Full opinion text
OPINION & ORDER LORETTA A. PRESKA, Chief Judge: Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), filed this action against Defendant Bloomberg L.P. (“Bloomberg”) after several current and former employees had filed charges with the EEOC alleging sex/pregnancy discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k), 2000e-2. (Second Amended Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6.) Generally, the complaint alleged that Bloomberg had discriminated and/or retaliated against the claimants and other similarly situated employees after they had announced their pregnancies and had returned to work following maternity leave. {Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.) Subsequently, Plaintiffs Jill Patricot, Tanys Lancaster, Janet Loures, Monica Prestía, Marina Kushnir, and Maria Mandalakis (collectively, the “Plaintiff-Intervenors”) intervened in this action on their own behalf. Before the Court is a motion brought by Bloomberg seeking summary judgment on claims asserted by the Plaintiff-Intervenors [dkt. no. 322], As set forth below, Defendant’s motion with respect to the Plaintiff-Intervenors is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 1. BACKGROUND The basic allegations and procedural history of this case as it pertains to the claims brought by the EEOC on behalf of the Non-Intervenor Plaintiffs are stated adequately in the Court’s prior opinions, with which the Court assumes the parties’ familiarity. EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P. (Bloomberg IV), [dkt. no. 557], 967 F.Supp.2d 802, 2013 WL 4799150 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2013); EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P. (Bloomberg III), 778 F.Supp.2d 458 (S.D.N.Y.2011); EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P. (Bloomberg II), 751 F.Supp.2d 628 (S.D.N.Y.2010); EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P. (Bloomberg I), No. 07 Civ. 8383, 2010 WL 3466370 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2010). Plaintiff EEOC brought a case on behalf of a class of similarly situated women who were pregnant and took maternity leave (“Class Members”), asserting that Defendant Bloomberg engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of the Class Members’ sex and/or pregnancy. The EEOC alleges that Bloomberg reduced pregnant women’s or mothers’ pay, demoted them in title or in number of directly reporting employees (also called “direct reports”), reduced their responsibilities, excluded them from management meetings, and subjected them to stereotypes about female caregivers, any and all of which violated the law because these adverse employment consequences were based on class members’ pregnancy or the fact that they took leave for pregnancy-related reasons. The Court has dismissed all claims brought by the EEOC. {See Bloomberg IV.) The only remaining claims are those brought by the Plaintiff-Intervenors. Consistent with their rights, the Court permitted Jill Patricot, Tanys Lancaster, Janet Loures, Monica Prestía, Marina Kushnir, and Maria Mandalakis to intervene in this action as plaintiffs to pursue claims on their own behalf. {See [dkt. nos. 6, 9, & 50].) In addition to claims brought under Title VII, the Plaintiff-Intervenors assert claims under Section 296(1) of the New York Executive Law (the “New York State Human Rights Law” or “NYSHRL”) and Section 8-107 of the New York City Administrative Code (the “New York City Human Rights Law” or “NYCHRL”). The Opinion that follows proceeds in two principal parts. First, the Court sets forth the legal standards relevant to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the Plaintiff-Intervenors’ claims. Then, the Court analyzes the instant motion as it relates to each of the Plaintiff-Intervenors, one-by-one. In so doing, the Court defers setting forth additional background specific to each individual Plaintiff-Intervenor’s claims until the portion of this opinion discussing that person’s claims. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Summary Judgment Standard In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court resolves all ambiguities and draws all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Lindsay v. Ass’n of Prof'l Flight Attendants, 581 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir.2009). “Summary judgment is appropriate only ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Kwan v. Schlein, 634 F.3d 224, 228 (2d Cir.2011) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Lindsay, 581 F.3d at 50. “The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Rule 56 mandates summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “[TJhere is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted). In the face of insufficient evidence, “there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “[Ejven in the fact-intensive context of discrimination cases,” “[i]t is now beyond cavil that summary judgment may be appropriate.” Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 993, 122 S.Ct. 460, 151 L.Ed.2d 378 (2001); see also Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 40 (2d Cir.2000) (instructing that “trial courts should not ‘treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact’ ” (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000))). Accordingly, a plaintiff alleging discrimination claims “cannot escape summary judgment merely by vaguely asserting the existence of some unspecified disputed material facts ... or defeat the motion through mere speculation or conjecture.” Jones v. Hirschfeld, 348 F.Supp.2d 50, 59 (S.D.N.Y.2004). Finally, in accordance with Local Rule 56.1, Bloomberg submitted a statement of material facts as to which it contends there is no genuine issue to be tried. (See generally Bloomberg 56.1.) Plaintiff-Intervenors, collectively, submitted a statement in opposition, (see generally Pl.-Intv’rs 56.1), and Bloomberg then submitted a reply thereto, (see generally Reply 56.1). To the extent any of these filings is not in total compliance with the local rules, the Court retains “broad discretion to accept [it], even if it does not comply strictly with the Rule’s requirements.” Primmer v. CBS Studios, Inc., 667 F.Supp.2d 248, 254 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (citing Photopaint Techs., LLC v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 155 n. 2 (2d Cir.2003); Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir.2001)). B. Statutes of Limitations Title VII provides a limitations period of 300 days for a claimant to file an administrative charge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). Although Title VII sets forth an individual filing rule, a “single-filing” or “piggybacking” exception to the rule might apply. Under such an exception, claims by all individuals arising out of similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame are deemed timely as of the date of the first-filed complaint with the EEOC. Snell v. Suffolk Cnty., 782 F.2d 1094, 1100 (2d Cir.1986). An individual who has previously filed her own EEOC charge, however, cannot invoke the exception. See Holowecki v. Fed. Express Corp., 440 F.3d 558, 564 (2d Cir.2006). In rare cases, a “continuing violation” exception may be observed under which, “if a Title VII plaintiff files an EEOC charge that is timely as to any incident of discrimination in furtherance of an ongoing policy of discrimination, all claims of acts of discrimination under that policy will be timely even if they would be untimely standing alone.” Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 220 (2d Cir.2004). The doctrine, however, clearly does not apply to “[discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, [or] denial of transfer.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). Under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, the statute of limitations is three years from the date that the claim accrued. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214; N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8—502(d); see also Greene v. Trs. of Columbia Univ. in N.Y., 234 F.Supp.2d 368, 377 (S.D.N.Y.2002). The limitations period tolls, though, during the period in which a complaint is filed with the EEOC and the issuance by the EEOC of a right-to-sue letter. See Cuttler v. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacob son, LLP, No. 10 Civ. 296(DAB), 2012 WL 1003511, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2012); Siddiqi v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 572 F.Supp.2d 353, 373 (S.D.N.Y.2008). C. Title VII & NYSHRL As the parties are aware, claims asserted under Title VII and the NYSHRL are analyzed pursuant to the same standard; therefore, analysis of identical claims brought by an individual under both of these laws can be performed in tandem. See Pucino v. Verizon Wireless Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 112, 117 n. 2 (2d Cir.2010). Plaintiff-Intervenors assert claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL arising in: (1) discrimination; (2) retaliation; (3) hostile work environment; and (4) constructive discharge. 1. Discrimination “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., prohibits various forms of employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” United States v. City of N.Y., 713 F.Supp.2d 300, 316 (S.D.N.Y.2010). As amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (“PDA”), Title VII prohibits “discrimination based on a woman’s pregnancy [because it] is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex.” Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983). Specifically, the PDA adds this definition to Title VII: The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); see id. § 2000e-l(a)-(b). An action for violation of Title VII may be brought by the person affected or by the EEOC. Here, the EEOC has brought an enforcement action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) on behalf of the twenty-nine Non-Intervenor Plaintiffs. Individuals may also intervene to assert their own claims, as has been done here by the Plaintiff-Intervenors. Similarly, the NYSHRL makes it “an unlawful discriminatory practice ... [f]or an employer ... because of an individual’s ... sex .;. to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1). To make out a pregnancy discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that she was treated differently from others who took leave or were otherwise unable or unwilling to perform their duties for reasons unrelated to pregnancy or that she simply was treated differently because of her pregnancy. Velez v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 244 F.R.D. 243, 264 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (“It has been repeatedly affirmed that the PDA does not require the creation of special programs for pregnant women; nor does it mandate any special treatment. To the contrary, the statute specifically requires that pregnant women be treated the same as all other employees with similar disabilities.” (quoting Dimino v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 64 F.Supp.2d 136, 157 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted))); see Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1448 (2d Cir.1995), reheard en banc on other grounds, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir.1997), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). At the summary judgment stage, such “claims are ordinarily analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and its progeny.” Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir.2008); see also Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir.) (applying McDonnell Douglas in pregnancy discrimination case). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie ease. Id. The plaintiffs burden of proof at this first stage “is not onerous.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). A plaintiff fulfills the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment by showing that: (1) she belonged to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to. an inference of discriminatory intent. Mathirampuzha, 548 F.3d at 78. Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a non-diseriminatory justification for its actions. As the Court of Appeals has noted, “[a]ny legitimate, non-discriminatory reason will rebut the presumption triggered by the prima facie case.” Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1335-36. The defendant’s burden is one of production, meaning that to rebut the presumption the defendant must “clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons” for the adverse employment action. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55, 101 S.Ct. 1089. At that point, the presumption of discrimination disappears, and the plaintiff must prove “that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but Were a pretext for discrimination.” Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089)). If the plaintiff cannot prove the presence of such a pretext by a preponderance of the evidence, then summary judgment is appropriate. See Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 470. In rare cases, discrimination claims are subject to a mixed-motive standard of analysis under Price Waterhouse. This dual-motive framework is available where the plaintiff demonstrates the availability of direct evidence of discrimination. “Evidence potentially warranting a Price Waterhouse burden shift includes, inter alia, policy documents and evidence of statements or actions by decisionmakers that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude. [T]o warrant a mixed-motive burden shift, the plaintiff must be able to produce a ‘smoking gun’ or at Jeast a ‘thick cloud of smoke’ to support [her] allegations of discriminatory treatment. Where ... the plaintiff fails to produce any such evidence, the plaintiff cannot withstand a motion for summary judgment by- arguing that a jury might reasonably find in [her] favor under the mixed-motives framework.” Price v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 808 F.Supp.2d 670, 687 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court of Appeals has noted, however, that “[a]n employer who discriminates is unlikely to leave a ‘smoking gun,’ such as a notation in an employee’s personnel file, attesting to a discriminatory intent.” Rosen v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 528, 533 (2d Cir.1991). “A victim of discrimination is therefore seldom able to prove his or her claim, by direct evidence and is usually constrained to rely on the cumulative weight of circumstantial evidence.” Id. Thus the existence of direct evidence in a case has been termed “a rare exception.” Bateman v. Project Hospitality, Inc., No. 07-CV-2085 (RRM)(RML), 2009 WL 3232856, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,' 2009); see also Sulehria v. City of N.Y., 670 F.Supp.2d 288, 305 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (“Direct evidence that the adverse employment action was motivated by discrimination, ‘a smoking gun,’ is typically unavailable, however.”). 