Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AMY BERMAN JACKSON, District Judge. Plaintiff David Jack Barouch brings this action under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). Plaintiffs complaint challenges the responses to written requests that he made to defendants, the Criminal Division (“CRM”) of the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”), the Executive Office for United States Attorneys (“EOU-SA”), the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”), and the Department of Treasury (“Treasury”). In each of his requests, plaintiff sought all records related to himself. All of the defendant agencies except for Treasury responded to plaintiffs requests by conducting searches. Many have disclosed some responsive records, and all have provided reasons for withholding at least some information. Defendants have filed two partial motions for summary judgment and dismissal, which together seek to dispose of this action in its entirety. Fed. Defs.’ Partial Mot. for Summ. J. and Dismissal [Dkt. # 15] (“Defs.’ 1st Mot.”); Fed. Defs.’ Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. and Dismissal [Dkt. #22] (“Defs.’ 2d Mot.”). Plaintiff opposes both motions, challenging the adequacy of the agencies’ searches and their withholdings. Resp. and Objection to Fed. Defs.’ Partial Mot. for Summ. J. and Dismissal [Dkt. # 16] (“Pl.’s 1st Resp.”); PL’s Verified Mem. Resp. to Fed. Defs.’ Supplemental Mot. for Summ. J. and Dismissal [Dkt. #25] (“PL’s 2d Resp.”). Plaintiff also challenges Treasury’s failure to undertake a search. The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to some of his claims. As to the others, the Court finds, based on affidavits and Vaughn indices submitted by the government, that the agencies conducted adequate searches for responsive documents, but they have not provided adequate explanations for all of their with-holdings. Accordingly, the Court will grant in part and deny in part defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The Court will direct EOUSA to disclose parts of four documents that it has withheld in full and will remand to BOP to review the documents it received from EOUSA after the commencement of this action. BACKGROUND Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Seagoville Federal Correctional Institution in Seagoville, Texas. PL’s 1st Compl. [Dkt. # 1] (“Compl.”) ¶ 1. In July 2010, he pled guilty to one count of possession of an unregistered destructive device, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d), and 5871. Minute Order, United States v. David Barouch, No. 4:10-CR00099-A(01) (N.D.Tex. July 9, 2010) [Dkt. #27]. In November 2010, he was sentenced in the United States District Court for the District of Northern Texas to 120 months in prison. Judgment, United States v. David Barouch, No. 4:10-CR-00099-A(01) (N.D.Tex. Nov. 1, 2010) [Dkt. # 41]. By letters dated April and May 2011, plaintiff submitted written requests to CRM, USMS, EOUSA, BOP, and ATF. Ex. 1 to Decl. of John E. Cunningham III (“Cunningham Deck”) [Dkt. # 15-3] at l(CRM); Attach. 2 to Decl. of Violet Mack (“Mack Decl.”) [Dkt. #22-1] at l(BOP); Ex. A to Decl. of David Luczynski (“Luczynski Decl.”) [Dkt. #22-2] at 1 (EOU-SA); Ex. A to Decl. of Stephanie M. Boucher (“1st Boucher Decl.”) [Dkt. # 22-3] at 1(ATF); Ex. A to Decl. of William E. Bordley (“Bordley Decl.”) [Dkt. # 22-4] at 1 (USMS). All of the documents sought “full disclosure and release of all files, records, data and/or information maintained by” each agency under plaintiffs name. Id. His request included his birth-date, place of birth, social security number, case numbers for his conviction and appeal, and the district in which he was convicted. Id. In addition, plaintiff maintains that he submitted an identical FOIA request to Treasury. Compl. ¶ 12; see also Aff. of Jack Barouch (“Barouch Aff.”), Ex. A to [Dkt. # 16], ¶ 1. I. Request to Treasury Plaintiff claims that Treasury possesses but has withheld documents responsive to his request. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 22, 25. Defendants claim that Treasury never received a request from plaintiff. Mem. in Support of Fed. Defs.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. and Dismissal [Dkt. # 15-2] (“Defs.’ 1st Mem.”) at 4. In support of this contention, Treasury has submitted a declaration from Hugh Gilmore, a supervisory program analyst in Disclosure Services, part of Treasury’s Departmental Offices, which oversees FOIA compliance for the bureaus of Treasury except for the Internal Revenue Service. Declaration of Hugh Gilmore [Dkt. #15-4] (“Gilmore Decl.”) ¶2. He states that Treasury has conducted a search of its FOIA tracking system to find any requests submitted under plaintiffs name, but none were located. Id. ¶ 5. The declaration also notes that although plaintiff alleges that ATF is an agency within Treasury, ATF became part of DOJ in 2003. Id. ¶¶ 6-7; see also Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 2135; Compl. ¶¶5, 6, 22, 25 (referring to ATF as a division of Treasury). II. Request to CRM CRM acknowledged receipt of plaintiffs request by letter dated May 6, 2011. Cunningham Decl. ¶ 4; see also Ex. 1 to Cunningham Decl. On May 23, 2011, it responded to the request. Cunningham Decl. ¶ 7; Ex. 2 to Cunningham Decl. The response directed plaintiff to send another letter to CRM indicating which section of the agency he wanted to be searched, and specifying the location and dates of his conviction, arrests, and the federal offenses, and any other applicable time-frames involved. Ex. 2 to Cunningham Decl. By letter dated June 6, 2011, plaintiff asked that CRM search the “FOIA/PA Unit,” and he responded to CRM’s other requests. Cunningham Decl. ¶ 8; Ex. 3 to Cunningham Decl. On July 6, 2011, CRM sent plaintiff a letter informing him that no responsive documents had been found. Cunningham Decl. ¶ 11; Ex. 5 to Cunningham Decl. The letter also explained plaintiffs right to appeal CRM’s determination to DOJ’s Office of Information Policy (“OIP”). Ex. 5 to Cunningham Decl. On July 12, 2011, plaintiff sent a letter to OIP appealing CRM’s decision. Cunningham Decl. ¶ 13; Ex. 6 to Cunningham Decl. OIP confirmed receipt of plaintiffs appeal by letter dated July 27, 2011, and informed plaintiff by letter dated October 11, 2011 that it had determined that CRM’s search was adequate. Cunningham Decl. ¶¶ 14-15; Exs. 7-8 to Cunningham Decl. On April 3, 2012, after plaintiff had filed the instant lawsuit, CRM received one potentially responsive document from EOU-SA because EOUSA had determined that the document originated with CRM. Cunningham Decl. ¶ 17; Exs. 9-10 to Cunningham Decl. The document was a July 15, 2005, memorandum (“Richter Memorandum”) from Acting Assistant Attorney General of CRM, John C. Richter, concerning “[c]harging under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) where the underlying crime of violence is the possession of the same weapon.” Cunningham Decl. ¶ 19 (internal quotation marks omitted); Ex. 11 to Cunningham Decl. On April 18, CRM informed plaintiff by letter that it was withholding the document in part pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), which permits agencies to withhold from production inter- or intraagency documents that would not be available in litigation. Cunningham Decl. ¶ 19; Ex. 11 to Cunningham Decl. This letter also informed plaintiff that he