Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION BERYL A. HOWELL, District Judge. The plaintiffs, Sharif Mobley and his wife Nzinga Islam, bring these two related actions against four federal government agencies — the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) and the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice — -pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (collectively “FOIA/PA”). The plaintiffs filed FOIA/PA requests seeking access to, inter alia, all records relating to themselves, in an apparent effort to shed light upon the arrest of Mobley in Sana’a, Yemen on January 26, 2010, and his subsequent incarceration there. All four defendants provided final determinations regarding the plaintiffs’ requests, some of which included the release of responsive records to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs now challenge the defendants’ handling of the plaintiffs’ requests on a number of grounds. The defendants contend that they have satisfied their obligations under the FOIA and the Privacy Act, and consequently they have moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims. I.BACKGROUND On January 26, 2010, Mobley was “abducted” from the streets of Sana’a, Yemen and held in the custody of the Yemeni government for several weeks, during which time he was allegedly questioned by U.S. agents and given medical attention for wounds he suffered during his abduction. See Deck of Cori A. Crider (“Crider Deck”) ¶¶ 8-10, 26-41, 47-48, ECF No. 24-1 (No. 11-2072). Mobley “is now alleged to have tried to escape from the Jumhori Hospital where he was held incommunicado, shooting two guards, one fatally.” See id. ¶ 50. Mobley remains in Yemeni custody on murder charges and faces a potential death sentence. See id. ¶ 53. On July 22, 2010, after all of these events transpired, Mobley filed, through counsel, a FOIA/PA request with defendants Department of Defense (or “Defense”), Department of State-(or “State”), and Department of Justice (or “Justice”), as well as to the Department of Homeland Security, which is not a party to these related actions. See Deck of Sheryl L. Walter (“First Walter Deck”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 24 (Aug. 1, 2012) (No. 11-2072); id. Ex. 1, ECF No. 24-1 (No. 11-2072). This request sought records relating to: 1. Mr. Mobley’s abduction from the streets of Sana’a, Yemen on January 26, 2010. 2. U.S. agencies’ involvement in that disappearance. 3. U.S. agencies’ interrogation of Mr. Mobley in incommunicado detention in Yemen, at a time when he was suffering torture and/or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (CIDT). 4. The wider pattern of U.S.-sponsored sweeps and proxy detention in Yemen from January 2010, of which Mr. Mobley’s seizure is a part. First Walter Decl. Ex. 1, at 2. The request clarified that Mobley was requesting “all records in any way relating to, pertaining to, or mentioning himself by any and all persons or entities, including all persons acting on behalf of the United States.” Id. Additionally, the request provided sixteen categories of records intended “to elucidate the sorts of records in the likely possession of the targeted agencies.” Id. These categories included, inter alia, “[a]ny records ... created from November 2009 ... between the federal government and the government of Yemen regarding Mr. Mobley,” including “[rjecords discussing whether Mr. Mobley was a target of intelligence interest” and “[a]ll records created after January 1, 2010, relating to visits of U.S. agents ... to Mr. Mobley” in the hospital or in prison. See id. at 4-5. The July 22, 2010, request also sought expedited processing and a fee waiver. See id. at 6-7. On August 15, 2011, both of the plaintiffs filed a separate FOIA/PA request with the CIA seeking “all Central Intelligence Agency (‘CIA’) records about Mr. Mobley and Ms. Islam.” Supp. Decl. of Michele L. Meeks (“Second Meeks Deck”) Ex. 2, at 1, ECF No. 49-2 (May 25, 2012) (No. 11-2072). This request referred to Mobley’s July 22, 2010 request “only for reference purposes” and clarified that “the scope of this request is for all CIA records about Mr. Mobley and Ms. Islam.” Id. The first agency to respond to the plaintiffs was the CIA. In a letter dated September 20, 2011, the CIA notified the plaintiffs that although, “[a]fter a thorough search of the appropriate records system,” the agency was “able to locate responsive material,” the material “must be denied in its entirety on the basis of ... PA exemptions Cj)(l) and (k)(l), and FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(8).” Second Meeks Deck Ex. 3, at 1, ECF No. 49-3 (No. 11-2072). The CIA’s first letter also stated that “[w]ith respect to responsive records that would reveal a classified connection to the CIA ... the CIA can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to your request.” Id. The CIA’s refusal to confirm or deny the existence of responsive records was “pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3), and PA exemptions (j)(l) and (k)(l).” Id. On January 11, 2012, however, the CIA sent the plaintiffs “amended final response letters,” which clarified that the initial response letter “contained inaccuracies,” and the amended letters “correctly reported that the CIA’s search for records that would reflect an open or otherwise acknowledged connection to Plaintiffs produced no responsive records.” Deck of Michele L. Meeks (“First Meeks Deck”) ¶ 13, ECF No. 39 (May 25, 2012) (No. 11-2072). The next agency to respond to Mobley’s request was the State Department. On December 13, 2011, State granted Mobley’s request for expedited processing. See First Walter Deck ¶ 9. State notified Mobley on February 6, 2012, based upon the nature of the request, that “the offices that were reasonably likely to have responsive documents were the Central Foreign Policy Records, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Office of Passport Services, the Office of Overseas Citizens Services, and the American Embassy in Sana’a.” Id. ¶ 19; see also id. Ex. 8, ECF No. 24-8 (No. 11-2072). Additionally, “based on information from other responsive documents, [State] also subsequently searched the Office of Legal Adviser.” First Walter Decl. ¶ 19. From December 20, 2011 to May 25, 2012, State notified Mobley by letter each time searches of these components had been completed, and State either released the responsive records or notified Mobley of the reason for withholding records or portions thereof. See id. ¶¶ 11-16; see also id. Exs. 7-13, ECF Nos. 24-7 to 24-13 (No. 11-2072). The searches performed by State ultimately yielded 293 total records responsive to Mobley’s request. First Walter Decl. ¶ 35. 