Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM & ORDER NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, District Judge. The case of William Lopez began twenty-three years ago. It was rotten from day one. In 1989, a man entered a crackhouse in Brooklyn and shot and killed a drug dealer named Elvirn Surria. Lopez was charged with murder for this shooting. After a jury trial before Justice Carolyn Demarest in New York Supreme Court, Lopez was convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison. His direct appeal and state collateral proceeding — again before Justice Demarest, twenty years later — were unsuccessful. Lopez now asks this court to grant his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the “Petition”), which argues, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court resolves this Petition today. Any discussion of Lopez’s case must begin with the weakness of the evidence the prosecution presented at trial. Lacking a murder weapon or any forensic evidence connecting Lopez to the shooting, the prosecution relied upon the testimony of two witnesses who were present at the crime scene, only one of whom identified Lopez. The first, Daisy Guadalupe Flores Lopez (“Flores,” and no relation to the Petitioner), came face-to-face and spoke with the shooter but did not recognize Lopez when she saw him in the courtroom. She described the shooter as a “tall, dark, black” man above 6'3" in height. Lopez is around 5'7" and the State later conceded that his “complexion could not be described as black.” Justice Demarest agreed that it was “not possible [that] this defendant could have committed the crime based upon [Flores’s] description.” The second witness was Janet Chapman. On the morning of the shooting, Chapman was in a room in the basement of the crackhouse in the midst of a two-day crack binge, and admittedly had smoked ten to twelve vials of crack in the two hours prior to the shooting. She told a prosecutor after the crime that she did not witness the shooting but saw Lopez with a gun, went back into her room, and then heard a shot and a body fall; At the trial itself, she switched gears and testified that she did in fact see Lopez shoot Surria through the partially ajar door to her room. After trial, Chapman changed her story yet again, this time even more dramatically— she claimed that Lopez was not present at all at the scene of the crime and that her testimony had been a “pure fabrication” made under duress from the prosecution. Just as important are those who did not testify. Lopez claims he told his trial attorney that his mother-in-law and sister-in-law (the “alibi witnesses”) were ready to testify that Lopez had been with them around the time of the crime. Counsel later stated that he had interviewed one witness and decided not to call her. But both witnesses have since submitted affidavits swearing that counsel never spoke to either of them regarding an alibi defense and describing in detail their interactions with Lopez around the time of the murder. Another key non-witness was Ear line Cafield, who knew Janet Chapman when both of them were inmates at Rikers Island jail. ' After trial but prior to sentencing, Cafield sent a letter to a prosecutor stating that Chapman had told her that someone other than Lopez had committed the crime. The prosecution forwarded this letter to Lopez’s counsel, but counsel never mentioned its contents to Justice Demarest. Finally, just a few months ago, Lopez’s habeas counsel was able to track down a man named Cesar Diaz in the- Dominican Republic. At an evidentiary hearing before this court, Diaz testified via videoconference that he was in the crackhouse when Surria was killed and saw the shooting. Diaz described the shooter as a “black, dark-skinned” man approximately 5'3" in height. When shown a,mug shot of Lopez taken soon after the murder, Diaz said he was “certain” that the person in the picture was not the shooter. In short, the prosecution’s evidence was flimsy to begin with and has since been reduced to rubble by facts arising after trial. Habeas relief, however, is an extraordinary remedy, particularly for those prisoners who are in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court. Lopez has a number of challenging hurdles to surpass if he is to receive it. The first is a procedural hurdle. Lopez’s Petition is indisputably untimely under the one-year statutory limitation period prescribed for habeas petitions from state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). He argues, however, that he should be excused from this limitation period because he has made a credible and compelling showing that he is actually innocent of the crime. See Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514, 518 (2d Cir.2012). To establish a “gateway” claim of actual innocence and thus overcome his procedural default, Lopez must demonstrate using “ ‘new reliable evidence’ ” that it is “ ‘more likely than not ... [that] no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt — or to remove the double negative, that more likely than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. at 541 (quoting House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006), and Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995)). Based on the weakness of the prosecution’s case and the new evidence Lopez has presented since trial, the court concludes that any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt as to his guilt; he is thus excused from the limitation period. (See Part II.) The second hurdle is one of state-court deference. Lopez’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was rejected on the merits by Justice Demarest during Lopez’s collateral state court proceeding. This means that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (“AEDPA”), the court may not grant habeas relief unless Justice Demarest’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). The court concludes that Justice Demarest’s analysis of the new evidence Lopez submitted in support of his ineffective assistance claim was an unreasonable determination of the facts under § 2254(d)(2). Indeed, her refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing to develop the central factual disputes underlying Lopez’s claim — without so much as an explanation — is baffling, not to mention unfortunate because the two alibi witnesses are now no longer available to testify. (See Part III.A.) Finally, there is a constitutional hurdle. Putting aside the reasonableness of Justice Demarest’s adjudication of his claim, Lopez must show that he is being held in custody in violation of the United States Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). For his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he must show: (1) that his counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Lopez has satisfied this standard because of his trial counsel’s failure to call his available alibi witnesses, a decision that had no basis in reasonable trial strategy and undermines the court’s “confidence in the outcome” of Lopez’s trial. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. (See Part III.B.) For these reasons and those set forth below, Lopez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND A. Trial Evidence and Proceedings The evidence at trial shows that on August 31, 1989, sometime after 2:00 a.m., two men entered the basement of a crack-house at 3053 Brighton Fifth Street in Brooklyn and demanded money and drugs from a drug dealer named Elvirn Surria. (Trial Tr. (Dkt. 59-2) at 247-50.) One of the men shot Surria twice with a double-barreled shotgun. (Id. at 250-54.) The weapon was not recovered (id. at 427), but Surria was later determined to have died from a single shotgun wound to the abdomen (Trial Tr. (Dkt. 59-1) at 161-62). William Lopez was charged for this shooting in New York Supreme Court, Kings County. (Goodman Aff. (Dkt. 59) ¶ 5.) Following a jury trial before Justice Carolyn Demarest, he was convicted of second-degree murder, second-degree criminal possession of a weapon, and third-degree criminal possession of a weapon. (Trial Tr. (Dkt. 59-3) at 722-23.) He was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment totaling twenty-five years to life. (Sentencing Tr. (Dkt. 59-3) at 21.) Two eyewitnesses testified at trial. The court will discuss each of their testimony in turn. 1. Testimony of Daisy Guadalupe Flores Lopez Daisy Guadalupe Flores Lopez was an immigrant from El Salvador. (See Trial Tr. (Dkt. 59-2) at 229.) On August 31, 1989, she was working at the crackhouse for Surria, whom she knew as “Moreno”; her job was to open the door to the crack-house and hand people drugs. (Id. at 229-30, 232, 247-54.) She “[njever” used drugs herself but accepted the job from Surria because she had been unable to secure other employment. (Id. at 254-55.) Drug deals at the crackhouse took place at a side door entrance into the building. (Id. at 235.) The side door was the only point of entrance and exit into the basement, which was down the stairs past the side door after entry. (Id. at 232-37, 334.) There were five rooms in the basement. (Id. at 331-32.) At around 2:00 a.m. on the morning of the shooting, Flores went down with Surria to one of the rooms in the basement of the crackhouse, and the two talked for awhile and listened to music. (Id. at 247-48.) At one point Flores went upstairs to the side door entrance and sold drugs to a girl. (Id.) She then went back downstairs to the basement. (Id.) “Seconds later,” someone knocked on the side door. (Id.) Surria went upstairs to the side door and Flores stayed downstairs. (Id. at 248-49.) Two armed men, one carrying a double-barreled shotgun, pushed Surria downstairs into the basement room occupied by Flores. (Id. at 249-50.) The two men demanded money and drugs from Surria and began searching the room. (Id. at 249.) Surria got angry and tried to grab their weapons. (Id. at 255-56.) The man with the shotgun then shot Surria twice and Surria fell to the floor. (Id. at 249, 251.) He pointed the gun at Flores, but, after Flores pleaded for her life, he did not shoot her. (Id. at 250.) The two men searched the basement and Surria’s pockets and took money and some pills. (Id. at 251-54.) After the men left, Flores stayed in the basement for a few minutes and then called an ambulance. (Id. at 251.) Flores offered a description of the shooter at trial. To fully understand this description, it is important to note the events at a hearing Justice Demarest conducted in the absence of the jury prior to Flores’s testimony. During that hearing, both Lopez’s counsel — William Lupo — and Assistant District Attorney Tess Allen (“A.D.A. Allen”) asked Flores to look around the courtroom to see if she recognized someone. (Id. at 216-17, 223.) Although Lopez was in the room, Flores stated multiple times — and in response to both attorneys’ questions— that she did not recognize anyone and that she did not see the shooter. (Id. at 217, 223.) After A.D.A. Allen persisted in seeking permission from Justice Demarest to attempt to elicit an identification from Flores during trial (see id. at 223-26), Justice Demarest ordered A.D.A. Allen to instruct Flores that she was not to offer any identification of a person in the courtroom (id. at 226). Justice Demarest stated: “This ruling is the identification by this witness, she has clearly testified unequivocally, and I see her looking around and saw her look at the defendant, I don’t think there’s any question that she cannot recognize him. The identification is suppressed in any way, shape or form.” (Id. at 225.) After Flores’s testimony resumed, A.D.A. Allen asked Flores to describe the shooter, and Flores answered that he was “tall, dark, black,” “Hispanic,” and appeared “drugged.” (Id. at 258-59.) Lupo then cross-examined Flores. In response to Lupo’s questioning, Flores testified that the shooter was a “little tall[er]” than Lupo and approximately Lupo’s size. (Id. at 260.) During a hearing before the court at the end of trial, Lupo stated: “I would ask the Court, for the purpose of this record, to indicate that I am approximately six-feet-three and 245 to 50 pounds, and that the defendant in this case is approximately 150 pounds, about five-feet-seven and is white, or light-skinned.” (Id. at 528.) A.D.A. Allen refused to stipulate to the defense counsel’s description of Lopez’s height and weight, but stated that “[t]he Court certainly can judicially note at this time that Mr. Lopez’s complexion could not be described as black.” (Id.) Lopez has since submitted documentation showing that he is 5'7" and light-skinned. (Frost Aff. (Ex. P to Resp. Opening Opp’n (Dkt. 59-5)) ¶ 6 (affidavit from Lopez’s investigator av'erring that he met Lopez and that Lopez was approximately 5'7" and “light-skinned”); Department of Correctional Services Inmate Photographs (Dkt. 109-1) (showing Lopez’s height and weight on September 26, 2012, as 5'7" and 165 pounds, respectively, and describing his race as “White”); Institutional Admission Form (Dkt. 109-1) (indicating on May 13, 1991, that Lopez was 5'7" and white).) In its brief in opposition to Lopez’s motion to vacate judgment, the State acknowledged that Lopez was no taller than 5'9". (People Aff. in Opp’n to Mot. to Vacate J. (Ex. R. to Resp. Opening Opp’n (Dkt. 59-6)) at 9-) After the jury convicted Lopez, Lupo moved to set aside the verdict on the grounds that it was against the weight.of the evidence, arguing again that Flores’s description of the shooter did not fit Lopez’s characteristics. (Trial Tr. (Dkt. 59-3) at 729-31.) Justice Demarest agreed with Lupo that “it appeared not possible [that] this defendant could have committed the crime based upon [Flores’s] description.” (Id. at 732.) Nevertheless, she found that she was required to “assume the jury accepted [Janet Chapman’s] testimony,” and thus denied Lopez’s motion. (Id.) 2. Testimony of Janet Chapman Janet Chapman (also known as “Janet Chamber,” “Janet Chaplan,” and “Ashley Foster”) was living in a room in the basement of the crackhouse at the time of the shooting. (Trial Tr. (Dkt. 59-2) at 331-32, 350, 381.) She was twenty-two years old, unemployed, and had a $200-per-day crack habit, which she supported through prostitution. (Id. at 382.) Chapman had been previously convicted twice of misdemeanor drug possession, twice of prostitution, and once for a drug sale. (Id. at 382.) Chapman testified that at approximately 2:00 a.m. on the morning of the shooting, she was in her room smoking crack with her friend Howie Sachs. (Id. at 350, 353, 355-56, 389-90.) Sachs had been “shooting up” cocaine (i.e., injecting