Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER JOY FLOWERS CONTI, District Judge. Presently before the court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (ECF No. 39) and brief in support (ECF No. 40) filed by defendants Kathleen Sebelius, Hilda Solis, Timothy Geithner, the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), the United States Department of Labor, and the United States Department of the Treasury (collectively, “defendants”); the Response in Opposition (ECF No. 51) filed by plaintiffs Geneva College (“Geneva”), Wayne L. Hepler (“Hepler”), The Seneca Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc. (“SHLC”), WLH Enterprises (“WLH”), and Carrie E. Kolesar (“Kolesar” and together with Geneva, Hepler, SHLC, and WLH, collectively “plaintiffs”); and defendants’ reply (ECF No. 54.) Subsequent to the filing of defendants’ motion, the court held a hearing on October 31, 2012, at which time the court heard argument and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing. (ECF Nos. 55 and 58.) The parties have kept the court well informed of recent decisions by other district courts and courts of appeals in similar cases around the country. The matter is now ripe for disposition, and for the reasons that follow, defendants’ motion will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The present case is one of dozens of similar lawsuits currently pending in district courts and courts of appeals throughout the country. In each case, individuals and entities, both for-profit and nonprofit, are challenging the provision of the new federal health care law requiring health insurance plans to provide coverage for certain services, which defendants assert are appropriate for women’s preventive care. Plaintiffs in this case, as discussed more fully below, are a private, nonprofit college, two for-profit entities, and individual owners of those entities. Plaintiffs object on religious grounds to being required to include coverage in their health plans for contraceptives such as ella and Plan B, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for women of reproductive capacity (the “objected to services”). I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS DERIVED FROM THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WHICH MUST BE TAKEN AS TRUE FOR THE PURPOSE OF RESOLVING THE MOTION TO DISMISS A. Geneva Geneva is a nonprofit institution of higher learning established in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania in 1848 by the Reformed Presbyterian Church of North America (“RPCNA”). (ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 11, 25.) Geneva’s mission is “to glorify God by educating and ministering to a diverse community of students in order to develop servant-leaders who will transform society for the kingdom of Christ.” (Id. ¶ 25.) This mission is central to Geneva’s institutional identity and activities. (Id. ¶¶ 27-29.) Geneva offers a traditional liberal arts and sciences curriculum as well as student programs and services that are rooted in the Christian faith. (Id. ¶ 26.) Pursuant to its mission and goals, Geneva has historically promoted a diverse student population and has opposed institutions (such as slavery) that it finds inimical to its beliefs. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.) Geneva is governed by a board of corporators and a board of trustees. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.) Members of the board of corporators must be members of the RPCNA and members of the board of trustees must be members of either the RPCNA or some other Reformed or Evangelical Christian congregation. (Id. ¶ 30-31.) Geneva’s faculty, staff and administration are drawn from among those who profess faith in Christ and who otherwise agree with the college’s Christian convictions. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Geneva does not require its students to profess a particular faith, but it does give enrollment priority to evangelical Christians and requires all students to live by standards of Christian morality. (Id. at ¶ 33.) Geneva and the RPCNA firmly believe “that the procurement, participation in, facilitation of, or payment for abortion [including the use of what it alleges are abortion-causing drugs like Plan B and ella] violates the Commandment against murder.” (Id. ¶ 43.) Geneva identifies several texts, including the Ten Commandments, Scripture, the articulated statements of the RPCNA, and the Westminster Larger Catechism in support of its view that human life begins at the moment of fertilization, and that any destruction of a human life thereafter constitutes murder. (Id. ¶¶ 38^44.) Geneva’s Student Handbook expressly provides that abortion “ ‘will not be tolerated.’ ” (Id. ¶ 49.) In furtherance of its views on abortion, Geneva’s students and staff participate in a host of pro-life activities both on and off campus. (Id. ¶¶ 45-48.) Geneva provides health insurance to its employees and makes health insurance available to its students. (Id. ¶ 51.) Geneva’s student health plan does not enjoy “grandfathered status” and its current plan year began on August 1, 2012. (Id. ¶¶ 73-74.) With respect to its employee health plan, Geneva’s contract for coverage explicitly excludes “ ‘drugs used to abort a pregnancy.’ ” (Id. ¶ 50.) At the time suit was filed, Geneva’s employee group health insurance plan was in its 2012 plan year, which began January 1, 2012 and concluded December 31, 2012. (Id. ¶¶ 52-53.) Geneva alleges that its current employee health plan remained grandfathered through the end of the 2012 plan year, but fears that it will not remain so in forthcoming years based upon financial pressures stemming from increased costs and decreased student enrollment. (Id. ¶¶ 54-57.) Geneva also fears that its employee health insurance plan could lose grandfathered status when its insurer attempts to enforce the provision excluding “ ‘[a]ny drugs used to abort a pregnancy.’ ” (Id. ¶ 58.) This concern arose when Geneva learned that its employee health plan allegedly provided ulipristal (“ella”), levonorgestral (“Plan B”), and intrauterine devices (“IUDs”) in the past without its knowledge. (Id.) Geneva instructed its insurer to stop providing these items on the grounds that they “can abort the pregnancy of an embryo after fertilization.” (Id.) The insurer allegedly indicated that it would remove the coverage at some point during the 2012 calendar and plan year. (Id.) Geneva alleges that the rules promulgated by defendants (as explained in detail below) make it difficult to determine whether any changes to its employee health plan with respect to ella, Plan B, and IUDs will cause it to lose its grandfathered status. (Id. ¶¶ 59-63.) Geneva alleges, therefore, that the ehmination of ella, Plan B, and IUDs from its health plan coverage will result in a loss of grandfathered status. (Id. ¶¶ 64-68.) B. The Heplers and SHLC Hepler and his family (which includes Kolesar) (collectively the “Heplers”), are practicing Catholics who strive to follow Catholic beliefs and teachings in all areas of their lives, including