Full opinion text
OPINION PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge. This is a civil action, brought in rem, in which the United States seeks forfeiture of over $250 million scattered throughout bank accounts located in Antigua and Barbuda, Guernsey, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, and Switzerland. A number of people, preferring that the United States government not get this money, have intervened to prevent its forfeiture. So far, plaintiff United States has managed to dismiss from this action seven of these intervening parties and has successfully defeated a motion to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiff now moves to dismiss from the action, for lack of standing, one more claimant: European Federal Credit Bank Limited (“Eurofed”), an Antiguan bank in liquidation. And here the plaintiffs winning streak comes to an end, because the Court concludes that Eurofed, acting by and through its appointed liquidators, has standing to contest the forfeiture of the defendant assets that are located in Antigua and Barbuda. As for the remaining assets to which Eurofed lays claim, however — those located in Lithuania and Switzerland — the Court agrees with the plaintiff that Eurofed has not demonstrated its standing to contest their forfeiture. The Court therefore will grant the plaintiffs motion in part and deny it in part. I. BACKGROUND A. Nature of the Forfeiture Action The United States initiated this litigation in 2004, seeking the forfeiture of money that is allegedly traceable to a series of acts of “criminal fraud, extortion, bribery, misappropriation, and money laundering” carried out by, among others, Pavel Ivanovich Lazarenko, a.k.a. Pavlo Lazarenko, a prominent Ukrainian politician who, with the aid of various associates, was “able to acquire hundreds of millions of United States dollar’s through a variety of acts of fraud, extortion, bribery, misappropriation and/or embezzlement” committed during the 1990s. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 10. According to the United States, those illegal acts, and subsequent attempts to launder the resulting criminal proceeds, involved the transfer of large sums of U.S. dollars into and out of United States financial institutions. Id. ¶¶ 11-13. The plaintiff seeks to claim ownership of those sums of money pursuant to federal statutes that provide for the forfeiture to the United States government of funds traceable or otherwise related to criminal activity that occurred at least in part in the United States. See id. ¶ 1. B. Eurofed and its Liquidation As permitted by the civil forfeiture statutes, several parties filed claims in this action asserting an interest in specific property sought by the plaintiff and contesting its forfeiture. At issue here is the claim submitted by an Antiguan bank, Eurofed, which is now in the process of being liquidated under the laws of Antigua. The plaintiff alleges that, before its liquidation, Eurofed was used by Lazarenko to launder proceeds of his criminal activities. Over $100 million of the funds named as in rem defendants in the plaintiffs complaint are alleged to have been formerly held on deposit for Lazarenko’s benefit at Eurofed. See Am. Compl. ¶ 5(d)-(h). Eurofed, acting by and through its appointed liquidators (the “Liquidators”), has intervened in this action, asserting an interest in five of the specific properties being sought by the plaintiff and named in paragraphs 5(d) through 5(h) of the amended complaint: Approximately $85.5 million in United States dollars held at Bank of Nova Scotia (Antigua) in the name of the Registrar of the High Court of Antigua & Barbuda; Approximately $1.6 million in United States dollars held at Bank of Nova Scotia (Antigua) in the name of the Registrar of the High Court of Antigua & Barbuda; All assets held at Credit Suisse (Geneva), in account number 0251-562927-6, in the name of European Federal Credit Bank Limited, last valued at approximately $4.8 million in United States dollars; All assets held at Banque SCS Alliance S.A. (Geneva) in account number 5491, in the name of European Federal Credit Bank Limited, last valued at approximately $483,629.69 in United States dollars; All assets held at Vilniaus Bankas [Lithuania] held for the benefit of European Federal Credit Bank Limited, formerly held at accounts 073721 and 073420 at Bankas Hermis in the name of European Federal Credit Bank Limited, last valued at approximately $29,344,-05.35 in United States dollars. Euro. Cl. at 3-4; see Am. Compl. ¶ 5(d)-(h). Eurofed has also asserted an interest in the plaintiffs catch-all in rem defendant: “All assets traceable to the above-mentioned proceeds and property.” Am. Compl. ¶ 5(j); see Euro. Cl. at 4. Because many of the arguments raised in connection with Eurofed’s standing to contest the forfeiture of these assets hinge on the precise details of Eurofed’s history and liquidation, a detailed account of both is necessary. The plaintiff alleges that Lazarenko and an associate, Peter Kiritchenko, obtained a controlling interest in Eurofed in 1997, becoming majority shareholders of the bank and placing Lazarenko in control of its investment decisions. See Plaintiff's Statement of Facts (“Pl.’s Stmnt.”) ¶¶ 1, 4. Lazarenko and his criminal associates were both the bank’s primary owners, the plaintiff alleges, and also its primary depositors. Id. ¶¶ 2-4. According to the plaintiff, the funds held by Eurofed on Lazarenko’s behalf were spread across a number of bank accounts — one in Lazarenko’s own name and six in the names of corporate entities that he allegedly controlled: Lady Lake Investments; Fairmont Group, Ltd.; Firststar Securities, Ltd.; Guardian Investment Group, Ltd.; Nemuro Industrial Group; and Orby International, Ltd. Id. ¶ 5(d). Eurofed is alleged to have held security deposits for two of these companies as well. Id. According to the plaintiff, by the end of 1997 over $100 million of Lazarenko’s money was held by Eurofed in these accounts. Pl.’s Stmnt. ¶ 4. In addition, the plaintiff alleges, approximately $1.6 million was formerly held on deposit at Eurofed in the account of Lazarenko’s associate Alexander Milchenko. Id. ¶ 5(e). Eurofed’s Liquidators acknowledge that in 1997 Lazarenko obtained an ownership interest in the bank, but they profess to lack enough information to confirm that he and his associates were the majority depositors. See Eurofed’s Statement of Facts (“Euro. Stmnt.”) ¶ 3. The reason for this uncertainty, they say, is that in the course of their duties they have not yet been able to determine whether the six companies allegedly affiliated with Lazarenko truly were owned or controlled by him. Id. And the funds of those six companies make up the bulk of the money at issue here: Lazarenko’s personal bank account appears to have held only approximately $150,000 by 1999, while the combined value of the six companies’ accounts exceeded $93 million. Moreover, the Liquidators, while seemingly acknowledging that Lazarenko exerted some influence over Eurofed’s actions and was more than a mere depositor, do not concede that he exerted total control over the bank or its investment decisions. Id. ¶ 4. The Liquidators also emphasize that Eurofed held millions of dollars in deposits from third parties who had no connection with Lazarenko. Id.; see Declaration of Charles William Augustine