rather than smoking or snorting it) for several days; he was “very'high” and was not “aware of anything that was going [on] around him.” (Id. at 356, 358, 389.) Chapman had not slept for two days and had smoked ten to twelve vials of crack in the two hours before the shooting. (Id. at 368, 389-91, 485-86, 512-16.) At some point that morning, Chapman heard “a girl’s voice” and Surria’s voice speaking in Spanish, a language that Chapman did not understand. (Id. at 354.) Someone then knocked on the side door to the crackhouse. (Id.) Chapman testified that, looking out from the partially ajar door to her room, she saw Surria walk down the stairs with Lopez (a.k.a. “Billy”), whom she had known from the neighborhood for over a year. (Id. at 354-55, 359.) The two seemed to be arguing in Spanish; Chapman did not understand what they were saying. (Id. at 354.) Through the crack in the door, Chapman saw Lopez point a shotgun at Surria and fire, after which she saw some smoke and heard (but did not see) Surria fall to the ground. (Id. at 355, 358, 364-66.) She then saw Lopez put his gun down and check Surria’s pockets but did not see him take anything. (Id. at 366.) Chapman then went back into her room. (Id. at 369.) After Lopez left the crackhouse, Chapman waited for about five minutes and left herself. (Id.) Chapman did not call the police after the shooting. (Id. at 369-70.) She testified that she did not come forward immediately because she was “scared,” “didn’t believe there w[ere] any innocent people involved,” and “was doing drugs at the time.” (Id. at 491.) On September 29, 1989, Chapman was arrested for prostitution. (Id at 370-71.) She was taken to a police station, was interviewed by a detective, and then gave a sworn audiotaped statement to an assistant district attorney concerning the Surria homicide.. (Id. at 393, 395-96, 468-85.) She subsequently viewed a lineup and identified Lopez as the shooter. (Id. at 374-75.) On cross-examination, Lupo attempted to impeach Chapman with a portion of the audiotaped statement she made at the police station. Contrary to her direct testimony, at the police station Chapman stated to the assistant district attorney that she had not been looking at Lopez when the gun was fired but rather saw Lopez with a gun, went back to her room, and then heard a shot and a body fall to the ground in the hallway. (Id. at 471-72, 477, 479.) When Lupo questioned her about this statement, Chapman said: “Yes. I had seen part of it. Okay, I didn’t see the— maybe somethings, but I saw most of it.” (Id. at 483.) At the time of her testimony, Chapman had been in custody at Rikers Island jail for about five months pursuant to an arrest for a drug sale and a related charge for a violation of probation (“VOP”). (Id. at 328.) There is conflicting evidence in the record regarding whether, at the time of her testimony, there was an outstanding deal between the prosecution and Chapman whereby Chapman would receive a sentence of time served on the VOP charge if she testified against Lopez consistently with her audiotaped statement at the police department. Specifically, during jury selection for Lopez’s trial on October 15, 1990, A.D.A. Allen volunteered that she did not “have any understanding of any promises or agreements or deals” with Chapman. (Trial Tr. (Dkt. 59-1) at 91.) Defense counsel referenced contrary information that he had gleaned from conversations with A.D.A. Allen. (See id. at 91-92.) A.D.A. Allen then told Justice Demarest that at an October 10, 1990, hearing on Chapman’s VOP before Justice Michael Curci, Justice Curci had the “bright idea [that] what we should do is a contract” with Chapman in exchange for her testimony, requiring that “she would testify consistent with [her] prior statement” at the police department. (Id. at 94-95.) A.D.A. Allen also told Justice Demarest, however, that the arrangement was never actually discussed with Chapman and that Chapman was not aware of it. (Id. at 94-96.) As it turns out, A.D.A. Allen’s representation was false. The transcript of the October 10 hearing before Judge Curci shows that the “contract” was discussed in open court in Chapman’s presence. (See Oct. 10, 1990, Hr’g Tr. (Hr’g Exs. (Dkt. 95-1) at 227-32) at 4-5.) Lupo brought this fact to Justice Demarest’s attention after he began to cross-examine Chapman. (See Trial Tr. (Dkt. 59-2) at 401-02.) A.D.A. Allen then shifted her position and represented to Justice Demarest that although there had been an offer, the offer had been “rescinded” and “there st[ood] at th[at] time no such agreement.” (Id. at 403.) Lupo continued his cross-examination of Chapman. Chapman acknowledged that she had heard Justice Curci’s statements about the “contract” at the October 10 hearing and that a contract had in fact been offered to her, but maintained that it had been withdrawn and that she did not expect any benefit in exchange for her testimony. (Id. at 489-90, 492, 494-95.) The withdrawal of the deal is not reflected in the transcript of the second appearance in Chapman’s VOP case on October, 12, 1990. (Dkt. 94-7.) That hearing took place “outside the presence of [Chapman]” and reflects only an off-the-record discussion between A.D.A. Allen, Chapman’s attorney, and the court, and then an adjournment of the case until October 24. (Id.) The transcript of the final hearing on the VOP case on October 24, 1990 — after Chapman’s testimony and Lopez’s conviction — suggests that the offer was in fact eventually withdrawn. (See Oct. 24, 1990, Hr’g Tr. (Dkt. 123-1) at 4.) However, as Justice Demarest pointed out in her decision denying Lopez’s motion to unseal the October 24 transcript, there was “no indication” in the transcript of whether the offer was withdrawn “prior to or subsequent to [Chapman’s] testimony at [Lopez]’s trial.” (June 11, 1999, N.Y. Sup.Ct. Decision & Order (Dkt. 64-1) at 3.) B. Alibi Witnesses At the time of the shooting and his trial, Lopez was common-law married to a woman named Juliana Guido (“Juliana”). (See Sept. 13, 2012, Evidentiary Hr’g Tr. (Dkt. 113) (“First Ev. Hr’g Tr.”) at 8.) Lopez considered Helen Guido (“Guido”), Juliana’s mother, to be his mother-in-law, and Lydia Rivera, Juliana’s sister, to be his sister-in-law. (Id. at 10,16.) According to Lopez, both prior to and during the trial he informed his counsel Lupo that both Guido and Rivera were willing to testify that Lopez had been with them at the time of the shooting. (See Lopez Aff. (Dkt. 55-3) at 1; First Ev. Hr’g Tr. at 15, 19.) Lopez claims Lupo later told him that he had spoken to both of these women and had advised against calling them as witnesses because they were “closely related” to Lopez and therefore would not be believable to the jury. (Lopez Aff. at 1; First Ev. Hr’g Tr. at 17.) After the State rested, Lupo told Justice Demarest at a hearing that Lopez had “produced for [Lupo] an alibi witness in this case.” (Trial Tr. (Dkt. 59-3) at 536.) Lupo stated that he had “interviewed that alibi witness” at “considerable length,” that he had advised Lopez and his family not to call this witness, and that Lopez and his family had agreed with that advice. (Id. at 536-37.) The court asked Lopez whether counsel had spoken truthfully and whether Lopez was “satisfied in not presenting whoever this witness was”; Lopez responded in the affirmative. (Id. at 