2. Retaliation Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee because she has engaged in a protected activity, that is, “has opposed any practice made an unlawful practice by [Title VII], or because [she] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Similarly, the NYSHRL safeguards employees against retaliation for engaging in protected activities. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). Like discrimination claims, retaliation claims are usually governed by the McDonnell Douglas standard. Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 79-81 (2d Cir.2001). To establish a prima facie retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show: “(1) participation in a protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir.2010). While the framework for analyzing retaliation claims mirrors that for discrimination claims, a plaintiff need not succeed on one in order to succeed on the other. See Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir.2002). 3. Hostile Work Environment Title VII and the NYSHRL prohibit “discriminatorily hostile or abusive [work] environments].” See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). To prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must establish two elements: “(1) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment, and (2) that there is a specific basis for imputing the conduct creating the hostile work environment to the employer.” Duch v. Jakubek, 588 F.3d 757, 762 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Unlike claims of discrimination based on disparate treatment or retaliation, this kind of claim is “based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061. Such acts “must be intimidating, hostile, or offensive, with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult permeating the workplace.” Kalp v. Kalmon Dolgin Affiliates of Long Island Inc., No. 11-CV-4000 (JG), 2013 WL 1232308 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2013) (citing Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.1995)). The first element is both subjective and objective. This means that the victim must “subjectively perceive [the] environment to be abusive” and that the conduct complained of also must be “severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment.” Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir.2004) (citation omitted). When evaluating this element, the Court must look at the entirety of the circumstances, including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367. 4. Constructive Discharge Constructive discharge “occurs when an employer, rather than directly discharging an individual, intentionally creates an intolerable work atmosphere that forces an employee to quit involuntarily. Working conditions are intolerable if they are so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.” Serricchio v. Wachovia Secs. LLC, 658 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir.2011). However, an employee’s mere dissatisfaction with job assignments or criticism from a supervisor do not, alone, give rise to such a claim. See, e.g., Spence v. Maryland Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 1147, 1156 (2d Cir.1993). D. NYCHRL Given the slow development of case law regarding the appropriate standard by which to evaluate NYCHRL claims at the summary judgment stage, it is unsurprising that the parties do not agree on just how much more liberally the NYCHRL requires this Court to examine the Plaintiff-Intervenors’ claims than is demanded under Title VII and the NYSHRL. Such continues to be a contentious legal issue in almost every case in which such claims are asserted alongside Title VII and NYSHRL claims. Nonetheless, while Plaintiffs’ brief proved helpful in distinguishing some of the differences between how Title VII and NYSHRL claims and NYCHRL claims should be examined, the Court of Appeals has more recently provided additional guidance to district courts based on decisions of the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court, First Department. In Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux North America, Inc., 715 F.3d 102 (2d Cir.2013), the Court of Appeals notes that district courts “must analyze NYCHRL claims separately and independently from any federal and state law claims” and “constru[e] the NYCHRL’s provisions broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible.” Id. at 109 (internal quotation marks omitted). Such is true “even if the challenged conduct is not actionable under federal and state law.” Id. Specifically, the Court of Appeals provided district courts with the following guidelines when reviewing NYCHRL claims: (1) NYCHRL claims must be analyzed separately and independently from federal and state discrimination claims; (2) the totality of the circumstances must be considered because “the overall context in which [the challenged conduct occurs] cannot be ignored”; (3) the federal severe or pervasive standard of liability no longer applies to NYCHRL claims, and the severity or pervasiveness of conduct is relevant only to the scope of damages; (4) the NYCHRL is not a general civility code, and a defendant is not liable if the plaintiff fails to prove the conduct is caused at least in part by discriminatory or retaliatory motives or if the defendant proves the conduct was nothing more than “petty slights or trivial inconveniences”; (5) while courts may still dismiss “truly insubstantial cases,” even a single comment may be actionable in the proper context; and (6) summary judgment is still appropriate in NYCHRL cases[ ] but only if the record establishes as a matter of law that a reasonable jury could not find the employer liable under any theory. Id. at 113 (citations omitted). At this point, additional observations of the Court of Appeals bearing on how burdens shift under the NYCHRL should be noted. Although it is clear a court must analyze NYCHRL claims independently of Title VII and NYSHRL claims and must consider both the McDonnell Douglas and mixed-motive frameworks, the Mihalik court noted that it remains “unclear whether, and to what extent the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis has been modified for NYCHRL claims.” Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110 n. 8. The court made this observation after comparing the opinions filed by the First Department in Bennett v. Health Management Systems, Inc., 92 A.D.3d 29, 936 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1st Dep’t 2011), and Melman v. Montefiore Medical Center, 98 A.D.3d 107, 946 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep’t 2012). Id. (“Although Bennett seemed to suggest the analysis has changed, the First Department later narrowly construed Bennett [in Melman ] as only requiring trial courts to consider whether plaintiffs claim could survive under either the McDonnell Douglas analysis or a mixed-motive theory of liability. It is unclear how this differs from the federal standard.” (citation omitted)). In the end, though, what remains clear is that the NYCHRL has “simplified the discrimination inquiry: the plaintiff need only show that her employer treated her less well [than other similarly situated employees], at least in part for discriminatory reasons. The employer may present evidence of its legitimate, non-discriminatory motives to show the conduct was not caused by discrimination, but it is entitled to summary judgment on this basis only if the record established as a matter of law that discrimination played no role in its actions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court further observes that the Mel-man court seemed to consider the possibility that a plaintiff could sustain a showing under a mixed-motive standard by relying principally on circumstantial evidence. See Melman, 98 A.D.3d at 128, 946 N.Y.S.2d 27. Given the liberal framework of the NYCHRL, this Court will consider circumstantial evidence when conducting its mixed-motive analysis of NYCHRL claims. Using these principles as a guide, the Court now reviews the legal standards for discrimination and retaliation claims under the NYCHRL. 1. Discrimination Section 8—107(l)(a) of the NYCHRL makes it “an unlawful discriminatory practice ... [flor an employer or an employee or agent thereof, because of the actual or perceived ... gender ... of any person, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such person or to discriminate against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(l)(a). “To establish a [pregnancy] discrimination claim under the NYCHRL, the plaintiff need only demonstrate ‘by a preponderance of the evidence that she has been treated less well than other employees because of her gender.’ ” Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110 (quoting Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 78, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep’t 2009)). “At the summary judgment stage, judgment should normally be denied to a defendant if there exist triable issues of fact as to whether such conduct occurred.” Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 78, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27. Moreover, the challenged conduct need not even amount to something tangible, like hiring or firing. Id. at 79, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 40. However, this Court remains “mindful that the NYCHRL is not a ‘general civility code.’ ” See Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110 (quoting Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 79, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27). “The plaintiff still bears the burden of showing that the conduct is caused by a discriminatory motive. It is not enough that a plaintiff has an overbearing or obnoxious boss. She must show that she has been treated less well at least in part because of her gender.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even upon such a showing, though, “defendants may assert an affirmative defense whereby [they] can still avoid liability if they prove that the conduct complained of consists of nothing more than what a reasonable victim of discrimination would consider petty slights and trivial inconveniences.” Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The burden at this stage is on the defendant to prove the conduct’s triviality. Id. Nevertheless, the defendant may prevail at summary judgment upon showing that a reasonable jury could conclude only that the challenged conduct was nothing more than petty. Id. “In evaluating both the plaintiffs claims and the defendant’s affirmative defense, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Id. Even a single incident signaling discrimination on account of a plaintiffs pregnancy may be actionable. See id.; Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 80 n. 30, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27. Finally, it is clear that a preference exists under the NYCHRL for a jury to make determinations regarding what are often borderline situations. Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 80, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27. Nevertheless, summary judgment remains “an appropriate mechanism for resolving [such] claims” where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding plaintiffs claim and the employer’s affirmative defense.” Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 111-12. 2. Retaliation Section 8-107(7) of the NYCHRL makes it unlawful for an employer to “retaliate or discriminate in any manner against any person because such person has ... opposed any practice forbidden under” the NYCHRL. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(7). The provision further provides that the “retaliation or discrimination complained of under this subdivision need not result in an ultimate action with respect to employment ... or in a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment ... provided, however, that the retaliatory or discriminatory act or acts complained of must be reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity.” Id. This means that to prevail on a retaliation claim under the NYCHRL, a plaintiff must show (1) “that she took an action opposing her employer’s discrimination” and (2) “that, as a result, the employer engaged in conduct that was reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in such action.” Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 112. Like discrimination claims under the NYCHRL, retaliation claims shall be interpreted broadly. Id. The phrase “ ‘opposing] any practice’ can include situations where a person, before the retaliatory conduct occurred, merely ‘made clear her disapproval of the [defendant’s] discrimination by communicating to [the defendant], in substance, that she thought [its] treatment of [her] was wrong.” Id. (quoting Albunio v. City of N.Y., 16 N.Y.3d 472, 479, 922 N.Y.S.2d 244, 947 N.E.2d 135 (2011)). Additionally, summary judgment is only appropriate where no reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence that the challenged conduct was reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity. Id. Such an “assessment [should] be made with a keen sense of workplace realities, of the fact that the ‘chilling effect’ of particular conduct is context-dependent, and of the fact that a jury is generally best suited to evaluate the impact of retaliatory conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). III. DISCUSSION A. Jill Patricot Jill Patricot (“Patricot”) alleges discrimination and retaliation claims against Bloomberg under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. As to Title VII, Patricot filed her EEOC discrimination charge on March 24, 2006, and her EEOC retaliation charge on June 13, 2008. 