Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION BERYL A. HOWELL, District Judge. The plaintiff, Kimberly Warner, who is currently employed as the Chief of the Digital Print Center (“DPC”), a unit of the Plant Operations Division of the Government Printing Office (“GPO”), initiated this action against GPO’s Chief Executive Officer, in his official capacity, alleging a “pattern of sex discrimination and retaliation” in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Complaint, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”), ¶ 1. Over the last decade, this plaintiff has had a fraught employment history with GPO, involving her filing five formal Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaints about multiple decisions made by GPO that the plaintiff alleged reflected discriminatory and retaliatory treatment of her. The wrongful actions alleged by the plaintiff in the instant action arise from three of these EEO complaints and include denial of her applications for more senior management positions, her requests for training opportunities, committee assignments, and a private office; the downgrading of two performance evaluations from the highest to second highest rating; understaffing, the noise level and equipment leasing at DPC; and the reassignment of three DPC employees, a management decision which the plaintiff views as a removal of certain of her supervisory functions. The defendant has moved for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiffs claims are fatally flawed because, inter alia, the alleged wrongful actions do not constitute adverse employment actions, are untimely, and/or were taken for legitimate, non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reasons, which the plaintiff cannot show are pretextual. For the reasons explained below, the defendant’s pending motion for summary judgment is granted. I. BACKGROUND After graduating from high school and working as a cashier and ticket seller for Tour Mobile Sightseeing, the plaintiff, in 1989, began her employment with GPO, where she initially worked as a payroll technician in the Finance Department. Compl. ¶ 6; Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 21 (“Def.’s Mot.”), Ex. 1 (Deposition. of Kimberly Warner (Oct. 17, 2011) (“Pl.’s Dep.”), ECF No. 21-5, at. 9; Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 24, at 2; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 3 (Declaration of Kimberly Warner (Apr. 16, 2012) (“Pl. Decl.”)), ECF No. 24-3, ¶ 2. Approximately six years af ter joining GPO, in 1995, the plaintiff began working as a graphic process operator in the Phototypesetting and Processing Section of GPO. Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt, of Mat. Facts Not in Dispute, ECF No. 24 (“Pl.’s Facts”), ¶ 1; Def.’s Stmt, of Mat. Facts Not in Dispute, ECF No. 21 (“Def.’s Facts”), ¶ 1; see also Compl. ¶ 6. In 2001, she was promoted to Supervisory Graphic Process Operator. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 9; Def.’s Facts ¶ 9; see also Compl. ¶ 6. The plaintiff has not attended college nor participated in any apprenticeship program to become a journeyperson in printing. Pl.’s Dep., ECF No. 21-5, at 18, 23 (plaintiff explained that she sat for the apprenticeship program test on one occasion but “did not place high enough” for acceptance into the program). In 2005, the Phototypesetting and Processing Section was renamed the Digital Print Center (“DPC”), and, in March 2005, the plaintiff became the first Chief of the DPC. Pl. Decl. ¶ 3. Also in 2005, the DPC was moved from the Electronic Photocomposition Division (“EPD”), which is now called “Pre-Press,” into the Bindery Division of GPO. Def.’s Mot., Ex. 2 (Deposition of John W. Crawford (Sept. 30, 2011 & Oct. 14, 2011) (“Crawford Dep.”)), ECF No. 21-6, at 21, Def.’s Facts ¶ 4; Pl.’s Facts ¶ 4 (“undisputed.”). DPC is a graphic processor operation that does prepress, printing, and finishing work, including, according to the plaintiff, binding. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 6; Def.’s Facts ¶ 6. Unlike other Bindery units, however, DPC employees do not need to be craft journeypersons. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 6; Def.’s Facts ¶ 6. In March or April of 2005, the plaintiff was promoted to the “newly created position of Chief of DPC.” Compare Pl.’s Facts ¶ 11 (indicating that plaintiff had held title of Chief of DPC “since the position was created on March 9, 2005”) with Compl. ¶ 6 (indicating that the plaintiff was promoted to this position in “April 2005”) and with Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 11-12 (indicating that plaintiff obtained this title “as part of the settlement,”" which occurred in March 2007). In this position, “she is currently paid at the same rate paid to an Assistant Foreperson.” Def.’s Facts ¶ 11; Pl.’s Facts ¶ 11. In her role as Chief of DPC, the plaintiff “supervises skilled subordinate employees performing both blue-collar and white-collar work, ensures that division goals are met, monitors production of GPO materials, troubleshoots any problems in the DPC and two offsite locations, and otherwise oversees the safe operation and maintenance of the DPC.” Compl. ¶ 7. The plaintiff “is in charge of scheduling, assigning work to, training, evaluating, and monitoring. employees across three shifts and serves as the selecting official for all vacancies within the DPC.” Id. Her “position requires expert knowledge in highly technical machinery, computers, and software applications; GPO and DPC procedures, work standards, and workflow; and GPO personnel policies, functions, and operations.” Id. A. 2005 Equal Employment Opportunity Complaints and 2007 Settlement Shortly after becoming Chief of the DPC, the plaintiff filed her first formal EEO complaint with GPO on April 27, 2005, alleging gender discrimination by Robert Schwenk, Directing Manager of Plant Operations, and Dannie Young, Superintendent of the Electronic Processing Division (“EPD”), because “she was being paid less than her male coworkers,” Compl. ¶ 8, and “being paid significantly less than the male supervisor she replaced,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2; see also Pl. Decl. ¶ 9; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 4 (EEO Complaint of Discrimination No. 05-16, filed April 27, 2005), ECF No. 24-4. Six months after filing her first complaint, the plaintiff filed a second formal EEO complaint on October 18, 2005, alleging that GPO had retaliated against her for filing her first complaint. Compl. ¶ 8. In 2006, the plaintiffs two EEO complaints were consolidated, and in March 2007, the plaintiff reached a settlement with GPO under which the plaintiff “received an increased hourly wage” equivalent to that of an Assistant Foreperson, and “a lump sum payment.” Id.; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 5 (EEOC Settlement Agreement, Warner v. James, EEOC No. 100-2005-00191X (Mar. 12, 2007)), at 2-5; Pl. Decl. ¶ 9. According to the plaintiff, management personnel supervising her during the key period at issue in the instant complaint “were all aware of this protected activity,” including Walter Wingo, who was her immediate supervisor as of early 2008, Katherine Taylor, who was her second-level supervisor, and John Crawford, who was her fourth-level supervisor. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2; see also Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 6 (Deposition of John W. Crawford (Sept. 30, 2011 & Oct. 14, 2011) (“Crawford Dep.”)), ECF No. 24-6, at 332-33; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 7 (Deposition of Katherine L. Taylor (May 3, 2011) (“Taylor Dep.”)), ECF No. 24-7, at 267; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 8 (Deposition of Walter H. Wingo, Jr. (Aug. 3, 2011) (“Wingo Dep.”)), ECF No. 24-8, at 250-51. B. Allegations of “Obstacles to Advancement” Following the 2007 Settlement The plaintiff alleges that she faced “obstacles to her professional advancement” after the settlement of her EEO complaints in 2007. Compl. ¶ 1. These alleged obstacles take myriad forms, including allegedly lower-than-deserved performance evaluations in 2007 and 2008, non-selection for promotion, poor working conditions, denial of professional opportunities, and reduction in supervisory responsibilities. The plaintiffs criticisms of multiple management decisions and activity from 2007 through 2010 could devolve into analysis of workplace minutia but are only generally described below with the key facts underlying her claims of gender discrimination and retaliation. 1. 2007 Performance Evaluation In the fourth quarter (“Q4”) of 2007, GPO implemented a bonus program for supervisors, including the plaintiff, and, in connection with that program, performance ratings were issued with respect to that single quarter. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 16; Def.’s Facts ¶ 16. On January 7, 2008, Ms. Taylor, who had become the Superintendent of the Bindery and the plaintiffs second-level supervisor in December 2007, shortly before the ratings were given, showed the plaintiff her performance rating for Q4 2007. Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 14, 17; Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 14, 17. The plaintiff points out that this was “her first evaluation since the March 2007 settlement.” Cpmpl. ¶ 16. This was also the first time that monetary awards were tied to performance ratings, and “achieving ‘outstanding’ was a little more difficult because goals had to be met to get the money.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 4, Affidavit of John Crawford (Mar. 13, 2009) (“Crawford Aff.”), ECF No. 21-4, ¶ 5; see also Crawford Dep., ECF No. 21-6, at 58. The plaintiff received an “excellent” rating, one rating below the highest rating of “outstanding,” which she had “consistently received” before then. Compl. ¶ 16;' Pl.’s Facts ¶ 18; Def.’s Facts ¶ 18. Although the plaintiff immediately disputed the rating, she nevertheless signed it at the direction of Ms. Taylor, who indicated that without the plaintiffs signature, she would not obtain her bonus. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 17. The plaintiff says that she signed the document to “acknowledge[ ] seeing the evaluation, not that she agreed with it.” Id. The plaintiff tried to discuss her evaluation with her fourth-level supervisor, John Crawford, who was Ms. Taylor’s predecessor as the Bindery Superintendent until he became the Production Manager in charge of the Bindery and five other divisions. Id.; Def.’s Facts ¶ 13; Crawford Dep., ECF No. 21-6, at 16-17 (as Production Manager, Mr. Crawford supervises “approximately a thousand people,” in six divisions, including “press, pre-press, plant planning, binding, production];,] engineering”). Mr. Crawford, however, refused to discuss the evaluation with the plaintiff. PL’s Facts ¶ 17. According to the plaintiff, she only received a copy of the evaluation form in March 2008, after it was processed by GPO’s Human Capital unit. Id. The plaintiff alleges that the form contained “irregularities,” because erasure marks indicated that her scores had been lowered. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4-5. While the plaintiff received checkmarks in the boxes for a “fully satisfied” rating for eight of nine listed Job Elements and in the box for an “outstanding” rating for the ninth, she alleges that the boxes for “outstanding” on five of the Job Elements had been checked, erased, and changed to “fully satisfied.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 4; Pl.’s Dep., ECF No. 24-1, at 62; Crawford Dep., ECF No. 24-6, at 352-53; Compl. ¶ 16. In addition, in the “Summary Rating” section of the form, she received an “excellent” rating, but she alleges that the box for an “outstanding” rating had been checked, erased and changed to “excellent.” Id. Another “irregularity” of the 2007 evaluation, according to the plaintiff, was that it was signed by Robert Allegar, based on “materials that [the plaintiff] submitted to show that she had met each Job Element.” Pl.’s Opp’n. at 5. The plaintiff claims, however, that Mr. Allegar “had worked outside the building for the previous year and had not supervised [the plaintiff] during that time.” Compl. ¶ 16; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. The ratings were also reviewed by Mr. Crawford, who could not recall specifically why the plaintiff was rated “fully successful” rather than “outstandin0g” for eight Job Elements, but understood that the plaintiff had not met some metrics under her goals. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5; Crawford Dep., ECF No. 24-6, at 94; Crawford Aff., ECF No. 21-4, ¶ 5 (“[S]he had some metrics but they were not what the goal said.”): Mr. Crawford explained that “[n]obody in Bindery received an ‘outstanding’ rating,” not even himself. Crawford Aff., ECF No. 21-4, ¶ 5. The plaintiff alleges that “[e]ach rating translated to a number of points, which were used to calculate [the plaintiffs] performance bonus.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 4; see also Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 13 (Supp. GPO Form 2970: Performance-Based Award Point Calc. Sheet for Kimberly Warner for Oct./ Nov. 2007); Pl. Decl. ¶28. The plaintiff was paid a bonus for fiscal year 2007 for the “excellent” rating she received. Declaration of Stephanie F. Smith (“Smith Decl.”) (June 29, 2012) (filed under seal), ECF No. 29, ¶ 3. If the plaintiff had received the “outstanding” rating that she says she deserved, her bonus would have been increased by at most $217.50. Id. 2. 2008 Non-selection for Position The plaintiff alleges that, after her 2007 EEO settlement with GPO, she has applied for seven positions within GPO at the “PG-13” and “PG-14” pay grades. Compl. ¶ 13. For each of the positions, including Passport Manager, In-Print Printing Service Specialist, and Assistant to the Production Manager, the plaintiff “was placed on the Best Qualified List ... but was only interviewed for one and was not selected for any of the positions.” Id. Instead, she alleges that men “were selected for all but one of the positions.” Id. The only non-selection expressly contested in her claims, however, is that, for the position of Assistant to the Production Manager. See Compl. ¶¶ 31, 35. Thus, this is the only unsuccessful application process specifically at issue in this lawsuit. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 4 (“At issue here is Ms. Warner’s February 2008 application to be Assistant to the Production Manager.”). Consequently, description of the application and selection process for this position is necessary to evaluate this aspect of the plaintiffs claims. In February 2008, a. vacancy for an Assistant Production Manager position (second shift) was announced under vacancy announcement 08-180, Pl.’s Facts ¶ 26; Def.’s Facts ¶ 26, and the plaintiff applied for it, Compl. ¶ 14. The major responsibilities of this posted position included: (1) “directing] all shift 2 functions necessary to accomplish pre-press, press and post-press work;” (2) “managing] production activities within the various Production Department divisions to ensure that production deadlines are met and commitments fulfilled, and that optimum quality of products and efficiency of operations are maintained;” (3) “start up the Federal Register, to ensure that it’s out of prepress and into plate and press;” and (4) putting out the Congressional Record, which is “equivalent to putting out a newspaper every day.” Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 27-28; Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 27-28. The plaintiff was among three individuals listed as eligible for consideration for the vacant position. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 29; Def.’s Facts ¶29. From this list, Mr. Crawford, who was the selecting official, selected Richard Lewis. Id. The plaintiff concedes that Mr. Lewis had 37 years of experience in the printing trade and, further, does not dispute that he had a broad range of experience in the operations of GPO, including work in positions involved in the processing of the Congressional Record and Federal Register as well as directly with pre-press and press, and otherwise had been exposed to various manufacturing requirements and every kind of job that comes through the Production department. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 30; Def.’s Facts ¶ 30. She contends that she had “comparable qualifications” to Mr. Lewis, however, and that “Mr. Crawford’s justification for hiring Richard Lewis” was not based upon his belief that Mr. Lewis was best qualified but instead was motivated by retaliatory and discriminatory motives against the plaintiff. Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 30, 32. The plaintiff further contends that she should have been given the opportunity to fill temporarily the Assistant Production Manager position, just as Mr. Lewis was given this opportunity for three months, allowing him to “gain[ ] valuable experience,” before he was promoted to the position. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 32; Compl. ¶ 14. Following her non-selection for the Assistant Production Manager position, the plaintiff filed an informal EEO complaint, on April 9, 2008, alleging gender and race discrimination, and retaliation for past EEO activity on the basis of, inter alia, the defendant “failing] to promote [the plaintiff] to the Assistant to the Production manager position and ... lowering ... her 2007 performance evaluation.” Compl. ¶ 23. Since there was no resolution of her informal complaint, the plaintiff filed, three months later on July 3, 2008, her third formal EEO complaint. Id. 3. Complaints About Working Conditions The plaintiff complains about multiple aspects of her physical working conditions, contending that these working conditions were retaliatory and discriminatory. She predicates this contention, at least in part, on a comment allegedly made in November 2007 by Mr. Crawford, who was then the Production Manager in charge of the Bindery and other GPO divisions and was aware of the plaintiffs earlier EEO settlement. The plaintiff was not present at the meeting when the alleged comment was made but understands from another person that Mr. Crawford indicated “that he was going to make things difficult” for her and that he was planning “to let the dogs out” on the plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 18; see also Pl.’s Dep., ECF No. 21-5, at 38-39 (plaintiff testifying that Mr. Young, who attended the meeting at which Mr. Crawford allegedly made this statement, repeated the statement to plaintiff in a telephone call, but she took no notes of the comment). Mr. Crawford denies ever having made such a comment, stating “I don’t use terms like that,” and further testified that he first learned of this allegation during his deposition. Crawford Dep., ECF No. 21-6, at 331. i. Workplace Noise and Other Inconveniences Absent a Private Office The plaintiff alleges that, in 2007, “excessively loud non-DPC machinery was put into the DPC.” Compl. ¶ 19. According to the plaintiff, the non-DPC machinery “is so loud that a safety inspector concluded that the noise level in the DPC is unsafe and advised [the plaintiff] and her employees [to] wear ear plugs.” Id. The plaintiff alleges, however, that “given the nature of DPC’s business, which includes consulting with customers and vendors over the telephone and servicing walk-up customers, wearing ear plugs is often not feasible” and that “[n]o other actions have been taken to remedy the problem.” Id. Related to the noise issue, the plaintiff alleges that she has been deprived an office and that, consequently, she “faces unnecessary obstacles to performing [her work] tasks because she does not have a private work space.” Compl. ¶20. The plaintiff complains that while her work space is situated “in the middle of the DPC [work] area,” “[a]ll Forepersons, Assistant Forepersons, and Group Chiefs in the Bindery Division have offices.” Id. She alleges that she “has been promised an office on several occasions but has never received one.” Id. Mr. Crawford indicates that he agrees with the plaintiff about having her own office, but that space for Bindery personnel has been used by others, noting that space “planned for the offices” was used for equipment and a “Bail-Out Commission.” Crawford Aff., ECF No. 21-4, ¶ 9; id. ¶ 10 (“I do still think Kim should have her own space.... We had been told that some other things have priority.”). Notwithstanding her workplace conditions, the plaintiff has been able to perform her duties at an “excellent” and “exceeds expectations” level, although she contends that she is hampered in being able to perform “at peak efficiency.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 39; Def.’s Facts ¶ 39. She does not appear to dispute that her work area contains a desk, computer, and a file cabinet, with additional access to a locked cage for storage of sensitive files and to conference rooms for private meetings and telephone calls. Def.’s Facts ¶ 39; Pl.’s Facts ¶ 39. Nevertheless, the plaintiff complains that since her “computer is visible to anyone walking near her,” she is unable to work on confidential matters on her computer when other employees are.present, and that she has to find meeting space in other offices or rooms, including “on multiple floors.