Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION JUSTICE, Senior District Judge. The above-entitled and numbered civil action was filed on December 19, 1997, by a group of migrant farm workers, claiming violations of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”), the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and various state laws. The primary defendant is Case Farms of Ohio, a chicken processing plant located in Winesburg, Ohio. A bench trial in this civil action commenced on March 29, 1999, and was completed on April 1, 1999. In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), the following memorandum opinion constitutes the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in this civil action. Table Of Contents Introduction I.Background Facts II.Trial Procedure Part i-. An Overview Of The Law Part il General Applicable Liability Principles I. Case Farms’ Liability "as to the 1996 Plaintiffs A. An Agricultural Employer’s Liability Under the AWPA The Joint Employer Doctrine - Case Farms and ATC as Joint Employers The Implication's of Joint Employer Status B. An Agricultural Employer’s Liability Under Common Law Agency Principles ATC’s Agency Hernandez’s Agency C. Case Farms’ Liability for the Actions of ATC and Alvaro Hernandez II. Case Farms’ Liability as to the 1997 Plaintiffs Part iii: Alleged Violations Of The awpa I. Unregistered Farm Labor Contractors’ Alleged Violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1842 A. The Law B. 1996 Plaintiffs C. 1997 Plaintiffs II. Written Disclosures: Alleged Violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a) A. The Law B. The 1996 Plaintiffs C. The 1997 Plaintiffs III. False or Misleading Information: Alleged Violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1821(f) A. The Law B. The 1996 Plaintiffs C. The 1997 Plaintiffs IV. Compliance with the Terms of the Working Arrangement: Alleged Violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1822(c) A. The Law B. The 1996 Plaintiffs C. The 1997 Plaintiffs V. Housing Health and Safety Codes: Alleged Violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1823(a) A. The Law B. The 1996 Plaintiffs C. The 1997 Plaintiffs VI.Posted Certificate of Occupancy: Alleged Violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1823(b) VII.Posted Terms and Conditions of Housing Occupancy: Alleged Violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1821(c) VIII.Insurance and Inspection of Vehicles: Alleged Violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1841(b) A. The Law B. The 1996 Plaintiffs C. The 1997 Plaintiffs IX. Proper Pay Statements: Alleged Violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2) X. Paid Wages When Due: Alleged Violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1822(a) XI.Damages for Violations of the AWPA A. The Assessment of Statutory Damages B. The Assessment of Actual Damages C. The Plaintiffs’ Damages 1. Use of Unregistered Farm Labor Contractors 2. Failure to Provide Written Disclosures 3. Providing False or Misleading Information 4. Failure to Comply with the Terms of the Working Agreement 5. Failure to Comply with Housing Health and Safety Codes 6. Failure to Secure the Certificate of Occupancy 7. Failure to Post the Terms and Conditions of Housing Occupancy 8. Failure to Insure and Inspect Vehicles 9. Failure to Provide Proper Pay Statements 10. Failure to Provide Wages When Due Part iv: Alleged Violations Of The flsa I. The Fair Labor Standards Act II. The Rules for Calculating Minimum Wage Violations III. Case Farms’ Alleged Minimum Wage Violations IV. Case Farms’ Alleged Overtime Wage Violations A. The 1996 Plaintiffs’ Overtime Allegations B. The 1997 Plaintiffs’ Overtime Allegations Part V: Alleged Violations Of State Law I. Case Farms’ Alleged Breach of Contract II. Case Farms’ Alleged Negligence III. Case Farms’ Alleged Fraud Conclusion INTRODUCTION 1. Background Defendant Case Farms of Ohio, Inc. (“Case Farms”), is a chicken processing plant in Winesburg, Ohio. At this facility, approximately 400,000 live chickens per week, year-round, are live-hung, slaughtered, eviscerated, cleaned, cut and de-boned, and ultimately packaged for market. Case Farms employees perform a range of jobs, which include eviscerating, deboning, receiving, grading, wrapping, weighing, and washing chickens. In consideration of its historically high turnover rate, Case Farms actively recruited workers for its processing plant during 1996 and 1997. Andy Cilona, primarily responsible for recruiting workers for Case Farms, served as Case Farms’ Human Resources Director from his date of hire until February 1996, and as Case Farms’ Director of Corporate Development, from February 1996 until mid-1997. During one of his recruiting trips in Florida, Cilona initiated contact with a labor agency for temporary employees, America’s Tempcorps (“ATC”). In conformity with an unwritten agreement with Case Farms, ATC worked in Texas, recruiting and hiring a number of people to work at Case Farms’ chicken processing plant in Ohio. During this recruitment process, ATC gave some of its recruits the telephone number of Alvaro Hernandez, a Case Farms employee, and instructed them to call Hernandez upon their arrival in Ohio. ATC also usually gave its recruits a free bus ticket or other free transportation to Ohio, as well as $20.00 each in traveling expenses. Case Farms ceased doing business with ATC in February 1996. There are two groups of plaintiffs in this civil action. Those workers recruited by ATC in McAllen, Texas, make up the “1996 plaintiffs.” The “1996 plaintiffs,” sixteen in number, are as follows: Eloy Cantu, Gerardo Castillo, Edna Mae Chong (representing the estate of deceased plaintiff Josephine Tijerina), Efrain Leal, Rafael Gonzalez, Sergio Hernandez, Jose Guadalupe Estrada, Martin Hernandez, Esperanza Hernandez, Joseph Cooper, Hugo Hernandez, Jesus Mejia, Guadalupe Zamorano, Ricardo Zamorano, Raul Zavala, and Michelle Galvan. The second group of plaintiffs, the eleven “1997 plaintiffs,” were provided recruitment information by Cilona, Case Farms’ employee, or by Alberto Garcia, an employee of the Texas Workforce Commission, in Eagle Pass, Texas. Most of the 1997 plaintiffs traveled to Ohio by bus and were, upon their respective arrivals in Ohio, without their own vehicles. This second group of plaintiffs was comprised of Gustavo Caballero, Estela Carreon, Carlos Gonzalez, Jose A. Guevara, Juan A. Jimenez, Yolanda Leura (representing the estate of her deceased son, Daniel Leura), Aurora Navarro, Carlos Reyna, Tomas Solis, Israel Trevino, and Urbana Zavala. Most of the twenty-seven plaintiffs worked for some period of time at the Case Farms plant. Whether recruited by ATC, Cilona, or Garcia, all plaintiffs who worked at Case Farms’ plant were supervised by Case Farms employees. Both sets of plaintiffs generally claim that they were recruited in Texas to work at Case Farms’ Winesburg facility, and that, upon arriving at Case Farms, they discovered that the actual terms and conditions of their employment, transportation, and housing in Ohio did not coincide with the promises made to them in Texas. At the trial of this case, plaintiffs testified to the inadequate housing conditions and transportation provisions they encountered upon arrival in Ohio. Thus, the bases for this civil action are the defendants’ alleged misrepresentations and mistreatment of the plaintiffs in the recruitment process in Texas, and, as well, the working and living conditions afforded them in Ohio. Plaintiffs contend that defendants violated a number of the statutory rights of employees created by the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiffs further allege