1. Background Bloomberg hired Plaintiff-Intervenor Patricot to work in its London office in 1998. (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 1) In November 2004, approximately three months into her pregnancy and a month and a half after Patricot announced her first pregnancy, she was offered a position as Global Data Manager of New York, which she accepted. (Id.) At the time she accepted the offer, Patricot understood that she was leaving Sales for the Global Data division, and both she and her supervisors considered the move to be a promotion. (Golden Decl. Ex. 2, at 18-20 (Patricot Dep.).) During her deposition, Patricot recalled: “I wanted the promotion, I needed the money, and I needed the stature, it was going to be good for me.” (Id. at 20.) Patricot now believes that she was offered the job in Global Data for the purposes of hiding her pregnancy from “powerful hedge fund managers.” (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 3.) As head of Global Data in New York, Patricot was placed in charge of more than seventy employees, including seven managers (her sales position had only required that she supervise a handful of direct reports). (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 8.) Approximately six months before her first maternity leave, Patricot was told that she and her group would be temporarily moved to a satellite office for about one week. (Silberstein Decl. Ex. 1, at 30-34, 456-57 (Patricot Dep.).) However, after moving to the new office, Patricot’s group remained there for the remainder of the six months until she went on leave. (Id. at 30-34, 455-57.) Patricot concedes that the move “[did not] prevent [her] obviously from getting in touch with people.” (Id. at 30.) Prior to going on maternity leave, Patricot’s supervisor Beth Mazzeo (“Mazzeo”) told her she was doing a “fabulous” and “great” job.. (Id. ¶4.) Patricot went on leave in late April 2005, and in May 2005, Patricot received her compensation award, increasing her total intended compensation from $216,953 to $270,522. (Id. ¶ 5-6.) This occurred despite a decrease in her Equity Equivalent Certificates (“EECs”) from 210 in May 2004 to 185 in May 2005. (Pl.-Interv’rs 56.1 ¶ 6; Reply 56.1 ¶ 6.) Patricot returned from maternity leave on September 22, 2005. (Bloomberg. 56.1 ¶ 11.) Patricot alleges that during her maternity leave and after her return, she was ignored by Mazzeo and excluded from calls, meetings, and normal decision-making processes. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13; Pl.-Interv’rs 56.1 ¶¶ 6, 11, 13.) Prior to taking leave, Patricot often worked from 8:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. or 7:00 P.M., but upon her return from leave, she left the office every day at approximately 4:45 P.M. (Bloom-berg 56.1 ¶ 15; Pl.-Interv’rs 56.1 ¶ 15; Reply 56.1 ¶ 15.) According to Bloomberg, Patricot’s predecessor complained to Mazzeo that Patricot’s subordinates were coming to her with issues that Patricot should have handled. (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 15.) Bloomberg states that such complaints prompted Mazzeo to schedule a meeting with Patricot about Patricot’s hours. (Id. ¶ 18.) On or about December 22, 2005, Mazzeo, a mother of three, met with Patricot. (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 15.) At this meeting, Patricot recalls that Mazzeo told her that “sometimes when you have a baby your career is paused” and that Mazzeo’s own career “was [paused] too for a little,” which Patricot understood as Mazzeo’s “trying to relate.” (Golden Decl. Ex. 2, at 62-63 (Patricot Dep.).) Also during this meeting, Mazzeo told Patricot that other Global Data managers worked until 5:30 or 6:00 P.M. each day and that Patricot needed to do the same. (Id. at 68-70.) In or about early February 2006, Mazzeo again approached Patricot about her hours. (Golden Decl. Ex. 2, at 86 (Patricot Dep.).) This time, Mazzeo insisted that Patricot stay until 5:30 P.M., and told her that she was setting a bad example on the floor. (Id. at 99.) Mazzeo asked if Patricot could stay late two days a week, but Patricot refused to stay until 5:30 or 6:00 P.M. and insisted on leaving at no later than 4:45 P.M. every day. (Id. at 101-103, 105, 618-19, 655-56, 658, 764; Ex. 17, at 50-51 (Keogh Dep.); Golden Decl. Ex. 15, at 203-04 (Sack Dep.).) On or about February 3, 2006, Patricot met with Jennifer Sack (“Sack”) from Bloomberg Human Resources (“HR”), who told Patricot that Mazzeo had a problem with her hours. (Golden Decl. Ex. 2, at 94 (Patricot Dep.).) Sack asked Patricot if her husband could relieve the nanny, which Patricot found inappropriate. (Id. at 105.) Patricot offered to come in an hour earlier, but she could not name any Global Data manager who did so. (Id. at 102, 155, 279, 472; Golden Decl. Ex. 1 ¶ 77 (Am. Compl.).) Patricot’s supervisees in the New York office generally started at 8:00 A.M., and the Company wanted to limit supervisory coverage to when it was necessary. (Golden Decl. Ex. 2, at 588 (Patricot Dep.); Golden Decl. Ex. 15, at 209 (Sack Dep.).) Patricot alleges that on or about February 10, 2006, Mazzeo called her at her desk and said that if she did not change her hours, Mazzeo would demote her to the position of Data Analyst. (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 21.) Patricot further states that she was never informed during any of the aforementioned conversations that her subordinates were looking for her after she left for the day and that such prompted the concern over her hours. (Pl.-Interv’rs 56.1 ¶¶ 17-18.) On February 14, 2006, Mazzeo demoted Patricot to Data Analyst. (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 22.) Shortly after Patricot’s demotion, allegedly in an attempt to intimidate her, Mazzeo appeared unannounced in the New York office and sat at a desk next to Patricot for the entire day without acknowledging her. (Pl.-Interv’rs 56.1 ¶ 26; Silberstein Decl. Ex. 1, at 144-45, 147-48 (Patricot Dep.).) On March 24, 2006, Patricot filed her charge of discrimination with the EEOC. (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 28) In her April 2006 self-evaluation she noted that she had “reached out to the Federal Government to hold an unbiased investigation,” particularly regarding Mazzeo. (Id.) Following her demotion, Patricot told Max Linnington (“Linnington”), the Head of Sales for the North and South Americas, that she wanted to return to Sales, and asked if any Team Leader positions were open; he told her that none was. (Id. ¶26.) Within a few months after Patricot joined Sales, however, two individuals were promoted to Team Leader positions, as were approximately 37 others between March 2006 and January 2009— none of whom was Patricot. (Reply 56.1 ¶ 26.) In May 2006, Patricot’s EEC award decreased from 185 to 140, and her total intended compensation decreased from $270,522 to $233,727. (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 29.) Patricot went on maternity leave for the second time at the end of August 2006. (Golden Decl. Ex. 4.) Patricot states that upon her return from maternity leave in or around March 2007, she no longer had a desk or direct telephone line. (Pl.Interv’rs 56.1 ¶ 34.B.) On October 3, 2007, Patricot filed a motion to intervene in the EEOC’s suit against Bloomberg. (First Mot. to Intervene [dkt. no. 2].) In her proposed complaint, Patricot referred to Michael Bloom-berg at least ten times, alleging that' he was responsible for the “culture of discrimination” at Bloomberg. (Id. Attach. 