Full opinion text
OPINION SAND, District Judge. Opinion as to Jurisdiction The sixth superseding indictment in this case (“the Indictment”) charges fifteen defendants with conspiracy to murder United States nationals, to use weapons of mass destruction against United States nationals, to destroy United States buildings and property, and to destroy United States defense utilities. The Indictment also charges defendants Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-‘Owhali, and Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, among others, with numerous crimes in connection with the August 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, including 228 counts of murder. The Indictment also charges defendant Wadih el Hage with numerous perjury and false statement counts. Six of the Defendants are presently in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons: Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, Ali Mohamed, Wadih El Hage, Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, and Mohamed Sadeek Odeh (“Odeh”). Presently before the Court is Odeh’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 5-244 for Lack of Jurisdiction, in which the other defendants join. For the reasons given below, we grant Odeh’s Motion as to Counts 284, 235, 240, and 241, but deny it as to Counts 5-233, 236-239, and 242-244. Discussion Odeh argues that most of the counts charged in the Indictment must be dismissed by this Court because they are based on statutes that are inapplicable to the acts he is alleged to have performed. In support of this position, Odeh advances six arguments, which we address seriatim. I. Extraterritorial Application Odeh argues that Counts 5-8, 11-237, and 240-244 must be dismissed because (a) they concern acts allegedly performed by Odeh and his co-defendants outside United States territory, yet (b) are based on statutes that were not intended by Congress to regulate conduct outside United States territory. More specifically, Odeh argues that “the following statutes that form the basis for the indictment fail clearly and unequivocally to regulate the conduct of foreign nationals for conduct outside the territorial boundaries of the United States: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 930; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 844; 18 U.S.C. § 1111; 18 U.S.C. § 2155; 18 U.S.C. § 1114; [18 U.S.C. § 924(c);] and 18 U.S.C. § 114.” Odeh’s Memo, at 7. Whether Congress intended several of these provisions (viz., Sections 844(f), (h), and (n); 930(c), and 2155) to apply extra-territorially present issues of first impression. A. General Principles of Extraterritorial Application It is well-established that Congress has the power to regulate conduct performed outside United States territory. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d 274 (1991) (“Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.”). It is equally well-established, however, that courts are to presume that Congress has not exercised this power — i.e., that statutes apply only to acts performed within United States territory — unless Congress manifests an intent to reach acts performed outside United States territory. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188, 113 S.Ct. 2549, 125 L.Ed.2d 128 (1993) (“Acts of Congress normally do not have extraterritorial application unless such an intent is clearly manifested.”); Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 69 S.Ct. 575, 93 L.Ed. 680 (1949)) (“It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’ ”). This “clear manifestation” requirement does not require that extraterritorial coverage should be found only if the statute itself explicitly provides for extraterritorial application. Rather, courts should consider “all available evidence about the meaning” of the statute, e.g., its text, structure, and legislative history. Sale, 509 U.S. at 177, 113 S.Ct. 2549; See also Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201-03, 113 S.Ct. 1178, 122 L.Ed.2d 548 (1993) (examining text, structure, and legislative history). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has established a limited exception to this standard approach for “criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers, or agents.” United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98, 43 S.Ct. 39, 67 L.Ed. 149 (1922). As regards statutes of this type, courts may infer the requisite intent “from the nature of the offense” described in the statute, and thus need not examine its legislative history. Id. The Court further observed that “to limit the[ ] locus [of such a statute] to the strictly territorial jurisdiction [of the United States] would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at home.” Id. Boioman concerned a statute making it illegal knowingly to “presentí ] a false claim against the United States, ... to any officer of the civil, military or naval service or to any department thereof....” Id. at 101, 43 S.Ct. 39 (emphasis added). In concluding that Congress intended this statue to apply extraterritorially, the Court reasoned that it “cannot [be] suppose[d] that when Congress enacted the statute or amended it, it did not have in mind that a wide field for such frauds upon the Government was in private and public vessels of the United States on the high seas and in foreign ports beyond the land jurisdiction of the United States.... ” Id. at 102, 43 S.Ct. 89. Odeh argues that Bowman is “not controlling precedent” because it “involved the application of [a] penal statute[ ] to United States citizens,” i.e., not to foreign nationals such as himself. Odeh’s Memo, at 17. This argument is unavailing for three reasons. First, although Bowman “is expressly limited by its facts to prosecutions of United States citizens,” Odeh’s Reply Memo, at 3 (emphasis added), its underlying rationale is not dependant on the nationality of the offender. Rather, Bowman rests on two factors: (1) the right of the United States to protect itself from harmful conduct — irrespective of the locus of this conduct, and (2) the presumption that Congress would not both (a) enact a statute designed to serve this protective function, and — where the statute proscribes acts that could just as readily be performed outside the United States as within it — (b) undermine this protective intention by limiting the statute’s application to United States territory. Given that foreign nationals are in at least as good a position to perform extraterritorial conduct as are United States nationals, it would make little sense to restrict such statutes to United States nationals. To paraphrase Bowman, “to limit [a statute’s coverage to United States nationals] would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed [by foreign nationals] as [by United States nationals].” Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98, 43 S.Ct. 39. Second, the Courts of Appeals — focusing on Bowman’s general rule rather than its peculiar facts — have applied this rule to reach conduct by foreign nationals on foreign soil. For example, the Court of Appeals for this Circuit has held that 18 U.S.C. § 1546, which criminalizes the making of false statements with respect to travel documents, was intended by Congress to apply extraterritorially to the conduct of foreign nationals. See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936, 88 S.Ct. 2306, 20 L.Ed.2d 1395 (1968); see also United States v. Larsen, 952 F.2d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir.1991) (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) — possession of narcotics with intent to distribute); United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir.1986) (same); United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1088 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 154, 83 L.Ed.2d 92 (1984) (same); United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137, 105 S.Ct. 2679, 86 L.Ed.2d 698 (1985) (18 U.S.C. § 2112 — theft of personal property of the United States); United States v. Zehe, 601 F.Supp. 196, 200 (D.Mass.1985) (18 U.S.C. §§ 792-799 — espionage). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has held that one of the statutes targeted by Odeh, viz., 18 U.S.C. § 1114 — which penalizes murder and attempted murder of officers and employees of the United States — applies to conduct by foreign nationals on foreign soil. See Benitez, 741 F.2d at 1317. Correlatively, no court, to date, has refused to apply the Bcnvman rule on the ground that the defendant was a foreign national. Third, the irrelevance of the defendant’s nationality to the Bowman rule is reinforced by a consideration of the relationship between this rule and the principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction recognized by international law. Under international law, the primary basis of jurisdiction is the “subjective territorial principle,” under which “a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ... conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory.” Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402(l)(a) (1987); see also Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law 47-50 (2d ed.1999). International law recognizes five other principles of jurisdiction by which a state may reach conduct outside its territory: (1) the objective territorial principle; (2) the protective principle; (3) the nationality principle; (4) the passive personality principle; and (5) the universality principle. See id. at 50-81. The objective territoriality principle provides that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to “conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.” Restatement § 402(l)(c). The protective principle provides that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to “certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.” Id. § 402(3) (emphasis added). The nationality principle provides that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to “the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory.” Id. § 402(2). The passive personality principle provides that “a state may apply law — particularly criminal law — to an act committed outside its territory by a person not its national where the victim of the act was its national.”. Id. § 402, cmt. g. The universality principle provides that, “[a] state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism,” regardless of the locus of their occurrence. Id. § 404 (emphasis added). Because Congress has the power to override international law if it so chooses, see United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C.Cir.1991); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.1945); Restatement § 402, cmt. i., none of these five principles places ultimate limits on Congress’s power to reach extraterritorial conduct. At the same time, however, “[i]n determining whether a statute applies extraterritorially, [courts] presume that Congress does not intend to violate principles of international law .... [and] in the absence of an explicit Congressional directive, courts do not give extraterritorial effect to any statute that violates principles of international law.” United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839 (9th Cir.1994) (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22, 83 S.Ct. 671, 9 L.Ed.2d 547 (1963)). Hence, courts that find that a given statute applies extra-territorially typically pause to note that this finding is consistent with one or more of the five principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law. See, e.g., United States v. MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.1998), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 318, 145 L.Ed.2d 114 (1999) (objective territorial principle); Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d at 841 (objective territoriality principle, protective principle, and universality principle); United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1205-1206 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 906, 113 S.Ct. 2332, 124 L.Ed.2d 244 (1993) (objective territoriality principle, protective principle, and passive personality principle); Benitez, 741 F.2d at 1316 (protective principle and passive personality principle); Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 11 (protective principle). The Bowman rule would appear to be most directly related to the protective principle, which, as noted, explicitly authorizes a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over “conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals.” Restatement § 402(3). Hence, an application of the Bowman rule that results in the extraterritorial application of a statute to the conduct of foreign nationals is consistent with international law. Therefore, it is not surprising that the lower courts have shown no hesitation to apply the Bowman rule in cases involving foreign defendants. Odeh attempts to distinguish the preceding lower federal court cases — with the exception of Benitez — by arguing that they concern a special category of “inherently extraterritorial” statutes. Odeh’s Reply Memo, at 7. Such statutes “regulate activities that routinely occur on the high seas or on foreign soil.” Id. at 8 (citing Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 8). According to Odeh, none of the statutes which he challenges, viz., 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(f), (h), and (n), 924(c), 980, 1111, 7, 114, 1114, and 2155 — with the possible exception of Section 2155 — fall into this category. See id. at 10. Rather, these statutes are “inherently domestic,” “bereft of any reference to extraterritorial acts,” and “lack any connection to international activities.” Id. This attempt to distinguish the preceding lower federal court cases fails for two reasons. First, it fails for basically the same reason that Odeh’s attempt to distinguish Bowman itself fails: It fixates-on the peculiar facts of these cases rather than on the underlying Bowman rationale on which the courts base their respective holdings. Again, this rationale depends in no way on the nationality of the perpetrator. Rather, it depends on the right of the United States to defend itself from harmful conduct regardless of its locus, and a presumption that Congress would not undercut the