the operation of their businesses. (Id. ¶¶ 75-77.) The Heplers have pursued this goal by building a chapel on their business premises, displaying religious imagery in their business, making charitable donations to Catholic causes, and providing health insurance to their families and Catholic employees consistent with their beliefs. (Id. ¶¶ 82-85.) The Heplers participate extensively in both Catholic and pro-life activities. (Id. ¶¶ 86-88.) Hepler and his thirteen children allege that they are committed to the Catholic church’s teachings on human life and sexuality, including the church’s position against abortifacients, contraceptives, and sterilization. (Id. ¶ 88.) SHLC is owned and directed by Hepler, Kolesar, and six of Kolesar’s adult siblings. (Id. ¶ 89.) Hepler owns a 58% share of SHLC and Kolesar and her six adult siblings each own a 6% share. (Id.) SHLC has twenty-two full-time employees, nineteen of whom (including Hepler and Kolesar’s husband) are covered by the company’s health insurance plan. (Id. ¶ 90.) Hepler also owns and operates a sawmill as the sole proprietorship WLH, which has six full-time employees, five of whom are covered under SHLC’s health insurance plan. (Id. ¶ 91.) Like Geneva, the Heplers allege that their sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit them from intentionally participating in, paying for, facilitating, or otherwise supporting the use of abortifacient drugs, contraception, sterilization, and related education and counseling through the health insurance coverage that SHLC provides their families and employees. (Id. ¶¶ 77-82.) The SHLC health insurance plan is currently in its July 2012 plan year, and will begin its next plan year on July 1, 2013. (Id. ¶ 98.) Plaintiffs allege that SHLC’s health insurance plan does not have grandfathered status. (Id. ¶ 97.) Pursuant to the Heplers’ stated beliefs, SHLC’s health insurance plan currently does not cover abortifacients, contraceptives and sterilization, and has not done so for several years. (Id. ¶¶ 94-99.) Hepler, Kolesar, SHLC and WLH allege that defendants’ requirement that SHLC’s nongrandfathered health plan provide coverage for the objected to services will force them to purchase a health plan that offers coverage for those services beginning in July 2013. (Id. ¶ 100.) II. THE RELEVANT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE OBJECTED TO SERVICES A. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 On March 23, 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (Mar. 23, 2010) (“ACA”) became law and an overhaul of the nation’s healthcare system began. Section 1001 of the ACA includes specific measures related to preventive care for women, and provides in part: (a) In general A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements for— (4) with respect to women, such additional preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration [“HRSA”] for purposes of this paragraph. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (the “preventive care provision”). Because the ACA did not specifically identify which preventive care services would have to be provided without cost sharing, further rulemaking was necessary. B. Preventive Care Services and Interim Final Regulations On July 19, 2010, defendants (the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury) issued interim final regulations implementing the preventive care provision. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the ACA, (the “first interim final regulations”), 75 Fed.Reg. 41,-726 (Jul. 19, 2010). The first interim final regulations require all group health plans and health insurance issuers offering nongrandfathered group or individual health coverage to cover, without cost sharing, the preventive care services outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13. Id. at 41,728. The first interim final regulations directed the Department of Health and Human Services, in conjunction with the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) to determine what preventive services are necessary and beneficial for women’s health and well-being. Id. The IOM was to report its findings to the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”), which was to issue the necessary guidelines. The report issued by the IOM on July 19, 2011 recommended that the HRSA guidelines include, inter alia: “[t]he full range of Food and Drug Administration [ (‘FDA’) ]-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity.” IOM Report at 10. FDA-approved contraceptive methods include the objected to services, such as the drugs ella and Plan B, as well as IUDs. C. HRSA Guidelines On August 1, 2011, HRSA adopted guidelines pursuant to the IOM recommendations and on August 3, 2011, again issued interim final regulations (the “second interim final regulations”). Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the ACA, 76 Fed.Reg. 46,-621 (Aug. 3, 2011). The second interim final regulations carve out an exemption allowing certain religious employers to avoid providing insurance coverage for the objected to services. 76 Fed.Reg. at 46,-626 (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(l)(iv)(B)). The exemption defines religious organizations as those employers that meet the following criteria: (1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization; (2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the organization; (3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the organization; (4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in section 6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. The sections of the Internal Revenue Code cited in subsection (4) define nonprofit organizations as “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches,” and “the exclusively religious activities of any religious order” that are exempt from taxation pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501(a). D. Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor Provision After allowing the public and interested groups to comment on the second interim final regulations, defendants adopted the definition of religious employer contained in those regulations without change on February 15, 2012. Group Health Plans and Health Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the ACA, 77 Fed.Reg. 8,725, 8,727-28 (Feb. 15, 2012). The adopted final regulations (the “final regulations”) contain a temporary enforcement safe harbor provision for nongrandfathered plans that do not qualify for the religious employer exemption. Id. HHS issued supplemental guidance (“HHS Guidance”) with respect to the safe harbor provision. The safe harbor provision provides that defendants will not take any enforcement action against an employer, a group health plan, or a group health insurance issuer with respect to nonexempt, nongrandfathered group health plans that fail to cover some or all of the recommended preventive services “until the first plan year that begins on or after August 1, 2013.” HHS Guidance, at 3. To qualify for the safe harbor provision, an organization must meet the following criteria: (1) The organization is organized and operates as a non-profit entity. (2) From February 10, 2012 onward, contraceptive coverage has not been provided at any point by the group health plan established or maintained by the organization, consistent with any applicable State law, because of the religious beliefs of the organization. (3) ... [T]he group health plan established or maintained by the organization (or another entity on behalf of the plan, such as a health insurance issuer or third-party administrator) must provide [notice] to participants ... which states that contraceptive coverage will not be provided under the plan for the first plan year beginning on or after August 1, 2012. (4) The organization self-certifies that it satisfies criteria 1-3 above, and documents its self-certification in accordance with the procedures detailed [elsewhere in the HHS Guidance], HHS Guidance, at 3. A similar safe harbor provision also applies to student health insurance coverage provided by nonprofit institutions of higher education that satisfy similar criteria. 