Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER VITALIANO, District Judge. Plaintiffs Yong Ki Hong and Hwan Media, Inc. commenced this action against defendants KBS America, Inc. (“KBSA”), Chang Joon Lee (“C.tJ. Lee”), Joseph Kong, Spring Video & Gift, Inc. (“Spring Video”), and Yang Joong Kim, d/b/a Han Kook Video, alleging federal antitrust violations under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2. Plaintiffs, owners of a Queens-based store that rents Korean videotapes, claim that defendants engaged in an unlawful horizontal price-fixing scheme and group boycott in order to monopolize the market for Korean videotapes and prevent plaintiffs’ store from competing in that market. Plaintiffs also assert New York state law causes of action under the Donnelly Act, N.Y.G.B.L. §§ 340 et seq., the Deceptive Practices Act, N.Y.G.B.L § 349(h), and common law theories of tortious interference with business relationships, unjust enrichment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and promissory estoppel. KBSA and C.J. Lee (together, “the KBSA litigants”) advance several counterclaims against plaintiffs and against now-counterclaim defendant Jung Hoon Lee (“J.H. Lee”), Hong’s business partner, including breach of contract, libel, slander, copyright infringement, violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), false advertising in violation of N.Y.G.B.L. § 350, unfair competition under New York common law, use of name with intent to deceive in violation of N.Y.G.B.L. § 133, a N.Y.G.B.L. § 349(h) deceptive practices claim, tortious interference with business relationships, and three related civil conspiracy claims. All defendants now move for summary judgment against all of plaintiffs’ claims. The KBSA litigants also move for summary judgment on their counterclaims for copyright violations, libel per se, and slander per se. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants defendants’ motions for summary judgment dismissing all of plaintiffs’ claims except three against Kong, Spring Video, and Kim for tortious interference with business relationships. Summary judgment is denied as to those three claims. The Court also denies the KBSA litigants’ motion for summary judgment on their counterclaims for copyright infringement, libel per se, and slander per se, and, upon searching the record, grants summary judgment to the counterclaim defendants on the libel per se and slander per se claims. Background The following facts are drawn from the pleadings and the parties’ submissions, including statements of undisputed material facts submitted pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1. The facts are construed, as they must be at summary judgment, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hamilton Beach/Proctor Silex, Inc., 473 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir.2007). Any relevant factual disputes are noted. Korean-American video stores in the New York metropolitan area purchase television programs, dramas, and movies that air in the Republic of Korea (i.e., South Korea) from various distributors, copy them with the distributors’ permission, and rent them to their retail customers. (Compl. (Dkt. No. 1) ¶ 13). There áre three distributors that supply Korean videos to stores in New York: Moon Hwa Broadcasting Company (“MBC”), Seoul Broadcasting Service (“SBS”) and defendant KBSA. (Id. ¶ 14). KBSA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of KBS Korea Broadcasting System, a large public broadcaster in South Korea. (Pls.’ Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pls.’ 56.1”) (Dkt. No. 139) ¶ 1). KBSA’s mission in the United States is twofold: to promote cultural ties between Korea and the United States by distributing Korean television programming to the broadest possible market; and, a market-driven one, to earn royalties on the distribution of copyright-protected KBS programs. (Id. ¶ 2). KBS provides access to its programming in the U.S. primarily through weekly “master tapes” containing KBS content, which KBSA licenses and distributes, at a weekly fee, to individual video store owners for copying and retail distribution to their walk-in customers. (KBSA Litigants’ Rule 56.1 Statement (“KBSA’s 56.1”) (Dkt. No. 126) ff. 3-4). According to KBSA, these licenses are site-specific, and do not automatically transfer if a store owner decides to move his store to another location. (Id. ¶ 5). Although the licenses were, as of the relevant dates of this litigation, entirely oral, KBSA alleges that the terms were well known in the Korean video market. (Id. ¶ 13; (C.J. Lee Deck (Dkt. No. 34), Exh. Q). Plaintiffs dispute the use of the term “license,” arguing that it was not used by KBSA or the video store owners prior to this litigation, and deny that the licenses were store-specific, generally non-transferable, and authorized distribution to walk-in customers only. (Pls.’ 56.1 ¶ 5). In or around February 2004, Hong and J.H. Lee decided to open a Korean video store, and began researching the market by speaking to others in the industry.' (Compl. ¶ 17; KBSA’s 56.1 ¶¶ 14, 17). On October 5, 2004, the two partners had a dinner meeting with Jong Seung Choi, a manager at MBC, and Hahn Gyoung Jo, a KBSA employee, at which the group discussed how Hong and J.H. Lee might go about opening a video store in Queens. (Pls.’ 56.1 ¶ 5). Exactly what was said during this meeting is in dispute. According to Choi, Jo suggested that, rather than open a new store, Hong and J.H. Lee should buy an existing,' inexpensive video store in Brooklyn (“the Shilla store”), and t hen move it to Queens. (Asher Deck (Dkt. No. 137), Exh. A, at 51:10-56:18). Choi further claims that Jo told the two partners that KBSA would continue to provide the Queens store with tapes following the relocation. Id. However, Jo contradicts this account, claiming (1) that it was Choi, not him, who suggested that Hong and J.H. Lee buy an existing store and relocate; (2) that he does not recall having discussed the Shilla store with Hong and J.H. Lee; (3) that he never said “this [relocation] strategy would work with KBS America;” and (4) that he “did not in any way state, imply or indicate that KBS America would approve a license for [plaintiffs’] store at either location.” (Jo Deck (Dkt. No. 35) at ¶¶ 23-33). In October 2004, Hong formed a corporation, Hwan Media Inc., in order to purchase the Shilla store. (KBSA’s 56.1 ¶ 22). Hong was the sole owner of Hwan Media. (Id.). J.H. Lee entered into a verbal agreement with Hong that he would receive 50% of the profits from the store, but was never an employee, shareholder, or officer of Hwan Media, nor was he paid for the services he performed for the business. (Id. ¶ 23). The partners purchased the Shilla store in Brooklyn for around $30,000 and assumed ownership of the store’s existing KBSA license. (Id. ¶ 19; Jo Decl. at ¶ 35). According to KBSA, a store in Queens would have cost between $100,000 and $500,000. (KBSA’s 56.1 ¶ 19). The rates store owners had to pay to the distributors for weekly master tapes were also higher in Queens than in Brooklyn. (Id. ¶ 20). After a few weeks in Brooklyn, Hong and J.H. Lee closed the Shilla store and relocated their operations to a storefront in Fresh Meadows, Queens (now called “the Samsung store”). (Id. ¶26). J.H. Lee subsequently asked Jo, who' had been delivering KBS master tapes to the Shilla store, to