Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge. Plaintiff William Dudley, Jr. has worked as a Sign and Shelter Mechanic for defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) for over two decades. Dudley brings this Title VII discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation suit, alleging that his supervisors routinely gave White employees special treatment and singled out Black employees for harsh criticism and unfair punishment. In particular, Dudley claims that while White employees frequently flouted WMATA’s attendance policy without repercussion, supervisors strictly enforced the policy against African Americans. Dudley avers that, after complaining about racial discrimination, he became the target of disrespect, condescension, baseless write-ups and suspensions, and retaliatory work assignments. Before the Court is defendant WMA-TA’s Motion for Summary Judgment, July 31, 2012, ECF No. 14. Upon consideration of the defendant’s motion, the plaintiffs Opposition, Sept. 10, 2012, ECF No. 19, the defendant’s Reply thereto, Oct. 22, 2012, ECF No. 33, and the record herein, the Court will grant defendant’s motion and dismiss the action with prejudice. I. BACKGROUND William Dudley, Jr. has worked for WMATA since November 1989, and has held the position of Sign and Shelter Mechanic AA since 1999. Affidavit of William I. Dudley, Jr. (“Dudley Aff.”) ¶ 1, Sept. 6, 2012, ECF No. 19-4; Def.’s Statement of Material Facts not in Dispute (“Def.’s SMF”) ¶1, July 31, 2012, ECF No. 14; Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts in Dispute (“Pl.’s SMF”) 10, Sept. 10, 2012, ECF No. 19-1 (not disputing Def.’s SMF ¶ 1). Dudley is responsible for repairing and replacing bus stop signs and shelters. Dudley Aff. ¶ 1. Dudley is African American. From 2005 to approximately February 2008, James Lacey, a Caucasian, held the title of Bus Maintenance Supervisor and supervised Dudley. Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 1-3; Pl.’s SMF 10 (not disputing Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 1-3). In February 2008, WMATA transferred responsibility for the Sign and Shelter Shop — where Dudley worked — from Bus Maintenance to Bus Planning. Since then, Scottie Borders, an African American Senior Program Manager for Bus Planning, has supervised Dudley. Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 3-4; PL’s SMF 10 (not disputing Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 3~4). Dudley’s Complaint alleges a series of instances of alleged discriminatory and retaliatory events that took place between June 2007 and May 2011. Compl. ¶¶ 6-18, Aug. 8, 2011, ECF No. 1. The Complaint asserts race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Compl. ¶¶ 21-26. A. Mr. Dudley’s June 2007 One Day Suspension for Violating WMA-TA’s Attendance Policy The WMATA Bus Services Employee’s Handbook establishes a policy by which WMATA may discipline employees for repeatedly reporting to work late. Ex. 5 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (excerpts of Bus Services Employee’s Handbook). Employees who arrive late or out of uniform, or who fail to report at all, are assessed “points” in their record for each incident. Id. For late reports under twenty minutes, employees receive one point. Employees who fail to report receive four points. WMATA issues a one-day suspension for employees who accumulate eight points within one 365-day period. Id. Management does not assess any points for two late arrivals under twenty minutes; therefore, an employee who WMATA suspends under the policy has actually arrived late ten times in one year. Between July 31, 2006, and June 16, 2007, Dudley arrived late to work ten times. Ex. 6 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (Record of Disciplinary Action for Unscheduled Absences). Lacey did not assess any points for two of Dudley’s late reports; on June 16, 2007, Dudley accumulated eight points. Id. Pursuant to WMATA policy, Lacey suspended Dudley for one day, which Dudley served on June 18, 2007. Ex. 6 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. After meeting with the WMATA Office of Civil Rights, Ex. 9 to PL’s Opp’n, Dudley completed an EEOC Intake Questionnaire on November 6, 2007, Ex. 10 to PL’s Opp’n. In the Questionnaire, Dudley alleged that Lacey discriminatorily enforced the attendance policy and that his one-day suspension was the result of racial discrimination. Ex. 10 to PL’s Opp’n. Dudley also stated, “I also feel that the comments and actions by (Lacey) management has created an intimidating, offensive, stressfull [sic ], and hostile working environment for me.” Id. On January 7, 2008, Dudley signed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination, stating that he was “unjustly issued a disciplinary write up for violating [WMATAj’s policies” on June 16, 2007, and later on August 31, 2007, “was suspended from employment for violating [WMATA]’s policies.” Ex. 11 to PL’s Opp’n. Dudley stated, “I believe that I was discriminated against based upon my race, Black, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.” Id. The charge stated the earliest date of the discrimination was on “06-16-2007,” and the latest on “08-31-2007.” Id. Dudley did not check the form’s “Continuing Action” box. Id. The EEOC sent Dudley a Right to Sue Notice on May 17, 2011. Dudley Aff. ¶ 22. B. Claims of Harsh Treatment Following EEOC Charge Dudley alleges that after he filed his EEOC Charge, Lacey and other management officials began to treat him more harshly. Dudley states that “Lacey regularly spoke to me in a derogatory and condescending manner at morning ‘toolbox’ meetings where he gave out assignments to the employees, he gave me what I believed were retaliatory job assignments, singled me out for criticism, used intimidating language towards me, constantly harassed me, and wrote false statements about my work.” Dudley Aff. ¶ 8. In particular, Dudley alleges that in “July 2008 Lacey gave me a verbal warning for parking my personal vehicle in the Bus II parking lot behind the shop and transferring my tools between my personal vehicle and my work truck, even though all the Sign and Shelter Mechanics who are assigned a company vehicle do the same thing on a daily basis and Lacey did not reprimand other employees.” Id. ¶ 9. C. Co-Worker Peter White’s July 2008 Incident On July 19, 2008, Dudley claims that he was the victim of unwarranted and unprovoked threats from Peter White, a Caribbean-Black co-worker. Dudley Aff. ¶ 10. When Lacey initially investigated the incident, he described it as “unprofessional behavior between co-workers,” which Dudley took to suggest that he was “at fault as well as White.” Id.; see also Ex. 13 to PL’s Opp’n. After supervisors completed the investigation, Lacey gave White a written reprimand and referred him to attend a Workplace Violence Awareness Class. Ex. 12 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. Lacey did not discipline Dudley for his incident. Id. White later filed a grievance, and WMATA agreed to remove “all paper work and material related to th[e] grievance ... from all the employee personnel files.” Ex. 13 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. D. Mr. Dudley’s