effectiveness of statutes intended to serve this protective purpose by limited them to United States territory and United States nationals. Second, as detailed below, most of the statutes targeted by Odeh are more clearly designed to protect the United States than is the drug smuggling statute, viz., 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), that is on Odeh’s list of “inherently extraterritorial” statutes; and, similarly, most of these statutes protect United States interests that are arguably of more importance than the interest protected by the fraudulent visa application statute, viz., 18 U.S.C. § 1546, which is likewise on that list. Surely it would be an anomalous state of affairs if, on the one hand, a statute that provides merely that “it shall be unlawful ... to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance,” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), were an “inherently extraterritorial” statute; while, on the other hand, a statute that makes it unlawful to “kill or attempt to kill any officer or employee of the United States,” 18 U.S.C. § 1114, were an “inherently domestic” statute. Yet it is precisely this anomalous state of affairs that Odeh invites this Court to establish. We decline to do so. A final general principle that bears on Odeh’s motion provides that a statute that is ancillary to a substantive offense statute will be presumed to have extraterritorial effect if the underlying substantive statute is first determined to have extraterritorial effect. See Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d at 1204-05 (18 U.S.C. § 3 — accessory after the fact); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031, 105 S.Ct. 1403, 84 L.Ed.2d 790 (1985) (21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 963 — conspiracy and attempt; “This court has ... regularly inferred extraterritorial reach of conspiracy statutes on the basis of a finding that the underlying substantive statutes reach extraterritorial offenses.”); United States v. Yousef, 927 F.Supp. 673, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (18 U.S.C. § 371 — conspiracy directed against the United States; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)— using or carrying a firearm in connection with another felony). B. 18 U.S.C. §§ 844, 924, 930, 1114, and 2155 In light of the preceding general principles, we find that Congress intended each of the following statutory provisions to reach conduct by foreign nationals on foreign soil: 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1), (f)(3), (h) and (n); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); 18 U.S.C. § 930(c); 18 U.S.C. § 1114; and 18 U.S.C. § 2155. We consider each in turn. 1. 18 U.S.C. § 844(f), (h), and (n) The Indictment predicates Count 5 on 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(f) and (n); Counts 7 and 8 on 18 U.S.C. § 844(f), and Count 242 on 18 U.S.C. § 844(h). Subsection 844(f)(1) provides: Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other personal or real property in whole or in part owned or possessed by, or leased to, the United States, or any department or agency thereof, shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years, fined under this title, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1). Given (i) that this provision is explicitly intended to protect United States property, (ii) that a significant amount of United States property is located outside the United States, and (iii) that, accordingly, foreign nationals are in at least as good a position as are United States nationals to damage such property, we find, under Bowman, that Congress intended Section 844(f)(1) to apply extra-territorially — irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator. Subsection 844(f)(3) provides: Whoever engages in conduct prohibited by this subsection [ (f) ], and as a result of such conduct directly or proximately causes the death of any person, including any public safety officer performing duties, shall be subject to the death penalty, or imprisoned for not less than 20 years or for life, fined under this title, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(3). Given that this provision is dependent on Subsection 844(f)(1), our determination that Congress intended that Subsection to apply extraterritoriality — irrespective of the nationality of the offender, leads us to conclude that Congress likewise intended this Subsection to apply extra territorially — irrespective of the nationality of the offender. Subsection 844(h) provides in relevant part: 18 U.S.C. § 844(h). The underlying substantive felony provision on which the Indictment predicates this ancillary provision is 18 U.S.C. § 2832(b). Section 2832(b) provides in relevant part that “[w]hoever outside the United States ... engages in a conspiracy to Mll[ ] a national of the United States shall [be punished as further provided].” 18 U.S.C. § 2382(b) (emphasis added). Because (i) Congress explicitly intended Section 2332(b) to apply extrater-ritorially, and (ii) foreign nationals are in at least as good a position as are United States national to engage in extraterritorial conspiracies to kill United States nationals, we find that Congress intended it to apply to foreign national offenders. Accordingly, we find that Section 844(h) likewise applies extraterritorially — irrespective of the nationality of the offender. Whoever (1) uses fire or an explosive to commit any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, or (2) carries an explosive during the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, including a felony which provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years. Subsection 844(n) provides in relevant part that “a person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this chapter shall be subject to the same penalties (other than the penalty of death) as the penalties prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C. § 844(n). The Indictment predicates this conspiracy provision on Subsections 844(f)(1) and (f)(3). As we have already concluded that those Subsections apply extraterritorially — irrespective of the nationality of the offender, we readily conclude that Subsection 844(n) likewise applies extraterritorially — irrespective of the nationality of the offender. Odeh advances two arguments in opposition to these conclusions about the extraterritorial reach of the preceding subsections of Section 844. First, he argues that Congress’s subsequent enactment of legislation similar to Section 844, but which'— unlike Section 844 — explicitly provides for extraterritorial application, indicates that Congress did not intend Section 844 to apply extraterritorially. Specifically, Odeh argues that, as 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(3) “penalizes the use of explosives against ... property ‘owned, leased, or used,’ by the United States [located abroad],” Odeh’s Memo, at 9 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(3)), “.... [s]urely[ ] Congress would not have felt the need to pass separate legislation penalizing the use of explosives against United States nationals abroad, if 18 