Walwyn ¶ 6 (estimating that innocent third parties had in excess of $25 million on deposit at Eurofed when it went into liquidation). Eurofed apparently maintained few of its deposits in Antigua itself. Instead, it established “correspondent” bank accounts in its own name at various other financial institutions around the world, in which it stored the bulk of the money deposited by its customers. See Declaration of Andrew Lewczyk, Ex. P, at 5. “These correspondent bank accounts were not held for the benefit of any particular depositor,” according to the Liquidators. “As a result, a customer’s deposits were not located in any particular location or correspondent account.” Id. at 8. In other words, if hypothetical Eurofed customers Sally, Sam, and Sue each deposited $40 with Eurofed in Antigua, the bank may well have divided that $120 among four of its own correspondent bank accounts in Switzerland, Lithuania, Liechtenstein, and the United States (placing, say, $30 into each account), making it impossible to trace Sally’s $40 deposit to any of Eurofed’s four correspondent accounts. In 1999, Antiguan government authorities with responsibility over financial crimes began to investigate Eurofed. Walwyn Decl. ¶ 2. That fall, the nation’s Office of Drug and Money Laundering Control Policy (“ONDCP”) applied to the High Court of Justice of Antigua and Barbuda for an order freezing all Eurofed assets linked to Lazarenko. Id. The High Court granted this request in an order dated October 29, 1999, prohibiting Lazarenko and several of his associates and affiliated companies from removing any of their funds from Antigua or in any way disposing of or diminishing those funds. Id., Ex. B, at 2. The apparent basis for this restraining order was Lazarenko’s criminal prosecution in Switzerland on money laundering charges, for which he was later convicted, and the alleged connection between those charges and the funds held at Eurofed. See id., Ex. H. On November 15, 1999, the Antiguan financial authorities placed Eurofed into receivership, pursuant to the International Business Corporations Act of Antigua and Barbuda (the “IBC Act”). See Declaration of Nicolette M. Doherty, Exs. B, C. Charles Walwyn and Donald Ward, from the accounting firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers Antigua, were appointed as receiver-managers, and these appointments were confirmed on November 25, 1999 by the High Court of Justice, which ordered the receivers to reorganize the bank. See id., Exs. C, D. Under the IBC Act, the receivers were charged, among other things, with “taking into [their] custody and control the property of the Bank” and “opening and maintaining a bank account or accounts for the moneys of the Bank coming under [their] control.” Id., Ex. C, at 1. In fulfillment of their responsibilities, in late November 1999 the receivers transferred approximately $76 million to Antigua that was being held in Eurofed correspondent bank accounts located within the United States. The Liquidators kept this money in a trust account that they established for Eurofed funds. Pl.’s Stmnt. ¶¶ 6-7; Euro. Stmnt. ¶¶ 6-7. On December 3, 1999, the High Court of Justice rescinded its previous receivership order and instead directed that Eurofed be liquidated and dissolved pursuant to the IBC Act. See Walwyn Decl., Ex. E. The court appointed Mr. Walwyn and Mr. Ward as liquidators, providing that they be remunerated at an hourly rate for their work from the funds of the bank. Id., Ex. E, at 2. Under the IBC Act, a liquidator “must,” among other responsibilities, “take into his custody and control the property of the corporation,” “open and maintain a trust account for the moneys of the corporation received and paid out to him,” and, “after his final accounts are approved by the court, distribute any remaining property of the corporation among the shareholders according to their respective rights.” IBC Act § 307(c), (d), (f). The Act also permits a liquidator to “bring, defend or take part in any civil, criminal or administrative action or proceeding in the name of and on behalf of the corporation.” Id. § 308(l)(b). On July 7, 2000, granting an ex parte application by the ONDCP, the Antiguan High Court of Justice issued an order directing that “all funds of Pavel Lazarenko and all his associated accounts frozen by Order of this Court” (in October of the previous year) be forfeited to the Antiguan government. Walwyn Decl., Ex. F, at 2. The Liquidators were ordered to pay those funds — specified in the order as $114,919,356.82, “or such amount thereof as remains in the Liquidators’ hands,” along with any accrued interest — into an Antiguan government bank account at the Bank of Nova Scotia in St. John’s, Antigua. Id. Both Lazarenko and the Liquidators promptly appealed this forfeiture order to the Court of Appeal for Antigua and Barbuda of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court. See Walwyn Decl., Ex. H, at 1. Lazarenko also moved the appellate court for a stay of the forfeiture order pending his appeal. Id., Ex. G, at 1. The Court of Appeal granted Lazarenko’s motion for a stay and ordered that, pending the appeal, the funds be placed into an interest-bearing account held at the Bank of Nova Scotia in the name of the Registrar of the High Court of Justice. Id. The preexisting freeze order from October 1999 remained in force. Id. The Liquidators complied with the order and transferred the funds. This is how the assets listed in paragraphs 5(d) and 5(e) of the plaintiffs complaint in this action came to be “held at Bank of Nova Scotia (Antigua) in the name of the Registrar of the High Court of Antigua Barbuda.” Am. Compl. ¶ 5(d), (e). The Liquidators’ appeal of the July 7, 2000 Antiguan forfeiture order was stayed by agreement of the parties, see Walwyn Decl., Ex. J, ¶ 4, while Lazarenko’s appeal of that order continued and ultimately succeeded. On April 27, 2001, the Court of Appeal ruled that the October 29, 1999 freeze order and the July 7, 2000 forfeiture order were not authorized by the Antiguan money laundering statute under the authority of which they ostensibly were issued. The appellate court held that at the time of the orders no evidence had been presented to the High Court linking the funds on deposit at Eurofed with the money laundering crime for which Lazarenko was convicted in Switzerland. Because the Antiguan money laundering statute required such a showing to be made, both the freeze order and the forfeiture order were invalid. See id., Ex. H, ¶ 1. A few days after the Court of Appeal ruled that the forfeiture and freeze orders were invalid, the Antiguan money laundering authorities applied for a new freeze order from the High Court of Justice. That court issued another ex parte order on May 2, 2001, directing that “[a]ll the rights and interests” of Lazarenko, “whether in his name or otherwise,” be “frozen until further order.” Walwyn Decl., Ex. I, ¶¶ 1-2. This order applied to any interests of Lazarenko in money held “within the account maintained by the Registrar ... at the St John’s Branch of the Nova Scotia Bank” or “within any account maintained by the liquidators of Eurofed Bank Ltd.” Id. In light of this new freeze order, Eurofed’s Liquidators applied for their own order from the High Court of Justice later that month. The Liquidators explained to the court that the money held in