could appeal the decision to OIP.Ex. 11 to Cunningham Decl. III. Request to USMS On May 17, 2011, USMS’s Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) received plaintiffs request. Bordley Decl. ¶ 2; Ex. A to Bordley Decl. By letter dated May 20, OGC acknowledged receipt of plaintiffs letter and informed him that the office had begun its search. Bordley Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. B to Bordley Decl. According to William E. Bordley, who is the Associate General Counsel and Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Officer for USMS, OGC searched the Prisoner Processing and Population Management/Prisoner Tracking System (PPM/PTS), JUSTICE/USM-005 and the Warrant Information Network (WIN), JUSTICE/USM-007. Bordley Decl. ¶¶ 1, 5. These resources comprise the electronic and paper records concerning USMS prisoners and others investigated by USMS pursuant to an arrest warrant or other judicial process. Id. ¶ 5. Following a search of these records, OGC identified 28 pages of material indexed to plaintiffs name, located in the Northern District of Texas — the relevant location identified by plaintiff in his request. Id.; Ex. A to Bordley Decl. By letter dated June 21, 2011, OGC informed plaintiff that it was releasing twenty-eight pages of documents to him. Bordley Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. C to Bordley Decl. Of these pages, fifteen were released in their entirety, and thirteen were released with redactions pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (“Exemption (b)(7)(C)”) and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (“Exemption (b)(7)(E)”). Bordley Decl. ¶ 6; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) (2012). The letter also informed plaintiff that he could appeal USMS’s determination to OIP.Ex. C to Bordley Decl. Plaintiff filed an appeal by letter dated July 1, 2011. Bordley Decl. ¶ 7; Ex. D to Bordley Decl. By letter dated September 21, 2011, OIP informed plaintiff that it was affirming the decision. Ex. E to Bordley Decl. USMS’s Vaughn index describes the information withheld and lists the basis for the withholdings. Bordley Decl. ¶¶ 11-12. USMS relied on Exemption (b)(7)(C) to withhold information from twelve pages of the responsive documents. Id. ¶ 12. In each instance, it was invoked to excise the name, address, prison identification number, and/or registration number of third parties, government employees, law enforcement officers, USMS employees and/or other prisoners. Id. USMS also withheld the secure website address from one page also pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). Id. IV. Request to ATF According to a declaration by the Chief of ATF’s Disclosure Division, Stephanie M. Boucher, the agency received a letter from plaintiff on August 1, 2011, that was dated July 20, 2011. 1st Boucher Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3. The letter indicated that plaintiff had filed a formal FOIA request more than thirty days prior but had not received a response. Ex. A to 1st Boucher Decl. Enclosed along with the letter was a copy of a request written by plaintiff under FOIA and the Privacy Act, dated April 26, 2011, as well as two attachments to the request. Id. The first attachment is a document stating that the request includes investigative records in the possession of the Colleybille [sic], Keller, and Fort Worth Police Departments, which — according to the attachment — operated as sub-agents for ATF in plaintiffs criminal case. Id. The second attachment is a document stating that the request includes (1) a microcassette recording of an October 2010 interview of plaintiff by ATF Agent Riddle with plaintiffs then-counsel Mic Mickelson, (2) a tape recording of a November 2010 interview with an inmate that was conducted by ATF Agent Riddle and an unnamed Texas Ranger, and was attended by plaintiff, and (3) a videotape recording of plaintiff purchasing two salad bowls from Bed, Bath, and Beyond in roughly April or May of 2010. Id. By letter dated August 2, 2011, ATF responded to plaintiff to inform him that ATF had received and would process his FOIA request dated August 1, but that it had not previously received a request from him. 1st Boucher Decl. II4; Ex. B to 1st Boucher Decl. According to the Boucher declaration, the Disclosure Division concluded that release of the records sought could reasonably be expected to interfere with ongoing law enforcement proceedings. 1st Boucher Decl. ¶ 5. Accordingly, by letter of August 3, 2011, ATF denied plaintiffs request pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (“Exemption (b)(7)(A)”). 1st Boucher Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. C to 1st Boucher Deck; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2012). The denial left open the option for ATF to invoke additional exemptions to support withholdings in the future. 1st Boucher Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. C to 1st Boucher Decl. The letter also informed plaintiff that he could appeal the denial to OIP. 1st Boucher Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. C to 1st Boucher Decl. After August 3, 2011, ATF notified plaintiff of that because his appeal from his criminal case had concluded, the agency intended to release documents that had been previously withheld. Decl. of Stephanie M. Boucher [Dkt. # 26-1] ¶ 3. According to Boucher, her staff contacted OIP after plaintiff filed the complaint in the instant case to determine whether plaintiff had filed an administrative appeal of ATF’s actions. 1st Boucher Decl. ¶8. OIP informed Boucher’s staff that it had no records of an appeal from plaintiff. Id. In addition, on April 10, 2012, ATF received potentially responsive documents from EOUSA because EOUSA had determined that the documents originated with ATF. 1st Boucher Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. D to 1st Boucher Decl. By letter dated April 12, 2012, ATF notified plaintiff that it was partially withholding the documents under Exemption (b)(7)(C). 1st Boucher Decl. ¶ 7; Ex. E to 1st Boucher Decl. V. Request to BOP By letter dated April 26, 2011, plaintiff submitted a Privacy Act/FOIA request to BOP. Mack Decl. ¶ 4; Attach. 2 to Mack Decl. The letter was directed to BOP’s Office of General Counsel FOIA/PA Section and was received by that office on May 17, 2011. Mack Decl. ¶ 4; Attach. 2 to Mack Decl. According to BOP Paralegal Specialist Violate Mack, the FOIA/PA Section staff determined that the appropriate location for plaintiffs search request was BOP’s South Central Region. Mack Decl. ¶ 5. Accordingly, on May 27, 2011, FOIA/PA Section staff uploaded the request letter into Metastorm BPM — the Bureau’s FOIA database — for processing by the SCRO Regional Counsel’s Office. Id. According to Mack, the now-retired SCRO Paralegal Specialist, Larry Collins, determined that the form of plaintiffs request was typical of forms used by inmates at particular institutions, except that plaintiff had also appended an additional page specifying in more detail the materials he sought. Id. ¶ 6; Attach. 2 to Mack Deck Those specific materials were: “[telephonic recordings or transcriptfs] of telephonic recordings” from (a) the Parker County detention center from May 1, 2010 through July 15, 2010; (b) FDC Fort Worth from July 1, 2010 through November 1, 2010; and (c) FCI Seagoville from October 28, 2010 to present, as well as any Parker County Detention Center or FDC Fort Worth inmate files concerning plaintiff not currently in the central file at Seagoville. Attach. 