claim herein relies upon alleged violations of petitioner’s state procedural or state constitutional rights in connection with the state trial court’s replacement of attorney Fuchs with attorney Callahan, that claim does not present a legitimate basis for federal habeas corpus relief. Federal habeas corpus relief will not issue to correct errors of state constitutional, statutory, or procedural law, unless a federal issue is also presented. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (holding complaints regarding the admission of evidence under California law did not present grounds for federal habeas relief absent a showing that admission of the evidence in question violated due process); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 3102, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990) (recognizing that federal habeas relief will not issue for errors of state law); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S.Ct. 871, 874, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984) (holding a federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law). In the course of reviewing state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings, a federal court does not sit as a super-state appellate court. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68, 112 S.Ct. at 480; Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 780, 110 S.Ct. at 3102; Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. at 41, 104 S.Ct. at 874. When a federal district court reviews a state prisoner’s habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 it must decide whether the petitioner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” The court does not review a judgment, but the lawfulness of the petitioner’s custody simpliciter. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). 3. Federal Constitutional Claims Without Merit Insofar as petitioner complains that he was denied legal representation in violation of the principle announced in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (holding Sixth Amendment was violated when state court refused to appoint counsel to represent indigent criminal defendant in a non-capital felony case), that complaint lacks any arguable merit. As was explained above, petitioner was represented by at least one court-appointed counsel at all times throughout petitioner’s capital murder proceeding and, save for an eight-day period in July, 2002, was represented by two experienced criminal defense counsel. Petitioner’s argument that he was deprived of counsel during a critical juncture in his state criminal proceeding is refuted by even a cursory review of the petitioner’s trial court records and utterly without arguable merit. Petitioner’s reliance on Cronic is likewise unavailing. As was explained above, the presumed prejudice principle of Cronic arises only in three narrow circumstances: first, when a criminal defendant is completely denied the assistance of counsel; second, when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing; and finally, where the circumstances are such that even competent counsel very likely could not render effective assistance. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047. The first of these three situations clearly does not apply to petitioner. Petitioner’s complaints about the performance of his trial counsel (detailed in petitioner’s third claim herein) do not rise above the garden-variety type of complaints of ineffective assistance which must be evaluated under Strickland’s dual prongs. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 697-98, 122 S.Ct. at 1851-52 (holding complaints about trial counsel’s waiver of closing argument at the punishment phase of trial and failure to adduce mitigating evidence insufficient to create a presumption of prejudice absent a showing trial counsel completely failed to challenge the prosecution’s case throughout the sentencing proceeding); United States v. Griffin, 324 F.3d at 364 (“When the defendant complains of errors, omissions, or strategic blunders, prejudice is not presumed; bad lawyering, regardless of how bad, does not support the per se presumption of prejudice.”); Riddle v. Cockrell, 288 F.3d at 718 (holding “constructive denial of counsel” sufficient to support a presumption of prejudice arises only when counsel was absent from the courtroom, there was an actual conflict of interest, or there was official interference with the defense). Finally, petitioner has alleged no facts showing the circumstances of his capital murder trial were such as to render it impossible for his two, court-appointed, trial counsel to adequately represent petitioner within the parameters set forth in Strickland and Cronic. Attorney Callahan replaced attorney Fuchs more than a month before the pretrial hearing in petitioner’s capital murder trial and almost two months before individual voir dire began. Under such circumstances, petitioner is not entitled to the presumption of prejudice recognized in' Cronic. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 697, 122 S.Ct. at 1851 (holding the presumption applicable only when counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing). Petitioner’s complaints about the substitution of attorney Fuchs by attorney Callahan do not implicate the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel of one’s choosing. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 151, 126 S.Ct. at 2565. E. Conclusions The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ rejection on the permits of petitioner’s primarily state-law complaints about the replacement of attorney Fuchs by attorney Callahan during the course of petitioner’s direct appeal was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, nor resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the petitioner’s state court proceeding. Furthermore, having examined de novo petitioner’s federal constitutional arguments in support of his initial claim herein, which federal claims petitioner raised for the first time in his state habeas corpus proceedings and were summarily dismissed by the state habeas court, this Court concludes that because petitioner’s federal constitutional complaints based upon Gideon v. Wainwright and Cronic (which the state habeas court summarily dismissed in the course of petitioner’s first and second state habeas corpus proceedings) lack any arguable merit, petitioner’s first ground for relief herein does not warrant federal habeas corpus relief. IV. Ineffective Assistance Claims A. The Claims In his third ground for relief herein, petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment by failing to (1) adequately voir dire the jury venire regarding their views on the death penalty, (2) adequately investigate petitioner’s background and present available mitigating evidence, (3) call the defense team’s investigator as a witness to contradict prosecution witness Erica Henderson, and (4) introduce petitioner’s hospital records to show petitioner suffered facial injuries in his confrontation with Riojas. B. State Court Disposition Petitioner presented his third and fourth assertions of ineffective assistance in his third claim herein (i.e., failing to introduce petitioner’s hospital records or call the defense investigator to testify), and an abridged version of his second assertion of ineffective assistance herein (i.e., inadequate mitigation investigation), to the state court in his first state habeas corpus application. In the course of its findings of fact and conclusions of law in petitioner’s first state habeas corpus proceeding, the state habeas trial court concluded, in pertinent part, that (1) there was no evidence before it showing any of the injuries reflected in the medical records had been caused by Riojas, (2) the evidence at trial did not raise the issue of self-defense under applicable state law, (3) the hospital records showing petitioner’s injuries would not have been admissible at petitioner’s capital murder trial, (4) there was no evidence showing the defense investigator (Jeff Mitchel) was available to testify at petitioner’s trial, (5) Erica Henderson admitted she told one of petitioner’s defense attorneys that the fatal shooting might have been accidental, (6) as a result, the petitioner’s defense counsel could not have introduced extrinsic evidence that she had made the same statement, (7) the testimony of petitioner’s paternal uncle Raul Gonzales would have added nothing of substance to the testimony furnished by petitioner’s three other family members who did testify during the punishment phase of petitioner’s capital murder trial, (8) Raul Gonzalez’s many criminal convictions would have undermined any benefit from his testimony at trial, (9) there was no evidence establishing that Dr. Allen was available to testify at petitioner’s capital murder trial, (10) Dr. Allen’s opinions expressed during the state habeas corpus hearing were based solely upon her view of records and not upon any personal examination of petitioner, (11) Dr. Allen’s testimony strongly supported a conclusion that petitioner would engage in future violent acts, and (12) Dr. Allen’s testimony that petitioner was not properly diagnosed with social conduct disorder was not credible in light of the documentary evidence before the court regarding petitioner’s background, including petitioner’s documented misconduct while in custody. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted these findings and conclusions when it rejected petitioner’s first state habeas corpus application on the merits. Ex parte Manuel Garza, WR 70797-01, 2008 WL 5245545, at *1. Petitioner presented the state habeas court with the same four ineffective assistance claims he presents in his third claim herein in his second state habeas corpus application. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals summarily dismissed petitioner’s second state habeas corpus application under state writ-abuse principles. Ex parte Manuel Garza, 2011 WL 4826968, at *1. C. Clearly Established Federal Law The Sixth Amendment entitles criminal defendants to “the effective assistance of counsel,” ie., legal representation that does not (1) fall below an objective standard of reasonableness in light of prevailing professional norms and the circumstances of the defendant’s case (Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 16-17, 130 S.Ct. 383, 384, 175 L.Ed.2d 328 (2009); Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. at 6-7, 130 S.Ct. at 16); and (2) give rise to a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different (Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 38-41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 452-53, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009); Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. at 19-20, 130 S.Ct. at 386). As was explained in Section III.C. above, the constitutional standard for determining whether a criminal defendant has been denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, was announced by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. In evaluating prejudice in the context of the punishment phase of a capital trial, a federal habeas court must re-weigh all the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence (had the petitioner’s trial counsel chosen a different course). Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. at 19-20, 130 S.Ct. at 386; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. at 2542. Strickland does not require the State to “rule out” or negate a sentence of life in prison to prevail; rather, it places the burden on the defendant to show a “reasonable probability” that the result of the punishment phase of a capital murder trial would have been different. Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. at 26-29, 130 S.Ct. at 390-91. In evaluating petitioner’s complaints about the performance of his counsel under the AEDPA, the issue before this Court is whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals could reasonably have concluded petitioner’s complaints about his trial counsel’s performance failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland analysis. Schaetzle v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 440, 444 (5th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1154, 124 S.Ct. 1156, 157 L.Ed.2d 1050 (2004). In making this determination, this Court must consider the underlying Strickland standard. Id. In those instances in which the state courts failed to adjudicate either prong of the Strickland test, this Court’s review of the un-adjudicated prong is de novo. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. at 38-39, 130 S.Ct. at 452 (holding de novo review of the allegedly deficient performance of petitioner’s trial counsel was necessary because the state courts had failed to address this prong of Strickland analysis); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2467, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005) (holding de novo review of the prejudice prong of Strickland required where the state courts rested their rejection of an ineffective assistance claim on the deficient performance prong and never addressed the issue of prejudice); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. at 2542 (holding the same). A habeas petitioner has the burden to prove both prongs of the Strickland ineffective assistance standard by a preponderance of the evidence. Rogers v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 483, 489 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 839, 130 S.Ct. 365, 175 L.Ed.2d 62 (2009); Blanton v. Quarterman, 543 F.3d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2383, 173 L.Ed.2d 1301 (2009); Montoya v. Johnson, 226 F.3d 399, 408 (5th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1067, 121 S.Ct. 2220, 150 L.Ed.2d 212 (2001). Under the well-settled Strickland standard, the Supreme Court recognizes a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 698, 122 S.Ct. at 1852; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066; Scheanette v. Quarterman, 482 F.3d 815, 820 (5th Cir.2007), stay denied, 555 U.S. 1160, 129 S.Ct. 1305, 173 L.Ed.2d 482 (2009); Sonnier v. Quarterman, 476 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 948, 128 S.Ct. 374, 169 L.Ed.2d 259 (2007); Amador v. Quarterman, 458 F.3d at 410; Gonzales v. Quarterman, 458 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1323, 127 S.Ct. 1909, 167 L.Ed.2d 568 (2007). D. Procedural Default on Inadequate Voir Dire Complaint Respondent correctly points out that petitioner presented the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals with his first assertion of ineffective assistance herein, i.e., petitioner’s complaint about the performance of his trial counsel during voir dire, in petitioner’s second state habeas corpus application, which the state habeas court dismissed under state writ-abuse principles. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ summary dismissal of petitioner’s second state habeas corpus application (which included petitioner’s first presentation of his initial assertion herein of ineffective assistance) on state writ-abuse principles constitutes a form of procedural default on same which bars federal habeas review of that claim. See, e.g., Hughes v. Quarterman, 530 F.3d 336, 342 (5th Cir. 2008) (“This court has held that, since 1994, the Texas abuse of the writ doctrine has been consistently applied as a procedural bar, and that it is an independent and adequate state ground for the purpose of imposing a procedural bar.”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2378, 173 L.Ed.2d 1299 (2009); Aguilar v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 526, 533 (5th Cir.2005) (holding the Texas abuse of the writ rule ordinarily is an adequate and independent procedural ground on which to base a procedural default ruling), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1136, 126 S.Ct. 2059, 164 L.Ed.2d 793 (2006); Matchett v. Dretke, 380 F.3d 844, 848 (5th Cir.2004) (holding the violation of the Texas writ-abuse rule ordinarily furnishes an adequate and independent procedural ground which bars federal habeas review of a claim), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1124, 125 S.Ct. 1067, 160 L.Ed.2d 1074 (2005); Cotton v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 746, 755 (5th Cir.2003) (holding the Texas writ abuse doctrine is an adequate and independent barrier to federal habeas review of unexhausted claims), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1186, 124 S.Ct. 1417, 158 L.Ed.2d 92 (2004); Henderson v. Cockrell, 333 F.3d 592, 605 (5th Cir.2003) (recognizing the Texas writ-abuse doctrine has been strictly and regularly applied since before August, 1997), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1163,