the account of the Registrar of the High Court of Justice — where it had been ordered deposited for safekeeping pending Lazarenko’s appeal of the now-vacated forfeiture order — made up the vast majority of the liquidation estate. Walwyn Decl., Ex. J, ¶¶ 3-6. The Liquidators further maintained that the innocent depositors and creditors of Eurofed who were not alleged by the government to be affiliated with Lazarenko “have been prejudiced by the fact that their funds have been removed from the liquidation together with the funds of [Lazarenko] and placefd] in the account of the Registrar.” Id. ¶ 10. Accordingly, the Liquidators proposed a pro rata division of the funds being held in the Registrar’s account, under which the funds of Lazarenko and the six companies he allegedly controlled would remain frozen in the Registrar’s account, while the funds of the remaining third-party depositors of Eurofed would be released to the Liquidators for use in the liquidation. Id. ¶ 7. The Liquidators also described the basis for their conclusions about which funds should be regarded as Lazarenko-related and remain frozen. As they explained, in view of the new restraining order, which imposed restrictions only on Lazarenko’s interests in Eurofed’s funds, it had become necessary to “quantify the funds held by the Liquidators for Pavlo Lazarenko and his alleged companies.” Walwyn Decl., Ex. J, at 5. Although Lazarenko himself had asserted ownership of the six companies alleged to be under his control, and had made claims in the liquidation for over $100 million of Eurofed funds based on that purported ownership, the Liquidators stated that they had “not been able to independently verify ownership of the companies.” Id. at 6. Taking a conservative approach, the Liquidators recommended treating the combined sum of the money in Lazarenko’s personal bank account and the accounts of the six companies over which he claimed ownership as potentially Lazarenko-related for the purposes of the freeze order. Since Lazarenko “ha[d] not provided any evidence supporting a claim any higher than this” amount, the Liquidators reasoned that the remainder of the funds could safely be regarded as non-Lazarenko-related and used to fund the liquidation claims of third-party depositors and creditors. Id. at 6-7. The Liquidators proposed, in other words, that all funds potentially related to Lazarenko would remain in the Registrar’s account, but that the remainder of the funds, which by all reports came from innocent third parties, be released to the Liquidators for use in funding the liquidation. After pro rata calculations and reductions, the Liquidators’ proposal called for the release of nearly $20 million to the Liquidators, while approximately $65 million in potentially Lazarenko-related funds would stay in the Registrar’s account. Id. at 10-11. In an order dated November 6, 2003, the High Court of Justice granted the Liquidators’ motion, over the objections of Lazarenko’s counsel. See Walwyn Decl., Ex. K. The court directed the Registrar to release the nearly $20 million from its account at the Bank of Nova Scotia to the Liquidators “for the purpose of pro rata payment to third party depositors and creditors” and for expenses of the liquidation. Id. ¶ 2. “The funds designated to Pavlo Lazarenko and associated companies,” however, totaling approximately $65 million, were to “remain frozen at the Bank of Nova Scotia, Antigua, in the account of the Registrar of the High Court until further order.” Id. ¶ 5. It is unclear whether Eurofed funds allegedly held for the benefit of Alexander Milchenko (approximately $1.6 million) were designated as being potentially Lazarenko-related in the Liquidators’ calculations, and thus whether a corresponding amount of money (reduced pro rata) was released to the Liquidators as part of the approximately $20 million they received. See Lewczyk Decl., Ex. P, at 10-11. Since the division of funds in 2003, the Liquidators report that they have worked to validate third-party claims and have used the $20 million released to them to make distributions to validated depositors and creditors. As of March 2012, they state, they had validated approximately 74 claims submitted by claimants unrelated to Lazarenko and had distributed over $14 million to those claimants. Because of the cap on the funds presently available to them, however, and because there are 107 additional third-party depositors and creditors whose claims have not yet been validated, the Liquidators have paid the validated third-party depositors and claimants on a pro rata basis. They report that the balance still owed to these 74 validated third-party claimants is $3,180,171. They also report that the total value of the “potential claims” of the additional 107 third-party depositors and creditors whose claims have not yet been validated is $6,966,692. “Thus ... the total potential remaining amount due to third party depositors and creditors unrelated to Lazarenko is $10,146,823,” while the “total unrestrained funds in the Liquidators’ possession ... is $4,347,542, and therefore, there is a deficit in the liquidation estate of at least $5,799,280.” Walwyn Decl. ¶¶ 16-17. C. Lazarenko’s Prosecution and the Initiation of this Forfeiture Action Meanwhile, in the United States, Lazarenko was criminally prosecuted for offenses stemming from his alleged laundering of money through American banks. Indicted in the Northern District of California on dozens of counts of conspiracy, money laundering, wire fraud, and interstate transportation of stolen property, Lazarenko was convicted in June 2004 of numerous counts — eight of which, for money laundering and conspiracy, survived a post-trial motion for a judgment of acquittal and an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Lazarenko, 564 F.3d 1026, 1029-32, 1047 (9th Cir.2009). The plaintiff initiated civil forfeiture proceedings in this Court in May 2004. As grounds for the forfeiture, the complaint alleges criminal conduct by Lazarenko that is similar to the charges levied against him in his criminal prosecution. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 120-155. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1355(a), and venue is proper here because all of the defendant properties are located in foreign bank accounts, and “[wjhenever property subject to forfeiture under the laws of the United States is located in a foreign country ... an action or proceeding for forfeiture may be brought ... in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.” All Assets I, 571 F.Supp.2d at 7 & n. 6 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b)(2)); see United States v. All Funds in Account Nos. 747.034/278, 747.009/278, & 747.714/278 in Banco Espanol de Credito, Spain, 295 F.3d 23, 26 (D.C.Cir.2002). The amended complaint includes eight claims for forfeiture falling into two general categories. The first four claims for relief allege the direct forfeiture of criminal proceeds pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), which provides for the forfeiture of proceeds from violation of certain enumerated criminal statutes or any offense constituting “specified unlawful activity” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7). See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 120-139. The last four claims for relief allege forfeiture of property