77 Fed Reg. at 16,504. E. Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-making Following the adoption of the final regulations and the HHS Guidance in February 2012, defendants issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPRM”) on March 21, 2012. Certain Preventive Services Under the ACA, 77 Fed Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012). The ANPRM seeks additional public comments and sets forth “questions and ideas” on how to best provide women with access to contraceptive services without cost-sharing, while accommodating the religious liberty concerns articulated by nonexempt religious organizations. Id. at 16,503. By its own terms, the ANPRM aims to “protect ... religious organizations from having to contract, arrange, or pay for contraceptive coverage.” Id. The ANPRM provided a ninety-day comment period ending June 19, 2012. Id. F. Updated Guidance The HHS updated its guidance bulletin (the “Updated HHS Guidance”) on August 15, 2012 by clarifying three points: “(1) that the safe harbor is also available to non-profit organizations with religious objections to some but not all contraceptive coverage ...; (2) that group health plans that took some action to try to exclude or limit contraceptive coverage that was not successful as of February 10, 2012, are not for that reason precluded from eligibility for the safe harbor ...; and (3) that the safe harbor may be invoked without prejudice by non-profit organizations that are uncertain whether they qualify for the religious employer exemption.” The safe harbor is aimed at providing an additional year — until the first plan year beginning on or after August 1, 2013 — for health plans and health insurance issuers to comply with the preventive care requirement. Updated HHS Guidance at 3. G. Proposed Rules On February 6, 2013, defendants issued proposed rules (the “proposed rales”) broadening the universe of organizations eligible for an exemption from the contraceptive requirement. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed Reg. 8,456, 8,462 (Feb. 6, 2013). In the proposed rules, defendants proposed an accommodation for religious organizations that object to providing contraceptive coverage, including religious institutions of higher education. The proposed rules exclude from the contraceptive requirement those organizations that meet certain criteria: (1) “The organization opposes providing coverage for some or all of the contraceptive services required to be covered under [the final regulations] on account of religious objections;” (2) “The organization is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity;” (3) “The organization holds itself out as a religious organization;” and (4) “The organization self-certifies that it satisfies the first three criteria.” 78 Fed Reg. at 8,462. In an effort to also accommodate those plan beneficiaries who may not share the beliefs of the organizations claiming the accommodation, the proposed rules also set forth proposed ways “to provide women with contraceptive coverage without cost sharing and to protect eligible organizations from having to contract, arrange, pay, or refer for contraceptive coverage to which they object on religious grounds.” Id. at 8,462-64. III. CLAIMS PRESENTED IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT A. Substantial Burdens Plaintiffs allege that the statutory scheme outlined above violates their religious beliefs by requiring them to provide coverage for the objected to services. (ECF No. 32 ¶ 110-11.) Consequently, Geneva (as a large employer) will allegedly be burdened by potentially being subject to fines or monetary penalties of at least $500,000 per year if it fails to include insurance coverage for the objected to services or, in the alternative, if it ceases to provide health insurance. (Id. ¶¶ 112-16.) Plaintiffs also allege that the Heplers, SHLC, and WLH are being forced to choose between providing health insurance that is inconsistent with their beliefs or providing no insurance at all, a choice that puts them at a competitive disadvantage and forces their employees to purchase health insurance, which includes coverage for the objected to services, on their own. (Id. ¶¶ 116-22.) Plaintiffs allege that the requirement to provide health insurance coverage for the objected to services (what plaintiffs refer to generally as the “mandate”) imposes substantial burdens on their religious beliefs, and that they are unable to avoid such burdens by self-insuring. (Id. ¶¶ 124-126.) Plaintiffs allege that they are not eligible for the religious employer exemption provided in the HRSA Guidelines, 76 Fed Reg. at 46,626, because it is unclear how defendants will interpret or determine each of the requirements. (ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 127-39.) Based upon the uncertainty, plaintiffs allege several hardships that will be incurred as a result of the mandate. Geneva alleges that it would have to change its religious affiliation, admissions, employment, and service programs to fall within the scope of the mandate’s religious employer exemption. (Id. ¶ 140.) Geneva also alleges that the mandate would burden its employee and student recruitment and retention efforts by making health insurance coverage uncertain. (Id. ¶¶ 146-47.) Plaintiffs allege that the mandate fails to protect their statutory and constitutional rights to not provide or facilitate the provision of the objected to services. (Id. ¶ 141^13.) Plaintiffs assert that the mandate impermissibly coerces them to provide coverage for the objected to services in violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs, lest they be subject to substantial fines. (Id. ¶¶ 144^15, 148-52.) B. The Mandate’s Applicability Plaintiffs allege that the mandate does not apply equally to all members of religious groups because it provides for numerous exemptions, and therefore the ACA is not a law of general applicability. (Id. ¶¶ 153-57.) According to plaintiffs, the offer of compromise made by President Obama in a press