2 to Mack Deck On August 14, 2011, BOP’s Office of General Counsel, Freedom of Information division received another letter from plaintiff. Mack Deck ¶ 14. This letter contained (1) a letter from plaintiff to the BOP FOIA section, dated July 20, 2011, requesting an update on the status of his April 26, 2011 FOIA request to the BOP Office of Central Counsel FOIA/PA Section, with a copy of the April 26 request attached, (2) a letter dated July 27, 2011, from BOP Legal Instruments Examiner Paula Champion, indicating that she had received a letter from plaintiff requesting records maintained by BOP at the Federal Correctional Institution, Fort Worth, Texas, and informing plaintiff that if his request was intended to be filed under the Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts, it should be sent to BOP’s Office of General Counsel, Freedom of Information Division, and (3) a FOIA request by plaintiff, identical to the April 26, 2011 request, but addressed to the Office of General Counsel, Freedom of Information, Bureau of Prisons Central Office and dated July 30, 2011. Mack Deck ¶ 14; Attach. 5 to Mack Deck According to Mack, Collins e-mailed FCI Fort Worth’s staff on June 7, 2011, requesting documents responsive to plaintiffs request. Mack Deck ¶ 7. In his email, Collins noted that plaintiff had been a “holdover” inmate — that is, a BOP inmate not yet transferred to his designated institution — at Fort Worth, and that he was specifically requesting all recorded telephone calls from Fort Worth during the specified timeframe. Id. & n. 2. Collins also sent an e-mail on June 7, 2011 to FCI Seagoville’s Legal Liaison requesting responsive records, specifically including recorded telephone calls for the requested period and any available telephone transactional data concerning plaintiff. Id. ¶ 8. The Mack declarations states that because the content of plaintiffs FOIA letter was the same or similar to letters that BOP receives frequently from other inmates, BOP interpreted the letter as a “form letter” rather than a request for all documents maintained in the central and medical files of the requesting inmate. Id. ¶ 11 & n. 5. To determine the scope of plaintiffs request, BOP looked to the more specific requests delineated in the attachments to plaintiffs letter. Id. ¶ 11. Since the requests described in the attachments were limited to records maintained by the Parker County Detention Center and FCI Fort Worth that would not be found in plaintiffs central file maintained at FCI Seagoville, BOP determined that the scope of plaintiffs request did not extend to all documents in his central file. Id. And since the requests were unrelated to any records that would be maintained in plaintiffs medical file, BOP determined that the scope did not extend to all documents in his medical file. Id. According to Mack, on June 8, 2011, FCI Fort Worth staff sent Collins the transactional data from plaintiffs use of the Inmate Telephone System (“ITS”) but informed him that it had found no recorded telephone conversations and no detainee files. Mack Decl. ¶ 12. On June 16, 2011, FCI Seagoville staff informed Collins that it would forward a CD containing a copy of the transactional data for plaintiffs ITS usage. Id. ¶ 13. The CD also contained recorded telephone conversations. Id. On August 31, 2011, the SCRO Regional Counsel responded to plaintiffs FOIA request. Mack Decl. ¶ 15; Attach 6. to Mack Decl. The letter indicated the following: • Parker County Detention Center records are not subject to FOIA requests and not within BOP’s jurisdiction. • BOP located no detainee file concerning plaintiff at FCI Fort Worth. • In consideration of the specific re- ■ quests noted in the attachments to plaintiffs request letter, BOP declined to interpret the scope of the request 'as including all documents in the central and medical files; however, plaintiff was invited to provide BOP with a clearer description of the records sought. • BOP’s search turned up 113 recorded telephone conversations from FCI Seagoville between the dates of December 18, 2010 and June 6, 2011. • No recorded telephone conversations were found at FCI Fort Worth. • Recorded telephone conversations are maintained on the TRUFONE system for 180 days, after which they are automatically deleted. • Recorded telephone conversations cannot be released without consent from all recorded parties and are, therefore, exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C). • Sixteen pages of telephone transactional data were released to plaintiff. • Plaintiff could appeal BOP’s response to his request by filing a written appeal with OIP. Mack Decl. ¶ 15; Attach. 6 to Mack Decl. By letter dated September 29, 2011, plaintiff requested preservation of the telephone conversations identified in BOP’s response. Mack Decl. ¶ 16; Attach. 7 to Mack Decl. SCRO Regional Counsel confirmed by letter dated October 24, 2011, that the records would be preserved through December 2017 per the BOP Records and Information Disposition Schedule. Mack Decl. ¶ 16; Attach. 8 to Mack Decl. On March 13, 2012,. after BOP received no correspondence indicating that plaintiff had elected to file an appeal, Collins sent an e-mail to an OIP representative, asking for a confirmation that plaintiff had not yet appealed the decision. Mack Decl. ¶¶ 18-19. On March 27, Collins received an email response indicating that OIP had no record of an appeal. Mack Decl. ¶ 20; Attach. 9 to Mack Decl. At the time that plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit, BOP had informed plaintiff only that it was withholding the records described in BOP’s August 31, 2011 letter. See Attach. 6 to Mack Decl. However, after the initiation of this action, EOUSA referred a number of additional pages to BOP to process. Luczynski Decl. ¶ 6. VI. Request to EOUSA On May 17, 2011, EOUSA received a letter from plaintiff requesting, pursuant to the Privacy Act and FOIA, copies of “all files, records, data, and/or information” maintained by EOUSA under the name David Barouch. Luczynski Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. A to Luczynski Decl. On May 31,, 2011, EOUSA acknowledged receipt of plaintiffs letter. Luczynski Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. B to Luczynski Decl. EOUSA’s letter informed plaintiff that, although the agency attempted to process most requests within twenty days, “Project Requests” — including requests about oneself in criminal case files — usually took about nine months. Ex. B to Luczynski Decl. According to David Luczynski, an EOU-SA attorney advisor who, among other things, reviews FOIA and Privacy Act requests submitted to EOUSA and prepares responses, EOUSA began its search in the Northern District of Texas, which was specified as the pertinent location in plaintiffs initial inquiry. Luczynski Decl. ¶¶ 1, 8; Ex. A to Luczynski Decl. EOUSA’s search involved reviewing the records from plaintiffs case, sending email requests for responsive documents to the Assistant United States Attorney in the Criminal Division, and searching the LIONS system — used by the United States Attorney Offices to monitor cases and retrieve files- — -using plaintiffs name as the search term. Luczynski Decl. ¶ 8 By letter dated March 26, 2012 — after the initiation of this case — EOUSA responded