involved in money laundering violations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A), which provides for the forfeiture of any property involved in or traceable to a violation of the money laundering provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 140-155. The plaintiff argues that all of the defendant properties are forfeitable under either theory. Civil forfeiture actions are governed by the procedures set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 983 and the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions (“Supplemental Rules”), a subset of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When the government files a complaint for forfeiture, “any person claiming an interest in the seized property may file a claim asserting such person’s interest in the property in the manner set forth in the Supplemental Rules[J” 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A); see Supp. R. G(5)(a). Nine individuals and three business entities filed claims contesting the forfeiture in this action. The individual claims were filed by Pavel Lazarenko, Alexander Lazarenko, Alexei Ditiatkovsky, and six people who maintained that they were innocent depositors of Eurofed. The institutional claims were filed by Eurofed (acting through its Liquidators), OAO Gazprom, and Universal Trading & Investment Company, Inc. The latter two companies claimed an interest in the defendant funds stemming from a kickback scheme allegedly orchestrated by Lazarenko that involved natural gas contracts in the Ukraine. See All Assets III, 772 F.Supp.2d at 196-205; All Assets IV, 772 F.Supp.2d at 211-18. The Court denied a motion by the Liquidators to transfer venue to the Northern District of California, where Lazarenko was being prosecuted, see Order, United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co., Ltd. (D.D.C. July 5, 2006), and it later denied a motion by Pavel and Alexander Lazarenko to dismiss the complaint for lack of 'subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See All Assets I, 571 F.Supp.2d at 6-17. Upon motion by the plaintiff, the Court dismissed the claims of the six individual Eurofed depositors, because those individuals did not file answers to the plaintiffs complaint as required by Supplemental Rule G(5)(b), a fatal procedural deficiency under the Supplemental Rules. See All Assets II, 664 F.Supp.2d at 101-03. The Court also granted judgment on the pleadings against OAO Gazprom and Universal Trading & Investment Company, Inc., concluding that neither company had standing to participate in this action because each lacked a cognizable interest in the property whose forfeiture they sought to contest. See All Assets III, 772 F.Supp.2d at 196-205; All Assets IV, 772 F.Supp.2d at 211-18. Four claimants now remain: Pavel Lazarenko, Alexander Lazarenko, Alexei Ditiatkovsky, and Eurofed. D. Background on the Pending Motion Supplemental Rule G(6) permits the government to issue special interrogatories to claimants early in the forfeiture proceedings, “limited to the claimant’s identity and relationship to the defendant property.” SUPP. R. G(6)(a). The purpose of such special interrogatories is to allow the government “to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing,” id., Advisory Committee Notes, 2006 Adoption, which facilitates the prompt elimination of claimants who have no right to participate in the proceedings and frees the government from the burden of responding to dispositive motions filed by such claimants. “The special interrogatories,” therefore, “are limited to questions dealing solely with claimant’s ownership interests in the property.” John K. Rabiej, Supplemental Rule G Governing Pretrial Procedures in Forfeiture in Rem Actions, Prac. Litig., May 2008, at 51. The plaintiff propounded special interrogatories to Eurofed’s Liquidators in 2008, see Declaration of Jason A. Levine, Ex. 18, and the Liquidators responded. After a stay in discovery that temporarily put things on hold, and after two subsequent requests by the plaintiff for more complete responses after discovery resumed, the Liquidators provided their second set of supplemental responses and objections to the plaintiffs special interrogatories in April 2010. See Levine Decl., Ex. 20. Approximately one year after receiving these special interrogatory responses, the plaintiff filed a “Motion to Strike Liquidators’ Claim or, in the Alternative, to Compel Complete Responses to Special Interrogatories.” See Dkt. No. 244. Rather than simply moving the Court to order the Liquidators to provide more comprehensive interrogatory responses, something the plaintiff had not yet attempted, the motion asked the Court to strike Eurofed’s claim entirely and dismiss the bank from the proceedings under Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(i)(A), which permits striking the claim of a forfeiture claimant who has failed to comply with Rule G(6). The plaintiff charged that the Liquidators had “repeatedly sought to avoid answering the threshold question of the nature and extent of their interest in the property subject to forfeiture through evasive and non-responsive answers to Special Interrogatories,” Dkt. No. 244-1 at 1-2, and that dismissal was an appropriate sanction for this noncompliance because the Liquidators had “provided conflicting evasive assertions of interest in their Claim, Answer and Special Interrogatory responses” and had “failed substantively to respond to Special Interrogatories despite multiple opportunities.” Id. at 2. As an alternative to dismissal, the plaintiff requested that the Liquidators be ordered to “fully respond” to certain special interrogatories, “so that Plaintiff and the Court are apprised of Liquidators’ purported interest in the Defendants In Rem.” Id. The Court heard argument on the plaintiffs motion in January 2012, combined with argument on another motion that has since been resolved. During the hearing, the Court indicated that, in its view, it would be unusual to strike a claim under Supplemental Rule G(8) based on inadequate responses to special interrogatories (as opposed to a complete failure to respond) where the plaintiff had not even taken the preliminary step of moving to compel additional responses. Cf. Supp. R. G(8), Advisory Committee Note (“As with other pleadings, the court should strike a claim or answer only if satisfied that an opportunity should not be afforded to cure the defects[.] Not every failure to respond to subdivision (6) interrogatories warrants an order striking the claim.”). The Court observed that much of the plaintiffs briefing was devoted to attacking the Liquidators’ standing outright, rather than the adequacy of their special interrogatory responses, but that the plaintiff had not moved to dismiss the Liquidators for lack of standing, as it was authorized to do by Supplemental Rule G(8)(e)(i)(B), instead basing its motion exclusively on the Liquidators’ purported discovery noncompliance. Given that the fight over the Liquidators’ interrogatory responses appeared to be serving as a proxy for a more fundamental dispute about their standing to participate in this action, the Court asked the parties to confer about whether, in lieu of having the Court determine whether additional interrogatory responses should be compelled, the parties would prefer to brief the question of the Liquidators’ standing head-on and without further discovery. Shortly thereafter, the parties advised the Court that they had agreed “to proceed without further supplementation of Liquidators’ responses to the Special Interrogatories and to rely on the existing record.” Dkt. No. 278 at 1. Under a jointly proposed scheduling order, the plaintiff agreed to file a motion to strike the Liquidators for lack of standing. Id. That motion, which the plaintiff has brought as a motion for summary judgment, is now before the Court. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW In a forfeiture action brought in rem pursuant to a federal statute, at any time before trial the United States “may move to strike a claim or answer ... because the claimant lacks standing.” SUPP. R. G(8)(c)(i)(B). Such a challenge to a party’s claim and answer “may be presented ... as a motion to determine after a hearing or by summary judgment whether the claimant can carry the burden of establishing standing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. G(8)(c)(ii)(B). Summary judgment may be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C.Cir.2006). “A fact is ‘material’ if a dispute over it might affect the outcome of a suit under the governing law; factual disputes that are ‘irrelevant or unnecessary’ do not affect the summary judgment determination.” Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d at 895 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d at 895. When a motion for summary judgment is under consideration, “the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Mastro v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 849-50 (D.C.Cir.2006); Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1998) (en banc). The non-moving party’s opposition, however, must consist of more than mere unsupported allegations or denials and must be supported by affidavits, declarations, or other competent evidence, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The non-moving party is required to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find in his favor. Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1987). If the non-movant’s evidence is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” summary judgment may be granted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (“[Wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is ‘no genuine issue for trial.’ ”) (quoting Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must “eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C.Cir.2007). “The inquiry performed [at this phase] is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. III. STANDING IN CIVIL FORFEITURE ACTIONS “Civil forfeiture actions are brought against property, not people. The owner of the property may intervene to protect his interest.” United States v. All Funds in Account Nos. 747.034/278, 747.009/278, & 747.714/278 in Banco Espanol de Credito, Spain, 295 F.3d at 25. In order to contest the forfeiture of property to the federal government in an in rem forfeiture proceeding, a claimant must “assert!] an interest” in “specific property” that is named as a defendant. SUPP. R. G(5)(a)(i)(A); see 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A) (“[A]ny person claiming an interest in the seized property may file a claim asserting such person’s interest in the property!.]”). A claimant who lacks such an interest has no standing to challenge the forfeiture. See Supp. R. G(8)(c)(i)(B); United States v. Funds from Prudential Securities, 300 F.Supp.2d 99, 103 (D.D.C.2004) (referring to Supplemental Rule C(6), the predecessor of Supplemental Rules G(5) and G(6)). “The extent of the interest in the defendant property sufficient to meet this standing requirement is left to case law.” Rabiej, Supplemental Rule G, at 55; see also United States v. Funds from Prudential Securities, 300 F.Supp.2d at 103 (stating that a claimant must “demonstrare] an interest ... sufficient to satisfy the court of his standing”). Establishing standing requires only that the claimant demonstrate “a colorable interest in the property, for example, by showing actual possession, control, title, or financial stake.” United States v. Real Property Located at 475 Martin Lane, 545 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir.2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. One Lincoln Navigator, 328 F.3d 1011, 1013 (8th Cir.2003). At the summary judgment stage, a claimant bears the burden of proving such a facially color-able interest by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. $148,840 in U.S. Currency, 521 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir.2008); see Supp. R. G(8)(c)(ii)(B). “Although a claimant must make [this] initial evidentiary showing of such an interest, a claimant need not definitively prove the existence of that interest.” United States v. $148,840 in U.S. Currency, 521 F.3d at 1273; see United States v. $557,933.89, More or Less, in U.S. Funds, 287 F.3d 66, 79 (2d Cir.2002) (“[T]he only question that the courts need assess regarding a claimant’s standing is whether he or she has shown the required ‘facially colorable interest,’ not whether he ultimately proves the existence of that interest.” (quotations omitted)); United States v. 116 Emerson St., 942 F.2d 74, 78 (1st Cir.1991). At the summary judgment stage, therefore, the question is only “whether a fairminded jury could find that the claimant had standing on the evidence presented.” United States v. $133,420.00 in U.S. Currency, 672 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir.2012); see All Assets II, 664 F.Supp.2d at 104-05 (stating that at the summary judgment stage, “each claimant must point to some evidence in the record that would allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude ... by a preponderance of the evidence that they have a cognizable interest in the assets potentially subject to forfeiture”). The claimant’s burden “is not a heavy one,” United States v. Real Property Located at 475 Martin Lane, 545 F.3d at 1140, and courts must not conflate the standing inquiry “with the merits determination that comes later.” United States v. One-Sixth Share of James J. Bulger in All Present and Future Proceeds of Mass Millions Lottery Ticket No. M246233, 326 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir.2003); see United States v. One Lincoln Navigator, 328 F.3d at 1013 (“This threshold burden is not rigorous: To have standing, a claimant ... need only show a colorable interest in the property, redressable, at least in part, by a return of the property.