that defendants were guilty of breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation with regard to the bases of plaintiffs’ claims. Defendant Case Farms responded to these allegations'with primarily legal defenses. Generally speaking, rather than refute the veracity of most of the plaintiffs’ factual claims, Case Farms’ primary defense at trial was that it cannot be held legally responsible for the plaintiffs’ alleged mistreatment. II. Trial Procedure The necessity of individually considering the evidence pertinent to the approximately fifteen legal claims brought by each of twenty-seven plaintiffs has made for a cumbersome record (and final judgment) in this civil action. In the course of this litigation, resolution of over 400 legal claims was required. Certain adjustments to standard trial procedure were made in this civil action to assist in expediting its disposition. By agreement of the parties and the court, only four plaintiffs (Martin Hernandez, Michelle Galvan, Carlos Gonzalez, and Israel Trevino) actually testified in person on direct examination at the trial. Fourteen of the remaining plaintiffs presented their direct testimony by means of designated deposition excerpts and affidavits, and were then made available for in-person cross-examination by Case Farms. The ten remaining plaintiffs did not testify at all on direct examination. For most of those individuals, however, parts of their deposition testimony were made a part of the record and submitted into evidence by Case Farms. Although it is acknowledged that such a procedure is less than ideal, it is also recognized that, in the interest of the efficient disposition of justice, such variations from standard routine may be necessary. However, as other courts have made manifest, it is preferable to have “live testimony, which, allows [the court] to judge the sincerity and credibility of plaintiffs’ claims and allows the parties to fill in the gaps other methods of proof often leave.” Bueno v. Mattner, 633 F.Supp. 1446, 1453 (W.D.Mich.1986). As other courts have also made clear, however, the ends of justice, at times, require a combination of live and written testimony. See Beliz v. W.H. McLeod & Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d 1317, 1331 (5th Cir.1985); Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 195 (5th Cir.1983); Donovan v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 599 F.Supp. 860, 868 (S.D.N.Y.1984). PART I: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”) is a broad-ranging network of migrant and seasonal worker protections that requires, in part, written and forthright disclosures, in the workers’ language, of working conditions at the time of recruitment. It prohibits false and misleading representations concerning employment policies and practices, housing conditions, and transportation arrangements for workers. It also regulates housing and transportation standards for covered workers. 29 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq. The AWPA was enacted in 1983 to replace Congress’ previous attempt (with the Farm Labor Contract Registration Act of 1963 (“FLCRA”)) “to protect agricultural workers whose employment had been historically characterized by low wages, long hours and poor working conditions.... ” H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547. According to Congressional records, the FLCRA “failed to reverse the historical pattern of abuse and exploitation of migrant and seasonal farm workers,” 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4549, and Congress reformulated its migrant and seasonal worker protections in the AWPA. In the Congressional record, it is stated thát, “evidence received by the committee confirms that many migrant and seasonal agricultural workers remain today, as in the past, the most abused of all workers in the United States.” H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547. The bulk of the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the AWPA’s statutory protections. The specific statutory provisions of the AWPA that are at issue in this civil action are as follows: 1) utilization of an unregistered farm labor contractor [29 U.S.C. §§ 1842, 1802(6) ], 2) failure to provide written disclosures [29 U.S.C. § 1821(a) and (g) ], 3) the use of false and misleading information [29 U.S.C. §§ 1821(f) and 1854], 4) violations of the terms of the working agreement [29 U.S.C. § 1822(c) ], 5) failure to ensure that the housing met applicable health and safety codes [29 U.S.C. § 1823(a), 29 C.F.R. § 1910.142 et seq., 20 C.F.R. § 654.406 et seq., 29 C.F.R. § 500.130 et seg.], 6) failure to secure certification that the housing met the applicable health and safety codes [29 U.S.C. § 1823(b)(1) ], 7) failure to post or to provide a statement of the terms and conditions of housing [29 U.S.C. § 1821(c) ], 8) failure to properly insure and inspect transportation vehicles' [29 U.S.C. § 1841(b)(1), 29 C.F.R.'§§ 500.70(c), 500.100(a) ], 9) failure to ensure that each plaintiff received a proper pay statement [29 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2) ], and 10) “wages owed when due” violations [29 U.S.C. § 1822(a), 29 C.F.R. § 531.35]. In the event of violation of these provisions, the AWPA provides for statutory or actual damages, or equitable relief, at the discretion of the court. 29 U.S.C. § 1854(c). Plaintiffs also allege violations of the minimum wage, and overtime wage, provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. The FLSA establishes a minimum wage, maximum working hours, record keeping and reporting requirements, and child labor prohibitions, as well as a system of civil and criminal penalties for its violation. The remainder of the plaintiffs’ claims, for breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation, are based on state law. PART II: GENERAL APPLICABLE LIABILITY PRINCIPLES The distressing and deplorable conditions allegedly encountered and endured by both groups of plaintiffs upon arriving in Ohio stand largely unrefuted. Often with little more than the $20.00 they were given for food during the three day bus ride -from the Rio Grande Valley, the majority of. the plaintiffs left behind their homes and families in Texas for the promise of suitable work in Ohio. Once there, many of the plaintiffs found themselves sleeping on floors in bare houses or apartments, often with a dozen or more other workers. One young woman described the frightening experience of sleeping in a unfurnished, one-bathroom house with approximately seventeen other people, mostly men. From the stand, she expressed her gratitude to several other male recruits, whom she had met just days before living with them in Ohio, for their willingness to allow her to sleep between them and the- wall for protection. Another plaintiff testified' that he and his sister were forced to sleep outside them apartment on concrete steps to escape the stench of the raw sewage that was seeping into their apartment. Other plaintiffs described their unremitting encounters with cockroaches and rats. With harrowing detail, plaintiffs related the discomfort and dangerousness of traveling to work in an overcrowded van that not only had only! boards laid on cement blocks in lieu ofl seats, but which also was filled with ex-| haust fumes. For the most part, these disturbing and unsettling accounts were uncontested by Case Farms. There can be no doubt that such living and transportation conditions were appalling, and would be, in many contexts, illegal. The plaintiffs’ express challenge in this civil action, however, was to establish Case Farms’ liability for such conditions. That is, before considering each of the many statutory violations