to plaintiff, indicating that it had identified relevant documents and was releasing 159 pages in full, releasing 50 pages in part, and withholding 282 pages in full. Compl. at 1; Luczynski Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. C to Luczynski Decl. The letter informed plaintiff that documents were withheld from production under the FOIA exemptions codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (“Exemption (b)(3)”), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (“Exemption (b)(5)”), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (“Exemption (b)(6)”), and Exemption (b)(7)(C), and under the Privacy Act exemption codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2) (“Exemption <j)(2)”). Luczynski Decl. ¶ 6. Ex. C to Luczynski Deck; see also Vaughn Index, Attach, to Luczynski Deck The letter also informed plaintiff that additional potentially responsive documents were being referred to ATF, CRM, and BOP. Luczynski Deck ¶ 6; Ex. C to Luczynski Deck Finally, the letter stated that plaintiff could appeal the decision to OIP within sixty days. Luczynski Deck ¶ 6; Ex. C to Luczynski Deck VII. Procedural Background Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed the complaint in this action on January 23, 2012, against DOJ, USMS, the DOJ Criminal Division, EOUSA, BOP, Treasury, ATF, and the Parker County Sheriff Department. Compl. at 1. The complaint alleges that the named defendants have “failed, refused, and neglected to comply with Plaintiffs reasonable requests for records, documents, audio tapes and jail tape recordings, and discovery.” Compl. ¶ 15. Plaintiff seeks an order compelling disclosure of his “entire record of investigation” for the years 2010 and 2011. Compl. ¶ 17. On December 12, 2012, the Court dismissed the Parker County Sheriff Department, sua sponte, because the local entity is not subject’ to the provisions of FOIA. [Dkt. # 18], Defendants filed two partial motions for summary judgment "or dismissal that together would dispose of the entire case. Defs.’ 1st Mot.; Defs.’ 2d Mot. The first motion, filed on November 9, 2012, seeks summary judgment or dismissal with respect to plaintiffs claims against Treasury and CRM. Defs.’ 1st Mot. Plaintiff filed an opposition on November 27, 2012. PL’s 1st Resp. Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion on December 21, 2012. Defs.’ Reply to PL’s Resp. and Objection to Federal Defs.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. and Dismissal [Dkt. #20]. On January 17, 2013, plaintiff filed a surreply to defendants’ response. PL’s Sur-Resp. to Defs.’ Reply to PL’s Resp. and Objection to Federal Defs.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. [Dkt. # 21] (“PL’s Sur-Resp.”). The second motion, filed on February 7, 2013, seeks summary judgment or dismissal with respect to the claims against the remaining federal defendants: ATF, BOP, USMS, and EOU-SA. Defs.’ 2d Mot. Plaintiff responded on March 11, 2013. PL’s 2d Resp. Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion on March 22, 2013. Defs.’ Reply, to PL’s Verified Mem. Response to Fed. Defs.’ Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. and Dismissal [Dkt. # 26] (“Defs.’ Reply”). On July 25, 2013, upon review of the parties’ submissions, the Court ordered defendants to deliver to chambers for in camera inspection four documents that had been withheld by defendant EOUSA. Minute Order (July 25, 2013), citing Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1195 (D.C.Cir.1978). EOUSA submitted the four documents to the Court in camera on August 2, 2013. The Court has reviewed these documents along with the parties’ memoranda and pleadings. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party must “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotation marks omitted). The existence of a factual dispute is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” only if a reasonable fact-finder could find for the non-moving party; a fact is only “material” if it is capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C.Cir.1987). In assessing a party’s motion, the court must “view the facts and draw reasonable inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769,167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (alterations omitted), quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) (per curiam). While the same legal framework applies in every case, where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, “the Court must take particular care to construe the plaintiffs filings liberally, for such complaints are held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ ” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Co., 722 F.Supp.2d 93, 107 (D.D.C.2010), quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). ANALYSIS I. The Court will grant summary judgment to defendants for all claims against Treasury Treasury moves for summary judgment on the grounds that there is no evidence that plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to the agency. Defs.’ 1st Mem. at 2. Treasury’s declarant, Gilmore, describes Treasury’s FOIA tracking system, Gilmore Decl. ¶ 4, and he states that upon conducting a search of that tracking system under plaintiffs name, he was unable to find a request. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that he submitted a FOIA or Privacy Act request to Treasury, let alone provide a copy of the request itself to the Court. Moreover, plaintiff has continually wrongly characterized ATF as a bureau of Treasury, Compl. ¶¶ 5-6, 22, 25, which suggests that he may have been under the impression that he was seeking records from Treasury when he submitted his request to ATF. Because there is no genuine dispute that no documents were produced to plaintiff by Treasury because Treasury did not receive a FOIA request from him, Gilmore Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, the Court will grant Treasury’s motion for summary judgment. II. The Court will grant in part and deny in part defendants’ motions for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs claims arising under FOIA The purpose of FOIA is to require the release of government records upon request and to “ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.” Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978). At the same time, Congress recognized “that legitimate governmental and private interests could be harmed by release of certain types of information and provided nine specific exemptions under which disclosure could be refused.” FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621, 102 S.Ct. 2054, 72 L.Ed.2d 376 (1982); see also Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. DOJ, 331 F.3d 918, 925 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“FOIA represents a balance struck by Congress between the public’s right to know and the government’s legitimate interest in keeping certain information confidential.”). The Supreme Court has instructed that “FOIA exemptions are to be narrowly construed.” Abramson, 456 U.S. at 630, 102 S.Ct. 2054. To prevail at the summary judgment phase in a typical FOIA action, an agency must satisfy two elements. Leadership Conference on Civil Rights v. Gonzales, 404 F.Supp.2d 246, 252 (D.D.C.2005). First, the agency must demonstrate that it has made “a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C.Cir.1990). Second, an agency must show that “materials that are withheld ... fall within a FOIA statutory exemption.” Leadership Conference on Rights, 404 F.Supp.2d at 252. After asserting and explaining its exemptions, an agency must release “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record” and provide it to the requesting party, “after deletion of the portions which are exempt.