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); see also United States v. $8,440,190.00 in U.S. Currency, 719 F.3d 49, 57 (1st Cir.2013) (“At the initial stages of intervention, the requirements are not arduous and typically any colorable claim on the defendant property suffices.”). Because the United States, rather than the claimant, is the plaintiff and bears the burden of proving the property’s forfeitability, “[t]he function of standing in a forfeiture action is therefore truly threshold only — to ensure that the government is put to its proof only where someone with a legitimate interest contests the forfeiture.” United States v. $557,933.89, More or Less, in U.S. Funds, 287 F.3d at 79. The nature of a claimant’s asserted property interest is “defined by the law of the State” — or here, nation — “in which the interest arose.” United States v. One Lincoln Navigator, 328 F.3d at 1013; see United States v. $100,348 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir.2004); United States v. One-Sixth Share, 326 F.3d at 45. But while state law defines a claimant’s interest in specific property, “federal law determines the effect of [that] ownership interest on [the claimant’s] right to bring a claim.” United States v. U.S. Currency, $81,000.00, 189 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir.1999) (citing United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722, 105 S.Ct. 2919, 86 L.Ed.2d 565 (1985)); see United States v. 5 S 351 Tuthill Rd., 233 F.3d 1017, 1021 (7th Cir.2000) (“State law defines and classifies property interests for purposes of the forfeiture statutes, while federal law determines the effect of the property interest on the claimant’s standing.”); United States v. BCCI Holdings, Luxembourg, S.A., 69 F.Supp.2d 36, 57 (D.D.C.1999) (same). IV. DISCUSSION As a civil forfeiture claimant, Eurofed must establish standing as to each of the five in rem defendants named in the plaintiffs complaint in which it asserts an interest. See Supp. R. G(5)(a)(i)(A) (providing that forfeiture claimants must “identify the specific property claimed”). These five properties fall into two fundamentally different categories. On one hand are the funds that are currently being held at the Bank of Nova Scotia, Antigua, in the name of the Registrar of the High Court of Justice, which the plaintiff alleges were formerly maintained on deposit at Eurofed for the benefit of Lazarenko and Alexander Milchenko. See Am. Compl. ¶ 5(d), (e). On the other hand are the funds located in Lithuania and Switzerland that are still on deposit at financial institutions where Eurofed formerly maintained correspondent bank accounts. See Am. Compl. ¶ 5(f), (g), (h). Because these two categories of in rem defendants are separated by significant differences regarding their legal relationship to Eurofed and its Liquidators, with consequences for Eurofed’s standing to contest their forfeiture, the Court will address the two categories separately. A. Defendant Funds Held at the Bank of Nova Scotia, Antigua, in the Account of the Registrar of the High Court of Justice 1. Eurofed’s Property Interest in the Antiguan Assets a. Relationship Between a Bank and its Deposits The parties agree that Antiguan law defines the nature of any interest that Eurofed and its Liquidators may have in the defendant funds that are located in Antigua and Barbuda. See Mem. at 25-29; Opp. at 17, 20-21. They further agree that where Antiguan statutes and case law do not answer a particular legal question, English common law applies, supplementing Antiguan law. See Mem. at 19, 27-28; Opp. at 21; Declaration of Nicolette M. Doherty in Support of Liquidators ¶ 13 (stating that “to the extent that local law has not restated or overruled English law, English statute and case law are deemed to form part of the law of Antigua and Barbuda”); Declaration of Felicity Rosalind Toube in Support of Plaintiff ¶ 6 (agreeing that “English common law applies unless Antiguan law has overruled or restated it”). Under longstanding principles of English law, applicable in Antigua, funds deposited with a bank become the property of the bank, and the depositor becomes a creditor of the bank: “Money, when paid into a bank, ceases altogether to be the money of the principal; it is then the money of the banker, who is bound to return an equivalent by paying a similar sum to that deposited with him when he is asked for it.” Foley v. Hill, [1848] 2 H.L.C. 28, 36, 9 E.R. 1002, 1005; see id., 2 H.L.C. at 36-37 (“The money placed in the custody of a banker is, to all intents and purposes, the money of the banker, to do with it as he pleases; he is guilty of no breach, of trust in employing it; he is not answerable to the principal if he puts it into jeopardy, if he engages in a hazardous speculation; he is not bound to keep it or deal with it as the property of his principal, but he is of course answerable for the amount, because he has contracted, having received that money, to repay to the principal, when demanded, a sum equivalent to that paid into his hands.”). The plaintiff and the Liquidators both acknowledge that, based on this precedent, Antiguan banks as a general rule own the deposits made by their customers. See Opp. at 20-21; Reply at 10. Deposits made with Eurofed by its customers, therefore, became Eurofed’s assets. But what, if anything, changed when the bank went into liquidation? The IBC Act, which governs the liquidation of international corporations registered in Antigua, does not explicitly address whether a corporation retains title to its assets once it enters liquidation. By repeatedly referring to “the property of the corporation,” IBC Act § 306(2), 307(c), 310(l)-(2), and “the moneys of the corporation,” id. § 307(d), however, the Act strongly suggests that it does retain title. Indeed, it is difficult to see how an appointed liquidator could, as the IBC Act directs, “carry on the business of the corporation,” id. § 308(c), or “sell by public auction or private sale any property of the corporation,” id. § 308(d), if that corporation was not the owner of its assets. Applicable English case law, moreover, confirms that a corporation in the process of being liquidated retains title to its assets. See Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v. C. & K. (Construction) Ltd., [1975] A.C. 167 (H.L.), 177 (stating that “a winding-up order does not of itself divest the company of the legal title to any of its assets”). Once in liquidation, however, the corporation loses the “beneficial ownership” of those assets. Id. at 177-81. In this respect, the corporation in liquidation is comparable to a trustee in bankruptcy, who is vested with legal ownership of the bankrupt’s property, but who “cannot enjoy the fruits of it himself or dispose of it for his own benefit” and instead is “under a duty to deal with it as directed by the statute for the benefit of all the creditors who come in to prove a valid claim.” Id. at 178. In other words: “The resolution or order for winding up divests the company of the beneficial interest in its assets,” and those assets “become a fund which the company thereafter holds in trust to discharge its liabilities.” Buchler and another v. Talbot and others, [2004] UKHL 9, ¶ 28 (opinion of Lord Hoffman) (citing Ayerst ). Consistent with these principles of English law, the IBC Act dictates that a corporation in liquidation “shall cease to carry on business, except the business that is, in the opinion of the liquidator, required for an orderly liquidation,” IBC Act § 305(l)(a), the aims of which are to pay off all creditors and to distribute any remaining corporate property among the shareholders. Id. § 307(i). In sum, an Antiguan bank in liquidation retains title to — though not beneficial ownership of — its assets, and those assets include the deposits made by the bank’s former customers. Therefore, the initiation of Eurofed’s liquidation did not divest the bank of its ownership of funds that its customers deposited with the bank, though it did alter the bank’s relationship with those funds by circumscribing what the bank could do with them. b. Relationship Between a Bank’s Liquidators