165 of these records were released to Mobley in full, 75 of the records were released in part with certain portions redacted, and 42 of the records were withheld in full. Id. The documents that were withheld from release, either in whole or in part, were withheld pursuant to one or more of the following: FOIA Exemptions 1, 5, 6, and 7(C); and PA Exemptions (d)(5), (k)(1), and (k)(2). See id. ¶¶ 36-53. The remaining eleven records were referred to the Department of the Army (in particular the Office of the Provost Marshal General (“OPMG”)) on March 5, 2012, for their review and direct response to Mobley, and all of these eleven records were eventually withheld in full by the OPMG, pursuant to FOIA Exemption 1 and PA Exemption (k)(1). Id. ¶ 35; see also FAC ¶¶ 21-24; Decl. of John G. Hargitt (“First Hargitt Decl.”) ¶¶4, 6, ECF No. 36-1 (June 25, 2012) (No. 11-2072). Mobley also filed a separate FOIA request with the OPMG on June 25, 2012, seeking any responsive records beyond the eleven records that had already been referred by State to the OPMG. See FAC ¶31. In response, the OPMG expedited the request and issued a final determination on July 19, 2012, identifying one responsive record and withholding it in full, pursuant to FOIA Exemption 1 and PA Exemption (k)(l). Id. ¶¶ 31-32; see also Decl. of John G. Hargitt (“Second Hargitt Decl.”) ¶ 6, ECF No. 42-5 (Aug. 30, 2012) (No. 11-2073). The final agencies to provide a final response to Mobley were Defense and Justice. Beginning with Defense, Mobley’s counsel clarified with Defense that he only believed that Defense possessed records responsive to line items 10, 14, and 15 of his FOIA/PA request. See FAC ¶¶ 11-12. Defense then referred this request to the Defense Intelligence Agency (“DIA”), which is a component of Defense and was “most likely ... to have potentially received intelligence reports stemming from the alleged interrogations of Mr. Mobley by ‘Khan from DOD’ or any other government agent or agency.’ ” FAC ¶ 13; see also Decl. of Alesia Y. Williams (“First Williams Decl.”) ¶ 6, ECF No. 20 (June 18, 2012) (No. 11-2073). On May 11, 2011, the DIA granted expedited processing of Mobley’s request because “news articles suggested that plaintiff Sharif Mobley was facing trial in a capital case in Yemen.” First Williams Decl. ¶ 7. The DIA then “conducted a search to determine if [the DIA] was in possession of any open-source news articles that referenced plaintiffs generally or the criminal matter concerning plaintiff Sharif Mobley in Yemen.” Id. ¶8. Although this search yielded responsive records, “these articles were part of the general news monitoring performed by other members of the Intelligence Community” and therefore “the DIA FOIA Office referred each of these open-source news articles to the agency that originated the distribution with the request that the distributor respond directly to the plaintiffs.” Id. Despite the expedited status of Mobley’s request, it was not until May 4, 2012' — -nearly one year after the request was expedited — that the DIA notified Mobley that 41 responsive documents “were referred to another government agency” and that “[t]o the extent that [Mobley] is requesting any intelligence information in the possession of DIA concerning himself or his family, my response is to advise you that DIA can neither confirm nor deny the existence of the requested information.” First Williams Decl. Ex. A at 1, ECF No. 20-1. The 41 responsive records identified by the DIA were located in the Open Source Center (“OSC”) and referred to the CIA on June 17, 2011. See Decl. of Michele L. Meeks (“Third Meeks Decl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 42-1 (Sept. 4, 2012) (11-2073). The OSC “collects, monitors, processes, analyzes, and disseminates publicly available information from primarily foreign sources.” Id. ¶8. Of the 41 documents referred to the CIA, 28 of the documents were released in full, six of the records were referred back to Defense, one record was referred to State, and the CIA withheld the remaining six records under FOIA Exemption 3 because the six records, although technically publicly available, were “subject to limited distribution” and “reveal certain sensitive but unclassified intelligence sources and methods.” Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 9. The CIA notified the plaintiffs of the decision to withhold these six documents by letter dated January 25, 2012. See id. ¶ 7. Finally, the response to Mobley’s FOIA/PA request by Justice, for purposes of these related actions, was made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). The FBI informed Mobley by letter dated April 5, 2011 that it was processing his request and that the FBI was “searching the, indices to our Central Records System [or ‘CRS’] for the information you requested.” See First Argali Decl. Ex. D at 1, ECF No. 25-5. The FBI granted Mobley’s request for expedited processing by letter dated May 23, 2011. See First Argali Decl. Ex. I at 1, ECF No. 25-10. On August 17, 2011, after the plaintiffs submitted the privacy waiver of Ms. Islam, the FBI treated the privacy waiver as a new FOIA request, and assigned it a distinct tracking number. See First Argali Decl. Ex. N, ECF No. 25-15. On August 18, 2011, Mobley’s counsel wrote the FBI an e-mail clarifying that Ms. Islam’s privacy waiver “was not a new request; it was an additional waiver form for use when processing [Mobley’s request], which was for records about Sharif Mobley and Ms family.” First Argali Decl. Ex. O, ECF No. 25-16 (No. 11-2073). On August 29, 2011, Mobley’s counsel contacted the FBI via e-mail, asking that the agency “please ensure that you search for all ‘main’ files and all ‘reference’ or ‘cross-reference’ files” and also requesting that the FBI search ten specific types of records systems. See First Argali Decl. Ex. P at 1, ECF No. 25-17. Similarly, on September 21, 2011, Mobley’s counsel contacted the FBI via e-mail to request that the FBI “include the Baltimore Field Office in your search” along with the Washington, D.C., Field Office. See First Argali Decl. Ex. R, at 1, ECF No. 25-19. On May 4, 2012 — the same date that the DIA provided its final response — the FBI notified Mobley that it had located eighty-five pages of responsive records, and in the same correspondence the FBI released all eighty-five pages in part, with certain portions redacted pursuant to one or more of the following: FOIA Exemptions 1, 6, and 7(C); and PA Exemption (j)(2). See First Argali Decl. ¶ 24. The plaintiffs filed both of the instant related actions on November 22, 2011, at which time only the CIA had provided a final determination regarding the plaintiffs’ FOIA/PA request. Currently pending before the Court are the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, as well as certain defendants’ supplemental motions for summary judgment, in both related actions. See Def. Dep’t of Defense’s Supplemental Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 42 (No. 11-2073); Def. Dep’t of State’s Supplemental Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 36 (No. 11-2072); Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 25 (No. 11-2073); Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 22 (No. 11-2072). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants both motions in full, with one minor exception discussed in more detail below. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. FOIA Congress enacted the FOIA to promote transparency across the government. See 5 U.S.C. § 552; Quick v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., 775 F.Supp.2d 174, 179 (D.D.C.2011). The Supreme Court has explained that the FOIA is “a means for citizens to know ‘what their Government is up to.’ This phrase should not be dismissed as a convenient formalism. It defines a structural necessity in a real democracy.” Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171-172, 124 S.Ct. 1570, 158 L.Ed.2d 319 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.” NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978). As a result, the FOIA requires federal agencies to release all records responsive to a request for production. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). Federal courts are authorized under the FOIA “to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” Id. § 552(a)(4)(B). This strong interest in transparency must be tempered, however, by the “legitimate governmental and private interests [that] could be harmed by release of certain types of information.” United Techs. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 601 F.3d 557, 559 (D.C.Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 872 (D.C.Cir.1992) (en banc). Accordingly, Congress included nine exemptions permitting agencies to withhold information from FOIA disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). “These exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, and must be narrowly construed.” Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy,— U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1259, 1262, 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 598 F.3d 865, 869 (D.C.Cir.2010) (“FOIA allows agencies to withhold only those documents that fall under one of nine specific exemptions, which are construed narrowly in keeping with FOIA’s presumption in favor of disclosure.” (citations omitted)). When a FOIA requester properly exhausts its administrative remedies, it may file a civil action challenging an agency’s response to its request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Wilbur v. CIA, 355 F.3d 675, 677 (D.C.Cir.2004). Once such an action is filed, the agency generally has the burden of demonstrating that its response to the plaintiffs FOIA request was appropriate. When an agency’s response is neither to confirm nor deny the existence of responsive documents — commonly known as a Glomar response — the agency “must demonstrate that acknowledging the mere existence of responsive records would disclose exempt information.” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. NSA, 678 F.3d 926, 931 (D.C.Cir.2012). “In Glomar cases, courts may grant summary judgment on the basis of agency affidavits that contain ‘reasonable specificity of detail rather than mere conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.’ ” Id. (quoting Gardels v. CIA 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C.Cir.1982)). “The supporting affidavit must justify the Glomar response based on ‘general exemption review standards established in non -Glomar cases.’ ” Id. (quoting Wolf v. CIA 473 F.3d 370, 374-75 (D.C.Cir.2007)). When an agency’s response to a FOIA request is to withhold responsive records, either in whole or in part, the agency “bears the burden of proving the applicability of claimed exemptions.” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (‘ACLU/DOD”), 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C.Cir.2011). “The government may satisfy its burden of establishing its right to withhold information from the public by submitting appropriate declarations and, where necessary, an index of the information withheld.” Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 852 F.Supp.2d 66, 72 (D.D.C.2012) (citing Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827-28 (D.C.Cir.1973)). “If an agency’s affidavit describes the justifications for withholding the information with specific detail, demonstrates that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption,” and “is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of the agency’s bad faith, then summary judgment is warranted on the basis of the affidavit alone.” ACLU/DOD, 628 F.3d at 619. “Ultimately, an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical or ‘plausible.’ ” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C.Cir.2009)). When a requester challenges an agency’s response based on the adequacy of the search performed, “[t]o prevail on summary judgment ... the defending ‘agency must show beyond material doubt ... that it has conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.’ ” Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1114 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (“Weisberg I”), 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C.Cir.1983)). “In order to obtain summary judgment the agency must show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C.Cir.1990). “Summary judgment may be based on affidavit, if the declaration sets forth sufficiently detailed information ‘for a court to determine if the search was adequate.’ ” Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 838 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting Nation Magazine v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C.Cir.1995)). B. Privacy Act The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, “regulates the ‘collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information’ about individuals by federal agencies.” Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 707 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 618, 124 S.Ct. 1204, 157 L.Ed.2d 1122 (2004)). The statute provides that, if any federal agency maintains a “system of records,” it must “upon request by any individual to gain access to his record or to any information pertaining to him which is contained in the system, permit him ... to review the record and have a copy made of all or any portion thereof in a form comprehensible to him.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(l). The statute defines a “system of records” as “a group of any records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual.” Id. § 552a(a)(5). If an agency “refuses to comply with an individual request,” the individual may bring a civil action against the agency. See id. § 552a(g)(1)(B). The Privacy Act, however, also permits agencies to exempt certain systems of records from the requirements of § 552a(d). See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)-(k) When an agency moves for summary judgment on the basis of a statutory exemption, it “bears the burden of sustaining its decision to claim an exemption from disclosure.” Wheeler v. CIA 271 F.Supp.2d 132, 136 (D.D.C.2003) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(A)). Much like in the FOIA context, at the summary judgment stage, “[i]n a Privacy Act case, the Court may rely on agency affidavits or declarations.” Jimenez v. Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, 764 F.Supp.2d 174, 180 (D.D.C.2011); accord Chambers v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 568 F.3d 998, 1003 (D.C.Cir.2009) (holding that “[i]n a suit seeking agency documents — whether under the Privacy Act or FOIA — ‘[a]t the summary judgment stage ... the court may rely on a reasonably detailed affidavit’ ”). III. DISCUSSION In these related actions, the plaintiffs challenge four separate aspects of the defendants’ responses to the plaintiffs’ FOIA/PA requests. First, the Court will address the plaintiffs’ challenges to the adequacy of certain defendants’ searches for records. Second, the Court will discuss the plaintiffs’ challenges to the propriety of certain defendants’ Glomar responses, i.e., refusals to confirm or deny the existence of responsive records. Third, the Court will discuss whether the defendants have adequately justified their determinations to withhold certain responsive records. Finally, the Court will assess whether certain defendants sufficiently established that all “reasonably segregable portion[s]” of the withheld records were provided to the plaintiffs. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). A. The Adequacy of the Defendants’ Searches As discussed above, “an agency responding to a FOIA request must ‘conduct] a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents,’ and, if challenged, must demonstrate ‘beyond material doubt’ that the search was reasonable.” Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C.Cir.1990) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Weisberg I, 705 F.2d at 1351). The adequacy of a search “is judged by a standard of reasonableness and depends, not surprisingly, upon the facts of each case.” Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (‘Weisberg II”), 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1984). “The question is not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was adequate.” Steinberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C.Cir.1994) (quoting Weisberg II, 745 F.2d at 1485). “Mere speculation that as yet uncovered documents may exist does not undermine the finding that the agency conducted a reasonable search for them.” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C.Cir.1991). 1. CIA The plaintiffs first contend that the CIA’s search for records reflecting an open or otherwise acknowledged affiliation between the CIA and the plaintiffs was inadequate for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs argue that the CIA “improperly failed to search the OSC for responsive records” based on the fact that 41 responsive records from the OSC were referred to the CIA by the DIA. See Pis.’ Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pis.’ Opp’n”) at 7, ECF No. 40 (No. 11-2072). Second, the plaintiffs argue that the CIA “improperly failed to search the FOIA office for records about Plaintiffs,” which the plaintiffs say was within the scope of their request for records. Id. at 7-8. a) Failure to Search the Open Source Center for Responsive Records With respect to the plaintiffs’ complaint about the failure to search the OSC, the CIA responds that because “most of the records contained in the DNI OSC are generally available to the public both through their original sources and through the World News Connection, CIA presumes in most cases that a FOIA requester does not want CIA to search those records unless the requester specifically asks for them.” Defs.’ Reply in Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Reply”) at 3, ECF No. 49 (No. 11-2072). The CIA contends that such a policy is reasonable for two main reasons. First, it “ensures that requesters do not receive public records that they do not want, particularly when requesters will often be charged fees for an agency to process and release publicly available material.” Id. Additionally, “requiring requesters to submit separate requests for publicly available records is consistent with FOIA’s requirement that agencies ‘make records promptly available’ because public records can often ... be released more quickly without [the] need to process them for redactions.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Cunningham v. Holder, 842 F.Supp.2d 338, 345-46 (D.D.C. 2012) (“The requirement of a specific request for public records makes sense.”). Alternatively, the CIA responds that it will agree to search the OSC and turn over any responsive records, “but it will charge plaintiffs fees for that purpose” because “plaintiffs should not be entitled to circumvent the applicable access fees [from World News Connection or Westlaw] and obtain those records for free simply by submitting a FOIA request.” Id. at 3-4; see also Second Meeks Deck ¶¶ 6-13 (explaining the CIA’s policy regarding search for publicly available records in response to FOIA requests). The plaintiffs, however, contest the CIA’s premise that the OSC is comprised mostly of publicly available records. Most glaringly, the plaintiffs point out that “[o]f the twenty-eight released records, twelve are available on the World News Connection” and “twelve out of twenty-eight is not ‘most’ by even the most lenient standards.” Pis.’ Sur-Reply to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pis.’ Surreply”) at 2, ECF No. 53 (No. 11-2072). The plaintiffs also observe that “the fact that CIA withheld seven records in full speaks volumes about whether or not this information is publicly available.” Id. The plaintiffs concede that “CIA should not have to process OSC records which are available on the World News Connection,” but they argue instead that “CIA should ... be required to search for and process all OSC records which are not [publicly available].” Id. On the one hand, the CIA is correct that a policy of “generally interpreting] [first-person] FOIA requests ... to be for non-public documents” is reasonable for all of the reasons that similar policies have been upheld in prior cases. Defs.’ Reply at 3 (No. 11-2072); see, e.g., Cunningham, 842 F.Supp.2d at 345 (“EOUSA’s request that Plaintiff submit a separate specific request for public records is consistent with FOIA’s requirements.”); McLaughlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 598 F.Supp.2d 62, 66 & n. 2 (D.D.C.2009) (upholding agency’s decision to charge duplication fees for publicly available records and observing that a policy of presuming that FOIA requests are for only non-public records “comports with the statutory requirement that agencies ‘make [responsive] records promptly available’ ”). The problem for the CIA is that only “[m]ost material from the OSC is ... available to the public,” Second Meeks Decl. ¶ 7, and therefore some portion of the records contained in the OSC database are necessarily non-public. This point is confirmed by the plaintiffs’ statement that only twelve of the twenty-eight OSC records it received from the CIA were publicly available. See Pis.’ Surreply at 2 (No. 11-2072). In other words, although the CIA’s policy regarding the processing of publicly available records is reasonable in theory, that policy does not apply to the entire OSC database, and for that reason the CIA’s determination not to search the OSC database in response to the plaintiffs’ request is problematic to the extent that non-public, responsive records exist in the OSC. The CIA appears to agree that the plaintiffs are entitled to receive any nonpublic, responsive records contained in the OSC database, free of charge. See Second Meeks Decl. ¶ 12 (“The [CIA] recognizes that, with respect to non-public records, requestors should generally be able to obtain information about themselves free of charge .... ”). Similarly, the plaintiffs agree that “CIA should not have to process OSC records which are [not publicly] available.” Pis.’ Surreply at 2 (No. 11-2072). The practical problem lies in deciding which party has the burden of determining which OSC records are publicly available and which are not. The plaintiffs propose placing that burden on the CIA. See id. The CIA, however, proposes placing that burden on the plaintiffs by essentially presuming that all OSC records are publicly available and charging fees for the production of all such records. See Defs.’ Reply at 4 (No. 11-2072). The parties have presented no evidence regarding how burdensome it would be to distinguish between public and non-public records retrieved from the OSC, but this will often be self-evident with the publication origin of the document, apparent on its face. Thus, the CIA must search the OSC database for any records responsive to the plaintiffs’ FOIA/PA request and must release any non-exempt, responsive records to the plaintiffs. Additionally the CIA may choose, in its discretion, to charge fees to the plaintiffs for any records that it produces from this search that it identifies as being publicly available, and the plaintiffs may challenge any fees that they believe are improperly levied on this basis. If the plaintiffs object to any of the fees charged, they should raise those objections at the administrative level before challenging them in a civil action, in order to give the agency an opportunity to correct any errors it may have made before seeking assistance from a court. See, e.g., Avocados Plus Inc. v. Veneman, 370 F.3d 1243, 1247 (D.C.Cir.2004) (holding that administrative exhaustion is intended, inter alia, to “giv[e] agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors” (internal quotation mark omitted)). b) Failure to Search the FOIA Office for Responsive Records The plaintiffs also argue that the CIA’s search was inadequate because it “improperly failed to search the FOIA office for records about Plaintiffs.” Pis.’ Opp’n at 7 (No. 11-2072). The CIA states that its FOIA officers “do not consider records of previous FOIA, PA, or [Mandatory Declassification Review, or ‘MDR’] requests ... to be responsive to a current request” except where a request “expressly seek[s] records of previous FOIA, PA, or MDR requests by the requester.” First Meeks Decl. ¶ 14. The plaintiffs nevertheless complain that their FOIA/PA requests “were explicitly ‘for all CIA records about Mr. Mobley and Ms. Islam’ ” and “it is in violation of FOIA for CIA to impose a requirement that ‘requests expressly seek[ ] records of previous FOIA, PA, or MDR requests.’ ” Pis.’ Opp’n at 7-8 (No. 11-2072). The CIA’s response is that they interpreted the plaintiffs’ August 15, 2011, FOIA/PA request to “expressly disclaim [] any interest in records regarding the [July 22, 2010] version of their FOIA request.” Defs.’ Reply at 4 (No. 11-2072). In support of this argument, the CIA cites language from the plaintiffs’ August 15, 2011 request, which stated that it was mentioning the July 22, 2010 request “only for reference purposes.” See id.; see also Second Meeks Decl. Ex. 2, at 1. The CIA says that it “interpreted that statement as an express disavowal of plaintiffs’ interest in obtaining records regarding the July 22, 2010 request” and that such an interpretation was “perfectly reasonable.” Defs.’ Reply at 4 (No. 11-2072). The D.C. Circuit has established that an agency “has a duty to construe a FOIA request liberally,” Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 890, and are “bound to read it as drafted” not as “agency officials ... might wish it was drafted,” Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 777 (D.C.Cir.1984). In this regard, it is clear that, for example, when a FOIA requester “seek[s] all of a certain set of documents” while also “evincing a heightened interest in a specific subset thereof,” such a request “is reasonably susceptible to the broader reading” of seeking the entire set of documents despite the fact that a specific subset of documents is named. LaCedra v. Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, 317 F.3d 345, 348 (D.C.Cir.2003); see also Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 890 (holding that FOIA request seeking records “‘pertaining to’ [Ross] Perot” and specifically “ask[ing] for records indexed under Perot’s name” was “sufficient to alert the agency that appeb lants sought information about Perot, even if it was not indexed under his name”). In this case, the language of plaintiffs’ request sent mixed signals about the request’s intended scope. On the one hand, it explicitly sought “all [CIA] records about Mr. Mobley and Ms. Islam,” but it also explicitly deemphasized the relevance of the plaintiffs’ prior FOIA/PA request by stating that it referred to that request “only for reference purposes.” Second Meeks Decl. Ex. 2, at 1. It is unclear from the four corners of the August 15, 2011 request what the plaintiffs meant by “only for reference purposes,” but the CIA was reasonable in interpreting “only for reference purposes” to mean not for purposes of expressing an interest in records associated with prior FOIA/PA requests. Thus, the plaintiffs’ specific disclaimer regarding the July 22, 2010 request could be reasonably interpreted to disavow an interest in obtaining records about that prior request, and therefore the CIA’s decision not to search its FOIA office for responsive records was reasonable. In sum, the Court holds that the CIA is only entitled to a partial grant of summary judgment regarding the adequacy of its search. The CIA must search the OSC for records responsive to the plaintiffs’ request, as discussed supra. The CIA is, however, entitled to summary judgment as to the adequacy of all other aspects of its search. 2. State Department Next, the plaintiffs challenge the adequacy of the State Department’s search on the grounds that “State failed to follow clear leads when performing its search for responsive records.” Pis.’ Opp’n at 27 (No. 11-2072). In their surreply, the plaintiffs clarify that they “concede the adequacy of the majority of State’s search” and only challenge State’s failure to assert that it searched the component where eighteen classified documents originated. See Pis.’ Surreply at 8 (No. 11-2072). The only information that State has provided on the public record regarding these eighteen documents, which State refers to as X1-X18, are the year in which each document was created and the number of pages contained in each document. See First Walter Decl. ¶¶ 182-99. Other than this, State maintains that “[n]o further information can be provided regarding [these] documents] on the public record.” Id. The government has also “submitted a classified, ex parte, in camera filing” that elaborates on the nature of records X1-X18. See Notice of Ex Parte, In Camera Filing, ECF No. 29 (No. 11-2072). As the plaintiffs concede, the State Department has no obligation to name the component from which these eighteen documents originate. See Pis.’ Surreply at 8 (No. 11-2072) (conceding that “State does not have to describe these records, or even the component in which they originated”). Upon review of the government’s ex parte, in camera filing, in conjunction with the public declarations submitted by the State Department, the Court is satisfied that the State Department searched all of its components reasonably likely to contain responsive information. Therefore, the State Department’s search was adequate, and the plaintiffs’ objections to the State Department’s search are unavailing. 