June 2009 Written Reprimand for Unprofessional Behavior On June 24, 2009, Lacey completed an investigation of a verbal disagreement between Dudley and his co-worker, Kehinde Ogundiran. Dudley asserts that he made an innocuous comment about meeting Ogundiran’s sister-in-law, to which Ogundiran responded angrily. Ex. 15 to PL’s Opp’n. Dudley characterizes Lacey’s report as a write up “for unprofessional behavior among co-workers,” see PL’s Opp’n 5, but WMATA insists that Lacey did not discipline either employee, see Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 8. Dudley filed a grievance requesting that WMATA remove the investigation report from his personnel file, worried about it being used for future discipline. Ex. 24 to PL’s Opp’n. Lacey denied this grievance, Ex. 16 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., and Dudley did not request further review. E. Mr. Dudley’s July 2009 Written Reprimand for Poor Work Performance/Insubordination On July 24, 2009, Lacey assigned Dudley and a co-worker to work on a sign that was down, but Dudley claims that when the men arrived they could not do the work because they did not have the proper tools with them. Dudley Aff. ¶ 12. Dudley says that he secured the sign and moved on to higher priority assignments. Dudley alleges that on July 29, 2009, his co-worker was absent, and he went to Lacey’s office to ask for help; after waiting three hours for Lacey to speak with him, he left to complete other jobs. The next day, Dudley again asked for help, and Lacey assigned Damien Wood to assist him. When the men arrived at the location of the down sign, Dudley claims that a maintenance man had disposed of the sign, and that he and Wood did not have that kind of sign with them in their truck. Id. On July 31, 2009, Lacey asked Dudley to explain why, a week later, the down sign still had not been fixed. The parties disagree on how this conversation went. Dudley asserts: Lacey began berating me for not completing the job the previous day and refused to listen to my explanation or talk to anyone else about why the work had not been completed. Lacey told me that I was to go out with William Arrington and get the job done that day. As I started to leave and Arrington came into the office, Lacey yelled at me in Arrington’s presence to “stand right there and listen to me” as if I were a child. I was angry and embarrassed and walked to the restroom to avoid a verbal confrontation. Lacey, however, continued yelling at me to “come back here” and “we’re going to the Superintendent’s Office.” Dudley Aff. ¶ 12. WMATA’s version of the events is different: Mr. Dudley became verbally combative, walked away, and refused Mr. Lacey’s direction to report to Superintendent Joseph Royer and explain why he left the job undone. Based upon Plaintiffs behavior, Mr. Lacey ordered him to report for a drug and alcohol test. In preparing the report regarding the incident, Mr. Lacey originally referred to it as “poor work performance.” However, after consulting with the Superintendent, the matter was documented as “insubordination.” Mr. Dudley received a written reprimand, but was not suspended. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 8-9; see also Exs. 17-23 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (supporting evidence for this version of the events). Dudley claims, “Lacey changed the writeup of Dudley to ‘insubordination’ because Lacey was told that it was improper to send an employee for drug and alcohol testing based upon an allegation of ‘poor job performance.’ ” PL’s Opp’n 6. F.Mr. Lacey’s July/September 2009 Order that Mr. Dudley Finish Installing a Bus Stop Previously Assigned to Another Employee In June and September 2009, Lacey assigned Dudley to complete work left unfinished by another employee. Each time, Dudley complained that he should not have to do the job of other employees, and that the other employee should have been disciplined for not completing the job. Exs. 17, 21 to PL’s Opp’n. He filed grievances, stating that he thought these work assignments were retaliatory and evidence of discrimination. Id. WMATA denied these grievances, and Dudley did not pursue the matter any further. G. Mr. Dudley’s Attempt in September 2009 to Review his Personnel File On September 3, 2009, Dudley sought to review his personnel file. Acting Superintendent Joseph Royer said he would allow Dudley to review the prior year of his personnel file, but Dudley refused this offer. See Exs. 42-43 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.; Dudley Aff. ¶ 15. Dudley filed a grievance — which Royer denied — and Dudley did not pursue the matter any further. Exs. 42-43 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. H. The Fall 2009 Toolbox Meeting and the “Tap Dance” Comment In Fall 2009, at a morning ‘toolbox’ meeting, Lacey asked an African American employee if he wanted to “do a tap dance” for the group. Lacey claims he made the statement because the Black employee was fidgeting, and did not understand its racial implications. Ex. 24 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. After the meeting, several Black employees complained and informed Lacey that his comments were racially insensitive. That morning, Lacey reconvened a meeting and apologized for his comments. Dudley was not present at the meeting where Lacey made the original comment, but he was present at the meeting where Lacey apologized. Id. I. Mr. Dudley’s December 2009 “Constructive Demotion” and Referral to the Employee Assistance Program In December 2009, WMATA instituted a bus route change in Silver Spring, Maryland. During the time WMATA undertook this project, Dudley missed five days of work on sick leave. He was absent on December 14, and when he returned to work on the 15th, he was assigned to assist Dante Proctor and did not lead the work that day. Proctor does not typically work in the Sign and Shelter Shop, but he was present the day before. Dudley was again on sick leave from December 16 through December 21. See Exs. 25-30 to Def.’s Mot. Summ J. (evidentiary documents). When Dudley returned on the 22nd, he was again assigned to assist Proctor. WMATA asserts that it assigned Dudley to assist because “Proctor knew of the status of the service change.” Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 10. Dudley argues that since “this was [his] regular job, [] he didn’t need to be ‘brought up to speed’ on assignments that are routinely assigned each day.” Pl.’s Opp’n 7; see also Dudley Aff. ¶ 16. Dudley “felt that [he] had been effectively demoted and humiliated in front of [his] coworkers and subsequently went to the WMATA Office of Civil Rights to file a retaliation claim about it and the other acts of harassment by Lacey, but ... Devin Walker refused to take these claims.” Dudley Aff. ¶ 17. Dudley admits he “was upset” when meeting with Walker, but says he “made no threatening statements.” Id. ¶ 18. Walker submitted an affidavit stating that, based on Dudley’s tone and some of his comments, he became “concerned for [Dudley’s] safety and the safety of his coworkers.” Affidavit of Devin L. Walker ¶ 3 (“Walker Aff.”), July 31, 2012, ECF No. 15-1. In particular, Walker claims Dudley stated that he would have to “drag [Lacey’s] ass across the desk” in order for something to be done, and made a possibly threatening reference to an earlier incident where one WMATA employee stabbed another. Id. ¶¶ 4-6. Because of these concerns, Walker referred Dudley to the Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”) where medical staff decided to hold Dudley off work until the matter was resolved. Id. ¶ 7; Ex. 41 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (under seal). Dudley was held off work until February 16, 2010, and this time was charged against his sick leave. Exs. 38, 39, 41 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. Dudley filed a grievance regarding the use of his sick leave, Ex. 28 to Pl.’s Opp’n, but WMATA denied this grievance, Exs. 38, 39 to Def.’s Mot. Summ J. J. Mr. Dudley’s May 2010 Ten Day Suspension for Violating WMA-TA’s Zero Tolerance Workplace Violence Policy On May 13, 2010, Dudley and William Adams — a Caucasian co-worker — were involved in a verbal altercation at work. According to Dudley, Adams “confronted [Dudley] in the bus yard cursing and threatening to ‘permanently close your eyes and make you stop breathing.’ ” Dudley Aff. ¶20. Dudley claims he was “clearly not the aggressor in this incident,” id., but was nevertheless suspended for ten days for violating the WMATA zero-tolerance workplace violence policy, Ex. 33 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. At the time of this incident, Lacey was no longer Dudley’s supervisor but did supervise Adams. After the incident, Lacey referred Adams to drug and alcohol testing, Ex. 32 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., and suspended Adams for twenty days, Ex. 33 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. Scottie Borders, and African American, supervised Dudley at this time. Borders issued Dudley a ten day suspension, Ex. 35 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., but Dudley alleges that the suspension was “based upon the decision of [Devin] Walker and other managers,” and that “Borders told [him] that he did not share the view that [Dudley] should be suspended,” Dudley Aff. ¶ 20. Dudley filed a grievance challenging the suspension, Ex. 38 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., but Kevin Newman and the WMATA Office of Labor Relations denied the grievance on July 12, 2012, Ex. 39 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. Dudley did not pursue this grievance any further. K. Mr. Dudley’s May 2011 Ten Day Suspension for Violating WMA-TA’s Zero Tolerance Workplace Violence Policy On April 14, 2011, Dudley was involved in an altercation with Peter White, an African American co-worker. According to Dudley, “White came into a room” where Dudley was, “closed the door behind him, and said, ‘if you keep fucking with me all of you motherfuckers are going down.’” Dudley Aff. ¶ 21. On May 10, 2011, WMA-TA suspended both Dudley and White for ten days. Exs. 42-43 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. At this time, Borders supervised Dudley, and Borders issued the suspension. Id. However, Dudley alleges that “Borders did not believe that I had instigated the incident,” but that the suspension came “upon the recommendation of [Devin] Walker and other managers.” Dudley Aff. ¶ 21. II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Summary Judgment “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The mere existence of any factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment; “the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original). A fact is material if, under the applicable law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Id. A dispute is genuine if the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Because “[credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge,” the “evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than “the existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The inferences drawn from the evidence “must be reasonably probable and based on more than mere speculation.” Rogers Corp. v. E.P.A., 275 F.3d 1096, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2002) (citations omitted). In addition, the non-moving party may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements. See Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999). The nonmoving party must present specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in its favor. Id. If the evidence presented is “merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. B. Title VII Discrimination Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it is unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). The plaintiff must plead “two elements for an employment discrimination case: (i) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Brady v. Office of Sergeant of Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C.Cir.2008). In Brady, the D.C. Circuit stated: Lest there be any lingering uncertainty, we state the rule clearly: In a Title VII disparate-treatment suit where an employee has suffered an adverse employment action and an employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision, the district court need not — and should not- — decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas [v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) ]. Rather, in considering an employer’s motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in those circumstances, the district court must resolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin? 520 F.3d at 494. C. Title VII Hostile Work Environment To establish a claim of a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment occurred because of the plaintiffs protected status; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question but nonetheless failed to either take steps to prevent it or afford the plaintiff prompt remedial action. Baloch v. Norton, 355 F.Supp.2d 246, 259 (D.D.C.2005). “To determine whether a hostile work environment exists, the court looks to the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Baloch v. Kempthome, 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C.Cir.2008). To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that her employer subjected her to “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)). The conduct must be sufficiently extreme to constitute an alteration in the conditions of employment so that Title VII does not evolve into a “general civility code.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998). “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Id. D. Title VII Retaliation Title VII also prohibits an employer from “discriminating] against” an employee because he has “opposed” a practice proscribed by Title VII or because “he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). To make out a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) that he opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII; (2) that the employer took a materially adverse action against him; and (3) that the employer took the action ‘because’ the employee opposed the practice.” McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 (D.C.Cir. 2012). Materially adverse actions are not limited “to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). However, a plaintiff must show that the employer’s actions “would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee.” Id. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405. Further, “an employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 56, 126 S.Ct. 2405. If the employer offers a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for the materially adverse action, “the sole remaining question” becomes “retaliation vel non — whether, based on all the evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that [the] proffered reason ... was pretext for retaliation.” Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 603-04 (D.C.Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also McGrath, 666 F.3d at 1380 n. 3 (“[T]he only question is whether the employee’s evidence creates a material dispute on the ultimate issue of retaliation.”). A plaintiff can show pretext “either directly by [showing] that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Jones v. Bemanke, 557 F.3d 670, 679 (D.C.Cir.2009) (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983)). E. Title VII Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies “In actions brought under Title VII, a court has authority over only those claims that are (1) contained in the plaintiffs administrative complaint or claims ‘like or reasonably related to’ those claims in the administrative complaint and (2) claims for which the plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies.” Pierson v. WMATA, 821 F.Supp.2d 360, 364 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.Cir.1995); Caldwell v. ServiceMaster Corp., 966 F.Supp. 33, 49 (D.D.C.1997)). “It is the defendant’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies.” Pierson, 821 F.Supp.2d at 364 (citing Brown v. Marsh, 111 F.2d 8, 13 (D.C.Cir.1985) (stating that “because untimely exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving it”)). “Dismissal results when a plaintiff fails to exhaust administrative remedies.” Pierson, 821 F.Supp.2d at 365 (citing Rann v. Chao, 346 F.3d 192, 194-95 (D.C.Cir.2003) (affirming trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs ADEA claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Gillet v. King, 931 F.Supp. 9, 12-13 (D.D.C.1996) (dismissing plaintiffs Title VII claim because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies)). Title VII “requires that an employee exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a claim with the EEOC prior to filing suit in the district court.” Headen v. WMATA, 741 F.Supp.2d 289, 294 (D.D.C.2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006)); see also Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.Cir.1995) (“Title VII requires that a person complaining of a violation file an administrative charge with the EEOC and allow the agency time to act on the charge.”). Title VII provides detailed procedures for bringing administrative charges, and its “charge filing provision [] ‘specifies with precision’ the prerequisites that a plaintiff must satisfy before filing suit.” National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974)). Title VII requires that “[a] charge ... shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred” or within three hundred days if the person “initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006). “Only after the EEOC has notified the aggrieved person of its decision to dismiss or its inability to bring a civil action within the requisite time period can that person bring a civil action herself.” Park, 71 F.3d at 907. III. DISCUSSION Dudley’s Complaint lists a number of discrete instances of alleged discriminatory and retaliatory conduct, describing a wide range of conduct spanning several years. However, the Court must be careful about which events it can and cannot consider. Before determining whether each of these events gives rise to discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims, the Court must ascertain the extent to which plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies. When analyzing each count, the Court must limit itself to events falling within a properly exhausted administrative charge, or for which there is an equitable justification for the failure to exhaust. The Court determines that Dudley’s Count I discrimination cause of action is limited to the events described in his January 2008 EEOC Charge. Dudley’s Complaint describes many discrete instances of discrimination that happen after the January 2008, but he has failed to administratively exhaust these discrete claims. Dudley has provided no equitable reason to excuse this failure to exhaust. As to the events covered by Dudley’s EEOC Charge, WMATA has proffered a race neutral, non-discriminatory reason for suspending Dudley. Dudley has not provided enough evidence to raise an inference of discrimination. Dudley’s primary evidence of discrimination — that WMATA allowed a White employee to work out of uniform — is not sufficient, as the two men are not sufficiently similar to make an apt comparison. Therefore, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Dudley’s Count I discrimination cause of action. The administrative exhaustion requirements for hostile work environment claims are more relaxed. However, even when the Court considers as true all the events Dudley describes in his Complaint and opposition brief, Dudley has not shown a workplace permeated with discriminatory ridicule, insult, or intimidation. Therefore, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Dudley’s Count II hostile work environment cause of action. Defendant is also entitled to summary judgment on Dudley’s Count III retaliation cause of action. When the Court limits its analysis to the events described in the exhausted charge — and events that could be reasonably expected to come out of an EEOC investigation into the charge — plaintiff has failed to even make a prima facie case for retaliation. The time between the last protected activity and the next adverse action is far too long to support an inference of causation, and Dudley has provided no direct evidence of retaliation to overcome this lack of temporal proximity. Therefore, WMATA is entitled to summary judgment on all three Counts, and the Court will dismiss this action with prejudice. A. Dudley’s Count I Race Discrimination Claims As noted above, Dudley complains about a wide variety of alleged discriminatory events. The Court must first determine which claims Dudley has properly exhausted. 