Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION ROBERT L. WILKINS, District Judge. Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (“Dodd-Frank”), the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated a rule imposing certain disclosure requirements for companies that use “conflict minerals” originating in and around the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”). Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed.Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249b) (the “Conflict Minerals Rule,” “Final Rule,” or “Rule”). The plaintiffs in this action-the National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”), the Chamber of Commerce, and Business Roundtable (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)— challenge various aspects of the SEC’s Final Rule as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. Plaintiffs also mount a constitutional attack against both the Rule and Dodd-Frank § 1502, claiming that the disclosures required by the SEC and by Congress run afoul of the First Amendment. 'Finding no problems with the SEC’s rulemaking and disagreeing that the “conflict minerals” disclosure scheme transgresses the First Amendment, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ claims lack merit. Accordingly, upon careful consideration of the parties’ briefing and the arguments of counsel, along with a thorough review of the Joint Appendix the parties relied upon as the administrative record in this case, the Court, for the reasons that follow, will DENY Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 14) and will GRANT the Commission’s and Intervenors’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkt. Nos. 15, 16). BACKGROUND A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework 1. Dodd-Frank Act § 1502 Responding to the national financial downturn, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act on July 21, 2010, and introduced a broad range of new measures designed to improve the troubled securities markets. As relevant here, Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank directed the SEC to develop and promulgate a rule requiring greater transparency and disclosure regarding the use of “conflict minerals” coming out of the DRC and its neighboring countries. Congress believed that “the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the [DRC] is helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern [DRC], particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation.” Dodd-Frank § 1502(a), 124 Stat. 2213. In Congress’s view, requiring companies “to make public and disclose annually to the Securities and Exchange Commission if the minerals in their products originated or may have originated in Congo” will help “to ensure activities involving, such minerals did not finance or benefit armed groups.” 156 Cong. Rec. S3976 (May 19, 2010) (statement of Sen. Feingold). Put another way, Congress concluded that this disclosure scheme was “a reasonable step to shed some light on this literally life-and-death issue,” and believed that it would “encourage companies using these minerals to source them responsibly.” 156 Cong. Rec. S3817 (May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Durbin). Dodd-Frank added Section 13(p) to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p). The statute directs the SEC to adopt regulations requiring companies that use “conflict minerals” that are “necessary to the functionality or production” of their products, id. § 78m(p)(2)(B), to disclose to the Commission whether those minerals originated in the DRC or an adjoining country, id. § 78m(p)(1)(A). If such “conflict .minerals” — tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold— did originate in the DRC or an adjoining country, then companies must also submit an additional report to the Commission containing a “description of the' measures taken ... to exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of such minerals,” and “a description of the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured that are not DRC conflict free.” Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). Under the statute, “DRC conflict free” means that a product “does not contain conflict minerals that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in the [DRC] or an adjoining country.” Id. § 78m(p)(1)(D). The report must also describe “the facilities used to process the conflict minerals, the country of origin of the conflict minerals, and the efforts to determine the mine or location of origin with the greatest possible specificity.” Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii). Notably, the statute additionally requires that any disclosures or reports provided to the SEC under these provisions must be made publicly available on the companies’ own Internet websites. Id. § 78m(p)(1)(E). Along with the' SEC, Section 1502 also created responsibilities for other federal agencies. For example, the statute requires the Comptroller General to submit regular reports‘to Congress assessing “the rate of sexual- and gender-based violence in war-torn areas” in and around the DRC, and “the effectiveness of section 13(p) ... in promoting peace and security” in the DRC and surrounding countries. Dodd-Frank § 1502(d)(1)-(2), 124 Stat. 2216-17. In addition, the Secretary of State is required to produce and make publicly available “a map of mineral-rich zones, trade routes, and areas under the control of armed groups” in the DRC and adjoining countries, and must also prepare and submit to Congress “a strategy to address the linkages between human rights abuses, armed groups, mining of conflict minerals, and commercial products.” Id. § 1502(c)(1)-(2), 124 Stat. 2215-16. 2. The Conñict Minerals Rule Following the passage of Dodd-Frank, the Commission published its proposed rule a few months later in December 2010. See Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed.Reg. 80,948 (Dec. 23, 2010). During the rulemaking process, the SEC received more than 13,-000 comment letters, and it also convened a public roundtable to solicit feedback from interested stakeholders and industry representatives; following the roundtable, the Commission requested additional comments. See 77 Fed.Reg. at 56,277-56,278. Ultimately, the SEC adopted the Final Rule (Rule 13p-1) by a 3-2 vote on August 22, 2012, and published its Adopting Release—which spans nearly 100 pages in the Federal Register—on September 12, 2012. Id. at 56, 274-56, 365. a) Overview of the Final Rule As set out in the Adopting Release, the SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule can be broken down into three overall steps, which the Court summarizes in turn. - - - At “Step One,” and as a threshold matter, companies must first determine whether they are covered by the Rule’s requirements at all. The Final Rule only applies to “reporting” companies-i.e., companies that “file reports with the Commission under-Section 13(a) or Section 15(c) of the Exchange Act,” 77 Fed.Reg. at 56,287—for which “conflict minerals áre necessary to the functionality or production of a product manufactured or contracted by that issuer to be manufactured,” id. at 56,290. It bears mentioning that the Commission considered extending the Rule’s reach farther—observing that the statute “could be interpreted to apply to a wide range of private companies not previously subject to [the SEC’s] disclosure and reporting rules,” id. at 56,285—but