alleged by the plaintiffs, an important threshold issue must be resolved. Does the law allow the plaintiffs to recover for their maltreatment from Case Farms? Can the 1996 plaintiffs, recruited and purportedly “employed” by ATC, recover from Case Farms? Can the 1997 plaintiffs, recruited either by Case Farms and/or the Texas Workforce Commission, hold Case Farms liable for the wretched conditions they endured after their arrival in Pennsylvania? I. Case Farms’ Liability as to the 1996 Plaintiffs A. An Agricultural Employer’s Liability Under the AWPA The Joint Employer Doctrine Because a basic tenet of Case Farms’ defense is that its liability as to the 1996 plaintiffs’ claims is limited by the intermediary role of ATC, determining liability in this civil action must begin with the oral contract between Case Farms and ATC.' The oral agreement between Case Farms and ATC was not complicated: Case Farms would pay ATC for each hour of work ATC’s recruits performed in Case Farms’ plant. ATC’s role was simply to recruit and supply workers. It is uncontested that ATC recruited, hired, and paid these plaintiffs. It is also uncontested that Case Farms did not cover the 1996 plaintiffs with a workers’ compensation policy while they worked on Case Farms’ processing line prior to February 1996. [Based on this arrangement, by which ATC employees worked in Case Farms’ processing plant, it is Case Farms’ position that it |eannot be held liable for any violation of he AWPA committed by ATC. In a very real sense, the history of statutory protections for migrant workers in America is a history of Congress’s evolving attempts to prevent agricultural owners and operators from shielding themselves from liability for mistreating employees. By hiring (and thereby shifting liability to) intermediary “independent contractors” to recruit and/or oversee workers, agricultural owners have, at times, sought to create a buffer between themselves and their workers. See, e.g., Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 188 (5th Cir.1983); Charles v. Burton, 857 F.Supp. 1574 (M.D.Ga.1994); Haywood v. Barnes, 109 F.R.D. 568, 585 (E.D.N.C.1986); Marshall v. Presidio Valley Farms, Inc., 512 F.Supp. 1195, 1197 (WD.Tex.1981). In the interests of justice, however, courts have frequently “pierced” this independent contractor “veil” with the invocation of the “joint employer doctrine.” See, e.g., Antenor v. D&S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 929-931 (11th Cir.1996); Brennan v. Correa, 513 F.2d 161, 163 (8th Cir.1975). Almost three decades ago, the Fifth Circuit formalized the joint employer doctrine in Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen, Inc., 471 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.1973), holding, in the context of the FLSA, that “even if the [crew leaders] are independent contractors, this does not, as a matter of law, negate the possibility that [a farmer] may be a joint employer of the .. .workers.” Id. at 237. Hence, “[independent contractor status does not necessarily imply the contractor is solely responsible for his employees. ... Another employer may be jointly responsible for the contractor’s employees.” Id. In making such a determination, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the importance of considering “the circumstances of the whole activity” and the “economic reality” of the situation. Id. Thus, as stated in another Fifth Circuit decision, the “determination of [the nature of an employment relationship] is not circumscribed by formalistic labels or common-law notions of the employment relationship, instead, our analysis must focus upon the totality of the circumstances, underscoring the economic realities of the [workers’] employment.” Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 190, 194 (5th Cir.1983). Today, this potent response to agricultural employers’ attempts to avoid liability for mistreatment’ of migrant workers has been incorporated into the AWPA (via the AWPA’s incorporation of FLSÁ definitions). As stated in the legislative history of the Act, the Congressional purpose in enacting the AWPA was “to reverse the historical pattern of abuse and exploitation of migrant and seasonal farm workers...” which would only be accomplished by “advancing] ... a completely new approach.” H. REP. No. 97-885, at 6, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547. The joint employer doctrine represents precisely such a “completely new approach,” as the AWPA explicitly states that two or more employees may be found liable for violating its provisions. 29 . C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5) (1998). The doctrine is a “central foundation” of the AWPA, and the “indivisible hinge between certain important duties imposed for the protection of migrant and seasonal workers and those liable for any breach of those duties.” H. REP. No. 97-885, at 13, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4552. Under the AWPA regulations, “joint employment means a condition. in which a single individual stands in the relation of an employee to two or more persons at the same time.” 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5) (1998). It is, in fact, the Fifth Circuit’s “Griffin & Brand factors” that are cited as guidelines for determining the existence of a joint employment relationship under the AWPA. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(ii) (1998). In reference to applying the Griffin & Brand formulation, the regulations state:- Congress stated that this formulation should be controlling in situations “where an agricultural employer ... asserts that the agricultural workers in question are the sole employees of an independent contractor/crewleader,” and that the “decision makes clear that even if a farm labor contractor is found to be a bona fide independent contractor, ... this status does not as a matter of law negate the possibility that an agricultural employer may be a joint employer ... of the harvest workers” together with the farm labor contractor. Further, re.garding the joint employer doctrine and the Griffin & Brand formulation, Congress stated that “the absence of evidence on any of the criteria listed does not preclude a finding that an agricultural association or agricultural employer was a joint employer along with the crewleader”, and that “it is expected that the special aspects of agricultural employment be kept in mind” when applying the tests and criteria set forth in the case law- and legislative history. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(ii) (1998). Thus, the AWPA “envisions situations where a single employee may have the necessary employment relationship with not only one employer but simultaneously such a relationship with an employer and an independent contractor.” Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322, 1328 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting Antenor, 88 F.3d at 932 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 7, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4553)). Again, under the AWPA, the specific point in issue is still the “economic reality” of the situation: In determining whether or not an employment relationship exists between the agricultural employer/association and the agricultural worker, the ultimate question to be determined is the economic reality-whether the worker is so economically dependent upon the, agricultural employer/association as to be considered its employee. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(iii) (1998). Case Farms and ATC as Joint Employers As is made clear from these regulations and legislative history, Congress established the structure of its migrant worker protections through the AWPA’s definitions. It is agreed, for the purposes of this civil action, that Case Farms was an “agricultural employer” under ‘the AWPA. It is further agreed that ATC was a “farm labor contractor” under the statute’s definitions. Again, these terms are each given broad definition. In spite of Case Farms’ somewhat unique arrangement, in which it never- actually passed money to the “ATC employees,” the economic reality of the facts at hand clearly reveals Case Farms and ATC to be “joint employers” of the “ATC employees.” Case Farms has apparently stipulated to this designation. Def. Resp. to PL Post-Trial Brf., at 14. Among the factors that make this fact abundantly clear are: (1) Case Farms exercised a high degree of control over the 1996 plaintiffs; (2) the plaintiffs performed a specialty job which was an integral part of Case Farms’ overall ' production process; (3) Case Farms owned and controlled the property and facilities where the 1996 plaintiffs’ work took place; (4) Case Farms had the ability to determine the wage rates or the method of payment of the 1996 plaintiffs; (5) the terms .of employment of the 1996 plaintiffs did not vary in any material way when they were placed on Case Farms’ payroll; (6) the .1996 plaintiffs were not part of a-business organization which shifted as a unit from one workplace to another; and (7) little skill or initiative was required to perform the chicken processing work done by the plaintiffs. The “economic reality” of the ATC/Case Farms relationship is that these workers worked in a Case Farm plant alongside Case Farms workers, were supervised by Case Farms supervisors, and produced Case Farms products. Thus, as acknowledged by Case Farms, ATC and Case Farms were “joint employers” of the 1996 plaintiffs. The Implications of Joint Employer Status The critical issue before this court, therefore, is the joint employer doctrine’s implications, rather than its. definitions. Does the.fact that Case Farms and ATC were joint employers of the 1996 plaintiffs make Case Farms liable for ATC’s violations of the AWPA? While each specific legal claim of the sixteen 1996 plaintiffs will be considered below, several general conclusions about the effects of this joint employer relationship can be made at this point. Case Farms is correct that “[n]owhere in the AWPA is it stated than an agricultural employer is automatically hable for every violation committed by a farm labor contractor.” Def. Post-Trial Brf., at 3. The AWPA does distinguish between areas in which an agricultural employer can be found automatically liable for a farm labor contractor’s action, and those instances in which it cannot. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 500.70(b), (c) & (d) (1998). These regulations do not, however, as Case Farms seems to imply, preclude an agricultural employer’s liability for housing or transportation arranged or provided by a farm labor contractor. On the contrary, these regulations put agricultural employers on notice that they may, in some instances, be held liable for farm labor contractors’ violations of the AWPA. The AWPA holds an agricultural employer automatically liable for the violations committed by a farm labor contractor in relation to wage issues, and the AWPA may, in certain instances, hold an agricultural employer liable for housing and transportation violations committed by a farm labor contractor. See Howard v. Malcolm, 852 F.2d 101, 106 (4th Cir.1988); Rodriguez v. Carlson, 943 F.Supp. 1263, 1267-1268 (E.D.Wash.1996). For example, as to housing related protections, the regulations provide that “[a]ny agricultural employer.. .which has a farm labor contractor operate housing which it owns or controls is responsible, as well as the farm labor contractor, for insuring compli-anee with the housing safety and health provisions of these regulations.” 29 C.F.R. § 500.70(d) (1998). See, e.g. Hernandez v. Ruiz, 812 F.Supp. 734, 735 (S.D.Tex.1993) (holding an agricultural employer liable for housing violations under the AWPA); Adams Fruit Co., Inc., v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 644, 110 S.Ct. 1384, 108 L.Ed.2d 585 (1990) (holding an agricultural employer liable for transportation violations under the AWPA). Thus, although Case Farms has acknowledged its status as a “joint employer” of the 1996 plaintiffs, that stipulation by no means resolves all of the legal claims in this civil action. Regarding certain wage-related provisions of the AWPA, Case Farms’ “joint employer” status may indeed invoke automatic liability for ATC’s alleged illegal actions. For other of the plaintiffs’ claims, however, a “joint employer” may or may not be held liable for the actions of a farm labor contractor. Case Farms’ liability for the several alleged violations of the AWPA by ATC, therefore, will depend both on the objective truth of plaintiffs’ claims that ATC violated the AWPA, and the standards set forth by the specific federal regulation at issue. Consequently, each of the plaintiffs’ claims will be considered individually. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to address another, independent but overlapping, theory of Case Farms’ liability for ATC’s actions. Case Farms, somewhat hyperbolically, argues that the AWPA prohibits the plaintiffs from recovering “against Case Farms for non-wage related AWPA violations unless they prove that Case Farms itself committed the alleged violations.” Def. Post Tr. Brf. at 5. Such a statement overlooks the very foundation, under the common law, for the joint employment doctrine. Under common law agency rules, the actions of an agent may, in certain circumstances, be said to have been committed by the agent’s principal. B. An Agricultural Employer’s Liability Under Common Law Agency Principles The fact that Congress has created a statutory framework of protections for migrant workers in no way exempts agricultural employers, recruiters, and overseers from common law agency principles. Montelongo v. Meese, 803 F.2d 1341, 1349 (5th Cir.1986) (agency principles apply fully under the FLCRA, the predecessor to the AWPA); Escobar v. Baker; 814 F.Supp. 1491, 1503-04 (W.D.Wash.1993), citing Bueno v. Mattner, 829 F.2d 1380, 1384 (6th Cir.1987). Rather, the protections afforded by the AWPA are designed to supplement traditional common law principles. H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 7, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4560. Thus, one theory under which the plaintiffs could prove that Case Farms itself committed the alleged violations would be to demonstrate that the ATC defendants’ misdeeds were committed by ATC within the scope of its role as an agent of Case Farms. ATC’s Agency Plaintiffs’ supplementary theory of Case Farms liability is, therefore, based on traditional, pre-AWPA common Jaw tenets of agency. Plaintiffs argue that an agency relationship existed between ATC and Case Farms, and that the scope of that relationship included both the express authority to recruit and hire people to work at Case Farms’ plant, and the implied authority to do all things proper, usual, and necessary to exercise that authority. Case Farms responds that to the extent any agency relationship existed between ATC and Case Farms, the scope of that agency was limited solely to informing recruits about the availability of work in Ohio at Case Farms’ processing plant. The fundamental precepts of the law of agency are well settled. At common law, a principal may be held liable for the acts of its purported agent based on an actual agency relationship created by the principal’s express or implied delegation of authority to the agent. Wells Fargo Business v. Ben Kozloff, Inc., 695 