Full opinion text
OPINION STANCEU, Judge: Plaintiff■ EOS of North America; ■ Inc. (“EOS”) brought three actions, now consolidated, challenging tariff classification decisions that United States Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) made upon liquidating'EOS’s entries in 2007. Consol. Am. Compl. (June 23, 2010), ECF No. 21-1. At issue are the tariff classifications of two models of machines, each known as a “laser sintering” system. Id. ¶¶ 18, 24, 38; Commercial Invoices, USCIT Court File (Court Nos. 08-00298, 09-00087, and 09-00185) (“Commercial Invoices”). EOS moves, and defendant United States cross-moves, for summary judgment on the classification of both models. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (May 27, 2011), ECF No. 38; Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (Sept. 12, 2011), ECF No. 47. The “Lasersintering system EOSINT M270” (hereinafter, the “M270”) and “Lasersintering system EOSINT P390” (hereinafter, the “P390”), rapidly manufacture complex, three-dimensional objects. Con-sol. Am. Compl. ¶ 18; Commercial Invoices. The systems use as a raw material either particles of metal (in the case of the M270) or particles of plastic (in the case of the P390). Consol. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 31, 38. Both systems rely on an automated process EOS describes as “laser sintering,” in which a computer, applying data stored therein, directs a built-in laser that selectively heats, and melts together, particles within a “build chamber” to form thin layers shaped according to the stored data. Id. ¶¶ 18, 20. The laser sintering process is described as a method of “additive manufacturing” because it uses raw material to make objects, layer by layer, from three-dimensional model data. Id. ¶ 19. The court, exercising jurisdiction under section 201 of the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2006), grants in part and denies in part plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and grants defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court determines that there are no genuine issues of fact material to the tariff classification issues presented. The court determines that the M270 is properly classified according to the alternate classification advocated by both parties and that defendant’s sole classification position for the P390 is correct. I. Background A. Entries of the EOSINT M270 (Metal) Laser Sintering System EOS imported two M270 laser sintering systems from Germany in 2007, filing Entry No. 336-8377783-6 (April 3, 2007) and Entry No. 336-7738167-2 (June 14, 2007) at the port of Chicago, Illinois. Pl.’s Stmt. Of Mat. Facts for which There Is No Genuine Issue to be Tried ¶4 (May 27, 2011), ECF No. 38 (“Pl.’s Stmt.”). Upon liquidating these two entries, Customs classified the M270 in subheading 8477.80.00, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) (2007) (“Machinery for working rubber or plastics or for the manufacture of products from these materials, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter; Other machinery”) at 3.1% ad. val., a classification it does not advocate before the court. Id. ¶ 6. In protesting the liquidation of the April entry (ie., Entry No. 336-8377783-6) on February 15, 2008, EOS claimed classification of the M270 in subheading 8479.89.98, HTSUS, a residual (“basket”) provision applying to “[mjachines and mechanical appliances having individual functions, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter; Other” at 2.5% ad val. Consol. Am. Compl. ¶¶26, 29. Customs denied this protest on March 19, 2008, concluding that the M270 was properly classified as a “machine tool” in subheading 8463.90.00, HTSUS (“Other machine tools for working metal or cermets, without removing material; Other”), at 4.4% ad val. Id. ¶ 30. EOS then filed a timely summons and complaint to contest the protest denial. Summons (Sept. 12, 2008), ECF No. 1; Compl. (Aug. 31, 2009), ECF No. 7. On September 2, 2008, EOS protested the liquidation of the June entry (Entry No. 336-7738167-2), claiming classification of the imported M270 as a “laser welding machine” in subheading 8515.80.00, HTSUS (“Electric ..., laser or other light or photon beam ... soldering, brazing or welding machines and apparatus, whether or not capable of cutting; ... Other machines and apparatus”), free of duty. Con-sol. Am. Compl. ¶ 36. Notwithstanding the action it took in denying the protest of the previous entry, and even though the M270 uses metal, not rubber or plastic, Customs concluded when denying the protest on November 25, 2008 that the classification determined upon liquidation, subheading 8477.80.00, was correct. Id. ¶ 37. EOS filed a timely summons and complaint to contest the protest denial. Summons (Feb. 23, 2009), ECF No. 1 (Court No. 09-00087); Compl. (Aug. 31, 2009), ECF No. 11 (Court No. 09-00087). B. Entry of. the EOSINT P390 (Plastic) Laser Sintering System EOS imported a P390 system into the United States on September 4, 2007 through the Port of Norfolk, Virginia on Entry No. 336-8542789-3. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 5. In liquidating this entry, Customs classified the P390 in subheading HTSUS 8477.80.00 (2007) as “Machinery for working rubber or plastics or for the manufacture of products from these materials, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter ... other machinery” at 3.1 % ad val. Id. ¶ 8. On September 29, 2008, EOS protested the liquidation of the entry, claiming that the-proper classification of the P390 was as a “laser ... beam ... welding machine” in subheading 8515.80.00, HTSUS (2007), free of duty. Consol. Am. Compl. ¶40. After Customs denied the protest oh May 6, 2009, EOS filed a timely summons and complaint. Summons (May 7, 2009), ECF No. 1 (Court No. 09-00185); Compl. (Aug. 31, 2009), ECF No. 5 (Court No. 09-00185). C. Proceedings in this Court In its consolidated complaint, plaintiff claimed that the M270 and P390 should be classified as laser beam welding machines in subheading 8515.80.00, HTSUS (2007) free of duty. Consol. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-44. For both systems, plaintiff also claimed, in the alternative, the residual provision of subheading 8479.89.98, HTSUS, which applies to “other ... machines and mechanical appliances having individual functions, not specified or elsewhere included in this chapter [chapter 84]; Other” at 2.5% ad val. Id. ¶¶ 46^17. Defendant asserted classification of the two M270 entries in subheading 8463.90.00, HTSUS as “[o]ther machine tools for working metal or cermets, without removing material: Other,” dutiable at 4.4% ad val. in its amended answer to plaintiffs consolidated complaint, filed on July 13, 2010. Answer to Consol. Am. Compl. 8-9, ECF No. 23. On May 27, 2011, plaintiff moved for summary judgment under USCIT Rule 56 on the classification of the M270 and P390, claiming classification of both in subheading 8515.80.00, HTSUS (2007) as laser beam welding machines, free of duty. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J.; Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 2 (May 27, 2011), ECF No. 38 (“PL’s Mem.”). In seeking summary judgment, plaintiff claimed that if the M270 is not properly classifiable as a laser beam welding machine in subheading 8515.80.00, HTSUS, then it is classifiable in subheading 8479.89.98, HTSUS,. “machines and mechanical appliances having individual functions, not specified or elsewhere included in this chapter [chapter 84]; Other,” at 2.5% ad val. Pl.’s Mem. 5-6. Plaintiff also conceded, without asserting as an alternate claim, that if the P390 is not properly classifiable as a laser beam welding machine in subheading 8515.80.00, HTSUS, then it is classifiable in subheading 8477.80.00, HTSUS, “[m]aehinery for working rubber or plastics or for the manufacture of products from these materials, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter ... other machinery,” at 3.1 % ad val, under which it was liquidated by Customs. Id. at 21 n. 11. On September 12, 2011, defendant cross-moved for summary judgment under US-CIT Rule 56. Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. Defendant argued that the M270 is properly classified as a “machine tool” in subheading 8463.90.00, dutiable at 4.4% ad val., and in the alternative, argued for classification in subheading 8479.89.98, the Chapter 84 residual provision, at 2.5% ad val. Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of its Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. & in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 2, 36-37 (Sept. 12, 2011), ECF No. 47 (“Def.’s Mem.”). In its summary judgment motion, defendant advocated the classification of the P390 in subheading 8477.80.00, HTSUS, (“[machinery for working rubber or plastics or for the manufacture of products from these materials, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter ... other machinery”), at 3.1% ad val. Id: at 2, 26. The court, held oral argument on March 8, 2012. At the conclusion of the argument, the court asked the parties a series of questions,' which the parties addressed in supplemental briefs filed on April 30, 2012. Suppl. Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Apr. 30, 2012), ECF No. 92-1 (“Pl.’s Suppl. Mem.”); Def.’s Suppl. Mem. in Supp. of its Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (Apr. 30, 2012), ECF No. 90. In its supplemental brief, plaintiff informed the court that in seeking .summary judgment, it no longer wished to pursue its alternative classification claim for the M270, ie., subheading 8479.89.98, the residual provision of Chapter 84, at 2.5% ad val; arguing that the laser beam welding machine provision, subheading 8515.80.00, HTSUS, which is free of duty, is the correct tariff classification of the M270. PL’s Suppl. Mem. 11.. II. Discussion The court proceeds de novo in actions brought under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930,19 U.S.C. § 1515 (2006), to contest the denial of a protest. See Customs Courts Act of 1980, § 301, 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1) (2006) (directing the Court of International Trade to “make its determinations upon the basis of the record made before the court”). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” USCIT R. 56(a). Where tariff classification is at issue, summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to the underlying factual issue of exactly what the merchandise is.” Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed.Cir.1998). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must credit the non-moving party’s evidence and draw all inferences in that party’s favor. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). “The court may not resolve or try factual issues on a motion for summary judgment.” Phone-Mate, Inc. v. United States, 12 CIT 575, 577, 690 F.Supp. 1048, 1050 (1988) (citation omitted), aff'd, 867 F.2d 1404 (Fed.Cir.1989). A dispute as to an immaterial fact does not preclude summary judgment. See, e.g., Houston North Hosp. Properties v. Telco Leasing, Inc., 688 F.2d 408, 410 (5th Cir.1982). Although no established standard governs the question of what constitutes a material fact, courts have held that “a fact is ‘material’ to the dispute ... ‘if it tends to resolve any of the issues that have been properly raised by the parties.’ ” Allied Int’l v. United States, 16 CIT 545, 548, 795 F.Supp. 449, 451 (1992) (quoting 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2725 at 93-95 (2d ed. 1983)). Classification under the HTSUS is determined according to the General Rules of Interpretation (“GRIs”), and, if applicable, the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation (“ARIs”). GRI 1 requires that tariff classification, in the first instance, “be determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative section or chapter notes.” GRI 1, HTSUS. The chapter and section notes of the HTSUS are not optional interpretive rules but statutory law. Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed.Cir.1999). Once-imported merchandise is determined to be classifiable under a particular heading, a court must then look to the subheadings to find the correct classification of the merchandise in question. Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1437, 1440 (Fed.Cir.1998) (citations omitted). The Court employs a two-step process in determining tariff classification. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 148 F.3d at 1365. “[F]irst, [it] construe[s] the relevant classification headings; and second, [it] determine^] under which of the properly construed tariff terms the merchandise at issue falls.” Id. (citing Universal Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 491 (Fed.Cir.1997)). Classifications determined by Customs are not controlling by reason of their authority, and the court “has an independent responsibility to decide the legal issue of the proper meaning and scope of HTSUS terms.” Warner-Lambert Co. v. United States, 407 F.3d 1207, 1209 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citing Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United States, 267 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed.Cir.2001)). The court first considers whether “the government’s classification is correct, both independently and in comparison with the importer’s alternative.” Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed. Cir.1984). If the court concludes that the government’s classification is incorrect, the court has an independent duty to find the correct classification. Id. Tariff acts must be construed to carry out the intent of the legislature, which is determined initially by looking at the language of the statute itself. Rubie’s Costume Co. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citations omitted). “Absent contrary legislative intent, HTSUS terms are to be construed according to their common and commercial meanings, which are presumed to be the same.” Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed.Cir.1999). (citation omitted). To ascertain these meanings, the court “may consult lexicographic and scientific authorities, dictionaries, and other reliable information” or may rely on its “own understanding of the terms used.” Baxter Healthcare Corp. of Puerto Rico v. United States, 182 F.3d 1333, 1337-38 (Fed.Cir.1999). Although not binding law, the Explanatory Notes (“ENs”) maintained by the Harmonized System Committee of the World Customs Organization may be consulted for guidance and are generally indicative of the proper interpretation of a tariff provision. Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 436 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed.Cir.2006). Decisions under former tariffs are not controlling on decisions made under the HTSUS, but they may be instructive when interpreting similar HTSUS provisions. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 549, 550 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1582-83. Where a tariff term has various definitions or meanings and has broad and narrow interpretations, the court must determine which definition best invokes the legislative intent. Richards Medical Co. v. United States, 910 F.2d 828, 830 (Fed.Cir.1990). A. Summary of the Court’s Classification Determinations made upon the Motion and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiff moved for summary judgment classifying the M270, and also the P390, in subheading 8515.80.00, HTSUS as laser beam welding machines, free of duty and moved in the alternative for summary judgment classifying the M270 in subheading 8479.89.98, HTSUS (“[m]aehines and mechanical appliances having individual functions, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter [ch. 84]”), at 2.5% ad val. Defendant moved for summary judgment classifying the M270 as a machine tool in subheading 8463.90.00, HTSUS at 4.4% ad val. or, in the alternative, in subheading 8479.89.98, HTSUS. Defendant moved for summary judgment classifying thé P390 in subheading 8477.80, HTSUS, ie., as a machine for manufacturing products from plastics, not specified or included elsewhere in chapter 84, HTSUS, at 3.1% ad val. The court concludes from the statements of material facts submitted by the parties that there is no genuine issue as to any fact material to the tariff classification of the M270. For the reasons discussed in this Opinion, the court grants both motions for summary judgment with respect to the alternate classification positions advocated by plaintiff and defendant for the M270. Because the M270 is not a machine tool for the purpose of tariff classification, it is not properly classified under heading 8463, HTSUS (machine tools for working metal, without removing material). The court rejects plaintiffs primary claim because the M270 is not a welding machine or apparatus so as to allow classification under heading 8515, HTSUS (“Electric ... laser ... beam ... welding machines and apparatus”). The M270 is properly classified in subheading 8479.89.98, HTSUS (other machines and mechanical appliances having individual functions not specified or included elsewhere in chapter 84; other), the alternate classification sought by plaintiff and defendant. The court concludes, further, that there is no genuine issue as to any fact material to the classification of the P390. The court determines that the P390, like the M270, is not a welding machine or apparatus within the scope of heading 8515. The court determines that subheading 8477.80.00, HTSUS, which pertains to machines for manufacturing products from plastics, at 3.1% ad val., is the proper classification for the P390. The court, therefore, grants the government’s summary judgment motion as to the classification of the P390. B. Undisputed Facts Pertinent to an ' Award of Summary Judgment The M270 and P390 are “laser sintering machines.” Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Stmt, of Mat. Facts as to which There Are No Genuine Issues to be Tried ¶2 (Sept. 9, 2011), ECF No. 47 (“Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Stmt.”). EOS refers to the M270 as performing a “Direct Metal Laser-Sintering” process and describes the P390 process as “laser-sintering.” Id. ¶ 17. The M270 and P390 build three-dimensional, solid objects using metal or thermoplastic powder, respectively. Id. ¶¶ 37, 47; Def.’s Stmt, of Add’l Mat. Facts as to which There Are No Genuine Issues to be Tried ¶ 20 (Sept. 12, 2011), ECF No. 47 (“Def.’s Stmt.”). The M270 and P390 are both powered by electricity. PL’s .Stmt. ¶ 23. Both machines include the following components: machine housing for gas-tight “build” or “process chamber,” optical system with solid-state laser and digital high-speed scanner (“galvanometer”), recoating system, elevator system for a building platform, heating modules, nitrogen generators, process computer with process controlsoftware, compressed air connection, electrical power connection, and. additional accessories. Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Stmt. ¶¶ 19-20 (citing Def.’s Exs. 4, 8 (M270, P390 Technical Description)). Neither machine includes any part-specific die, jig, or mold. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. The parties concur as to the essential details of the building process used by the M270 and P390. A “job” is prepared by creating the three-dimensional shape of an object to be built on the process computer using computer-assisted design (“CAD”). Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 2; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt, of Add’l Mat. Facts as to which There Are No Genuine Issues to be Tried ¶ 24 (Dec. 6, 2011), ECF No. 62 (“PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt.”). Once the data are converted, the M270 and the M390 build a three-dimensional object by using a laser to selectively melt metal powder particles, or thermoplastic powder particles, respectively, one layer at a time. Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Stmt. ¶ 46; Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 37. As the -layers are built up.additively, they take on the dimensions of the CAD file. Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Stmt. ¶-47. The additive manufacturing, or “laser sintering,” process for both the M270 and P390 takes place inside an enclosed, atmosphere-controlled “build” or “process” chamber. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 1, 21. During the build process, a recoating “arm” distributes the metal or thermoplastic powder pursuant to the particular pattern of the CAD. Id. ¶¶ 6, 28, 34. The galvanometer focuses the light energy of the laser onto an area of the powder. Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 37. The laser shoots down upon the powder, elevating the temperature such that the powder fully melts and intermixes. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 7-9, 30-31; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Stmt. ¶ 38. The laser melts more than one particle at a time. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 11; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt. ¶29. The laser applies no physical/electro-magnetic force or pressure upon the metal or thermoplastic powder. PL’s Stmt. ¶¶ 51-53. After the laser moves away from the spot being heated, the melted material cools and solidifies such that it becomes attached to the surface below it. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 13, 36; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 13. After the two-dimensional layer is complete, the laser turns off, the platform on which the article is being built drops, and the recoating arm spreads a fresh layer of powder across the top of the incomplete article. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 33-34; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 15. The process is repeated, one layer at a time, until the object is complete. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 6, 37; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 14. The parties disagree as to what happens as the laser melts the powder particles during the sintering process, specifically as to whether, during that process, the laser re-melts a portion of the hardened layer below. Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Stmt. ¶¶ 42, 45. Defendant asserts that there is sufficient energy and heat transfer not only to melt the layer of powder particles spread on top of the layer below, but also to remelt a portion of that layer. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 17, 36; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Stmt. ¶ 38. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the fusion or bonding results because the layers below are hardening but not yet fully hardened. PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 17. The court concludes that this dispute is not a genuine issue of material fact. The question of which description of the melting and solidifying process, plaintiffs or defendant’s, more accurately depicts the reality of that process has no bearing on the court’s classification determination. Under either description, the processes performed by the M270 and P390 are not “welding” processes that would enable classification of either system under heading 8515 (laser beam welding machines and apparatus). Next, plaintiff disagrees with defendant’s characterizing the application of laser heat to the powder as “working” the material, PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 29, 32, while defendant disagrees with plaintiffs describing the build process as a “welding” process and plaintiffs describing the subsequently melted metal or plastic particles as “weld pools” or “weld paths,” Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 15-16, 46. Each party objects to the other’s use of the respective terms as carrying improper legal conclusions. The court’s analysis of whether, for tariff classification purposes, the M270 is a laser beam welding machine or machine tool and whether the P390 is a welding machine is not affected .by the parties’ use of their respective, suggestive terms. Mere use of such terms does not, as a factual matter, impart the characteristics of a “welding” process or a ■ machine tool that “works” metal. Thus, the use of those, terms does not create a genuine dispute as to any fact material to the tariff classification of the subject merchandise. The parties also disagree as to a detail concerning the operation of the internal CAD computer system of the subject goods: Defendant asserts that the CAD data determines the geometry or shape of the three-dimensional end product and that the software on the M270 or P390 converts that data in a so-called “slice” file comprising the three-dimensional geometry of the end product into “two-dimensional” layers or slices. Defi’s Stmt. ¶¶ 3-4, 24-25. Plaintiff maintains that the M270 and P390 translate the data presented within a CAD model into instructions to guide the building of the three-dimensional end product and that the process control software converts the three-dimensional geometry of the end product into a mathematical representation consisting of three-dimensional layers of a pre-determined thickness. PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 3-4, 24-25. The question of whose formulation of the process more accurately depicts the CAD process is far too abstract and theoretical, and indeed too remote from the actual classification issues in this case, to have any effect on the court’s analysis. Defendant objects to plaintiffs assertion that the word “sintering” is an historical term and a misnomer when used in the context of “laser sintering” and plaintiffs related assertion that the process employed by the subject goods involves full melting of powders, as opposed to traditional powdered metal sintering using a mold, heat, and/or pressure. PL’s Stmt. ¶ 14; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Stmt. ¶ 14. The court sees no merit in this objection. The undisputed fact that the process performed by the M270 and P390 involves the complete melting of particles, see Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 9, is a material fact because it is directly relevant to the question of whether the process is a “welding” process, as the court explains later in this Opinion. Plaintiffs view that the term “sintering” or “laser sintering” does not accurately describe the processes of the M270 and P390 because these processes involve full melting of powders does not change this essential fact. Plaintiffs' view is merely an opinion on the meaning of the term “sintering,” which is not a question of fact. Nor is it a question upon which the court’s classification analysis depends; the term does not appear in any of the candidate headings. Defendant objects to plaintiffs assertion that the M270 and P390 are “laser sintering systems” as opposed to “laser sintering machines.” Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Stmt. ¶¶ 2, 13. Under the court’s analysis of the terms of the competing tariff headings, the question of whether the subject merchandise is properly described as a “system” is also not one upon which the court’s classification decisions depend. Finally, defendant voices a general objection to plaintiffs labeling the subject merchandise as “state of the art,” “Cutting-edge,” and “at the forefront of the industry.” Id. ¶¶ 49-50. The court notes that these are merely descriptive terms, the use of which by plaintiff does not create an issue of material fact because it does not alter the actual material facts as to what the M270 and P390 are and how they function. 1. Undisputed Facts Pertaining Specifically to the M270 The parties agree that the M270 normally uses a metal base plate (or “build plate”) during the laser sintering process, on top of which the recoating arm distributes the first layer of metal powder. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 6; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 5. Additionally, if required, the M270 can utilize a support structure, which itself is created on top of the build plate and is made of the same metal powder as that being processed. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 43. The M270 is also capable of operating directly upon a partially-fabricated object without a metal build plate, completing the final fabrication of the object. Id. ¶ 35. The metal particles used by . the M270 are spherical in shape and are- completely melted into a “puddle” during the build process. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 9. The laser sintering process of the.M270 does not involye “plastic deformation,” i.e., the permanent change to the shape of a metal workpiece through the application of force or pressure. Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Stmt. ¶ 59. Following the completion of the sintering process, the end product is unpacked and separated from the build plate and/or support structure (if used during the building process) with a band saw. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 18-Í9. The parties disagree as to a detail concerning the heating of the build plate during the sintering process. Plaintiff contends that the metal build plate is heated by an ancillary heating element prior to the laser’s discharge only to keep moisture out of the raw metal powder. PL’s Stmt. ¶ 34. Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that removing moisture from the metal powder is not the only reason why the platform heating module heats the metal build plate. Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Stmt. ¶ 34. The court concludes that the purpose of the heating system for the build plate does not bear on the question of whether the M270 is a machine tool or performs a “welding” function and, therefore, is not a fact material to the tariff classification of the M270. Defendant also disagrees with the definition of “machiné tool” set forth by plaintiff, arguing that this definition is not complete, accurate, or exhaustive. Id. ¶ 54. Because the scope and meaning of the term “machine tools” as used in the article description for heading 8463 is a- pure question of law, this disagreement does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the M270. Finally, defendant objects to plaintiffs assertion that “plastic deformation” never involves melting of material, id. ¶¶ 55, 57, and to plaintiffs non-exhaustive list of machine tools that , perform plastic deformation as compared to those that remove material, id. ¶¶ 56, 58. The precise details of the nature of plastic deformation might have relevance to a determination of the definition of “machine tool” but is not relevant to the question of what the M270 does. There is no dispute that the M270 does not function by subjecting metal to plastic deformation. Id. ¶ 59. Because the scope and meaning of the term “machine tool” is a question of law for the court to decide, this dispute does not preclude a grant of summary judgment. 