conference on February 12, 2012 does not apply to Geneva because the offer is not contained in any rule or guidance made final by defendants; and does not apply to the Heplers, SHLC, and WLH because they are not nonprofit organizations. (Id. ¶¶ 158-60.) Geneva asserts that it is subject to the mandate’s requirement that its health insurance plans provide coverage for the objected to services beginning in its January 2013 plan year. (Id. ¶ 163.) Geneva disputes whether its employee health plan will maintain its grandfathered status when its insurer removes abortifacients from its coverage during this plan year. (Id. ¶ 165.) Geneva alleges that even if its employee health plan retains grandfathered status, maintaining that status will cause it substantial harm by preventing it from making any necessary changes to that plan in response to changing financial conditions. (Id. ¶¶ 165-69.) This uncertainty regarding grandfathered status will allegedly make it difficult for Geneva to know whether, and on what terms, it may offer health insurance, and will require it to plan for its employees’ health insurance needs without certainty about the law. (Id. ¶¶ 170-71.) Geneva disputes that it can comply with the HHS Guidance regarding the temporary safe harbor, because it cannot self-certify that it “did not offer non-abortifacient contraception and sterilization after February 10, 2012.” (Id. ¶ 174.) Even if Geneva could avoid any burden based upon the safe harbor, it alleges that it will still be harmed for several reasons: (1) the HHS Guidance is vague, so Geneva may still not qualify; (2) the safe harbor provision can be revoked at any time; (3) at the end of the extension, the mandate will still apply; and (4) even if the safe harbor applied, its effect would still leave Geneva in violation of the mandate, despite defendants’ promise not to enforce it. (Id. ¶ 175.) Because the February 2013 proposed rules were issued after the parties filed their briefs, neither defendants nor Geneva addressed their impact. The Heplers, SHLC, and WLH allege that the safe harbor does not apply to them because SHLC and WLH, the employers, are for-profit entities. (Id. ¶ 176.) C. Claims for Relief Based upon the above allegations, plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to twelve claims for relief. Counts I through VI are claims asserted by Geneva: count I alleges a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (“RFRA”); count II alleges a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; count III alleges a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; count TV alleges a violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment; count V alleges a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and count VI alleges a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq. Counts VII through XII allege the same violations as Counts I through VI, with respect to Hepler, Kolesar, SHLC, and WLH. IV. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD A. Lack of Justiciability Based Upon Standing or Ripeness Claims must be dismissed if the plaintiff lacks standing to assert them or if the claims are not ripe. The standing doctrine requires plaintiffs to show a valid “case or controversy” exists as required by Article III and imposes a constitutional limit on who may bring suit. The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir.2000). To establish standing, plaintiffs must plead that they have: (1) suffered an injury-in-fact; (2) that is fairly traceable to defendant’s challenged actions; and (3) that is likely redressable by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The United States Supreme Court in Lujan defined the injury-in-fact requirement as “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.”” Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. An alleged injury must be “ ‘certainly impending’ to constitute injury in fact.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (citing Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)). The “underlying purpose of the imminence requirement is to ensure that the court in which suit is brought does not render an advisory opinion in ‘a case in which no injury would have occurred at all.’ ” Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 500 (D.C.Cir.1994) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 2130). In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), the United States Supreme Court set forth the two fundamental considerations in determining ripeness: (1) “the fitness of the issues for judicial decision;” and (2) “the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507. In the context of a pre-enforcement declaratory judgment action, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit refined the Abbott Laboratories test, requiring courts to consider: (1) the adversity of the parties’ interests; (2) the conclusiveness of the judgment with respect to the legal relationship between the parties; and (3) the practical help or utility of the judgment. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir.1990). B. Failure to State a Claim A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, when considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir.2002). While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.... Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” (Id. at 1949) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (internal citations omitted). Two working principles underlie Twombly. Id. First, with respect to mere conclusory statements, a court need not accept as true all the allegations contained in a complaint. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.) Second, to survive a motion to dismiss, a claim must state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. (citing 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir.2007)). “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not ‘show[n] — that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2)). A court considering a motion to dismiss may begin by identifying pleadings that are not entitled to the assumption of truth because they are mere conclusions. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of the complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. If further amendment of the complaint “would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,” then amendment would be futile and the plaintiffs claim must be dismissed with prejudice. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir.1997) (citing Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir.1996)). Y. DISCUSSION A. Geneva’s Claims — Justiciability 1. Standing Defendants challenge this court’s jurisdiction to hear Geneva’s claims pursuant to the justiciability doctrine of standing; and maintain that Geneva is eligible for the nonenforcement safe harbor provision, which will shield it from the objected to requirements until at least August 1, 2013. Defendants also point to the ANPRM as evidence that Geneva will almost certainly never be subject to the mandate. Geneva responds that the safe harbor and ANPRM are not sufficient guarantees to deprive it of standing, particularly in light of the relaxed standing requirement applied in cases implicating the First Amendment. Geneva argues that it is currently suffering injury-in-fact as it faces uncertainty in preparation and substantial planning costs for upcoming plan years. Defendants’ motion challenges Geneva’s claims on the basis of standing due to an alleged lack of injury in fact. a. The Safe Harbor Provision and Imminent Injury Defendants rely principally on McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 226, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), to support their claim that enforcement of the mandate is “too remote temporally” to constitute an imminent injury. McConnell, however, involved a situation in which the challenged policy would, if at all, only be enforced five years in the future. Id. Even under the safe harbor provision, Geneva’s health plans will now both be subject to the mandate in its present form in less than a year. Its student health plan will be subject to the mandate’s requirements on August 1, 2013, and its employee health plan will be subject to those requirements on January 1, 2014. This time frame does not strike the court as being “too remote temporally” to circumvent the imminent injury requirement. Plaintiffs point to several court decisions in support of their imminent injury argument. Most persuasive is Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir.2011), overruled on other grounds by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012), in which the defendants (the same departments and individuals as in the present case) conceded that a delay of more than two years constituted imminent harm for standing purposes. In Belmont Abbey College v. Sebelius, 878 F.Supp.2d 25, 35 (2012), the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that “the safe harbor merely delays enforcement by one year; it does not (in and of itself) reduce the certainty of the impending injury.” Id. Pursuant to the reasoning set forth in Belmont Abbey, and the concession by defendants in this case, Geneva alleged an injury that is not too remote to preclude standing. b. The ANPRM and Certainly Impending Injury Although Geneva established that an injury may be imminent, the standing doctrine also requires that that injury be concrete and certainly impending. Defendants point to the ANPRM to support their claim that “there is no reason to suspect that Geneva will be required to sponsor a health plan that covers certain contraceptive services in contravention of its religious beliefs once the enforcement safe harbor expires. And any suggestion to the contrary is entirely speculative at this point.” (EOF No. 40 at 17) (emphasis added). Geneva responds that the mandate is the current law, notwithstanding defendants’ assurances that its requirements will eventually be changed. Geneva alleges that it is suffering current harm with respect to its need to prepare for future plan years, the financial costs associated with planning, and its current difficulties in recruiting employees and students due to the uncertainty surrounding its health insurance. c. Other Decisions Addressing the Same Standing Arguments At least two courts, including one court of appeals that reviewed the lower court decisions in Belmont Abbey, 878 F.Supp.2d at 36-37 (finding that religiously-affiliated college lacked standing), and Wheaton College v. Sebelius, 887 F.Supp.2d 102, 107-12 (D.D.C.2012) (finding that religiously-affiliated college lacked standing despite allegations that the college could face ERISA lawsuits over contraceptive coverage), rejected the same arguments raised by defendants and found that religiously-affiliated institutions had standing in similar circumstances. See Wheaton College v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551, 552-53 (D.C.Cir.2012) (holding the appeals in Wheaton College and Belmont Abbey in abeyance and finding that both institutions “clearly had standing” at the time the suits were filed); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Sebelius, 907 F.Supp.2d 310, 331-33 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (finding that a nonprofit religious organization had adequately pled a certainly impending injury based upon specific allegations of preparation costs and how funds were reallocated because of the contraceptive requirement); but see Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 12-253, 2012 WL 6756332, at *4 (N.D.Ind. Dec. 31, 2012) (finding that religiously-affiliated university lacked standing despite allegations that the safe harbor period did not provide sufficient planning time); Zubik v. Sebelius, 911 F.Supp.2d 314, 328-29 (W.D.Pa.2012) (finding that nonprofit religious organizations lacked standing despite allegations that the safe harbor period did not provide sufficient planning time, and that the organizations would be unable to enter into union negotiations, set tuition rates, and make teacher retention decisions). d. Standing Determined at Time Suit Filed Standing is determined based upon “the facts of the case as they existed at the time the lawsuit was filed.” Clark v. McDonald’s Corp., 213 F.R.D. 198, 227 (D.N.J.2003) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 570 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 2130). Standing is distinguishable from mootness and ripeness, both of which can strip a court of jurisdiction after a case has already been filed. The subsequent events and assurances upon which defendants heavily rely, therefore, do not remove Geneva’s standing as measured at the time this case was filed in February 2012. Viewing Geneva’s claim of standing as of the date the suit was originally filed, it becomes clear that it acted in response to an injury that was imminent and almost certain to occur. In the amended complaint, Geneva acknowledges that its health care plans will likely lose their grandfathered status beginning in the present plan year, and will thus be subject to the ACA’s requirements. (ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 57-68, 73.) As an employer of more than fifty full-time employees, Geneva must provide health insurance that includes coverage for the objected to requirements. (Id. ¶ 101.) If Geneva fails to provide such coverage, it will be subject to financial penalties of at least $500,000 per year. (Id. ¶ 112-15.) Geneva alleges that the religious employer exemption is inapplicable to it as an organization that does not primarily serve those of its own faith or inculcate religious values. (Id. 127-29.) Geneva acknowledges that it was not eligible for the temporary enforcement safe harbor as of the time the suit was filed, since the original HHS Guidance did not exempt organizations like Geneva that had provided contraceptive coverage. (Id. ¶ 174.) In addition to claims of future harm, Geneva alleges several current injuries that it believes are sufficient to establish standing, and relies on Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 422 F.3d 490 (7th Cir.2005), to support its argument that “the present impact of a future though uncertain harm may establish injury in fact for standing purposes.” Id. at 498. Geneva alleges that it requires substantial lead time to prepare for future health care plan years (ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 56-57, 171); that it is suffering monetary harm in planning for the contraceptive requirement (Id. ¶ 180); and that its employee and student recruitment efforts have been burdened as a result of uncertainty surrounding its health care plans (Id. ¶¶ 146-47). In support of its argument, Geneva notes that defendants have acknowledged the importance of planning with respect to future health insurance plan years. 