F.2d 940, 944-45 (5th Cir.1983); Esso Intern., Inc. v. S.S. Captain John, 443 F.2d 1144, 1146 (5th Cir.1971). Both forms of agency are at issue here. Express actual authority exists “where the principal has made'it clear to the agent that he [or she] wants the act under scrutiny to be done.” Pasant v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 52 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir.1995). Further, giving an agent express authority to undertake a certain act also-includes the implied authority to do all things proper, usual, and necessary to exercise that express authority. Sheet Metal Workers Local Union 54 v. E.F. Etie Sheet Metal Co., 1 F.3d 1464, 1471 (5th Cir.1993); Mechanical Wholesale, Inc. v. Universal-Bundle Corp., 432 F.2d 228, 230-31 (5th Cir.1970) (“An agent has apparent or implied authority to do those things which are usual and proper to conduct business which he is employed to conduct.”) Applying these . principles, the plaintiffs assert that the scope of the agency relationship between Case Farms and ATC expressly authorized ATC to recruit and hire people to work at Case Farms’ Ohio plant. Such a contention is certainly well-supported by. the evidence. Former Case Farms’ Director of Corporate Development, Andy Cilona, among others, testified that “the arrangement with ATC was for it to hire workers for Case Farms’ production.” Cilona Examination Tr. at 27-28; see Trial Tr. at 579, 598. Based on Case Farms’ explicit agreement with ATC, it is found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such an express agency relationship, the scope of which included recruiting and hiring migrant workers to perform jobs at Case Farms’ plant, did exist between Case Farms and ATC. A principal is liable for the actions of an agent only if those actions are taken in the scope of the agent’s employment. See, Entente Mineral Co., v. Parker, 956 F.2d 524, 526 (5th Cir.1992); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958). While Case Farms acknowledges that ATC was expressly authorized to recruit and hire workers for its plant, the chicken processing company maintains that the scope of that relationship was extremely narrow, and that the vagueness of the plaintiffs’ claim that ATC was Case Farms’ agent glosses over the exact nature of the relationship between ATC and Case Farms. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that the scope of ATC’s express authority to recruit and hire people to work at Case Farms’ plant included the implied authority to do all things proper, usual, and necessary to exercise that authority. See, Wells Fargo Business Credit v. Ben Kozloff, Inc., 695 F.2d 940, 945 (5th Cir.1983). A preponderance of the evidence supports the plaintiffs’ contention. Credible evidence, adduced at trial, reveals that housing and transportation issues were well within the class of activities proper, usual, and necessary to recruit and hire workers for Case Farms’ Ohio processing plant. It is uncontested that the combination of its high turnover rate, and relative isolation from metropolitan areas, complicates Case Farms’ recruitment process. For Case Farms, recruitment was, at all relevant times, an on-going, virtually nation-wide undertaking. The very fact that this Ohio chicken processing plant was recruiting workers in Florida and Texas attests to the difficulties it faces finding workers. Furthermore, once the workers arrived in Ohio, it was difficult for workers to find housing on their own because of language barriers, lack of personal transportation, and their unfamiliarity with the area. So, it was essential to the success of Case Farms’ hiring practices to assist out-of-state workers with housing. Cilona Examination Tr. at 15-18, 21-22. Case Farms, before any relationship with ATC, actually did assist incoming workers with housing and transportation in Ohio. Cilona Ex. Tr. at 28. Furthermore, it was clear from the evidence adduced at trial that Case Farms meant for ATC to perform these duties. Trial Tr. at 598; Cilona Ex. Tr. at 28. Thus, it is found that Case Farms knew that these duties were proper, usual, and necessary in order to recruit and retain a workforce primarily migrating from out-of-state. Case Farms points out, and places much weight on the fact, that its representatives Cilona and Kohli both testified that ATC was not authorized to hire workers and make them full fledged “Case Farms” employees. Def. Resp. to PI. Post-Trial Brf. at 3. Rather, under the arrangement with ATC, the workers would supposedly remain “ATC employees,” despite the fact that they worked in the Case Farms plant, doing the same work, at the same rate of pay, under the supervision of the same supervisors, as Case Farms workers. Whether or not a plaintiff would become a “full-fledged” Case Farms employee, however, cannot be dispositive of the agency issue at hand. At issue in this civil action is precisely the question of whether superficial differences (such as which corn-parly’s name appeared on a plaintiffs pay stub) somehow immunize the company that owns and operates the plant from liability. Given the fact that housing and transportation were necessary components of Case Farms’ recruitment process, ATC’s actions in those arenas were within the scope of its relationship as an agent of Case Farms. For the foregoing reasons, it is found that the ATC defendants were clearly acting as Case Farms’ agent in all of their actions relating to the recruitment and hiring of workers for Case Farms’ chicken processing plant in Winesburg, Ohio. And, under the AWPA, recruitment by an agricultural employer includes recruitment through an agent. H.R. RPT. No. 97-885, at 14, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4560; Bueno, 829 F.2d 1380; Montelongo, 803 F.2d 1341. Hence, ATC’s interactions with the 1996 plaintiffs may be attributed to Case Farms for the purpose of assessing compliance with AWPA. Hernandez’s Agency Another threshold issue, that should be resolved before the individual legal claims are considered, is whether Case Farms may be held responsible for the actions of Alvaro Hernandez. The evidence shows that Case Farms’ own employee, Alvaro Hernandez, who also apparently worked for ATC, had express and implied authority to assist ATC workers with housing and transportation. Alvaro Hernandez was a line leader supervisor at the Case Farms’ plant. ATC provided recruits with Hernandez’s phone number and instructed them to call him upon their arrival in Ohio. As an example of his role at the plant, credible evidence was presented that Alvaro Hernandez took plaintiffs Martin Hernandez and his sister, Esperanza Hernandez, to the plant on their first day of work, issued them their supplies, showed them how to punch in their time cards, and showed them where they would be working. Trial Tr. at 33-35. Alvaro Hernandez also assisted those two plaintiffs with obtaining a shift change, and with receiving their pay in cash. Similarly, Case Farms employee Alvaro Hernandez took an. active and prominent role in situating plaintiff (and “ATC employee”) Michelle Galvan upon her arrival in Ohio. Galvan first spoke with a Case Farms employee named “Shelly.” Trial Tr. at 115-116. When Hernandez arrived at the plant, he told Galvan that he would take Galvan and her companions to a trailer, but that it had no electricity. Trial Tr. at 117. Galvan told Hernandez that she and the others preferred to stay at the plant rather than be put in a place without heat or electricity. Trial Tr. at 117. Hernandez responded that he had another house. Trial Tr. at 119. Galvan understood from Hernandez that the housing he put her in was temporary and that he would find another house for her and the