2. Undisputed Facts Pertaining Specifically to the PS90 The parties agree that the P390 requires the atmosphere in the build chamber and the thermoplastic powder to be pre-heated prior to the sintering process by an ancillary radiant heat source. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 21; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Stmt. ¶ 32. Without heating, the laser would “shock” the powder, potentially causing deformities in the finished product. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 22. Nitrogen gas is also pumped into the build chamber prior to the 'sintering process, without which the atmospheric conditions could cause distortion and degrade the quality of the plastic powder. Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 23. The heating modules and nitrogen generators included in the P390 create the aforementioned conditions. Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 20 (citing Def.’s Ex. 8 (P390 Technical Description)). Unlike the M270, the P390 does not utilize a build plate, and the first layer of the object being built is created on a plastic powder base. Def.’s Stmt. ¶26. When the sintering process is finished, the newly built object is finished and cooled down, and the excess powder is brushed away. Id. ¶ 38. The final object removed from the machine is seamless in its composition. Id. ¶ 39. The parties disagree as to a detail concerning the heating of the thermoplastic materials. While defendant asserts that the build layer of material must be warmed to a “predetermined” temperature before the laser can begin applying heat, id. ¶ 35, plaintiff asserts that the layer of plastic materials must be heated to the “set point” of the process operating temperature, PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 35. This disagreement is not an issue of material fact affecting the tariff classification of the P390 because it does not inform the court’s analysis of whether the P390 is a “welding machine or apparatus” within the meaning of the article description for heading 8515, HTSUS. The parties also disagree as to whether the final structure of the finished object is determined entirely by the heat and movement of the laser, as plaintiff contends, PL’s Stmt. ¶ 32, or if other factors, such as the type of plastic material used, have an effect, Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Stmt. ¶ 32. This issue does not affect the court’s classification analysis. Even were the court to presume that plaintiff is correct, it still would not conclude that the P390 performs a “welding” function. C. Tariff Classification of the M270 Section XVI of the HTSUS includes “machinery and mechanical appliances,” which are classified generally within chapter 84, and “electrical equipment,” which is classified generally within chapter 85. Sec. XVI, ch. 84-85, HTSUS. In then-various arguments, the parties identify for the M270 the following candidate headings within these two chapters of the HTSUS: headings 8463 (“Other machine tools for working metal ... without removing material”), 8479 (the residual heading for “[m]a-chines and mechanical appliances having individual functions, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter ... ”), and 8515 (“... laser ... beam ... welding machines and apparatus”). Also, the court has identified 8543 (the residual heading for “[e]lectrical machines and apparatus, having individual functions, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter ... ”) as a heading that merits consideration. The court concludes that the M270, by application of GRI 1, is properly classified under heading 8479. In brief summary, heading 8463, the preferred heading advocated by defendant, is precluded by GRI 1 because the M270 is not a “machine tool” within the meaning of that term as used in the article description for the heading. Because the government’s preferred classification position has been shown to be incorrect, the court proceeds to determine the correct classification. Jarvis Clark Co., 733 F.2d at 878. In doing so, the court concludes that the heading plaintiff advocates, heading 8515, is also incorrect because the M270 does not conform to the term “... laser ... beam ... welding machines and apparatus” as used in the article description for heading 8515. Of the two residual headings, heading 8479 is correct for the M270 because chapter 85 does not include machinery and apparatus of a kind covered by chapter 84, which remain classified within chapter 84 even if electric. 1. The M270 Is Not Properly Classified under Heading 8463, HTSUS In cross-moving for summary judgment, defendant argues that the M270 is properly classified under heading 8463, HTSUS. Answer to Consol. Am. Compl. 8-9; Def.’s Mem. 9. This heading and the immediately preceding and succeeding headings include various types of machine tools. Headings 8456-8465, HTSUS. The article description for heading 8463 is “[ojther machine tools for working metal or cermets, without removing material.” The M270 does not fall within the scope of the term “machine tool” as used in the article description for this heading. Neither the HTSUS nor the Explanatory Notes contain a succinct definition of “machine tool.” According to common (as well as technical) definitions, the term refers to a “machine” that uses “tooling” to shape solid work, either by the removal of material from, or by the deformation of, a solid piece of metal or another rigid or semi-rigid material. A “machine tool” is “a usu[ally] power-driven machine designed for shaping solid work by tooling either by removing material (as in a lathe or milling machine) or by subjecting to deformation (as in a punch press).” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) 1354 (1993). A machine tool is also defined as “a stationary power-driven machine for the shaping, cutting, turning, boring, drilling, grinding, or polishing of solid parts, especially metals.” McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Engineering 340 (2d ed..2003) (emphasis added). “Machine tools” are “tools used to modify the shapes of materials in specific, controlled ways, such as by drilling holes, turning diameters, grinding radii, and performing many more operations on almost any type of rigid or semi-rigid material.” McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Engineering 660 (2d ed. 1993) (emphasis added). The various definitions inform the court that the term “machine tool” is not commonly understood to refer to a machine that performs its operations on particles or powder as opposed to a solid material. The text of the HTSUS illustrates this point. The article description for the heading immediately preceding heading 8463, heading 8462, groups three categories of goods: [1] “[mjachine tools (including presses) for working metal by forging, hammering, or die-stamping; [2] machine tools (including presses) for working metal by bending, folding, straightening, flattening, shearing, punching, or notching;” and [3] “presses for working metal or metal carbides, not specified above.” Heading 8462, HTSUS. The article description indicates that certain types of presses, all of which work solid metal objects in specified ways, are machine tools within the scope of the heading while other presses, although for working metal (or also, in this case, for working metal carbides), are classified under the heading even though they might not necessarily fit within a