75 Fed Reg. at 41,-730 (noting that “requirements in these interim final regulations require significant lead time in order to implement”). Courts have held that suffering monetary harm is sufficient to constitute injury-in-fact for standing purposes, and that “injury-in-fact is not Mount Everest.” Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 293-94 (3d Cir.2005). The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that burdens on recruitment efforts are sufficient to give rise to standing. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925). Considering the circumstances that existed at the time Geneva filed suit, it is apparent that Geneva “clearly had standing” at that time. See Wheaton College v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d at 552. 2. Ripeness Geneva must also establish that its claims are presently ripe for judicial review. Ripeness “prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies,” and “protect[s] the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) (citing Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)). Underpinning the ripeness doctrine are considerations of “whether the facts of the case are ‘sufficiently developed to provide the court with enough information on which to decide the matter conclusively,’ and whether a party is ‘genuinely aggrieved so as to avoid expenditure of judicial resources on matters which have caused harm to no one.’ ” Khodara Envtl., Inc. v. Blakey, 376 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir.2004) (citing Peachlum v. City of York, Pa., 333 F.3d 429, 433-34 (3d Cir.2003)). Unlike standing which is determined as of the time the ease commenced, ripeness may consider events which have occurred after the filing of the complaint. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 114-17, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) Geneva acknowledges that Step-Saver provides the appropriate test for ripeness in this case, but it urges the court to apply a “relaxed standard” to their claims because they present a facial challenge involving First Amendment rights. (ECF No. 51 at 14) (citing Peachlum, 333 F.3d at 435). The proposed standard aims to quell concerns that “a person will merely comply with an illegitimate statute rather than be subjected to prosecution.” Peachlum, 333 F.3d at 435. Geneva’s argument was raised in Persico v. Sebelius, No. 12-123, 919 F.Supp.2d 622, 634-37, 2013 WL 228200, at *10-11 (W.D.Pa. Jan. 22, 2013), and the court found Peachlum to be inapplicable to challenges to the mandate for three reasons. First, the plaintiffs in Pérsico (a Catholic Bishop and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Erie, Pennsylvania) did not assert a facial challenge to the mandate; rather, they challenged the law as applied. Id. at 634-35, at *10 (acknowledging that a law may be facially challenged on grounds that the law is impermissibly overbroad). Second, Peachlum was inapposite to the plaintiffs’ situation. In Peachlum, the court recognized a relaxed ripeness standard in situations where “even the remotest threat of prosecution” exists. Peachlum, 333 F.3d at 435. The relaxed standard did not apply, however, to cases where there is “a promise not to prosecute.” Id. In Persico, the government repeatedly offered its assurances that the ongoing regulatory process ensured that the law would almost certainly never be enforced against the plaintiffs. Persico, 919 F.Supp.2d at 637-38, 2013 WL 228200, at *12. These assurances were “effectively a promise ... by the Defendants not to prosecute the Mandate in its current form.” Id. at 635-37, at *11. Finally, that case did not present the same situation as in Peachlum, where the issues were “predominantly legal,” and required no further factual development. Those same reasons are arguably applicable to Geneva’s situation and as further discussed below, the legal landscape faced by Geneva changed after this case was filed. Under the February 2013 proposed rules, Geneva may be exempted from compliance in the near future. Under these circumstances, the relaxed standard does not apply. a. Adversity of Interest To satisfy the first prong of the Step-Saver framework, “the party seeking review need not have suffered a ‘completed harm’ to establish adversity of interest ... it is necessary that there be a substantial threat of real harm and that the threat ‘must remain ‘real and immediate’ throughout the course of the litigation.’ ” Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1463 (3d Cir.1994) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). “[A] potential harm that is ‘contingent’ on a future event occurring will likely not satisfy this prong of the ripeness test.” Pittsburgh Mack Sales & Serv. v. Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 66, 580 F.3d 185, 190 (3d Cir.2009) (citing Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 647-48). If a subsequent event removes the potential harm, then the controversy becomes speculative and the claim is no longer ripe. Zubik, 911 F.Supp.2d at 324-25 (citing Presbytery of N.J., 40 F.3d at 1463). Geneva maintains that its position is sufficiently adverse because it is challenging the law as it currently stands. (ECF No. 51 at 15-16.) It argues that the only remaining question is whether defendants will follow through on their promises to change the regulations. While Geneva is correct that the regulations embodying the mandate are final, and that “weighs in favor of justiciability,” Nebraska v. United States Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 877 F.Supp.2d 777, 801 (D.Neb. 2012), those regulations are interim and defendants are taking substantial steps to exempt entities like Geneva from the mandate’s requirements. Put differently, Geneva’s concerns are based on a contingency that will be eliminated if the February 2013 proposed rules are finalized in the regulations. Defendants insist that the mandate as it currently stands will never be enforced against institutions similar to Geneva. The temporary enforcement safe harbor already precludes enforcement of the mandate until at least August 1, 2013 for Geneva’s student health plan and January 1, 2014 for its employee plan. The February 2013 proposed rules go further and if they become final would exempt Geneva from having to include the coverage for the objected to services in its health plans. 