make future deliveries to the Queens location. (Id. ¶ 27). Jo made one tape delivery to a street corner in Queens and another two to the Samsung store. (Id.). Defendants attest that, each time Jo made a delivery to the Queens location, he informed the store owners that the tapes were for use in the Shilla store in Brooklyn, not for the Samsung store in Queens. (Id. ¶ 28). Hong and J.H. Lee distributed KBS content from these tapes at the Samsung store for three to four weeks, as well as KBS sports programming for which they did not have a license. (Id. ¶ 32; Asher Deck, Exh. J, 71:8-23; KBSA’s 56.1 ¶ 33). During this time, defendants claim that the Samsung store owners continued to pay the lower Brooklyn rate for the master tape deliveries. (KBSA’s 56.1 ¶ 31). In December 2004, KBSA stopped providing the Samsung store with KBS master tapes. The circumstances surrounding this supply cut-off, and the reasons for it, are in dispute. C.J. Lee, General Manager of KBSA’s Eastern regional office, claims that, sometime during the week of November 29, 2004, he learned that the partners had moved their store from Brooklyn to Queens, which led him to “investigate whether KBS programs were being illegally rented” from the Queens location. (C.J. Lee Decl. ¶¶ 69-70.) C.J. Lee states that he visited the Samsung store on December 3, 2004, enabling him to confirm firsthand that plaintiffs were distributing KBS content. (Id. ¶¶ 71-74; KBSA’s 56.1 ¶ 35). Soon thereafter, KBSA terminated the supply of KBS master tapes to plaintiffs. (KBSA’s 56.1 ¶ 35) Defendants contend that KBS cut off Hong and J.H. Lee’s supply of videos because the partners had violated the terms of the Shilla store license by neglecting to inform KBSA management about the move to Queens and failing to request a new license for the Samsung store. (Id.). Because of this, defendants claim, KBSA was unable to investigate the viability of the new store’s location and its potential impact on KBSA’s distribution stream. (Id.). C.J. Lee states that he subsequently told Hong and J.H. Lee that they would have to apply for a license through the “normal approval process,” which involved review by KBSA’s Los Angeles office. (Id. ¶ 36). Plaintiffs vehemently dispute defendants’ account of these events. (Pls.’ 56.1 ¶ 35(b)). They contend that Hong and J.H. Lee did, in fact, inform KBSA management of the move during their October 5, 2004 dinner meeting with Jo and Choi, at which Jo allegedly “encouraged, authorized and approved” the purchase of the Shilla store and its subsequent relocation to Queens. (Id. ¶ 35(a)). They further assert that it was never agreed that the license to copy and distribute KBS programming was site-specific and would not automatically transfer from the Shilla store to the Samsung store. (Id. ¶ 13). As discussed above, Choi — a non-party witness — largely corroborated plaintiffs’ version of the dinner meeting, while Jo and C.J. Lee deny that any such authorization and approval was granted. Plaintiffs further claim that KBSA’s termination of supply had nothing to do with either the relocation of the store or the license issue. Instead, they point to evidence of anticompetitive behavior on the part of other video store owners in conjunction with KBSA. Kim, owner of Han Kook Video, was at the time the president of the New York Korean Video Store Owners Association (the “Association”), whose members own and operate Korean video stores in the New York area. (Id. ¶ 35(b)). Kong, owner of Spring Video, was the vice-president of the Association at the time. Plaintiffs claim that Kim, Kong, and other Association members entered into an agreement to charge a uniform $1.50 price for video rentals, and pressured KBSA to cut off supply to plaintiffs’ store because it was charging only $1.00 per rental. As evidence of this alleged price-fixing scheme, plaintiffs cite the following: • Choi’s deposition testimony that he heard that Kim visited all the other Korean video store owners and got them to agree on a $1.50 rental price. (Pls.’ 56.1 ¶ 35(b); Asher Decl., Exh. A, at 101:3-25). • Hong’s deposition testimony that Kim told him he had been suggesting to all the video stores that they should charge $1.50, which had been widely accepted. (Geercken Decl. (Dkt. 127), Exh. H at 101:16-102:24). • A February 25, 2005 telephone conversation between Kim and Hong regarding the apparent hostility from other store owners regarding the pricing practices and location of the Samsung store. Plaintiffs and defendants have offered competing transcriptions of this conversation. (See Pls.’ 56.1 ¶ 35(b); Asher Decl., Exh. B (“Hong Deck), Exh. 1 (plaintiffs’ transcription); C.J. Lee Decl., Exh. E (defendants’ transcription)). • A recorded February 25, 2005 conversation (the “bakery conversation”) between Hong, J.H. Lee, and C.J. Lee at which, plaintiffs claim, C.J. Lee admitted that KBSA terminated the Samsung store’s supply of videos because the two partners would not abide by the terms of the price-fixing agreement. (Hong. Decl. ¶ 27). Defendants claim that the recording of this conversation is garbled and unintelligible, (see KBSA’s 56.1 ¶¶39-40). The Court ordered that a transcription be made of an audio-enhanced version of the recording, and both parties have again offered their own competing transcriptions. (See Pls.’ 56.1 ¶ 35(b); Asher Deck Exh. C (court-ordered transcription), Exh. E (plaintiffs’ transcription), Exh. D (defendants’ transcription)). All three transcriptions are, indeed, extremely difficult to decipher. • Statements Kong and Kim allegedly made in May 2004 to members of the Korean-American media regarding their intention to enforce the price- ' fixing arrangement and shut out non-cooperators, as well as articles in the Korea Central Daily News and - Korea Times reporting the alleged statements. (Pls.’ 56.1 ¶ 35(b); Compl., Exh. A). • An affidavit from a customer stating that she started renting from the Samsung store because its rental price was $1, as opposed to the $1.50 charged by other stores in the area. (Pls.’ 56.1 ¶ 35(b); Asher Decl., Exh. K). • A “suspicious flurry of phone calls” between Kong and Han, another KBSA employee, around the time the Samsung store’s video supply was terminated, including seven calls on the day C.J, Lee and Han visited the store. (Pls.’ 56.1 ¶ 35(b); Asher Decl., Exh. O). • A complaint submitted to the Federal Trade Commission by Assa Video, another Korean video store, accusing KBSA of operating an unlawful monopoly in the Korean video rental market along with video stores and other distributors. (Pls.’ 56.1 ¶ 35(b); Asher Decl., Exh. L). • A petition circulated by the National Association of Video Owners urging KBSA to remedy the problems of overpricing and oversaturation. (Pls.’ 56.1 ¶ 35(b)). On or around December 8, 2004, Hong and J.H. Lee contacted and spoke with with reporters from the Korean-American media, alleging that KBSA had wrongfully terminated the supply of videos to the Samsung store. (KBSA’s 56.1 ¶¶ 64, 37; Geercken Deck., Exh. M, 266:18-275:2). That same month, Hong also delivered a bottle of whiskey to C.J. Lee at KBSA’s Eastern regional office, apparently in hopes of receiving a favorable resolution to the conflict. (C.J. Lee Decl. ¶¶ 118, 121; Pls.