3. FBI In his final challenge related to search adequacy, Mobley contends that the FBI’s search for responsive records was inadequate for two interrelated reasons. First, he says that the FBI’s search was inadequate because it did not search certain specific records systems that Mobley’s counsel asked it to search. See PL’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“PL’s Opp’n”) at 21-22, ECF No. 45 (No. 11-2073). Second, Mobley argues that “[t]he inadequacy of FBI’s search is demonstrated by the ample evidence that other records exist.” Id. at 22. For this point, Mobley cites the fact that, in related Civil Case No. 11-2072, “State produced numerous records to Mobley, some of which consisted of extensive email traffic between State and FBI,” which “demonstrate the existence of significant email records about Mobley that were not identified in FBI’s search,” and Mobley also points to certain press coverage, which indicated that “FBI was even discussing Mobley with the press,” yet “no records of interaction with the press were identified by FBI’s search.” Id. To provide some context to Mobley’s argument, as discussed briefly above, Mobley’s counsel contacted the FBI via e-mail on August 29, 2011 — slightly more than thirteen months after Mobley submitted his FOIA/PA request to the FBI — to ask that: [W]hen conducting your search for responsive records, please ensure that you search all “main” files and all “reference” or “cross-reference” files, and that you search the following records systems: 1) all shared drives, including the “I-drive” and “S-drive,” especially for FBI [Headquarters] and the New Jersey and New York field offices (this includes shared drives which have been assigned letters besides “I-drive” and “S-drive”); 2) the ELSUR index; 3) all “tickler” files; 4) Automated Case Support (ACS) files; 5) Electronic Case Files (ECF); 6) Universal Index Files (UIF); 7) Investigative Case Management (ICM) files; 8) Legal Attache (LEGAT) files, especially for LEGATs -with responsibility for Yemen from 2006 to the present; 9) Confidential Source System (CSS) files; and 10) all “zero” files or other record systems not identified above which are not normally searched in response to FOIA/PA requests. First Argali Decl. Ex. P, at 1. As explained in the Bureau’s sworn declaration, “[t]he FBI conducted a search of the [Central Records System, or ‘CRS’] utilizing a phonetic breakdown of Sharif Mobley’s name, including any variations of the first and last name that sound like or are spelled differently than the name.” First Argali Deck ¶ 31. “The FBI also used the plaintiffs date of birth to facilitate the identification of responsive records.” Id. The CRS “enables the FBI to maintain all information which it has acquired in the course of fulfilling its mandated law enforcement responsibilities” and includes “administrative, applicant, criminal, personnel, and other files compiled for law enforcement purposes.” Id. ¶25. “The CRS currently consists of over 115 million records.” Second Deck of Dennis J. Argali (“Second Argali Deck”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 50-2 (Oct. 12, 2012) (No. 11-2073). Although Mobley concedes that “several of these systems” that his lawyer specifically requested to be searched, including ACS, ECF, UIF, ICM, and LEGAT, “have been incorporated into the CRS,” Mobley maintains that “many have not, including the shared drives, the ELSUR index, ‘tickler’ files, CSS files, ‘zero’ files, and emails.” PL’s Opp’n at 21-22 (No. 11-2073). Several of these complaints were cleared up by the FBI’s second sworn declaration, which clarified that (1) the FBI’s original search would have identified any CSS or “zero” files, Second Argali Deck ¶ 6, (2) the EL-SUR indices were searched and yielded no responsive results, see id. ¶ 8, and (3) because “tickler” files “were a phenomenon associated with earlier times in the FBI” and “would have been historical in nature,” there “is no need for the FBI to search for tickler files” absent an express request to do so, see id. ¶ 7. Finally, the FBI contends that it need not search shared drives or unspecified e-mail systems “[g]iven the broad search of the comprehensive CRS system and the ELSUR indices” and Mobley’s failure to ask the FBI specifically to search e-mail systems. See id. ¶ 9(b); Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Reply”) at 16-19, ECF No. 50 (No. 11-2073). Specifically, the FBI argues that, with respect to the documents that Mobley says exist based on documents produced by State, “FBI’s failure to turn up documents that plaintiff speculates exist does not mean that FBI’s search was inadequate.” Defs.’ Reply at 18 (No. 11-2073) (citing Wilbur, 355 F.3d at 678). Mobley does not appear to contest the FBI’s explanations regarding the CSS files, “zero” files, ELSUR indices, or “tickler” files. Instead, Mobley focuses his attention on the FBI’s refusal to search shared drives and unspecified e-mail systerns. See Pl.’s Sur-Reply to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“PL’s Surreply”) at 11-13, ECF No. 55 (No. 11-2073). As to the shared drives, Mobley cites a D.C. Circuit case that he says rejected the FBI’s argument, ie., that a comprehensive search of the CRS and the ELSUR indices would render any further searching unduly burdensome. See PL’s Surreply at 12 (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C.Cir.1998)). Campbell stands for the proposition that “the court evaluates the reasonableness of an agency’s search based on what the agency knew at [the search’s] conclusion rather than what the agency speculated at its inception.” Campbell, 164 F.3d at 28. Thus, the Court held that even though “the FBI started with the reasonable assumption that only a CRS review would be necessary ... that assumption became untenable once the FBI discovered information suggesting the existence of documents that it could not locate without expanding the scope of its search.” Id. In particular, in Campbell, “some of the Bureau’s own documents suggested] — through administrative annotations and express references in the text— that searching [other records systems] would have identified additional information.” Id. at 27. Mobley contends that Campbell “is important for three separate but equally important reasons.” PL’s Surreply at 12 (No. 11-2073). First, Mobley argues that the FBI was required to search all shared drives and unspecified e-mail systems for responsive records because he “established in his Opposition several places in FBI’s release which suggest the existence of documents it had not located.” Id. at 13. Hence, Mobley contends that “upon discovering this information, [the FBI] was required to expand its search to locate any responsive documents located in other systems.” Id. (citing Campbell, 164 F.3d at 28). In his opposition brief, Mobley did cite one example in the FBI’s release that could have suggested the existence of other, unreleased FBI documents. In particular, Mobley stated in his opposition that “[d]uring the course of several interviews documented in released records, Mobley and the interviewers discussed an FBI investigation into his wife and mother-in-law for unemployment fraud” and “[n]o records of this investigation were released or withheld by FBI.” PL’s Opp’n at 22-23 (No. 11-2073). Mobley urges that this information in released FBI records constitutes “significantly more than ‘mere speculation’ ” and warrants more extensive searching by the FBI. Id. at 23-24. The Court disagrees. Even assuming that the released FBI records establish the existence of an FBI investigation into Ms. Islam, such records would not have been responsive to Mobley’s FOIA request in any event. The parties do not address this point, but Mobley’s request generally sought “all records in any way relating to, pertaining to, or mentioning [Mobley ].” First Argali Decl. Ex. A at 2. The request also specifically sought records relating to Mobley’s abduction in Yemen on January 26, 2010, the United States government’s involvement in that abduction, and the United States government’s interrogation of Mobley while he was detained in Yemen. Id. In specifying the types of records contemplated by these specific categories, the request also mentioned “all records created after January 1, 2010, relating to the Mobley family’s dealings at the U.S. Embassy-Sana’a.