78 Fed Reg. at 8,462. Geneva appears to come within the requirements for exemption in the proposed rules. First, Geneva vigorously opposes provision of coverage for the objected to services on religious grounds, (ECF No. 32 ¶ 43); second, Geneva operates as a nonprofit entity, (Id. ¶ 11); and finally, Geneva holds itself out as a religious organization, as evidenced by its mission, which is “to glorify God by educating and ministering to a diverse community of students in order to develop servant-leaders who will transform society for the kingdom of Christ.” (Id. ¶ 25.) The proposed rules appear to exempt institutions like Geneva from the mandate— provided Geneva complies with the fourth requirement for exemption, self-certifying that it meets the first three requirements. When an agency expressly assures that it will not enforce regulations against a party, there is no adversity of interest. Salvation Army v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs of State of N.J., 919 F.2d 183, 192-93 (3d Cir.1990). Here, the proposed rules appear to exempt Geneva from complying with the mandate and, if they become final, will eliminate any remaining adversity of interest. Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 735, 118 S.Ct. 1665, 140 L.Ed.2d 921 (1998) (finding a claim unripe when “the possibility that further consideration will actually occur before [the regulation] is implemented is not theoretical, but real”). This conclusion comports with the findings of the majority of courts which addressed this issue in the context of religiously-affiliated colleges and universities. See Persico, 919 F.Supp.2d at 638-39, 2013 WL 228200, at *13 (collecting cases). One court which found that a religious organization’s claims were ripe, Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 907 F.Supp.2d at 335-36, did not have before it the February 2013 proposed rules that if adopted should ensure that “defendants will never enforce the regulations in their current form against [Geneva].” (ECF No. 60 at 5.) Based upon the most recent developments, this court, like the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Wheaton College, will “take the government at its word” that it will, in good faith, finalize the proposed rules before the expiration of the safe harbor period — meaning prior to August 2013. 703 F.3d at 552. The court concludes that Geneva’s claims, even though ripe when this case was filed, are not ripe now due to an insufficient adversity of interest. b. Conclusiveness of Judgment The conclusiveness inquiry requires the court to determine whether there is a “ ‘real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical set of facts.’ ” Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937)). Without such consideration, a declaratory judgment becomes nothing more than a contingency itself, and “applying it to actual controversies which subsequently arise would be an ‘exercise in futility.’ ” Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 412 (3d Cir.1992) (citing Step-Saver 912 F.2d at 648). Geneva argues that the appropriate inquiry with respect to conclusiveness is whether its claims are “predominantly legal.” (ECF No. 51 at 16-17) (citing Presbytery of N.J., 40 F.3d at 1463-64.) It notes that the factual record in this case, like most First Amendment cases, is largely undisputed. Geneva points out that government agencies cannot avoid review by simply holding out the possibility of regulatory change. (ECF No. 51 at 18) (citing CSI Aviation Services, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Transp., 637 F.3d 408, 410 (D.C.Cir.2011) (rejecting a “trust us— we’ll fix it later” approach to rulemaking)). There, however, is an active rulemaking process underway at this time that will likely moot Geneva’s claims. Defendants are taking concrete steps to ensure that the law will be changed to reflect the concerns expressed by Geneva and other nonprofit entities that are similarly situated. Those procedures are expected to be concluded before the expiration of the safe harbor period. Geneva’s contention that the mandate’s requirements are “final rules” was made without the benefit of the proposed rules and ignores the nature of the second interim final regulations. See Colo. Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 11-3350, 2013 WL 93188 at *7, n. 9 (D.Colo. Jan. 7, 2013). In Colorado Christian University the court pointed out that “Defendants only finalized the religious employer exemption as an amendment to the interim final rule,” not the mandate as a whole. Id. (citing 77 Fed Reg. at 8,730). The requirements being challenged are not finalized; and the safe harbor, ANPRM, and recent proposed rules are affirmative steps taken to amend the rules as they currently stand. The mandate’s requirements remain in flux, and judicial review at this time could be an “exercise in futility” and a waste of judicial resources. Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 412. c. Practical Utility or Help The third prong of the Step-Saver framework requires the court to consider whether a declaratory judgment would be useful to the parties. A useful judgment is one that clarifies the legal relationships between the parties and allows the plaintiff to “make responsible decisions about the future.” Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649. Because the rules in place are in the process of being amended to exempt Geneva from having to comply with the mandate’s requirements, judicial intervention at this time will not assist the parties in any meaningful way. Geneva alleges that a decision in this case would allow it to make informed decisions about planning for future health care plan years, and to better understand the impact the mandate’s requirements will have on employment and student recruitment. Unfortunately, any decision made by this court will likely be irrelevant in light of the ongoing rulemaking process. “The mere fact that a declaratory judgment would be useful to assist Plaintiffs in making their upcoming operational decisions is insufficient to overcome the fact that no actual controversy ... exists between the parties.” Zubik, 911 F.Supp.2d at 327. Because defendants represent that the final regulations will address the concerns of colleges like Geneva and the February 2013 proposed rules reflect that Geneva would be covered by an exemption, a decision rendered by this court on Geneva’s claims will not serve any practical utility. Based upon consideration of the factors set forth in Step-Saver, the court concludes that Geneva’s claims are not ripe for review at this time, and defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Geneva’s claims shall be GRANTED without prejudice. Geneva argues in the alternative that defendants’ promises of future change make this a mootness, rather than a ripeness question. Because the recent proposed rules are not yet final, the court cannot conclude at this time that the issues raised are moot. If defendants do not live up to their promises, this action may become ripe again; thus, to the extent that the court will dismiss Geneva’s claims, it will do so without prejudice. See note 13, supra. B. Claims Asserted by Hepler, Kolesar, SHLC and WLH 1. Religious Freedom Restoration Act Claims of Hepler, Kolesar, SHLC and WLH It is undisputed that the Hepler and Kolesar have standing to pursue their claims. The court must consider whether SHLC and WLH (the “Hepler Entities” and together with Hepler and Kolesar, the “Hepler plaintiffs”) have standing and whether the Hepler plaintiffs stated cognizable claims under the RFRA. Pursuant to the RFRA, the government may not “substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, ‘even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.’” Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)). The government may, however, substantially burden the exercise of religion if the burden: “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b). The simple language of the RFRA belies the challenge of applying it to the Hepler plaintiffs in the present case. The Hepler plaintiffs bear the initial burden under the RFRA of establishing “that application of the offensive law or policy would substantially burden a sincere, religious exercise.” Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6744, 2013 WL 140110 at *9 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 11, 2013) (citing Norwood v. Strada, 249 Fed.Appx. 269, 271 (3d Cir.2007)). a. Standing to Assert Claims Under the RFRA It goes without saying that the individual members of the Hepler family are “persons” as defined by the RFRA. The more difficult issue arises with respect to whether the Hepler Entities are “persons” that can exercise religion in the context of the RFRA. Neither the Supreme .Court nor the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has had an opportunity to decide whether a secular, for-profit corporation or entity can exercise religion. Other district courts which addressed this question in the context of challenges to the ACA have considered the question as it applies to both the RFRA and the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause. Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F.Supp.2d 106, 114 n. 9 (D.D.C.2012) (acknowledging that courts employ Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence in interpreting RFRA claims). Defendants argue that a secular, for-profit corporate entity cannot exercise religion because once such an entity enters the regulated commercial market, its owners’ beliefs do not trump the regulatory scheme to which all other commercial entities are subject. Defendants point out that corporate entities that have been found to exercise religion have always done so in the context of advancing a religious purpose; and the Hepler Entities did not espouse a religious purpose that would place them in this category. According to the Hepler plaintiffs, a closely-held, family-owned corporation and its religious owners are virtually indistinguishable, and therefore the corporation can effectively exercise the owners’ religion. The Hepler plaintiffs rely on the recent Supreme Court decision in Citizens United (extending the First Amendment right to freedom of speech to corporate entities) for the proposition that secular corporations can exercise religion because the First Amendment rights of individuals and corporations are coextensive. The Hepler plaintiffs point out that denying corporations free exercise rights would require owners like the Heplers to compartmentalize their religious beliefs, thus preventing them from running their businesses according to their deeply held religious principles. The RFRA itself does not define “person” as used in the statute. In supplemental briefing, the Hepler plaintiffs suggest that the court apply the definition of “person” as set forth in 1 U.S.C. § 1, which provides that “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise ... the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations ... as well as individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added). On its face, this definition allows the Hepler Entities to assert a right to exercise religion in the RFRA context. The court, however, concludes that it need not address head-on the issue whether all for-profit corporations may exercise First Amendment free exercise rights, because SHLC may assert the RFRA and First Amendment claims on behalf of its owners, the Heplers. Two decisions from the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit guide this court’s holding that a for-profit, secular corporation has standing to assert the religious exercise claims of its owners in certain circumstances: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir.1988), and Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.2009). The Hepler plaintiffs rely heavily on Townley and Stormans in arguing that a closely-held corporation may assert its owners’ free exercise and RFRA rights where the corporate entity “ ‘is merely the instrument through and by which [the owners] express their religious beliefs.’ ” Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1120 (quoting Townley, 859 F.2d at 619-20). A district court addressing a challenge similar to the present case also found Toumley and Stormans persuasive in finding that a secular, for-profit corporation may assert its owners’ free exercise rights. Tyndale House, 904 F.Supp.2d at 114-17. Townley involved a closely-held corporation that manufactured and sold mining equipment. Townley, 859 F.2d at 611. The company was 94% owned by Jake and Helen Townley, who sought to operate the business on the basis of their Christian faith, and who were “ ‘unable to separate God from any portion of their daily lives, including their activities at the Townley company.’ ” Id. at 612. Townley sought a religious exemption from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act allowing it to require employees to attend weekly devotional services. Id. The court of appeals explicitly declined to “address the abstract issue whether a for-profit corporation has rights under the Free Exercise Clause independent of those of its shareholders and officers;” rather, the court held that the company had standing to assert the rights of Jake and Helen Townley. Id. at 619-20, n. 15. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently relied on Townley in a case with facts quite similar to the present circumstances. In Stormans, the owner of a pharmacy challenged a Washington state regulation that required pharmacies to provide Plan B to customers despite religious and moral objections. Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1116-17. The pharmacy in Stormans was a fourth-generation family-owned company in which the shareholders and directors were all members of the same family. Id. at 1120. The owners alleged, and the court agreed, that the pharmacy was “an extension of the beliefs of the members of the Stormans family, and that the beliefs of the Stormans family [were] the beliefs of [the pharmacy].” Id. The court held that “Stormans, Inc. does not present any free exercise rights of its own different from or greater than i