1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies for Racial Discrimination Claims While Dudley claims that WMATA racially discriminated against him for years, and cites several examples of alleged discrimination, Dudley has not exhausted his administrative remedies for each discriminatory act. In this case, the plaintiff has only exhausted his administrative remedies as to one EEOC Charge. On January 7, 2008, Dudley filed a race discrimination charge with the EEOC. See Ex. 3 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J; Ex. 11 to Pl.’s Opp’n. In this Charge of Discrimination, Dudley stated the “particulars” as: I. On 11/13/89, I was hired by Respondent to work as a Cleaner/Shifter. On 06/16/07, while I was employed by Respondent as a Sign/Shelter Mechanic AA, I was unjustly issued a disciplinary writeup for violating Respondent’s policies. Subsequently, on 8/31/97 [sic ], I was suspended from employment for violating Respondent’s policies. By contrast, Caucasian co-workers who have committed the same or similar violations were subjected to little or no disciplinary action. II. I believe that I was discriminated against based upon my race, Black, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Id. He checked the box indicating that this discrimination was based on “race,” but left the “retaliation” box unchecked. Id. The EEOC did not take any action, and issued a Right to Sue Notice on May 17, 2011. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 15; Dudley Aff. ¶22. Dudley does not assert that he filed any other EEOC Charges or received any other Right to Sue Letters. He does not complain about any other discrete acts of discrimination that would have fallen within the limitations period covered by his January 2008 EEOC Charge. All of the other instances of discrimination come after Dudley filed his EEOC Charge. Cf. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110-11, 122 S.Ct. 2061 (“The [statutory] requirement ... that the charge be filed ‘after’ the practice ‘occurred’ tells us that a litigant has up to 180 or 300 days after the unlawful practice happened to file a charge with the EEOC.... A discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act ‘occurred’ on the day that it ‘happened.’ A party, therefore, must file a charge within either 180 or 300 days of the date of the act or lose the ability to recover for it.”). WMATA has proven this affirmative defense by producing the EEOC Charge Dudley filed, and identifying its date and subject matter. The Supreme Court has held that “[discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to an act alleged in timely filed charges.” Id at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061. To exhaust administrative remedies, “a Title VII plaintiff raising claims of discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts must file his charge within the appropriate time period.” Id. at 113-14, 122 S.Ct. 2061. “A party must exhaust [his] administrative remedies within the Title VII limitations period for each discrete act of discrimination alleged or lose the ability to recover for it.” Lipscomb v. Winter, 577 F.Supp.2d 258, 271 (D.D.C.2008); see also Wada v. Tomlinson, 517 F.Supp.2d 148, 183 (D.D.C.2007) (“[A] Title VII plaintiff is required to exhaust his or her administrative remedies with respect to each discrete allegedly discriminatory or retaliatory act....”). Some courts in this circuit have read Morgan narrowly, and found that incidents of discrimination or retaliation “like or reasonably related to those claims in the administrative complaint” do not need to be separately charged. Pierson, 821 F.Supp.2d at 364. But even under this more forgiving standard, Dudley is restricted to the events described in his January 2008 EEOC Charge. Dudley’s only properly filed and exhausted EEOC Charge is limited to his Fall 2007 suspension and warning for violating WMATA’s attendance policies. None of the other alleged instances of discrimination relate to WMATA’s attendance policy, or derive from this or a similar set of facts. None of the other alleged instances of discrimination happened within 300 days prior to Dudley filing his EEOC Charge. Dudley claims that WMATA removed a record of discipline from Peter White’s file, Compl. ¶ 10; that Lacey wrongfully wrote up Dudley for unprofessional behavior and insubordination on several occasions, id. ¶¶ 11-13; that WMATA placed Dudley on administrative leave after Dudley attempted to initiate a discrimination complaint, id. ¶ 14; that Joseph Royer denied Dudley the opportunity to fully review his employee file, id. ¶ 16; and that WMATA wrongfully suspended Dudley twice for violations of the workplace violence policy, id. ¶¶ 17-18. Regardless of the substantive merits of these claims, these are clearly discrete acts of discrimination requiring Dudley file a separate charge within the applicable limitations period. See, e.g., Park, 71 F.3d at 907-08 (a civil suit under Title VII is only as broad as the scope of any investigation that reasonably could have been expected to result from the initial charge of discrimination). Any connection between the acts properly charged and the later episodes is so tenuous that, if the Court found them to be related, it would completely undermine Title VII’s detailed filing scheme and the Supreme Court’s holding in Morgan. Cf. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 108, 122 S.Ct. 2061 (“ ‘strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the lav/ ”) (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980)); id. at 109, 122 S.Ct. 2061 (Title VII’s “charge filing provision [] ‘specifies with precision’ the prerequisites that a plaintiff must satisfy before filing suit.”) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974)). None of the subsequent incidents deals "with WMATA’s attendance policy, or events that derive from this allegedly unequal application of the attendance policy. Several episodes deal with discipline imposed by different supervisors. See Ex. 35 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (Borders suspended Lacey in May 2010); Ex. 36 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (Borders suspended Lacey in May 2011). If the only commonality were that WMATA supervisors took adverse action towards Dudley on the basis of Dudley’s race, then Title VII’s detailed procedures would become useless. Once Dudley files one discrimination charge, he would be able to fold in separate instances of discrimination without needing to file new charges. Courts in this Circuit have split over whether a failure to exhaust administrative remedies presents a jurisdictional bar to suit. Holmes v. PHI Service Co., 437 F.Supp.2d 110, 119 (D.D.C.2006) (“The Supreme Court has never expressly addressed whether Title VII’s exhaustion requirement is, as a whole, jurisdictional or non jurisdictional. Moreover, it has reached somewhat contradictory conclusions as to whether specific components of Title VII’s exhaustion requirement are themselves jurisdictional prerequisites.... The situation is not entirely clear in the District of Columbia Circuit either.”). In Holmes v. PHI Service Co., Judge Reggie Walton provides an excellent analysis of how district courts in this Circuit, lacking clear guidance from the Supreme Court or D.C. Circuit, have approached this issue. Id. at 119-25. After carefully examining the case law, Judge Walton decided that failure to exhaust is not a jurisdictional bar and allowed suit to continue when the plaintiff received a Right to Sue letter after commencing suit. Id. at 124-25. This Court will follow Judge Walton’s approach and consider whether there is any equitable reason to allow non-exhausted claims to go forward. Plaintiff argues that exhaustion is “subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling” and “a plaintiff may be excused if the court finds that there are equitable reasons for doing so.” Pl.’s Opp’n 26 (citing Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951, 960 (D.C.Cir.1982); Siegel v. Kreps, 654 F.2d 773, 777 (D.C.Cir.1981)). However, plaintiff argues that equitable tolling applies to his retaliation claims, not his unexhausted discrimination claims. Pl.’s Opp’n 26-27 (under heading “To the Extent Necessary, Equitable Tolling Applies to Dudley’s Retaliation Claims”). Even if Dudley meant to argue for tolling for his discrimination claims, equity does not excuse Dudley’s failure to file a timely charge for each discrete discriminatory act. “The plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving any equitable reasons for his or her failure to comply with Title VII’s time requirements.” Bass v. Bair, 514 F.Supp.2d 96, 99 (D.D.C.2007). “The court’s power to equitably excuse noncompliance with administrative filing deadlines, however, ‘will be exercised only in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances.’ ” Smith-Thompson v. District of Columbia, 657 F.Supp.2d 123, 132 (D.D.C.2009) (quoting Mondy v. Sec’y of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 (D.C.Cir.1988)). “An employer does not engage in affirmative misconduct, justifying equitable estoppel, merely by touting its internal procedures as the appropriate forum for resolving discrimination complaints.” Id. (citing Washington v. WMATA 160 F.3d 750, 752-53 (D.C.Cir.1998)). Dudley asks the Court to consider “a plaintiff’s intelligence and familiarly with the process and whether defendant had actual notice of plaintiffs claims” when considering whether to apply equitable tolling. Id. at 26 (citing Broom v. Cald era, 129 F.Supp.2d 25, 29 (D.D.C.2001); President v. Vance, 627 F.2d 353, 362 (D.C.Cir.1980)). Other than mentioning that Dudley “dealt with the EEOC pro se,” id., plaintiff does not explain how plaintiff lacked intelligence or familiarly with the process in a way that would excuse his failure to exhaust. Lacking any contrary evidence, the Court may infer from Dudley’s filing of an EEOC Charge in January 2008 that he was familiar enough with the process to know how to file a charge for later, discrete incidents of discrimination. After submitting his initial charge, Dudley continued to send documents to the EEOC. See Ex. 32 to Pl.’s Opp’n; Dudley Aff. ¶ 22. Dudley claims that he “sought to amend [his] EEOC complaint” to include later events, but the “EEOC told [him] that it was premature because they hadn’t gotten to [his] complaint yet.” Dudley Aff. ¶ 22. Dudley states that he sent the EEOC over 400 pages of documents, providing information on later instances of discrimination and retaliation. Id. Dudley has included 58 of those pages as an exhibit. Ex. 32 to PL’s Opp’n. These pages include copies of internal grievances for later incidents, id., which Dudley characterizes as instances of “retaliation.” Dudley Aff. ¶ 22. This does not excuse Dudley’s failure to file a separate EEOC Charge for each discrete incident of discrimination. Dudley has the burden of “pleading and proving any equitable reasons” for his failure to comply with Title VIPs exhaustion requirements. Bass, 514 F.Supp.2d at 99. Noticeably absent from Dudley’s exhibits are: any correspondence between Dudley and the EEOC about amending the charge, evidence that WMA-TA knew that Dudley continued to send the EEOC documents about later events, evidence as to when Dudley sent the EEOC these documents, evidence that Dudley did not know that he had to file separate charges for each act of discrimination, evidence that Dudley was misled by anyone about EEOC filing requirements, or the Right to Sue Letter itself. Dudley continued to file internal grievances, but if filing internal grievances were sufficient, alone, to put WMATA on notice that Dudley intended to pursue Title VII actions, then requiring an EEOC Charge would be superfluous. Plaintiff could simply avoid the administrative process entirely by filing an internal grievance, and proceeding directly to federal court if the employer denies that grievance. “WMA-TA’s internal procedures offer a separate forum for pursuing discrimination complaints, which does not displace ... Title VII filing requirements.” Washington v. WMATA, 160 F.3d at 753 (where WMATA “touted its internal procedure as the appropriate forum for resolving discrimination complaints,” plaintiff not entitled to tolling because he “demonstrated no affirmative misconduct on the part of WMA-TA,” nor did he show “that WMATA’s decision letter disposing of his claim was misleading”). Dudley only filed one EEOC Charge relating to this suit, and that that Charge only discussed the one-day suspension and reprimand for violating WMATA’s attendance policy. Finding that Dudley failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for the other instances of discrimination complained of, and finding no reason to apply equitable tolling, the Court will only consider the merits of the claims raised in the January 2008 EEOC Charge. 2. Dudley’s Prima Facie Case of Race Discrimination The burden for establishing a prima facie case for discrimination under Title VII is not heavy. Dudley needs to allege that he “suffered an adverse employment action ... because of [his] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Brady, 520 F.3d at 493. Dudley has shown that he suffered an adverse employment action — being suspended for one day for violating WMATA’s attendance policy, see Def.’s SMF ¶ 11; Pl.’s SMF 10 (not disputing Def.’s SMF ¶ 11) — and has alleged that it was because of his race— Dudley claims that White employees are not similarly punished for violating the attendance policy, see Pl.’s SMF 1-2; Dudley Aff. ¶¶ 3-9. This establishes a prima facie case for racial discrimination. 3. WMATA’s Response & Dudley’s Evidence of Discrimination As noted by the D.C. Circuit, “the question whether the employee ma[kes] out a prima facie case is almost always irrelevant.” Brady, 520 F.3d at 493. When “an employer has asserted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for taking adverse employment action against the plaintiff, “the district court must resolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin?” Id. at 494. WMATA has offered a straightforward legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for suspending Dudley: Dudley showed up late ten times in one year, violated a clear WMATA policy, and was suspended in accordance with that clear policy. See Exs. 6 & 7 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.; Def.’s SMF ¶ 11. Even absent such a clear policy, courts have recognized tardiness as a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for taking adverse personnel action. See, e.g., Clarke v. WMATA 904 F.Supp.2d 11, 16-18, 2012 WL 5505242, *3-*4 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2012); Turner v. Shinseki, 824 F.Supp.2d 99, 116 (D.D.C. 2011). WMATA avers that it enforces this policy in a race-neutral manner, providing evidence that around the same time Lacey suspended Dudley, Lacey also suspended White employee Barry Brassford for similar