Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge. Before the Court is defendants District of Columbia and Cathy Lanier’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint, Mar. 27, 2012, ECF No. 22. Upon consideration of the motion, the plaintiffs Opposition, May 7, 2012, ECF No. 24, the defendant’s Reply thereto, May 22, 2012, ECF No. 26, and the record herein, the Court will grant in part and deny in part defendants’ motion. I. BACKGROUND This case arises out of the tragic March 30, 2010 death of sixteen-year-old Brishell Jones. Compl. ¶ 19, June 23, 2011, ECF No. 1-1. After Jones attended a funeral service for Jordan Howe, a young homicide victim, she was killed in a retaliatory drive by shooting. Id. ¶ 40. The United States Attorney charged five men in connection with the shooting. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. These men have since been convicted of serious charges. See Keith L. Alexander, Theresa Vargas & Paul Duggan, D.C. jury convicts 5 of murder in attacks, Wash. Post, May 8, 2012, at A14. Jeffrey Best, Robert Bost, and Orlando Carter were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. See Paul Duggan & Heather Hermann, Long sentences for 5 in 2010 killings, Wash. Post, Sept. 12, 2012, at B5. Lamar Williams was sentenced to a term of 30 years for providing the AK-47 style assault rifle used in the killings. Id. Nathaniel Simms cooperated with prosecutors, pled guilty to murder, and was sentenced to 25 years. See Keith L. Alexander, Nathaniel Simms sentenced to 25 years for 2010 shootings, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2012, at B4. Sanquan Carter, whose killing of Jordan Howe precipitated the drive by that took Jones’ life, was sentenced to 54 years for Howe’s murder. Duggan & Hermann, Long Sentences, supra at B5. Plaintiff Nardyne Jefferies — the mother of decedent Brishell Jones and the personal representative of her estate, Compl. ¶¶ 20-21 — seeks to hold a wide array of government agencies and officials responsible for her daughter’s death. The Complaint claims that Jones’ death was the result of “the [Assistant U.S. Attorneys]’ and D.C. Government officials’, agencies’, and employees’ customs, practices, and culture of action and inaction based on irresponsible judgment and decision-making; negligence; gross negligence; willful disregard; racial discrimination; and deliberate indifference to the safety, welfare, and the life of Brishell Jones, and African American teenagers, in particular, and African American Youths in the District of Columbia and their families, in general.” Id. ¶ 24. This Court has dismissed plaintiffs claims against the D.C. Department of Human Services, D.C. Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services, D.C. Department of Mental Health, D.C. Metropolitan Police, Justice Grants Administration, D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Services, D.C. Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, D.C. Office of the Attorney General, D.C. Housing Authority, Mayor Vincent Gray, U.S. Attorney Ronald Machen, Office of the U.S. Attorney for D.C., Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for D.C., D.C. Pretrial Services Agency, and the United States of America. Orders Granting Mots. Dismiss, Mar. 27, 2012, ECF Nos. 18, 20, 21. Plaintiffs Complaint describes the events preceding the death of Brishell Jones. On March 21, 2010, Sanquan Carter lost a bracelet at a party. Compl. ¶ 34. Just past midnight on March 22, Sanquan Carter called his brother Orlando, claiming someone stole his bracelet. Orlando Carter arrived at the location of the party, along with Nathaniel Simms and Jeffrey Best. The group opened fire at the party-goers, killing Jordan Howe. Id. On March 22, 2010, the Metropolitan Police Department for the District of Columbia (“MPDC”) began investigating this shooting. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff alleges that eyewitnesses positively identified Sanquan Carter and Orlando Carter. Id. On March 23, police arrested Sanquan Carter for Jordan Howe’s murder. Later that day, police responded to the United Medical Center to find Orlando Carter suffering from gunshot wounds. Id. ¶ 37. Orlando Carter allegedly reported to police that someone loyal to Howe might have shot him. Orlando Carter was medevacked to Washington Hospital Center, where he was admitted in stable condition. Orlando Carter left the hospital “without police interference or objection,” and allegedly called Jeffrey Best and told him to hide the weapons used in Howe’s shooting. Id. Plaintiff alleges that “on March 23, 2010, officers of the [MPDC] and U.S. Attorney Ronald Machen, Jr., had an opportunity to execute a search warrant of Orlando Carter’s ‘crash pad’ apartment ..., where it was believed the weapons used in the Howe shooting were located.” Id. ¶ 38. The plaintiff faults the MPDC and Machen for not seeking judicial authorization for a nighttime search and not staking out the apartment overnight. Id. Because of these actions, plaintiff alleges, by the time officers executed the warrant they “found nothing usable to obtain an arrest warrant for Orlando Carter.” Id. On March 26, Chief of Police Cathy Lanier had an emergency meeting with Machen. Id. ¶ 39. At this meeting, Chief Lanier asked Machen for an arrest warrant for Orlando Carter; Machen refused, citing a lack of evidence. Id. On March 30, 2010, Brishell Jones attended funeral services for Jordan Howe. Id. ¶ 40. After the funeral, Jones and a group of at least fifteen youths congregated outside a building at 4022 South Capitol Street SE, Washington, D.C. That day, Orlando Carter rented a minivan, and— accompanied by Jeffrey Best, Robert Bost, and Nathaniel Simms — went looking for the people he felt responsible for his March 23rd shooting and Sanquan Carter’s missing bracelet. Seeking another gun to carry out the planned drive by, Jeffrey Best and Robert Bost killed Tavon Nelson in an attempt to steal Nelson’s handgun. Orlando Carter then drove the minivan to 4022 South Capitol Street; Best, Bost and Simms opened fire on the crowd. The men fired weapons — including an AK-47 style assault rifle — used in the murder of Howe. Id. Nine people were wounded; DeVaughn Boyd, William Jones, III, and Brishell Jones died. Id. ¶¶ 41, 43, 45. Jones, sixteen-years-old, died of a gunshot wound to the head. Id. ¶ 44. Three ambulances were dispatched to the scene; plaintiff claims that the “ambulance closest to the scene ... was the last to arrive,” because “[ijnstead of dispatching to the scene when it first received the emergency call, the ambulance operators chose to run personal errands.” Id. ¶ 42. MPDC officers arrested Orlando Carter and Nathaniel Simms after a vehicular pursuit; police later arrested Jeffery Best, Robert Bost and Lamar Williams. Id. ¶¶ 22-23, 46, 49. Plaintiffs Complaint lists fourteen counts: (1) § 1983 claim for violations of substantive and procedural due process, id. ¶¶ 50-56; (2) wrongful death, survival, and loss of consortium, id. ¶¶ 57-68; (3) gross negligence and negligence, id. ¶¶ 69-82; (4) state-created and reckless endangerment/deliberate indifference, id. ¶¶ 83-88; (5) egregious incompetence, id. ¶¶ 89-97; (6) equal protection violations, id. ¶¶ 98-102; (7) race discrimination, id. ¶¶ 103-105; (8) executive abuse of authority/power, id. ¶¶ 106-107; (9) failure to supervise and notify in violation