2 ¶ 17.) Around that time, Patricot also attended a press conference with fellow Plaintiff-Intervenor Tanys Lancaster concerning the complaint. (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 30.) According to press reports, Bloom-berg spokesperson Judith Czelusniak accused these two Plaintiff-Intervenors of participating in a “publicity stunt” and “dragging the mayors [sic] name into their battle in their lawsuit against the company to settle.” (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 31.) Subsequently, the Court granted Patricot’s motion to intervene, and Patricot filed her complaint on October 25, 2007. (Compl. of Pls.-Interveners [dkt. no. 7].) Patricot now further alleges that on or about May 6, 2008, following a status conference during which the EEOC disclosed that there were 58 claimants in the case, Linnington yelled at her on the sales floor and treated her in an “abusive and unprofessional manner.” (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 33; Pl.-Interv’rs 56.1 ¶ 31.) Patricot admits that she is unaware of whether Linnington knew about the conference, that she herself did not attend the conference, and that she cannot speak to the question of how Linnington spoke to other employees. (Golden Decl. Ex. 2, at 492-94 (Patricot Dep.).) However, Patricot notes that news regarding the conference was reported on Bloomberg’s terminal scrolling system, which is on every employee’s desk. (Pl.Interv’rs 56.1 ¶ 31.) Patricot filed a retaliation charge with the EEOC in June 2008. (Id. ¶ 34.) Patricot attended Mazzeo’s deposition, in December 2008. (Id. at 566.) Patricot alleges that Mazzeo was not truthful during her deposition, and this led her to speculate that the “culture [of Bloomberg] had not changed.” (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 34.) At this time, Mazzeo was still in charge of Global Data, while Patricot had been in Sales since 2006. (Id.) Patricot resigned from Bloomberg on January 2, 2009. (Id.) 2. Analysis of Claims under Title VII & NYSHRL a. Discrimination Claims The parties are in agreement that Patricot is a member of a protected class. As such, in order to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, Patricot must show that she was qualified for the position, she suffered an adverse employment action, and the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. Patricot alleges a series of events that she claims to be adverse and motivated by her becoming pregnant. At the outset, the Court holds that Patricot cannot establish a prima facie case with respect to the initial events involving her November 2004 change in position from one in the Sales division to one leading the New York Global Data division. Buyer’s remorse is insufficient to term such a move a demotion where the undisputed facts demonstrate that she voluntarily accepted the position because she “wanted the promotion, [ ] needed the money, and [] needed the stature.” (See Reply 56.1 ¶¶ 2, 6-7, 8, 10.) The law does not bestow upon employees within a protected class a guarantee that new positions will not entail a change in certain job-specific duties, and the potential for less job satisfaction than a prior job. Simply stating that she harbored “fears that this was not really a promotion, which she was warned about by colleagues,” (see Silberstein Deck Ex. 1, at 17-18 (Patricot Dep.)), and pointing out that her group eventually was moved to a satellite office during part of her pregnancy, (see id. at 30-34, 455-57), does not translate into a triable issue of fact when the job change resulted in increasing her responsibilities from managing a handful of employees to managing more than seventy, (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 8), led to an approximately $50,000 raise, (id. ¶ 6), and is contradicted by the earlier-noted statement reflecting that the change was voluntary and one that Patricot ultimately thought at the time “was going to be good for [her],” (id. ¶ 10). Because Patricot cannot establish that this change was adverse, she cannot establish a prima facie case with respect to her November 2004 position change. Similarly, the Court finds that what Patricot describes as a compensation decrease in 2005 was not an adverse action. As this Court has found previously [compensation at Bloomberg, as in most for-profit enterprises, signals to some degree an employee’s performance. At least during the times at issue here, compensation at Bloomberg included both a base salary and variable, additional compensation known as [EECs] that were redeemable one year after they were granted. EEC grants had an “intended value” based on projected company (not individual) performance, and the intended value of EEC grants plus base salary comprised an employee’s total intended compensation for a given year. The actual value of an EEC grant could differ from its intended value based on actual company (not individual) financial performance; actual value was determined upon redemption. The change in the raw number of EEC grants from year to year did not indicate better or worse performance because an EEC grant did not have a constant intended or actual value year to year. Therefore, an employee’s intended compensation for a given year, rather than actual compensation, is the relevant comparative metric for employee compensation. Bloomberg III, 778 F.Supp.2d at 463 (citations omitted). It follows that, although the number of Patricot’s EECs decreased from 210 to 185, her total intended compensation increased by $54,000 from $216,952 in May 2004 to $270,522 in May 2005. (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 6) And even if such a change in EECs equated to adverse action, such does not give rise to an inference of discrimination where Bloomberg has noted that there was an across-the-board reduction of twenty-three percent in the number of EECs awarded in 2005, (see Reply 56.1 ¶ 6), and Patricot (whose reduction was less than that) has not put forth any evidence that her decrease was greater than that of similarly situated employees in the Sales Department. See, e.g., Martinez-Santiago v. Zurich N. Am. Ins. Co., No. 07 Civ. 8676(RJH), 2010 WL 184450, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2010) (“[W]hen an individual’s salary falls within the middle of a range, the mere existence of other higher paid employees does not necessarily give rise to an inference of discrimination.”). The Court next considers whether Patricot’s discrimination claims survive with respect to the events subsequent to her return from maternity leave. With respect to these events, the Court notes again that there appears to be no dispute as to whether Patricot is a member of a protected class and whether she was qualified for the relevant positions. Insofar as establishing the adverse action element, the Court notes the following guidance from Sanders v. N.Y.C. Human Resources Administration, 361 F.3d 749 (2d Cir.2004): An adverse employment action is a “materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment. To be materially adverse, a change in working conditions must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. Examples of such a change include termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices ... unique to a particular situation.” Id. at 755 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Bloomberg does not dispute that Patricot’s demotion represents an adverse employment action. Bloom-berg, however, does dispute that other individual actions were also adverse. Plaintiff argues that the events she alleges as adverse are properly viewed in the aggregate and, as such, the Court should refrain from weighing whether isolated events taken together constitute an adverse action. (See Pl.