537.) According to Lopez, he agreed with Lupo’s decision based upon Lupo’s representation that Lupo had spoken to Guido and Rivera. (See First Ev. Hr’g Tr. at 17-18.) After Lopez was convicted and incarcerated, his relationship with Juliana ended, and he remarried. (First Ev. Hr’g Tr. at 9.) He began to lose contact with the people he had previously considered his family because they “weren’t too happy” about his remarriage. (Id. at 20.) He testified that sometime in 2003, he had a conversation with Rivera over the phone, and she told him that Lupo had never spoken to her about appearing as a witness. (Id. at 20-21.) She later told him that Lupo had not spoken to Guido either. (IcL) Lopez asked Rivera if she could make a statement, and she agreed to do so. (See id.) In 2005, Rivera and Guido provided signed and notarized affidavits to Lopez. (Rivera Aff. (Hr’g Exs. at 1); Guido Aff. (Hr’g Exs. at 2).) Guido’s affidavit, dated April 4, 2005, states that on August 31, 1989, Lopez was living with Juliana and their daughter in the rear apartment of Guido’s home at 84 Brighton 1st Place in Brooklyn. (Guido Aff.) She “vividly” recalled that, at “approximately two to three in the morning” on the day of the shooting, Lopez came by and talked to her for “about an hour or so” about a disagreement he had with Juliana earlier. (Id)’ Guido was awake at that time because she worked a midnight shift at Coney Island Hospital and normally could not fall asleep until early the next morning. (Id.) Guido offered him some advice and then Lopez told her that he was going to his brother’s home on Brighton 3rd Street — where Rivera lived in the basement — to spend the night. (Id; see also First Ev. Hr’g Tr. at 113.) Besides Lopez’s concern about the disagreement with Juliana, Lopez “appeared to be in good spirits.” (Guido Aff.) Guido stated that she could “attest with absolute certainty[ ] that [Lopez] could not have committed the crime ... because later after communicating with [her] daughter Lydia Rivera, [she] was informed that [Rivera] was in fact with him during the time frame in which this crime was to have occurred,” at “[approximately 3 to 3:30 am.” (Id.) Guido also stated that she was present during trial and expected to testify, but that Lupo never spoke to her about testifying. (Id.) Rivera’s affidavit, dated October 21, 2005, states that on August 31, 1989, she resided at 3053 Brighton 3rd Street in Brooklyn with her husband and two children. (Rivera Aff.) She alleges that in the early hours of that “warm summer day,” • she, Lopez, Juliana, and Rivera’s son “were all in the front of the house drinking refreshments and simply talking about different things,” including “trying to patch up [the] disagreement” between Lopez and Juliana. (Id) After the start of Lopez’s trial, she asked Lopez “how in the world they c[ould] accuse him of doing something as heinous as murdering someone that morning when [they] were all outside in front of the house during that time,” and advised him to make clear to his attorney that she was willing to testify on his behalf. (Id.) However, she stated, “Lupo never called to speak to [her] nor attempted to inquire about her testimony.”. (Id.) C. Earline Cafield’s Letter On November 2, 1990, after Lopez’s con-., viction but prior to his sentencing, A.D.A. Allen sent Lopez’s counsel a letter attaching another letter from a Rikers Island inmate named Earline Cafield. (Allen Ltr. (Hr’g Exs. at 240); Cafield Ltr. (Hr’g Exs. at 233-35).) Cafield’s letter, dated October 12, 1990 — the day Lopez’s jury was selected and sworn — recited conversations that Cafield had with .Chapman while the two were housed together at Rikers Island, prior to Chapman’s testimony in Lopez’s case. (See Cafield Ltr.) The letter states, in relevant part: [T]here’s someone here who claims to have been a witness to a murder and “is cooperating” with the Brooklyn D.A.’s office. Her name is Janice Chaplin A.K.A. Janet Chapman. She says she’s here ostensibly on a probation violation but that in actual fact the D.A. had her picked up to make sure she’d be available to testify against this guy she says she saw kill another guy. She’s a crack addict and a prostitute. First she told me the guy who got killed [Surria] was a •dealer from South America. Then she said at another time that the guy was at the place where he was killed to buy crack. At another time she’s told me she was dealing crack for the guy who got murdered. Then, about three weeks ago another girl [“Joyce”] comes into the jail who was also at the crime scene immediately before and after the murder and she may have been there when it happened. There was also a “Howie” there who went through the victim’s pockets after he was killed.... She [Chapman] told me [on October 11, 1989,] that the guy [Surria] had bought some crack for a[ ] girl in exchange for sex (oral sex) and the girl[’]s boyfriend came after they’d finished and had an argument with the guy and shot him with a shotgun over the girl going out with him, but last night from a conversation between the three of us [Cafield, Chapman, and Joyce], it came out that the guy [Surria] was lured there to be robbed, she’s [Chapman is] the one who lured him there and this Howie did the killing. Howie has a Jewish last name and is a Vietnam veteran. (Id.) In other words, Cafield was told on different occasions that the murder was committed by (1) a man whose girlfriend had exchanged sexual favors for crack with Surria or (2) a man named “Howie” with “a Jewish last name” — presumably Howie Sachs — who had conspired with Chapman to lure Surria to the crackhouse to be robbed. (Id. at 2-3.) In her cover letter, A.D.A. Allen stated that her office had conducted an investigation of the letter and had learned that Cafield: (1) “underwent a CPL 730 [mental competency] exam at one time and was found unfit”; and (2) “ha[d] a history of violence that was known to [Chapman].” (Allen Ltr. at 1.) She noted further that cooperating witnesses often sought to “remove the taint of the image of cooperating by putting another gloss on themselves to the other inmates for the purposes of self-protection,” that multiple women connected to the Lopez case were in the same facility as Chapman and Cafield, and that Chapman had been confronted in the jail “by an incarcerated girlfriend of [Lopez].” (Id.) A.D.A. Allen concluded: In light of the various people in jail from the neighborhood where Janet [Chapman] lives, and in light of the obvious dangers to people considered as ‘rats’ and so forth, the District Attorney’s office is convinced that Janet [Chapman]’s in court testimony should not be upset by a letter from a source as unreliable as Earline Cafield. (Id.) The defense never made meaningful use of the Cafield letter. Lopez’s trial counsel, Lupo, was incapacitated after the verdict, having undergone heart bypass surgery, and is now deceased. Lopez was represented at sentencing by Irving Anolik. (Sentencing Tr. (Dkt. 59-3).) At the time of Lopez’s sentencing hearing before Justice Demarest, Anolik confessed that he had not seen the trial transcript (id. at 5), that he was “totally unfamiliar” with Lopez’s case (id. at 8), and that he was “totally unprepared to handle the sentence” (id. at 13), but Justice Demarest insisted on proceeding with sentencing (id. at 16-17). The