of Mandatory Juvenile Public Safety Notification Act, id. ¶¶ 108-15; (10) violation of D.C.Code § 16—2332(d—1)(1), id. ¶¶ 116-18; (11) failure to enforce D.C. gun and ammunition laws, id. ¶¶ 119-24; (12) failure to enforce state and federal housing authority regulations, id. ¶¶ 125-26; (13) fraud, waste and misuse of federal funds, id. ¶¶ 127-28; and (14) intentional infliction of emotional distress, id. ¶¶ 129-30. Plaintiff seeks two hundred and twenty million dollars ($220,-000,000.00) in compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 44-45. After carefully considering the plaintiffs Complaint, documents incorporated therein, and the parties’ briefs, the Court will grant in part and deny in part defendants’ motion to dismiss. Defendants asked the Court to dismiss all claims against Chief of Police Cathy Lanier and the District of Columbia with prejudice. See Proposed Order for Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, Mar. 27, 2012, ECF No. 22. However, the general rule is that when a Court dismisses a count for failing to state a claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), it does so without prejudice to refile and with leave to amend the complaint. When amendment would be futile — such as when plaintiff bases claims on non-existent causes of action — dismissal with prejudice may be appropriate. Following these principles, the Court will take the following actions: It will dismiss all claims against Cathy Lanier in her individual capacity without prejudice, and dismiss all claims against Cathy Lanier in her official capacity with prejudice. It will dismiss plaintiffs request for punitive damages from the District of Columbia without prejudice. It will dismiss plaintiffs claims against the District of Columbia under Counts Five, Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen with prejudice. It will dismiss plaintiffs claims against the District of Columbia under Counts One, Four, and Six without prejudice. It will dismiss plaintiffs Title VII claim under Count Seven with prejudice, and dismiss plaintiffs D.C. Human Rights Act claim under Count Seven without prejudice. It will dismiss plaintiffs claims against the District of Columbia under Counts Two, Three, and Fourteen without prejudice — except to the extent those claims relate to the conduct of the ambulance operators closest to the scene who allegedly ran personal errands. See Compl. ¶ 42. The Court will deny the District of Columbia’s request to dismiss plaintiffs claims under Counts Two, Three, and Fourteen insofar as those claims relate to the alleged misconduct of the ambulance operators. The Court will grant the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days. The Court will hold any discovery in abeyance until the plaintiff has had an opportunity to amend its complaint, and defendants have had an opportunity to file a second motion to dismiss, if warranted. This allows discovery to proceed on all surviving matters in a uniform manner, in the interests of judicial economy. This would also allow the Court — if no federal claims or diverse parties remain — to transfer the case back to Superior Court. II. LEGAL STANDARD The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “ ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and must accept as true all reasonable factual inferences drawn from well-pleaded factual allegations. In re United Mine Workers of Am. Employee Benefit Plans Litig., 854 F.Supp. 914, 915 (D.D.C.1994). While the court must construe the complaint in the plaintiffs favor, it “need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff[ ] if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Moreover, the court is not bound to accept the legal conclusions of the non-moving party. See Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 762 (D.C.Cir.1997). The court is limited to considering facts alleged in the complaint, any documents attached to or incorporated in the complaint, matters of which the court may take judicial notice, and matters of public record. See EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.Cir.1997); Marshall County Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1993). Factual allegations in briefs or memoranda of law may not be considered when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, particularly when the facts they contain contradict those alleged in the complaint. Henthorn v. Dep’t of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 688 (D.C.Cir.1994); cf. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (when a motion to dismiss is based on the complaint, the facts alleged in the complaint control). When a court dismisses a claim, typically it does so without prejudice to refile or amend the complaint. O’Donnell v. Barry, 148 F.3d 1126, 1137 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“ ‘[A] dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) generally is not final or on the merits and the court normally will give plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.’ ”) (quoting Wright, Miller & Kane, 5A Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 at 360-61 (1990)). A “complaint that omits certain essential facts and thus fails to state a claim warrants dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) but not dismissal with prejudice.” Belizan v. Hershon, 434 F.3d 579, 583 (D.C.Cir.2006). This gives the complainant another opportunity to allege facts that would properly sustain a cause of action, and is in line “with the preference expressed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ... for resolving disputes on their merits.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2485, 2494, 177 L.Ed.2d 48 (2010). However, a court should also consider Rule l’s directive that the Federal Rules “should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. “Dismissal with prejudice is warranted only when a trial court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C.Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted). A district court does not abuse its discretion when it dismisses with prejudice claims for which amendment would be futile. See, e.g., Simpkins v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 366, 370 (D.C.Cir.1997) (“[T]o permit [plaintiff] to file another suit containing the same worthless claims would be inconsistent with the duty of lower federal courts to stop insubstantial Bivens actions in their tracks and get rid of them.... Such lawsuits impose undue burdens on the officer being sued, and thus interfere with the operations of government.”); Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Com’n, 916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C.Cir.1990) (upholding sua sponte dismissal with prejudice when “patently obvious that [plaintiff] could not have prevailed on the facts alleged in his complaint” and “apparent that the claimant could not possibly prevail”); Carty v. Author Solutions, Inc., 789 F.Supp.2d 131, 135-36 (D.D.C.2011) (dismissal with prejudice appropriate when permitting amendment would be futile because “amended complaint would suffer from the same flaw as the original complaint”). III. ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS AGAINST CHIEF OF POLICE CATHY LANIER Plaintiff sued many government officials in both their individual and official capacities, Compl. 