Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge. “This case presents the familiar conflict between the legal principle of non-discrimination and the political principle of not-in-my-backyard.” New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 295 (3d Cir.2007). Plaintiffs challenge certain zoning and environmental ordinances enacted by Defendant Village of Pomona, asserting that the ordinances are unlawful under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., the Fan-Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., the New York Civil Rights Law § 40-c(l), (2), Article I, Sections 3, 8, 9, and 11 of the New York State Constitution, and New York common law. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenge the enactment and enforcement of the Village of Pomona, New York Code Sections 130-4 (defining educational institutions and dormitories), 130-10(F)(12) (limiting the size of dormitories pursuant to an educational use), and 126 (establishing wetlands protections) (together, the “challenged ordinances”). Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Motion is granted in part and denied in part. I. Background The Court assumes the following facts, largely drawn from Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, as true for purposes of the instant Motion. Plaintiffs have brought this action to challenge the aforementioned zoning ordinances adopted by Defendant Village of Pomona (the “Village”); Plaintiffs claim that the ordinances unlawfully prohibit Plaintiff Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov (the “Congregation”) from owning, holding, building, and operating a rabbinical college on a 100-acre tract (the “Subject Property”) located in the Village and owned by the Congregation. (Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶ 1 (Dkt. No. 28).) A. The Parties Plaintiffs are corporations and individuals affiliated with the Orthodox Jewish community, including various sects of the Hasidic community, all of whom allege an interest in the construction of a rabbinical college on the Subject Property. (Id. ¶¶ 24-27.) The Congregation, the owner of the Subject Property, is a religious corporation that was formed in 2004 with the aim of constructing a rabbinical college and related facilities on the Subject Property. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff Kolel Belz of Monsey (“Kolel Belz”) is a religious corporation that serves more than 200 families and purports to “represent! ] the interests of itself and the broader Orthodox community in actively seeking trained” rabbinical judges (“dayanim ”) to “conduct the activities of rabbinical courts.” (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.) Plaintiffs Rabbi Mordechai Babad (“M. Ba-bad”), Rabbi Wolf Brief, Rabbi Hermen Kahana, Rabbi Meir Margulis, Rabbi Gergely Neuman, Rabbi Meilech Menczer (“M. Menczer”), Rabbi Jacob Hershkowitz, Rabbi Chaim Rosenberg, Rabbi David A. Menczer (“D. Menczer”), and Rabbi Aryeh Royde (collectively, the “Individual Plaintiffs”) are trained Rabbis who seek to live and to teach and/or to study at the Congregation’s proposed rabbinical college. (Id. ¶¶ 11-20.) Defendants consist of the Village, its Mayor, Nicholas Sanderson, and the members of its Board of Trustees, Ian Banks, Alma Sanders Roman, Rita Louie, and Brett Yagel. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) B. The Religious Significance of a Rabbinical College According to Orthodox Jewish belief, Orthodox Jews are not permitted to resolve conflicts in the secular court system. (Id. ¶ 54.) Rather, the Orthodox Jewish religion requires that Orthodox Jews resolve conflicts in rabbinical courts before rabbinical judges applying Jewish law. (Id.) The Orthodox Jewish community therefore is obligated by religious belief to create rabbinical courts in every locale where Orthodox Jews live. (Id. ¶¶ 54-55.) Currently, however, because there are very few trained rabbinical judges in the United States, “there are only a very few Rabbinical [cjourts ... serving Orthodox Jews in the entire United States,” and those courts are “extremely overburdened.” (Id. ¶ 49.) Plaintiffs allege that by building the rabbinical college, the Congregation seeks to ameliorate the “severe” shortage of trained rabbinical judges in the Orthodox Jewish community. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 33.) While several other rabbinical colleges exist in the United States, “[t]he existing [institutions] are insufficient to meet the need of students” who wish to become rabbinical judges and to train the number of “Rabbinical [j]udges needed to serve the Orthodox Jewish community.” (Id. ¶ 82.) Moreover, not all of the rabbinical colleges in the United States offer the “full course of study or religious environment” that the Congregation’s planned rabbinical college will offer. (Id.) Although Plaintiffs acknowledge that one rabbinical college already offers the same type of program that the Congregation’s rabbinical college plans to offer — Kollel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, located in Brooklyn, New York — that “facility is extremely overcrowded and ... [i]ts doors have been shut for several years to new rabbis because of ... dire space limitations.” (Id. ¶ 48.) C.The Congregation’s Planned Rabbinical College The Congregation’s planned rabbinical college will be “devoted solely to religious training of [rabbinical judges] who will be tested and certified by rabbinical authorities ... after many years of intense religious study.” (Id. ¶ 53.) Rabbinical students, all of whom must be ordained Rabbis, “will normally begin these specialized religious studies between the ages of 20 and 30.” (Id. ¶ 59.) Training to become a certified rabbinical judge may take “up to (or beyond) fifteen years.” (Id.) During that time, rabbinical students will study the religious laws of the Orthodox Jewish tradition, as well as “the wise and just application of the religious laws,” and they will learn how “to counsel members of the Orthodox Jewish community on the day-to-day guestions that arise in applying Jewish Law to every aspect of their daily lives.” (Id. ¶ 58.) The academic format of the planned rabbinical college “is based upon strenuous religious study and prayer during the hours of 5:00 a.m. to 10:30 p.m., with meal breaks.” (Id. ¶ 60.) Plaintiffs believe that “it is essential for these students to live, study and pray in the same place in order to minimize outside influences and to intensify the religious learning experience.” (Id. ¶ 65.) In accord with Plaintiffs’ belief that “[r]esidential housing is essential to the training provided by” a rabbinical college, the Congregation’s rabbinical college will include housing for the rabbinical students. (Id. ¶ 64.) Such housing must accommodate families, as many students “will be married, some with young children.” (IcL ¶¶ 59, 66.) Additionally, because “Orthodox Jews must pray three times per day, in morning, afternoon and evening services,” (id. ¶ 63), Plaintiffs allege that it is essential to their religious beliefs that the rabbinical college and the residential housing be close in proximity to synagogues (“shuts ”), (id.). Accordingly, the planned rabbinical college will include up to ten shuts to accommodate Orthodox Jews of all sects and traditions, including Ashkenazic, Sephardic, and other Hasidic and Orthodox sects. (Id. ¶ 68.) The Congregation’s rabbinical college will also include four rabbinical courtrooms on campus, “which will be used to litigate and settle disputes, and as teaching facilities for students to become certified [r]abbinical [j]udges.” (Id. ¶ 69.) The campus will further house “multiple libraries, which will contain the books necessary for the educational program.” (Id. ¶ 70.) While the Orthodox Jewish religion prescribes a rigorous program for the certification of rabbinical judges, Plaintiffs allege that no formal accreditation process exists for the program that will be offered by the rabbinical college. (Id. ¶¶ 105-06.) D. The Subject Property The Subject Property consists of a 100-acre tract of land located within the Village and also within the larger Town of Ramapo. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 73, 75.) The Congregation purchased the Subject Property in August 2004 with the intention of building thereon its rabbinical college and related facilities. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 73.) Around the same time, an “additional contiguous 30 acres was [sic] purchased by an affiliate of the Congregation to serve as a buffer between the [r]abbinical [c]ollege and the neighboring community.” (Id. ¶ 74.) Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he Subject Property is uniquely suited to meet the needs of the Congregation” in building the rabbinical college. (Id. ¶ 76.) According to Plaintiffs, “the Subject Property is the only available parcel of land” that is both appropriately sized and situated in close proximity to the “religious infrastructure and population,” as required for a rabbinical college. (Id. ¶ 83.) Plaintiffs further allege that the Subject Property also is an appropriate location for the planned rabbinical college because of its proximity to both the Village and the other villages located within the Town of Ramapo, which are also home to a large Orthodox Jewish community. (Id. ¶ 77.) Importantly, these villages are equipped with “the infrastructures necessary to maintain the practices prescribed by [the Orthodox Jewish] beliefs, including synagogues, yeshivas, elementary and high schools for boys and girls, ritual baths, and kosher food stores and restaurants.” (Id.) Moreover, it is the Orthodox Jewish community in these villages, as well as other villages within the greater area of Rockland County, that the Congregation’s rabbinical college is intended to serve. (Id. ¶ 80.) Plaintiffs allege that “[n]o alternative properties exist in [the Village] or in surrounding communities which can legally or practicably accommodate the” planned rabbinical college. (Id. ¶ 84.) E. The Village’s Land Use Ordinances Plaintiffs claim that the Village’s land use ordinances prohibit the Congregation from building its rabbinical college on the Subject Property. (Id. ¶¶ 92-95.) First, Plaintiffs allege that the Village’s zoning laws generally prohibit the Congregation from building the rabbinical college itself. The entire Village, including the Subject Property, is designated as an “R-40 District,” which “requires a minimum of 40,-000 square feet per lot (approximately one acre) for the development of one-family homes,” (id. ¶ 88). See also Vill. of Pomona, N.Y.Code § 130-5. The Village’s Zoning Code permits a limited number of uses on land within the Village’s boundaries— e.g., one-family residences, houses of worship, libraries and museums, public parks and playgrounds. See Vill. of Pomona, N.Y.Code § 130-9(A). According to Plaintiffs, a rabbinical college could not qualify under any of the uses permitted by the Village. While the Village does grant, upon approval by either the Village Board of Trustees or the Village Board of Zoning Appeals, certain special use permits, Plaintiffs allege that a rabbinical college could not qualify as a special use under the other provisions of the Village’s zoning Code. (SAC ¶ 91.) Specifically, although Sections 130-4 and 130-10 of the Village Zoning Code empower the Board of Trustees to issue a special use permit for “educational institutions,” Plaintiffs allege that Section 130-4’s restricted definition of “educational institution” as “[a]ny private or religious ... school conducting a full-time curriculum of instruction a minimum of five days per week for seven months per year and accredited by the New York State Education Department or similar recognized accrediting agency,” Vill. of Pomona, N.Y.Code § 130-4 (emphasis added), prevents the rabbinical college from being permitted as a special use. (SAC ¶ 93.) Plaintiffs allege that no formal accreditation process exists for the rabbinical college, (id. ¶¶ 105-06), and thus claim that the rabbinical college cannot qualify under the Village’s land use ordinances as either a permitted use or a special use under Sections 130-9 and 130-10, (id. ¶ 95.) Plaintiffs further allege that the Village’s land use ordinances prohibit the Congregation from building residential facilities requisite to its rabbinical college. Although the Subject Property consists of a 100-acre tract of land, it is considered a single “lot” under the Village’s zoning law. (Id. ¶ 89.) Pursuant to Section 130-9 of the Village’s Zoning Code, unless the Subject Property is subdivided, the entire 100-acre tract may house only a single one-family residence; multiple dwellings are explicitly prohibited. See Vill. of Pomona, N.Y.Code § 130-9(A)(1). Allegedly, it is “impracticable” for the Congregation to comply with this restriction given the alleged need to house students, teachers, and their families on the rabbinical college campus. (SAC ¶ 92.) While the land use ordinances permit dormitories as an “accessory use to an” educational institution “on the same lot as the educational use,” Vill. of Pomona, N.Y.Code § 130-10(F)(12), Plaintiffs allege that a rabbinical college cannot meet the Village’s definition of an educational institution. Moreover, Section 130-4 of the Village Code defines “dormitory” as exempting rooms that “contain separate cooking, dining or housekeeping facilities,” id., § 130^1, which Plaintiffs allege are required to house families adequately. (SAC ¶ 107.) Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that the land use ordinances unreasonably prohibit the construction of more than one dormitory building per lot and limit the size of a dormitory to twenty percent of the “total square footage of all buildings on the lot,” see Vill. of Pomona, N.Y.Code § 130-10(F)(12). (SAC ¶¶ 108-09.) According to Plaintiffs, “applying generally accepted architectural standards and. guidelines for school building square footage per student and dormitory square footage per student, such a restriction results in permitted school dormitories which could house a maximum of only approximately three (3%) of any student body.” (Id. ¶ 163.) Therefore, the “twenty percent restriction effectively eliminates all dormitories.” (Id.) Based on these provisions of the Village’s Zoning Code, Plaintiffs argue that “there is no question that the College’s proposed use is forbidden within the Village.” (Id. ¶ 111.) F. The Village’s Environmental Regulations In April 2007, the Village adopted a wetlands protection ordinance, which requires a 100-foot buffer around wetlands of 2,000 square feet or more. See Vill. of Pomona, N.Y.Code § 126-3(A). Plaintiffs contend that the Village enacted this law “specifically to prevent the Hasidic Jewish community from locating and obtaining housing within the Village.” (SAC ¶ 174.) Plaintiffs further allege that “the ... wetlands law ... exempts nearly every lot in the entire Village, except for the [Subject Property] (and perhaps a very few other uses, if any).” (Id. ¶ 169.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs challenge the law as “intended to restrict development of the [Subject Property], which contains 37 acres of wetlands.” (Id.H 171.) G. Discriminatory Purpose Plaintiffs allege that the Village adopted the challenged ordinances with the deliberate purpose of precluding construction of the rabbinical college. (Id. ¶¶ 156-159.) Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the timing of the enactment of some of these zoning laws suggests discriminatory animus. For example, the Village’s definition of “educational institution” was amended one month after the Congregation’s August 2004 purchase of the Subject Property to require that a qualifying institution be “accredited by the New York State Department of Education or a similar recognized accrediting agency,” Vill. of Pomona, N.Y.Code § 130 — 4. (SAC ¶ 156.) Just a few months thereafter, in late 2004, the Village further amended its Zoning Code to exclude from its definition of “dormitory” any single-family, two-family and multifamily dwelling units, see Vill. of Pomona, N.Y.Code § 130-4, and to limit the number of dormitories per lot. (SAC ¶¶ 157-58.) In January 2007, the Village again amended its Zoning Code to limit the size of dormitory buildings — relative to the total square footage of all buildings on the lot — to be used as accessories to educational institutions. (Id. ¶ 162.) Plaintiffs further allege that the “ ‘Dormitory’ legislation [passed in 2007] was ... designed and enacted specifically to prevent the Hasidic Jewish community from residing and obtaining housing within the Village,” as evidenced in part by “[c]ommunity opposition ... through public comment at the hearing on the dormitory legislation.” (Id. ¶¶ 164-65.) Plaintiffs highlight the following comments, made by the Village’s then-Mayor, Herbert Marshall, in response to the community’s opposition as further evidence of the discriminatory motive behind the dormitory legislation: Ladies and gentleman, let me say something. We sitting at this table have limitations that are placed on us as to what we can say, and what we can’t say, because our attorney tells us what we can say and what we can’t say. I can’t say what I feel — I can’t — if I agree with you, I don’t agree with you, I don’t have that luxury of being able to say that here. All that I can say is that every member of this board works very, very hard to do what is best for this community. You have your issues. Don’t assume because no one has gotten up and said, wow, I agree with you, oh boy; don’t assume that because we didn’t do that we don’t agree. (Id. ¶ 166.) Plaintiffs further allege that Mayor Sanderson and Trustees Yagel and Louie were elected to office based on campaign promises to “fight this plan” and “stand up to this threat,” ostensibly referring to the Congregation’s plan to build the rabbinical college. (Id. ¶ 178.) Plaintiffs also cite an article published in a local newspaper, the Journal-News, which stated that Mayor Sanderson defeated former Mayor Marshall “in a contest defined by land-use concerns sparked by plans for a rabbinical college.” (Id. ¶ 198.) Plaintiffs also allege that Trustees Yagel and Louie “expressly warned a civic association to be careful not to allow discriminatory statements to slip out.” (Id. ¶ 183.) Mayor Sanderson allegedly stated publicly in 2007 that “[t]he single most important issue facing the village at this time is the as yet un-proposed, but leaked, [r]abbinical [e]ollege development,” and that the Village should “maintain[ ] its cultural and religious diversity.” (Id. ¶ 180 (fourth alteration in original).) It is further alleged that, prior to his election, Mayor Sanderson “appeared in a campaign video [in which] he said that the [r]abbinical [c]ollege could not only ‘change the village,’ but could change ‘the makeup of the village,’ ” suggesting, in Plaintiffs’ view, his intention of “controlling the influx of Hasidic Jews into the Village.” (Id. ¶ 179.) Once Mayor Sanderson was elected, he allegedly stated “if they use RLUIPA to get us, we will fight,” further noting that “it would cost $1,000,000 to fight a RLUIPA challenge, and ... the funds could be raised over ‘3-5 years’ before a lawsuit would be filed.” (Id. ¶ 181, 184.) In addition to these and other specific allegations concerning animus toward the rabbinical college, Plaintiffs also generally allege that there has been “[Community [h]ostility to Hasidic Jews” in the Village, which “played a significant role in the discriminatory actions undertaken by the Defendants and led directly to targeting of various Jewish uses of the Subject Property.” (Id. ¶ 186.) In support of this allegation, Plaintiffs cite various slurs and other offensive statements about Hasidic Jews made by members of the Village’s community. (Id. ¶¶ 188-95.) The various statements include an alleged statement by Doris Ulman, the Village’s Attorney, at a seminar on RLUIPA that “residents should not ‘cave into them and sell our houses,’ referring,” in Plaintiffs’ view, “to the Hasidic population.” (Id. ¶ 192.) H. The Congregation Contacts the Village Regarding the Project The Congregation does not allege that it submitted a formal application for the planned rabbinical college to the Village. Rather, the Village first became aware of the Congregation’s plan for the rabbinical college when a “hypothetical sketch plat ... was apparently leaked to the ‘Preserve Ramapo’ group,” a “local private organization that has” expressed concerns about “population growth in Ramapo’s Hasidic communities.” (Id. ¶¶ 175-76.) Plaintiffs allege that the Village amended its zoning laws in a discriminatory manner in 2004 and later in 2007 based on its knowledge from this leak of the Congregation’s plan to build the rabbinical college. The Congregation reached out to the Village Board of Trustees and other Village representatives in March and April 2007 to discuss the project and whether it could “be accommodated by the Village.” (Id. ¶¶ 208-09.) After apparently receiving no response from the Village, counsel for the Congregation telephoned Ulman on May 9, 2007 to discuss the project. (Id. ¶ 210.) Counsel subsequently followed up on May 10, 2007 with two letters requesting a “[pjublic [mjeeting, for an informal design and technical review of a proposed project,” (id.), as is encouraged under the Village’s Zoning Code. See Vill. of Pomona, N.Y.Code § 130-28(E)(3) (“Applicants are encouraged to submit a preliminary, informal application and to discuss it with the appropriate permitting Board prior to formal submission of a complete and detailed special permit application.”). Ulman responded by letter on May 14, 2007, stating I do not understand why you would request any meeting to discuss the design of a project that is illegal until you have applied for the required zone change. At no time did your letters or discussions with ••me suggest that a public meeting was requested to discuss the project. In my opinion, any meeting, public or private, would be premature. (Defs.’ Ex. R; SAC ¶ 211.) On June 22, 2007, the Congregation contacted Mayor Sanderson, the Village Board of Trustees, and Ulman by letter, again suggesting a meeting to discuss the Congregation’s proposed project. (SAC ¶ 212.) The letter requested “that the Village of Pomona Board of Trustees exercise its authority under federal law to grant an exemption to a religious institution to allow for the construction of’ the rabbinical college. (Defs.’ Ex. S at 1; SAC ¶ 213.) On July 3, 2007, Mayor Sanderson responded to the Congregation by letter, stating that the Village “cannot grant your request to have the Board of Trustees exempt [the project] from the provisions of the Pomona Zoning Law” and that “the only remedy available for the [r]abbinical [c]ollege were [sic] legislative ones [sic].” (SAC ¶¶ 214-15.) II. Discussion A Standard of Review 1. Rule 12(b)(1) “[A] federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a cause of action only when it ‘has authority to adjudicate the cause’ pressed in the complaint.” Singer v. Xipto, Inc., 852 F.Supp.2d 416, 422 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (quoting Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007)). “Determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry, and a claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that it exists.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he court must take all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, but jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively, and that showing is not made by drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting it.” Id., (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 2. Rule 12(b)(6) “On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint, the court must accept a plaintiffs factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiffs] favor.” Gonzalez v. Caballero, 572 F.Supp.2d 463, 466 (S.D.N.Y.2008); see also Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir.2008) (“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “In adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has held that “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his [or her] ‘entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (third alteration in original) (citations omitted). Instead, the Court has emphasized that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” id., and that “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” id. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Plaintiffs must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. But if a plaintiff has “not nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged— but it has not ‘show[n]’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))). “A court presented with a motion to dismiss under both Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) must decide the jurisdictional question first because a disposition of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is a decision on the merits, and therefore, an exercise of jurisdiction.” Homefront Org., Inc. v. Motz, 570 F.Supp.2d 398, 404 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Ala. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 896 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir.1990). B. Justiciability Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this case and that Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe. 1. Standing The Court begins, as it must, with the question of Plaintiffs’ standing. See Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.8d 293, 298 (2d Cir.2009) (“[Standing ... is intended to be a threshold issue at least tentatively decided at the outset of the litigation.”); Licensing by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra (In re Gucci), 126 F.3d 380, 387-88 (2d Cir.1997) (“Whether a claimant has standing is ‘the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.’ ” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975))). “[T]o satisfy Article Ill’s standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Pac. Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, 542 F.3d 341, 350 (2d Cir.2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000)); see also W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co. v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100, 106-07 (2d Cir.2008) (same); Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chi. v. Bank of Am., NA, 907 F.Supp.2d 536, 544-45, No. 12-CV-2865, 2012 WL 6062544, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2012) (same). It is the burden of the party invoking federal jurisdiction to establish standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). However, “at the pleading stage, standing allegations need not be crafted with precise detail.” Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 631 (2d Cir.2003) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130); see also Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Mukasey, 283 Fed.Appx. 848, 850 (2d Cir.2008) (same); Heghmann v. Sebelius, No. 09-CV-5880, 2010 WL 2643301, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2010) (same). Generally, “the ‘injury-in-fact’ requirement means that a plaintiff must have personally suffered an injury.” Huff, 549 F.3d at 107; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (“By particularized, we mean that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (“[Article] III requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to show that he [or she] personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A plaintiff must allege a personal stake in the outcome of the case and a “distinct and palpable” injury. See Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A., 524 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978); City of New Rochelle v. Town of Mamaroneck, 111 F.Supp.2d 353, 358 (S.D.N.Y.2000). As for causation, a plaintiff “satisfies] .the causation requirement if the complaint ‘averts] the existence of [an] intermediate link between the ... [challenged] regulations and the injury.’ ” Pac. Capital Bank, 542 F.3d at 350 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 156 (2d Cir.1992)); see also In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., Nos. M 21-95, 05-CV-7116, 2009 WL 151168, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2009) (same). Causation is lacking if the claimed injury is “th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court” rather than the challenged conduct. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also M.J. Entm’t Enters., Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 234 F.Supp.2d 306, 311-13 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance that did not apply to plaintiffs property). But a plaintiff need not claim that a defendant’s challenged actions were the very last step in a chain of events leading to an injury adequately to allege causation. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168-69, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (noting that the ‘fairly traceable’ requirement does not demand that “the defendant’s actions [be] the very last step in the chain of causation”); Ctr. for Reproductive Law & Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir.2002) (same). Finally, the redressability requirement demands that there is a “ ‘non-speculative likelihood that the injury can be remedied by the requested relief.’ ” Coalition of Watershed Towns v. EPA, 552 F.3d 216, 218 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam) (quoting Huff, 549 F.3d at 106-07); see also M.J. Entm’t, 234 F.Supp.2d at 311 (determining that redressability requirement was not met because “a ruling by this Court invalidating the ‘special permit use’ provisions of the Zoning Code would not redress plaintiffs injury,” as plaintiffs proposed use was barred by another ordinance). To meet this standard, the plaintiff must allege facts that show it is “ ‘likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” Watershed Towns, 552 F.3d at 218 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) (holding that there was no standing where it was “entirely speculative” whether withdrawal of the challenged tax exemption would lead “any particular school ... to change [the] policies” that had caused the plaintiffs’ injuries); Lamar Adver. of Penn, LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, 356 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir.2004) (finding injury redressable, because, “[w]ere [plaintiff] to succeed on the merits of its claims, it likely would be able to erect at least some of the signs it has asserted an intent to build”). a. The Congregation The Congregation has shown that it has standing to challenge the ordinances at issue because, accepting as true the allegations in the Second Amended-Complaint, the Congregation has alleged a particularized injury that would be redressed if the Court granted the requested relief. The Congregation alleges, inter alia, the following in support of its standing: (1) the Congregation owns the Subject Property; (2) it purchased the Subject Property with the intention of building a rabbinical college thereon; (3) it already has begun to develop plans to build the rabbinical college; (4) the Subject Property is subject to Sections 130-4, 130-9, and 130-10 of the Village Zoning Code, as well as Section 126 (the Village’s wetlands ordinance), which on their face prohibit unaccredited educational institutions and some of the Congregation’s planned accessory uses; and (5) those provisions were enacted unlawfully to prevent the Congregation from building its rabbinical college. (Pis.’ Mem. 23.) Under these circumstances, the Congregation has sufficiently alleged an “injury in fact” that gives it a personal, stake in the outcome of the litigation, as the Congregation’s intended use of the Subject Property is allegedly prohibited by the challenged ordinances. See Lamar, 356 F.3d at 373-75 (finding that standing requirements were satisfied, where an ordinance prevented plaintiff from building certain signs); Chabad Lubavitch v. Borough of Litchfield, 796 F.Supp.2d 333, 338 (D.Conn.2011) (holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance); M.J. Entm’t, 234 F.Supp.2d at 310 (determining that plaintiff had established standing with respect to one claim, where the challenged ordinance kept the plaintiff from “offering] topless dancing as entertainment at its business establishment”). The Congregation also has met the other elements of Article III standing. The Congregation’s alleged injury is fairly traceable to Defendants, because the Congregation allegedly cannot build the rabbinical college or its accessory uses as a result of the challenged ordinances. See Pac. Capital Bank, 542 F.3d at 350 (noting that an allegation of an “intermediate link between” an injury and a challenged regulation is sufficient to demonstrate traceability (internal quotation marks omitted)); M.J. Entm’t, 234 F.Supp.2d at 310 (holding that the plaintiffs “injury is traceable to the challenged action of [Defendant because Plaintiff] cannot [engage in its desired use] at its current location or relocate to another location ... because of the municipality’s Zoning Code”). Further, the alleged injury is redressable through the requested relief, because invalidation of the challenged ordinances allegedly could allow the Congregation to build the rabbinical college and its accessory uses. Taking the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint as true, “the Subject Property is the only available parcel of land” that is both appropriately sized and appropriately situated in close proximity to the “religious infrastructure and population,” as required for a rabbinical college. (SAC ¶ 83.) Based on these allegations, there is a “non-speculative likelihood” that if the challenged ordinances were invalidated, the Congregation could build the rabbinical college on the property. See Watershed Towns, 552 F.3d at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Second Amended Complaint does not clarify whether a complete plan for the rabbinical college, including financing commitments, yet exists, the Court is aware that there is a chance that even if the requested relief is granted, the Congregation might not build the rabbinical college on the Subject Property. But “these types of uncertainties always exist in housing development cases,” and they “should not be used as a means to defeat standing.” ACORN, 2006 WL 2053732, at *10; see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261-62, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (“[A]ll housing developments are subject to some extent to ... uncertainties.... [A] court is not required to engage in undue speculation as a predicate for finding that the plaintiff has the requisite personal stake in the controversy.”); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 689 F.2d 391, 394 (2d Cir.1982) (“[T]he requirement that the relief requested be likely to redress the injuries alleged by a plaintiff is not a demand for complete certainty.”). b. The Individual Plaintiffs The Individual Plaintiffs are trained Rabbis who seek to live and to teach and/or to study at the Congregation’s planned rabbinical college. (SAC ¶¶ 11-20.) Defendants contend that the Individual Plaintiffs cannot meet the injury-in-fact requirement because they are “yet-to-be admitted or enrolled students,” a yet-to-be hired Dean, and yet-to-be-hired lecturers who have “no basis to claim injury now,” before the school has been “approved or constructed-let alone opened its doors.” (Defs.’ Mem. 30.) Defendants’ argument is unavailing. The Individual Plaintiffs assert that they have been prevented from studying, teaching, worshipping, and living at the rabbinical college by the challenged ordinances, which they allege discriminate against them based on their religion. (Pis.’ Mem. 23-24; SAC ¶¶ 156-159.) Contrary to Defendants’ argument that the Individual Plaintiffs are “yet-to-be admitted” or “yet-to-be hired,” the Individual Plaintiffs have submitted affidavits that, taken as true, demonstrate that each has been either offered a position at the rabbinical college or offered enrollment as a student at the rabbinical college once it opens. (M. Ba-bad Aff. ¶¶ 1, 12; Brief Aff. ¶¶ 5-6; Kahana Aff. ¶¶ 5-6.) The Individual Plaintiffs, therefore, have a personal and concrete stake in seeing the rabbinical college built. See Ross, 524 F.3d at 222 (holding that a plaintiff must allege a personal stake in the outcome of the case and a “distinct and palpable” injury (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264, 97 S.Ct. 555 (holding that an individual who sought to live in planned housing community had standing to challenge discriminatory zoning laws preventing development of that housing community); ACORN, 2006 WL 2053732, at *11 (allowing individual plaintiffs who sought to live in affordable housing project in defendant city to challenge zoning ordinances preventing construction of the affordable housing project). The fact that the rabbinical college is not yet built or has not yet opened does not prevent the Individual Plaintiffs from asserting an injury now, as Defendants contend. (Defs.’ Mem. 30.) Indeed, the Individual Plaintiffs’ alleged injury-in-fact stems from the very fact that the rabbinical college cannot yet be built or opened. Further, the Individual Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is both fairly traceable to Defendants and redressable by the Court. First, the Individual Plaintiffs’ inability to live and teach at the rabbinical college is caused by the challenged ordinances, which allegedly prevent the construction and operation of the rabbinical college and some of its accessory uses on the Subject Property. Second, taking the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint as true, there is at least a non-speculative likelihood that if the challenged ordinances were invalidated, the Congregation’s planned rabbinical college could be built, and the Individual Plaintiffs could study, work, and live on the Subject Property. Cf. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264, 97 S.Ct. 555 (finding that the individual plaintiffs injury — inability to obtain affordable housing in defendant village — was redress-able by the requested relief, because it was likely that the housing development would materialize absent the challenged discriminatory ordinance); ACORN, 2006 WL 2053732, at *11 (same). c. Kolel Belz Plaintiff Kolel Belz is a religious corporation that serves more than 200 families of congregants and purports to “represent[ ] the interests of itself and the broader Orthodox community in actively seeking trained” rabbinical judges to “conduct the activities of rabbinical courts.” (SAC ¶¶ 34-35.) In support of its standing argument, Kolel Belz argues that it “will benefit from this litigation because it will have access to the services of rabbinical judges trained at the [rjabbinical [c]ollege.” (Pis.’ Mem. 24-25.) Defendants argue that Kolel Belz lacks standing to raise any of its claims on its own behalf or on behalf of the local Orthodox community. (Defs.’ Mem. 26-29.) For the following reasons, the Court agrees that Kolel Belz lacks standing to pursue this action. Kolel Belz, “as an organization, is fully able to bring suit on its own behalf ‘for injuries it has sustained,’ ” Int’l Action Ctr. v. City of New York, 522 F.Supp.2d 679, 693 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (quoting Mid-Hudson Catskill Rural Migrant Ministry, Inc. v. Fine Host Corp., 418 F.3d 168, 174 (2d Cir.2005)), “so long as those injuries— or threats of injury — are ‘both “real and immediate,” [and] not “conjectural or hypothetical,” ’ ” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bordell v. Gen. Electric Co., 922 F.2d 1057, 1060 (2d Cir.1991)). Kolel Belz, however, fails to allege that it has personally suffered any injury based on the Village’s zoning ordinances. Instead, it alleges that the challenged ordinances will deprive the local Orthodox community of trained rabbinical judges. Even assuming that this alleged injury is cognizable as an injury-in-fact, Kolel Belz does not allege that it suffers any personal injury separate and apart from the interests of the local Orthodox community. See Huff, 549 F.3d at 109 (holding that an investment advisor lacked standing to sue based on injuries suffered by its clients); Int’l Action Ctr., 522 F.Supp.2d at 693 (finding that plaintiff organization failed to allege an injury to itself that was not merely speculative). Accordingly, the Court finds that Kolel Belz lacks standing to pursue this action on its own behalf. As Kolel Belz has not alleged that it is a membership organization, it cannot assert (and, indeed, it has not asserted) associational standing. Therefore, “[t]o the extent that [Kolel Belz] seeks to sue on behalf of’ the local Orthodox community, “it may pursue its claim only on a theory of third-party standing.” Mid-Hudson, 418 F.3d at 174; see also Huff, 549 F.3d at 109. A plaintiff may assert “third-party standing where [it] can demonstrate (1) a close relationship to the injured party and (2) a barrier to the injured party’s ability to assert its own interests.” Huff, 549 F.3d at 109; see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 447, 118 S.Ct. 1428, 140 L.Ed.2d 575 (1998) (O’Con-nor, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that a plaintiff asserting third-party standing must have “a close relation to the third party,” and “some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests [must exist]” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mid-Hudson, 418 F.3d at 174 (“[A] plaintiff seeking third-party standing in federal court must ... demonstrate] a close relation to the injured third party and a hindrance to that party’s ability to protect its own interests.”). “In this vein, courts historically have permitted ‘[trustees [to] bring suits to benefit their trusts; guardians ad litem [to] bring suits to benefit their wards; receivers [to] bring suit to benefit their receiverships; assignees in bankruptcy [to] bring suit to benefit bankrupt estates; [and] executors [to] bring suit to benefit testator estates.’ ” Huff, 549 F.3d at 109 (alterations in original) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 287-88, 128 S.Ct. 2531, 171 L.Ed.2d 424 (2008)). Here, however, Kolel Belz has failed to allege what type of relationship it has to the members of the local Orthodox community. The Second Amended Complaint alleges merely that Kolel Belz is a religious corporation and that some of the Individual Plaintiffs engage in rabbinical studies there. (SAC ¶¶ 21, 38.) These allegations do not provide the Court with a basis to conclude that Kolel Belz has a sufficiently close relationship to the members of the local Orthodox community to warrant recognition of third-party standing. Nor has Kolel Belz provided the Court with any allegations from which the Court could conclude that members of the community cannot vindicate their own interests. To do so, Kolel Belz would need to establish that “some barrier or practical obstacle (e.g., third party is unidentifiable, lacks sufficient interest, or will suffer some sanction) prevents or deters the third party from asserting his or her own interest.” Benjamin v. Aroostook Med. Ctr., Inc., 57 F.3d 101, 106 (1st Cir.1995). Kolel Belz offers nothing by way of an allegation, let alone proof, of any such barriers preventing third parties from challenging the Defendants’ conduct. Indeed, the participation of the Individual Plaintiffs — some of whom are connected to Kolel Belz (SAC ¶ 38) — suggests otherwise. See Hodak v. City of St. Peters, 535 F.3d 899, 905 (8th Cir.2008) (noting that circuit courts agree that “if a third party actually asserts his [or her] own rights, no hindrance exists and third-party standing is improper”). For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff Kolel Belz lacks standing to bring this suit. Accordingly, its claims are dismissed without prejudice. 2. Ripeness a. Facial Challenges Plaintiffs have raised facial challenges to the legality of certain portions of the Village’s Zoning Code under the Equal Protection Clauses of both the Federal Constitution and the New York Constitution, as well as the Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Free Association Clauses of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution and corollary protections in the New York Constitution, and under RLUIPA. Defendants summarily assert that Plaintiffs “facial challenge^] fail[] to meet the jurisdictional requirement[ ] of ripeness,” (Defs.’ Mem. 13), arguing that Plaintiffs should be required to participate “in the normal land use process,” (id.). Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, however, “ ‘facial’ challenges to regulations] are generally ripe the moment the challenged regulation or ordinance is passed.” Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736 n. 10, 117 S.Ct. 1659, 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997); see also Cnty. Concrete Corp. v. Township of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir.2006) (noting that the finality requirement “does not apply ... to facial attacks on a zoning ordinance, i.e., a claim that the mere enactment of a regulation either constitutes a taking without just compensation, or a substantive violation of due process or equal protection.” (emphasis in original)); Lamar, 356 F.3d at 374 (holding that a party “need not have first sought and been denied any permit prior to filing a facial challenge” (emphasis in original)); MacDonald v. Safir, 206 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir.2000) (“[T]here is no need for a party actually to apply or to request a permit in order to bring a facial challenge to an ordinance (or parts of it).... ”); Charette v. Town of Oyster Bay, 159 F.3d 749, 757 (2d Cir.1998) (“[Making] no effort to apply for a permit ... does hot, of course, deprive [plaintiff] of standing to assert that the [zoning ordinance] is facially invalid... .”); S. Lyme Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Old Lyme, 539 F.Supp.2d 524, 536 (D.Conn.2008) (“[F]acial challenges are generally ripe the moment the challenged regulation or ordinance is passed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ecogen, LLC v. Town of Italy, 438 F.Supp.2d 149, 155 (W.D.N.Y.2006) (“[Facial challenges to legislative acts are ripe by their very nature.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); City of New Rochelle, 111 F.Supp.2d at 360 (holding that facial challenge to land use law was ripe as it presented “pure questions of law”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ facial challenges to the Village’s zoning ordinances are ripe for review. b. As-Applied Challenges Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenges to the Village’s zoning laws are not ripe for adjudication, because the Congregation failed “formally [to] present[ ][its] actual plans for the proposed [rjabbinical [c]ollege to the Village,” or to “ma[k]e any application for a special use permit, use variance, zoning amendment or zone change as required by the Village zoning laws.” (Defs.’ Mem. 12.) The Court agrees that Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenges under the Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Free Association Clauses of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the FHA, and RLUIPA, as well as Plaintiffs’ as-applied claims under New York state law, are unripe, and thus, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. “Ripeness is a doctrine rooted in both Article Ill’s case or controversy requirement and prudential limitations on the exercise of judicial authority.” Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 347 (2d Cir.2005). The ripeness doctrine’s “basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977); see also Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) (“Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F.Supp.2d 445, 454-55, No. 11-CV-6351, 2012 WL 4808939, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012) (“Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to eases or controversies of sufficient immediacy and reality and not hypothetical or abstract disputes.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). At its core, ripeness is “peculiarly a question of timing,” meaning that a case can become ripe for adjudication even if initially premature. Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140, 95 S.Ct. 335, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974). Thus, for example, an action is not ripe if it involves contingent future events that may or may not occur. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985). “Determining whether a case is ripe generally requires [courts] to ‘evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’ ” Murphy, 402 F.3d at 347 (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507); see also Simmonds v. INS, 326 F.3d 351, 359 (2d Cir.2003) (same); New York v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 896 F.Supp.2d 180, 195-96, Nos. 11-CV-2599, 11-CV-3857, 11-CV-3780, 2012 WL 4336701, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012) (same). “The ‘fitness of the issues for judicial decision’ prong ... requires a weighing of the sensitivity of the issues presented and whether there exists a need for further factual development.” Murphy, 402 F.3d at 347 (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507); see also E. End Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Village of Westhampton Beach, 828 F.Supp.2d 526, 536 (E.D.N.Y.2011) (same). The “ ‘hardship to the parties’ prong ... injects prudential considerations into the mix requiring [courts] to gauge the risk and severity of injury to a party that will result if the exercise of jurisdiction is declined.” Murphy, 402 F.3d at 347 (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507); see also E. End Eruv Ass’n, 828 F.Supp.2d at 536 (same). i. The Final Decision Requirement “Building on the foregoing, the Supreme Court has developed specific ripeness requirements applicable to land use disputes.” Murphy, 402 F.3d at 347. In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), the Supreme Court formulated a two-pronged approach to evaluate the ripeness of a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim. The first prong requires the land developer to obtain a final, definitive position as to the application of the relevant zoning laws to the property from the municipal entity responsible for those laws. Id. at 186, 105 S.Ct. 3108. Under this prong, the plaintiff cannot seek federal court review of a zoning ordinance or provision until it has submitted at least one meaningful application for a variance. Id. at 190, 105 S.Ct. 3108. Under the second prong, the property owner must seek compensation for an alleged taking before initiating a federal lawsuit. Id. at 194, 105 S.Ct. 3108. This second prong derives from the “Fifth Amendment’s proviso that only takings without ‘just compensation’ infringe that Amendment.” Suitum, 520 U.S. at 734, 117 S.Ct. 1659; see also Murphy, 402 F.3d at 348-5 (discussing Williamson’s two-prong ripeness analysis in Takings Clause cases). Although this ripieness paradigm was originally developed by the Supreme Court in the context of a regulatory takings challenge, see Williamson, 473 U.S. at 186, 105 S.Ct. 3108, the Second Circuit has applied prong one of the Williamson analysis to land use disputes involving more than just takings claims. See Murphy, 402 F.3d at 349-50. Indeed, the Second Circuit has applied this test to as-applied challenges to land use laws under RLUIPA, the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. See id. at 348-51 (applying final decision test for ripeness to as-applied RLUIPA claims and as-applied First Amendment free exercise claims); Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 88-89 (2d Cir.2002) (noting that Williamson’s finality test had been extended to Equal Protection claims and Due Process claims); Southview Assocs., Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 96-97 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that plaintiffs substantive due process claim was subject “to only the final decision prong of the Williamson ripeness test”); accord Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 979 (9th Cir.2011) (“All of the circuits to address this issue have applied the final decision requirement to RLUIPA claims, as well as to related First Amendment-based § 1983 claims....”); Miles Christi Religious Order v. Township of Northville, 629 F.3d 533, 537 (6th Cir.2010) (noting that the Sixth Circuit has applied the finality requirement to Equal Protection and First Amendment challenges to land use requirements); Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1291-92 (3d Cir.1993) (applying Williamson final decision rule to substantive Due Process, procedural Due Process, and Equal- Protection as-applied challenges to zoning determination); Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 841 F.2d 770, 774-76 (7th Cir.1988) (applying final decision rule to Equal Protection and Due Process claims); Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr. v. Inc. Village of Old Westbury, No. 09-CV-5195, 2012 WL 1392365, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2012) (noting that in the Second Circuit the final decision rale applies to First Amendment and RLUIPA challenges to land use laws). The final decision requirement also applies to land use disputes arising under New York law. See Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 67 N.Y.2d 510, 505 N.Y.S.2d 24, 496 N.E.2d 183, 189-90 (1986) (finding that as-applied claims under the First Amendment of the New York State and Federal Constitutions unripe based on plaintiffs failure to obtain a final decision, where the plaintiff had yet to seek administrative approval of its “rebuilding program”); Waterways Dev. Corp. v. LaValle, 28 A.D.3d 539, 813 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (2006) (holding that under New York law, a claim is not ripe if a governmental body has yet to render a “final determination as to the validity” of a proposed project); cf. Koultukis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Bldgs., Index No. 103643/01, 2001 WL 1722885, at *1 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Oct. 4, 2001) (“[A] controversy cannot be ripe for judicial review if the claimed harm may be prevented or significantly ameliorated by further administrative action.” (citation omitted)). “A final decision exists when a development plan has been submitted, considered and rejected by the governmental entity with the power to implement zoning regulations.” S & R Dev. Estates, LLC v. Bass, 588 F.Supp.2d 452, 461 (S.D.N.Y.2008); see also Ecogen, 438 F.Supp.2d at 155 (holding that the final decision rule generally requires “that the plaintiff ... have submitted at least one application for, and been denied, permission for the proposed structure or use of the subject property.”); Goldfine v. Kelly, 80 F.Supp.2d 153, 159 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (“In order to have a final decision, a ‘development plan must be submitted, considered, and rejected by the governmental entity.’ ” (quoting Unity Ventures, 841 at 774)); Barwick, 505 N.Y.S.2d 24, 496 N.E.2d at 189-90 (holding that decision was not final “until plaintiff has sought and the Commission has granted or denied a certificate of appropriateness or other approval .... ” (citation omitted)); Waterways, 813 N.Y.S.2d at 486 (holding that case was not ripe, because “[t]he plaintiff ha[d] not applied for a building permit for the residential units involving the variance at issue” and “[therefore, there [had] been no final determination as to the validity thereof’). Furthermore, generally, even if a plan has been submitted and rejected, a claim is not ripe until the “property owner submit[s] at least one meaningful application for a variance.” Murphy, 402 F.3d at 348; see also id. at 353 (“[F]ailure to pursue a variance prevents a federal challenge to a local land use decision from becoming ripe.” (citing Williamson, 473 U.S. at 190, 105 S.Ct. 3108)); Bikur Cholim, Inc. v. Village of Suffern, 664 F.Supp.2d 267, 275 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (“In general, ... failure to seek a variance prevents a zoning decision from becoming ripe.”); S & R Dev. Estates, 588 F.Supp.2d at 461-64 (dismissing claims on ripeness grounds, where the plaintiff had not applied for a variance); Goldfine, 80 F.Supp.2d at 159 (same); Korcz v. Elhage, 1 A.D.3d 903, 767 N.Y.S.2d 737, 738-39 (2003) (same); Dick’s Quarry, Inc. v. Town of Warwick, 293 A.D.2