following colloquy then occurred: THE COURT: You don’t wish to speak to any issues? MR. AN[OLIK]: Well, I can just speak to what I was told very briefly. One, I understand that a letter was received during the trial or perhaps shortly after the trial from some individual. THE COURT: Mr. An[olik], my interest is what you think is fair for your client and whether you wish to draw my attention to anything specifically. (Id. at 18.) Anolik then proceeded to discuss Lopez’s “steady history of employment,” “stable family,” non-violent past, and belief that he had not received a fair trial. (Id. at 18-19.) Anolik never mentioned the Cafield letter again. Justice Demarest then sentenced Lopez to concurrent terms of imprisonment totaling twenty-five years to life. (Id. at 20-21.) D. Janet Chapman’s Recantation Lopez’s brother, Eugene Lopez (“Eugene” ), testified at the September 13, 2012, evidentiary hearing in this court regarding three typewritten statements Chapman gave him in the months after Lopez was sentenced, each of which was admitted into evidence at the hearing. Eugene knew Chapman casually from the neighborhood as a drug addict and a prostitute; Chapman would occasionally purchase drugs and paraphernalia from Eugene, and would sometimes spend time with Lopez’s then common-law wife Juliana, who lived with Lopez in the basement of Eugene’s apartment and was also a drug user. (First Ev. Hr’g Tr. at 93-94, 113.) According to Eugene, a couple of months after the trial, Chapman approached Eugene and Juliana as the two of them were sitting on the stoop in front of Eugene’s home. (Id. at 95, 110.) Chapman “apologizefd] for having to testify the way she did against [Lopez]” and told Eugene that Officer Boyle of the NYPD had “pressured” and “threatened” her into testifying, and had held her in custody for three weeks until she testified. (Id. at 95.) Eugene asked her “if she could help [him] fix what she had done,” and “she agreed to write a statement.” (Id. at 95-96.) Eugene testified that he did not threaten Chapman or offer her anything in return for the statement, but rather that Chapman agreed to give the statement “voluntarily.” (Id. at 99.) A few days later, Chapman came to Eugene’s home and gave Eugene a typed statement that was signed but not sworn, dated, or notarized. (Id. at 96.) Eugene testified that neither he nor Juliana typed this statement — or any of the three statements — for Chapman, but he did not know if anyone else had assisted Chapman in writing it. (Id. at 101-02.) This letter states: I Jannet [sic] Chapman of sound mind and judgement [sic] do hereby confess that my testimony relevant to the trial of the People vs. William Lopez was not true. William Lopez was not present at the scene of the crime. The D.A. forced me to testify on behalf of the state under due ress [sic] and the constant threat of going to jail if I did not cooperate with the D.A. office. Let me say again William Lopez is completely innocent he was never at the scene of the crime. (First Chapman Statement (Hr’g Exs. at 237).) Eugene sent Chapman’s statement to Lopez. (First Ev. Hr’g Tr. at 96-97.) Lopez told Eugene that the statement was unacceptable because it was not notarized. (Id. at 97, 114-15.) Eugene then “waited around” for a few days until Chapman “resurfaced again” and told her that the letter was unacceptable. (Id.) Chapman “volunteered” to write another letter. (Id. at 115.) A few days later, while Eugene was sitting outside his home with Juliana, Chapman brought Eugene another typed (and again unsworn) statement. (Id. at 98.) This one states, in relevant part: I Janet Chapman of sound[ ] mind, and judgement [sic] do hereby confirm that my testimony given on 10/16/90 for the murder trial of the PEOPLE V. WILLIAM LOPEZ ... was not true and William Lopez is completely innocent____William Lopez was not at the murder scene and never had anything to do with the murder. (Second Chapman Statement (Hr’g Exs. at 238).) Eugene, Juliana, and Chapman then took a cab ride over to a nearby pharmacy. (First Ev. Hr’g Tr. at 114.) The statement was signed and notarized at the pharmacy in Eugene’s presence. (Id. at 114, 117.) The three of them then left the pharmacy, got back into the cab, and were driven back to Brighton Beach. (Id.) Eugene thanked Chapman' and she left. (Id. at 114.) Eugene brought the statement to his brother. (Id. at 99.) Lopez told Eugene that his appellate attorney, Anolik, “had said something about it being shabby or incorrectly written” and that he would “need a better statement.” (Id.) Eugene testified that Chapman then “disappeared for a while.” (Id.) When she “showed up back in the neighborhood,” Eugene “told her about what had happened” and asked if she could provide a “better” statement; she agreed to do so. (Id. at 99,117-18.) Sometime after that, on a Sunday, Chapman came back to Eugene’s house. (Id. at 100.) She presented Eugene with an unsigned affidavit dated “August, 1991.” (Id.; Third Chapman Statement (Hr’g Exs. at 226).) The affidavit states: JANET CHAPMAN aka JANET CHAMBERS, being duly sworn under penalty of perjury, deposes and says: The district attorney’s representative promised to arrange my early release in exchange for a statement that I saw William Lopez carrying a shotgun-type weapon near the scene of a shooting murder. Although I never saw anything such as the assistant district attorney suggested, I readily agreed to make the statement because I wanted to get out of jail. I attended William Lopez’s trial and testified against him when I knew my every word was pure fabrication. I immediately felt guilty for telling a lie that placed a man in prison, but I was also frightened of being sent back to jail on other charges or for perjury; therefore, I kept quiet for a time and only confided in a few close friends. Each person who heard the story of my lie was horrified. I reached the point where I could no longer live with the lie constantly weighing down on my conscience. I must also reveal that the district attorney told me never to tell anyone that we cut a deal about my testimony in exchange for my freedom. Even when I took the stand at trial, I lied about the deal and testified that no promises had been made to me. (Third Chapman Statement.) Eugene remembered that because it was a Sunday, he could not get the statement notarized. (First Ev. Hr’g Tr. at 100, 119.) Chapman therefore left the statement with Eugene and promised to come back the following day. (Id. at 100.) But she did not come back, and Eugene never saw her again. (Id. at 100-01.) E. Direct Appeal After trial, still represented by Anolik, Lopez appealed his convictions to the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, Second Department, on six grounds: (1) insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the prosecution’s failure to disclose the existence of a cooperation agreement between the prosecution and Chapman; (3) prosecutorial misconduct during summation; (4) various errors in the jury charge; (5) variance between the indictment and the prosecution’s theory of the case at trial; and (6) ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. (Goodman Aff. ¶ 9.) On October 12, 1993, the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment below and rejected all of Lopez’s claims on the merits. See People v. Lopez, 197 