1-4, among them Cathy Lanier, Chief of Police of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia. Since the facts do not support suing Chief Lanier in her individual capacity, and suing her in her official capacity would be redundant, the Court will dismiss all claims against Chief Lanier. It will dismiss claims against Chief Lanier in her individual capacity without prejudice, and dismiss claims against her in her official capacity with prejudice. A. Claims Against Chief Lanier in her Individual Capacity 1. Chief Lanier Not Personally Involved in the Misconduct The plaintiff may bring a claim against Chief Lanier in her individual capacity if the plaintiff alleges Chief Lanier “was directly responsible for the constitutional deprivation or that [s]he gave ‘authorization or approval of such misconduct.’ ” Ekwem v. Fenty, 666 F.Supp.2d 71, 76 (D.D.C.2009) (quoting Int’l Action Center v. United States, 365 F.3d 20, 27 (D.C.Cir.2004)). “Where a complaint against an official in h[er] individual capacity does not ‘establish the [offieial]’s personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing,’ judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.” Id. (quoting Swinson v. Metro Police Dep’t, No. 08-0809, 2009 WL 1327225, at *2 (D.D.C. May 12, 2009)). No facts in the Complaint specify Chief Lanier’s personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing. Even by the most generous reading, plaintiffs “effort to hold [Chief Lanier] personally liable fades into respondeat superior or vicarious liability, clearly barred under Section 1983.” Int’l Action Ctr., 365 F.3d at 27. The plaintiff makes bare assertions that the MPDC and Chief Lanier “exercise[ed] a policy and custom based on discrimination against black youths wherein their safety or lives were not as valuable or protected as others,” Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 12, and that they “would have responded differently, faster, and more effectively had the targeted community, victims, and witness been Caucasian and residing in other regions of the District,” id. at 14. The plaintiff seeks to hold Chief Lanier personally liable for failing to act more diligently in “obtaining and executing search and arrest warrants, making multiple and expeditious arrests, [and] tracking and obtaining custody of all assault weapons used against the young people at the initial shooting on March 22, 2010.” Id. This does not show Chief Lanier’s personal involvement “outside the mention of her official capacity as the Chief of Police who generally oversees all police activity.” Defs.’ Reply ISO its Mot. Dismiss 6. In fact, the only part of the Complaint discussing Chief Lanier’s personal involvement regards an emergency meeting Chief Lanier had with the U.S. Attorney about obtaining an arrest warrant for Orlando Carter. Compl. ¶ 39. If anything, this shows that Chief Lanier sought to protect the community. The plaintiff broadly claims that the MPDC and Chief Lanier’s inaction contributed to Jones’ death, but has “failed to link the likelihood of particular constitutional violations to any past transgressions, and failed to link [this] particular supervisor! ] to those past practices or any familiarity with them. In the absence of such ‘affirmative links,’ [Chief Lanier] cannot be shown to have the requisite ‘direct responsibility’ or to have given ‘[her] authorization or approval of such misconduct[.]’ ” Int'l Action Ctr., 365 F.3d at 27 (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976)). 2. Chief Lanier has Absolute Immunity from Individual Liability for Plaintiff’s Common Law Causes of Action Based on the facts alleged, absolute immunity would bar the plaintiffs common law claims. Under District of Columbia v. Thompson (Thompson I), 570 A.2d 277 (D.C.1990) “a federal official engaged in a discretionary act within the ‘outer perimeter of [the official’s] line of duty’ is absolutely immune from suit,” id. at 294 (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959)). Courts in the District extend this absolute immunity to officials working in the United States and District of Columbia governments. See, e.g., Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1020 (D.C.1990) (extending absolute immunity to Athletic Director of University of the District of Columbia); Kendrick v. Fox Television, 659 A.2d 814, 819 (D.C.1995) (absolute immunity bars common law suit against MPDC Deputy Chief of Police). Actions that “have more or less connection with the general matters committed by law to his control or supervision” fall within the “outer perimeters” of the official’s duties. Moss, 580 A.2d at 1020. “The reason why absolute immunity is available for discretionary official acts is clear: to ensure that when public officials exercise discretion in carrying out their duties, concern about tort liability will not inhibit the ‘fearless, vigorous and effective administration of policies of government.’ ” Kendrick, 659 A.2d at 819 (quoting Thompson I, 570 A.2d at 295). The plaintiff does not allege facts showing Chief Lanier acted beyond the outer perimeters of her official duties. The decisions she made investigating the earlier shooting, obtaining search and arrest warrants, and directing police resources clearly fall within her official duties. The plaintiff admits as much when she claims Chief Lanier’s involvement in the investigation and policies are “inherent in her position as Chief.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 18. The “complaint alleges that the Chief was acting within the scope of her employment and as an agent for the District of Columbia,” id., and does not allege that Chief Lanier acted outside the scope of her employment to harm plaintiff. In determining whether an action is “discretionary” or “ministerial,” a court balances “society’s concern to shield the particular government function at issue from the disruptive effects of civil litigation” against “the vindication of private injuries otherwise compensable at law.” Moss, 580 A.2d at 1021. In striking this balance, the court should consider: (1) the nature of the plaintiffs injury, (2) the availability of alternative remedies, (3) the ability of the court to judge fault without unduly invading the executive function, and (4) the importance of protecting particular kinds of official acts. Id. While plaintiffs injury is serious, alternative remedies are available. The plaintiff may file a wrongful death suit against the persons directly responsible for Jones’ death — her murderers. The third and fourth factors counsel strongly in favor of finding Chief Lanier’s actions discretionary. Courts are appropriately uneasy about second-guessing the judgment of police officials. See, e.g., Kendrick, 659 A.2d at 820 (expressing worry about “second-guessing details of judgments police officials have to make in conducting sensitive and difficult investigations.... Court scrutiny ... where public safety issues are implicated, is likely to be overly intrusive, amounting to an invasion of the executive function that Thompson I indicates should be avoided.”); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306, 1311 (D.C.1983) (“[T]he public interest is not served ‘by allowing a jury of lay [persons] with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight to second-guess the exercise of a police [officer’s discretionary professional duty.’”) (quoting Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379, 1384 (1982)). The actions Lanier took as Chief of Police “required] personal deliberation, decision and judgment” and are thus “[discretionary acts[.]” Nealon v. District of Columbia, 669 A.2d 685, 690 (D.C.1995). Considering the nature of Chief Lanier’s actions—as alleged in the Complaint — the Court would be unable to “judge fault without unduly invading the executive function[.]” Moss, 580 A.2d at 1021. Therefore, her actions were discretionary and fell within the outer perimeters of her official duty. Chief Lanier would be absolutely immune from individual liability for plaintiffs common law claims. 