conduct. Exs. 8 & 9 to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.; Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 12-13; Pl.’s SMF 10 (not disputing Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 12-13). Dudley conceded that the showed up late ten times and violated WMATA’s policy. See Pl.’s SMF 10 (not disputing Def.’s SMF ¶ 11). While conceding that he repeatedly reported late, Dudley contends that WMATA enforced its policy in a discriminatory manner — i.e., Lacey gave White employees favorable treatment under the policy, and strictly enforced it against Dudley. See, e.g., Dudley Aff. ¶¶ 4-6; Affidavit of Kenneth A. Ray ¶¶ 5-8, Aug. 24, 2012, ECF No. 19-6; Affidavit of Freddie L. Kenley ¶ 5, July 18, 2012, ECF No. 19-7; Declaration of James T. Lumpkins ¶ 11, May 14, 2012, ECF No. 20-1. In particular, Dudley and his co-workers allege that a White employee named William Adams regularly came to work out of his official uniform. Id. According to witnesses and a picture taken by Dudley, Adams mocked the uniform policy by wearing an orange shirt with “Metro” printed on it. See, e.g., Ex. 7 to PL’s Opp’n. Dudley claims that he and his co-workers brought this discrepancy to management’s attention on numerous occasions, but management did not take their complaints seriously. Dudley Aff. ¶¶ 5-6. Dudley alleges Adams did not begin complying with the uniform policy until September 28, 2007, after WMATA issued a Staff Notice on the subject. Dudley Aff. ¶ 6; see also Ex. 8 to PL’s Opp’n (memo informing all maintenance workers to wear official uniforms). Dudley argues that the issues of “showing up late” and “showing up out of uniform” are part of the same WMATA policy, see Pl.’s Opp’n 1-2 — specifically Rule 1.28, which states: (a) Employees shall be in regulation work uniform, before punching their time card “IN,” to begin the scheduled shift. Employees shall be in their work area and promptly ready for any work assignment by their scheduled shift time. (b) Employees not in regulation uniform, and not in their work area ready to perform their work assignment by their scheduled report time, will be subject to corrective action. Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Opp’n 9 (Metro Rules and Regulations handbook). The way plaintiff interprets this policy, the Rule requires “employees in the Office of Bus Maintenance ... to report to work at 6:00 a.m. in uniform or they are considered late. If they are out of uniform after 6:00 a.m., they are considered late regardless of when they punched in.” PL’s Opp’n 1-2. Therefore, since Lacey overlooked Adams’s frequent “lateness,” but strictly enforced the policy as to Dudley, plaintiff argues that this raises issues of material fact as to WMATA’s proffered explanation, and whether Dudley was the victim of intentional discrimination. See id. at 15-18. In order to rebut WMATA’s proffered explanation, Dudley need not “demonstrate] that []he was treated differently from similarly situated employees who are not part of the protected class.” George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 412 (D.C.Cir.2005). Using such comparison evidence is one acceptable method; Dudley may also show that “the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence,” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000), as “in appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose,” id. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097. However, Dudley provides no such evidence that WMATA’s proffered explanation is “unworthy of credence.” WMA-TA’s legitimate explanation is that Dudley showed up late ten times, and was suspended in accordance with the policy; Dudley admits that he showed up late. Def.’s SMF ¶ 11; Pl.’s SMF 10 (not disputing Def.’s SMF ¶ 11). Dudley claims, “Lacey’s credibility is ... called into question by his marking of WMATA’s Record of Disciplinary Action for Unscheduled Absence forms as excused for late arrivals of White employees for reasons that he marked as unexcused for Black employees.” Pl.’s Opp’n 20. This does not undermine Lacey’s assertion that Dudley arrived late ten times; it goes to whether Lacey implemented the policy in a discriminatory manner, essentially by comparing the treatment of employees in a protected class with that of employees in a non-protected class. Furthermore, Dudley tries to use all his unexhausted claims of retaliation and discrimination, and the constituent events of his hostile work environment claim, as “additional evidence ... of discriminatory behavior exhibited by Lacey and others in management.” Id. at 19-20. As discussed infra, the events Dudley complains of are not sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment. These events do not show that Lacey was so racist and hostile towards Dudley that any explanation Lacey provides for the suspension would be “unworthy of credence.” While plaintiff is correct that using a “comparator” is not required, Pl.’s Opp’n 17-18, “comparator” evidence is the strongest evidence plaintiff has. Nevertheless, Dudley’s use of Adams as a “comparator” is not sufficient to overcome WMATA’s proffered legitimate explanation. When determining whether another employee is similarly-situated to the plaintiff: It is fundamental that to make a comparison of a discrimination plaintiffs treatment to that of non-minority employees, the plaintiff must show that the ‘comparables’ are similarly-situated in all respects____ Thus, to be deemed “similarly-situated”, the individuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare his/ her treatment must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it. Phillips v. Holladay Property Services, Inc., 937 F.Supp. 32, 37 (D.D.C.1996) (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir.1992)) (citations and formatting omitted). Dudley and Adams share the same supervisor and have been subject to the same standards, but they have not engaged in the same conduct, and there are mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or their employer’s treatment of them for it. In a Title VII case brought by a WMA-TA employee complaining that he was unfairly disciplined for showing up pate, Judge Contreras stated: [T]he plaintiff argues that similarly situated white employees arrived late to work without suffering similar consequences. In general, a Title VII plaintiff may demonstrate pretext by showing that his employer gave favorable treatment to similarly situated employees of a different race. Brady, 520 F.3d at 495; Wicks v. Am. Transmission Co. LLC, 701 F.Supp.2d 38, 45 (D.D.C.2010). Yet to draw an apt comparison, the plaintiff must demonstrate that all relevant aspects of his employment situation were “nearly identical” to those of the other employees. See Royall v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 548 F.3d 137, 145 (D.C.Cir.2008). Here, the plaintiff alleges that Warren Woodward, a white employee, was often late but never punished. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3 (claiming that Mr. Woodward had a habit of arriving late, but that “Ms. Wang had blatantly overlooked Mr. Woodwardfs] tardiness in violating WMATA’s arrival policy for years with no form of disciplinary action taken against him.”). The analogy is flawed. Clarke, 904 F.Supp.2d at 17, 2012 WL 5505242, *4. Plaintiffs attempt to draw an analogy between himself and Adams is also flawed. First, Adams and Dudley did not engage in the same conduct. Rule 1.28 requires employees to be on time, and in uniform. Dudley and Adams violated two distinct parts of this Rule. If Dudley claimed that Adams repeatedly arrived after the report time — like Dudley did — and was not disciplined, this might present an apt comparison. However, that is not the case. Lacey disciplined Dudley for showing after the report time, but Dudley was in uniform. Dudley claims Adams was out of uniform, but does not allege Adams showed up after the report time. Dudley and Adams may have allegedly violated the same “rule,” but they did not engage in the same conduct to violate that rule. Dudley has not demonstrated that all relevant aspects of his employment situation were “nearly identical” to that of Adams. See Royall, 548 F.3d at 145. Second, WMATA has offered mitigating circumstances that would distinguish Dudley and Adams’s conduct, and WMATA’s treatment of them for it. According to WMATA, Dudley and Adams had different job responsibilities — Adams worked as a welder and Dudley did not. WMATA claims that the standard-issue polyester uniforms could pose a fire hazard to a welder such as Adams, and “safety is permitted to trump the letter of the rule, in this instance.” Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 14. Dudley claims that this explanation is baseless because Adams had the option to wear an official cotton uniform. Dudley Aff. ¶4. Regardless of whether Adams “needed” to wear something other than the official uniform to perform his job, WMA-TA has shown relevant differences between Adams and Dudley’s job responsibilities that make a comparison between the two less apt. Dudley may have disagreed with Lacey’s decision to let a White welder wear his street clothes to work, but this “favoritism” has little direct relationship to whether Lacey used Dudley’s repeated tardiness as pretext for suspending Dudley. When relying on a comparator to overcome the employer’s proffered legitimate explanation, there must be a very close relationship between the compared employees. Where the employees engaged in different conduct to violate different aspects of the same rule, and the employee has offered mitigating circumstances to explain any perceived unfairness, there is not an apt enough comparison. Lacking sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence to rebut WMATA’s proffered legitimate reasons for suspending Dudley and warning him about late reports, Dudley’s Count I discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment. B. Dudley’s Count II Hostile Work Environment Claim Dudley claims that a series of racist and discriminatory actions by WMATA supervisors contributed to a hostile work environment. Compl. ¶¶ 23-24; Pl.’s Opp’n 1-13. To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, Dudley needs to show that his “workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult” that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Baloch v. Kempthome, 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)). Such claims are “usually characterized by a series of events that cumulatively give rise to a claim, although each individual component might not be actionable on its own.” Craig v. District of Columbia, 881 F.Supp.2d 26, 32 (D.D.C.2012) (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061). It does not matter whether Dudley’s hostile work environment claim “is discrimination-based or retaliation-based ... because the legal standard is the same for either theory.” Bonnette v. Shinseki, 907 F.Supp.2d 54, 80 n. 11, 2012 WL 5986466, *20 n. 11 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2012). 1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies for Hostile Work Environment Claim The requirements for exhausting administrative remedies and timely filing charges are different for hostile work environment claims. “Because a hostile work environment claim aggregates numerous occurrences, these claims are subject to a different timeliness analysis than claims involving discrete acts.” Craig, 881 F.Supp.2d at 32. Thus, Dudley “need only allege that one or more contributing acts occurred within the relevant time period” and “[i]t does not matter that some component acts may fall outside that period.” Id. This does not open the door “to recovery for time-barred claims,” and the incidents falling outside of the period covered by the charge must be “adequately linked into a coherent hostile environment claim.” Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1251 (D.C.Cir.2011). Dudley’s EEOC Charge did not check the “continuing action” box or clearly complain about a hostile work environment. See Ex. 10 to Pl.’s Opp’n; Def.’s SMF ¶ 16; Pl.’s SMF 12, ¶ 16 (not disputing that he failed to allege hostile work environment on EEOC Charge). However, on the EEOC Intake Questionnaire, Dudley stated, “I also feel that the comments and actions by (Lacey) management has created an intimidating, offensive, stressfull [sic] and hostile working environment for me.” Ex. 10 to PL’s Opp’n 2. Dudley also complained about alleged discriminatory “comments and actions by James Lacey towards me when meeting about writeups.” Id. at 3. Since Dudley clearly complained to the EEOC about a hostile work environment in his Intake Questionnaire, the Court assumes that his hostile work claim is “like or reasonably related to those claims in the administrative complaint,” and would be within the “scope of any investigation that reasonably could have been expected to result from” looking into the January 2008 EEOC Charge. Pierson, 821 F.Supp.2d at 364 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Holmes-Martin v. Leavitt, 569 F.Supp.2d 184, 191-93 (D.D.C.2008) (allowing hostile work environment claim to proceed even though it was not specifically listed as separate cause of action in EEOC complaint). Therefore, the fact that Dudley’s official charge did not explicitly mention a hostile work environment does not prevent him from bringing his claims in federal court. 2. Merits of Hostile Work Environment Claim When the Court looks at the incidents Dudley describes, they are not enough to support a hostile work environment claim. Dudley describes many events he believes, when taken as a whole, make up a hostile work environment. But Dudley has failed to establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim. When the Court considers the totality of the evidence proffered, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, there are no genuine issues of fact, and no reasonable jury could find that plaintiff established a hostile work environment claim. Simply put, Dudley “cannot meet the high burden of showing hostility in the work environment” at WMATA “that was ‘severe,’ ‘pervasive.’ and ‘abusive.’ ” Nurriddin v. Goldin, 382 F.Supp.2d 79, 108 (D.D.C.2005), aff'd sub nom., Nurriddin v. Griffin, 222 Fed.Appx. 5 (D.C.Cir.2007). The bulk of Dudley’s hostile work environment claim consists of discrete instances of alleged discrimination or r