Full opinion text
OPINION PETER G. SHERIDAN, District Judge. Before the Court are Motions for Summary Judgment brought by four groups of defendants referred to in this opinion as the Federal Defendants, the Camden City Defendants, the Camden County Defendants, and the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office Defendants (collectively, “Defendants”). This suit arises out of events that occurred primarily on the morning of January 8, 2008, when deputized members of the United States Marshals Service visited the home of Linda Martin in Camden, New Jersey in search of her son, Phillip Martin, who died within minutes of the Marshals’ arrival from a gunshot wound to his head. The relevant authorities, including the Defendants, maintain that Phillip died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound, while Plaintiffs claim that one of the United States Marshals shot Phillip and that the rest of the Defendants participated in a conspiracy to cover up the shooting, thereby violating several rights secured by the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and subjecting plaintiffs to common law torts. The Court has reviewed the record, and held oral argument on February 26, 2013, and for the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are granted in part and denied in part; only Plaintiffs’ narrow claims under Counts Three and Four regarding the unlawful detention of Linda and Dwayne Martin by certain of the Defendants after Phillip’s death survive the motions. BACKGROUND A. The Parties This Complaint is brought by Plaintiffs for claims arising out of the death of Phillip Martin on January 8, 2008. Plaintiffs are: Linda Martin, Phillip Martin’s mother who brings claims on her own behalf as well as in her role as administratrix of Phillip Martin’s estate; Dwayne Martin, Phillip Martin’s younger brother; Phillip Corey Clax, Phillip Martin’s eldest surviving son; and Bryhem Clax, Phillip Martin’s youngest surviving son (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Defendants Kevin Cunane, Christopher Leone, Barrett Johnson, John Hunsinger, Timothy O’Brien and Jerome Scott were all working as deputized members of the United States Marshals Service New York/ New Jersey Regional Fugitive Task Force on the day of the incident at issue in this lawsuit, and as such they are referred to herein as the “Federal Defendants” or “Marshals”. The Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders, Camden County Medical Examiner Gerald Feigin, M.D. (“defendant Feigin” or “Dr. Feigin”) and Camden County Medical Examiner investigator Patrick Daley are referred to herein as “Camden County Defendants.” William Wiley, Wayne Matthews, Keith James, and James Phillips were all working for the Camden City Police Department on January 8, 2008, and are collectively referred to herein as the “Camden City Defendants.” John Ellis and Gary McBride, employees of the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office, are referred to herein as “Camden County Prosecutor’s Office Defendants”. The Complaint asserts various constitutional and state law causes of action against the different groups of defendants. As already stated, the claims arise from the death of Phillip Martin on January 8, 2008. That morning, members of the Fugitive Task Force arrived at Linda Martin’s home looking for her son, Phillip, in order to execute a warrant for his arrest. While they were in the home, one gunshot' was fired, and Phillip Martin was later found dead in an upstairs bedroom. The relevant authorities at the time determined that Phillip Martin committed suicide by shooting himself in the head with a .38 caliber revolver. Plaintiffs now claim that one' of the Marshalls shot and killed Phillip Martin and that the rest of the defendants were either negligent in performing their investigative duties or were engaged in a conspiracy, along with the Marshals, to cover up Phillip Martin’s murder. B. Events of January 8, 2008 As of January 2008, there were at least three outstanding warrants for the arrest of Phillip Martin: in June 2007, Roanoke City General District Court, a state court in Virginia, issued a warrant for Mr. Martin’s arrest for misdemeanor assault and battery; in August 2007, Roanoke City Circuit Court, another Virginia state court, issued a warrant for Martin’s arrest for failing to appear oh charges of eluding police and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; and in October 2007, the Virginia Department of Probation and Parole issued an arrest warrant for Phillip Martin for parole violations related to his previous conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.. Nee.Bober Decl. Ex. A (Arrest Warrants). In December 2007, law enforcement authorities in Virginia requested assistance in locating' Phillip Martin from the New York/New Jersey Regional Fugitive Task Force (the “Fugitive Task Force”), after an initial investigation indicated that Martin may have been residing with family in Camden. See id. Ex. A (Cunane Depo.) at 20:19-21; see also id. Ex. G (U.S. Marshals Report of Investigation dated December" 13, 2007) (hereinafter “USMS 12/13/07 Report”); id. Ex. K (New Jersey State Police Fact Briefing Sheet). In its report requesting assistance from the Fugitive Task Force, the Marshals Service indicated that it had been working with a confidential source who had recently received a call from Phillip, and had determined that the call had been made from a cell phone subscribed to by Phillip’s brother, Dwayne Martin, who-the Marshals Service said resided at 103 S. 35th Street in Camden. See USMS Report. Defendant Kevin - Cunane, a member of the Fugitive Task Force, was assigned to locate and apprehend Martin. See Cunane Depo. at 20:16-21; Bober Decl. Ex. D (U.S. Marshals Report of- Investigation dated January 9, 2008) (hereinafter “USMS 1/9/08 Report”). Before attempting to locate Phillip Martin, Cunane accessed law enforcement databases, which indicated that Martin had an outstanding 1995 arrest warrant from Collingswood, New Jersey. See Cunane Depo. 26:19-22. The New Jersey warrant listed Phillip’s address as 103 S. 35th Street in Camden, which matched the current address that the Marshals had been given for Phillip’s brother Dwayne. See Arrest Warrant; USMS 12/13/07 Report. Cunane also accessed property records and motor vehicle records, which indicated that 103 S. 35th Street was owned by Phillip’s mother Linda Martin, and that Linda and Dwaun Martin (another of Phillip’s brothers) had listed that address as their address of record with the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission. See Cunane Depo. 23:6-9; see also Bober Decl. Ex. E (documents from Cunane’s investigative file). Cunane also obtained address information for other known associates of Phillip Martin, including a woman named Cherry Boyce. See id. On the morning of January 8, 2008, Cunane and the other members of the Fugitive Task Force gathered to discuss the arrest targets for the day, including Phillip Martin. See Bober Decl. Ex. F (Cunane Interrogatories) at 4. The group was briefed about its intended targets. Before arriving at 103 S. 35th Street, the Marshals searched for Phillip Martin at the home of Cherry Boyce, who lived on Benson Street in Camden. See Cunane Depo. at 