-Intv’rs Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Def. Bloomberg’s Mot. for Summ. J. [dkt. no. 328] (“Pl.-Intv’rs Br.”), at 27 (“Weighing the evidence to determine whether all of these actions can be considered adverse employment actions, independently or in the aggregate, is not the job of the Court at the summary judgment stage.”)) While the Court rejects the insinuation that alleging numerous isolated events in-and-of itself creates a triable issue of fact, it interprets Patricot’s point as her assertion that she was subjected to a pattern of discriminatory actions that could be interpreted by a jury as evidence of or part of more significant adverse acts. Moreover, in the Plaintiff-Intervenors’ brief, Patricot identifies four distinct adverse actions when arguing that Bloom-berg acted under the guise of pretext: (1) “Patricot’s ‘Promotion’ to Head of Global Data”; (2) “Patricot’s Demotion to Data Analyst”; (3) “Defendant’s Failure to Promote Patricot to Team Leader in Sales”; and (4) “Compensation Decreases.” Because the Court has already held that Patricot cannot establish a prima facie case regarding the first of these allegedly adverse actions and her 2005 change in compensation, the Court determines whether she can show that the remaining events constitute adverse actions giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent and, if so, whether she can survive the subsequent burden-shifting analysis. i. Demotion to Data Analyst and 2006 Compensation Decrease Bloomberg does not dispute that Patricot has made out a prima facie case with respect to this adverse employment action. Rather, Bloomberg asserts that demoting Patricot was lawful. The Court finds that an issue of fact remains with respect to this claim. Having made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts under McDonnell Douglas to Bloomberg to offer non-discriminatory justifications for its actions. Bloomberg states that Patricot’s demotion was a product of her “refusal to work the hours required of her Global Data role.” (See Mem. of Law in Support of Bloom-berg’s Mot. for Summ. J. as to Claims of the Pl.-Interv’rs [dkt. no. 323] (“Bloomberg Br.”), at 26.) According to Bloomberg, the nature of her position required that she stay at work after 4:45 P.M. at least a few days of the week because Patricot had responsibilities to fulfill between 5:00 and 5:30 P.M., namely the supervision of her subordinates who, according to deposition testimony, were forced to approach Patricot’s predecessor in the position for guidance after Patricot left each day. (See id. at 27; Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 17-20.) Instead, following her return from maternity leave, Patricot (who prior to taking leave often worked until between 6:00 and 7:00 P.M.) insisted on leaving work every day at 4:45 P.M. (Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 19.) As this Court has noted, “[t]he law does not mandate ‘work-life balance,”’ Bloomberg III, 778 F.Supp.2d at 485, and accordingly, Bloom-berg has stated a nondiscriminatory justification for its actions. Patricot now must show by a preponderance of the evidence that said justification is merely pretext for discrimination. According to Patricot, Bloomberg’s explanation amounts to pretext for the following reasons. First, to counter Bloom-berg’s statement that her failure to work sufficient hours justified her demotion, Patricot asserts that her first successor only visited the New York office once during the seven months he held the position and left the Princeton office before 5:30 P.M. approximately forty-six times during that span and her second successor visited the New York office only twenty-eight times in the twenty-two months he held the position and often left work before 5:30 P.M. (See Pl.-Inter’vr Br., at 28-29.) Second, Patricot challenges the legitimacy of Bloomberg’s claims that she had to be present to fulfill her duties by contending that she was always available even after she physically had left the office and that she was never informed that her subordinates were looking for her as the reason why she needed to stay later than 4:45 P.M. (Id. at 29-30.) To support her claims, Patricot relies upon “badge data” produced by Bloomberg reflecting these claims. Bloomberg attempts to explain this data in its reply by offering more detailed badge data demonstrating that the badge data upon which Patricot relies fails to reflect occasions when employees “badged in to the Princeton office, took the Bloomberg shuttle to New York, worked in New York, and then returned to Princeton and badged out there.” (See Reply Mem. in Support of Bloomberg’s Mot. for Summ. J. on Interv’rs’ Claims [dkt. no. 539] (“Reply Br.”), at 10 n. 2.) According to Bloomberg, this latter set of badge data shows that Patricot’s first successor “was in New York about twice a week immediately after he took over from Patricot, and less frequently later,” at which point he “felt he was letting his team down and asked” that those duties be reassigned to someone else. (See id; Reply 56.1 ¶ 17.) But while a review of this latter badge data refutes Patricot’s observation from the former data that her successor only visited the New York office once, it does not overcome the overarching issue. Bloomberg makes much ado about Patricot’s unavailability within the office after the markets closed at 4:00 P.M. and 5:30 P.M. and her successor’s working a schedule such that he stayed late in the New York office approximately twice a week. (See id; see also Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 22.) The new badge data, however, reflects that Patricot’s immediate successor in 2006 was in the New York office nine times in March, seven times in April, six times in May, five times in June, twice in July, twice in August, and zero times in September. (See Dreiband Decl. Ex. 118.) As such, on average, the only month he was in the New York office twice a week was March. Not only is this contrary to Bloomberg’s contention in its opening brief that he “came up to New York two to three times per week,” it is contrary to Bloomberg’s reliance on the assertion that his presence was completely consistent with the arrangement offered to Patricot. (See Bloomberg Br., at 27.) Moreover, while Patricot’s predecessor often stayed past 5:00 P.M. during the bulk of the times he did go to New York, the data shows that as the frequency of his appearances in the New York office dwindled, so did his record of staying late in the New York office past 4:45 P.M.: only three out of five times in June, one of two times in July, and zero times in August. (See Dreiband Decl. Ex. 118.) Finally, Bloomberg points out that Patricot’s successor asked that his duties be reassigned in September 2006 due to his inability to spend more time in New York. (See id) This, though, does not counter Patricot’s assertion that there was a double standard. Indeed, it only speaks to that individual’s subjective belief about whether he could adequately fulfill his duties. Bloomberg’s subsequent acquiescence in his request does not equate to there being no question of fact as to whether Bloomberg shared his sentiment. Nothing in the record indicates that Patricot’s first or second successor was confronted by Bloomberg about the time he did not spend in the New York office. This information, along with Patricot’s testimony that Mazzeo told her that “sometimes when you have a baby your career is paused,” (see Bloomberg 56.1 ¶ 15), and Patricot’s statement that she was never informed that her subordinates were forced to approach others for guidance, (see Pl.