U.S.C. § 844 applied extra-territorially.” Id. We find this argument unpersuasive. The argument appears to envision the following scenario: Wishing to prosecute bombings of federal property overseas, but aware that Section 844(f) applies only to bombings in the United States, Congress was forced to enact a separate statute, which, though covering basically the same conduct as 844(f), applies extraterritorially. Given the similarity of the two statutes, however, one wonders why Congress would not simply have amended Section 844(f) by specifying that it applies extra-territorially, or, alternatively, repeal Section 844(f) when it enacted Section 2332a(a)(3). The obvious explanation for why Congress took neither of these actions is that there are important substantive differences between Section 844(f) and Section 2332a(a)(3). The latter covers threats and conspiracies to damage United States property whereas the former does not. The former covers the use of fire for the purpose of damaging United States property whereas the latter does not. The latter covers biological weapons whereas the former does not. The former provides for fines whereas the latter does not. Hence, Congress had numerous reasons to enact Section 2332a(a)(3) other than a supposed need to cure Section 844(f)’s unfor-túnate “intraterritoriality.” Cf. Larsen, 952 F.2d at 1101 (reasoning, in regard to two statutes whose relationship parallels the relationship between Sections 844(1) and 2332a(a)(3), that, because “the two statutes [did not] ha[ve] precisely the same provisions, beyond the extraterritoriality issue, ... [these] other differences between the statutes ... can explain Congress’ intent in enacting [the later of the two].”). This said, the question remains why, given the similarity between the two statutes, Congress, at the time it enacted Section 2332a(a)(3), did not bother to make explicit Section 844(f)’s extraterritoriality — especially in light of the fact that Congress amended Section 844(f) in the very act in which Section 2332a(a)(3) was added to Title 18. See Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. 103-322, Title VI, § 320106, 108 Stat. 1769, 2111. The Government’s proposed explanation for this omission is that “Congress is ... well aware that under Bowman and its progeny, it [is] not required to explicitly spell out its intent when the nature of the conduct covered by Section [844(f) ] re-flectes] necessarily its intent to apply to foreign conduct.” Gov’t Memo, at 21. The problem with this explanation is that it does not really account for the difference between Congress’s handling of the two statutes. Congress could have relied on Bowman for Section 2332a(a)(3) just as much as it supposedly relied on Bowman for Section 844(f). Congress chose not to rely on Bowman for Section 2332a(a)(3), presumably, because it wanted to leave no doubt that it intended this statute to apply extraterritorially. But then why didn’t Congress likewise make Section 844(f)’s extraterritoriality explicit? A more plausible explanation is that Congress’s enactment of Section 2332a(a)(3) was carried out without concern about its relation to Section 844(f). And this is just to say that Congress’s disparate treatment of these two provisions has little bearing on the issue of Section 844(f)’s extraterritoriality. In short, we find Odeh’s speculations about the relation between these two statutes insufficient to overcome our conclusion — based on Bowman — that Congress intended Section 844(f) to apply extraterri-torially. This brings us to Odeh’s second argument. Odeh points out that “[t]he Second Circuit has recognized ... that ‘congressional consideration of an issue in one context, but not another, in the same or similar statutes, implies that Congress intends to include that issue only where it has so indicated.’ ” Odeh’s Reply Memo, at 13 (quoting United States v. Azeem, 946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir.1991)) (emphasis added by Odeh). Given (i) that Section 844(f) and Section 2332a(a) are indeed very similar, and (ii) that the latter expressly provides for extraterritorial application, whereas the former does not, courts should presume that Congress did not intend Section 844(f) to apply extraterritorially. This second argument is potentially more powerful than Odeh’s first argument because it rests on an interpretive presumption rule, and thus does not require speculation about Congress’s motives (as does his first argument). Indeed, if the Azeem rule were the only interpretive presumption rule applicable to Section 844(f), Odeh’s second argument would be quite persuasive. But of course there is a second interpretive presumption rule applicable to Section 844(f): the Bowman rule. Given that the respective applications of these two rules to Section 844(f) yield irreconcilable conclusions about its coverage of extraterritorial conduct, the question becomes which of these two rules should be accorded precedence. “[I]t is a traditional maxim of interpretation that specific rules control over general rules.” Apostolic Pentecostal Church v. Colbert, 169 F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir.1999) (citing Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758, 81 S.Ct. 864, 6 L.Ed.2d 72 (1961)). The Azeem rule appears to be entirely general, applying to any and all “issues” that may be considered by Congress for inclusion within any and all types of statutes. The Bowman rule, in contrast, applies primarily to criminal statutes, see Kollias v. D & G Marine Maintenance, 29 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1146, 115 S.Ct. 1092, 130 L.Ed.2d 1061 (1995) (finding that “Boioman should be read narrowly [such that] .... only criminal statutes, and perhaps only those relating to the Government’s power to prosecute wrongs committed against it, are exempt from the presumption” of intrater-ritoriality), and only to a single issue that may be considered for inclusion within such statutes: extraterritorial application. Given that Section 844(f) is a criminal statute, and that we are here considering the issue of its extraterritorial application, the Bowman rule controls. Therefore, our conclusion — based on the Bowman rule— that Section 844(f) applies extraterritorially survives Odeh’s second argument as well. 2. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) The Indictment predicates Counts 243 and 244 on Section 924(c). Section 924(c). Section 924(c) provides in relevant part: [A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall [be punished as further provided].... The Indictment predicates this ancillary provision on Subsections 844(f)(1) and (f)(3). Having concluded that Congress intended those Subsections to apply extra-territorially — irrespective of the nationality of the offender, we conclude that this ancillary provision likewise applies extra-territorially — irrespective of the nationality of the offender. 3. 18 U.S.C. § 930(c) The Indictment predicates Counts 11-233 on Subsection 930(c). Subsection 930(c) provides that “[a] person who kills or attempts to kill any person in the course of a violation of subsection (a) or (b), or in the course of an attack on a Federal facility involving the use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, shall be punished [as further provided].” 