3. Chief Lanier has Qualified Immunity from Individual Liability for Plaintiff’s Statutory and Constitutional Causes of Action Chief Lanier would also enjoy qualified immunity from individual liability for plaintiffs constitutional and statutory claims, “[government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzger ald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Qualified immunity mitigates the “social costs [of] the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office.” Id. at 814, 102 5.Ct. 2727. It is appropriate to raise issues of qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss. “Where the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive .... [W]e repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions are the earliest possible stage in the litigation.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Qualified immunity protects Chief Lanier from personal liability for conduct she would not have reasonably known violated the Constitution or a statute. Saucier, 533 U.S at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. To be liable, Chief Lanier would have had to violate a “clearly established” constitutional or statutory right. Id. (“ ‘The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ ”) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). Chief Lanier is immune “as long as [her] actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights [she is] alleged to have violated.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034. The facts alleged by plaintiff do not show how Chief Lanier acted in violation of a clearly established constitutional or statutory right. First, as discussed supra, the plaintiff alleges little about Chief Lanier’s personal involvement — apart from her supervisory role, and her meeting with Machen — in the investigation or alleged rights violations. Second, the plaintiff relies on conclusory statements that Chief Lanier “had a clear obligation ... to provide Brishell Jones and other intended victims with equal protection of the laws, to not discriminate against African American youths, and to provide them with the same protection and value for their lives as those similarly situation but of a different race.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 20-21. But other than further circular assertions that Chief Lanier would have treated the case differently if the victims were White, see id. at 14, the plaintiff does not allege facts showing Chief Lanier violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right. “[B]are allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery[.]” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18, 102 S.Ct. 2727. Chief Lanier is entitled to qualified immunity from all of plaintiffs constitutional and statutory causes of action. The plaintiff has failed to allege facts that Chief Lanier personally participated in the alleged wrongdoing, apart from actions she took within the scope of her employment. Based on her actions, as alleged in the Complaint, Chief Lanier enjoys absolute immunity from all plaintiffs common law claims, and qualified immunity from all plaintiffs constitutional and statutory claims. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice all claims against Chief Lanier in her individual capacity. B. Claims Against Chief Lanier in her Official Capacity The Court will also dismiss all claims made against Chief Lanier in her official capacity. A suit against a District of Columbia official in her official capacity is “equivalent to a suit against the municipality itself.” Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 424 (D.C.Cir.1996). The Supreme Court has explained that “[ojfficial-capacity suits ... [generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Courts in the District of Columbia frequently dismiss claims against individuals named in their official capacity as “redundant and an inefficient use of judicial resources.” Robinson v. District of Columbia, 403 F.Supp.2d 39, 49 (D.D.C.2005); see also Jenkins v. Jackson, 538 F.Supp.2d 31, 33-34 (D.D.C.2008). The District of Columbia is a named defendant who has received proper notice. Therefore, the claims against Chief Lanier in her official capacity are redundant, inefficient and should be dismissed. Plaintiff concedes redundancy, but states that “there is no requirement that, because of the equivalence, the public official defendant must be dismissed.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 17. This provides no reason to keep the redundant claims, and amendment would be futile. The Court will dismiss all claims made against Chief of Police Cathy Lanier in official capacity with prejudice. IV. ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA By dismissing Chief of Police Cathy Lanier as a defendant to this action, the Court will treat all claims made against Chief Lanier in her official capacity as claims against the District itself. The Court has previously dismissed claims against various D.C. government agencies, including the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services, Metropolitan Police Department, and D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Services. See Orders Granting Mots. Dismiss, ECF Nos. 18, 20, 21. A “noncorporate department or other body within a municipal corporation is not sui juris.” Braxton v. Nat’l Capital Hous. Auth., 396 A.2d 215, 216-17 (D.C.1978). “Decisions from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals have consistently held that, in the absence of a statutory provision providing otherwise, bodies within the District of Columbia government are not suable as separate entities.” Hinton v. Metropolitan Police Dept., Fifth District, 726 F.Supp. 875, 875 (D.D.C.1989). Therefore, the Court will treat plaintiffs claims and allegations against District agencies as though they were directed at the District itself. A. Plaintiffs Request for Punitive Damages from the District of Columbia The plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages totaling two hundred and twenty million dollars ($220,000,-000.00). Compl. 44-15. The Complaint does not disaggregate punitive damages from compensatory damages, but presents one total figure for each group of claims. Id. The defendants argue, “Punitive damages may not be awarded against the District of Columbia ... absent an express statutory mandate.” Defs.’ Mem. ISO its Mot. Dismiss 6. Federal and local courts in this jurisdiction have held that the District generally cannot be liable for punitive damages. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 260 n. 21, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (“The general rule today is that no punitive damages are allowed [against a municipality] unless expressly authorized by statute.”); Teart v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 686 F.Supp. 12, 13 (D.D.C.1988) (“In the absence of express statutory authority, punitive damages are not recoverable against the District of Columbia.”); Finkelstein v. District of Columbia, 593 A.2d 591, 599 (D.C.1991) (“[P]unitive damages may not be awarded against the District of Columbia[.]”); Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831, 832 (D.C.1975) (per curiam) (“The clear weight of authority in the states is that as a general rule there can be no recovery of punitive damages against a municipality absent a statute expressly authorizing it.”). Plaintiff counters that punitive damages are available against the District, absent statutory authority, if there are “ ‘extraordinary circumstances.’ ” Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 9 (quoting Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 658 (D.C.Cir.2001)). Plaintiff does not allege any statute authorizes punitive damages against the District, but argues that “given the horrendous nature of Miss Jones’ death ... a reasonable jury could find that the allegations in [plaintiff’s complaint ‘present circumstances upon which a reasonable jury might find the existence of ‘extraordinary circumstances[.]’ ’ ” Id. at 11 (quoting Butera, 235 F.3d at 657). Plaintiffs discussion of Butera, tellingly, omits the case’s definition of “extraordinary circumstances.” The D.C. Circuit stated: The term “extraordinary circumstances” is a term of art in this context. In Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433 (D.C.Cir.2000), the court ... clarified the meaning of “extraordinary circumstances” to refer to circumstances such as “where a jurisdiction’s taxpayers are directly responsible for perpetrating the policies that caused the plaintiffs injuries” or “where a municipality or its policymakers have intentionally adopted the unconstitutional policies that caused the damages in question.” Id. at 447. Butera, 235 F.3d at 657. The plaintiff has alleged no facts that would show “that the District of Columbia policymakers intentionally adopted an unconstitutional policy,” id., or that the District’s taxpayers are “directly responsible for perpetrating the policies that caused the plaintiffs injuries,” Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 447. Plaintiff emphasizes the magnitude of the harm and alleged misconduct, Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 9-11, but does not meet But-era’s specific, narrow meaning of “extraordinary circumstances.” Based on the facts alleged in the Complaint, plaintiff cannot recover any punitive damages from the District of Columbia, and the Court will dismiss plaintiffs request for punitive damages without prejudice. B. Plaintiffs Common Law Claims Against the District of Columbia 1. Claims Barred by Public Duty Doctrine (Counts Two and Three) In Count Two, plaintiff brings a wrongful death claim, alleging that “[t]he cause and circumstances under which Brishell [Jones] was murdered resulted directly and/or indirectly from an ongoing series of long and short term decisions, actions, and/or inactions rising to the level of noncompliance with state and federal law ..., negligence and/or incompetence by ... D.C. government agencies, their directors, agents, and employees.” Compl. ¶ 62. The Complaint further alleges: As a result and proximate cause of the Defendants AUSA and D.C. government agencies’, their Directors’, agents’, and employees’ gross negligence, intentional disregard, and breach of their duties, their acts and omissions/failures to act while working within the scope of their employment as the District’s agents, servants, and/or employees caused Ms. Jefferies (and Mr. Jones) to be deprived of their smart, kind, and loving daughter[.] Id. ¶ 63. In Count Three, plaintiff brings negligence and gross negligence claims. Plaintiff alleges that the District of Columbia and its officials, through a dereliction of their official duties and failure to enforce federal and District laws meant to protect the community, failed to prevent the killing of Jones. Id. ¶¶ 69-82. The Complaint states, “Pursuant to D.C. government legislation, policies, customs, practices and strategy plans, Brishell Tashé Jones was a member of a statutorily protected class which triggered a ‘special relationship’ with and imposed an increased duty of care by Defendant D.C. government agencies, their directors, agents and employees including the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department and other law enforcement agencies.” Id. ¶ 75. Plaintiff cites five “statutes, regulations, and administrative documents” as creating the necessary “special relationship”: (1) D.C. Youth Development Strategy Implementation Plan, December 2005; (2) Mandatory Juvenile Public Safety Notification Amendment Act of 2006; (3) the Omnibus Public Safety Amendment Act 2009; (4) Enhanced Crime Prevention and Abatement Emergency Amendment Act of 2008; and (5) Records Access Emergency Amendment Act of 2009. Id. The defendants insist that the public duty doctrine bars plaintiffs negligence claims, and plaintiff has shown that her claims fall under an exception to this doctrine. See Defs.’ Mem. ISO its Mot. Dismiss 13-23. For the most part, the Court agrees, and will dismiss most of plaintiffs claims under Counts Two and Three without prejudice. Under the public duty doctrine, the “[government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any particular citizen.” Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C.1981). The doctrine applies, inter alia, to “cases where individuals seek to hold the District liable for negligence or wrongful death because of a failure to protect a person.” Taylor v. District of Columbia, 776 A.2d 1208, 1214 (D.C.2001). “[A]s a general rule, there is no individual right of action for damages against the government for failure to protect a particular citizen from harm caused by the criminal conduct of another.” District of Columbia v. Harris, 770 A.2d 82, 87 (D.C.2001). “The doctrine operates to shield the District and its employees from liability arising out of their actions in the course of providing public services ... [and] applies in the case of such services as police and fire proteetion[.]” Hines v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 133, 136 (D.C.1990). The D.C. Court of Appeals, in Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C.1983), explained the justification for the public duty doctrine, particularly as it applies to public safety and police judgments: [C]ourts have had occasion to consider, and to reaffirm, the various policies which have led the law to determine that the duty to prevent crime is a general duty owed to the public and, therefore, unenforceable by any one individual. Foremost is the practical realization that individuals, juries and courts are ill-equipped to judge considered legislative — executive decisions] as to how particular community resources should be or should have been allocated to protect individual members of the public. Severe depletion of these resources could well result if every oversight, omission or blunder made by a police official rendered a state or municipality potentially liable in compensatory, let alone punitive damages. In effect, police officials would be placed in the