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(9). The district court reviews the agency’s action de novo, and “the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); accord Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C.Cir.1981). Once the case comes to court, “FOIA cases are typically and appropriately decided on motions for summary judgment.” Moore v. Bush, 601 F.Supp.2d 6, 12 (D.D.C.2009). In any motion for summary judgment, the Court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, draw all reasonable inferences in his favor, and eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Montgomery v. Chao, 546 F.3d 703, 706 (D.C.Cir.2008); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). However, where a plaintiff has not provided evidence that an agency acted in bad faith, “a court may award summary judgment solely on the basis of information provided by the agency in declarations.” Moore, 601 F.Supp.2d at 12. A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Once a FOIA request has been processed, a plaintiff is required to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing an action to compel disclosure of documents. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6); 28 C.F.R. § 16.9(c); Wilbur v. CIA, 355 F.3d 675, 677 (D.C.Cir.2004). Failure to exhaust such remedies bars the lawsuit. See Banks v. DOJ, 813 F.Supp.2d 132, 138-39 (D.D.C.2011) (granting agency’s motion for summary judgment in FOIA action where plaintiff failed to file an administrative appeal before filing the lawsuit); Schwaner v. Dep’t of Army, 696 F.Supp.2d 77, 81 (D.D.C.2010) (same). However, because exhaustion is not a jurisdictional bar under FOIA, courts will deem a plaintiff to have constructively exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to a FOIA claim when an agency “fails to comply with the applicable time limit provisions” of FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i). The agency has twenty days to make an initial determination, and following an administrative appeal of a FOIA decision, twenty days to make a determination on the appeal. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)-(ii). A requester will be found to have “constructively exhausted” his administrative remedies if, after the twenty days has expired but before the agency responds to his request, he files an action in federal court complaining that the agency failed to respond to his FOIA request within the applicable time limit. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i) (2012); 28 C.F.R. § 16.9(a), (c) (2012); see also Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 70-71. Constructive exhaustion is applied narrowly: courts in this district have declined to find that a requestor has constructively exhausted his administrative remedies if the agency responds to his request before he brings suit, even if the agency’s response is outside the statutory time limit. See, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 888 F.Supp.2d 189, 192-193 (D.D.C.2012). 1. EOUSA At the time plaintiff filed the complaint in this action, EOUSA had not responded to his request for documents, despite the expiration of the mandatory statutory time limit for agency response under FOIA. Defs.’ 2d Mem. at 17 n. 8. EOUSA concedes that plaintiffs “administrative remedies were constructively exhausted by the time he filed this lawsuit.” Id. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claims against EOUSA under FOIA. 2. ATF But the ATF has moved to dismiss the FOIA claims against it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Defs.’ 2d Mem. at 4-5. ATF issued two different decisions in response to plaintiffs request: (1) it denied his August 3, 2011 request because it did not find any responsive documents; and (2) it later disclosed redacted versions of documents that EOUSA had referred to it after the inception of this action. 1st Boucher. Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7. ATF claims that plaintiff has failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies under FOIA without distinguishing between these two different determinations. Defs.’ 2d Mem. at 4-5. Because plaintiff has not appealed either of these decisions to OIP, ATF maintains, judicial review of its decisions is unavailable. Defs.’ 2d Mem. at 5. For his part, plaintiff maintains that “it would be futile to undergo the deliberative and fruitless delay of further administrative review.” Pl.’s 2d Resp. at 36. The Court will address each of ATF’s decisions separately. a. Plaintiffs claim with respect to ATF’s August 3, 2011 decision is barred With respect to the first set of documents, the Court agrees with ATF that plaintiffs claim under FOIA is barred for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. When plaintiff received notification — in the letter dated August 3, 2011 — that his initial request to ATF had been denied, he was notified that he could appeal the decision to OIP.Ex. C to 1st Boucher Decl. Plaintiff did not do so. 1st Boucher Decl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff is correct that in certain contexts, “the exhaustion requirement may be waived by the agency, or disregarded by the court when application of the doctrine would be futile.” Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 891 (D.C.Cir.1987). “[S]till, as a jurisprudential doctrine, failure to exhaust precludes judicial review if the purposes of exhaustion and the particular administrative scheme support such a bar.” Wilbur v. CIA 355 F.3d 675, 677 (D.C.Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Hidalgo v. FBI, 344 F.3d 1256, 1258-59 (D.C.Cir.2003). And “the FOIA’s administrative scheme favors treating failure to exhaust as a bar to judicial review.” Hidalgo, 344 F.3d at 1259. Moreover, permitting plaintiff to obtain judicial review without exhausting his administrative remedies in this case would undermine the purpose for the exhaustion requirement: “preventing premature interference with agency processes, affording the parties and the courts the benefit of the agency’s experience and expertise, or compiling a record which is adequate for judicial review.” Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Ryan v. Bentsen, 12 F.3d 245, 247 (D.C.Cir.1993). Therefore, with respect to ATF’s August 3, 2011 determination, defendants’ motion to dismiss, construed as a motion for summary judgment, will be granted, b. Plaintiffs failure to file an administrative appeal of ATF’s determination under FOIA with respect to the documents referred to it by the EOUSA does not bar this Court’s review of the merits of the determination The Court, however, finds a distinction between the challenges to ATF’s determination regarding the documents that ATF uncovered in its initial search and the determination on the documents referred to ATF by EOUSA after the initiation of this action. Plaintiff was first informed of his right to appeal ATF’s decision regarding the documents referred to it by EOUSA by letter dated April 12, 2012, after plaintiff had already filed his complaint in this Court. Ex. E to 1st Boucher Decl. In other words, when plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit, there was no administrative remedy available for plaintiff to exhaust regarding these documents. See Luczynski Decl. ¶ 6 (showing EOUSA referred documents to ATF after plaintiff filed suit). It is true that plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to these documents in a literal sense. But a FOIA requester will be deemed to have “constructively exhausted” his administrative remedies “if the agency fails to comply with the applicable time limit provisions.