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 66-67). C.J. Lee considered this an act of bribery, which he claims to “abhor,” and returned the bottle unopened. (C.J. Lee Decl. ¶¶ 120-21; KBSA’s 56.1 ¶ 67). On or around February 2, 2005, Hong and J.H. Lee sent a letter to KBSA’s CEO, Kevin Kwon, imploring him to resume the Samsung store’s supply of KBS master tapes. (KBSA’s 56.1 ¶¶ 37, 65; Kwon Aff., (Dkt. No. 36), Exh. 1). The letter also indicated that C.J. Lee had terminated the supply in response to threats he believed the Samsung store owners had made to KBSA, and suggested that “a third person” — implicitly, other store owners — had spread lies about Hong and J.H. Lee in order to damage their relationship with KBSA. (Kwon A., Exh. 1). Also in February 2005, Hong filed two complaints via the Internet with South Korea’s Citizen’s Complaint Resolution Committee, an agency within the Blue House (the Korean equivalent of the White House). (KBSA’s 56.1 ¶66; C.J. Lee Decl. ¶¶ 117-124., Exhs. M-N). These complaints charged KBSA of wrongfully terminating the Samsung store’s video supply and accused C.J. Lee of soliciting and accepting bribes from store owners, and of threatening to “make things very difficult” for Hong. (KBSA’s 56.1 ¶66; C.J. Lee Decl. ¶¶ 117-124, Exhs. M-N). On March 2, 2005, Hong and Hwan Media filed this lawsuit against defendants under the Sherman Act and a host of state law causes of action. (See Compl.) In response, the KBSA litigants asserted a raft of counterclaims. (See Am. Ans. (Dkt. No. 56)). Now before the Court are defendants’ motions for summary judgment against all of plaintiffs’ claims, as well as the KBSA litigants’ motion for summary judgment on its counterclaims for copyright infringement, libel per se, and slander per se. Standard of Review A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Brown v. Eli Lilly and Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir.2011) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court cannot try issues of fact but can only determine whether there are issues of fact to be tried.” Sutera v. Schering Corp., 73 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir.1995) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). The burden rests with the moving party to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. See, e.g., Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir.2005). “[A] court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hamilton Beach/Proctor Silex, Inc., 473 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). If the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating no dispute of material fact, the burden t hen shifts to the nonmoving party. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir.2002). However, the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Moreover, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original). A.genuine issue of material fact exists when “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted). Finally, the Second Circuit has instructed that, “[i]n the context antitrust cases ... summary judgment is particularly favored because of the concern that protracted litigation will chill pro-competitive market forces.” PepsiCo, 315 F.3d at 104. Therefore, “[although all reasonable inferences will be drawn in favor of the non-movant, those inferences ‘must be reasonable in light of competing inferences of acceptable conduct.’ ” Id. at 105 (quoting Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.1998)). Discussion I. Plaintiffs’ Claims a. The Sherman Act To succeed on a Sherman Act claim, a plaintiff must not only satisfy the substantive elements of the statute, but must also establish antitrust standing, which is distinct from standing under Article III of the Constitution. See Shaywitz v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, 675 F.Supp.2d 376, 385 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. Calif. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535 n. 31, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983)). The Supreme Court has described several factors relevant to antitrust standing: whether the alleged injury “‘is of the type that the antitrust statute was intended to forestall,’ ‘the directness or indirectness of [that] injury,’ the extent to which the plaintiffs asserted damages are speculative, ‘the potential for duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of damages,’ and ‘the existence of more direct victims of the alleged conspiracy.’ ” Gatt Commc’ns, Inc. v. PMC Associates, L.L.C., 711 F.3d 68 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540-45, 103 S.Ct. 897). The Second Circuit has “distilled these factors into two imperatives.” Gatt Commc’ns, 711 F.3d at 76. First, an antitrust plaintiff must plausibly allege “that it suffered a special kind of antitrust injury.” Id. at 76 (internal quotations omitted). Second, the grievant must show that “it is a suitable plaintiff to pursue the alleged antitrust violations and, thus, is an ‘efficient enforcer’ of the antitrust laws.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). To that end, case law has embraced a three-step process for determining whether a plaintiff has sufficiently alleged antitrust injury: First, the [plaintiff] ... must identify the practice complained of and the reasons such a practice is or might be anticompetitive. Next, [the court must] identify the actual injury the plaintiff alleges. This requires [the court] to look to the ways in which the plaintiff claims it is in a “worse position” as a consequence of the defendant’s conduct. Finally, the court must compare the anticompetitive effect of the specific practice at issue to the actual injury the plaintiff alleges. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Significantly, “[i]t is not enough for the actual injury to be ‘causally linked’ to the asserted violation.” Id. (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977)). “Rather, in order to establish antitrust injury, the plaintiff must demonstrate that its injury is ‘of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from. that which makes or might make defendants’ acts unlawful.’ ” Gatt Commc’ns, 711 F.3d at 76 (quoting Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 438 (2d Cir.2005)). Put differently, “[plaintiffs must allege harm to the general market that has, in turn, harmed their own interests.” E & L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Indus., Ltd., 360 F.Supp.2d 465, 474 (E.D.N.Y.2005). Not surprisingly, the parties in this case spar over whether plaintiffs have established antitrust standing. Plaintiffs’ chief contention is that KBSA cut off then-supply of KBS videos in retaliation for their failure to adhere to the alleged price-fixing agreement, and to prevent the Samsung store from freely competing with other Korean video stores. (Pls.’ Mem. (Dkt. No. 138) at 12). “As a result,” plaintiffs assert, “[the Samsung] store had significant losses that it would otherwise have not suffered had KBS[A] continued its supply of content.” (Id.) “The type of injury Plaintiffs suffered,” they continue, “was therefore distinctly an antitrust type of injury and resulted directly from the defendant store owners’ desire to limit competition and maintain a price floor and from defendant KBS[A]’s complicity in maintaining the store owners’ price floor.” (Id. (emphasis in original)). They further contend that defendants’ actions were “intended not only to injure [plaintiffs], but also video customers, who would as a result need to pay artificially higher prices for their videos. Once supply of KBS content to Plaintiffs’ store was terminated, customers had to travel to Flushing.” (Id. at 13). The KBSA litigants counter that “any injury to Plaintiffs’ business once KBSA terminated supply (inasmuch as Plaintiffs continued to rent videos from other, allegedly less popular suppliers) would be purely private in nature and, therefore, insufficient to give rise to antitrust standing.” (KBSA’s Mem. (Dkt. No. 128) at 10). Citing Union Cosmetic Castle, Inc. v. Amorepacific Cosmetics USA Inc., 454 F.Supp.2d 62 (E.D.N.Y.2006), the KBSA litigants argue that a distributor does not achieve antitrust standing merely because it suffers a loss in profits, or goes out of business, after a supplier cuts off its supply of a popular product, even if the supplier’s actions unreasonably hamper competition and result in uniformally higher prices. (KBSA’s Mem. at 11). Furthermore, the KBSA litigants contend that the market for Korean video rentals does not, in fact, reveal uniform pricing, and that no anticompetitive effects have resulted from any of their actions. (Id.). The controlling precedent, however, is not Union Cosmetic, but is, instead, Gatt Communications, in which the Second Circuit considered and rejected a plaintiffs claim of antitrust standing on essentially identical facts. See 711 F.3d at 76-80. In its light, plaintiffs’ argument for antitrust standing must fail. Because the facts in Gatt Communications are so analogous to the case at bar, they are worth recalling here. In that case, Gatt (a retailer of commercial radios) and Vertex (a radio manufacturer/distributor) entered into a contract, pursuant to which Gatt became a licensed dealer of Vertex radios and equipment. Id. at 71-72. According to the agreement, Gatt’s dealings with Vertex would be coordinated through PMC, also a dealer /retailer of Gatt radios and Gatt’s sales representative in New York. Id. at 72. Vertex instructed Gatt that failure to cooperate with PMC could result in termination of the contract. Id. Between 2002 and 2007, various governmental agencies in New York purchased Vertex radios by soliciting bids from dealers. Id. at 72. Unbeknownst to these agencies, the dealers (at PMC’s direction, and with Vertex’s support and encouragement) operated a bid-rigging scheme between 2005 and 2007, whereby one dealer would submit a “real” bid for a particular solicitation (never to fall below a specified price floor) and other dealers would submit inflated phony bids, resulting in a loss of opportunity to win the bid for any but the “real” bidder. Id. Each dealer would t hen get a turn as the “real” bidder on subsequent solicitations, creating artificially higher prices paid by the agencies for Vertex radios. Id. After a year and a half of participating in the bid-rigging scheme, Gatt decided to break ranks with the cartel, and submitted its own rogue bid for a contract with the New York City Transit Authority (“NYC-TA”) in excess of $1 million. Id. at 73. NYCTA indicated that Gatt would likely win the contract, and PMC complained to Vertex, which promptly terminated its contract with Gatt. Id. NYCTA t hen re-bid the solicitation after discovering technical errors in the original solicitation, and Gatt, now unable to sell Vertex products, was unable to participate in the bidding. Id. at 74. Gatt subsequently sued PMC under the Sherman Act, seeking to recover lost profits from the NYCTA contract and subsequent bid solicitations from which it was now shut out. Id. Affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of antitrust standing, the Second Circuit observed that, while “the illegal ‘practice’ Gatt alleges is the carrying out of an illegal bid-rigging scheme, and Gatt’s alleged injury is the harm it suffered as a consequence of its' inability to continue selling- Vertex products ... [t]his harm only supports antitrust injury ... if it flows from that which makes the bid-rigging scheme unlawful.” Id. at 77. Considering this question, the court reasoned that, even assuming that the alleged bid-rigging scheme is unlawful, it is so only because of the harm it may cause— increased prices — to purchasers of Vertex products. See Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 793, 797 (2d Cir.1994). Gatt’s lost revenue resulting from the Vertex termination, however, is not an injury that flows from that which makes bid-rigging unlawful. Gatt has not been forced to pay higher prices for a product, as customers who are victimized by price-fixing schemes might.... Even if the antitrust laws seek to prevent Vertex and PMC’s alleged activities because of resulting harms to competition, these laws are not concerned with injuries to competitors such as Gatt resulting from their participation in or exile from such schemes. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338, 110 S.Ct. 1884, 109 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990). Gatt Commc’ns, 711 F.3d at 77 (emphasis in original). In line with its analysis, the court held that “Gatt’s allegations fail to demonstrate injury ‘of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes [the] defendants’ acts unlawful [under the antitrust laws].’ Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489, 97 S.Ct. 690. Therefore, Gatt does not have antitrust standing to pursue these claims.” Gatt Commc’ns, 711 F.3d at 77. The alleged wrongful conduct now before the Court is functionally indistinguishable from that presented in Gatt Commu nications. Here, the only injury that plaintiffs claim to have suffered as a result of defendants’ allegedly unlawful activities is lost revenue due to the termination of plaintiffs’ access to their KBS video supply. But, as Gatt Communications makes crystal clear, a competitor’s lost profits is not an injury “of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.” 711 F.3d at 77. Rather, horizontal price-fixing schemes are illegal under the antitrust laws “only because of the harm [they] may cause — increased prices — to purchasers” of the product for which prices have been fixed. Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiffs never paid higher prices for KBS videos as a result of the alleged price-fixing arrangement. They claim, instead, and more grievously to them, that their supply of KBS videos was simply cut off when they refused to participate, just as Gatt’s supply of Vertex radios was terminated after it abandoned the bid-rigging scheme that fixed prices there. Plaintiffs, of course, try to divert attention to their rental customers. In their brief, they refer to the “artificially higher prices” that the price-fixing scheme would create for customers, and also point out that “[o]nce supply of KBS content to Plaintiffs’ store was terminated, customers had to travel to Flushing” to rent their videos. (Pls.’ Mem. at 13). Certainly, these are the kinds of injuries that the Sherman Act was intended to prevent, and if video customers brought suit on those facts, they might well achieve antitrust standing. It is unmistakable from the record, though, that if such injuries were inflicted, they were not suffered by plaintiffs themselves; their injury was profit, not price. In Gatt Communications, the court held that lost profits, though an economic injury, is simply not the type of injury that confers antitrust standing on a claimant. That is the case here. Plaintiffs fare no better with regard to their Sherman Act § 2 claim. In the complaint, they advance this claim against all defendants, but only brief KBSA’s alleged monopoly power. (See Pls.’ Br. at 17-21). Even if KBSA did, in fact, operate such a monopoly, G.K.A. Beverage Corp. v. Honickman, 55 F.3d 762 (2d Cir.1995) forecloses any possibility that plaintiffs might have antitrust standing to bring a § 2 claim. In G.K.A. Beverage, a group of truck drivers/distributors of soda products sued a soda bottling company for allegedly monopolizing the local bottling market (that is, the market one level up in the distribution chain from the drivers). Id. at 764-66. The drivers claimed to have suffered losses after the bottler allegedly used its monopoly power to drive a competing bottler, with whom the drivers had a contract, into bankruptcy. Id. at 766. The court held that the drivers’ injuries were merely derivative, and that “a party in a business relationship with an entity that failed as a result of an antitrust violation has not suffered the antitrust injury necessary for antitrust standing.” Id.; see also A.G.S. Electronics, Ltd. v. B.S.R. (U.S.A.), Ltd., 460 F.Supp. 707, 710-11 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 591 F.2d 1329 (2d Cir.1978) (plaintiff distributor lacked antitrust standing where its sole injury was lost profits due to defendant manufacturer’s acquisition of a competitor and termination of plaintiffs exclusive distribution contract with that entity). In this case, plaintiffs baldly assert (without any supporting evidence) that KBSA controls 60% of the market for broadcasters and/or suppliers of Korean videos. (Pls/ 56.1 ¶ 35). Even if true, this fact would not, without more, prove that KBSA had monopoly power over its competitors. See, e.g., PepsiCo, 315 F.3d at 109 (64% of market share insufficient to show monopoly power). But, even accepting, for argument’s sake, plaintiffs’ claim that KBSA possesses monopoly power over the market for Korean videos, they would still lack antitrust standing. G.K.A. Beverage leaves no doubt that a product distributor may not sue a supplier under § 2 of the Sherman act when its injuries are merely derivative of the supplier’s monopoly power against its competitors. Plaintiffs never competed with KBSA; rather, they were one of its customers. Therefore, the injury they suffered as a result of KBSA’s alleged monopoly — termination of their video supply — was, at best, derivative. There can be no antitrust standing based on this injury. Despite the intimations in the complaint, plaintiffs do not marshal any record evidence showing, nor do they even allege in their brief, a monopoly of the video rental market held by the non-KBSA litigants. As such, the Court must consider any such claims as abandoned. See, e.g., Singleton v. City of Newburgh, 1 F.Supp.2d 306, 312 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (claims raised in complaint but nowhere else in the record were deemed “abandoned” at the summary judgment stage). But even if plaintiffs had not abandoned these claims, they would still lack antitrust standing to pursue them. Once again, the only injury plaintiffs have suffered is loss of profits due to KBSA’s termination of their KBS video supply. Assuming as true plaintiffs’ claim that KBSA had cut off this supply in retaliation for their refusal to join the video stores’ alleged monopolistic cartel, this injury is, at best, a derivative one. G.K.A. Beverage makes clear that an injury of this nature cannot support antitrust standing. In short, plaintiffs have not suffered the kind of injury needed to support antitrust standing. Consequently, they cannot pursue their causes of action under the Sherman Act, and defendants are granted summary judgment on all such claims. b. The Donnelly Act The Donnelly Act claims stumble on the same ground: antitrust standing. The Donnelly Act prohibits “[e]very contract, agreement, arrangement or combination whereby ... [a] monopoly ... is or may be established or maintained, or whereby '... competition ... is or may be restrained.” N.Y.G.B.L § 340(1). The New York Court of Appeals has held that “the Donnelly Act, having been modelled on the Federal Sherman Act ... should generally be construed in light of Federal precedent and given a different interpretation only where State policy, differences in the statutory language or the legislative history justify such a result.” X.L.O. Concrete Corp. v. Rivergate Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 513, 518, 611 N.Y.S.2d 786, 634 N.E.2d 158 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiffs have offered no reasons for interpreting their Donnelly Act claims differently from their Sherman Act claims, and the Court detects none independently. Indeed, the courts in both Gatt Communi cations, 711 F.3d at 81-82, and G.K.A. Beverage, 55 F.3d at 766-67, dismissed plaintiffs’ parallel Donnelly Act charges along with their Sherman Act claims for lack of antitrust standing. The Court now follows suit. Summary judgment for defendants on all Donnelly Act claims is granted. c. Deceptive Practices Act New York’s Deceptive Practices Act (“DPA”), N.Y.G.B.L. § 349(h), prohibits “[deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce.” In this lawsuit, plaintiffs allege that they “had a reasonable expectation that the price of [Korean rental] videos and their distribution would not already be established and controlled by Defendants and their fellow co-conspirators,” but that “that expectation was thwarted by Defendants’ activities” — presumably, since the motion papers are otherwise silent, the alleged price-fixing scheme — “and by their concealment of those activities.” (Compl. ¶ 85). Furthermore, plaintiffs allege that, “[b]y fixing the price at which Korean videos were sold, and by monopolizing the Korean video market, Defendants wrongfully deprived Plaintiffs of the opportunity to compete in a free and open marketplace.” (Id. ¶ 86). To prevail on a DPA claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant has engaged in “(1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.” City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits.Com, Inc., 12 N.Y.3d 616, 621, 911 N.E.2d 834, 883 N.Y.S.2d 772 (2009). To qualify as “consumer-oriented conduct,” a defendant’s acts or practices “need not be repetitive or recurring,” but “must have a broad impact on consumers at large; private contract disputes unique to the parties ... would not fall within the ambit of the statute.” New York Univ. v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 N.Y.2d 308, 320, 662 N.E.2d 763, 639 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1995) (internal quotations omitted). “Materially misleading conduct” is that which is “likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.” Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 85 N.Y.2d 20, 25, 647 N.E.2d 741, 623 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1995). Notably, “Mlthough the [DPA] is based upon section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ..., New York has chosen not to include ‘unfair competition’ or ‘unfair’ practices in its consumer protection statute, language that bespeaks a significantly broader reach.” In re Digital Music Antitrust Litigation, 812 F.Supp.2d 390, 410 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (internal quotations omitted). “Accordingly, ‘anticompetitive conduct that is not premised on consumer deception is not within the ambit of the statute,’ Leider v. Ralfe, 387 F.Supp.2d 283, 295 (S.D.N.Y.2005), because ‘[t]he statute seeks to secure an honest market place where trust, and not deception, prevails.’ ” Music Antitrust Litigation, 812 F.Supp.2d at 410 (quoting Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 N.Y.2d 314, 324, 774 N.E.2d 1190, 1195, 746 N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (2002)); see also In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation, 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 197 (D.Me.2004) (“An antitrust violation may violate section 349, but only if it is deceptive.”) (emphasis added). In this case, plaintiffs have failed to adduce evidence that the allegedly unlawful conduct — the price-fixing scheme—was in any way materially misleading to consumers. While horizontal price floors may be illegal under antitrust laws due to their anticompetitive effects, arrangements of this nature do not necessarily mislead customers, or dupe them into making purchases they otherwise would not have made. These schemes may result in artificially inflated costs, but without additional evidence of materially misleading conduct, they cannot in and of themselves under-gird a successful DPA claim. Mere failure by the scheme’s participants to disclose the nature of the arrangement is not enough — direct evidence of misleading or deceitful activity is required. See, e.g., In re Digital Music Antitrust Litigation, 812 F.Supp.2d 390, 409 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (“[I]f failure to disclose participation in a purported antitrust conspiracy were sufficient to state a consumer-protection claim, t hen any [Sherman Act] Section 1 antitrust case would automatically become a consumer-protection case. That is not the law.”) (emphasis in original). See also id. at 410 (dismissing DPA claim based on price-fixing scheme in the absence of facts indicating deceptiveness); Leider v. Ralfe, 387 F.Supp.2d 283, 295 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting DPA claim because defendants’ monopolistic practices, “while certainly reprehensible, [were] not secretive”). Despite their conclusory assertions regarding the “deceptive” nature of defendants’ conduct, (see Compl. ¶ 85), plaintiffs point to no record evidence suggesting that defendants ever took steps to ensure that customers were unaware of the alleged price-fixing scheme, or engaged in any other deceptive activity. On the contrary, plaintiffs themselves claim that Kong and Kim publicly announced, in a May 2004 press conference (at least five months before plaintiffs purchased the Shilla store), the intention of Association-affiliated stores to tamp down on increased price competition and ensure that uncooperative stores would be unable to operate. (Pls.’ 56.1 ¶ 7). Plaintiffs include as exhibits to the complaint articles from two Korean language newspapers describing the press conference and reporting the key quotes from Kim and Kong. (Compl., Exhs. A and B). They cannot now credibly assert that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether defendants were deceitful in operating the alleged price-fixing scheme. Simply put, the defendants’ alleged scheme may have been, in the words of Leider, “reprehensible,” but it was not “secretive.” Plaintiffs therefore cannot survive summary judgment on their DPA claim. It is of no import that “the practice of which Plaintiffs complain is not merely the charging of high prices but rather inducing Plaintiff Hong to open and relocate a video store with the expectation that he could freely set the rental price of his videos, conspiring to charge a high price, using market power to enforce the conspiracy, and terminating supply that Defendants had promised.” (Pls.’ Mem. at 22). The fact remains that all of these allegations are part and parcel of the general claim that defendants operated an illegal price-fixing cartel and retaliated against plaintiffs for their refusal to participate. As explained above, plaintiffs have not provided any facts indicating that this scheme was one that might materially mislead reasonable consumers. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ DPA claim fails, and summary judgment is awarded to defendants. d. Tortious Interference Claims Next, plaintiffs advance a claim against all defendants for “tortious interference with customer base,” (Compl. ¶¶ 106-111), a cause of action that does not exist under New York law. Plaintiffs reformulate this claim in their brief as one for tortious interference with an existing contract and prospective business relations — two separate causes of action — and the parties both brief the issue accordingly. (Pls.’ Mem. at 28-26; KBSA Mem. at 29-31; KBSA’s Reply (Dkt. No. 141) at 15-16). The Court, therefore, construes plaintiffs’ fourteenth claim as two distinct claims: one for tortious interference with an existing contract, and one for tortious interference with prospective business relations. Under New York law, “[t]o succeed on a cause of action alleging tortious interference with an existing contract, the plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of a valid contract between it and a third party, (2) the defendants’ knowledge of that contract, (3) the defendants’ intentional procurement of the third party’s breach of that contract without justification, and (4) damages.” Barns & Farms Realty, LLC v. Novelli, 82 A.D.3d 689, 690, 917 N.Y.S.2d 691, 693 (2d Dep’t 2011) (internal quotations omitted). With regard to the first element, the contract at issue must be specific, as “conclusory allegations of interference with an unspecified contract are insufficient.” Lesesne v. Brimecome, 918 F.Supp.2d 221, 227 (S.D.N.Y.2013). As to the second element, “although a defendant need not be aware of all the details of a contract, it must have actual knowledge of the specific contract” that is the subject of the claim. Medtech Products Inc. v. Ranir, LLC, 596 F.Supp.2d 778, 796 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (internal quotations omitted). Finally, a plaintiff cannot prevail on a claim of this nature unless he demonstrates an actual breach of the specified contract. See NBT Bancorp Inc. v. Fleet/Norstar Financial Group, Inc., 87 N.Y.2d 614, 620-21, 664 N.E.2d 492, 496, 641 N.Y.S.2d 581, 584 (1996) (“Indeed, breach of contract has repeatedly been listed among the elements of a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations.”). To support their claims that defendants interfered with existing contracts, plaintiffs point to “three affidavits of existing customers of Plaintiffs who have all claimed under oath that in the event the Defendants ceased supply of KBS content, they would have no choice but go to another store that supplies KBS content.” (Pls.’ Mem. at 24; Asher Decl., Exh. K (Affidavits of So Mi Yoon, Yun Sook Park, and Han Suh Hahn)). But, at no point do any of the affiants indicate that they had a contract of any kind— written or oral, express or implied — to rent videos from the Samsung store: they merely attest that they rent or have rented KBS videos from Samsung, but will have to begin renting them from a different store if Samsung’s KBS supply is terminated. (Asher Decl., Exh. K at PDF pp. 2, 4-5). There is no evidence whatsoever of a binding contractual relationship between any of these customers and plaintiffs. Pointedly, the evidence points in exactly the opposite direction — to traditional, ad hoc retail transactions. The claim of tortious interference with an existing contract, as a result, fails on that ground alone. Even if such contractual relationships did exist, there is, moreover, no evidence of a breach: the affiants merely state that they “may” or “will have to return to [their] prior rental place [s]” if Samsung remains unable to obtain KBS videos. (Id.). Mere anticipation of breach, however, will not suffice: a plaintiff must show an actual breach to prevail. See, e.g., Am. Bldg. Maintenance Co. of N.Y. v. Acme Property Servs., Inc., 515 F.Supp.2d 298, 315 (N.D.N.Y.2007) (rejecting claim of tortious interference with contractual relations because plaintiffs “failed to allege actual breach” by the third party). Similarly, even if there were actual contracts between plaintiffs and the three named customers, there is no record evidence whatsoever that any of the defendants had actual knowledge of these contracts. For these additional reasons, summary judgment must be awarded to defendants. The claim of tortious interference with prospective business relations meets the same fate. A claim of this nature requires proof of “(1) the defendant’s knowledge of a business relationship between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant’s intentional interference with the relationship; (3) that the defendant acted by the use of wrongful means or with the sole purpose of malice; and (4) resulting injury to the business relationship.” 534 East 11th Street Housing Dev. Fund Corp. v. Hendrick, 90 A.D.3d 541, 542, 935 N.Y.S.2d 23, 24 (1st Dep’t 2011). “[I]t is not necessary that the prospective relation be expected to be reduced to a formal, binding contract.” Hannex Corp. v. GMI, Inc., 140 F.3d 194, 205 (2d Cir.1998) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B cmt. c). “Accordingly, the tort encompasses ... interferences with ... the opportunity of selling or buying ... chattels or services, and any other relations leading to potentially profitable contracts.” Hannex, 140 F.3d at 205 (internal quotations omitted). Once again, plaintiffs falter because they have offered no evidence indicating that any of the defendants had actual awareness of plaintiffs’ business relationships with affiants Yoon, Park, and Hahn, or that they intentionally sought to interfere with those relationships. Plaintiffs assert that “Defendants knew or should have known the Plaintiffs had customers who enjoyed KBS content and employed wrongful means to interfere with that relationship.” (Pls.’ Mem. at 25). A generalized allegation of this nature will not pass muster; plaintiffs must show that defendants had actual knowledge of the specific business relationships with which they allegedly interfered. Courts have repeatedly rejected general claims of this nature because the party claiming interference could not make such a showing. See, e.g., Boehner v. Heise, 734 F.Supp.2d 389, 406-07 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (granting summary judgment to defendant, a ginseng trade organization, in part because plaintiff, a ginseng wholesaler, could not show that the defendant knew that a particular supplier had sold ginseng to plaintiff in the past or intended to do so in the future); Sedona Corp. v. Ladenburg Thalmann & Co., Inc., No. 03-Civ. 3120, 2009 WL 1492196, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2009) (dismissing claim because, while plaintiff “refers to Defendants’ knowledge of [plaintiffs] business model generally, at no point does [it] actually allege that Defendants knew about the specific business relationships [at issue]”) (emphasis added); 800America, Inc. v. Control Commerce, Inc., 202 F.Supp.2d 288, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (holding similarly). Because the record is bereft of evidence indicating that defendants had knowledge of plaintiffs’ business relationships with Yoon, Park, or Hahn (or, indeed, with any other specific customer), the Court grants summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs’ claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations. Relatedly, plaintiffs also advance three tortious interference claims against Kong, Spring Video, and Kim on the grounds that these defendants intentionally interfered with plaintiffs’ contractual, economic, and prospective business relationship with KBSA. (Compl. ¶¶ 88-105). Although these defendants move to dismiss “any and all claims asserted against [them]” in their motions, (see Def. Kong and Spring Video’s Mem. (Dkt. No. 135) at 4; Def. Kim’s Mem. (Dkt. No. 132) at 4), neither defendants nor plaintiffs analyze or even mention these particular claims in their briefs. Accordingly, the Court denies defendants’ motion for summary judgment at this time on these causes of action. Gavigan v. Comm’r of I.R.S., No. 3:06-CV-942, 2007 WL 1238651, at *7 (D.Conn. Apr. 27, 2007) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss a specific claim because it “did not brief the issue and makes only passing references to dismissing all of Plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6)”); Goshorn v. Bonamie, No. 95-CV-188, 1998 WL 166832, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 08, 1998). At the same time, given the parallel tortious interference claims that are dismissed by .this Order, leave is granted to Kong, Spring Video, and Kim to file a supplemental summary judgment motion on those claims. e. Unjust Enrichment As part of their state law assaults, plaintiffs bring a cause of action against all defendants for unjust enrichment. (See Compl. ¶¶ 112-15). It is, though, derivative of their antitrust claims. Plaintiffs concede that a litigant “cannot recover for unjust enrichment if the underlying basis for the claim is a failed antitrust claim pursuant to the holding set forth in Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner, 890 F.Supp. 250, 257 (S.D.N.Y.1995).” (Pls.’ Mem. at 26); see also Sands v. Ticketmaster-New York, Inc., 207 A.D.2d 687, 688, 616 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (1st Dep’t 1994). Plaintiffs, however, go on to assert that their antitrust claims “are cognizable and certainly not barred as a matter of law,” and, therefore, “the claim for unjust enrichment should be sustained.” (Pls.’ Mem. at 26). As discussed above, plaintiffs lack antitrust standing to pursue their Sherman Act and Donnelly Act claims. However, in both Kramer and Sands, the courts rejected plaintiffs’ antitrust claims on the merit s, rather than disposing of them on the threshold issue of antitrust standing, as the Court has done here. See Kramer, 890 F.Supp. at 254-57; Sands, 207 A.D.2d at 688, 616 N.Y.S.2d 362. These holdings could plausibly be interpreted to extend only to cases in which the court fully considers the underlying antitrust claims on the merit s. However, courts have held that indirect purchasers — who, under Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977), lack antitrust standing to bring claims under the Sherman Act and other federal antitrust statutes — may not circumvent the Court’s holding in Illinois Brick by characterizing their causes of action as unjust enrichment claims. See, e.g., In re Digital Music Antitrust Litigation, 812 F.Supp.2d 390, 412 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (“[I]t is beyond peradventure that indirect purchasers may not employ unjust enrichment to skirt the limitation on recovery imposed by [Illinois Brick].”); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation (“In re NMV”), 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 211 (D.Me.2004) (holding similarly). Other courts have applied this doctrine to state-level antitrust statutes as well. See, e.g., In re DDAVP Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 903 F.Supp.2d 198, 232-33 (S.D.N.Y.2012); In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 241 F.Supp.2d 563, 565 (D.Md.2003); In re NMV, 350 F.Supp.2d at 211. The Court is persuaded that the logic of these holdings should extend generally and bar all litigants who lack antitrust standing from bringing identical claims under a common law theory of unjust enrichment. Certainly, if such plaintiffs were permitted to repackage their antitrust claims as unjust enrichment actions, the entire thrust and purpose of the antitrust standing doctrine would disintegrate. Practically, if economic harm caused by market manipulation was cognizable on a theory of unjust enrichment, the antitrust laws themselves would be superfluous. Therefore, because they lack antitrust standing on their Sherman and Donnelly Act claims, plaintiffs cannot advance identical claims under a theory of unjust enrichment. Summary judgment must be, and is, awarded to defendants on those claims. f. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Seeming far out of place in a commercial setting, plaintiffs sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the grounds that defendants “knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of their collusion to deprive Plaintiffs and others from being able to compete in a free and open competitive marketplace,” and that their “extreme and outrageous” conduct in fact caused emotional distress to plaintiff Hong. (Compl. ¶¶ 116-21). A tort of this nature obligates a plaintiff to show “extreme and outrageous conduct; (n) intent to cause, or disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe emotional distress; (iii) a causal connection between the conduct and injury; and (iv) severe emotional distress.” Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993). “In practice, courts have tended to focus on the outrageousness element, the one most susceptible to determination as a matter of law.” Id. This standard is “rigorous, and difficult to satisfy.... Indeed, of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims considered by the [New York Court of Appeals], every one has failed because the alleged conduct was not sufficiently outrageous.” Id. at 122, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d. 699 (internal quotations omitted). For a plaintiff to succeed, the defendant’s conduct must have been “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiffs allege two distinct categories of conduct that they believe qualify as “extreme and outrageous”: defendants’ alleged operation of the price-fixing scheme itself, and defendants’ statements and actions pressuring Hong to join in that scheme. (See Compl. ¶¶ 117-18; Pls.’ Mem. at 26-27). As to the latter category, plaintiffs specifically allege that Kim told Hong that he “should raise his price or be put out of business,” and that C.J. Lee “also threatened [Hong] that he would make it ‘very difficult’ for him to continue his business operation” after Hong filed one of the Blue House [i.e., the South Korean government] complaints. (Pls.’ Mem. at 26-27). Accepting these allegations as true for argument’s sake, plaintiffs cannot ascend Howell’s steep stairs to the necessary threshold showing. Despite its potential illegality, the mere existence of the price-fixing scheme cannot satisfy the first Howell element: it simply is not “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” 81 N.Y.2d at 122, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699. “A wide range of conduct — though offensive or even otherwise illegal — is not considered ‘utterly intolerable in a civilized society’ to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”- Neufeld v. Neufeld, 910 F.Supp. 977, 984 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (collecting cases in which conduct that was unlawful, including racial discrimination and sexual harassment, was nonetheless found not to satisfy the first Howell element). Furthermore, the price-fixing scheme was not directed at plaintiffs, and there is no evidence that defendants intended, nor had any reason to foresee, that plaintiff would be emotionally harmed merely by the existence of the arrangement. Nor do plaintiffs’ other allegations demonstrate “extreme and outrageous” conduct. Kim’s putative statement that Hong “should raise his price or be put out of business,” and Lee’s alleged threat to make it “very difficult” for Hong’s business to survive, may have been offensive, but they do not rise to the level of patent outrageousness. See, e.g., Novak v. Rubin, 129 A.D.2d 780, 781, 514 N.Y.S.2d 523 (2d Dep’t 1987) (defendant’s threat to ruin plaintiffs wife’s career if plaintiff pursued a lawsuit against him was, “as a matter of law, simply not ‘outrageous’ enough to support ... a claim [for intentional infliction of emotional distress]”); Huzar v. State, 156 Misc.2d 370, 374-75, 590 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1004 (N.Y.Ct.Cl.1992) (dismissing similar claim premised on allegation that the defendant threatened to have plaintiff fired if she did not drop her worker’s compensation claim). Succinctly, the record evidence does not come close to demonstrating conduct that would support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Consequently, the Court grants summary judgment to defendants. g. Promissory Estoppel Finally, plaintiffs move against KBSA on a theory of promissory estoppel. (See Compl. ¶¶ 122-27). Under New York law, a party may recover damages in the absence of a written contract if it can show “(1) a promise that is sufficiently clear and unambiguous; (2) reasonable reliance on the promise by [that] party; and (3) injury caused by the reliance.” MatlinPatterson ATA Holdings LLC v. Fed. Express Corp., 87 A.D.3d 836, 841-42, 929 N.Y.S.2d 571, 577 (1st Dep’t 2011). Wielding the sabre of promissory estoppel, plaintiffs thrust with the following allegations: that KBS “made a clear and unambiguous oral promise that, if plaintiff Hong would buy an existing store and obtain the accompanying license, it would supply the store with its product;” that KBS[A] failed to disclose that “it would honor the foregoing commitment only if Hong would enter into an illegal conspiracy and agreement in restraint of trade;” that Hong “[Reasonably reli[ed] on KBS[A]’s promise” and “purchased a store and obtained the accompanying license;” and that “KBS[A] now refuses to deal with Plaintiffs and supply their store with its product,” on account of which “Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages.” (Compl. ¶¶ 123-27). KBSA, in turn, raises the shield of the Statute of Frauds, which “requires a written contract for an agreement that is not to be performed within one year of its making.” Sheehy v. Clifford, Chance Rogers & Wells LLP, 3 N.Y.3d 554, 560, 822 N.E.2d 763, 766, 789 N.Y.S.2d 456, 459 (2004) (citing G.O.L. § 5-701(a)(1)). As KBSA correctly observes, a plaintiff may “avoid the application of the Statute of Frauds b