ultimately thought the more reasonable interpretation was to limit the Rule’s application to reporting issuers. The SEC also considered several other factors bearing on the Rule’s scope. As relevant to this case, the' Commission concluded that the Rule should not be limited to issuers that directly manufacture products with necessary conflict minerals, but should also reach issuers who contract to manufacture such products; the Commission also' declined to adopt any type of categorical de minimis exception to the Rule’s coverage. See id. at 56,288-56,292, 56,295, 56,298. After applying these coverage standards, issuers that are subject to the Conflict Minerals Rule must proceed to “Step Two,” which requires covered issuers to conduct a “reasonable country of origin inquiry” regarding their conflict minerals. Id. at 56,311. The Rule does not precisely define what constitutes a “reasonable country of origin inquiry,” noting that it can “differ among issuers based on the issuer’s size, products, relationships with suppliers, or other factors,” and “depending] on the available infrastructure at a given time.” Id. But the Rule does provide some guidance. The inquiry “must be reasonably designed to determine whether the issuer’s conflict minerals did originate in the Covered Countries, or did come from recycled or scrap sources, and it must be performed in good faith.” Id. at 56,312. As explained in the Adopting Release, the Commission would “view an issuer as satisfying the reasonable country of origin inquiry standard if it seeks and obtains reasonably reliable representations” — “either directly from that facility or indirectly from the issuer’s immediate suppliers” — “indicating the facility at which its conflict minerals were processed and demonstrating that those conflict minerals did not originate in the Covered Countries or came from recycled or scrap sources.” Id. The Rule also confirms that an “issuer is not required to receive representations from all of its suppliers,” emphasizing that the “standard focuses on reasonable design and good faith inquiry.” Id. The SEC, instead, expects issuers to take into account “warning signs” and “red flags” suggesting that their minerals may have originated in the Covered Countries, or otherwise “casting doubt” on the source of their minerals. Id. at 56, 311-56, 312 & n. 448. Depending on the results of a company’s reasonable country of origin inquiry, it may or may not be required to proceed to the Rule’s third step. On the one hand, if, through its reasonable country of origin inquiry, an issuer: (1) “determines that its necessary conflict minerals did not originate in the Covered Countries or did come from recycled or scrap sources,” or (2) “has no reason to believe that its. conflict minerals may have originated in the Covered Countries or reasonably believes that its conflict minerals are from recycled or scrap sources,” then the issuer’s tracing obligations end there. Id. at 56,313 (emphasis added). The Rule simply requires that the issuer- disclose its determination to the Commission, briefly describing the scope and results of its reasonable country of origin inquiry on a newly-created “Form SD.” Id. On the other hand, if the issuer: (1) “knows” that its conflict minerals “originated in the Covered Countries and did not come from recycled or scrap sources,” or (2) “has reason to believe” that its minerals “may have originated in the Covered Countries (and may not have come from recycled or scrap sources),” then the issuer must proceed to the Rule’s third step. Id. At “Step Three,” issuers must exercise “due diligence” in an effort to more definitively determine “the source and chain of custody” of their conflict minerals. Id. While the SEC did not expressly spell out the steps that must be taken to qualify as “due diligence,” the Final Rule does require an issuer “to use a nationally or internationally recognized due diligence framework, if such a framework is available for the specific conflict mineral.” Id. at 56,326. Specifically, the Commission confirmed that the OECD due diligence guidance “satisfies [its] criteria and may be used as a framework for purposes of satisfying the final rule’s requirement that an issuer exercise due diligence in determining the source and chain of custody of its conflict minerals.” Id. (citing OECD Due Diligence Guidance). Further, the Adopting Release confirms that a “critical component of due diligence” is an independent, private sector audit designed to ensure that the issuer’s due diligence “is in conformity with ... [a] nationally or internationally recognized due diligence framework,” and that the issuer’s actual due diligence efforts comport with the due diligence approach described in its report. Id. at 56,320, 56,329. Depending on the information uncovered during the due diligence process, an issuer' may then be required to prepare a Conflict Minerals Report. If, following due diligence, “an issuer determines that its conflict minerals did not originate in the Covered Countries or that its conflict minerals did come from recycled or scrap sources, then no Conflict Minerals Report is required.” Id. at 56,312 (emphasis added). The issuer must still, however, prepare and submit a Form SD to the Commission describing the scope and results of its due diligence efforts. Id. By contrast, if the issuer’s due diligence reveals that its minerals did originate in the Covered Countries and did not come from recycled or scrap sources — or if the issuer cannot determine the source of its conflict minerals through due diligence — then the issuer must prepare and submit a Conflict Minerals Report to the SEC. Id. at 56,313. The Conflict Minerals Report must include, among other matters, “a description of the measures the issuer has taken to exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of [its] conflict minerals,” accompanied by “a certified independent private sector audit.” Id. at 56,320. In addition, unless the issuer’s products can be identified as “DRC conflict free,” the report must set forth “a description of the facilities used to process those conflict minerals, the country of' origin of those conflict minerals, and the efforts to determine the mine or location of origin with the greatest possible specificity.” Id. An issuer’s Conflict Minerals Report must also include a description of its products that have “not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free,’ ” although issuers can include additional explanatory information they believe necessary or appropriate. Id. at 56,322 (“[I]ssuers can add disclosure or clarification,” which “allows issuers to include the statutory definition of ‘DRC conflict free’ in the disclosure to make clear that ‘DRC conflict free’ has a very specific meaning, or to otherwise address their particular situation.”). On this last point, the Commission also .authorized a temporary transition period allowing companies unable to determine the origin of their conflict minerals to describe those minerals as “DRC conflict undeterminable,” rather than as having “not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free.’ ” Id. at 56,321. The Rule allows this alternative description for a two-year period for all reporting issuers, and for a four-year period for “smaller” companies. Id. at 56,321-56,322. Significantly, the Rule does not require that companies place any type of label or disclosure on products. Id. at 56,323 (“We note that many commentators appeared to believe that the proposed rules would require that an issuer physically label its products as “DRC conflict free” or not “DRC conflict free”.... The final rule does not require a physical label on any product.”). Rather, these descriptions must be set forth in an issuer’s Conflict Minerals Report, if at all, although a copy of the Conflict Minerals Report must also be publicly posted on the company’s website, as well. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(E); 77 Fed.Reg. at 56, 362-56, 363. The Final Rule became effective on November 13, 2012, and the first reports and disclosures it requires are due to be filed with the SEC by May 31, 2014. 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,274. b) Signiñcant Comments and Issues Considered by the Commission Insofar as they are relevant to the claims Plaintiffs press in this case, the Court summarizes some of the more significant comments and issues considered— and in some cases, adopted — by the Commission during the rulemaking process. First, many commentators urged the Commission to adopt a de minimis exception to the Rule’s coverage, submitting a wide variety of proposed threshold amounts for the SEC’s consideration. See 77 Fed.Reg. at 56,295, 56,298. For example, some commentators suggested that an issuer should be exempt from coverage if the cost of conflict minerals in its products makes up less than 1% of the issuer’s total production costs. Id. at 56,295. Some other stakeholders recommended a de minimis exception applicable to “trace, nominal, or insignificant amounts of conflict minerals” that are part of a company’s products. Id. And still other commentators proposed the adoption of a de minim-is exception in circumstances “when the issuer is unable to determine the origin of only 5% of the product’s minerals,” “for products containing less than 0.1% by weight of a conflict mineral,” and/or “if an issuer’s global usage of conflict minerals comprised less than 0.01% of its materials.” Id. Ultimately, the Commission declined to adopt any categorical de minimis exception as part of the Final Rule. Id. at 56,298. In its view, a de minimis threshold would have been contrary to the Rule’s purpose, given that the standard “focuses on whether the conflict mineral is ‘necessary’ to a product’s functionality or production,” rather than “the amount of a conflict mineral contained in the product.” Id. The SEC, in reaching this decision, also relied upon commentators’ indications that conflict minerals “are often used in products in very limited quantities,” as well as the Commission’s own “understand[ing] that there are instances in which only a minute amount of conflict minerals is necessary for the functionality or production of a product.” Id. In addition, the SEC received a number of comments encouraging the Commission not to apply the Final Rule to companies that “contract to manufacture” products containing necessary conflict minerals, but that do not “manufacture” such products directly. Id. at 56,289-56,290. Despite the urging of those commentators, the Commission ultimately determined that the Rule should apply to both categories of issuers — those that directly manufacture products containing necessary conflict minerals, as well as those that contract to manufacture such products. Id. at 56,290. In so doing, the Commission declined to define “contract to manufacture” in the Final Rule, believing such a definition would prove “unworkable.” Id. at 56,290-56,291. But the Adopting Release does offer guidance. The SEC explained that the term “contract to manufacture” only “include[s] issuers that have some actual influence over the manufacture of their products.” Id. at 56,291. Consequently, the Commission explained that an issuer would not be viewed as “contracting to manufacture a product” if “its actions involve no more than”: (a) “[s]pecifying or negotiating contractual terms ... that do not directly relate to the manufacturing of the product, such as training or technical support, price, insurance, indemnity, intellectual property rights, dispute resolution, or other like terms ... (b) “[ajffixing its brand, marks, logo, or label to a generic product manufactured by a third party”; or (c) “[s]ervicing, maintaining, or repairing a product manufactured by a third party.” Id. In the Commission’s view, this approach avoids sweeping “pure retailer[s]” into the Rule’s scope, given that companies simply “offer[ing] a generic product under [their] own brand name or a separate brand name” generally do not “exert a sufficient degree of influence” over the manufacturing process. Id. at 56,292. As another key point, the proposed rule would have required an issuer to undertake fullblown due diligence efforts if, based on its reasonable country of origin inquiry, it was “unable to determine that its conflict minerals did not originate in the Covered Countries.” Id. at 56,312. Believing this framework would unreasonably require issuers to “prove a negative,” the Commission ultimately concluded that such an “approach would arguably be more burdensome than necessary to accomplish the [Rule’s] purpose,” and that “requiring a certainty in this setting would not be reasonable and may impose undue costs.” Id. at 56,312-56,313. As a result, the Final Rule incorporates the standard outlined above, whereby an issuer is excused from due diligence obligations so long as it “has no reason to believe that its conflict minerals may have originated in the Covered Countries,” or “reasonably believes that its conflict minerals are from recycled or scrap sources.” Id. at 56,313. In the SEC’s view, this procedure struck the appropriate balance: “This revised approach does not require an issuer to prove a negative to avoid moving to [due diligence], but it also does not allow an issuer to ignore or be willfully blind to warning signs or other circumstances indicating that its conflict minerals may have originated in the Covered Countries.” Id. Separately, the terms of the proposed rule also would have required issuers unable to determine the source of their conflict minerals to describe their products in the Conflict Minerals Report as “not DRC conflict free.” Id. at 56,317. Responding to commentators’ concerns that it “would impose an unfair stigma” on companies that are forced to describe products as “not DRC conflict free,” “particularly on issuers that did not know whether their minerals directly or indirectly financed or benefited armed groups in the Covered Countries,” the Commission modified the applicable language in the Final Rule. Id. at 56,322. Instead, issuers must now explain that such products have “not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free’ ” (unless they rely upon the alternative disclaimer of “DRC conflict undeterminable” during the temporary transition period). Id. In the Commission’s view, this approach avoids incentivizing issuers to “avoid determining the origins of the conflict minerals that they use,” while remaining faithful to “Congress’s directive in Section 1502” of Dodd-Frank. Id. at 56,321. B. Procedural History Plaintiffs initially filed this action with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, invoking 15 U.S.C. § 78y as the direct jurisdictional springboard to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending with the appellate court, however, the D.C. Circuit issued its decision in American Petroleum Institute v. SEC, 714 F.3d 1329 (D.C.Cir.2013), concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over a direct challenge to a different SEC rule issued under Dodd-Frank. Id. at 1333. The D.C. Circuit held that its original jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Exchange Act is limited to challenges to “final orders issued by the Commission” and to challenges to “rules promulgated pursuant to enumerated sections of the Act.” Id. Outside of those limited circumstances, the Circuit explained, “a party must first proceed by filing suit in district court” under the APA. Id. The American Petroleum decision was issued on April 26, 2013; four days later— apparently reading the writing on the wall — Plaintiffs (then Petitioners) moved to transfer the instant case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, and the Circuit granted that request. Following transfer of this matter to the undersigned on'May 2, 2013, the Court directed the parties to submit a status report outlining how they wished to proceed- — and, in particular, indicating whether any party desired to submit new or additional briefing, or whether the parties preferred the Court to simply treat the briefs previously filed with the Court of Appeals as cross-motions for summary judgment. (See Dkt. No. 2). The parties opted for the latter approach, agreeing that there was no need for additional briefing; the parties requested that the Court treat Plaintiffs’ (formerly Petitioners’) brief filed with the D.C. Circuit as a motion for summary judgment, and the Commission’s and Intervenors’ appellate briefs as cross-motions for summary judgment. (See Dkt. No. 9). The parties also requested expedited review of this case. (Id.). The Court adopted this approach via Order on May 16, 2013, and set a hearing on the cross-motions for July 1, 2013. The Court entertained argument from the parties for nearly three hours on the 1st of July, and took this matter under submission at that time. ANALYSIS This case presents two separate categories of claims for the Court’s review. First, Plaintiffs challenge the SEC’s promulgation of the Conflict Minerals Rule under the APA, claiming that the Commission ignored its statutory obligations under the Exchange Act in issuing the Rule and that the Commission’s rulemaking was arbitrary and capricious in several other respects. Second, Plaintiffs mount a constitutional attack against both the Final Rule and Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank, contending that the obligation. for companies to publish their conflict minerals disclosures on their own websites compels speech in violation of the First Amendment. The Court discusses these two subjects separately below. A. Plaintiffs’ APA Claims 1. Applicable Standards of Review “When ruling on a summary judgment motion in a case involving final review of an agency action under, the APA, the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) do not apply because of the limited role of the court in reviewing the administrative record.” Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 887 F.Supp.2d 259, 265-66 (D.D.C.2012). Instead, “[sjummary judgment serves as a mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the administrative record supports the agency action and whether the agency action is consistent with the APA standard of review.” Id. at 266 (citing Richards v. INS, 554 F.2d 1173, 1177 & n. 28 (D.C.Cir.1977)). Under the APA, agency action is unlawful if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). The “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review is a narrow one, and it is well settled that “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). While the reviewing court must conduct a “searching and careful” review, the agency’s action remains “entitled to a presumption of regularity,” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), and the court “will not second guess an agency decision or question whether the decision made was the best one,” C & W Fish Co. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 1556, 1565 (D.C.Cir.1991). But the court must nevertheless be satisfied that the agency “examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856; see also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA 682 F.3d 1032, 1036 (D.C.Cir.2012). Moreover, where a case turns on the agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with implementing, courts apply the well-worn, two-part Chevron test. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Under Chevron Step One, the court must first determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778; Pub. Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 901 F.2d 147, 154 (D.C.Cir.1990). If so, then the court’s inquiry ends, and the clear and unambiguous statutory language controls. See Northeast Hosp. v. Sebelius, 657 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C.Cir.2011) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778). In answering this question, the court reviews the statute de novo, “employing traditional tools of statutory construction,” Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA 489 F.3d 1221, 1228 (D.C.Cir.2007), by assessing “the statutory text at issue, the statute as a whole, and ... legislative history where appropriate,” Int’l Swaps, 887 F.Supp.2d at 268 (internal citations omitted); see also Bell Atl. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C.Cir.1997) (characterizing the Chevron Step One inquiry “as a search for the plain meaning of the statute”). If the statute is ambiguous, however, then the analysis shifts to Chevron Step Two, whereby the reviewing court must consider “whether the agency’s [interpretation] is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778; see also Peter Pan Bus Lines v. FMCSA 471 F.3d 1350, 1353 (D.C.Cir.2006). Under Chevron, “[a] statute is ambiguous if it can be read more than one way.” Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Org. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 333 F.3d 168, 173 (D.C.Cir.2003). “Because the judiciary functions as the final authority on issues of statutory construction, an agency is given no deference at all on the question whether a statute is ambiguous.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 310 F.3d 202, 205-06 (D.C.Cir.2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 2. The SEC’s Statutory Obligations Under The Exchange Act Plaintiffs’ briefing opens with an overarching challenge to the Commission’s promulgation of the Conflict Minerals Rule: they argue that the SEC failed to “analyze' properly the costs and benefits” of the Rule as a whole, ostensibly in contravention of its statutory directives under the Exchange Act. (Pls.’ Brief at 26-27). From Plaintiffs’ view, “[t]he Commission had to conduct an adequate analysis of the overall costs and benefits of the rule, including the alternatives it adopted, in order to satisfy its statutory obligations and exercise its authority in a reasoned manner.” (Id. at 26). They claim that the Commission shirked its statutory obligations to consider “whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation,” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f), and to ensure that the Rule would not “impose a burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of’ the Exchange Act, id. § 78w(a)(2). Plaintiffs argue that the SEC was required by the Exchange Act to independently determine whether the rule was “necessary or appropriate ... to decrease the conflict and violence in the DRC.” (Pls.’ Reply at 4). As Plaintiffs see it, the Commission abdicated this responsibility and improperly deferred to “Congress’s determination that conflict minerals disclosure will yield social benefits in the form of decreasing conflict and violence in the DRC,” (id. at 3), and “failed to even conclude that [its] choices will improve conditions in the DRC at all,” (Pls.’ Brief at 33). By supposedly ducking this statutory obligation, Plaintiffs contend, the Commission’s decision-making was arbitrary and capricious, necessitating vacatur of the Conflict Minerals Rule. The Court disagrees. To begin with, Sections 3(f) and 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act simply do not mandate the type of analysis Plaintiffs claim was lacking here. Section 3(f) provides that whenever “the Commission is engaged in rulemaking ... and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (emphasis added). And Section 23(a)(2) states that the Commission shall, “in making rules and regulations ... [,] consider among' other matters the impact any such rule or regulation would have on competition,” and “shall not adopt any such rule or regulation which would impose a burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes” of the Act. Id. § 78w(a)(2) (emphasis added). By their terms, these provisions only obligate the SEC to “consider” the impact that a rule or regulation may have on various economic-related factors — efficiency, competition, and capital formation. In doing so, the Commission may deem it appropriate (or even necessary) to weigh the costs and benefits of its proposed action as related to these enumerated factors, but to suggest that the Exchange Act mandates that the SEC conduct some sort of broader, wide-ranging benefit analysis simply reads too much into this statutory language. This is particularly true here, where the resulting benefits Plaintiffs accuse the Commission of ignoring relate to humanitarian objectives that Congress concluded would be achieved by the rule-making, rather than some sort of economic objectives underlying the Commission’s rule. (See, e.g., Pls.’ Brief at 1 (complaining that the SEC “did not determine whether the rule will provide any benefits to the people of the DRC”) (emphasis in original); id. at 23 (“[T]he Commission imposed these enormous costs without determining whether the rule would yield any benefits for the Congolese people.”) (emphasis in original); Pls.’ Reply at 1-2 (“[T]he Commission failed to assess whether these determinations would yield any benefits or instead make a tragic humanitarian situation even worse.”) (emphasis in original)). Simply put, there is no statutory support for Plaintiffs’ argument that the Commission was required to evaluate whether the Conflict Minerals Rule would actually achieve the social benefits Congress envisioned. Nor is Plaintiffs’ argument reinforced by any of the Circuit precedent they cite. It is true, as Plaintiffs assert, that our Court of Appeals has emphasized the SEC’s “statutory obligation to determine as best it can the economic implications of its rule.” Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C.Cir.2011) (emphasizing the Commission’s “unique obligation to consider the effect of a new rule upon ‘efficiency, competition, and capital formation,’ ” under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f) & 78w(a)(2)); see also Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 176-77 (D.C.Cir.2010) (applying Securities Act’s companion provision, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b), which similarly requires the SEC to consider “efficiency, competition, and capital formation”); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C.Cir.2005) (construing companion provision of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c), which tracks the same language). In this vein, the D.C. Circuit has: invalidated a rule based on the Commission’s failure “to estimate and quantify the costs it expected companies to incur,” and its “ducking serious evaluation of the costs that could be imposed upon companies,” Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150, 1152; vacated a rule due to the SEC’s failure to conduct “an analysis of whether the specific rule will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation,” Am. Equity, 613 F.3d at 178 (emphasis in original); and struck down a regulation because the SEC failed to determine a “range within which a fund’s cost of compliance will fall,” which the court found “would be pertinent to its assessment of the effect the condition would have upon efficiency and competition, if not capital formation,” Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 143-44. As should be clear, however, all of those cases involved shortcomings on the Commission’s part with respect to the economic implications of its actions—economic implications that the SEC was statutorily required to consider in adopting the challenged rules. By contrast, none of those decisions lends support to Plaintiffs’ theory that the Conflict Minerals Rule must be invalidated because the SEC failed to consider whether the Rule would actually achieve the humanitarian benefits identified by Congress. Plaintiffs also fail to account for another important distinction between those decisions and the case at bar. All of those cases involved rules or regulations that were proposed and adopted by the SEC of its own accord, with the Commission having independently perceived a problem within its purview and having exercised its own judgment to craft a rule or regulation aimed at that problem. See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1146 (reviewing proxy rule adopted by the SEC based on its belief that “the current process impede[d] the expression of shareholders’ right under state corporation laws to nominate and elect directors”); Am. Equity, 613 F.3d at 170-71 (invalidating “Rule 151A,” through which the SEC “sought to ensure that purchasers of [fixed index annuities] would be entitled to the full protection of the federal securities laws”); Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 137 (reviewing rule amending mutual fund regulations based on the SEC’s belief that “more was required” due to a “serious breakdown in management controls”). Here, by contrast, the Commission promulgated the Conflict Minerals Rule pursuant to an express, statutory directive from Congress, which was driven by Congress’s determination that the due diligence and disclosure requirements it enacted would help to promote peace and security in the DRC. As a result, the SEC rightly maintains that its role was not to “secondguess” Congress’s judgment as to the benefits of disclosure, but to, instead, promulgate a rule that would promote the benefits Congress identified and that would hew closely to that congressional command. See Pub. Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d 1541, 1557 (D.C.Cir.1989) (“[A]gencies surely do not have inherent authority to second-guess Congress’ calculations.”); Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 150 F.Supp.2d 36, 48 (D.D.C.2001) (same). Therefore, while Plaintiffs inveigh against the Commission’s apparent disregard for its “statutory mandate” in failing to assess whether the Conflict Minerals Rule would actually achieve the benefits Congress identified, this argument rests on a false premise. The Exchange Act imposes no such statutory obligation. And framed appropriately, the Court is easily convinced that the Commission discharged any potential responsibility to consider whether the Final Rule will “promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation,” and that the Commission appropriately considered the Rule’s impact on competition more generally, as required by the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 78w(a)(2). Indeed, Plaintiffs do not meaningfully contest these points. First, the Adopting Release confirms that the Commission considered the Rule’s impact on efficiency, explaining “that the required disclosure will help investors in pricing the securities of the issuers subject to the Conflict Minerals Statutory Provision” and “could improve informational efficiency.” 77 Fed.Reg. at 56,350. On the other hand, the SEC posited that because “the cost of compliance for this provision will be borne by the shareholders of the company,” the Rule could “divest capital away from other productive opportunities” and “may result in a loss of allocative efficiency,” although such loss might be offset “by increased demand for the firm’s products and/or shares by socially conscious consumers and investors.” Id. Second, the Commission considered whether the -Rule would “have a significant impact on capital formation,” explaining that it “[did] not expect that the rule would negatively impact prospects of the affected industries to the extent that would result in withdrawal' of capital from these industries.” Id. at 56,350-56,351. And third, the Commission considered the Rule’s effect on competition, noting that “issuers with a reporting obligation under the Conflict Minerals Statutory Provision could be put at a competitive disadvantage with respect to private companies that do, not have such an obligation.” Id. at 56,350. The SEC also observed that “the implementation of the statute may provide significant advantage to foreign companies that are not reporting in the United States ... but do compete directly with reporting issuers in the United States.” Id. But on balance, the SEC concluded that “to the extent the final rule implementing the statute imposes a burden on competition in the industries of affected issuers,” it “believefd] the burden is necessary and appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of Section 13(p).” Id. Therefore, upon review of the record, the Court is convinced that the Commission appropriately considered the various factors that Sections 3(f) and 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act actually require. No statutory directive obligated the Commission to reevaluate and independently confirm that the Final Rule would actually achieve the humanitarian benefits Congress intended. Rather, the SEC appropriately deferred to Congress’s determination on this point, and its conclusion was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law — whether because of some statutory directive under the Exchange Act or otherwise. 3. The Commission’s Estimation of Particular Costs Plaintiffs next argue — albeit somewhat weakly — that the Commission arbitrarily underestimated some aspects of the Rule’s costs. Parroting language from our Circuit, Plaintiffs accuse the Commission of “inconsistently and opportunistically framing] the costs” of the Rule and “fail[ing] adequately to quantify the certain costs.” (Pls.’ Brief at 31) (quoting Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148-49). In particular, Plaintiffs focus on two aspects of the Commission’s cost analysis: information technology (“IT”) costs and the estimated number of suppliers that will be impacted by the Rule. As Plaintiffs see it, the Commission arbitrarily rejected the estimates that NAM submitted during the rulemaking process “simply because other commenters provided lower estimates.” (Pls.’ Reply at 8). These arguments miss the mark. As a general matter, the Court disagrees that the Commission simply rejected NAM’s estimates out of hand, as Plaintiffs assert. Upon receiving four separate cost estimates from commentators (including one from NAM), the Commission noted the “wide divergence” among the various analyses, ranging from $387 million to $16 billion. 77 Fed.Reg. at 56,351. As set forth in the Adopting Release, the Commission believed that “a combination of the analyses [would] provide a useful framework for understanding various cost components,” and it “strive[d] to achieve a balanced and reasonable analysis based on the data and assumptions provided by all commentators, as well as [the Commission’s] own analysis and assumptions.” Id. Moreover, while the Commission placed particular emphasis on two studies — those prepared by NAM and by Tulane University — it noted that “even these two studies did not provide sufficiently documented evidence to support all of their assumptions and assertions.” Id. As a consequence, the SEC took “into account the views expressed in other comment letters, and made modifications to the analyses provided by the manufacturing industry association and university group commentators accordingly.” Id. This approach, the Commission concluded, “better synthesize[d] the information provided to [it] in the comment process.” Id. This methodology strikes the Court as eminently appropriate, which means that Plaintiffs are left to argue that certain, specific aspects of the Commission’s calculations were arbitrary and unreasonable. They fare no better on that front. First, with respect to the IT costs, the Commission noted that “an important consideration” in these estimates was the “cost of upgrading or implementing changes to IT systems.” Id. While the Commission initially looked to the IT cost estimates submitted by NAM and by Tulane University, it believed that those figures “may have been over-inclusive,” given the input of other ' commentators who pointed out that: (1) “conflict minerals software for small companies can be downloaded for free”; (2) the systems used in NAM’s and Tulane’s studies were “the most expensive systems on the market”; and (3) many companies interviewed “would not need to invest in new software solely for conflict minerals.” Id. But neither did the Commission accept, hook-line- and-sinker, the lower estimates submitted by those other commentators. Instead, the SEC struck what it believed to be the right balance among all the estimates submitted: “[W]e do not intend to replace the manufacturing industry association and university group commentators’ cost estimates with the smaller estimate provided; rather, for purposes of our cost estimate, the appropriate estimate lies somewhere in between those two estimates.” Id. While Plaintiffs may believe the Commission got it wrong, their disagreement does not render the SEC’s analysis on this point arbitrary or unreasonable. Nor was the Commission’s analysis of the total number of affected first-tier suppliers improper. While NAM’s study estimated that each issuer had an average of 2,000 first-tier suppliers, the Commission found that number “not supported by other estimates” and “difficult to reconcile with figures reported by other commentators.” Id. at 56,352. At the same time, the SEC also declined to accept the lower figure proffered by another commentator: “[We] do think a prudent reduction in the manufacturing industry association commentator’s estimate is warranted, but here again, we do not know that 163 is any more representative of an average company’s experience.” Id. In turn, the Commission relied upon Tulane University’s estimate of 1,060 average suppliers, which it found most reasonable. Id. In so doing, the Commission weighed comments received from the various parties and exercised its discretion in concluding which figures were most appropriate. While Plaintiffs, again, may disagree, the Court cannot say that the SEC acted arbitrarily or capriciously in reaching this particular estimate. 