56:1-5; id. at 64:14-65:8. After the Marshals did not find Phillip' at Boyce’s home they proceeded to 103 S. 35th Street. See Leone Depo. 39:23-40:2. The Marshals arrived at 103 S. 35 Street at approximately 6:30 a.m. See Leone Depo. 31:14-17; Bober Decl. Ex. V (Linda Depo.) at 102:18-19. Cunane was the lead U.S. Marshal for the assignment to arrest Phillip Martin; Cunane assigned operational positions for the other team members in the event that Phillip was present at any of the locations they visited. See Cunane Interrogatories at 4-5; see also Bober Decl. Ex. G (Arrest Team Task Force worksheet with team member assignments) (hereinafter “Arrest Worksheet”); Hunsinger Depo. 25:20-26:13. Some members of the team were assigned to remain on the property’s perimeter, and others were assigned to approach and enter the house. It is undisputed that Defendants Barrett Johnson, John Hunsinger, and Tim O’Brien were assigned to the “search team” that would enter the home. Cunane was also in the group that entered the house, and was part of the “inside control team,” whose job would typically be to remain on the first floor. See Cunane Interrogatories at 4-5; Arrest Worksheet; Hunsinger Depo. 26:5-8. Cunane, Leone, Johnson, Hunsinger, and O’Brien approached the house, and Cunane knocked on the, front door. See Cunane Interrogatories at 5; Bober Decl. Ex. H (Leone Interrogatories); Cunane Depo. 30:14-16; id. at 89:16-18; Leone Depo. 41:3-6; Hunsinger Depo. 28:4-6. After “a few minutes,” see Linda Depo. 109:20-110:1, Linda “slightly opened the door,” id. at 113:21. The parties dispute what exactly happened next. The Federal Defendants say that Cunane, asked Linda what her name was, and who was in the house with her. Linda Depo. 132:4-10. The Federal Defendants further contend that Linda Martin told Cunane her name and said that her sons Dwayne and Phillip were in the house, and that Phillip was upstairs. Id. 132:11-13; Leone Depo. 45:3-5; Cunane Depo. 82:8-11. In the Marshals’ version, the Marshals only entered the home to search for Phillip Martin after being told by Linda that Phillip was in the house. See Linda Depo. at 132:15-16. Plaintiffs, citing only the January 15, 2013 Declaration of Linda Martin, which she submitted in support of Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, contend that when Ms. Martin slightly opened the door to find out who was knocking, the Marshals burst into her home, with guns drawn. See Linda Decl. ¶¶ 7-10. Plaintiffs say that the Marshals did not present any arrest warrant or search warrant to Ms. Martin or tell Ms. Martin why they were at her home. See id. Plaintiffs claim Ms. Martin, without telling them her name, told the Marshalls that she and her two sons were in the house and that Phillip was sleeping in a bedroom upstairs. See id. As the Marshals entered the house, Cunane motioned to Federal Defendant Barrett Johnson that ’ Phillip was upstairs. See Johnson Depo. 81:17-82:15. Cunane and Leone remained on the first floor with Linda and Dwayne, who had been asleep on an air mattress on the living room floor when the Marshals arrived. See Leone Depo. 45:7-19. Johnson, O’Brien, and Hunsinger (in that order) began to climb the stairs, which are located directly in front of the front door. See Leone Depo. 45:5-7; Hunsinger Depo. 28:12-14; id. 28:17-19. They went up the stairs “tactically,” meaning they ascended slowly and methodically, with weapons drawn, trying to be “as quiet as possible.” See Johnson Depo. 83:15-84:20. Johnson testified that as he ascended the stairs, he could see a doorway at the top of the stairs that led to a bathroom, and doorways at his one o’clock and three o’clock positions that led into bedrooms. See Johnson Depo. 89-92. There were no doors in the doorways, and no banister or railing at the top of the steps, apparently because of ongoing renovations. See Hunsinger Depo. 29:1; see also Complaint ¶¶ 36-37 (noting that house had “no interior privacy doors” and no “retention banister” due to ongoing renovations). Johnson stated that as' he approached the top of the steps, he saw a black male, sitting on what Johnson believed to be a television console, with his head down, and holding a gun in his right hand between his legs. See Johnson Depo. 114:21-115:3; Bober Decl. Ex. B (report of investigation signed by Johnson). What happened next is subject to dispute by the parties. It is undisputed that very soon or immediately after Johnson reached the top of the stairs he said the word “gun” and began to push the other agents down the steps. See Johnson Depo. 111:22-112:2; id. 116:2-4; Hunsinger Depo. 29:4-10. It is also undisputed that simultaneously or almost simultaneously, everyone in the house heard a gunshot. See Johnson Depo. 120:13-14; Hunsinger Depo. 29:4-10; Dwayne Depo. 94-95; Linda Depo. 153-54. The Plaintiffs point out that members of the law enforcement group present in the house that day have testified to slightly different depictions of the events immediately before the gunshot was heard. Cunane stated in his report that all of the officers made it to the top of the stairs and “witnessed Martin reaching for a handgun”. See Cunane Report. U.S. Marshals investigator Kenneth King’s report contained similar information. See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Concise Statement of Disputed Facts (hereinafter “SDF”) ¶¶ 301-303. The two key differences between Cunane’s and King’s depiction of the events and Defendants’ current version of the facts are: (1) that in Cunane’s and King’s versions “all of the officers” made it to the top of the stairs and saw Phillip Martin, rather than the Federal Defendants’ current depiction of the facts wherein just Johnson reached the top of the stairs; and (2) that Martin was not holding a gun at the time he was seen by law enforcement personnel but instead he was reaching for a gun at that time. Plaintiffs also point out that while Johnson testified at a deposition that Phillip Martin raised his hand towards his head while holding the firearm, his report on January 8, 2008, does not state that, and Johnson could not explain why his deposition testimony is contradicted by his incident report. See SDF ¶¶ 95-96; Exhibit P-13. Finally, Plaintiffs point out that Hunsinger, who was one of the three officers that ascended the stairs towards Phillip Martin’s room, testified he never saw Phillip Martin with a gun or reaching for a gun. See SDF ¶ 363. This last fact is actually consistent with what Defendants are claiming the undisputed facts are for the purposes of this summary judgment motion — that only Johnson reached the top of the stairs and witnessed Phillip Martin holding a gun. As stated above, the parties agree that what happened next was that Johnson said the word, “gun” and simultaneously or nearly simultaneously a gunshot was heard. At this stage in the litigation, there has been no evidence produced that anyone currently living saw this shot being fired. The evidence presented by Defendants suggests that the shot was fired by Phillip Martin. Plaintiffs do not present any direct evidence that the shot was fired by anyone else, but they point to what they consider are inconsistencies in Defendants’ evidence. Defendants say that as Johnson said the word “gun”, he began to push the other agents down