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 39. ii. Understaffing of DPC The plaintiff alleges that “DPC is not adequately staffed, resulting in [the plaintiff] and her staff being overworked, unable to take time off, and under intense pressure.” Compl. ¶ 21. As a result of the understaffing, the plaintiff alleges that she “has had to step in to do printing work that would otherwise be done by her subordinate employees, making it difficult for her to complete her supervisory duties.” Id. To remedy the understaffing, the .plaintiff “has been trying to fill vacancies in the DPC since 2006,” id., and, in fact, in 2007, filled one of 5 approved positions for Océ operator vacancies. Id. The defendant points out that the plaintiff had the opportunity to fill all of the Océ operator positions in 2007, “but chose not to make a selection-from the certificate of eligibles issued” for these vacancies, except for one. Def.’s Facts ¶40. The plaintiff explains that “there were not enough qualified individuals,” and that the remaining four vacancies were cancelled in May 2008 before she could fill them. See Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 40-41. According'to Ms. Taylor, during the 2009 fiscal year budget process “headcount was being reduced across the board,” and she “could not make a business case-to keep the [Océ] operator vacancies in the budget when the DPC had operated for a period of time without those vacancies being filled[.]” Def.’s Facts ¶ 41; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 2 (Aff. of Katherine Taylor) (“Taylor Aff.”) ¶ 9. Consequently, “the vacancies were cancelled.” Id. The plaintiff discounts this business-related justification for the cancellation of the vacancies and posits instead that “Ms. Taylor’s cancellation of the vacancies was motivated by retaliation and discrimination.” Pl.’s Facts ¶41. The plaintiff filed an informal EEO complaint on July 9, 2008, “alleging discrimination based on sex and race[,] and retaliation for her participation in the EEO complaint process, including removing the functions that control [the plaintiffs] pay grade level and the failure to adequately staff DPC.” Compl. ¶ 25. Since there was no resolution of her informal complaint, the plaintiff filed her fourth formal EEO complaint on August 21, 2008. Id. The plaintiff concedes that she was able to hire three graphic process operators in the 2009-2010 time period because a need was identified for those positions. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 42; Def.’s Facts ¶ 42; Pl.’s Dep., ECF No. 21-5, at 213-16. 4. 2008 Performance Evaluation The plaintiffs “Summary Rating” in her performance evaluation for 2008 was “exceeds expectation,” which is the second highest available rating under “Outstanding,” based upon a score of 67 out of 75 on the individual goals in her performance plan for that review period. Def.’s Facts ¶ 21; Compl. ¶ 17; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 12 (Summary Rating Form), ECF No. 21-8. The plaintiff contends that these scores are “inappropriate and undeserved,” Pl.’s Facts ¶21, and disputes the justification given by her immediate supervisor, Walter Wingo, for the ratings. At a meeting in February 2009, Mr. Wingo explained that the plaintiff received an “exceeds expectations” rating because she failed to meet three goals in her performance plan for the 2008 time period. Def.’s Facts ¶ 22; Wingo Dep., ECF No. 24-8, at 62, 76. This performance plan required, inter alia, that the plaintiff (1) ensure that 7B cards, which a supervisor uses to track an employee’s disciplinary history, were up-to-date and that corrective actions were timely; (2) “[djevelop and maintain records by operator of percent time spent on printer operation and job handling; hand-finishing, Digipath utilization;” and (3) “develop a job description proposal by August 30, 2008 for a ‘Graphic Processor' Operator Pre-flight Specialist.’ ” Def.’s Facts T22; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 11 (GPO Supervisory Performance Agreement for Kimberly Warner, dated Mar. 24 & 25, 2008) (“GPO Supervisory Performance Agreement”), ECF No. 21-8, at 5, 7, 9; Pl.’s Dep., ECF No. 21-5, at 85-86; Taylor Dep., ECF No. 21-7, at 49. With respect to the first goal, Mr. Win-go said that the plaintiff failed to ensure that the 7B cards of one of her subordinate supervisors were up-to-date and that corrective actions were timely. Def.’s Facts ¶ 23; Taylor Dep., ECF No. 21-7, at 48-50; Pl.’s Dep., ECF No. 21-5, at 96-98. The plaintiff does not appear to dispute the fact that the- required documentation was incomplete-for a DPC employee, but rather disagrees about whether she should be held responsible for the lapse. The plaintiff contends that she “was not responsible for the 7B'cards of employees directly supervised by her subordinate supervisors,” but only for those employees “she directly supervised.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 23. With respect to the second goal, Mr. Wingo informed the plaintiff that she did not include records reporting the “percent time” operators spent on “printer operation and job handling; hand-finishing; [and] Digipath utilization” in her evaluation binder. Def.’s Facts ¶ 24; Taylor Dep., ECF No. 21-7, at 53-55; Pl.’s Dep., ECF No. 21-5, at 88-89. The plaintiff asserts that “[t]his was not true,” and states that she had reported the operators’ time on a log sheet in terms of the numbers of hours worked. Pl.’s Opp’n at 7; Pl. Decl. ¶ 38. The plaintiff concedes that her performance plan plainly required reporting the number of hours as a percentage of time worked on each particular task but contends that any failure to report the hours as dictated by the performance plan' had previously been excused by Ms. Taylor. Pl.’s Dep., ECF No. 24-1, 87:13-88:5; Pl. Decl. 38; PL’s Opp’n at 7 (Ms. Taylor “had told Ms. Warner that reporting hours without a percentage was acceptable.”); PL’s Facts ¶ 24 (plaintiff maintained the records “in hours, per Ms. Taylor’s instructions”). Finally, with respect to the third goal, Mr. Wingo told the plaintiff that “she did not submit written standards and ratings for Graphic Processor Operators and a job description proposal for Graphic Processor Operator, Pre-flight Specialist” by the August 30, 2008 deadline set out in the performance plan. PL’s Opp’n at 7; Pl. Decl. ¶ 39. The plaintiff does not dispute that she failed to hand-over to any supervisor a copy of the job description by the deadline of August 30, 2008, but takes the position that the “performance plan did not require her to do so” and her supervisors never asked for it. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 25. According to Mr. Wingo, the position description should have been turned over to him by the deadline stated in the performance plan, and he told the plaintiff that. Wingo Dep., ECF No. 24-8, at 78. She contends that she fulfilled this performance plan goal because she had completed the job description by the deadline and had included this undated document “in the binder that she submitted to document her 2008 performance.” Def.’s Facts ¶ 25. The plaintiff was paid a bonus for fiscal year 2008 for the “exceeds expectations” rating she received. Smith Decl., ECF No. 29, at ¶ 4. If the plaintiff had received an “outstanding” rating, as she says she deserved, her bonus would have been increased by between $129 and $345.00. Id. The plaintiff attempted to appeal her evaluation through the Human Capital department, but Mr. Wingo would not change her ratings. Pl.’s Opp’n at 8; Pl. Decl. ¶ 41. The plaintiff filed an informal EEO complaint on March 24, 2009, “alleging discrimination on the basis of retaliation for participation in the EEO complaint process, including arbitrarily lowering scores on her 2008 performance appraisal.” Compl. ¶ 28. Since there was no resolution of the informal complaint, the plaintiff filed her fifth formal EEO complaint on April 30, 2009. Id. 5. Denial of Professional Opportunities Since her 2007 EEO settlement, the plaintiff claims that she has been denied various professional opportunities, alleging in her Complaint that at unspecified times she was not allowed to “cross-train—that is, to train to do work in another GPO division—and to participate in special projects, although similar opportunities are given to male employees.” Id. ¶ 15. More specifically, the plaintiff alleges that “[f]or over two years, [her] requests to cross-train in the Binding Division have been denied,” while “Darrell Mahoney, a Foreperson in the Binding Division, has been given the opportunity to observe and learn about [the plaintiffs] position.” Id. The plaintiff also cites two examples of “special projects” for which she has been denied the opportunity to participate. First, she alleges that her request at some unspecified time for a detail proposed by “the Superintendent of Planning, Scheduling, and Estimating,” “was denied by [the plaintiffs] supervisors.” Id. Second, she cites the denial of her request to “to join a new Safety Committee, spearheaded by Mr. Mahoney,” even though one of her own subordinates was solicited to participate. Id. With respect to the Safety Committee, the plaintiff does not dispute that this committee was created in approximately 2008 to give non-supervisory employees the opportunity to assess the safety of their own work areas and, consistent with its focus on nonsupervisory employee involvement, that Mr. Mahoney was the only supervisor on the Committee after his name was proposed “by an employee of the safety office.” Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 33, 34, 35; Taylor Dep., ECF No. 21-7, at 152-57; Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 33, 34, 35. 6. Changes in Supervisory Responsibilities The plaintiff complains that certain personnel or equipment changes amount to a “stripping] of supervisory duties” motivated by gender discrimination and retaliation. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 35. According to the plaintiff, she “is left out of meetings where important decisions are made,” even though Forepersons and Assistant Forepersons are invited to these meetings. Id. ¶22. In response to this complaint, Ms. Taylor, “has claimed that she forgot to invite [the plaintiff].” Id. The plaintiff concedes that she voluntarily stopped attending certain meetings due to an incident of verbal abuse from a.manager, Marvin Verter. Id. ¶ 27. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that “[i]n December 2008, a verbal tirade from Mr. Verter caused [the plaintiff] to suffer an anxiety attack that sent [her] to the medical station where she spent the afternoon receiving oxygen.” Id.; see also Pl.’s Dep., ECF No. 24-1, 169:1-170:10; Pl. Decl. ¶ 58. After this incident,.the plaintiff says she did not feel comfortable attending Mr. Verter’s weekly production meeting, so she sent a representative from the DPC to attend in her place. Pl.’s Opp’n at 11; Pl. Decl. ¶ 58. Ms. Taylor then informed the plaintiff that no one from DPC was needed at the weekly meeting, “leaving the DPC excluded from these meetings altogether.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 11; Pl. Decl. ¶58. The plaintiff alleges that Mr. Crawford, who is Mr. Verter’s direct supervisor, has “ignored” her requests to meet about the situation with Mr. Verter. Compl. ¶ 27. Mr. Crawford apparently disputes this characterization of his handling of the situation, explaining that he “talked to Marvin about his tone ... he addresses everyone no matter what sex or race the same.” Crawford Aff. ¶ 8. “I have told him to work on it, as some can perceive it in a different way. He is just straightforward.” Id. In further support of her claims of having decreased supervisory duties, the plaintiff cites three examples of “[d]ecisions affecting the DPC” for which she was excluded from meetings: (1) “what equipment to put in the DPC;” (2) “the decision to close DPC operations in Laurel, Maryland;” and (3) the transfer of an employee to another GPO unit. Compl. ¶ 22. Not only is the plaintiff critical of the decision-making process, in which she claims to have been excluded, but she also plainly disagrees with the decisions themselves, even though she does not dispute the context. in which these decisions were made: namely, that “DPC was running at a significant financial loss and Ms. Taylor tried to find ways to reduce those losses.” Def.’s Facts ¶ 43; Pl.’s Facts ¶ 43 (undisputed). Regarding the decision about DPC equipment, apparently this reflects the plaintiffs disagreement with management’s decision to allow the lease for an electric static color tone printer, called the iGen3, which was located in the DPC, to expire in 2010. Def.’s Facts ¶ 51; Pl.’s Facts ¶ 51 (undisputed). The plaintiff disputes that allowing this lease to expire was a cost-saving measure, contrary to the outcome of a management analysis regarding the amount of product generated from the machine. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 52; Def.’s Facts ¶ 52; Taylor Dep., ECF No. 21-7, at 203-04; Pl.’s Dep., ECF No. 21-5, at 130-31. Instead, the plaintiff contends that the decision was “motivated by retaliation and discrimination.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 52. With respect to the closing of DPC’s Laurel, Maryland operations, the plaintiffs complaint appears to relate principally to the reassignment of two employees who were, and remain under, her supervision and whose job is to operate the Océ machines, which are located in both GPO’s Laurel facility and its main facility. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 38; Def.’s Facts ¶ 38. For safety reasons, two operators are required to run the machine, and, consequently, “the machine in Laurel could not be operated if one of the employees was not able to come to work.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 37; Def.’s Facts ¶ 37. The plaintiff contends that reassigning the employees from Laurel “caused a backlog in the work that can only be done on the Océ machine,” and disputes that the reassignment was made by Ms. Taylor to improve efficiency, even though she does not contest that additional operators were present at the main facility to ensure that the requisite two operators were available for work to be accomplished during their shift. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 36; Def.’s Facts ¶ 36. Rather, the plaintiff points to the timing of the reassignment of the two employees and closure of the Laurel facility “[i]n July 2008, about three months after [the plaintiff] filed the informal EEO complaint and about the same time she filed the formal complaint,” Compl. ¶ 24, to contend that these actions were due to retaliatory and discriminatory motivation. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 36. Finally, and related to the plaintiffs complaint about her supervisory duties being “decreased,” she alleges that in August 2008, “around the time that [she] filed her second [sic-fourth] formal [EEO] complaint,” she learned that one of her employees was being transferred to another GPO unit. Compl. ¶ 26. Specifically, Ms. Taylor and other GPO managers decided it was more cost-effective to re-categorize one of the plaintiffs employees, William Middlebrooks, who was working in the Senate Documents Room, as a detail so that GPO could pass on to the Senate a greater share of the cost of his work. Id.; Def.’s Facts ¶ 44; Taylor Dep., ECF No. 21-7, at 73; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 10, ECF No. 21-8 (E-mail chain between Ms. Warner and Ms. Taylor Regarding Re-categorizing Mr. Middlebrooks as a Detail (Aug. 13, 2008) (“Senate Detail E-mail Chain”)). The plaintiff was consulted as part of the team that negotiated how to handle the detail arrangement, when another unit of GPO, the Congressional Publishing Services (“CPS”), insisted that the detailed employee be placed within that unit—consistent with the management of all other congressional details—and resulted in the plaintiff losing an individual from her “head eount[.]” Def.’s Facts ¶ 47; see id. ¶¶ 46-50; Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 46-50; Taylor Aff. ¶ 7. The plaintiff “did voice her concerns to Ms. Taylor” about reassigning the employee “out of DPC,” Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 49-50, and Ms. Taylor agreed “and tried to argue that position to CPS,” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 48; Def.’s Facts ¶48, but without success. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 50; Def.’s Facts ¶ 50; Senate-Detail Email Chain. Ms. Taylor, along with management, determined that “the best thing for GPO overall ... was to detail the employee through CPS rather than continue running at a loss.” Def.’s Facts ¶ 49. The plaintiff disputes this reason for the detail, alleging instead that it was motivated by retaliation and discrimination. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 49. C. Resolution of EEO Complaints and the Instant Lawsuit A final agency decision was reached on May 11, 2010 for the third and fourth formal consolidated EEO complaints filed on July 3, 2008 and August 21, 2008, respectively. Compl. ¶ 29. The agency found that GPO had not discriminated or retaliated-against the plaintiff. Id. More than 180 days had passed since the plaintiff filed her fifth formal complaint on April 30, 2009, without a final agency decision. Id. ¶ 28. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit on August 4, 2010, within three months of her receipt of the final agency decision on the third and fourth formal consolidated complaints. She asserts two claims: first, she 'alleges sex discrimination under Title VII because (1) she “applied for, was qualified for, and was rejected for several positions within GPO, including the Assistant Production Manager position[;]” (2) she was denied an office and (3) training opportunities; (4) given a downgraded 2007 performance evaluation; and (5) stripped of supervisory duties. Compl. ¶¶ 30-31. Second, the plaintiff claims that she faced “retaliatory discrimination” in violation of Title VII in all five of those instances, as well as (6) in her 2008 performance appraisal. Id. ¶¶ 34-85. As a result of this alleged discrimination and retaliation, the plaintiff seeks, inter alia, “back pay, reinstatement of leave, compensatory damages, and an injunction ordering that she be promoted to a position at the PG-14 pay scale.” Compl. ¶ 2; id. at 11-12, ¶¶ A-G. Following a lengthy period of almost two years for discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: See ECF No. 21. This motion is now pending before the Court. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A. Summary Judgment Granting a motion for summary judgment is appropriate if the, movant carries the burden of showing “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” based upon the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits, and other factual materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a, c); Ali v. Tolbert, 636 F.3d 622, 628 (D.C.Cir.2011); Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C.Cir.1994). The Court is only required to consider the materials explicitly cited by the parties, but may, on its own accord, consider “other materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3). When, at the summary judgment stage, the parties present a genuine dispute about the facts, the Court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party and accept the nonmoving party’s evidence as true. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). For a factual dispute to be “genuine,” the non-moving party must establish more than “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, and cannot rely on “mere allegations” or conclusory statements, see Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124, 134 (D.C.Cir.2006); Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.Cir.1993); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Notably, “[sjelfserving testimony does not create genuine issues of material fact, especially where that’very testimony suggests that corroborating evidence should be readily available.” Fields v. Office of Johnson, 520 F.Supp.2d 101, 105 (D.D.C.2007). Rather, the nonmoving party must present specific facts “ ‘such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ” Grosdidier v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, Chairman, 709 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C.Cir.2013) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). If the evidence “is mere ly colorable, or is not significantly probar tive, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted), see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Moreover, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In that situation, summary judgment is properly granted against a party who, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. B. Sex Discrimination Title VII of the Civil Rights Act “makes it unlawful for federal employers to discriminate on the basis of ... gender” and to retaliate “when an employee has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice.” Grosdidier, 709 F.3d at 23 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The “two essential elements of a discrimination claim are that (i) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of the plaintiffs ... sex....” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C.Cir.2008). With respect to the first element, an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim generally entails a “significant change in employment status,” Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1293 (D.C.Cir.2003), or “tangible employment action evidenced by firing, failing to promote, a considerable change in benefits, or reassignment with significantly different responsibilities[.]” Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C.Cir.2003). The second element of causation requires a showing “that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s decision.” Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2523, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013). “Where, as here, the record contains no direct evidence that the adverse employment action of which the plaintiff complains was caused by prohibited discrimination, we turn to the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to analyze the claim.” Jackson v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 703, 706 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C.Cir.2006)). “Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id. (internal quotation' marks and alteration omitted). Where an employer “has asserted legitimate, non-discriminatory reason[s] for” the actions being challenged, “the district court need not—and should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie ease under McDonnell Douglas.” Brady v. Office of Sgt. at Arms, U.S. House of Reps., 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C.Cir.2008) (emphasis in original). Instead, the Circuit has instructed that “the district court must resolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of ... sex ... ?” Id.; see also Bright v. Copps, 828 F.Supp.2d 130, 142 (D.D.C.2011); Diggs v. Potter, 700 F.Supp.2d 20, 40 (D.D.C.2010) (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 494). In resolving that “central question” regarding “the legitimacy of the proffered reason and the ultimate question of discrimination, the court looks to ‘(1) the plaintiffs prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its actions; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff ... or any contrary evidence that may be available to the employer....’” Grosdidier, 709 F.3d at 25 (emphasis in original) (quoting Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C.Cir.1998) (en banc)); see also Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 897. While the plaintiff need not “submit evidence over and above rebutting the employer’s stated explanation in order to avoid summary judgment,” Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1351 (D.C.Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), the plaintiff must do more than merely state a disagreement with, or disbelief of, the explanation to satisfy the burden of showing that a reasonable jury could find that the employer’s asserted reason was not the actual reason, .and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff on a prohibited basis. C. Retaliation The legal framework for demonstrating retaliation under Title VII is similar, but not identical, to the framework for establishing wrongful discrimination. A prima facie case of retaliation requires a plaintiff to show that “(1) [s]he engaged in protected activity; (2) [s]he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1357 (quoting Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 529 (D.C.Cir.2007)); see also McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 (D.C.Cir.2012) (“To prove unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII; (2) that the employer took a materially adverse action against him; and (3) that the employer took the action ‘because’ the employee opposed the practice.”); Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C.Cir.2007); Smith v. District of Columbia, 430 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C.Cir.2005); Morgan v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 328 F.3d 647, 650-51 (D.C.Cir.2003); Singletary v. District of Columbia, 351 F.3d 519, 524 (D.C.Cir.2003); McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F.2d 783 (D.C.Cir.1984). With respect to the first element, protected activity encompasses utilizing informal grievance procedures, such as complaining to management or human resources about the discriminatory. conduct, as well as the filing of both informal and formal EEO complaints. Richardson v. Gutierrez, 477 F.Supp.2d 22, 27 (D.D.C.2007) (“It is well settled that Title VII protects informal, as well as formal, complaints of discrimination.”); Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F.Supp.2d 78, 94 (D.D.C.2005) (“Initiation of EEO counseling to explore whether an employee has a basis for alleging discrimination constitutes protected activity, even in the absence of an unequivocal allegation of discrimination.”). The second element of an adverse employment action is necessary to sustain a claim of retaliation, just as it is for discrimination claims. In the retaliation context, however, an employment action that is “materially adverse” is defined as one that is “harmful to the point that [it] could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006); Ginger v. District of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340, 1346 (D.C.Cir.2008). Thus, retaliation “encompass[es] a broader sweep of actions” than wrongful discrimination, including “extend[ing] beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harms.” Bridgeforth v. Jewell, 721 F.3d 661, 664 n. * (D.C.Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Finally, the lessened motivating-factor causation standard that applies to wrongful discrimination claims does not apply to claims of unlawful retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Instead, a Title VII retaliation claim requires “proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.” Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr., 133 S.Ct. at 2528. In other words, “traditional principles of but-for causation” apply and the plaintiff must show that “the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Id. at 2533. The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to retaliation claims such that “[w]here, as here, the employer has proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for a challenged employment action, the central question is whether the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-retaliatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally retaliated against the employee in violation of Title VII.” McGrath, 666 F.3d at 1383 (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted); see also Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 678 (D.C.Cir.2009) (observing that “these principles apply equally, to retaliation claims”). III. DISCUSSION The plaintiff alleges six discrete instances in which she was targeted for retaliation because of her prior EEO activities and, in all but one instance, for gender discrimination. Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-2; Compl. ¶¶ 31, 35. As previously noted, the plaintiff alleges that the following actions were taken against her in retaliation of her pri- or EEO activities and because of her gender: (1) non-selection “for several positions within GPO, including the Assistant Production Manager position;” (2) “given a downgraded 2007 performance evaluation;” (3) “denied an office;” (4) “denied training opportunities;” and (5) “stripped of her supervisory duties.” Compl. ¶¶31, 35. In addition, the plaintiff alleges that-(6) she was “given [a] downgraded ... 2008 performance appraisal” in retaliation for her prior EEO activities. Compl. ¶ 35. The defendant has proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory and non-retaliatory explanations for each of these alleged instances. The Court will assess these explanations in tandem with the strength of the plaintiffs prima facie claims of gender discrimination and retaliation, in order to determine whether the, plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence attacking the defendant’s explanations for the allegedly wrongful actions to present a triable issue of fact warranting denial of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. A. Non-Selection For Assistant Production Manager Position The plaintiff alleges that “Mr. Crawford’s decision not to hire [the plaintiff] for the [Assistant Production Manager] position was motivated by both retaliation and sex discrimination,” since she was “just as much qualified” as the selected candidate. Pl.’s Opp’n at 20; Pl.’s Dep., ECF No. 21-5, at 32. The defendant does not dispute that the plaintiffs allegations regarding her non-selection make out prima facie discrimination and retaliation claims, but rather contends that the plaintiff “cannot establish that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her non-selection was a pretext for discrimination.” Def.’s Mem. at 6. The plaintiff counters that the defendant’s proffered reason for non-selection, namely, that the selected candidate was the- best qualified candidate, is pretext because the selecting official “misrepresented her qualifications.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 22. To determine whether the plaintiffs challenge to the defendant’s proffered reasons for the plaintiffs non-selection are sufficient to present a triable issue, the Court looks first at the comparative qualifications of the plaintiff and the selected candidate, and then evaluates the plaintiffs evidence that her qualifications were misrepresented by the selecting official, as well as her other arguments purportedly showing pretext. 