position of insuring the personal safety of every member of the community, notwithstanding limited resources and the inescapable choices of allocation that must be made. Moreover, police officials who act and react in the milieu of criminal activity where every decision to deploy law enforcement personnel is fraught with uncertainty must have broad discretion to proceed without fear of civil liability in the unflinching discharge of their duties.... [T]he public interest is not served by allowing a jury of lay [persons] with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight to second-guess the exercise of a police [officer’s discretionary professional duty. Such discretion is no discretion at all. Other practical considerations come to bear at the level of day-to-day law enforcement. If the police were held to a duty enforceable by each individual member of the public, then every complaint — whether real, imagined, or frivolous — would raise the spectre of civil liability for failure to respond. Rather than exercise reasoned discretion and evaluate each particular allegation on its own merits the police may well be pressured to make hasty arrests solely to eliminate the threat of personal prosecution by the putative victim. Such a result historically has been viewed, and rightly so, as untenable, unworkable and unwise. Furthermore, other effective mechanisms exist to control the behavior of errant police officials.... [0]n balance the community is better served by a policy that both protects the exercise of law enforcement discretion and affords a means of review by those who, in supervisory roles, are best able to evaluate the conduct of their charges. Id. at 1311-12 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In essence, plaintiffs Complaint alleges that Jones’ death was “preventable,” Compl. ¶ 19, and the District had opportunities to stop the chain of retaliatory violence, id. ¶¶ 33-40, but negligently failed to act, id. ¶¶ 69-81. The Complaint highlights the failure to arrest Orlando Carter at the hospital, id. ¶ 37, the failure to stake out or execute a nighttime search warrant at the “crash pad,” id. ¶ 38, and the failure to obtain an arrest warrant for Orlando Carter sooner, id. The vast majority of plaintiffs factual allegations boil down to a claim that the District failed to prevent a crime. The public duty doctrine bars exactly this kind of “police negligence” claim. The public duty doctrine determines when the District or its officials have a duty to a particular person, rather than the public at large. See Warren, 444 A.2d at 4. The doctrine, therefore, resolves whether the government owed any duty of care to the plaintiff or decedent. If, based on reading the Complaint, the public duty doctrine applies, the Court may appropriately dismiss the tort claims under 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim. See id. at 1 (affirming trial judges’ holdings “that the police were under no specific legal duty to provide protection to the individual appellants” and affirming dismissals of “complaints for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted” under local analogue to Rule 12(b)(6)). The Court must consider whether some exception applies. “Under the public duty doctrine, a person seeking to hold the District of Columbia liable for negligence must allege and prove that the District owed a special duty to the injured party, greater than or different from any duty which it owed to the general public.” Klahr v. District of Columbia, 576 A.2d 718, 719 (D.C.1990). Plaintiff may establish such a special relationship or duty by demonstrating either “direct contact or continuing contact between the victim and the governmental agency or official,” or that a statute prescribes “mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole.” District of Columbia v. Forsman, 580 A.2d, 1314, 1317 (D.C.1990). “The threshold for establishing a special relationship is very high.” Trifax Corp. v. District of Columbia, 53 F.Supp.2d 20, 30 (D.D.C.1999). Under the first exception to the public duty doctrine, plaintiff must “allege and prove two things: (1) a direct or continuing contact between [the plaintiff] and a governmental agency or official, and (2) a justifiable reliance on the part of [the plaintiff].” Klahr, 576 A.2d at 720. “The required contact must ... be a ‘direct transaction with the party injured or an arms-length relationship in which the city’s agent is dealing directly, in some form, with the person injured.’ ” Powell v. District of Columbia, 602 A.2d 1123, 1130 (D.C.1992) (quoting City of Tampa v. Davis, 226 So.2d 450, 454 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1969)). “Moreover, the government must engage in ‘affirmative undertaking’ of protection on which the victim justifiably relies.” Taylor, 776 A.2d at 1215 (quoting Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1317-18). “Affirmative negligence” is required, as opposed to “inaction or futile action.” Johnson v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d at 142, 143 (D.C.1990) (quotation omitted). The plaintiff must show a “justifiable reliance on a specific undertaking to render aid.” Hines, 580 A.2d at 138. The Complaint does not allege there were any contacts between District officials and the plaintiff or decedent, other than the “contact” between the ambulance operators and Ms. Jones. See Compl. ¶ 42. The Court examines the conduct of ambulance operators separately, in the following section. Nothing else in the Complaint alleges a “direct transaction with the party injured or an arms-length relationship in which the city’s agent is dealing directly, in some form, with the person injured.” Powell, 602 A.2d at 1130. Even if there were some contact between the government and plaintiff, the Complaint says nothing about justifiable reliance. There is a high burden for showing justifiable reliance: Justifiable reliance, in this context, means particular or special reliance. The definition could not be otherwise. In a civilized society, every citizen at least tacitly relies upon the constable for protection from crime. Hence, more than general reliance is needed to require the police to act on behalf of any particular individual. The plaintiff must specifically act, or refrain from acting, in such a way as to exhibit particular reliance upon the actions of the police in providing personal protection. Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1315 (citations omitted). The plaintiff has pled nothing about particular or special reliance. Most of plaintiffs allegations under Counts Two and Three cannot proceed under this exception to the public duty doctrine. The second exception to the public duty doctrine involves a specific statute or regulation that prescribes “mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole.” Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662, 667 (D.C.1987). “[I]f a state agency is required by statute or regulation to take a particular action for the benefit for a particular class and fails to do so, or negligently does so, and the plaintiffs justifiably rely to their detriment on the agency’s duty to act, a cause of action in negligence will lie against the state or its agency.” Id. at 672. In Turner, for example, the D.C. Court of Appeals found that the Child Abuse Prevention Act imposes “upon certain public officials specific duties and responsibilities which are intended to protect a narrowly defined and otherwise helpless class of persons: abused and neglected children.” Id. at 668. The Child Abuse Prevention Act mandates that District officials act in certain ways to protect a special class, and when officials breach those duties, “that statutorily protected class suffers in a way uniquely different from the public at large.” Id. In the present case, plaintiff lists five “statutes, regulations, and administrative documents” as supporting a statutory exception to the public duty doctrine. Compl. ¶ 75. None create any duty of care owed by the District of Columbia or its agents to Brishell Jones, and none can support an exception to the public duty doctrine. First, the plaintiff cites the “D.C. Youth Development Strategy Implementation Plan, December 2005” as creating a “special relationship” with African American youths in Wards 7 and 8. Id. The Youth Development Strategy Plan was not a statute or official regulation, but represents a “police-community partnership ... formed to reduce violence in communities east of the Anacostia River through law enforcement, conflict resolution, and intervention and prevention strategies.” Id. ¶ 32. “To address safety issues, [MPDC] agreed to meet with the [Violence Intervention Partnership] members monthly[.]” Id. This partnership does not carry the force of law, or require government officials to act in any particular way, so it cannot create the “special relationship” required under Turner. See also Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1317-18 (matters of general police procedure cannot create special duty to protected class). Plaintiff relies on Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583, 375 N.E.2d 763 (1978), where the New York Court of Appeals held that a police officer’s voluntary undertaking of a duty to supervise a school crossing made him liable when he negligently performed that duty, and an injured child’s mother acted in reliance on that duty, id. at 196-97, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583, 375 N.E.2d 763 (cited in Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 27-30). However, as discussed in supra note 6, D.C. courts have frequently distinguished Florence on its facts. See, e.g., Hines, 580 A.2d at 138-40; Stoddard, 623 A.2d at 1153-54. Plaintiff does not explain what specific duties the Youth Development Strategy Plan imposed, and how the District breached those duties. Plaintiff claims District “Agencies decreased participation and stopped attending” monthly meetings with community groups. Compl. ¶ 32. It is not clear that the Plan required D.C. officials to attend these meetings, or how this “breach” could have been a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. Furthermore, plaintiff does not allege how she, or the decedent, relied on the Youth Development Strategy Plan to her detriment. The Plan cannot support a “special relationship” exception to the public duty doctrine. Second, the plaintiff cites the Mandatory Juvenile Public Safety Notification Amendment Act of 2006. Compl. ¶ 75. For reasons discussed in greater detail in infra Part IV.C.l., the Act is for the protection of the public as a whole, and not for any particular class. Furthermore, the plaintiff concedes in her Opposition that the Act was enacted “to keep D.C. residents out of harm’s way,” and therefore creates a “general public duty.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 31. This Act cannot support a statutory exception to the public duty doctrine. Third, the plaintiff cites the Omnibus Public Safety Amendment Act of 2009. Compl. ¶ 75. This Act is a large collection of amendments to the D.C. Official Code. 54 D.C.Reg. 7413 (Aug. 26, 2009). The amendments, inter alia, establish new criminal offenses, redefine and repeal existing offenses, change sentence ranges, create working groups, extend administrative deadlines, clarify local rules of evidence and criminal procedure, and define statutory terms. Id. The amendments cover a wide range of matters, including the destruction of campaign materials, the qualifications of the Chief Medical Examiner, disclosure of mental health information, establishing a gun-offender registry, exceptions to the physician—patient privilege, and texting while driving. Id. It is a classic example of a law meant for the benefit of all, and not a particular class. Plaintiff did not respond in any way to defendants’ argument that this law could not create an exception to the public duty doctrine. See Defs.’ Reply ISO its Mot. Dismiss 9-10. Since the Omnibus Public Safety Amendment Act of 2009 is for the protection of all, not a protected class, it cannot support a statutory exception to the public safety doctrine. Fourth, the plaintiff cites the Enhanced Crime Prevention and Abatement Emergency Amendment Act (“ECPA”) of 2006. Compl. ¶¶ 72, 75. The stated purposes of the ECPA are: To amend, on an emergency basis, the Juvenile Curfew Act of 1995 to authorize the Mayor to modify curfew hours by issuing an executive order; to amend Title 16 of the ... Official Code to require the Family Court ... and the Director of the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services [“DYRS”] to disclose specified information to the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department; to require the Metropolitan Police Department to notify the Superintendent of the District of Columbia Public Schools of the filing of a petition against a student by the Office of the Attorney General for certain offenses and to disclose certain records relating to the charge; to amend Titles 23 and 16 of the ... Official Code to create a rebuttable presumption for detaining certain adults and juveniles charged with robbery or certain handgun violations pending a trial or disposition hearing; to amend Chapter 25 of Title 24 of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations governing the Metropolitan Police Department’s Closed Circuit Television system to authorize its use in the prevention, detection, deterrence, and investigation of crime; to require the Mayor to make available to the Council certain Metropolitan Police Department records relating to the performance of officers, to provide biweekly crime briefings to the Council, and to submit to the Council a Crime Emergency Plan for each police district; to require the Mayor to conduct reviews of certain violations of persons who are on pre-trial release, parole, or probation, and to request that the United States Marshals’ Service prioritize pending arrest and fugitive warrants for persons who have committed certain offenses; and to amend the Fiscal Year Budget Support Act of 2006 to require that the Metropolitan Police Department maintain the total percent of sworn officers assigned to the police districts as existed on June 11, 2006. 53 D.C.Reg. 6477 (July 21, 2006). The ECPA does not single out any particular group for protection, but protects the public generally. It only mandates a few actions. It requires the Family Court and Director of DYRS to disclose specified information about violent or repeat offenders to the Chief of Police, and requires the MPDC to notify and share records with the School Superintendent when the Office of the Attorney General charges a student with a specified offense. Id. As discussed in greater detail in infra Part IV.C.1, mandating disclosure between government agencies protects the public rather than a specified class. The EPCA requires the Mayor to submit crime prevention plans and disclose certain MPDC records and information to the City Council, and conduct reviews of certain violations of persons on pre-trial release. 