18 U.S.C. § 930(c). A “Federal facility” is defined as “a building or part thereof owned or leased by the Federal Government, where Federal employees are regularly present for the purpose of performing their official duties.” 18 U.S.C. § 930(g)(1). Given (i) that this provision is explicitly intended to protect vital United States interests, (ii) that a significant number of Federal facilities are located outside the United States, and (iii) that, accordingly, foreign nationals are in at least as good a position as are United States nationals to attack Federal facilities, we find, under Bowman, that Congress intended this provision to apply extraterritorially — irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator. Odeh argues that (i) because Section 930(c) was added to Section 930 by Title VI, Section 60014 of the Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1973, and (ii) because Title VI “contained several statutory provisions that expressly provided for extraterritorial jurisdiction,” it follows that “Congress’s failure to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction in” Section 930(c) means that Congress did not intend that it apply extraterritorially. Odeh’s Memo, at 10-11. As Odeh suggests in his Reply Memorandum, this argument involves an application of the Azeem rule. See Odeh’s Reply Memo, at 12-14. Having concluded, in Subsection I.B.1 above, that the Bowman rule trumps the Azeem rule when the statute is criminal and the issue is extraterritorial application, we find that this argument cannot overcome our earlier conclusion — based on the Bowman rule — that Section 930(c) applies extrater-ritorially. 4. 18 U.S.C. § 1114 The Indictment predicates Counts 236 and 237 on Section 1114. Section 1114 provides in relevant part: Whoever kills or attempts to kill any officer or employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of the United States Government (including any member of the uniformed services) while such officer or employee is engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties, or any person assisting such an officer or employee in the performance of such duties or on account of that assistance, shall be punished .... 18 U.S.C. § 1114. Given (i) that this provision is explicitly intended to protect vital United States interests, (ii) that a significant number of United States officers and employees perform their official duties in places outside the United States, and (iii) that, accordingly, foreign nationals are in at least as good a position as are United States nationals to kill or attempt to kill United States officers and employees, we concur with the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the offense described by Section 1114 is “exactly the type of crime that Congress must have intended to apply extraterritorially’,’ — irrespective of the nationality of the offender. Benitez, 741 F.2d at 1317. Odeh argues that this conclusion is belied by Section 1114’s legislative history. Specifically, Odeh points out that, “[i]n 1996, Congress amended § 1114, [by] omitting [a] list of [specific types of] federal employees encompassed by the statute, and replacing it with the general language” quoted above. Odeh’s Memo, at 18 (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, Title VII, Subtitle B, § 727(a), 110 Stat. 1302). Furthermore, “at the same time it amended § 1114, in the same piece of legislation, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 1116, dealing with the murder or manslaughter of internationally protected persons,” id., by adding the following subsection: (c) If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an internationally protected person outside the United States, the United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if (1) the victim is a representative, officer, employee, or agent of the United States, (2) an offender is a national of the United States, or (3) an offender is afterwards found in the United States.... § 721(c), 110 Stat. at 1298 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1116(c)). Odeh argues that, “[sjince all embassy employees are internationally protected persons, and [thus] are within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1116(c), Congress had no need to include embassy employees abroad within the framework of 18 U.S.C. § 1114.” Odeh’s Memo, at 19. This argument is reminiscent of Odeh’s first argument concerning Section 844(f), albeit with one important difference: Whereas the conclusion of that argument is that Section 844(f) in toto does not apply extraterritorially, the conclusion of this argument is merely that Section 1114 does not apply to a narrow category of ex-traterritorially located employees, viz., embassy employees. The much more limited scope of the latter argument is presumably due to the fact that Sections 1114 and 1116 are even less similar to each other than are Sections 844(f) and 2332a(a)(3). Specifically, Section 1116 appears to apply to a relatively small subset of the broad class of United States employees and officers covered by Section 1114. Of course this means that the two statutes overlap to a considerable extent, and it is thus theoretically possible that Congress — despite having chosen to use broad and inclusive language in Section 1114 — intended to exclude a single subset of the class of United States employees, viz., embassy employees. A court would only be justified in concluding that this was Congress’s actual intention, however, on the basis of particularized evidence of this intention. The mere fact of overlap cannot suffice. Yet Odeh’s argument basically relies on this mere fact. Hence, our conclusion that Congress intended Section 1114 to apply extraterritorially is unaffected by Odeh’s argument. 5. 18 U.S.C. § 2155 The Indictment predicates Count 6 on Section 2155(a) and (b). Subsection 2155(a) provides: Whoever, with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of the United States, willfully injures, destroys, contaminates or infects, or attempts to so injure, destroy, contaminate or infect any national-defense material, national-defense premises, or national-defense utilities, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2155(a). Given (i) that this provision is explicitly intended to protect vital United States interests, (ii) that a significant number of national-defense premises and utilities are located outside the United States, and (iii) that, accordingly, foreign nationals are in at least as good a position as are United States nationals to injure such premises and utilities, we find, under Bowman, that Congress intended it to apply extraterritorially — irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator. Subsection 2155(b) provides that “[i]f two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be punished as provided in subsection (a) of this section.” Because this conspiracy provision is ancillary to Subsection 2155(a), our finding that that Subsection applies extraterritorially — irrespective of the nationality of the offender — leads us to conclude that this Subsection likewise applies extraterritorially — irrespective of the nationality of the offender. C. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and 114 In contrast to our assessment of the preceding five statutes, we find that neither 18 U.S.C. § 1111 nor 18 U.S.C. § 114 applies to the extraterritorial conduct alleged in the counts predicated on these statutes. We consider each statute in turn. i. is u.s.c. § mi Counts 234 and 285 of the Indictment are predicated on 18 U.S.C. § 1111. Section 1111(a) defines murder in the first and second degrees. Section 1111(b) specifies the penalties for each of these two types of murder, and limits the reach of Section 1111 to murders committed “[w]ithin the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b). The “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7. Among other places, this realm of special jurisdiction includes [a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building. 18 U.S.C. § 7(3). Odeh confines his attention to Section 7(3), arguing, on a number of grounds, that it “do[es] not extend federal court jurisdiction to acts occurring in foreign countries,” including, especially, United States embassy premises. Odeh’s Memo at 12 (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Government’s response to this position consists of two, seemingly independent arguments. One of these arguments likewise focuses on Section 7(3), i.e., on the meaning of “the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” The Government bases this argument almost entirely on United States v. Erdos, in which the Fourth Circuit held that “18 U.S.C. § 7(3) is a proper grant of ‘special’ jurisdiction embracing an embassy in a foreign country acquired for the use of the United States and under its concurrent jurisdiction.” 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876, 94 S.Ct. 42, 38 L.Ed.2d 122 (1973). The Government’s second argument consists in the (now familiar) application of the Bowman rule. The specific target of the Government’s Bowman analysis is unclear, however. At times, the Government appears to be focusing on Section 1111(a), i.e., on the substantive offense of murder. At other times, however, the focus appears to be Section 7(3). We consider these two arguments in reverse order. a. The Bowman Argument We consider first the Government’s (apparent) attempt to apply the Bowman rule to Section 7(3). As noted, Bowman established that, as regards a certain class of criminal statutes, Congress need not “make specific provision in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense.” 260 U.S. at 98, 43 S.Ct. 39 (emphasis added). It is evident that this rule of statutory interpretation can only be applied to statutory provisions that describe particular criminal offenses. Section 7(3), however, is not a statutory provision of this type. Instead, it specifies locations within which particular offenses may be committed. Hence, it simply makes no sense for a court to ask if it can be inferred, from “the nature of the offense” described in Section 7(3), that Congress intended for the courts to have jurisdiction over instances of this offense committed “out side [sic] of the strict territorial jurisdiction” of the United States. Id. at 98, 43 S.Ct. 39. Presented with the task of interpreting Section 7(3), a court— rather than focusing on the nature of an offense — must simply determine the meaning of expressions such as “lands ... under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the United States.” This brings us to the Government’s (apparent) attempt to apply the Bowman rule directly to Section 1111(a), i.e., to the offense of murder. At first sight, it might be thought that this provision — unlike Section 7(3) — is susceptible to a Bowman analysis. It makes sense to ask whether congressional intent to apply a murder statute to murders committed beyond United States territory can be inferred from the nature of the offense of murder. Section 1111, however, does not merely define the offenses of first and second degree murder, and then specify the penalties for each of these two types of murder. If this were all it did, then Bowman would be relevant. The actual Section 1111, however, includes its own jurisdictional element, viz., 1111(b) — which limits Section 1111 as a whole to murders committed “[w]ithin the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Hence, it is misguided to attempt to apply Boivman to Section 1111(a). Presented with the question of whether Section 1111 applies to a particular murder, a court must determine whether this murder was committed “[wjithin the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Answering this question requires the court to determine the correct interpretation of Section 7(3). And, as noted, it makes no sense to suggest that Bowman’s rule of interpretation can be used for this latter purpose. b. The Erdos Precedent Erdos concerned the killing, in the American Embassy in the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, of one American citizen by a second American citizen. Id. at 158. As noted, Erdos held that “18 U.S.C. § 7(3) is a proper grant of ‘special’ territorial jurisdiction embracing an embassy in a foreign country acquired for the use of the United States and under its concurrent jurisdiction.” Id. at 160. Unfortunately, the reasoning upon which the Court based this holding is elliptical and disjointed. The Court devoted most of its attention to a determination of the relationship between the third phrase of § 7(3) (viz., “any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building”) and the first two phrases of Section 7(3) (viz., “[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof’). The Court (correctly) determined that “the third phrase is independent of and does not modify the first two [such that] the sentence describes two kinds of places within the ‘special’ jurisdiction of the United States.” 474 F.2d at 159. Putting this determination together with the (correct) determination that the third phrase refers to places “within the United States,” the Court (apparently) inferred that the first two phrases refer to places outside the United States. Id. Given that United States embassies are located outside the United States, the Court was thus able to conclude that United States embassies are within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States. As for the Court’s holding that United States embassies are under the concurrent jurisdiction of the United States Government, this appears to be based on the Court’s determination that the United States “exercises practical dominion” over its embassies, which determination appears to be based, in turn, on the court’s belief that embassies are “ ‘part of the territory of the United States of America.’ ” Id. at 159 (quoting United States v. Archer, 51 F.Supp. 708, 709 (S.D.Cal.1943)). We do not agree with Erdos ’ holding for three reasons. First, Erdos ’ view that the first two phrases of Section 7(3) refer to places outside of United States territory is supported neither by the legislative history of Section 7(3) and its precursors,, nor by the (closely related) history of judicial interpretation of these statutes. This legislative and interpretive history indicates that Congress intended these first two phrases to refer to places within United States territory. The ultimate source of Section 7(3) is Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution, which provides: The Congress shall have Power ... To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings .... U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Clause 17 was the primary basis of the oldest of Section 7(3)’s statutory antecedents, viz., several provisions of the Act of April 30, 1790, entitled “An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States.” Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. at L. 112. Section 3 of that Act, for example, provided “that if any person or persons shall, within any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, commit the crime of wilful murder, such person or persons on being thereof convicted shall suffer death.” See United States v. Guiteau, 12 D.C. 498 (1882) (“It will be observed that, in designating the places in which the commission of murder should be deemed a crime against the United States, the legislature employed substantially, and to some extent, precisely the language found in [Clause 17] which conferred upon it the power to exercise exclusive legislation over certain places.”). This 1790 antecedent of Section 7(3) remained in force until 1874, when it was codified — and, in the process, slightly altered — as Section 5339 of Chapter Three, Title 70 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Chapter Three was entitled, “Crimes Arising within the Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States.” Section 5339 provided in relevant part that “[e]very person who commits murder — First. Within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Untied States ... shall suffer death.” 70 Rev.Stat., ch. 3, § 5339 (1874). See United States v. Hewecker, 79 F. 59, 63 (S.D.N.Y.1896) (“The first clause of [Section 5339] is the same as section 3 of the act of 1790.... ”). Section 5339 then served as the basis of the immediate precursor of Section 7(3), viz., Section 272(3) of the Act of March 4, 1909 — “An Act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws of the United States.” Section 272(3) differed from Section 7(3) only in not including a reference to concurrent jurisdiction. Specifically, it provided that the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States included any lands reserved or acquired for the exclusive use of the United States, and under the exclusive jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, dockyard, or other needful building. Act of March 4, 1909, c. 321, § 272, 35 Stat. 1143. (In this version of the provision, the influence of Clause 17 is even more evident than it was in the previous two versions.) Finally, the Act of June 11, 1940, c. 323, 54 Stat. 304, amended the 1909 version by striking ‘exclusive’ from the first phrase and inserting ‘or concurrent’ between ‘exclusive’ and ‘jurisdiction’ in the second phrase. No further changes have been made. As suggested by the strong influence exerted by Clause 17 on this series of jurisdictional statutes, judicial interpretation of Clause 17 has likewise influenced the interpretation of these statutes. Historically, the most important interpretive question raised by Clause 17 has been whether, as regards lands that are purchased by the consent of the States, the Federal Government must exercise exclusive jurisdiction over such lands; or, viewed from the opposite perspective, the question has been whether the States are prohibited from retaining concurrent jurisdiction over the lands transferred to the Federal Government. Strictly construed, Clause 17 appears to permit the Federal Government to acquire — and the State to relinquish — concurrent as well as exclusive jurisdiction. Clause 17 merely grants Congress the power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over lands acquired by consent of the states. Given that a State could refuse to sell the land — such that the Federal Government could exercise no jurisdiction over it whatsoever — it would seem to follow that the State has the power to place conditions on its agreement to sell the land in question. Until well into the Twentieth Century, however, this is not the construction of Clause 17 favored by the courts. Prior to 1885, several lower federal courts had even held that Clause 17 “prescribes the only mode by which [the United States] can acquire land as a sovereign power; and therefore they hold only as an individual when they obtain it in any other manner.” United States v. Penn, 48 F. 669, 670 (C.C.E.D.Va.1880) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Tierney, 28 F.Cas. 159, 160 (C.C.S.D.Ohio 1864) (stating that consent of the state legislature is “essential to the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction by the United States”). In Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, however, the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, and put in place the interpretation that would hold sway until well into the Twentieth Century. Specifically, the Court held that “[w]hen the title is acquired by purchase by consent of the legislatures of the states, the federal jurisdiction is exclusive of all state authority.” 114 U.S. 525, 532, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264 (1885) (emphasis added). The Court made clear, however, that this is not the exclusive procedure by which the United States may acquire exclusive jurisdiction over land located within the States. The United States may also reserve exclusive jurisdiction over such land at the time a state is admitted into the Union. See 114 U.S. at 526, 5 S.Ct. 995 (“Congress might, undoubtedly, upon such admission, ... stipulate! ] for retention of the political authority, dominion, and legislative power of the United States over the reservation.... ”). This reigning interpretation came to an end in 1937, when the Supreme Court, in James v. Dravo Contracting Company, 302 U.S. 134, 148-50, 58 S.Ct. 208, 82 L.Ed. 155 (1937), held that Clause 17 permits the United States to acquire merely concurrent jurisdiction over lands purchased by consent of the States. Keeping this history of the judicial interpretation of Clause 17 in mind, we now take a closer look at Section 7(3) and its precursors. The first thing to note about the (nearly identical) 1790 and 1874 precursors of Section 7(3) is that they are consistent with the then reigning judicial interpretation of Clause 17. The grammatical structure of these provisions clearly indicates that the Federal Government is presumed to have exclusive jurisdiction over forts, arsenals, dockyard, and magazines — the very types of facilities mentioned by Clause 17. Second, each of these provisions implicitly described two distinct categories of lands over which the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction: those acquired in the manner provided for in Clause 17, and those acquired in