the steps. See Johnson Depo. 111:22-112:2; id. 116:2-4; Hunsinger Depo. 29:4-10. Dwayne Marshall, one of the Plaintiffs, testified that he never lost sight of the Marshals (see Dwayne Depo. 95:5-18) was “looking up the steps” when he heard one gunshot (id. 96:8-12), and did not see any Marshal fire his gun (id. at 97:4-6; see also Bober Decl. Ex. GG (transcript of interview with Dwayne Martin dated January 8, 2008) (hereinafter “1/8/08 Dwayne Interview”). Leone was wearing a microphone underneath his jacket that he could use to communicate with the officers who were outside the house. See Leone Depo. 53:21-24; id. 54:11-16. Leone testified that he yelled “shots fired” into his microphone, positioned himself at the bottom of the stairs, and pointed his gun toward the top of the stairs to cover the three Marshals who were descending. See Leone Depo. 53:21-24; id. 54:11-16. When the Marshals reached the bottom of the stairs, Hunsinger and the other Marshals asked Johnson what had happened, and Johnson replied that he had seen a man with a gun, that the man was bringing the gun up towards his head, and that the man might have shot himself. See Hunsinger Depo. 29:12-18; Leone Depo. 56:19-57:7. The Marshals testified that they were unsure whether the individual with the gun had in fact shot himself, or whether he had been shooting at the Marshals or into the air, and also whether he was still armed and dangerous. See Hun-singer Depo. 29:23-30:2; Leone Depo. 57:8-10. Defendants Fallon and Scott, who were assigned to the perimeter, did not enter 103 S. 35th St. until after the gunshot had been fired. Bober Decl. Ex. Q (Scott Interrogatories); id. Ex. R (Fallon Interrogatories). The Marshals then called the Camden City Police Department to request assistance, and eventually members of what has variously been referred to as the Camden City Police Department Emergency Response Team (“ERT”) or the “SWAT team”, arrived on the scene. See Leone Depo. 69:16-70:17. While they waited for the ERT to arrive, the Marshalls remained downstairs, and tried to establish contact with Martin, including by yelling up the stairs to him and by calling him on a cell phone number that was provided to them by Dwayne. See Scott Interrogatories at 5; Dwayne Depo. 112:24-113:8; see also Leone Depo. 69:9-70:13. Camden City police officers began to arrive on the scene, in response to the “shots fired” radio call. See e.g., Scott Interrogatories at 5. Then, upon the SWAT team’s arrival, members of the team were advised that a gunshot had gone off on the second floor of the premises. See Brief of Camden City Defendants in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter “Camden City Br.”) Ex. B (Saponare Dep.) at 32:4-11. Before any member of the SWAT team entered the premises, Linda Martin executed a “Consent to Search” form. See id. at 38:7-13; see also Camden City Br. Ex. C (executed Consent to Search form) (hereinafter “Consent to Search”). At some point after the gunshot, the law enforcement officers in the Martin home had forced Linda and Dwayne to leave the house. See e.g., Cunane Depo. 72:12-73:3; Leone Depo. 54:2-3. The circumstances of Linda and Dwayne’s removal and of Linda’s execution of the Consent to Search form are in dispute and are addressed in more detail infra. After repeated attempts to contact Phillip proved unsuccessful, the Marshals ceded control of the situation to the SWAT team, and at approximately 7:30 a.m. the SWAT team entered Phillip’s bedroom. See Bober Decl. Ex. I (Camden Police Department Information Report dated January 8, 2008) & Ex. J (USMS Report of Investigation dated January 8, 2008). Officer Angel Ramos, who was carrying a bulletproof shield, was the first officer up the stairs and into the bedroom. See Ramos Depo. 8:21-23; 9:7-13. When Ramos entered the room he observed what he described as “a black male kneeling down,” which turned out to be the slumped over body of Phillip Martin. See Ramos Depo. 9:5. Ramos also saw a handgun on the floor in “close proximity to the body.” See Ramos Depo. 9:17-18. It was standard procedure for the SWAT team to render a handgun safe— i.e., to unload it — to protect against the possibility that an unknown person could be hiding somewhere in the house and would try to use the gun against them. See Pleskonko Depo. 14:20-15:4; id. at 16:6-15; Ramos Depo. 13:5-16. In this matter, there has been no evidence put forth that any particular officer made the gun found on the floor in Phillip Martin’s bedroom safe, but the gun was later found away from Phillip Martin’s body on the opposite side of the mattress on which Martin’s body partially rested, with the bullets removed and placed next to it. Officer Ramos testified that he personally did not touch the gun, and that he did not see and was not aware that any other member of the SWAT team touched the gun; he also testified that if the gun had been touched, it would not have been the subject of an incident report, but that someone would have told the commander that it had been touched. Ramos Depo. 8:11-11:5. Once the SWAT team determined that Phillip Martin was dead and that there was no one else in the house, they left, telling the Marshals on their way out that they had found a dead body upstairs. See Leone Depo. 70:14-23. At that point, with both Marshals and Camden City Police Department personnel in and around the house, crime scene investigators Ellis and McBride from the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office entered the home and began to process the scene. See Leone Depo. 71:8-24; O’Brien Depo. 39:24-47:2; see also Bober Decl. Ex. J (Report of Investigation dated January 8, 2008). Ellis and McBride photographed and videotaped the scene and collected a variety of physical evidence, including a .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with a black knit cap taped tightly around the grip; a discharged, deformed bullet that had ricocheted around the room and landed on the floor close to Martin’s body; a spent shell casing; and unfired live rounds that had been removed from the weapon. See Bober Decl. Ex. L (Camden County Prosecutor’s Office Evidence Submission Review and receipt). Defendant Keith James of Camden County Police Department, who had arrived at 103 South 35th Street after the shooting, also took photographs. See Bober Decl. Ex. H (Defendant Keith James’ answers to interrogatories). Phillip’s body was removed by the Camden County Medical Examiner’s Office, which performed an autopsy the next day, January 9, 2008. See Bober Decl. Ex. O (autopsy report dated January 9, 2008). Defendant Feigin conducted the post-mortem examination and autopsy at the Underwood Hospital Morgue. See Post-Mortem Report, Goldberg Decl., Exhibit B. Dr. Feigin concluded that the cause of decedent’s death was “[g]unshot wound to head” and that the manner of death was “[sjuicide.” See Goldberg Decl., Exhibit B. The medical examiner also determined that Phillip Martin’s wound was a “contact wound,” meaning that the muzzle of the gun was pressed against the head when the gun was fired. See id.; see also Feigin Depo. 185-86. The examiner determined that the bullet entered slightly above the right ear near the right temple, traveled from right to left and slightly upward, and exited at the left side of the skull, toward the back of the head. See Bober Decl. Ex. O (autopsy report). Defendant Ellis’s report for the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office concluded that Phillip shot himself in the head at his right temple with the .38 Smith & Wesson that was recovered at the scene. See Bober Decl. Ex. P (Camden County Prosecutor’s Office, Summary Investigative Report). The report describes the path of the bullet as exiting the left side of Phillip’s head, striking a wall, ricocheting off another wall leaving behind hair and tissue splatter, and landing on the ground near Phillip where it was recovered. These items were later provided to the New Jersey State Police Ballistics Laboratory, which determined that the casing that was recovered from the scene had been fired from the gun that was recovered at the scene, but that tests on the bullet were inconclusive. See Bober Decl. Ex. M (New Jersey State Police Laboratory Report dated April 13, 2009). Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Medical Examiner and Prosecutor’s Office made the determinations that they did, but Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Feigin and the Camden County Prosecutor’s office did not conduct “good faith, adequate and unbiased” investigations and “deliberately failed to obtain significant material evidence ... that would have shown that Phillip Martin’s death was not suicidal.” See SDF ¶ 55; PL Opp. to Camden County Pros. Mot. Sum. J. (docket no. 135) at 4-5. Plaintiffs’ also submitted the reports of a forensic pathologist, forensic psychologist and forensic scientist, who have all raised certain issues with the Defendants’ methods and conclusions. See Pl. Opp. to Def. Mot. Sum. J., Exs. 103-105. Plaintiffs’ forensic science consultant, Gary Rini M.F.S., concluded that Phillip Martin’s death was not a suicide. Among other opinions offered by Rini, he says that Martin was on his knees at the time he sustained the fatal wound and that “suicide can be excluded as the manner of death” because “the scene was altered,” there was no blood found on the .38 Smith & Wesson or on Phillip’s hands, and Phillip’s right hand “was discovered tucked in a bag beneath him and between his legs.” See Bober Deck Ex. CC (expert report of Gary Rini). Rini wrote: “there is no evidence documented or present that demonstrates that the decedent died as the result of a self inflicted gunshot wound.” Id. Pathologist Dr. Emily Wofford Ward says that “Dr. Feigin’s determination that Mr. Martin’s manner of death was a suicide is flawed.” She says that “[t]he wound that Dr. Feigin describes is more consistent with a .40 caliber (or larger) bullet than from a .38 caliber bullet.” Ward raises some questions about parts of the report that she finds confusing, and faults Dr. Feigin because his examination, both his written description and the attached photographs, were in her opinion unclear. Dr. Ward concludes that “the manner of Mr. Martin’s death was not the result of a self-inflicted contact wound to his head by a .38 caliber handgun.” Plaintiffs also submit the report of Dr. Manuel St. Martin, who conducted a “psychological autopsy.” St. Martin concludes that Phillip might not have killed himself because he does not fit the profile of someone who would die by a self-inflicted gunshot wound during police confrontations and because he believes that there are inconsistencies in the police reports and autopsy reports that were created. Linda and Dwayne’s Detention The facts surrounding Linda and Dwayne’s detention after removal from their home are in dispute. In sum, the Defendants all disclaim involvement with Linda and Dwayne’s transportation to the police department for questioning, although it seems that Defendants do not deny that the Martins were removed from their home, detained in a vehicle, and somehow transported to the Camden City police station where they were eventually questioned by law enforcement officers including Defendant Investigator Gary McBride of the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office and Defendant Wayne Matthews of the Camden City Police. Plaintiffs assert that they were detained and transported in a Camden Police Department vehicle after they were forcibly removed from their home in night clothes, transported to Camden Police Department, and interrogated inside a secured room, all against their will and in spite of their protestations. Cunane testified that immediately after the gunshot was heard he told Dwayne to stay where he was. Cunane Depo. 73:14-19. Cunane testified that at some point he “removed” Linda and Dwayne from the home. The testimony adduced in discovery suggests that Linda Martin’s forcible removal from the home happened almost immediately after the gunshot was fired; Leone testified that as the Marshals who had ascended the steps rapidly descended after the gunshot was heard, “Kevin [Cunane] was moving Mrs. Martin out towards the front door.” See Leone Depo. 53:24-54:3. Cunane himself testified that he “pushed [Linda] out the front door.” Cunane Depo. 72:12-73:3. However, the evidence is not clear as to exactly what happened after Linda Martin was pushed out the door. Cunane testified that he removed Linda for her safety, and that he was aware that after he pushed her out the front door she was placed in a vehicle, although due to the chaotic nature of the time-period after the gunshot was heard Cunane did not know who placed Linda in the vehicle or whose vehicle it was. Id. 70:17-71:9. Linda Martin testified that Camden City police officers “pulled” her out of the house, and “dragged” her across the street while she was barefoot and in her pajamas and eventually forced her into a police car. Linda Depo. 175:6-178:5. She said that the officer who put her in the car did so without explanation and then sat down in the front seat and did not respond to Linda Martin’s questions. Id. 174:11-175:5. Linda Martin then sat in the police car and witnessed the SWAT team arrive and later bring her son Dwayne out of the house in handcuffs. Id. 178:20-179:4. Dwayne, for unexplained reasons, was allowed to remain in the home longer than his mother, albeit under the close supervision of the Marshals. See, e.g., Dwayne Depo. 112:7-11. Dwayne said about the circumstances of his leaving the house: “they just asked me to leave and I left.” Id. 112:20-23. Cunane testified that he “removed Dwayne from the house” and that he then “handed [him] off to a Camden City Police Officer who had arrived on the scene.” Cunane Depo. 72:12-73:4-7. As he walked out the front door, he was handcuffed and placed into the Camden City police car where his mother was already sitting. Dwayne Depo. 113:10-12. Ms. Martin testified that as she sat in the car, before Dwayne was brought to join her, Defendant Wiley of the Camden City Police presented her with a “Consent to Search” form in which the operative fields that are meant to be completed were blank. When Linda Martin refused to sign the “blank” form, the police officers who presented it to her filled it out with pertinent information. Linda Depo. 180:3-183:14. Linda Martin said that she was forced to sign the form, and did not read it before signing it. Id. 183:16-184:2. Ms. Martin also testified that the doors were locked during the duration of her time