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)®. The documents processed by ATF were actually in the possession of EOUSA, which had not responded to plaintiffs request when plaintiff filed his complaint in this action, despite the expiration of the applicable time limit for the agency to respond. See, e.g., Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 65-66. EOUSA concedes this. Defs.’ 2d Mem. at 17 n. 8. It would be anomalous to review plaintiffs challenges to EOUSA’s withholdings of documents that were identified by EOUSA in the spring of 2012 and that were processed by EOUSA, but to decline review on exhaustion grounds the determinations of other agencies to which EOUSA sent some of the documents it identified at the same time. Compare Defs.’ 2d Mem. at 17 n. 8 (conceding administrative remedies were constructively exhausted) with 1st Boucher Decl. ¶ 8 (asserting that plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his ATF request). Since the exhaustion requirement under FOIA is not jurisdictional, Hidalgo, 344 F.3d at 1258, the Court finds that plaintiff has constructively exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the documents uncovered by EOUSA after the initiation of this action, regardless of whether they were processed by EOUSA or by another agency, such as ATF. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs challenge to ATF’s determination on the documents it received from EOUSA is not barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 3. BOP a. The Court is barred from reviewing plaintiffs challenge to BOP’s August SI, 2011 determination because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to that determination BOP argues that plaintiff is barred from seeking judicial review of BOP’s response to his FOIA request because he failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing the instant suit. Defs.’ 2d Mem. at 9. Plaintiff argues that any further administrative review would be “futile.” Pl.’s 2d Resp. at 36. With respect at least to the documents that were the subject of BOP’s August 31, 2011 letter, plaintiffs request differs little in relevant respects from his request to ATF: Plaintiff was informed on August 31, 2011, that certain documents were being released to plaintiff, that others were being withheld, and that he was entitled to an administrative appeal. Mack Decl. ¶ 15; Attach. 6 to Mack Decl. In addition, the letter informed plaintiff that he might obtain additional documents by specifying that he also sought the records located in his central and medical files. Mack Decl. ¶ 15; Attach. 6 to Mack Decl. Plaintiff responded to BOP on September 29, 2011, but he did not file an administrative appeal with OIP. Mack Decl. ¶¶ 16, 20; Attach. 7 to Mack Deck; Attach. 9 to Mack Deck Plaintiffs conclusory characterization of further administrative review as “futile” is insufficient to overcome the rule that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to judicial review in this context for the same reasons that the Court discussed with respect to ATF. Accordingly, the Court is barred from reviewing plaintiffs challenge to BOP’s August 31, 2011 determination. b. BOP must identify which documents were referred to it by EOUSA and produce them or explain its basis for withholding them Defendants argue that that plaintiffs challenge to BOP’s withholding of the documents referred to it by EOUSA after the initiation of this action is also barred because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Defs.’ 2d Mem. at 17 n. 7. The Court finds for the same reasons discussed above with respect to ATF that plaintiff has constructively exhausted his administrative remedies, and the Court may therefore address the merits of his claim. Moreover, BOP has yet to produce to plaintiff the documents referred to it by EOUSA or to explain the basis for its withholdings. See generally Mack Deck (making no reference to documents referred to it by EOUSA). Consequently, plaintiff has not received any determination on the referred documents, despite the fact that he had constructively exhausted his administrative remedies. See Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 70-71. Accordingly, the Court will remand to BOP with the direction that it either produce the documents referred to it by EOUSA to plaintiff or justify any withholdings. The FOIA claims that remain, then, are against CRM, USMS, EOUSA, and ATF for its handling of records transmitted to it by EOUSA. B. The agencies’ searches were adequate In pursuing those claims, plaintiff challenges the adequacy of the agencies’ searches. Comph ¶ 15; Ph’s 1st Resp. at 3; Ph’s 2d Resp. at 8-13. The Court finds that each of these agencies’ searches was adequate. To prevail in a FOIA case, the agency must demonstrate that it has made “a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.” Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68. . “[A]t the summary judgment phase, an agency must set forth sufficient information in its affidavits for a court to determine if the search was adequate.” Nation Magazine, Wash. Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C.Cir.1995), citing Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68. Such agency affidavits attesting to a reasonable search “are afforded a presumption of good faith[,]” Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 314 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (D.D.C.2004), and “can be rebutted only “with evidence that the agency’s search was not made in good faith.’ ” Id., quoting Trans Union LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 141 F.Supp.2d 62, 69 (D.D.C.2001). 1. CRM CRM maintains that it conducted an adequate search for records responsive to plaintiffs request that was reasonably calculated to uncover ’all relevant' documents. Defs.’ Reply at 4. Plaintiff disputes this assertion, in part contending that defendants’ failure to locate the three missing audiotapes demonstrates the inadequacy of the search. PL’s 2d Resp. at 10-11. To show that CRM performed adequate searches for responsive records, defendants submitted a declaration by John Cunningham III — a Trial Attorney in the CRM currently assigned to the FOIA and Privacy Act Unit. Cunningham Decl. ¶ 1. The Cunningham declaration states that, as a general practice, CRM searches its Central Criminal Division Index File (“CRM-001”) in response to FOIA requests. Id. ¶ 9. The declaration further states that CRM searched CRM-001 as well as the CRM oracle menu — the Case Automated Tracking System (“CATS”). Id. ¶ 10. CRM used plaintiffs name as a search term. Ex. 4 to Cunningham Decl. In addition, since plaintiff had indicated in his submission of materials to CRM that the section of CRM that he reasonably believed might contain responsive records was the FOIA and Privacy Act Unit of the Office of Enforcement Operations, CRM specifically searched that unit’s records. Cunningham Decl. ¶ 9; Ex. 3 to Cunningham Decl. The Cunningham declaration also indicates that it is common for CRM to find no records responsive to a federal inmate’s Privacy Act request because most federal criminal cases are prosecuted by EOUSA. Cunningham Decl. ¶ 12. This affidavit therefore establishes that CRM searched the databases that were likely to turn up documents responsive to plaintiffs requests using search terms that correspond to the scope of the requests. Plaintiff specifically challenges CRM’s search on the basis that after informing him that it had found no responsive documents, it later “admitted” ' the existence of one document that had originated with CRM. PL’s Sur-Resp. to Def.’s 1st Mot. at 1. Plaintiff appears to be referring to the document that EOUSA referred to CRM after the inception of this action. The fact that EOUSA referred a document to CRM that it determined “may or may not be responsive” to plaintiffs request does not make CRM’s search inadequate. See Ex. 9 to Cunningham Decl. First, it was EOUSA that uncovered the document in its files, not CRM. But even if CRM had uncovered additional documents after its initial search, “the mere fact that additional documents have been discovered does not impugn the accuracy of the [agency] affidavits. The issue [is] not whether any further documents might conceivably exist but whether [the agency]’s search for responsive documents was adequate.” Goland v. CIA 607 F.2d 339, 369 (D.C.Cir.1978). The Court therefore finds, on the basis of the Cunningham declaration, that CRM’s search was “reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Weisberg v. DOJ, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C.Cir.1983). 2. USMS The Court similarly finds that USMS conducted an adequate search. Defendants have submitted a declaration by USMS Associate General Counsel and Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Officer Bordley. Bordley Decl. ¶ 1. The Bordley declaration states that OGC searched the systems of records routinely searched for documents concerning prisoners for documents relating to plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. OGC used plaintiff’s name as well as other personal identifying information to identify documents indexed to him. Id. ¶4. The other personal identifiers submitted to OGC included plaintiffs date of birth, place of birth, social security number and information concerning his criminal case. Ex. A to Bordley Decl. USMS conducts searches using the requestor’s name and/or other identifying information, often his prisoner registration number or social security number. Bordley Decl. ¶ 5. In addition, plaintiff identified the Northern District of Texas as the location to be searched, and OGC confirmed that this was the location where USMS would reasonably expect to find responsive documents. Bordley Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. A to Bordley Decl. USMS’s search located twenty-eight pages of responsive documents, and USMS produced those pages to plaintiff with some limited redactions. Bordley Decl. ¶ 6. In light of these facts, this Court finds, on the basis of Bordley’s affidavit, that the search was “reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Weisberg, 705 F.2d at 1351. 3. EOUSA Finally, the Court also finds that EOUSA conducted an adequate search. The Luezynski declaration states that, upon receiving plaintiffs request, EOUSA requested that the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas search and forward responsive documents. Luezynski Decl. ¶8. The FOIA contact for the Northern District of Texas searched for records from the case files of plaintiffs criminal case, and sent e-mails to the Assistant United States Attorneys in the Criminal Division to ascertain whether they had any responsive records. Id. To search for files, the FOIA contact used the “LIONS” system, which is a computer system used by United States Attorneys’ Offices to access databases which can be used to retrieve files pertaining to cases and investigations based on a defendant’s name, the internal administrative number for the case, and the district court case number. Id. The FOIA contact used plaintiffs name as the search term. Id. According to the declarant, “[a]ll responsive documents to Plaintiffs FOIA request would have been located in the [United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas]. There are no other records systems or locations within EOUSA or DOJ in which other files pertaining to Plaintiffs name were maintained.” Id. These affidavits establish that the agencies searched the databases that were likely to turn up documents responsive to plaintiffs requests using search terms that correspond to the scope of the requests. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of bad faith on the part of the government. The Court therefore finds, on the basis of defendants’ affidavits, that the searches were “reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Weisberg, 705 F.2d at 1351. Plaintiff argues that the searches performed by the DOJ subsections and by EOUSA were inadequate because they failed to turn up three responsive audio tapes that are in the agencies’ possession. Pl.’s 2d Resp. at 11. But, “the mere fact that additional documents have been discovered does not impugn the accuracy of the [agency] affidavits. The issue [is] not whether any further documents might conceivably exist but whether [the agency’s] search for responsive documents was adequate.” Goland v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 607 F.2d 339, 369 (D.C.Cir.1978); see alsoWeisberg v. DOJ, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“[T]he issue to be resolved is not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was adequate.”); Iturralde v. Comptroller of the Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“[T]he adequacy of a FOIA search is generally determined not by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the search.”); Adionser v. DOJ, 811 F.Supp.2d 284, 293 (D.D.C.2011) (rejecting a plaintiffs challenge to the adequacy of a search because he challenged it “based on the results of the search rather than the actual method by which” the search was conducted). Plaintiff does not identify any problems with the way in which the search was conducted, but rather challenges the results of the search. As the Court has already explained, the agencies have met their burden of demonstrating that the methods they used to search for responsive documents can be reasonably expected to produce the information plaintiff requested. And although plaintiff lodges a series of conclusory allegations that the agencies acted in bad faith, he does not proffer any evidence of bad faith. The Court therefore finds, on the basis of the government’s declarations, that the agencies’ searches were “reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Weisberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C.Cir.1983). C. The agencies have met their burden to show that they released reasonably segregable portions of responsive records with the exception of four documents withheld by EOUSA FOIA expressly requires agencies to extract “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record” and provide it to the requesting party “after deletion of the portions which are exempt.