1. Comparative Qualifications To give rise to an inference of retaliation, the plaintiff must be “substantially more qualified” than the successful candidate to perform the duties listed in the vacancy announcement, and the non-selected candidate must have a “stark superiority of credentials.” Porter v. Shah, 606 F.3d 809, 815, 816 (D.C.Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Grosdidier, 709 F.3d at. 25 (“To prevail on a relative qualifications claim, [the plaintiff] must show that she is ‘significantly better qualified for the job than [the applicant] ultimately chosen.’ ” (emphasis in original) (quoting Adeyemi v. District of Columbia, 525 F.3d 1222, 1227 (D.C.Cir.2008)). When the relative qualifications of the plaintiff and the selected candidate are generally similar, courts must be careful about injecting themselves or a jury into the hiring process, unless there is a viable showing of pretext. See Stewart, 352 F.3d at 429 (courts are “not ‘superpersonnel departments that reexamine[ ] an entity’s business decisions.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Dale v. Chi. Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir.1986))). Thus, the difference in qualifications must be “great enough to be inherently indicative of discrimination.” Jackson v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 703, 707 (D.C.Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In a close case, a reasonable [fact-finder] would usually assume that the employer is more capable of assessing the significance of small differences in the qualifications of the candidates, or that the employer simply made a judgment call.” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1294. This is not even a close case. The job posting for the Assistant Production Manager position described the major duties as including managing “production activities within the various Production Department divisions,” such as “pre-press, press and post-press work,” and serving “as the authoritative source of advice on procedural and regulatory matters with respect to printing operations.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 4, ECF No. 21-8. To be eligible for consideration for the position, which is a “PG-14 grade level, applicants must possess 52 weeks of specialized experience equivalent to the PG-13 grade level.” Id. In addition, the candidates were rated based upon their “annual performance rating,” five job elements for “Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSAs) required for this position,” “work experience^” and “years experience.” Id. Set against these standards, the selecting official, Mr. Crawford, gave both the selected candidate, Mr. Lewis, and the plaintiff the same rating on four out of the five job elements, with the plaintiff receiving a slightly lower score of “4.5” compared to Lewis’s “5” on the single KSA element regarding “knowledge of current manufacturing and/or printing plant methodologies.” Compare Def.’s Mot., Ex. 6 (“Ranking Factors” for Richard C. Lewis), ECF No. 21-8, at 8, with Ex. 7 (“Ranking Factors” for Kimberly Warner), ECF No. 21-8, at 9. While the plaintiffs score of “5” was higher than Mr. Lewis’s score of “4” for “annual performance rating,” the plaintiff received a lower score for “work experience” (ie., the plaintiffs score of “3” compared to Mr. Lewis’s score of “5”) and for “years experience” (ie., the plaintiffs score of “1.1” compared to Mr. Lewis’s score of “3.7”). In the final tally of “total points,” the plaintiffs rating of 31.6 was lower than that of Mr. Lewis’ 35.7. According to the defendant, Mr. Crawford selected Mr. Lewis for the position because Mr. Lewis was the “best qualified” candidate as reflected not only by the lower score received by the plaintiff but also by the “contemporaneous ranking of the candidates based on their written submissions against the KSA (knowledge, skill, and abilities) elements for the position, as well as factoring in other information from the written submissions, including work experience, years of experience, and the rating received in the employee’s most recent performance rating.” Def.’s Mem. at 5. Indeed, it is undisputed that the selected candidate held more positions than the plaintiff across a broader array of units that would be subject to supervision by the Assistant Production Manager. Specifically, at the time of the selection, the selected candidate had held four supervisory positions, including group chief, assistant foreperson, foreperson, and foreperson in charge, and had worked in two different GPO divisions, Plant Planning and Bindery. Crawford Dep., ECF No. 21-6, at 151:2-22. In comparison, the plaintiff had held only two supervisory positions, including Supervisory Graphic Processor Operator and Chief of DPC, and had worked only in the DPC, which was relocated to the Binding division in 2005. Compl. ¶ 6. Further, it is undisputed that the selected candidate had 37 years of experience in the “trade,” including at GPO, whereas the plaintiff had 11 years of experience at the time they both applied for this position. Crawford Dep., ECF No. 21-6, at 158. The plaintiff here does not — and cannot — contend that she is significantly, or even markedly more qualified than the selected candidate. Nevertheless, the plaintiff targets the selecting official, John Crawford, as “one of the chief, architects” of the discriminatory and retaliatory actions she claims, Pl.’s Opp’n at 17, and challenges as pretext his evaluation of her qualifications, arguing that “Mr. Crawford [i]ntentionally [m]ischaracterized [the plaintiffs] [qualifications as [compared to Mr. Lewis’s.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 21. In attacking the qualifications-based explanation proffered by the defendant for the nonselection, the plaintiff may seek to expose flaws in the explanation by showing, for example, “that the employer’s explanation was fabricated after the fact,..... misstates the candidates’ qualifications,” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1295, or was based on an error or inconsistency regarding an employee’s performance or qualifications that is “too obvious to be unintentional,” Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 367 (D.C.Cir.2007); Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 345 (D.C.Cir.1999); Farris v. Clinton, 602 F.Supp.2d 74, 89-90 (D.D.C.2009). The plaintiff has simply not presented sufficient evidence on this record, however, that the appraisal of the plaintiffs qualifications was flawed such that the qualifications-based explanation for her non-selection was pretextual. As evidence of the intentional mischaracterization of her qualifications, the plaintiff relies largely on two parts of the record: first, the plaintiff cites the portion of Crawford’s Affidavit, in which he states that he did not consider the plaintiff to “have knowledge in running the stated Congressional work through the production plant,” Crawford Aff., ECF No. 21-4, ¶ 7; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 23; and, second, two statements allegedly made by Mr. Crawford in 2006 and 2008, which the plaintiff argues “demonstrate that he had both retaliatory and discriminatory animus towards Ms. Warner.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 23. These arguments, and others, simply do .not withstand scrutiny or create a triable issue of fact regarding the legitimate reason based on comparative qualifications for the selection of Mr. Lewis over the plaintiff for the position of Assistant Production Manager. 2. The Plaintiff Has Not Shown That Her Qualifications Were Misc