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added). Nowhere in this request, however, did Mobley say that he was requesting all documents about Ms. Islam. Indeed, the only reference to Ms. Islam was within the request for “all records created after January 1, 2010, relating to the Mobley family’s dealings at the U.S. Embassy-Sana’a.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, although Mobley complains that he is entitled to records about an investigation into his wife for unemployment fraud, records of such an investigation would not be responsive to even the most liberal construction of Mobley’s FOIA/PA request. The D.C. Circuit has long held that “mere reference to other files does not establish the existence of documents that are relevant to [a requester’s] FOIA request.” Steinberg, 23 F.3d at 552; see id. (“If that were the case, an agency responding to FOIA requests might be forced to examine virtually every document in its files, following an interminable trail of cross-referenced documents like a chain letter winding its way through the mail.”). Therefore, Mobley’s argument that the FBI’s failure to produce any records about the investigation into Ms. Islam indicates a deficiency in the Bureau’s search is unavailing. Second, Mobley observes that, in Campbell the “FBI conceded that it would have to perform an ELSUR search if specifically asked to do so within the FOIA request.” Pl.’s Surreply at 12 (No. 11-2073) (emphasis omitted). From this, Mobley posits that the FBI was required to search all shared drives because Mobley “specifically instruct[ed] FBI” to do so. Id. Mobley’s reasoning on this point, however, is incorrect as a matter of law. At the outset, Mobley’s reliance on Campbell for the proposition that the “FBI conceded that it would have to perform an ELSUR search if specifically asked to do so within the FOIA request,” id., is misleading. The portion of the Campbell opinion to which Mobley refers was a recitation by the Court of the FBI’s argument that “the ‘weight of authority’ justifies refusing to supplement a CRS search with an ELSUR search unless specifically asked to do so within the FOIA request.” See Campbell, 164 F.3d at 28. Regardless of what this statement suggests about what the FBI “conceded,” the FBI’s arguments in litigation do not amount to FOIA precedent. This concession would not help Mobley in any event because Mobley’s specific demands in this case came over a year after Mobley’s FOIA request was submitted, in an unsolicited e-mail from his counsel, rather than “within the FOIA request.” See id. Although Mobley attempts to shoehorn such communications into the ambit of Campbell by arguing that the FBI’s purported concession extends to the entire “FOIA request process,” PL’s Surreply at 12 (No. 11-2073), it is the law in this Circuit that an agency “is not obligated to look beyond the four corners of the [FOIA] request for leads to the location of responsive documents,” Kowalczyk, 73 F.3d at 389. Relatedly, Mobley’s argument that the FBI was required to search all shared drives because Mobley “specifically instruet[ed] FBI” to do so, Pl.’s Surreply at 12 (No. 11-2073), fundamentally misconceives the standard for the adequacy of an agency’s search under the FOIA. An agency’s search obligations are not dictated by a requester’s demands to search particular components or databases. Rather, an agency’s search obligations are dictated by whether the scope of the search is “reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents,” Morley, 508 F.3d at 1114 — a standard that an agency satisfies by searching “all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist),” Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68. Thus, even when a requester specifically asks an agency to search a particular database, the agency has no obligation to do so unless that database is “likely to contain responsive materials.” See id. Campbell stands for this very proposition. In that case, the D.C. Circuit held that the FBI was required to search the ELSUR and “tickler” files, but only because “some of the [FBI’s] documents suggest ... that searching the ELSUR index, or searching for ticklers, would have identified additional information [responsive to the request].” Campbell, 164 F.3d at 27; see also id. at 28 (“[A]n agency ‘cannot limit its search to only one record system if there are others that are likely to turn up the information requested.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68)). In this case, Mobley has offered no reasoned argument why a search of “all shared drives,” as per his counsel’s informal e-mail request, would be likely contain responsive materials, other than the fact that he specifically asked for these drives to be searched and the incorrect assertion, discussed above, that “several places in FBI’s release ... suggested] the existence of [unreleased, responsive] documents.” Pl.’s Surreply at 12-13 (No. 11-2073). Absent some reason to believe that shared drives are likely to contain responsive materials, Mobley’s arguments are insufficient to require the FBI to conduct further searches. Mobley’s final argument under Campbell is that the FBI has not accounted for all shared drives in its sworn declaration. See PL’s Surreply at 12 (No. 11-2073). Mobley complains that, in the FBI’s second sworn declaration, it “only addresses the ‘I-drive’ and ‘S-drive’ ” but “mak[es] no mention of other shared drives and why they were not searched.” Id. In addition to discussing the “I-Drive” and “S-Drive” in its second sworn declaration, the FBI also appeared to speak more categorically regarding “shared drives.” See Second Argali Deck ¶ 9(b). From the FBI’s declaration it is difficult to ascertain with certainty whether “S-Drive” is a generic term used within the FBI to refer to all “shared drives” or whether the FBI maintains multiple kinds of shared drives that may be limited in use to function or location. See id. (“ ‘S-Drive’ systems are common drives or shared drives that are currently used by the FBI headquarters and field offices.”). Mobley’s counsel also asserts for the first time in his surreply that he “recently learned of the existence of a ‘T-Drive,’ ” which he implies may also be a shared drive, though he has offered no evidence to support such an implication. See Pl’s Surreply at 12-13 (No. 11-2073). Whether or not there are other shared drives beyond the “I-Drive” and “S-Drive,” however, is a red herring. Ultimately, the FBI has averred that “[g]iven the broad search of the comprehensive CRS system and the ELSUR indices ... [the FBI’s acting FOIA chief] determined that there is no reasonable basis to conclude that responsive records are reasonably likely to be located by further searches of shared drives.” Second Argali Decl. ¶ 9(b). This conclusion is entitled to “a presumption of good faith,” SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1200, despite the fact that its reasoning for why searches of shared drives would be unlikely to uncover responsive records is quite cursory. Although the agency’s justification for not searching shared drives is thin, Mobley’s argument for why shared drives are likely to contain responsive records is even thinner. As discussed above, Mobley’s purported bases for requiring a search of all shared drives are either conclusory or unsupported, and therefore they are insufficient to rebut the presumption that the FBI’s averments are in good faith. Therefore, Mobley’s argument that the FBI’s search was inadequate for failing to search all shared drives must fail. In sum, all of Mobley’s challenges to the adequacy of the FBI’s search for responsive records are insufficient to defeat the FBI’s entitlement to summary judgment on this issue. B. The Propriety of the Defendants’ Glomar Response The next category of issues raised by the plaintiffs is the propriety of the DIA and the CIA issuing Glomar responses to the plaintiffs’ FOIA/PA requests. A Glomar response is “an exception to the general rule that agencies must acknowledge the existence of information responsive to a FOIA request and provide specific, non-conclusory justifications for withholding that information.” Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1178 (D.C.Cir.2011). Thus, a Glomar response allows an agency to respond to a FOIA request by neither confirming nor denying the existence of any records responsive to the request, on the grounds that “confirming or denying the existence of records would itself ‘cause harm cognizable under a[ ] FOIA exception.’ ” Id. (quoting Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374). 1. CIA As discussed above, the CIA notified the plaintiffs, in response to their FOIA/PA request that “[w]ith respect to responsive records that would reveal a classified connection to the CIA ... the CIA can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to your request.” Second Meeks Decl. Ex. 3, at 1. The plaintiffs challenge this Glomar response on three grounds: (1) the CIA officially acknowledged the existence of responsive records that would reveal a classified affiliation with the plaintiffs, and thus it waived its ability to issue a Glomar response; (2) the CIA improperly invoked FOIA Exemption 1 to support its Glomar response; and (3) the CIA improperly invoked FOIA Exemption 3 to support its Glomar response. a) The CIA Did Not ‘Waive” Its Ability to Issue a Glomar Response. The plaintiffs’ first argument is premised on what the CIA has referred to as an “inaccurae[y]” or “error” in its initial, September 20, 2011, response to the plaintiffs’ request. See First Meeks Decl. ¶¶ 13, 22. As discussed previously, this initial letter stated that “we were able to locate responsive material.” Second Meeks Decl. Ex. 3, at 1. The amended response letter, however, which was sent over three months later, on January 11, 2012, admitted that “our initial response letter contained inaccuracies regarding our search,” and it went on to state that the CIA was “unable to locate any information or records” after “searching] for CIA-originated responsive records that might reflect an open or otherwise acknowledged Agency affiliation.” Second Meeks Deck Ex. 4, 'at 1. In its brief, the CIA’s only explanation for this about-face was that it was “based on an internal misunderstanding,” though the nature of that misunderstanding is unclear. Defs.’ Mem. in Supp of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 11 n. 2, ECF No. 22 (No. 11-2072). The plaintiffs contend that this “misunderstanding” is “[o]ne of the key issues” that is “at the core of CIA’s processing of Plaintiffs’ FOIA/PA requests.” Pis.’ Opp’n at 2 (No. 11-2072). They argue that, because there is no evidence to establish “that the ‘mistake’ was truly an innocent administrative error that should have no consequences,” there “is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the nature of CIA’s ‘mistake’ and the appropriate consequences for the agency,” which preclude summary judgment on this issue. Id. at 11. Despite this restrained framing, the bottom line of the plaintiffs’ argument on this issue is that the “CIA waived its right to issue a Glomar response” because the CIA officially acknowledged the existence of responsive records. Id. at 6, 8-9. The fundamental error in the plaintiffs’ argument, however, as the defendants point out, is that “plaintiffs have made no argument that the CIA’s initial response actually disclosed [the relevant] Glomar fact,” ie., the fact that “records revealing a classified connection between plaintiffs and the CIA” existed. Defs.’ Reply at 6 (No. 11-2072). In order to constitute an “official acknowledgement” of information that waives an agency’s ability to issue a Glomar response, “the information requested must be as specific as the information previously released,” the “information requested must match the information previously disclosed,” and “the information requested must already have been made public through an official and documented disclosure.” Wolf, 473 F.3d at 378 (quoting Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1990)). “In the Glomar context, then, if the prior disclosure establishes the existence (or not) of records responsive to the FOIA request, the prior disclosure necessarily matches both the information at issue — the existence of records — and the specific request for that information.” Id. at 379. In this case, the prior disclosure, ie., the initial September 20, 2011, response letter, only disclosed that the CIA was “able to locate responsive material,” and the context of the letter clearly conveyed that this “responsive material” was limited to responsive records that would reveal an unclassified connection to the CIA. See Second Meeks Deck Ex. 3, at 1; First Meeks Deck ¶ 22 (stating that the CIA “mistakenly claimed that the CIA was withholding [records reflecting an unclassified relationship with Plaintiffs]”). This implication was clear because in the very next paragraph, the letter stated that the CIA could neither confirm nor deny the existence of “responsive records that would reveal a classified connection to the CIA.” Second Meeks Deck Ex. 3, at 1 (emphasis added). Any other reading of this letter would be nonsensical because it would entail reading the letter to state simultaneously that the CIA both refused to confirm and confirmed the existence of responsive records reflecting a classified connection to the CIA. Since the Court interprets the CIA’s initial response letter to not have established the existence or nonexistence of responsive records that would reveal a classified connection to the CIA, the CIA did not waive its ability to issue a Glomar response to those records. b) The CIA’s Invocation of FOIA Exemption 1 to Issue a Glomar Response Was Procedurally Sound. In addition to their waiver argument, the plaintiffs contend that “CIA’s invocation of [FOIA] Exemption (b)(1) fails for both a procedural and a substantive reason.” Pis.’ Opp’n at 12 (No. 11-2072). Procedurally, the plaintiffs argue that “CIA has not demonstrated that it followed the appropriate steps when determining that the fact of the existence or nonexistence of responsive records ... is classified.” Id. The parties refer to “the fact of the existence or nonexistence of responsive records” as the “Glomar fact.” See id. at 12; see also Defs.’ Reply at 6 (No. 11-2072). In the plaintiffs’ view, “[a] Glomar fact is itself a piece of information,” and therefore “since [Executive Order 13,526] establishes a uniform system for classifying information ... an agency must follow the Order’s procedures when classifying an intangible piece of information as a Glomar fact just as it would when classifying a document.” Pis.’ Opp’n at 12-13 (11-2072) (emphasis omitted). Hence, under the plaintiffs’ argument, “the classification of the Glomar fact is improper” because the CIA did not properly classify that fact under Executive Order 13,-536, id., and therefore the CIA was not permitted to issue its Glomar response under FOIA Exemption 1, which only applies to classified information and information “specifically authorized under criteria es