other women, but he never did. Trial Tr. at 121. Galvan also testified that she understood from Hernandez that the van in which he drove her and others to and from work belonged to Case Farms. Trial Tr. at 135, 137. Galvan complained repeatedly to several Case Farms supervisors about the housing and the rides to work. Trial Tr. at 138-39. On at least one occasion, Case Farms’ Human Resources Director, Andy Cilona, told her to speak to Hernandez about the problem. Trial Tr. at 139. These facts indicate that Alvaro Hernandez was working as an agent of Case Farms. As it did in with respect to ATC’s role, Case Farms contends that the scope of Alvaro Hernandez’s role was too limited to establish his role as an agent regarding these actions. Case Farms points to Cilo-na’s testimony that Hernandez’s job duties as a Case Farms employee did not include assisting ATC’s employees outside the workplace. Case Farms’s contention that “Mr. Cilona’s testimony that any actions taken by Mr. Hernandez with respect to ATC’s employees were not authorized by Case Farms, or within the scope of Mr. Hernandez’s job duties at Case Farms remains unchallenged.” Def. Resp. to PL PosL-Trial Brf. at 23. Alvaro Hernandez did assist workers in finding housing for Case Farms, however. What activities were ultimately within the scope of that agency relationship, is a question for the court, not for Cilona. For the purposes of determining his status as an agent of Case Farms, it is necessary to examine the actual instances of instruction from his supervisors and actual actions taken by Hernandez, rather than his theoretical job description. The fact that an agent’s action, directed and approved by a principal, is not included in the agent’s descriptive job summary does not immunize the principal from liability. The alleged agent’s actual conduct, rather than his official descriptive duties, can establish liability of a principal for its agent’s actions. From his actions, it is determined that Alvaro Hernandez was, in fact, working as an agent of Case Farms, along with agent ATC. Furthermore, Case Farms’ proposition that Hernandez’s daily transportation of ATC employees to and from work was performed as an ATC employee, not a Case Farms employee, begs the question of Hernandez’s apparent authority to act on Case Farms’ behalf. Whether he was working for ATC (an agent of Case Farms) or for Case Farms, his actions can, under common law agency principles, be attributed to Case Farms. Based on the totality of the credible evidence adduced at trial, it is determined that Alvaro Hernandez was acting under the authorization and direction of Case Farms’ employees, and that the functions he carried out with respect to the 1996 plaintiffs were done in his capacity as a Case Farms employee; thus, he was, perforce, an agent of Case Farms. In those instances where Hernandez may have acted on his own behalf for ATC, he would still be an agent of Case Farms via ATC. Case Farms may, therefore, be held responsible for Hernandez’s housing and transportation activities in relation to the 1996 plaintiffs. C. Case Farms’ Liability for the Actions of ATC and Alvaro Hernandez It is against the background of these general principles of liability that the many claims brought by the 1996 plaintiffs in this civil action will be considered. The AWPA makes clear that Case Farms, as an agricultural employer and a joint employer of the 1996 plaintiffs, may be held liable for the actions, in certain instances, of its “farm labor contractor,” ATC. At the same time, ATC’s actions, under common law precepts of agency, can be attributed directly to Case Farms for the purpose of assessing compliance with the AWPA. The combined effect of the AWPA’s statutory worker protections, and these common law principles, is that “[defendants cannot escape liability under the Act, by arguing that they never explicitly authorized others to perform farm labor contracting activities [ie., recruiting, housing, and transporting] on their behalf when they accepted the benefit of migrant labor brought to their farm by other workers,” Bueno, 829 F.2d 1380, 1384, and when such activities were necessary components of ATC’s agency. II. Case Farms’ Liability as to the 1997 Plaintiffs The 1997 plaintiffs were recruited, generally speaking, by Case Farms’ employee Andy Cilona. Given the absence of an intermediary (like ATC) in the recruitment of these plaintiffs, the issues of Case Farms’ potential liability for AWPA violations is much more straightforward. Case Farms accepts responsibility for the actions of its agent Andy Cilona; The battleground for the 1997 plaintiffs, therefore, is largely factual, and will be addressed in the context of each legal claim brought by this group of plaintiffs. PART III: ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE AWPA The two sets of plaintiffs have brought three types of legal claims. The first, and most extensive, involves alleged violations of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq. This statute establishes wide-ranging protections and remedies for migrant and seasonal workers through its regulation of, and requirements for, agricultural employers and farm labor contractors. Plaintiffs have brought claims under ten separate provisions of the AWPA. I. Unregistered Farm Labor Contractors: Alleged Violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1842 A. The Law One of the central functions-of the AWPA is its creation and implementation of a registration system for entities that recruit workers covered under the Act. The AWPA prohibits an employer’s utilization of the services of a farm labor contractor to supply any migrant or seasonal agricultural worker without first taking reasonable steps to determine that the farm labor contractor possesses a certificate of registration which is valid, and which authorizes the activity for which the contractor is utilized. 29 U.S.C. § 1842. The purpose of this provision is to make the employer who uses a farm labor contractor (and not just the contractor) liable for guaranteeing the contractor’s compliance with the housing and transportation safety protections of the AWPA. See Charles, 169 F.3d at 1328; Howard v. Malcolm, 852 F.2d 101 (4th Cir.1988). As mentioned above, Case Farms has stipulated that ATC qualifies as a “farm labor contractor” under the AWPA. It is undisputed that ATC recruited, hired, employed, and furnished the 1996 plaintiffs and other migrant workers, for work at Case Farms. Uncon. Facts ¶ 36. Furthermore, the evidence adduced at ■ trial reveals that Case Farms utilized ATC for the specific purposes of recruiting, soliciting, hiring, employing, and furnishing workers. These are all “farm labor contracting activities” as defined by the AWPA. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(6). Case Farms clearly provided ATC valuable consideration, in the form of $8.00 per hour of work performed by each worker, in return for its services. Case Farms also does not dispute that ATC was not registered with the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) as a farm labor contractor. Nor was ATC authorized by DOL to house or transport workers. See Trial Exh. P-47. In most Instances, compliance with this threshold requirement will ensure an agricultural employer’s conformity with the AWPA generally. It is clear that if Case Farms had taken any steps to verify ATC’s registration or authorization to house or transport workers, this civil action would probably not have been filed. The harms allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs in this civil action stem from precisely the types of mistreatment that the AWPA’s registration requirements are designed to prevent. B. The 1996 Plaintiffs Case Farms concedes that it did not determine whether ATC possessed a valid certificate of registration. Plaintiffs Eloy Cantu-, Gerardo Castillo, Edna Mae Chong, Efrain Leal, Rafael Gonzalez, Sergio Hernandez, Jose Estrada, Martin Hernandez, Esperanza Hernandez, Joseph Cooper, Hugo Hernandez, Jesus Mejia, Guadalupe Zamorano. Ricard Zamorano, Raul Zava-la, and Michelle Galvan, therefore, have established a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a). These plaintiffs’ entitlement to damages for these violations will be considered, infra, Part III, Section XI. C. The 1997 Plaintiffs ATC’s registration is not at issue in regards to the 1997 plaintiffs. Because none of the 1997 plaintiffs were recruited by ATC, they have no valid claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1842. II. Written Disclosures: Alleged Violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a) A. The Law As part of its overarching purpose of assuring “necessary protections for migrant and seasonal workers,” 29 U.S.C. § 1801, the AWPA dictates what information each agricultural employer must ascertain, and disclose in writing, to migrant workers at the time of recruitment. 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a). Contreras v. Mt. Adams Orchard Corp., 744 F.Supp. 1007 (E.D.Wash.1990); Rodriguez v. Jackson, 1988 WL 150697, 110 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 35,137 (D.Ariz.1988); Escobar, 814 F.Supp. at 1503. The AWPA also demands that such written disclosures be provided in a language commonly understood by the migrant agricultural workers. 29 U.S.C. § 1821(g). In this civil action, many of the plaintiff migrant workers speak only Spanish. Although the particular shortcomings of Case Farms’ disclosures to each particular plaintiff, if any, must be culled independently from the evidence before this court, the plaintiffs allege, generally, that Case Farms, at times through its agent ATC, failed to comply with this provision of the AWPA by neglecting to provide the plaintiffs with various legally-mandated written disclosures. Case Farms’ response to this allegation is, first, that many of the plaintiffs did not establish that they failed to receive written disclosures, and, second, that such disclosures were, in this instance, as to the 1996 plaintiffs, the responsibility of ATC, not of Case Farms. B. The 1996 Plaintiffs Case Farms contends that even if the 1996 plaintiffs had produced evidence that they did not receive the required written disclosures, Case Farms would not be hable under the AWPA, because 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a) refers only to entities that “recruit” workers (such as ATC), not to all entities that employ those workers (such as Case Farms).' Such an argument fails, however, for two reasons. First, as has already been' detailed, in its. recruitment and hiring of the plaintiffs in this civil action, ATC was acting within the scope of its duties as an agent of Case Farms. In effect, this agency relationship erases the superficial, if not wholly artificial, delineation between Case Farms and ATC that is repeatedly urged by the defendant. Second, although the term “recruit” is not defined by the AWPA, its meaning was clearly meant to be expansive. The meaning of the term “recruits,”= according to the AWPA’s legislative history, “runs the spectrum from the actual pre-employment discussions between the recruiter and the migrant worker to the filing of job orders with the interstate recruitment system established by the Wagner-Peyser Act.” H.R. REP. No. 97-885 at 13, reprinted in. 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4559. “Recruit,” simply and directly stated, means “to hire or otherwise obtain or secure the services of... and include[s] all pre-em-ployment discussions that relate to a worker’s employment.” Contreras, 744 F.Supp. 1007. “Recruit” also includes indirect recruitment in the form. of word-of mouth recruitment through other - workers. Flores v. Rios, 36 F.3d 507, 514-15 (6th Cir.1994); Rodriguez v. Jackson, 1988 WL 150697, 110 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 35, 137 (D.Ariz.1988). The AWPA intended agricultural employers to be liable for acts of recruiting when Using a third party or intermediary, since recruitment by an agricultural employer also includes recruitment by an agent. 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4560; Montelongo, 803 F.2d 1341; Soliz, 615 F.2d at 276. Under even a relatively narrow definition of “recruit,” ATC was involved in the recruitment of workers under 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a). ATC caused radio advertisements to be broadcast inviting interested individuals to information sessions at a hotel. ATC explained the job opportunities to the 1996 plaintiffs, and, in many instances, put them on a bus to Ohio. It is beyond contention that ATC recruited the 1996 plaintiffs. Thus, based on the fact that ATC’s actions to recruit and hire workers are, under the common law, attributable to Case Farms, it is determined that, as a matter of law, Case Farms “recruited” the 1996 Plaintiffs. “The duty [to provide written disclosures], while contingent on the activity of the recruitment, is not exclusive to one entity in the chain between the agricultural worker and the ultimate employer, although each entity need not independently provide such information.” 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4560. Case Farms can, therefore, be held liable for violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a), if a plaintiff meets his or her burden of proof. Case Farms also contends that the plaintiffs have not, as a factual matter, met their burdens of proof, alleging that only two of the 1996 Plaintiffs, Rafael Gonzalez and Joseph Cooper, “testified that they were not provided' with a written disclosure form by ATC in Texas.” Def. Post-Tr. Brf. at 12. This statement, by itself, is misleading. Although not all of the 1996 plaintiffs testified that they did not receive the required disclosures, many of them did testify that the documents they were given were limited to a pamphlet showing a map and phone number. A document substantially similar, if not repheating, this pamphlet was admitted into evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit l. Uncontroverted evidence that a plaintiff received only a non-compliant document easily meets the plaintiffs burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she did not receive the mandated information. Hence, the following findings of fact and conclusions of law are warranted: Eloy Cantu. Plaintiff Cantu, via his depositions, testified that the only papers he received when he was recruited was a paper with á Florida telephone number on it. Cantu Dep. at 10-11. Case Farms presented no evidence to the contrary. It is found, therefore, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Case Farms failed to provide Cantu with the written disclosures required by AWPA, under 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a). Gerardo Castillo and Efrain Leal. When they were recruited, plaintiffs Castillo and Leal were provided only a document that was very similar to Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 mentioned above. Castillo Dep. at 26. It is found, therefore, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Case Farms failed to provide Castillo and Leal with the written disclosures required by the AWPA, as provided by 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a). Edna Mae Chong (representing the estate of Josephine Tijerina) and Michelle Galvan. Plaintiff Galvan provided uncontested testimony that the only written document