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). “[I]t has long been the rule in this Circuit that non-exempt portions of a document must be disclosed unless they are inextricably intertwined with exempt portions.” Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 344 F.Supp.2d 1, 18 (D.D.C.2004) (emphasis in original), quoting Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C.Cir.1977). Agencies and courts must “differentiate among the contents of a document rather than to treat it as an indivisible record for FOIA purposes.” Abramson, 456 U.S. at 626, 102 S.Ct. 2054 (internal quotation marks omitted). Regardless of whether a party actually challenges an agency’s determination on the segregability of requested records, a district court must not “simply approve the withholding of an entire document without entering a finding on segregability, or the lack thereof.” Schiller v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 964 F.2d 1205, 1210 (D.C.Cir.1992), abrogated on other grounds by Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1259, 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1116 (D.C.Cir.2007) (“If the district court approves withholding without such a finding [of segregability], remand is required even if the requester did not raise the issue of segregability before the court.”). The district court’s findings of segregability must be “specific.” Sussman, 494 F.3d at 1116. The government bears the burden of demonstrating that no reasonably segregable material exists in the withheld documents. Army Times Publ’g Co. v. Dep’t of Air Force, 998 F.2d 1067, 1068 (D.C.Cir.1993). The agency must “provide[ ] a detailed justification and not just conclusory statements to demonstrate that all reasonably segregable information has been released.” Valfells v. CIA 717 F.Supp.2d 110, 120 (D.D.C.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 97 F.3d 575, 578 (D.C.Cir.1996) (affirming summary judgment where government affidavits explained non-segregability of documents with “reasonable specificity”). The government may meet its obligation of “reasonable specificity” with “[t]he combination of the Vaughn index and [agency] affidavits.” Johnson v. Exec. Office for U.S. Att’ys, 310 F.3d 771, 776 (D.C.Cir.2002); see also Loving v. Dep’t of Def., 550 F.3d 32, 41 (D.C.Cir.2008). Whether the Vaughn index is sufficient “turns on whether the - agency has sufficiently explained why there was no reasonable means of segregating factual material from the claimed privileged material.” Wilderness Soc’y, 344 F.Supp.2d at 18. “[A] blanket declaration that all facts are so intertwined” is not sufficient to meet this burden. Id. at 19. With the exception that is explained later in this opinion in the context of plaintiffs request to EOUSA, the Court finds that defendants have met their burden of showing with reasonable specificity that they disclosed all segregable material. The grounds for this conclusion are explained along with the Court’s substantive discussion of the propriety of the government’s withholdings. D. FOIA Exemptions 1. CRM did not err in withholding the Richter Memorandum pursuant to Exemption (b)(5) CRM argues that summary judgment is appropriate because the only document responsive to plaintiffs request that has been withheld is the Richter Memorandum, which it contends was appropriately withheld subject to Exemption (b)(5). Defs.’ 1st Mem. at 9-13. Plaintiff has generally challenged defendants’ invocation of Exemption (b)(5). See Pl.’s 2d Resp. at 19-20. FOIA Exemption (b)(5) allows agencies to withhold records if the requested documents include “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). In determining whether a document was properly withheld under Exemption (b)(5), a court must ensure that the document satisfies two conditions: (1) “its source must be a Government agency, and [ (2) ] it must fall within the ambit of a privilege against discovery under judicial standards that would govern litigation against the agency that holds it.” Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8, 121 S.Ct. 1060, 149 L.Ed.2d 87 (2001). These privileges include the attorney work product and deliberative process privileges, which are the two privileges that CRM contends protect the Richter Memorandum. Id.; Defs.’ 1st Mem. at 11-12. Since the Court finds thát CRM has satisfied the work product prong, it will not address the deliberative process prong. The work product doctrine protects “ ‘mental processes of the attorney,’ ” Klamath, 532 U.S. at 8, 121 S.Ct. 1060, quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), when such material was “prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial....” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 432 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C.Cir.2005), quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3) (internal quotation marks omitted). It extends to material which “can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.” Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 186 F.3d 959, 968 (D.C.Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine also includes materials relating to “foreseeable litigation, even if no specific claim is contemplated.” Schiller, 964 F.2d at 1208, abrogated on other grounds by Milner, 131 S.Ct. 1259. The “ ‘testing question’ ” when reviewing a withholding under the work-product prong of Exemption (b)(5) is “‘whether, in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.’ ” In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 884 (D.C.Cir.1998), quoting Senate of Puerto Rico v. DOJ, 823 F.2d 574, 586 n. 42 (D.C.Cir.1987). CRM maintains that, as a document created by the executive branch and that never left the executive branch, the Richter Memorandum meets Exemption (b)(5)’s threshold requirement that its source must be a government agency. Defs.’ 1st Mem. at 12. Because plaintiff does not dispute this assertion, and because there is no evidence that the government’s assertion is false, Klamath’s first prong is not at issue here. See 532 U.S. at 8,121 S.Ct. 1060. CRM also contends that the document is predecisional and deliberative, and was prepared in anticipation of litigation, because it relates to “[c]harging under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) where the underlying crime of violence is the possession of the same weapon.” Cunningham Deck ¶ 19; see also Ex. 11 to Cunningham Deck Although plaintiff does not specifically dispute this assertion in his opposition to defendant’s summary judgment motion relating to the CRM request, he contends generally that Exemption (b)(5) does not protect factual material. Pl.’s 2d Resp. at 19-20. But this argument is unavailing with respect to the work product doctrine. “The work-product privilege simply does not distinguish between factual and deliberative material.” Martin v. Office of Special Counsel Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 819 F.2d 1181, 1187 (D.C.Cir.1987); see also Judicial Watch, 432 F.3d at 371, (quoting Martin for the proposition that the work-product doctrine does not “distinguish between factual and deliberative material.”); COMPTEL v. FCC, 910 F.Supp.2d 100, 122 (D.D.C.2012) (“If a document is fully protected as work product, then segregability is not required because that privilege does not distinguish between factual and deliberative materials.”) (internal quo