A.D.2d 594, 602 N.Y.S.2d 872 (2d Dep’t 1993). Lopez moved for reconsideration, and that motion was denied on January 19, 1994. (See Goodman Aff. ¶¶ 11-12.) Anolik did not petition on Lopez’s behalf for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. On November 29,1999, Lopez made a pro se motion to the Court of Appeals seeking permission to file a late application for leave to appeal, pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law (“C.P.L.”) § 460.30. (Id. ¶ 13.) The Court of Appeals dismissed the motion as untimely on May 4, 2000. (Id. ¶ 14.) Lopez then filed a petition for writ of coram nobis with the Appellate Division, claiming that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. (Id. ¶ 16.) The Appellate Division denied this petition on December 24, 2001. People v. Lopez, 289 A.D.2d 510, 735 N.Y.S.2d 782 (2d Dep’t 2001). F. Habeas Petition On July 5, 2002, Lopez filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising the same six issues he raised on direct appeal. (Pet. (Dkt. 1).) On April 24, 2004, the court dismissed Lopez’s Petition as time-barred, on the grounds that it had been filed more than a year after his conviction became final and that there were no extraordinary circumstances meriting equitable tolling of the limitation period. (Apr. 24, 2004, Mem. & Order (Dkt. 12).) Lopez moved for reconsideration of the court’s decision on the grounds that he was entitled to an exception from the one-year limitation period because he was actually innocent of the crimes of conviction. (Dkts. 14-15.) On September 13, 2005, this court granted Lopez’s motion for reconsideration. (Sept. 13, 2005, Mem. & Order (Dkt. 17).) The court first noted that, at the time, it was not settled in the Second Circuit whether the Constitution requires an actual innocence exception to AEDPA’s limitation period, and that the Second Circuit had instructed district courts to address this question only if confronted with a colorable actual innocence claim. (Id. at 1-2 (citing Whitley v. Senkowski, 317 F.3d 223 (2d Cir.2003)).) The court then found that Chapman’s written recantation of her trial testimony “appeared], assuming its veracity, to provide substantial support for Lopez’s actual innocence claim.” (Id. at 2.) Accordingly, the court vacated its April 24, 2004, opinion, reopened Lopez’s case, appointed Lopez counsel, and instructed counsel to engage an investigator to locate Chapman. (Id. at 3.) G. Investigation At counsel’s request, this court assigned Lawrence Frost to locate Chapman. (Nov. 1, 2005, Order.) Frost learned, however, that Chapman had died, as had Howard Sachs. (Frost Aff. (Ex. P to Resp. Opening Opp’n (Dkt. 59-5)) ¶¶ 3, 18.) Frost was unable to locate Earline Cafield (id. ¶ 19), and Lopez later learned that she too had died (July 17, 2012, Pet’r Ltr. (Dkt. 72) at 1). Frost himself died on April 17, 2012. (May 8, 2012, Pet’r Ltr. (Dkt. 67) at 1.) H. State Collateral Proceedings On October 9, 2009, following Frost’s investigation, Lopez asked the court for an order staying and holding his Petition in abeyance so that he could exhaust his state court claims. (Dkt. 40.) See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that ... the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”). The court granted this motion. (Dkt. 42.) Lopez then moved in New York Supreme Court, Kings County, to vacate his judgment of conviction pursuant to C.P.L. § 440.10(l)(d), (g), and (h). (Def. Mot. to Vacate J. (Dkt. 59-5).) He raised four claims: (1) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because of counsel’s failure to investigate and call the alibi witnesses and to investigate the Cafield letter; (2) that he was actually innocent of the crime of conviction; (3) that Chapman’s recantation, the Cafield letter, and the existence of the alibi witnesses constituted newly discovered evidence that would have resulted in his acquittal; and (4) that the use of Chapman’s perjured testimony at trial violated his due process rights. (Def. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate J. (Dkt. 59-5) (“Def. 440 Mem.”) at 21-43.) He also requested an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 27, 36.) On December 8, 2010, Justice Demarest — the same judge who had presided over Lopez’s trial — issued an order denying Lopez’s motion to .vacate judgment. (Dec. 8, 2010, N.Y. Sup.Ct. Decision & Order (Dkt. 59-6) (“440 Opinion”).) She did not mention Lopez’s request for an evidentiary hearing, thus denying that request by implication. (See id.) The pertinent details of her decision will be discussed in Part III.A. Lopez submitted an application for leave to appeal Judge Demarest’s decision to the Appellate Division, which was denied on April 7, 2011, 2011 WL 1314221. (N.Y.App. Div. Decision & Order on Appl. (Dkt. 59-6).) Lopez then filed an application with the New York Court of Appeals for a certificate to appeal the decision pursuant to C.P.L. § 460.20; this application was dismissed on June 30, 2011, 17 N.Y.3d 798, 929 N.Y.S.2d 106, 952 N.E.2d 1101 (2011). (N.Y.Ct. of Appeals Certificate Dismissing Appl. (Dkt. 59-6).) I.Amended Habeas Petition Having exhausted his claims, Lopez returned to this court, and filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on November 25, 2011. (Am. Pet. (Dkt. 54).) He raised three claims in addition to those he raised in his original Petition: (1) that he was actually innocent of the crimes of conviction, excusing him from AEDPA’s limitation period (Pet’r Opening Mem. (Dkt. 56) at 22-29); (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, because of counsel’s failure to investigate and call the potential alibi witnesses and investigate Cafield’s letter (id. at 30-35); and (3) that the use of Chapman’s perjured testimony violated the Fourteenth Amendment (id. at 36-38). J. First Evidentiary Hearing Lopez requested an evidentiary hearing on his actual innocence claim (id. at 28-29) and his ineffective assistance claim (id. at 35). The court granted this request. (April 17, 2012, Order (Dkt. 66).) The parties then submitted letters discussing the proper scope of the hearing. (See May 8, 2012, Pet’r Ltr. (Dkt. 67); May 21, 2012, Resp. Ltr. (Dkt. 68); May 31, 2012, Pet’r Ltr. (Dkt. 69).) In particular, the parties disagreed on whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Cullen v. Pinholster, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011), permitted the court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Lopez’s ineffective assistance claim. On July 10, 2012, this court issued an opinion addressing the effect of Pinholster on Lopez’s request for an evidentiary hearing. Lopez v. Miller, 906 F.Supp.2d 42 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (“Lopez I”). The court concluded as follows: Lopez is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on both his gateway claim of actual innocence and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. With respect to the latter claim, however, Pinholster precludes the court from relying upon evidence produced at the hearing to determine whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the state court’s adjudication of Lopez’s ineffective assistance claim involved an unreasonable application of federal law or was based on an unreasonable detexmiination of the facts. But if the