and the Bank’s Assets Under the IBC Act, when a corporation is ordered to be liquidated, “the powers of the directors and shareholders cease and are vested in the liquidator.” IBC Act § 305(l)(a). A liquidator is required by the IBC Act to “take into his custody and control the property of the corporation,” to discharge any obligations to “creditors and other persons having claims against the corporation,” and, ultimately, to “distribute any remaining property of the corporation among the shareholders according to their respective rights.” IBC Act § 307(c)-(i). A liquidator also may, among other things, “carry on the business of the corporation as required for all orderly liquidation,” “do all acts and execute any documents in the name and on behalf of the corporation,” and “bring, defend or take part in any civil, criminal or administrative action or proceeding in the name of and on behalf of the corporation.” Id. § 308(l)(b), (c), (e). In other words, upon the commencement of a liquidation proceeding, the company’s corporate structure ceases to exist, and the liquidator — alone empowered to act on the company’s behalf — runs the company’s affairs with the limited end of winding them down and appropriately distributing its assets. “The functions of the liquidator are thus similar to those of a trustee [in] bankruptcy or an executor in the administration of an estate of a deceased person.” Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v. C. & K. (Construction) Ltd., A.C. at 176-77. A key distinction, however, is that under English law (applicable in Antigua) a trustee in bankruptcy gains legal title to the bankrupt’s property, and an estate administrator gains legal title to the deceased’s property, but a liquidator does not gain title to the corporation’s property. That is because, as explained earlier, the corporation in liquidation never loses title to its assets — merely the “beneficial ownership” of those assets. Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v. C. & K. (Construction) Ltd., A.C. at 177. While a liquidator is often described as being similar to a trustee, therefore, “he is not a trustee in the strict sense,” but rather “is more rightly described as the agent of the company” who “has cast upon him by statute and otherwise special duties,” including “the duty of applying the company’s assets in paying creditors and distributing the surplus among the shareholders.” Knowles v. Scott, [1891] 1 Ch 717, 723; see Janvey v. Wastell, [2010] EWCA Civ 137, ¶ 121 (opinion of Lady Arden) (“As a matter of law, the liquidators have two capacities. First, they are the agents of SIB. Secondly they are trustees for the unsecured creditors.... However, their only interest in the assets of SIB ... is as trustees!.]”); cf. Deloitte & Touche (Liquidator) v. Bennett, 81 O.R.3d 389, 396 (May 18, 2006) (Can.Ont.Sup.Ct.J.) (“A liquidator is separate and distinct from the company being liquidated.... The liquidator acts as a quasi-trustee for creditors and stands in a different position from the corporation.”). Under Antiguan law, in short, liquidators take possession of the corporation’s property and control over its affairs (not ownership of its assets) — but they do so only with the limited end of winding down the corporation in accordance with the provisions of the IBC Act, in the process of which they exercise a quasi-fiduciary duty to the creditors of the corporation. 2. Implications of Eurofed’s Property Interest in the Antiguan Assets under Federal Law Having elucidated the legal relationships under Antiguan law among a bank in liquidation, its assets (which include the deposits of its customers), and its appointed liquidators, the Court must next determine whether a bank’s interest in those assets is sufficient under federal law to support its standing, acting through its liquidators, to contest their forfeiture. See United States v. 5 S 351 Tuthill Rd., 233 F.3d at 1021; United States v. U.S. Currency, $81,000.00, 189 F.3d at 33. With little difficulty, the Court concludes that Eurofed, acting through its Liquidators, has a colorable interest in the defendant assets located in Antigua and therefore may not be barred from contesting their forfeiture at the summary judgment stage. See United States v. Real Property Located at 475 Martin Lane, 545 F.3d at 1140; United States v. One Lincoln Navigator, 328 F.3d at 1013; United States v. $148,840 in U.S. Currency, 521 F.3d at 1275; United States v. $557,933.89, More or Less, in U.S. Funds, 287 F.3d at 79. A variety of property interests may serve as the basis for a claimant’s entitlement to contest a civil forfeiture, including not only ownership but also possessory and other lesser forms of interest. “The type of interest claimed dictates the type of evidence required to establish standing.” United States v. $148,840.00 in U.S. Currency, 521 F.3d at 1274 (citing United States v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir.1994)). A claimant who asserts an “ownership interest” in the defendant property and who presents “some evidence of ownership” supporting that assertion has satisfied its burden of demonstrating standing at the summary judgment stage. United States v. $133,420.00 in U.S. Currency, 672 F.3d at 639. This is common ground among the courts of appeals. See, e.g., United States v. $148,840.00 in U.S. Currency, 521 F.3d at 1276 (“[W]hen a claimant has asserted an ownership interest in the res at issue and has provided some evidence tending to support the existence of that ownership interest, the claimant has standing to challenge the forfeiture.”); United States v. U.S. Currency, $81,000.00, 189 F.3d at 35 (“[A]n allegation of ownership and some evidence of ownership are together sufficient to establish standing to contest a civil forfeiture.”); Torres v. $36,256.80, 25 F.3d 1154, 1158 (2d Cir.1994) (same); United States v. $38,570 U.S. Currency, 950 F.2d 1108, 1112-13 (5th Cir.1992) (“[A] claimant is required to submit some additional evidence of ownership along with his claim in order to establish standing to contest the forfeiture.”). Eurofed has repeatedly claimed to be the owner of the defendant funds at issue here. See Euro. Cl. at 4 (asserting that Eurofed “is the legal owner of the accounts and/or funds” in which the bank has claimed an interest); Lewczyk Decl., Ex. P, at 5 (asserting that “all deposits into Eurofed became assets of the Bank.”); Opp. at 17 (asserting that “Eurofed is the legal owner of all of the defendant Eurofed assets”). The only question, then, is whether the bank has provided enough evidence supporting this assertion of ownership to satisfy the Court of its standing at this stage in the proceedings. In assessing the sufficiency and probity of evidence that purports to demonstrate a colorable ownership interest, courts generally look to “indicia of dominion and control such as possession, title, and financial stake.” United States v. $38,570 U.S. Currency, 950 F.2d at 1113; see United States v. $148,840.00 in U.S. Currency, 521 F.3d at 1275; United States v. 1998 BMW “I” Convertible, 235 F.3d 397, 399 (8th Cir.2000). Eurofed has demonstrated all of these. As explained in the foregoing discussion of Antiguan banking and corporate law, Eurofed gained title to the deposits of its customers. See supra at 23-25. Those deposits are among the funds now being held in the