53 D.C.Reg. 6477. The Complaint does not allege that the District violated this part of the Act. Furthermore, there is no indication that these provisions are designed to protect African American youths in Wards 7 and 8 in particular, rather than the public as a whole. The ECPA requires additional budgeting to maintain the same percentage of sworn officers assigned to police districts as existed on June 11, 2006. There is no allegation in the Complaint that the District violated this mandate, and there is no indication that protects a special class rather than the public as a whole. For all these “mandatory actions,” there are no facts suggesting that plaintiff or decedent justifiably relied on any statutory obligation to their detriment. In particular, plaintiff alleges that the District failed to enforce the curfew in violation of the ECPA. Compl. ¶ 33. First, the EPCA does not mandate that the May- or amend or enforce a curfew; it simply authorizes him to do so by executive order. 53 D.C.Reg. 6477. A curfew imposes obligations on minors, not the government. As plaintiff states in her Opposition, “On March 22, 2010 through and after March 30, 2010, the Juvenile Curfew Act of 1995 ... was in effect in the District, including Congress Heights, due to a determination by Defendant District of Columbia that there was a ‘public safety necessity.’ ” PL’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 30. So even if the ECPA required the Mayor to impose a curfew, by plaintiffs omission the Mayor fulfilled that duty. The “breach” plaintiff alleges is that Sanquan Carter violated his curfew when he shot Jordan Howe on March 22, 2010. Compl. ¶ 33. This is not a breach by a government official of any mandatory duty imposed by the ECPA. It is a claim that the government failed to catch a criminal, prevent a crime — the type of claim barred by the public duty doctrine. See, e.g., Powell, 602 A.2d at 1125 (public duty doctrine generally “bar[s] lawsuits by a person seeking, as an individual, to enforce the duties to prevent crime and otherwise protect against injury”). Putting aside any problems -with proximate causation — while Sanquan Carter violated curfew when he killed Howe, Orlando Carter and his crew were in compliance when they killed Ms. Jones around 7:30 p.m. on March 30, Compl. ¶¶ 40-41—the District has not violated any mandatory duty in failing to effectively enforce the curfew. By imposing a curfew, the District does not become the insurer of all those injured by a minor violating that curfew. See, e.g., Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1311 (“In effect, police officials would be placed in the position of insuring the personal safety of every member of the community, notwithstanding limited resources and the inescapable choices of allocation that must be made.”); Walters v. Hampton, 14 Wash.App. 548, 543 P.2d 648, 652 (1975) (city cannot be made “insurer” against every harm posed by criminal act) (cited by Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1311). Furthermore, there is nothing alleging that plaintiff or decedent ever relied on any aspect of the curfew to their detriment. Therefore, this statutory “duty” cannot support a finding of a “special relationship” under the ECPA. The plaintiff also claims that “paragraph 6 of the [EPCA] allocates funding for the components of the DC’s youth development and youth anti-violence strategies and emphasizes increased protection for court-involved youths.” PL’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 30. The plaintiff continues: “DC City Council asked the CFO to authorize sufficient funding from the contingency reserve find to support mediation and peace-building initiatives in Wards 7 and 8.” Id. The plaintiff quotes language, allegedly from the “Act,” allocating: $75,000 (annual $300,000) to continue girl gang/crew mediation and peace-building initiative in Wards 5, 6, 7, 8. This involves peer mediation activities, summer employment opportunities, leadership development, and a retreat for gang/crew members. Id. There are many problems with this argument. First, plaintiff raises this funding issue for the first time in her Opposition; nothing about it appears anywhere in the Complaint or Notice of Claim. Cf. Henthorn, 29 F.3d at 688 (factual allegations in briefs or memoranda of law may not be considered when deciding 12(b)(6) motion). Second — as far as this Court can tell — this language is not from the ECPA, as plaintiff claims. The quoted language comes from an open letter from then-May- or Anthony Williams to Linda Cropp, then-Chair of the D.C. Council. See May- or Anthony Williams, The Mayor’s Six-Step Proposal to Curb Crime, Wash. Post, July 18, 2006, available at www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2006/07/18/AR2006071800755_pf. html. In the letter, Mayor Williams continued, “[W]hüe I understand Council approval is not required to access these funds, I am requesting an affirmation of Council’s support through a Sense of the Council resolution to allocate this funding as proposed.” Id. Regarding money for gan^crew mediation, there is nothing to suggest that anything required funds be spent for this purpose. There is absolutely no allegation that, even if there was some mandate, anyone violated this mandate. The plaintiff makes no connection between this mediation and peacebuilding initiative and the events surrounding Jones’ death. No facts support justifiable reliance. This cannot support any “special relationship” creating an exception to the public duty doctrine. After considering all plaintiffs allegations and arguments, the Court finds plaintiff has not alleged facts that the District violated any mandatory provision of the ECPA designed for the special protection of a particular class. Fifth and finally, plaintiff cites the Records Access Emergency Amendment Act of 2009. Compl. ¶ 75. This Act does not mandate anything; it simply permits the Chairman of the Committee on Human Services or his designee to obtain records pertaining to youths in the custody of the DYRS. 56 D.C.Reg.1939 (Mar. 6, 2009). There is no indication that this Act protects a particular group rather than the public as a whole. The plaintiff has not alleged how plaintiff or the decedent relied to their detriment on this Act. The plaintiff did not respond in any way to defendants’ argument that this Act cannot support an exception to the public duty doctrine. See Defs.’ Reply ISO its Mot. Dismiss 9-10. This law cannot establish a statutory exception or create a “special relationship.” After considering the applicability of the public duty doctrine to plaintiffs claims under Counts Two and Three, and any possible exceptions to that doctrine, the Court finds — based on the facts alleged in the Complaint — that plaintiff has, for the most part, failed to allege that the government owed any duty of care to plaintiff or the decedent. It has also failed to allege facts that would support a finding that the District violated any duty owed, or that plaintiff justifiably relied to her detriment on any obligati