court later concludes — based solely on the state court record — that the state court’s decision was unreasonable under § 2254(d), it will consider the evidence generated at the hearing to determine whether Lopez is being held in custody in violation of the United States Constitution, thus entitling him to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The court will hold the hearing on Lopez’s claims before it rules on the substance of those claims. Id. at 44, at *1. Prior to the hearing, Lopez informed the court that Rivera and Guido were unable to testify (see Sept. 11, 2012, Pet’r Ltr. (Dkt. 86) at 4 & n. 3), and has since provided the court with evidence that Rivera died less than a month before the hearing (see Rivera Death Certificate (Dkt. 105-1)), and that Guido could not testify because of mental and physical disability (see McHale Aff. (Dkt. 105-2) (affidavit from Lopez’s investigator stating that the social worker at Guido’s nursing home had told him in person that Guido “would never be able to travel to New York” because of “anxiety depression, altered mental status[,] ... a blockage in her heart, diabetes, heart failure and a-fib,” and that the administrator of the facility later told him over the phone that “Guido’s condition [wa]s unchanged and unlikely to improve”); Zduniak Aff. (Dkt. 120-1) (signed letter from Guido’s social worker stating that “[d]ue to [Guido’s] health conditions [Guido] was unable to attend the hearing she was requested to attend in September”)). Lopez argued that the court should consider Guido’s and Rivera’s affidavits in lieu of live testimony, as well as Chapman’s recantation statements and Ca-field’s letter. (See Sept. 11, 2012, Pet’r Ltr.) Respondent argued that the court should not consider any of these documents. (See Sept. 12, 2012, Resp. Ltr. (Dkt. 77).) The court held an evidentiary hearing on September 13, 2012. Lopez, Eugene, and A.D.A. Allen testified. (First Ev. Hr’g Tr.) The parties filed additional briefing after the hearing. (Pet’r Post-Hr’g Mem. (Dkt. 94); Resp. Post-Hr’g Opp’n (Dkt. 97); Pet’r Post-Hr’g Reply (Dkt. 104).) K. Second Evidentiary Hearing On December 13, 2012, Lopez moved to reopen the evidentiary hearing so that the court could hear testimony via videoconference from a man named Cesar Diaz who was living in Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic. (Dec. 13, 2012, Pet’r Ltr. (Dkt. 114).) Lopez provided the court with a signed affidavit from Diaz explaining the substance of Diaz’s intended testimony. (Diaz Aff. (Dkt. 114-1).) Lopez also explained his unsuccessful efforts to locate Diaz before the first evidentiary hearing. (See Dec. 13, 2012, Pet’r Ltr. at 3-4.) The court granted Lopez’s motion and set a date for the hearing. (Dec. 14, 2012, Order.) On January 10, 2013, the court held another evidentiary hearing. (Jan. 10, 2013, Evidentiary Hr’g Tr. (“Second Ev. Hr’g Tr.”).) Diaz testified from Santo Domingo via a videoconference and a Spanish-language translator. (See id.) Diaz testified that in August 1989, he was living in Brighton Beach, Brooklyn. (Id. at 7.) He was involved in selling drugs, including in the basement of the 3053 Brighton Fifth Street crackhouse. (Id. at 8-9.) His partner in the drug business was Surria, a friend of his whom he knew as “Moreno.” (Id. at 9.) At approximately 9:00 p.m. on August 30, 1989, Diaz went to the basement of the crackhouse. (Id.) Also present were Surria and two women who lived in the crack-house. (Id. at 9-10.) Diaz consumed between ten and fifteen beers. (Id. at 10, 19.) At one point after 1:00 a.m., someone knocked on the door to the crackhouse. (Id.) Diaz went upstairs and opened the door. (Id. at 10.) Two men were at the doorway. (Id.) One of them — a “little black guy” approximately 5'3" to 5'4", 140 pounds, and with a Panamanian accent— put a gun (a “long weapon”) to Diaz’s throat. (Id. at 10, 22-23.) The second man was about 5'0" and “chubby,” and had a Puerto Rican accent. (Id. at 10, 23.) The two men demanded money and drugs from Diaz. (Id. at 11.) Diaz claimed that he did not have any drugs or money, and one of the men put his hand in Diaz’s pocket and took out $200. (Id.) When the men arrived, Surria was in a room with the two women, but when he heard the conversation between Diaz and the two men, he came out immediately. (Id.) The man with the gun fired a shot at Surria’s stomach. (Id.) Surria said, “oh, what’s happening here? Why did you do this to me?” and fell to the floor. (Id.) The two intruders fled the crackhouse immediately. (Id. at 11, 25.) Diaz checked Surria’s pulse and found that he was not breathing. (Id. at 12.) Diaz then ran outside to his girlfriend’s house and asked her to call the police. (Id.) Shortly after this event, Diaz moved to Manhattan. (Id. at 12.) He collected about $3,000 so that he could send Sxirria’s corpse to Surria’s family in Santo Domingo. (Id. at 12-13.) At one point, he learned that the police wanted to speak with him about the shooting, but he never spoke with them. (Id. at 13.) Diaz was subsequently convicted of drug-related crimes and was deported to Santo Domingo in 2003, where he has since lived. (Id. at 13-14.) After several unsuccessful efforts, Lopez’s lawyers were able to locate Diaz in 2012. (See Dec. 13, 2012, Pet’r Ltr. at 3-4.) One of Lopez’s lawyers spoke with him on the phone and then sent him a mug shot of Lopez that was taken when he was arrested in August 1989. (Second Ev. Hr’g Tr. at 14; Ex. A to Second Ev. Hr’g Tr. (Dkt. 121-1).) At the evidentiary hearing, Diaz testified that the person in the mug shot did not resemble either of the two men who broke into the crackhouse the night Surria was killed. (Second Ev. Hr’g Tr. at 14.) Unlike the man in the picture, Diaz said, one of the intruders was “black [and] dark-skinned, and the other one was short and chubby.” (Id. at 15.) Diaz stated that he was “certain” that the person in the mug shot was not one of the two intruders. (Id.) Diaz was then cross-examined, and the hearing concluded. (Id. at 17-30.) II. ACTUAL INNOCENCE The court has already determined that Lopez’s Petition was not filed within the one-year limitation period prescribed for habeas petitions submitted by state prisoners, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), and that Lopez had not shown any “extraordinary circumstances” meriting equitable tolling of the limitations period. (Apr. 24, 2004, Mem. & Order at 3-4.) Lopez does not dispute these conclusions. Instead, he argues that he has established a credible and compelling “gateway” claim of actual innocence, thereby excusing him from the limitation period and enabling this court to reach the merits of his constitutional claims in spite of his procedural default. (See Pet’r Opening Mem. at 24-28; Pet’r Post-Hr’g Mem. at 17-20.) The court agrees. “[Hjabeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). The Supreme Court has thus long recognized that, in “appropriate cases,” the principles of comity and finality underlying procedural bars on habeas review “must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). Such exceptions are, however, limited to “extraordinary ease[s] where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). “Though the [Supreme] Court has never expressly held that a petitioner may obtain habeas relief based solely on a showing of actual innocence,[] it has recognized that, in rare cases, an assertion of innocence may allow a petitioner to have his accompanying constitutional claims heard despite a procedural bar.” Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514, 540 (2d Cir.2012) (citations omitted). An actual innocence claim is therefore procedural (not substanfive) in nature; it is “not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315, 115 S.Ct. 851. In other words, in order to obtain habeas relief in the face of a procedural obstacle such as this, a petitioner must advance both a legitimate “gateway” claim of actual innocence and a meritorious constitutional claim. Rivas, 687 F.3d at 540-41. The Supreme Court has applied the actual innocence exception to a number of procedural barriers to habeas relief, including the bar on second and successive habeas petitions, see Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851, and procedural default in state court, see House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 521-22, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). The Court has not yet ruled, however, on whether a gateway claim of actual innocence could excuse a petitioner from AEDPA’s limitation period. Until recently, the Second Circuit had declined to decide the issue as well. The court explained that it would not do so (and instructed district courts not to do so) until presented with a case where resolution of the issue could make a difference— that is, where the petitioner made a credible and compelling showing of actual innocence. See Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 174 (2d Cir.2004); Whitley, 317 F.3d at 225. That was the state of the law when this court first recognized the potential that Lopez could pass through the actual innocence gateway. (See Sept. 13, 2005, Mem. & Order.) In Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514 (2d Cir.2012), the Second Circuit was at last presented with the proper case for deciding whether the Constitution requires an actual innocence exception to AEDPA’s limitation period. The court answered this question in the affirmative, holding “that a credible and compelling showing of actual innocence under the standard described by the Supreme Court in Schlup and House warrants an equitable exception to AED-PA’s limitation period, allowing the petitioner to have his otherwise time-barred claims heard by a federal court.” Rivas, 687 F.3d at 518. Before discussing whether the petitioner himself had made such a showing, Rivas elucidated the Supreme Court’s standard for actual innocence claims. To excuse a petitioner from a procedural default, “a claim of actual innocence must be both ‘credible’ and ‘compelling.’ ” Id. at 541 (quoting House, 547 U.S. at 521, 126 S.Ct. 2064). “For the claim to be ‘credible,’ it' must be supported “with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.’ ” Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851). As long as the petitioner has presented “some new reliable evidence,” the court may proceed to the “compelling” prong of the claim, at which point the court’s analysis “is not limited to [new reliable] evidence” but must be based on “all the evidence, old and new.” House, 547 U.S. at 537, 126 S.Ct. 2064 (emphases added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rivas, 687 F.3d at 542. “For the claim to be ‘compelling,’ the petitioner must demonstrate that ‘more likely than not, in light of the new evidence, no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt — or to remove the double negative, that more likely than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt.’ ” Rivas, 687 F.3d at 518 (quoting House, 547 U.S. at 538, 126 S.Ct. 2064). This “standard is ‘demanding and permits review only in the extraordinary case.’ ” Id. at 542 (quoting House, 547 U.S. at 538, 126 S.Ct. 2064). The court will address the two requirements for a gateway actual innocence claim — “credible” and . “compelling” — in turn. A. Credible To .repeat, a “credible” actual innocence claim “must be supported ‘with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.’ ” Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851). Lopez has presented four pieces of purported new reliable evidence in support of his actual innocence claim: the alibi witness affidavits, Earline Cafield’s letter, Janet Chapman’s recantation statements, and Cesar Diaz’s testimony. All of this evidence is “new” for actual innocence purposes because it was not presented at trial. See Rivas, 687 F.3d at 543 (“new evidence” is “evidence not heard by the jury”). The question for the court is thus whether these pieces of evidence are “reliable.” As an initial matter, it is important to note that in considering the reliability of evidence for actual innocence purposes, the court “is not bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 328, 115 S.Ct. 851. Instead, the court must determine the reliability of all the new evidence Lopez has submitted, both admissible and inadmissible, by considering it “both on its own merits and, where appropriate, in light of the pre-existing evidence in the record.” Doe, 391 F.3d at 161. As to new witness testimony in particular, the court “consider[s] the potential motives to be untruthful that the witness may possess, corroboration or the lack thereof, internal consistency, and the inferences or presumptions that crediting particular testimony would require.” Id. at 164-65. 1. Affidavits of Guido and Rivera Although the affidavits of Guido and Rivera are hearsay, the court has no difficulty concluding that they are reliable and may be considered for Lopez’s actual innocence claim. First, the court finds no reason to doubt that the affidavits actually constitute the testimony of Guido and Rivera. Each of the affidavits is signed, notarized, and sworn, and Respondent does not dispute their authenticity. Second, although approximately sixteen years had passed between the shooting and the signing of the affidavits, their contents indicate little risk that the affiants misremembered the events of the morning of the shooting. Both Guido and Rivera stated that they had clear memories of that morning due to the context in which they interacted with Lopez. See Rivera Aff. (recalling the morning “distinctly”); Guido Aff. (recalling the morning “vividly”).) Guido recalled that she was usually awake around the time she saw Lopez because she worked the midnight shift at Coney Island Hospital and normally could not fall asleep until early next morning. She also remembered that although Lopez “appeared to be in good spirits,” he was concerned about a disagreement he had with Juliana earlier that night. Rivera recalled that the shooting occurred on a “warm summer day”; that she, Lopez, Juliana, and Rivera’s son were in front of the house in the early hours of that day drinking refreshments and talking; and that they were attempting to “patch up [the] disagreement” between Lopez and Juliana. The affidavits are thus detailed and consistent with each other. Cf. United States v. Leppert, 408 F.3d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir.2005) (“cross-corroboration” of statements supported their reliability). Moreover, the affiants expected that they would need to remember their interactions with Lopez soon after they occurr