4. The De Minimis Threshold Plaintiffs next complain that the Commission wrongly failed to implement any type of a de minimis exemption from the Conflict Minerals Rule’s coverage. Their attack on this front is twofold. They first contend that the Commission believed the statute unambiguously foreclosed any de minimis threshold, when, according to Plaintiffs, Congress - actually left that determination up to the SEC. Because the Commission wrongly treated the statute as unambiguous and thought itself precluded from even considering a de minimis exception, Plaintiffs argue, the Court should not afford the SEC’s determination any deference and should instead remand to the agency for further proceedings. Second, Plaintiffs insist that even if the Commission did exercise its discretion on this point, its analysis of the de minimis issue was arbitrary and cannot survive APA review. In particular, Plaintiffs take issue with the Commission’s allegedly conelusory rationale, and they fault the Commission for failing to conduct any meaningful analysis of the various de minimis proposals submitted during the rulemaking process. The Court considers each of these arguments in turn. Beginning with Plaintiffs’ opening theory, they maintain that Dodd-Frank § 1502 is silent, or at least ambiguous, as to the propriety of 'the SEC adopting a de minimis threshold as part of the Final Rule. In support, Plaintiffs argue that the statute “does not forbid” or unambiguously foreclose the use of a de minimis .exception, which, in their view, is an indication that “[t]he Commission plainly had power to adopt a de minimis exception.” (Pls.’ Reply at 11). According to Plaintiffs, the SEC therefore could have looked to its general exemptive authority under the Exchange Act, through which the Commission can “exempt ... any cláss or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of [the Exchange Act] or of any rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.” 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1); see also id. § 78l(h) (authorizing exemptions from several provisions of the Act, including Section 13, “upon such terms and conditions and for such period as it deems necessary or appropriate,” provided “that such action is not inconsistent with the public interest or the protection of investors”). Alternatively, Plaintiffs contend that the Commission could have relied on its inherent authority, under general principles of administrative law, to create a de minimis exception. See, e.g., Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (D.C.Cir.1979); Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. FLRA 397 F.3d 957, 962 (D.C.Cir.2005) (“As long as the Congress has not been ‘extraordinarily rigid’ in drafting the statute ... ‘there is likely a basis for an implication of de minimis authority to provide [an] exemption when the burdens of regulation yield a gain of trivial or no value.’ ”) (quoting Envt’l Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 466 (D.C.Cir.1996)) (alterations in original). Plaintiffs argue the Commission wrongly ignored these precepts and “concluded that it lacked authority” and was “precluded from considering” any de minimis exception as part of the Final Rule. (Pis.’ Brief at 35). To this end, Plaintiffs point to several statements by the SEC within the Adopting Release: • “The statute itself does not contain a de minimis exception, and for several reasons we believe it would be contrary to the Conflict Minerals Statutory Provision and Congressional purpose to include one,” 77 Fed.Reg. at 56,298; • “If [Congress] had intended that the provision be limited further, so as not to apply to a de minimis use of conflict minerals, we think.Congress would have done so explicitly,” id.; and • “[W]e are of the view that Congress intended not to provide for a de minimis exception, and including one in • the final rule would therefore thwart, rather than advance, the provision’s purpose,” id. In this same vein, Plaintiffs also highlight several passages from the SEC’s briefing in this case: • “[T]he Commission’s broader conclusion that consistent with the- views of the State Department, we believe Congress intended the disclosure provisions to apply to the use of even smaller amounts of conflict minerals originating in the Covered Countries necessarily precluded the adoption of any of the de minimis thresholds,” (Pls.’ Reply at 11) (quoting Def.’s Brief at 48) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); • “It was not for the Commission, through de minimis exemptive authority, to find that Congress overreached and to bring the statutory requirements back into line,” (Id.) (quoting Def.’s Brief at 46); and • Highlighting the SEC’s decision not “to create a de minimis exception based on its analysis of the ‘text, structure, and purposes of Section 1502,’ ” (Id.) (citing and quoting Def.’s Brief at 16, 43). Plaintiffs insist that these statements betray the SEC’s unambiguous treatment of the statute during the rulemaking process. For its part, the Commission recognizes its general powers of exemptive authority — both expressly under the Exchange Act and impliedly under general APA principles. But the Commission disagrees that it believed Congress, through Section 1502, unambiguously foreclosed the use of those powers in the Conflict Minerals Rule. According to the SEC, it “did not conclude that it ‘lacked authority’ to create or that it ‘was precluded from considering’ a de minimis exception.” (Def.’s Brief at 44). Instead, the. Commission rejoins that it exercised discretion in interpreting the statute, “appropriately] examined, whether such an exception would further the disclosure scheme Congress envisioned,” and reasonably concluded that there was “ample reason to decline to create such an exception under either its general or its inherent authority.” (Id. at 46). Since neither side contends that Congress clearly and unambiguously answered the question of whether a 'de minimis exception could be adopted as part of the Conflict Minerals Rule, the Court need not embark on a full-blown analysis under Chevron Step One. Rather, as do the parties, the Court treats the statute as silent on the de minimis issue. Ordinarily, the Court would therefore proceed to Chevron Step Two and determine whether the Commission’s interpretation is “a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863, 104 S.Ct. 2778. But Plaintiffs insist that the Court’s analysis must stop here. On this point, Plaintiffs are correct that “deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute is not appropriate when the agency wrongly ‘believes that interpretation is compelled by Congress.’ ” Peter Pan, 471 F.3d at, 1354 (quoting PDK Labs., Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 798 (D.C.Cir.2004)). Rather, “Chevron step 2 deference is reserved for those instances when an agency recognizes that the Congress’s intent is not plain from the statute’s face.” Id.; see also Sec’y of Labor v. Nat’l Cement Co. of Cal., 494 F.3d 1066, 1073 (D.C.Cir.2007) (applying these principles where the agency “incorrectly treated the statute as unambiguous and interpreted it accordingly”); State of Ariz. v. Thompson, 281 F.3d 248, 253-54 (D.C.Cir.2002) (no Chevron deference accorded where agency “believe[d] that the statute clearly bar[red]” a contrary interpretation, and that it was “without discretion to reach another result”). Plaintiffs also rightly observe that, in such circumstances, the appropriate course of action is for a court to remand to the agency “to interpret the statutory language anew.” Peter Pan, 471 F.3d at 1354; see also Int’l Swaps, 887 F.Supp.2d at 280-81. In Plaintiffs’ view, this is precisely what transpired here. The Commission disagrees. The question for the Court, therefore, becomes whether, as Plaintiffs see things, the SEC treated Section 1502 as unambiguous on the de minimis issue and felt “without discretion to reach another result,” or whether, as the Commission contends, it exercised its discretion in finding a de minimis exception inappropriate. On balance, the SEC has the better of this argument. Most significantly, the language used by the Commission is a far cry from the type of definitive, declarative agency statements that our Circuit has described as a conclusion that the agency treated a statute as unambiguous. Plaintiffs do not identify any clear statement—either in the Adopting Release or in the SEC’s briefing before the Court-showing that the Commission believed its interpretation was “plainly” required by the statute. Contra Peter Pan, 471 F.3d at 1353 (relying on agency statement that “[t]his interpretation is not consistent with the plain language of the statute ”) (emphasis in original); Nat’l Cement, 494 F.3d at 1074 (pointing to agency declaration that “the definition of ‘coal or other mine’ plainly includes a road such as the one at issue”) (emphasis in original). Nor do Plaintiffs point to any statement on the Commission’s part evincing a belief that the statute “[did] not permit” a con trary interpretation. Contra Peter Pan, 471 F.3d at 1353 (relying on agency statement that a statute “does not permit FMCSA to withhold registration for failure to comply with ADA requirements”) (emphasis in original); State of Ariz., 281 F.3d at 253 (looking to agency remark that “the TANF legislation ... does not permit it being designated as the ... primary program”) (emphasis in original); Transitional Hosps. Corp. of La. v. Shalala, 222 F.3d 1019, 1029 (D.C.Cir.2000) (relying on agency’s statement that “[w]e do not believe that the statute permits us to extend the exclusion for long-term care hospitals”) (emphasis in original). At best, the language Plaintiffs highlight demonstrates that the Commission considered, as one part of its decision-making process, what it believed Congress’s intent to have been in enacting Section 1502. True, the Commission deployed traditional tools of statutory construction in doing so, looking to Congressional intent and legislative history. But it is entirely appropriate for an agency, in the course of construing a statute it is charged with implementing, to consider whether a particular interpretation is consistent with the statute’s purpose. See Vill. of Barrington v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 665-66 (D.C.Cir.2011) (explaining that agency’s parsing of statutory language to discern Congress’s intent, along with its consideration of legislative history, “appropriately guide[d] [the] agency in interpreting an ambiguous statute”); see also Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. FCC, 412 F.3d 145, 151 (D.C.Cir.2005) (“A ‘reasonable’ explanation of how an agency’s interpretation serves the statute’s objectives is the stuff of which a ‘permissible’ construction is made.”) (citing Cont’l Air Lines v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1452 (D.C.Cir.1988)). This is all the Commission did here. While the Court is mindful that the Commission did not explicitly indicate its belief that Section 1502 was ambiguous on the de minimis issue, our Circuit has expressly rejected the notion that “an assertion of ambiguity is required” by an agency in order to merit deference under Chevron Step Two. See Braintree Elec. Light Dep’t v. FERC, 667 F.3d 1284, 1288-89 (D.C.Cir.2012) (“As long as the text is ambiguous and the agency does not insist that it is clear, a reasonable interpretation will warrant our deference.”). Further, Plaintiffs’ argument overlooks the fact that the Commission’s Adopting Release set forth additional policy-based and practical reasons underlying its belief that the adoption of a de minimis exception would be inappropriate. Relying on commentators’ feedback that conflict minerals “are often used in products in very limited quantities,” the SEC determined that “including a de minimis threshold could have a significant impact on the final rule.” 77 Fed.Reg. at 56,298; see also id. (“[W]e understand that there are instances in which only a minute amount of conflict minerals is necessary for the functionality or production of a product.”). The Commission would have felt no need to discuss these reasons if it believed itself congressionally hamstrung from exercising its discretion on this issue. It also bears noting that, in its Proposing Release, the Commission sought comment “as to whether there should be a de minimis threshold in [the] rules based on the amount of conflict minerals used by an issuer in a particular product or in its overall enterprise and, if so, whether such' a threshold would be consistent with the Conflict Minerals Statutory Provision.” 77 Fed.Reg. at 56,293. If the Commission truly thought itself foreclosed from even considering a de minimis threshold, then there would have been no reason to solicit feedback on the issue as part of the rulemaking process. Taking all of these factors into account, the Court concludes that the Commission did not believe its “interpretation [was] compelled by Congress,” Peter Pan, 471 F.3d at 1354, but that the Commission instead exercised its independent judgment in declining to adopt a de minimis exception. As such, the Court’s focus turns to Chevron Step Two, asking whether the Commission’s interpretation of Section 1502 on this issue was permissible. The Court need not tarry here long. Of course, the Court “defer[s] to the administering agency’s interpretation as long as it reflects a permissible construction of the statute.” Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428, 432 (D.C.Cir.2012) (quoting Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 393 (D.C.Cir.2011)). And the Court has no trouble concluding that the SEC’s interpretation — that it possessed discretion to determine whether a de minimis exception was appropriate— was permissible. Indeed, this is the very interpretation Plaintiffs themselves champion. (See Pls.’ Reply at 11) (“The Commission plainly had power to adopt a de minimis exception.”). As a result, the Commission’s reading of Section 1502, at least as it pertains to the de minimis exception, survives the Chevron gauntlet. But this is still not the end of the matter, because not only do Plaintiffs challenge the Commission’s interpretative approach, they also take issue with the SEC’s application of its interpretation. Stated another way, Plaintiffs argue that even if the Commission exercised discretion in not adopting a de minimis exception, its decision was still irrational and arbitrary.