in the police car. Id. 186:21-23. At one point, Linda asked Officer Wiley and another officer whether she could get clothes, shoes, and a handbag from the house, which the officers disallowed without explanation. Id. 189:15-20. Eventually, Linda and Dwayne were driven to the Camden City Police Station by the uniformed police officer who had been sitting in the front seat of the car the whole time. See Dwayne Depo. 113:10-12; Linda Depo. 193:18-194:4. Linda recalled that when they arrived at the station, the police officer who drove her told another officer who had been at Linda Martin’s home earlier and who was entering the police station at the same time that he “ha[d] the mother here and she’s not cooperative.” Linda Depo. 196:17-197:18. At the station, Linda and Dwayne were taken to separate places. The officer driving the car took Dwayne downstairs separate from his mother and handcuffed him to a wall in what Dwayne called “a holding cell.” Id. 113:13-114:3. According to Dwayne, he was not told why he was being held, and he remained there handcuffed to the wall in a locked holding cell for what he remembered as forty-five minutes, which is probably relatively accurate given the timeline. Id. 114:15-115:13. Linda was in a separate room. She was not handcuffed, nor was the door locked, but she was told she could not leave. Id. 194:18-195:21; 199:16-200:7. At one point she freely left the room to use the bathroom, and she was allowed to use someone’s phone to call her mother, but she was made to continue to wait alone in a room despite her requests to be allowed to leave. Id. 205:3. Eventually, Dwayne’s handcuffs were removed, he was allowed to use the bathroom, and then he was taken to what he called a “conference room” where he rejoined his mother who was sitting at a table. Id. 117:2-118:3. There also were law enforcement officers in the conference room at that time; it was in that room that Linda and Dwayne were told that Phillip had committed suicide. Id. 121:9-17. While they were in the conference room together, Linda asked to leave and was told by one of the people in a suit that she could not leave at that time. Id. 131:21— 132:10. Linda and Dwayne were each interviewed separately by Defendants McBride and Matthews, which interviews were recorded and transcribed. The recorded portions of the interviews lasted seven minutes (Dwayne) and eleven minutes (Linda), although as all of the undisputed evidence makes clear the Plaintiffs spent more time at the police station than it took to conduct the interviews. During her interview, Linda Martin clearly expresses her desire to go home. McBride tells her that she is not being forced to remain at the police station, but the record reflects that he did not take any steps to make sure she was allowed to leave. Eventually, a police officer drove Linda and Dwayne home. Plaintiffs’ March 23, 2008 Letter The Plaintiffs sent a letter on March 23, 2008 to Camden City Police Chief Edward Harges. See PI. Opp. to Mot. Sum. J., Ex. 87. In the “cc” field, Plaintiffs’ letter lists 11 additional state and local recipients, including Governor Corzine and various other government officials. Plaintiffs also claim that other officials, including Chris Christie in his role as United States Attorney, received the letter as evidence by certified mail receipts indicating that something, although it is not clear what, was mailed to Christie and the others. See PI. Opp. to Mot. Sum. J., Ex. 109 (docket no. 134-12). In the letter, Linda Martin complains about the events of January 8, 2008. Ms. Martin says U.S. Marshals went to her home and “caus[ed] [her] son to take his life”, although she also says that “[fjrom their actions, it appears to Phillip’s family and friends that the Marshals came with the sole intent to kill him.” Linda Martin complains about the actions of the law enforcement officers on the morning in question, faulting the Marshals for their sudden entrance and their failure to use less forceful means to get Phillip Martin to come downstairs, and she faults the Marshals and other officers for the way they treated her and Dwayne in the aftermath of the gunshot being heard. In the letter, Plaintiffs do not ask for any specific relief, nor do they threaten suit or make a claim for money damages. Instead the letter seems to be asking for answers to Linda Martin’s questions. It is not clear what action, if any, Defendants took in response to the letter, but it is undisputed that none of the Defendants responded to the letter, although there is a dispute as to whether all of the Defendants received the letter. The record reflects that the ballistic work performed on the gun found in Phillip Martin’s room was not ordered until April 2008, which was after Plaintiffs sent the letter. The Complaint Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a complaint on January 6, 2010, alleging that they had “reason to believe” that the Marshals and Camden City Police “entered [their] home without a search warrant and without invitation [and] did cause [Phillip Martini’s death.” See Complaint dated January 6, 2010 (docket no. 1). Plaintiffs then retained counsel and filed two amended complaints. The operative pleading is thus the Second Amended Complaint (docket no. 40), which contains seven causes of action. Count V, which alleged that Camden County Prosecutor Warren Faulk is liable to Plaintiffs for failing to properly train and supervise his employees in the areas of crime scene investigations, was previously dismissed by order of Judge Garrett Brown for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Docket Nos. 36, 37. The remaining Defendants did not file motions to dismiss, and instead each moved for summary judgment in November and December, 2012, after extensive discovery was taken. DISCUSSION I. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court should grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Concomitantly, “the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). Thus, “there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Id.; First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968). To that end, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) the, court noted: In our view, the plain language of rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has established the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion “must do more than simply show some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that the party opposing the motion must present evidence which is not merely “colorable” but which is “significantly probative.”). II. The Claims Six causes of action remain in this lawsuit. Count One, subtitled “4th Amendment Violations by the above listed USMS agents,” alleges that the Federal Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for violating their 4th Amendment rights and alleges a conspiracy and cover-up by the agents. Count Two, subtitled “14th Amendment Equal Protection Violation,” alleges that the “above listed law enforcement officers from Camden County, and [the Camden City Police Department]” are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Plaintiffs’ 14th Amendment equal protections and/or due process rights, and that Defendant Dr. Feigin is liable to the decedent’s estate for violating