-Intv’rs Br., at 29), demonstrate that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Bloomberg’s justifications for demoting Patricot amount to pretext. ii. Failure to Promote Patricot alleges that, upon moving back to Sales, Bloomberg further discriminated against her by failing to promote her to Team Leader. To establish a prima facie case for discriminatory failure to promote, the plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) she was rejected for the position; and (4) the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants having the plaintiffs qualifications.” See Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 709 (2d Cir.1998). The Court holds that Patricot cannot make out such case. It is undisputed that Patricot did not formally apply for any Team Leader positions. Normally, a specific application is required to satisfy the second element of such a claim. See Petrosino, 385 F.3d at 227. A narrow exception to this requirement, exists, however, where a plaintiff can “demonstrate that (1) the vacancy at issue was not posted, and (2) the employee either had (a) no knowledge of the vacancy before it was filled or (b) attempted to apply for it through informal procedures endorsed by the employer.” Id. Patricot does not meet this exception. Patricot relies on her one statement to Bloomberg’s Head of Sales of the Americas in March 2006 asking whether any Team Leader positions were available as constituting her application to be considered for all future openings. (See Pl.Interv’rs Br., at 30-31.) But Patricot does not demonstrate that a single inquiry constitutes an informal procedure endorsed by the employer to apply for all future openings. Moreover, the fact that persons were promoted to Team Leader in May 2006 does not show that management knew in March 2006 that positions would open. Finally, Patricot does not even allege that she had no knowledge of the availability of any of the positions for which she was allegedly passed over, but merely states that Bloomberg never apprised her of any vacancies. (See id. at 31.) As such, Patricot cannot make out a discriminatory failure to promote claim under Title VII or the NYSHRL. b. Retaliation Claims Patricot alleges a series of individual events that allegedly constitute retaliation against her for filing a discrimination charge with the EEOC in March 24, 2006. She went on her second maternity leave from September 2006 through March 2007. Because the filing of a discrimination charge constitutes a protected activity, Patricot can make out a prima facie case by showing that (1) her employer knew of the protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. The Court addresses each of the alleged retaliatory acts in turn, i. Failure to Provide Desk or Telephone First, Patricot claims that she was retaliated against upon her return from her second maternity leave by being denied her own desk or telephone. Bloom-berg does not dispute that, with respect to this event, it was aware that Patricot had engaged in protected activity. Rather, Bloomberg asserts that standing alone, the denial of one’s own desk and telephone line has never been held to be a retaliatory adverse action. (See Reply Br., at 14 (citing Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 466 (2d Cir.1997)).) Under these circumstances, the Court agrees. Although Patricot’s brief characterizes the period of time as five months, this mischaracterizes Patricot’s own recollection as stated in her deposition. In fact, Patricot’s recollection is that her time without a direct phone line was anywhere between “a good couple of months” to five months. (See Silberstein Decl. Ex. 1, at 184, 491.) Considering that Patricot has not put forth any evidence on the matter other than the uncertain range as stated in her deposition, that she had just returned from a long leave of absence, and that her own deposition testimony indicates that -a person who was hired either while she was .on leave or around the time she returned did not have a direct phone line, (see id. at 185), the Court holds that Patricot cannot demonstrate that Bloomberg’s failure to give her a desk and phone immediately upon her return constituted an adverse employment action or that such gives rise to an inference of retaliation under Title VII and the NYSHRL. ii. Mistreatment by Senior Management Patricot asserts that “she was completely ostracized by senior management” between the time she filed her discrimination charge in March 2006 and quit in January 2009. (Pl.-Interv’rs Br., at 33.) First, she claims that “[o]n several occasions, senior managers, who were friendly and responsive to Patricot during her prepregnancy years, passed Patricot in the hallways of Defendant’s offices only to avoid eye contact with [her] altogether and studiously ignore her.” But the Court cannot imagine how such behavior amounts to anything more than “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners.” See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And viewing such behavior as anything but would turn Title VII and the NYSHRL into a general civility code. Similarly, Patricot asserts that one week after she filed her complaint to Bloomberg HR, “Mazzeo showed up unannounced at Defendant’s [New York] office, only to turn her head and ignore Patricot when they passed in the hallway” and then sit right next to Patricot the entire next day in “a clear attempt to intimidate and harass Patricot.” {See Pl.-Interv’rs Br., at 34.) While such behavior, if true, is childish and reflects poor leadership skills, it is yet another example of behavior best dealt with by a general civility code within the workplace. Patricot does not cite any legal authority holding that analogous conduct constitutes adverse employment action. Moreover, Patricot does not even assert that she was adversely affected by Mazzeo’s conduct or that such conduct might dissuade Patricot or other employees from engaging in future protected activity. As such, the Court finds that Patricot cannot establish a prima facie case with respect to these perceived slights. iii. Public Verbal Reprimand Patricot asserts that approximately five days after this case’s May 1,