other ways. Third, each of the provisions limited the Federal Government’s exercise of legislative jurisdiction to lands over which the Federal Government had exclusive jurisdiction. This fact virtually guarantees that neither of these provisions was intended by Congress to extend to offenses committed in foreign territory. It is inconceivable that those earlier Congresses believed that the United States had exclusive jurisdiction over any parcel of foreign territory. Indeed, the then reigning interpretation of Clause 17 appears to have stemmed from a fundamental presupposition of those times — one that was not to be relinquished until 1937 in Dravo: that a government has the authority to exercise legislative jurisdiction over a given piece of land only if it has exclusive jurisdiction thereof. See The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812) (Marshall, C.J.) (“The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.”). This brings us to the 1909 precursor of Section 7(3), viz., Section 272(3) of the Act of March 4, 1909. The first thing to notice about this provision is that it made much more explicit the fact — implicit in the two earlier provisions — that there are two basic categories of land in the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States: those acquired in accordance with the procedure specified in Clause 17, and those acquired in other ways. Second, and more important, the language alone of Section 272(3) — unlike the language of the two earlier versions— does not strictly specify that all the covered lands must be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Rather, although Section 272(3) specifies that lands acquired in ways other than that provided for in Clause 17 must be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, the third phrase, which concerns lands acquired as provided for in Clause 17, contains no such “exclusive jurisdiction” requirement. Hence, it is theoretically possible that the 60th Congress intended this phrase to cover lands over which the United States exercises only concurrent jurisdiction. There is a fatal flaw in this suggestion, however: Such an interpretation of the third phrase would be inconsistent with the reigning interpretation of Clause 17. Indeed, in light of this reigning interpretation — not to mention the fundamental presupposition (on which that interpretation was based) that legislative jurisdiction based on land requires exclusive jurisdiction — it is far more likely that a reference to exclusive jurisdiction was omitted from the third phrase because everyone assumed that lands acquired by the consent of the states were necessarily under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Correlatively, the 60th Congress included an exclusive jurisdiction requirement in the first part of Section 272(3) (pertaining to lands acquired by means other than that provided for in Clause 17) precisely because there existed for such lands no equivalent of the reigning interpretation of Clause 17. In sum, Section 272(3), like its two predecessors, limited legislative jurisdiction by the Federal Government to lands over which the Federal Government enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction. Therefore, it no more concerned lands in foreign territory than did its two predecessors. We come, finally, to the 1940 revision of Section 272(3) (viz., Section 7(3) itself)— which, as noted, extended the reach of the statute to lands over which the United States exercises merely concurrent jurisdiction. The House Report concerning this revision explicitly states that the revision was prompted by Dravo’s holding that Clause 17 permits states who consensually transfer lands to the United States to retain concurrent jurisdiction thereof. See H.R.Rep. No. 76-1623, at 1 (1940) (“Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in James v. Dravo Contracting Company (302 U.S. 134, 58 S.Ct. 208, 82 L.Ed. 155) (December 1937), it was the accepted view that the United States acquired exclusive jurisdiction over any lands purchased with the consent of the State for any of the purposes enumerated in article I, section 8, clause 17 of the Constitution, and that any provision of a State statute retaining partial or concurrent jurisdiction was inoperable. In the Dravo case it was held that a State may properly retain partial or concurrent jurisdiction.”) The 76th Congress believed that this holding necessitated a revision of Section 272(3) because it believed that Section 272(3) “limited the criminal jurisdiction of the Federal Government to such Federal reservations in respect to which the United States had acquired exclusive jurisdiction.” Id As such, Section 272(3) would not apply to lands over which the States chose to retain concurrent jurisdiction. Hence, the purpose of the 1940 revision was “simply [to] restore[ ] to the Federal Government the jurisdiction it was recognized as having until the Dravo decision was handed down.” Id. This reference to “restoration” cannot be taken literally. The revision did effect a change. Specifically, “[t]he most significant effect of th[e] bill is to grant Federal courts concurrent criminal jurisdiction on reservations where the United States does not have exclusive jurisdiction.” Id. Hence, in saying that the Bill “restores” to the Federal Government the jurisdiction it had prior to Dravo, the Report appears to be saying that the Federal Government will henceforth be able to exercise legislative jurisdiction over lands acquired by consent of the states where the states retain concurrent jurisdiction — just as it had been able to exercise legislative jurisdiction over lands acquired by consent of the states where the states did not retain concurrent jurisdiction. At the very least, given that Section 272(3) did not apply to lands in foreign territory, if the 76th Congress intended the Bill to extend the reach of that statute to lands in foreign territory, surely it would not have said that the purpose of the Bill was “simply [to] restore[ ]” the jurisdiction the Federal Government had enjoyed prior to Dravo. Nor is there the slightest mention of such an extraterritorial extension in the Act’s legislative history. In sum, the legislative and interpretive history of Section 7(3) strongly supports Odeh’s position that Section 7(3) does not concern lands outside the United States. A second flaw of Erdos ’ handling of Section 7(3) concerns the reasoning supporting the Court’s conclusion that the United States has concurrent jurisdiction over United States embassy premises. This conclusion appears to be based on the Court’s application of the following test: “The test, as to property within or without the United States, is one of practical usage and dominion exercised over the embassy or other federal establishment by the United States Government.” 474 F.2d at 159. Although the Court is silent about the provenance of this test, it appears to be the Court’s own gloss of the “exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction” requirement of the second phrase of Section 7(3). The basic problem with this gloss is that, in light of the preceding account of Sect