his 14th amendment equal protection rights by discriminating against Phillip Martin on the basis of his race, as evidenced by the “deficient autopsy report and manner of death conclusion.” Count Three, subtitled “4th Amendment Violations by state actors,” alleges that the “above listed law enforcement officers of Camden County and the [Camden City Police Department]” are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Plaintiffs’ 4th Amendment rights through their “unlawful acts.” Count Four, subtitled “Violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act,” alleges that the “above listed law enforcement officers of Camden County and the [Camden City Police Department” are liable under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1, et seq., “because of [their] unlawful actions,” and that Dr. Feigin is liable under the CRA “because of his sub-standard work and discriminatory intent.” Count Six, subtitled “Violations of NJ Constitution, Article I, Section 7,” alleges that “defendants” are liable to the estate of Phillip Martin for excessive use of force and to Linda and Dwayne Martin for “unlawfully entering and searching the family home; for unlawfully arresting them; and for their unlawful false imprisonment,” all in violation of the New Jersey Constitution. Count Seven, subtitled “Common Law Wrongful Death and Survival Action,” alleges that “defendants” breached their duty to the decedent to use reasonable efforts in the conduct of their official duties to avoid unnecessary harm to him thus causing his death, and as a result defendants are liable to Phillip Martin’s estate and to his beneficiaries. The Plaintiffs seek, among other things: a declaratory judgment that Phillip Martin’s death was not a suicide, and that Defendants’ actions violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the Constitution and state and federal statutes; (2) an injunction that will mandate institutional changes to require defendants to provide training to officers in the are of crime scene investigations involving claims of death through suicide; and (3) an award of compensatory and punitive damages. The claims in the Second Amended Complaint suffer from vagueness and ambiguity that make it difficult to ascertain what the factual basis for the claims are as well as which defendants they are directed at. A plain reading the claims in the Second Amended Complaint would suggest that Count One is directed only at the Federal Defendants, Count Two is directed at the Camden City Defendants, Camden County Defendants, and to Dr. Feigin, Count Three is directed to the Camden City and Camden County Defendants, Count Four is directed to the Camden City and Camden County Defendants, as well as to Dr. Feigin, Count Six is directed to the Federal, Camden City, and Camden County Defendants, and Count Seven is directed to all Defendants. However, in Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, Plaintiffs asserted that some of the claims which do not on their faces appear to be directed at certain defendants in fact are, and that certain claims which on their face appear to address particular factual allegations actually address additional or alternative factual allegations. This mid-stream clarification of the claims is ordinarily improper. However, this opinion addresses the full breadth of Plaintiffs’ claims as set forth in the Second Amended Complaint as well as in Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motions for summary judgment, and finds that only a narrow subset of Plaintiffs’ claims survive summary judgment, which are the 4th Amendment claims in Count Three related to Linda and Dwayne’s detention after the gunshot and asserted by way of § 1988. III. Count One: 4th Amendment Violations by the Federal Defendants Subsumed within Count One are several different theories of liability rooted in Plaintiffs’ right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures as bestowed by the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs’ main allegation in Count One is that one of the U.S. Marshals shot Phillip Martin and thereby violated his 4th Amendment right to be free from excessive force. However, also under Count One, Plaintiffs allege that the U.S. Marshals used excessive force by drawing their weapons and in the manner they approached Phillip Martin on the morning in question. In addition, under Count One the Plaintiffs allege that the U.S. Marshals violated Plaintiffs’ 4th Amendment rights by entering the Martin home, and by detaining Linda and Dwayne Martin after the gunshot rang out as the Marshals ascended the stairs towards Phillip Martin’s bedroom. In analyzing these allegations and all the constitutional violations alleged by Plaintiffs, the Court considers whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Courts first examine if “the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This is where most of the analysis ends in this case. However, if a court finds that a right has been violated, then courts inquire whether the right that was violated “was clearly established,” or, stated differently, “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted.” Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 207 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151). In ruling on Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the Court’s analysis begins with the question of whether any constitutional rights have been violated. A. Unjustified Shooting The Court will first address the Plaintiffs’ theories of liability that are predicated on the first set of factual allegations — i.e., the allegations that one of the Federal Defendants killed Phillip Martin. Plaintiffs allege, in essence, that Phillip Martin was murdered. As explained below, the Court finds that there is no evidence to support the allegations of a shooting by one of the Marshals, that Plaintiffs’ broad allegations of a “conspiracy” or cover-up do not change that, and instead, the admissible evidence points to the only plausible conclusion: that Phillip Martin committed suicide as the Marshals closed in to arrest him. The most important testimony on this issue is that of Dwayne Martin. Dwayne testified that (1) he was in the living room as the Marshals ascended the stairs, (2) he could see the Marshals — “their full body from their head to their toes” — as they climbed the stairs, (3) the Marshals never left the stairs, (4) they were never out of his sight, (5) he heard one gunshot, and (6) he did not see any Marshal fire his gun. See Dwayne Depo. 94:24-97:6. This testimony, with absolutely no admissible testimony to contradict it, is sufficient to resolve the excessive force (ie., murder) claim against the Marshals. The Marshals all agree that they either never made it off the stairs or, at most, made it to the landing at the top and turned around immediately. See Johnson Depo. 110:2-13 (“never made it to the landing”); O’Brien Depo. 69-71 (Johnson and Hunsinger made it to the landing, and gunshot was fired as they were descending); Hunsinger Depo. 40:19-21 (“I don’t believe he made it to the top. He might have been on the first or second [step] or maybe he was at the top landing.”); Id. 28-29 (heard gunshot as he was being pushed down stairs). There is no evidence that any Marshal fired his gun, and the only other person in the house, Linda, testified that she heard one gunshot but could not see from her vantage point who fired the gun. See Linda Depo. 155:7-10; see also id. 132:15-22. As stated above, in support of their opposition to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, Plaintiffs submitted a declaration by Linda Martin, which states that Phillip Martin was shot by one of the Federal Defendants. This declaration provides a different narrative than the one Linda Martin offered at her deposition and during an interview with Investigator McBride on the day of the incident. “A party may not create a material issue of fact by filing an affidavit disputing his or her own testimony without demonstrating a plausible explanation for the conflict.” Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 624 (3d Cir.2004). “[I]f it is clear that an affidavit is offered solely for the purpose of defeating summary judgment, it is proper for the trial judge to conclude that no reasonable jury could accord that affidavit evidentiary weight and that summary judgment is appropriate.” Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir.2007). Here, it is clear to the Court that Linda Martin’s declaration is offered solely for the purpose of defeating summary judgment by creating a triable issue of fact, and accordingly the Court will disregard the declaration in its entirety, which is appropriate because a district court may disregard this type of affidavit unless there is independent evidence to bolster the contradictory testimony. See id. at 253-254. Here, the declaration filed by Ms. Martin in an attempt to avoid summary judgment directly contradicts her deposition testimony on several crucial facts. Most importantly, Linda Martin testified at her deposition that after the Marshals entered her home she stood in the middle of the living room because the Marshals told her to, and that she could not see who fired the gunshot although she thought it was a Marshal. See Linda Depo. 132:21-22; id. 133:3-9. In the affidavit submitted in support of her motion for summary judgment, however, Ms. Martin again swore that it was one of the Marshals who shot Phillip Martin but this time she said she was “standing at the bottom of the stair [sic] and watched the U.S. Marshals group,” and that “after the agents were upstairs and out of my sight, I heard a gunshot; definitely from one of the officers.” ¶¶ 4, 12-13. The crucial difference is that now Ms. Martin is saying that she was in a vantage point to see the Marshals ascend the stairs, reach the top, then go out of view. Previously, she had said she was standing in the middle of the living room and that she could not see the Marshals. In addition, although more relevant to the topic of the Marshals entrance into the Martin home and the legal claims associated with that, Linda previously testified at her deposition that she had a conversation with the Marshals before they entered the home, and they entered after she told them that Phillip, the fugitive they were looking for, was in the house: Q: Did they ask you who was in the house with you? A: Yes, they did. Q: Who did you tell them was in the house with you? A: My son Dwayne and Phillip. Q: And what happened after that? A: They forced theirself in my house with their guns drawn and went upstairs and shot my son. 132:8-17. This is consistent with her statement to the local police on that day: Q: Okay, so you answered the door, you saw them they had ... A: They asked me who was here, I said me and my two sons. Q: Um Hum. A: And um, they came in and asked Dwayne his name and um they said what’s the other son’s name. I said Phillip, he’s upstairs. See Jan. 8, 2008, interview of Linda Martin. Now, recognizing that this admission is fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims, see infra, Ms. Martin seems to have changed her story, claiming that the Marshals “simply barged their way in after I opened the door.” Plaintiffs do not provide a “plausible explanation for the conflicts],” Baer, 392 F.3d at 624, so the Court will disregard the declaration. Jiminez, 503 F.3d at 253. Without Linda Martin’s declaration, the plaintiffs have submitted no evidence that the Marshals shot Phillip Martin. In their opposition to the Federal Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs offer no response to the point made that Dwayne testified that the Marshals never left his sight and never left the steps, yet all the evidence suggests, and even plaintiffs’ expert opines, that the bullet that killed Phillip was fired from inside his bedroom, which was out of Dwayne’s sight and clearly not where the Marshals were standing when the shot went off. Although Linda and Dwayne Martin have testified that they believe Phillip did not kill himself, their belief as stated by them is based only on speculation, rather than facts or anything they observed. Summary judgment cannot be avoided by resorting to speculation, or statements of personal opinion or mere belief; indeed, “inference based on speculation or conjecture does not create a material factual dispute.” Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n. 12 (3d Cir.1990); see also Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 608 (3d Cir.2002) (party opposing summary judgment must rely on facts, not “opinions or conclusions”). There is no evidence apart from speculation that any Marshal fired his weapon, let alone that any Marshal made it to the top of the stairs, down the hallway, entered Phillip’s room, shot him at close range from inside the room from a position consistent with the trajectory that the bullet traveled, and then had time to cover-up the scene. The Court simply, does not see how that is possible, let alone plausible, based on the evidence in the record. The physical evidence also supports the conclusion that Phillip shot himself. The bullet entered near Phillip’s right temple and exited on the left side of his head; see Bober Decl. Exhibit 0 (Autopsy Report). Phillip was right-handed. See Linda Depo. 172:8-12. The medical examiner determined that the wound was a close-contact wound, meaning that the muzzle of the weapon was pressed against Phillip’s head when the trigger was pulled. See Autopsy Report; Feigin Depo. 185-86. The bullet traveled on an upward trajectory through Phillip’s brain. See Autopsy Report. These facts are consistent with a suicide and with Dwayne’s testimony (as well as the testimony of the Marshals themselves) that the Marshals never left the steps, or, at most, were on the landing before turning around immediately. Dwayne’s and the Marshals’ testimony is inconsistent with the idea that one of the Marshals left the steps and shot Phillip Martin from close range, and with an upward trajectory. A single deformed .38 caliber bullet was found in the room, along with a .