Registrar’s account that the plaintiff seeks to forfeit. See Am. Compl. ¶ 5(d) (stating that the funds sought in the Registrar’s account include “assets derived from deposits” of Lazarenko and his associated companies); id. ¶ 5(e) (making same assertion regarding deposits of Alexander Milchenko). Based on the principle that a bank owns the deposits of its customers, it may be that Eurofed itself lost title to the funds when it deposited them in Eurofed’s own correspondent bank accounts with other financial institutions overseas: at that point, it would appear, the financial institutions with whom Eurofed did business became the owners of the money, and Eurofed was put into the position of the customer, with nothing more than a claim for damages against the institutions if they did not return the money upon request. But once Eurofed’s receivers secured the transfer of these funds back to Antigua and placed them in the receivers’ trust account, as ordered by the Antiguan courts, the funds once again became “the property of the corporation.” IBC Act § 307(c); see id. § 307(d), (e) (referencing “the moneys of the corporation received”); Doherty Decl., Ex. C, at 1. Eurofed thus has made a sufficient showing that it owns the funds being held in the Registrar’s account in Antigua, as it claims, and this is sufficient to establish the bank’s standing at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., United States v. One Lincoln Navigator, 328 F.3d at 1013 (holding that where state law defines the “owner” of a vehicle as “a person who holds the legal title,” such legal title “establishes a prima facie case of ownership,” which, in the circumstances, conferred standing to contest the vehicle’s forfeiture). In addition to demonstrating a colorable ownership interest in these funds, Eurofed also has provided evidence that it has a possessory interest in the funds and a financial stake in their disposition. The funds were placed into Eurofed’s hands by its customers, were maintained by the bank in its own overseas accounts, and were reclaimed from those foreign accounts by Eurofed’s receivers. That the funds are not presently within Eurofed’s control — being temporarily frozen, for the convoluted reasons explained earlier, in the account of the Registrar of the High Court of Justice — hardly diminishes Eurofed’s clear possessory relationship to those funds. Moreover, Eurofed undoubtedly has a financial stake in the funds, as the bank’s Liquidators are under a legal obligation to take into their control the bank’s property, discharge financial obligations to creditors, and distribute any surplus to its shareholders. See IBC Act § 307(b). If the forfeiture action in this Court fails on the merits, and if no other attempts to forfeit the funds (whether by the government of Antigua or some other government) are successful, the funds presumptively will be released to Eurofed for use in the liquidation. Having made a showing of ownership, possession, and financial stake with respect to the in rem defendants being held in Antigua, Eurofed has satisfied the “undemanding” requirements necessary to survive a summary judgment challenge to its standing, United States v. 5 S 351 Tuthill Rd., 233 F.3d at 1022, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate any countervailing legal or factual considerations that undermine this conclusion. 3. The Plaintiff’s Counter-Arguments In an effort to rebut the foregoing determinations, the plaintiff summons a veritable blizzard of legal and factual counterarguments. Some of these arguments address Eurofed’s property interest in the Antiguan assets, while others seek to pry Eurofed’s interests and legal rights apart from those of its .Liquidators. When the storm clears, however, it becomes evident that none of these arguments has merit, a. Fiduciary or Custodial Relationship The plaintiff alleges that Lazarenko, his associates, and his affiliated companies did not have a normal depositor-creditor relationship with Eurofed. According to the plaintiff, the Lazarenko-related funds were not held “on deposit” at Eurofed at all. Instead, “Eurofed Bank had a ‘fiduciary and investment’ relationship with Lazarenko regarding his personal account, while the accounts of his corporate shells and the personal account of Milchenko were subject to custodial agreements.” Pl.’s Stmnt. ¶ 28. Therefore, according to the plaintiff, even if Antiguan banks generally own the deposits of their customers, Eurofed’s Lazarenko-related funds “did not become assets of the bank” because they were merely “held in a custodial or safekeeping relationship.” Mem. at 37. And since these funds never belonged to Eurofed at all, the bank would suffer no injury from their forfeiture. Id. In support of these assertions, the plaintiff furnishes several types of documents. Two are stray pages of unknown provenance: The first, as the Liquidators correctly characterize it, is “an unidentified, shorthand spreadsheet that does not even identify Lazarenko at all,” Euro. Stmnt. ¶ 28, but merely is entitled “Fiduciary Account Balance and Investment Portfolio.” Lewczyk Decl., Ex. S, at 1. Next is a similarly unidentified sheet of paper, apparently a copy of a fax transmittal, containing a single paragraph that purports to be signed by Lazarenko and directs that his “deposit account” is “to be invested by the direction of’ either Lazarenko himself or his associate Peter Kiritchenko. Id. at 2. The plaintiff also supplies six identical “Custodian Agreements,” signed by representatives of each of Lazarenko’s affiliated companies, which authorize Eurofed to open a “custodian account” for each company. See id., Exs. Q, R, T; Declaration of John J. Truex, Exs. A-F. Finally, the plaintiff supplies additional documents executed by Lazarenko’s affiliated companies appointing Eurofed as their banker and setting forth certain terms of their accounts. See id., Exs. G-L. In addition to these documents, the plaintiff has submitted a declaration by an English lawyer which opines that, based on her review of the documents, “it appears to me from these records that the funds held in these accounts were assets held in a trust or fiduciary relationship for Lazarenko, and therefore did not become assets of Eurofed.” Toube Decl. ¶ 19. The plaintiffs evidence, while suggestive, is far too limited and ambiguous to support a judgment, without any further factual development, that Eurofed held the money of Lazarenko and his affiliated companies in a custodial or fiduciary capacity, rather than as traditional cash deposits. The Liquidators assert that, according to the records available to them, all of the Eurofed accounts at issue in this proceeding are indeed cash accounts, contrary to Ms. Toube’s assessment. Suppl. Walwyn Deck ¶ 4. In support, they provide accounting records of Eurofed from 1999 that, they say, show these deposits to have been recorded as assets of the bank, “rather than off balance-sheet assets that would be consistent with a custodial or trust relationship.” Id.; see id., Ex. A. They also note that even Lazarenko himself has never claimed that his deposits or those of his companies were held in trust or were anything other than standard cash deposits — a claim he presumably had strong incentive to make, as it may have given him priority over regular depositors of Eurofed in the liquidation proceedings. See id., Ex.