she and Tijerina received at the time they were recruited to work for Case Farms was a document similar to Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. Trial Tr. at 111. It is found by a preponderance of the evidence, that Case Farms failed to provide Tijerina and Galvan with the written disclosures required by AWPA, under 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a). Rafael Gonzalez. This plaintiff testified by deposition that when he was recruited to work in Ohio, he did not receive any papers. R. Gonzalez Dep. at 11, 16-17. Defendant Case Farms did not contest this testimony. It is found by a preponderance of the evidence that Case Farms failed to provide Gonzalez with the written disclosures required by AWPA, under 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a). Sergio Hernandez. Plaintiff Hernandez testified that he received only one piece of paper when he was recruited in McAllen, Texas, to work for Case Farms. S. Hernandez Dep. at 12-13. Although this plaintiffs testimony is lacking in detail, the plaintiff asks this court to infer that this paper was similar to Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. Case Farms argues that such an inference would be “rank speculation,” and that if this plaintiff had not received the required disclosures, he could have included that in his testimony. In the context of the whole of the many plaintiffs’ evidence before the court, it is certainly more likely than not that this one page document was the same one-page, non-compliant flyer that each of the other plaintiffs received. The fact that the merit of each plaintiffs individual claims must be considered separately does not mean that each plaintiffs testimony must be viewed in isolation. It is found by a preponderance of the evidence, that Case Farms failed to provide Hernandez with the written disclosures required by 29 U.S.C. § 1821. Jose Estrada. This plaintiff testified by deposition that when he was recruited to work in Ohio, he did not receive any papers. There was no evidence to the contrary. Estrada Dep. at 11. It is found by a preponderance of the evidence, that Case Farms failed to provide Estrada with the written disclosures required by AWPA, 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a). Martin Hernandez and Esperanza Hernandez. Plaintiff Hernandez testified as to his experience, and that of his sister, Esperanza Hernandez. He testified that the only document he received when he was recruited was that represented by Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. Trial Tr. at 18-19. It is found by a preponderance of the evidence, that Case Farms failed to provide Martin Hernandez and Esperanza Hernandez with the written disclosures required by 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a). Joseph Cooper. Plaintiff Cooper also testified that he received only a docu-mént like the “Amish Country” flyer entered as Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. Case Farms did not contest this testimony. It is found by a preponderance of the evidence, that Case Farms failed to provide Cooper with the written disclosures required by AWPA. Guadalupe Zamorano, Ricardo Za-morano, Hugo Hernandez, and Raul Zavala. Plaintiff Guadalupe Zamorano testified that the only document he received was a map with Alvaro’s name on it, and that he was not provided with any written information about work. G. Zamorano Aff. ¶ 2; G. Zamorano Dep. at 23. Guadalupe Zamorano also testified that he, Hugo Hernandez, Ricardo Za-morano, and Raul Zavala were recruited together, and that the only documentation they received was that which is represented by Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. Defendant’s claim that Guadalupe Zamora-no’s testimony is unclear as to who was in the room is found to be without merit. Ricard Zamorano clearly used the phrase “all of us” to refer to this group of plaintiffs. R. Zamorano at 23. The combination of the testimony of witnesses and circumstantial evidence illustrates to the court’s satisfaction that these plaintiffs received the same, non-AWPA-compliant flyer. It is found by a preponderance of the evidence, that Case Farms failed to provide Guadalupe Zamorano, Ricard Zamorano, Hernandez and Zavala and with the written disclosures required by AWPA, under 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a). Jesus Mejia. Case Farms did not dispute Mejia’s testimony that when he was recruited in McAllen, Texas, to work in Ohio, he was not shown or given any written documents. It is found by a preponderance of the evidence, that Case Farms failed to provide Mejia with the written disclosures required by AWPA under 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a). C. The 1997 Plaintiffs The 1997 plaintiffs’ claims that Case Farms violated 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a) are complicated by the fact that not all of this group were recruited in the same manner. Case Farms has presented general defenses to the 1997 plaintiffs’ allegations regarding 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a) by grouping the plaintiffs according to how they were recruited. For example, two plaintiffs, Aurora Navarro and Urbana Zavala, went directly to Case Farms from another workplace in Ohio. A. Navarro Dep. at 15-16; U. Zavala Dep. at 36-38. Case Farms maintains that these plaintiffs were not recruited, “in any sense of the word, by anybody,” and that they “both admittedly never spoke to neither Cilona nor Garcia regarding work at Case Farms.” Def. Post-Trial Brf. at 15. This proposition is not, however, supported by the evidence. Both of these plaintiffs did speak to Cilona prior to their employment with Case Farms. Zavala Aff. ¶ 3. Furthermore, as has been discussed previously, the legislative history of the AWPA indicates that recruitment covers a broad range of times and activities. Recruitment can certainly occur en route to another job. See 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4560. According to the uncontested testimony of Urbana Zavala, she and Aurora Navarro were told by Cilona about housing and transportation arrangements at Case Farms while in the car with Cilona after he picked them up in Chillieothe, Ohio. Zavala Aff. ¶ 3. Case Farms correctly contends, however, that the evidence indicates that both Aurora Navarro and Urbana Zavala “had made the decision to become employed at Case Farms without ever having met either Mr. Garcia or Mr. Cilona.” Def. Post-Trial Brf. at 15. The question before this court, therefore, is whether the AWPA disclosure requirements apply when the worker decides, independently of any action on the part of the agricultural employer, on his or her own to come work for that employer. In light of the intended broad definition of “recruit” under the AWPA discussed earlier, “recruit” should not be limited to a meaning that includes changing a worker’s mind. Rather, “to recruit” should be given its dictionary meaning of “to secure the services of-” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 959 (1979). Similar to the facts in Bueno, both Aurora Navarro and Urbana Zavala personally talked to Cilona before their services were secured, and, therefore, Case Farms was “required to disclose the information listed in section 1821(a).” Bueno, 633 F.Supp. at 1466. As provided for by the AWPA, a “potential employee needs information concerning the terms and conditions of employment to make an informed judgment concerning the desirability of the employment opportunity.” Id. Plaintiffs Aurora Navarro and Urbana Zavala were, therefore, recruited for the purposes of the AWPA. The following findings are warranted: Urbana Zavala and Aurora Navarro. Plaintiff Zavala