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, and the New Jersey State Police ballistics laboratory concluded that the spent casing that was recovered in the room had been fired from the .38 Smith & Wesson that was reeovered. See Bober Decl. Ex. M (Lab Report). Plaintiffs’ three expert reports do nothing to change the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs have offered no plausible theory to support their version of the facts and to controvert the well-supported narrative offered by Defendants. Plaintiffs’ ballistics expert, Gary Rini, opines that “suicide can be excluded as the manner of death” because “the scene was altered,” there was no blood found on the .38 Smith & Wesson or on Phillip’s hands, and Phillip’s right hand “was discovered tucked in a bag beneath him and between his legs.” See Bober Decl. Ex. CC (expert report of Gary Rini). Thus, according to Rini, “there is no evidence documented or present that demonstrates that the decedent died as the result of a self-inflicted gunshot wound.” Id. At the same time, Rini’s rendering of the path that the bullet must have taken confirms that the bullet must have been fired from inside the bedroom. See Bober Decl. Ex. DD (rendering prepared by Rini). Rini does not explain who, if not Phillip, was the shooter, and how that shooter did so from inside the bedroom. The notion that there was someone else in the bedroom at the time of the shooting is inconsistent with all of the deposition testimony before the Court, which agrees that none of the Marshals ever made it past the top of the step, or at the very farthest, the landing. The plaintiffs’ other reports are from a psychiatrist who states that he performed a “psychological autopsy,” and a pathologist who opines that the autopsy was flawed. The psychiatrist, Manuel St. Martin, concludes that Phillip might not have killed himself because he does not fit the profile of someone who would die by a self-inflicted gunshot wound during police confrontations; St. Martin says that such people are typically males either in domestic violence disputes, in hot pursuit by law enforcement, or in standoffs following the commission of a crime. See Bober Decl. Ex. EE at 3. But here, where a fugitive task force has surrounded the home of a suspect, entered the home, and is ascending the steps, guns drawn, in an attempt to arrest the suspect, it certainly can be said that police are in “hot pursuit” or a standoff situation. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, St. Martin offers no opinion on whether Phillip killed himself, but rather states that “information about how Mr. Martin spent his final weeks and observations could shed light on the presence or absence of suicidal intent.” Id. Finally, the plaintiffs submit the report of a pathologist, Dr. Emily Wofford Ward, who impugns the methods of Defendant Dr. Feigin. Dr. Ward complains that Dr. Feigin’s report is “quite short and confusing,” and that the photograph of the wound “is of such poor quality and so out of focus that any interpretation of the wound appearance, based on the photographs, cannot be based on reasonable medical certainty and, therefore, would be more conjecture than sound opinion.” See Bober Deck Ex. FF. But it is Dr. Ward’s opinion that is based on a photograph of poor quality, not Dr. Feigin’s; Dr. Feigin actually conducted the autopsy. Dr. Ward, on the other hand, does base her opinion on the photograph, and even though she believes the quality is so poor that “any interpretation” would be “conjecture,” she opines that Phillip’s death “was not the result of a self-inflicted contact wound.” Id. Given that she admits that the photograph is so poor that any opinion based upon it would be “conjecture,” her opinion is of questionable admissibility. Finally, the fact that she opines so carefully that Phillip’s wound was not a “contact wound”, leaves open the possibility that Phillip fired the gun himself, as the Defendants contend he did. These reports on their faces are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. “When an expert opinion is not supported by sufficient facts to validate it in the eyes of the law, or when indisputable record facts contradict or otherwise render the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury’s verdict.” Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209, 113 S.Ct. 2578, 125 L.Ed.2d 168 (1993). Thus, courts grant summary judgment when the expert relied upon by the party opposing the motion does not rely on sufficient facts to support his opinion. See, e.g., Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1198-99 (3d Cir.1995) (affirming grant of summary judgment where plaintiffs expert “lack[ed] a factual basis”; “expert testimony without ... a factual foundation cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment”). Because the Plaintiffs’ expert reports are conjecture and further because they are contradicted by the record, they are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Against the substantial evidence presented by Defendants that Phillip Martin’s death was a suicide, and without the declaration of Linda Martin and the expert reports, Plaintiffs can only point to various alleged inconsistencies or deficiencies in the ensuing investigation and in testimony-generated during this litigation, which they contend are evidence that the Marshals killed Phillip Martin and that the Marshals and the rest of the Defendants conspired to cover up the killing. However, Plaintiffs have submitted absolutely no credible evidence that Phillip Martin’s death was anything but a suicide. Defendants’ various theories of inconsistencies and deficiencies in the investigation are too numerous to recount all of them here, but the Court will address a few of the allegations. Citing Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir.1982), Plaintiffs argue that there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the Federal Defendants employed the “throw-down” technique, i.e., that the Federal Defendants killed an unarmed Phillip and then “threw down” a gun next to him to make it look as if the he had been armed. See Opp. Br. 17-21. But Webster is readily distinguishable. Unlike the instant case, the plaintiffs in Webster had very strong evidence to support their claims apart from speculation: first, a taxi driver and a local resident who had witnessed the shooting testified that Webster had no weapon and was shot without putting up any resistance. Id. Further, one of the arresting officers testified against his fellow officers and admitted under oath that Webster had been shot while he was pinned to the ground and, in the officer’s opinion, his fellow officers had used excessive force. Id. at 1222. Plaintiffs here do not have anything that approaches the evidence in Webster. Plaintiffs’ arguments are based largely on the fact that defendant Tim O’Brien testified in his deposition that he had inherited a Smith & Wesson when his father-in-law passed away in 1992, which was the same type of gun that was recovered near Phillip’s body. See Opp. Br. at 20-21. There is no evidence tying the gun recovered at the scene to the gun O’Brien inherited from his father-in-law. Further, O’Brien later corrected his testimony, explaining that he was mistaken and the gun in question was actually a Colt. See generally O’Brien Deck Plaintiffs argue, as Defendants did with regard to Linda Martin’s declaration, that the “sham affidavit” doctrine applies and that the Court should disregard O’Brien’s corrective declaration. See Opp. Br. at 20-21. However, unlike Linda Martin, O’Brien has provided a plausible explanation for the conflict between his declaration and his testimony. Further, the point on which his decl