definition of the term “machine tool.” The Explanatory Note to heading 8462 specifies two types of presses that do not perform an operation described in either of the first two categories and, therefore, fall within the third category: “[pjresses for moulding metallic powders by sintering” and “[pjresses for compressing metal scrap into bales.” EN 84.62(9), (10). EN 84.62 does not describe these twó typés of presses as machine tools. The M270 is not a “press” and therefore not classifiable under heading 8462; nevertheless, the Explanatory Note for the heading, when read in the context of the heading terms, is an indication of the general principle that the various machines that build objects out of metallic powders, as opposed to solid workpieces, are not “machine tools” for purposes of the Harmonized System nomenclature upon which the HTSUS is based. The scope of heading 8465 is another example of the principle that machines and systems classified as “machine tools” under the HTSUS are those that perform work on rigid or semi-rigid materials, not particles or granules. That heading encompasses a large variety of machine tools “for working wood, cork, bone, hard rubber, hard plastics or similar hard materials” but, unlike heading 8462, does not include machines falling outside the scope of the term “machine tool.” Heading 8465, HTSUS. The Explanatory Note to heading 8465 instructs as follows: The heading excludes machines for working materials which although referred to in the heading do not possess the characteristics of hard materials at the time work commences on them. For this reason, machines for cutting or .slicing supple plastics or unhardened rubber are excluded (heading 84.77). Furthermore, the heading does not cover machines for making articles from granules or powder, such as machines for moulding plastic materials (heading 84.77), machines for agglomerating or moulding particles or fibres of wood or other ligneous matter (heading 84.79) or other similar machines. EN 84.65. The Note does not describe as “machine tools” the machines thus excluded from heading 8465, all of which are provided for in headings that do not use the term “machine tool.” See headings 8477, 8479, HTSUS. A process of building entire metal objects from metallic particles, such as the process that EOS describes as “laser sintering” and “additive manufacturing,” is not one performed by removing material from solid metal forms. Nor is it performed by deforming a metal article. See Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 59 (concurring with plaintiff that there is no plastic deformation of the metal particles during the M270 building process). The M270, therefore, is not a “machine tool” classifiable under heading 8463, HTSUS. Defendant argues that the term “machine tools” as used in heading 8463 encompasses not only machines performing “traditional machining processes” but also those performing “nontraditional,” technically advanced methods of machining, such as that performed by the 'M270, that “reflect the evolution of the industry.” Def.’s Mem. 11-12. Defendant would place in the latter category “electron-beam machining, electrical-discharge machining, electrochemical machining, ion beam machining, laser machining, plasma arc machining, ultrasonic machining, chemical machining, photochemical machining, and water jet machining.” Id. at 11 (citing Def.’s Ex. 16 (28 The New Encyclopedia BHtannica 714 (15th ed. 1998))). Defendant also points out that some modern machine tools “incorporate the technology of computer-aided design and computer aided manufacturing to produce the final work product of the machine.” Id. at 12 (citation omitted). Defendant advocates that the court apply a definition of “machine tools” developed by the Association for Manufacturing Technology (“AMT”), as follows: “power driven manufacturing machinery, not portable by hand, used in the procéss of transforming man-made materials into discrete durable goods.” Id. at 12-13 (citing Def.’s Ex. 19(A) (Bylaws of AMT, Art. I, Sect. 1.01(a))). Defendant is correct that modern machine tools use various advanced technologies to perform their “machining” functions. But advances in technology do not convince the court to construe the term “machine tools,” as used in heading 8463, HTSUS, as broadly as defendant does. The AMT definition defendant favors would encompass a seemingly infinite variety of stationary “power-driven machines” with applications in the manufacturing of “discrete durable goods,” including machines that the Harmonized System nomenclature, as addressed in the Explanatory Notes, would not consider to be machine tools. The court considers the AMT definition too broad and imprecise for use in tariff classification. Defendant also offers a declaration by Mr. Patrick McGibbon, AMT’s Vice President for Strategic Information and 'Research and Membership, which includes the statement that “[u]sing lasers to sinter materials in an additive process, which adds one very thin layer at a time, represents just another technology in the continuing evolution of both materials and machine tools.” Id. at 13 (citing Def.’s Ex. 19 (Decl. of Patrick McGibbon)). The quoted sentence from Mr. M'cGibbon’s declaration presents Mr. McGibbon’s opinion on the scope of the term “machine took” The proper meaning of that term as used in the article description for heading 8463, however, is a question of law for the court to decide, not a question of fact. See Warner-Lambert Co., 407 F.3d at 1209. Mr. McGibbon’s opinion is not consistent with the common meaning of the term as defined in authoritative sources and as reflected in the Explanatory Notes. Moreover, Mr. McGibbon relies for his opinion, at least in part, on the definition of “machine tool” adopted by his association; as the court has explained, that definition is not useful for the purpose of tariff classification. Nor is the court persuaded by defendant’s argument that the M270 is a machine tool because, like other technically advanced machine tools, it performs a “nonconventional method! ] of machining.” Def.’s Mem. 11, 18. The HTSUS already reflects technically advanced, nonconventional methods of machining, for example by providing in heading 8456 for machine tools that remove material “by laser or other light or photon beam, ultrasonic, electro-discharge, electro-chemical, electron beam, ionic-beam or plasma arc processes.” Heading 8456, HTSUS; EN 84.56. Another example is heading 8458, which includes “computer numerical control” (“CNC”) lathes. See EN 84.58 (Subheading Explanatory Note!,] Subheadings 8458.11 and 8458.91). CNC work centers are also encompassed by heading 8465. See EN 84.65. But no heading within the “machine tool” headings of 8456 to 8465, inclusive, includes a term the court could construe, even futuristically, to encompass the M270 system, which in its principal function does not use a rigid or semi-rigid substance as the starting material and instead manufactures entire articles from raw materials in powdered form. ■ Defendant also points to the definition of “machine tool” found in Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary: “a machine designed for shaping solid work,” Def.’s Mem. 11 (citing Def.’s Ex. 15 (Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 714 (1985))), arguing that the M270 “shapes” metal particles to form “solid work” and therefore conforms to this definition, id. at 15. However, the more complete definition of the term taken from one of Webster’s unabridged dictionaries, which the court cited previously, suggests that defendant is misinterpreting the shortened form of the definition. “Shaping” solid work, according to the more complete Webster’s definition (and consistent with other established “machine tool” definitions) does not describe processes that form a solid object from powder or particles. As the unabridged Webster’s definition shows, the shaping occurs as a result of “tooling” that either removes material from, or deforms, a solid object. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) 1354 (1993). Further, defendant quotes a “U.S. Customs Informed Compliance Publication” (“ICP”) that sets forth five criteria a machine must satisfy to qualify as “machine tool” for tariff classification purposes. Def.’s Mem. 14 (citing Def.’s Ex. 20 (What Every Member of the Trade Community Should Know About: Machine Tools (March 2006) (“ICP ”))). The ICP is neither binding on the court nor entitled to deference. Moreover, it does not support the government’s position that a machine creating solid objects from particles or granules of metal can be considered a machine tool for the purpose of tariff classification. As the first criterion, the ICP states that “we conclude that a machine tool is a machine that: [ ] improves or advances the status of a workpiece by shaping or surface working. It may do this by producing a new product or by restoring an old one to its original condition ...” ICP at 11 (emphasis added). The M270 does not begin with a “workpiece.” Elsewhere, defendant argues that “there is no requirement that the work be a block of material versus powder particles” and that “[t]he powder particles are in a solid state (i.e., not melted) prior to the laser sintering process.” Reply Mem. in- Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and in Supp. of Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. 3 & n. 2 (Jan. 23, 2012), ECF No. 81 (“Def.’s Reply Mem.”). But under the unabridged Webster’s definition for “machine tool” that the court quoted above, and under the Explanatory Notes, there is such a requirement, as even the ICP seems to recognize. Defendant argues, further, that “workpiece” is defined as “a piece of work in process of manufacture.” Def. Mem. 21 (quoting, inter alia, Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1360 (1985)). Defendant submits that the powder used by the M270 satisfies this definition. Id. However, the definition of “workpiece” defendant offers is not in the specific context of a.machine tool process and does not overcome the weakness in defendant’s argument, which is that the M270 does not apply tooling to remove material from, or to deform, a solid object. In its reply brief, defendant argues that the inclusion of the term “[o]ther” in subheading HTSUS 8463.90.00, HTSUS, reflects the expansiveness of heading 8463 and congressional intent to include in this heading machines of a type not yet known at the time of enactment. Def.’s Reply Mem. 7-8. Relying on the cases Sears Roebuck & Co. v. United States, 22 F.3d 1082 (Fed.Cir.1994) and Brookside Veneers v. United States, 847 F.2d 786 (Fed.Cir.1988), defendant submits that the HTSUS must be construed to allow for the evolution of the machine tool industry, consistent with congressional intent, such that a technologically advanced machine such as the M270 should find classification within the scope of heading 8463. Id. This argument is not in accord with the principle underlying GRI 1. The inclusion under a heading of a subheading designated “other” is not properly construed as an invitation to expand the scope of the heading beyond the terms expressed in the heading article description. “Only after determining that a product is classifiable under the heading should the court look to the subheadings to find the correct classification for the merchandise.” Orlando Food Corp., 140 F.3d at 1440 (citing GRIs 1 & 6, HTSUS). Also, defendant’s reply brief directs.the court’s attention to deposition testimony of Mr. Andrew Snow, EOS’s Regional Director of North America, in which Mr. Snow stated that the M270 can be described as a machine tool for working metal. Def.’s Reply Mem. 8 (citing Def.’s Ex. 12 (Snow Dep. 34-35, Oct. 28, 2010)). Mr. Snow’s testimony appears to offer an opinion on the meanings of the tariff terms “machine tool” and “working” as found in the article description for heading 8463, each of which, as previously noted, is a question of law for the court to decide, not a question of fact. There is no dispute of fact that the M270 uses metal particles in performing its “laser sintering” function. This testimony, therefore, does not advance defendant’s argument that the M270 is a “machine tool for working metal” within the meaning of heading 8463, HTSUS. Because, for the reasons discussed above, the M270 is not properly classified as a “machine tool” under heading 8463, the court proceeds to consider the other candidate headings within the HTSUS. 2. The M270 Is Not Properly Classified under Heading 8515, HTSUS Plaintiff claims classification of the M270 under heading 8515. Consol. Am. Compl. ¶ 44; Pl.’s Mem. 5. The court disagrees, concluding that the M270 is not described by any term within the article description for the heading. Heading 8515 describes three categories of goods in descriptions separated by semicolons: (1) “[e]lectric (including electrically heated gas), laser or other light or photon beam, ultrasonic, electron beam, magnetic pulse or plasma arc soldering, brazing or welding machines and apparatus, whether or not capable of cutting;” (2) “electric machines and apparatus for hot spraying of metal or cermets;” and (3) “parts thereof.” Heading 8515, HTSUS. Because the M270 does not operate by hot spraying of métal, and because it is a complete machine, not a part, only the first category of the heading merits further consideration. It is not disputed that the M270 performs its building function by means of a laser beam. The essential question is whether the M270 is properly described by the term “laser ... beam welding machines and apparatus” as used in the heading 8515 article description. In considering the meaning of the tariff term, the court first considers the more basic question of what constitutes “welding.” A common definition of the verb “weld” is to unite or consolidate (as metallic parts) by heating to a plastic or fluid state the surfaces of the parts to be joined and then allowing the metals to flow together with or without the addition of other molten metal or by hammering or compressing with or without previous softening by heat. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) 2,594 (1993). The noun form of “weld” is used to refer to the joint created by the welding process or to the junction of a welded piece. Id. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the verb “weld” as “[to] join together (metal parts) by heating the surfaces to the point of melting with a blowpipe, electric arc, or other means, and uniting them by pressing, hammering, etc. ...” The Oxford English Dictionary, available at http://oxford dictionaries.com/definition/english/weld (last visited May 10, 2013) (emphasis added). The parties disagree on whether the laser sintering (additive manufacturing) function performed by the M270 correctly can be termed a “welding” function such that the M270 would answer to the description “welding machine or apparatus” as specified by heading 8515. Plaintiff advocates a definition of the term under which welding is any process that “involves (a) heating of metal or plastic materials to the melting point[] and (b) joining, uniting, or fusing the materials together.” Pl.’s Mem. 9 (footnote omitted). This, however, is a broader conception of the term “welding” than those of the dictionary definitions quoted above and broader even than some dictionary definitions upon which plaintiff relies for its argument. Plaintiff s formulation makes no mention of the heating of surfaces, is not limiting to “joining” of “parts,” and is satisfied by “uniting” or “fusing” of materials, without regard to whether those materials are joined by welds or retain their individual shape or identity. Although the Explanatory Note to Heading 8515 does not expressly define the verb “weld” or the adjective “welding” as applied to machines and apparatus, it is nonetheless informative on the intended meaning of “welding” as used in the article description for the heading. Consistent with the definitions the court has cited, the Explanatory Note, in several contexts, refers to welding as a process that creates joints between parts. The Note informs the reader that “[b]razing and soldering are operations in which metal parts are joined by means of a filler metal with a lower melting point that wets the parent metal(s). The parent metal(s) does (do) not participate by fusion in making the joint.” EN 85.15(I)(A) (emphasis added). By implication, the Note contrasts these two methods of joining with various types of welding, in which a joint is formed between parts by melting or fusing the parts together through the application of heat from any of various sources. Explanatory Note 85.15 describes certain of the heat sources used by various welding apparatus so as to connote that a welding process is one of “joining” preexisting “parts” or “pieces” (or, as is inapplicable here, one of “cutting”). For example, in describing machines for the resistance welding of metal, the Explanatory Note states that “[t]he heat required for forming welded joints is produced by the resistance to the flow of an electric current through the parts to be joined (Joule heat).” Id. at (I)(B) (emphasis added). In discussing electron beam welding machines, the Note explains that “[t]he heat is produced in the piece(s) to be welded or cut by impact of the electrons of a focused electron beam generated in vacuum.” Id. at (I)(E) (emphasis added). For “hot gas welding,” the Explanatory Note informs that “[t]he surfaces to be joined are warmed by electrically heated gas (generally air) and joined under pressure with or without additives.” Id. at (I)(H)(1) (emphasis added). EN 85.15(I)(G) refers to “[m]achines and apparatus for photon beam welding, whether or not capable of cutting” that it subdivides into machines and apparatus for “[flaser beam welding” and those for “[flight beam welding.” Id. at (I)(G)(1) & (I)(G)(2). Although the Explanatory Note does not define the term “laser beam welding,” it describes the heat source for this process as follows: The heat is derived from a source of essentially coherent, monochromatic radiation, which can be focused into a high-intensity beam. It is produced by the impact of this beam on the piece to be welded. Id. at (I)(G)(1) (emphasis added). Explanatory Note 85.15 clarifies that the heading was intended to include, at least, a class of goods known to commerce as laser beam welding machines, which operate by creating “welded joints” (“welds”) that unite pieces of metal at the surfaces through the application of energy from a laser beam. The question this case presents is whether the heading, although including within its scope such “conventional” laser beam welding machines and apparatus, also encompasses machines that use the energy of a laser beam to build entire objects from metal particles. The court concludes that it does not. Construed as a whole, EN 85.15 is more supportive of a narrow definition of “welding” and of “laser beam welding” than of a broader definition such as that posited by plaintiff. Established definitions support this conclusion. “Laser beam welding” has been defined as a “welding process that produces coalescence with the heat from a laser beam striking the joint.” Illustrated Diet, of Metalworking and Mfg. Tech. 271 (1999) (emphasis added). Another definition is A method of joining metals by means of fusion or by solid-state processes. Metals having similar composition may be united in one homogenous piece by fusing together the edges in contact, or by additional molten metal of the proper characteristics deposited where it will form a, fused joint with each piece. Van Nostrand’s Scientific Encyclopedia 3007 (6th ed. 1983) (emphasis added). A third definition is “a joining process that produces coalescence of materials with the heat obtained from the application of a concentrated coherent light beam impinging on the surfaces to be welded.” Joining: Understanding the Basics 90 (2011) (emphasis added). Here, the parties agree that the metal particles, which are spherical in shape, are fully melted (“liquified”) in the M270’s additive manufacturing process. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 8-9. As plaintiff admits, the melting of the metal parties “destroyfs] their individual identities, thus rendering them shapeless,” and “when the molten metal re-solidifies, the particles coalesce and do not re-acquire their individual shapes or identities', which have been destroyed by the laser.” Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 10. The definitions of “welding” and laser beam welding” do not explicitly describe a process capable of producing entirely new three-dimensional objects using as a starting material only spherical particles that melt and coalesce, thereby losing individual shape and identity. To the contrary, some of the definitions, discussed above, are flatly inconsistent with such a process. Plaintiff points out that EOS’s German parent was not even founded until 1989, and that therefore, a machine performing the “laser sintering” process of the M270 did not exist at the time the Harmonized System nomenclature was drafted. PL’s Mem. 20 (citing PL’s Ex. 21 (Corporate Management, EOS e-manufacturing .solutions, available at http://www.eos.info/en/ about-eos/corporate-management.html (last visited [by plaintiff] May 27, 2011))). Plaintiff urges the court to recognize that tariff terms are “written for the future.” Id. (citing Jomac-North, Inc. v. United States, 63 Cust.Ct. 173, 177, C.D. 3892 (1969)). However,- the court finds nothing in the detailed discussion within EN 85.15 by which it may conclude that a laser sintering process such as that performed by the M270, had it' existed when the scope of Harmonized System heading 85.15 was defined, would have been considered a “welding” process by the drafters of the Harmonized System. As the court- discussed above, any inference would be-to the contrary; the EN includes references describing “welding” as the uniting of “parts” by heating of surfaces to form welded “joints.” From dictionary definitions and EN 85.15, the court concludes that the laser sintering function of the M270 is not a “welding” function because it does not accomplish the joining of “parts” at their “surfaces” to form “joints” (“welds”) and because it constructs entire objects from particles. The latter is a capability that is not expressly contemplated by EN 85.15, that is inconsistent with some established definitions of the term “welding,” and that is not definitively encompassed by any established definition of the term “welding” or “laser beam welding” of which the court is aware. Citing various deposition testimony and an unpublished technical article (a Ph.D. dissertation), plaintiff argues that micrograph pictures taken of metal objects built by the M270 reveal “interfaces,” which .plaintiff characterizes as the equivalent of welded “joints.” PL’s Mem. 13-15 (citing PL’s Ex. 4 (Rosen Dep. 105, Mar. 18, 2011); PL’s Ex. 5 (Ream Rep. 5, Jan. 11, 2011); PL’s Ex. 6 (Rosen Rep. 5, Jan. 11, 2011); PL’s-Ex. 9 (Bourell Dep. 73, 82-86, Feb. 11, 2011); PL’s Ex. 10 (Ream Dep. 183