Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION ELLEN LIPTON HOLLANDER, District Judge. ‘ Kristy Lynn Murphy-Taylor and her husband, Donald Taylor, plaintiffs, have sued five defendants, alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., as well as violations of the federal and Maryland state constitutions and tort claims under Maryland common law. In particular, plaintiffs sued R. Gery “Gary” Hofmann, who is the Sheriff of Queen Anne’s County, Maryland (“Sheriff Hofmann”); his brother, John Dennis Hofmann (“Hofmann”); Major James L. Williams of the Queen Anne County Sheriffs Office; Queen Anne’s County; and the State of Maryland. In brief, plaintiffs claim that, while Ms. Murphy-Taylor was employed in the Queen Anne’s County Sheriffs Office, she was subjected to sexual harassment by several fellow employees, and-was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Hofmann, a co-worker. Further, plaintiffs claim that Sheriff Hofmann and Major Williams failed to address the sexual harassment and the assaults, and subsequently retaliated against Ms. Murphy-Taylor for pressing charges against Hofmann for his sexual assault of plaintiff on or about August 25, 2009. Hofmann was convicted of second-degree assault of plaintiff following his guilty plea in May 2011. One day after Hofmann’s conviction, Sheriff Hofmann terminated Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s employment. On the basis of these allegations, plaintiffs assert nine counts: a claim of violation of the federal constitutional right to due process, along with claims of failure to train and supervise, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); deprivation of constitutional rights and privileges, also under § 1983 (Count II); conspiracy to deprive Ms. Murphy-Taylor of the equal protection of the law, again under § 1983 (Count III); violation of Title VII (Count IV); civil conspiracy under Maryland law (Count V); abusive discharge under Maryland law (Count VI); violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count VII); negligence (Count VIII); and loss of consortium (Count IX). After plaintiffs filed suit, the United States moved to intervene as a plaintiff, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), in order to assert Title VTI claims against the State, the County, and Sheriff Hofmann in his official capacity. See ECF 36. That motion was granted, without opposition, see ECF 40, resulting in the docketing of the United States’ Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Complaint (“US Complaint”) (ECF 41). The United States’ complaint contains four counts, all under Title VII. Count I alleges hostile work environment sexual harassment, and the other three counts assert retaliation for engaging in protected activify, by three different modalities: creation of a retaliatory hostile work environment (Count II); retaliatory constructive discharge (Count III); and retaliatory termination (Count IV). Three motions to dismiss are now pending. Specifically, before the United States intervened, the County had filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against it (“County Motion”) (ECF 24). In conjunction with the intervention of the United States, I advised the parties that I would consider the County Motion as directed to the United States’ complaint as well as plaintiffs’ complaint, and permitted further briefing of the motion. See ECF 38. Sheriff Hofmann, Major Williams, and the State (collectively, the “State Defendants”) have filed two motions: one to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint (“State-Plaintiffs Motion”) (ECF 43), and the other to dismiss the United States’ complaint (“State-US Motion”) (ECF 59). Hofmann has filed an answer denying liability, see ECF 44, and did not join in any of the pending motions. In the course of the briefing of the pending motions, plaintiffs conceded that “all claims against the Office of the Sheriff of Queen Anne’s County should be dismissed because this entity is not legally distinct from the State of Maryland itself.” ECF 48 at 1. Therefore, they voluntarily dismissed their claims against the Sheriffs Office. See ECF 53 & 54. And, plaintiffs did not oppose dismissal of their State law claims against the County. See ECF 28 at 1 n. I. They also voluntarily dismissed their claims against the State under § 1983 and State law (ie., all claims against the State except their Title VII claims), and dismissed their State law civil conspiracy claim (Count V) against all defendants. See ECF 56 & 57. Thus, as to the individual defendants (Hofmann, Sheriff Hofmann, and Major Williams), all claims remain pending, except the civil conspiracy count. As to the County, only the Title VII and § 1983 claims are pending. And, as to the State, only the Title VII claims are pending. The motions have been fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary to resolve them. For the reasons that follow, the County’s motion will be granted in part and denied in part; the State Defendants’ motion will be granted in part and denied in part; and the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss the United States’ complaint will be denied. Factual Background Ms. Murphy-Taylor was hired as a deputy sheriff by the Queen Anne’s County Sheriffs Office in 1999. US Complaint ¶ 13. From June 2005 until July 2010, she served as a detective in the Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”) of the Sheriffs Office. Id. At various times during her assignment with the CID, four other employees had supervisory responsibility over Ms. Murphy-Taylor: Dennis Hofmann, the Sheriffs brother, who was promoted from the rank of corporal to sergeant and later to first sergeant during Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s employment; Captain Curtis Benton; Lieutenant Dale Patrick; and Stephen Stouffer, who was promoted from the rank of detective to corporal during Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s employment. Id. ¶¶ 13, 29. Shortly after Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s initial assignment to the CID in June 2005, Captain Benton made several remarks to her that were derogatory to women. For example, on one occasion, in regard to the first search warrant that Ms. Murphy-Taylor had served, Captain Benton remarked to her that it was “ ‘the first search warrant a female has ever written and probably will be the last.’ ” Id. ¶ 17. In or around September 2005, Ms. Murphy-Taylor complained to the Queen Anne’s County Human Resources Department (“HRD”) about Captain Benton’s remarks. Representatives of the HRD told her that nothing could be done about the comments because Captain Benton served in an appointed position. See id. ¶ 18. Beginning in November 2006, Hofmann repeatedly attempted to touch Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s breasts, either in the CID offices or in Sheriffs Office vehicles. Id. ¶ 19. In or around June 2007, Hofmann sexually assaulted Ms. Murphy-Taylor in a hotel room while they were attending an off-site training course as part of their job duties. Id. ¶ 20. In or around August 2007, Ms. Murphy-Taylor complained to the Sheriff about the sexual assault at the training course as well as numerous other sexual assaults committed by Hofmann. Id. ¶ 21. However, the Sheriff did not investigate Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s complaint or take any corrective action to prevent further assaults, and Hofmann continued to work closely with Ms. Murphy-Taylor and to sexually harass her. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. Hofmann was subsequently promoted by the Sheriff. Id. ¶ 22. On or about August 25, 2009, Ms. Murphy-Taylor and Hofmann were riding together in the same Sheriffs Office vehicle, on official business, returning from a court hearing in Cecil County, Maryland. See id. ¶ 23; Amended Complaint ¶ 16. Hofmann was driving the vehicle and Ms. Murphy-Taylor was in the front passenger seat. Amended Complaint ¶ 17. While Hofmann was operating the vehicle, he reached over with his right hand and forcefully put it down the front of Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s pants, touching her vaginal area. Id. He also put his right hand inside Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s blouse and touched her right breast. Id. ¶ 18. Ms. Murphy-Taylor told Hofmann to stop and tried to push his hand away, but he overpowered her, continued to touch her right breast, and attempted to touch her left breast. Id. ¶¶ 19, 20. Ms. Murphy-Taylor again told Hofmann to stop and that she was not feeling well. Id. ¶ 21. On several occasions in November 2009, Lieutenant Patrick and Detective Stouffer made derogatory and sexually explicit comments about Ms. Murphy-Taylor and another female detective, insinuating that Ms. Murphy-Taylor and the other detective had sex at an off-site training that they both attended. See U.S. Complaint ¶¶ 24-26. On or about November 18, 2009, Ms. Murphy-Taylor met with then-Captain Williams and the Queen Anne’s County Administrator to complain that she had been sexually harassed numerous times on the job. Id. ¶ 27. On or about November 20, 2009, and February 2, 2010, Ms. Murphy-Taylor filed written complaints with Captain Williams concerning the sexual harassment. Id. ¶¶ 28, 30. While Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s complaints were investigated, she continued to work closely with and was supervised by Hofmann, Lieutenant Patrick, and Detective Stouffer. Id. ¶ 31. On April 8, 2010, Ms. Murphy-Taylor complained to Major Williams about continued contact with Hofmann during the investigation, despite her request not to have contact with him. Id. ¶ 33. No action was taken in response to this complaint. Id. Then, in December 2009, Detective Stouffer was promoted to corporal. Id. ¶ 29. The Sheriff and Sheriffs Office management substantiated Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s complaints against Hofmann, Lieutenant Patrick, and Corporal Stouffer. Id. ¶ 32, 33. Nevertheless, the Sheriffs Office retained them in their positions and continued to allow them to supervise Ms. Murphy-Taylor. Id. ¶ 33. In addition, between December 2009 and July 2010, Ms. Murphy-Taylor “was subjected to numerous other acts of reprisal by the Sheriff and management officials with the Sheriffs Office.” Id. ¶ 34. For example, she was singled out to receive an undesirable assignment in severe weather; faced disparate treatment in working conditions, such as having a “no personal items at work” policy enforced against her that was not enforced against other CID officers; received a negative performance evaluation on July 20, 2010; and received unjustified criticism of her investigative report writing. Id. She was also subjected to rumors by the Sheriff and senior management in the Sheriffs Office that she had filed sexual harassment complaints against Hofmann because Hofmann had broken off a consensual affair with her and she was a “jilted lover,” id., notwithstanding that the Sheriff and his management had substantiated Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s sexual harassment complaints against Hofmann. Id. On or about February 15, 2010, Ms. Murphy-Taylor filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which was assigned Charge No. 531-2010-00776C. See Feb. 2010 Charge of Discrimination, Ex. 3 to County-Plaintiffs Reply (ECF 37-1). There, she detailed several instances of sexual assault by Hofmann as well as sexual harassment by Hofmann, Captain Benton, Lieutenant Patrick, and Corporal Stouffer, including but not limited to the incidents detailed, supra, which are recounted in the complaints filed by plaintiffs and the United States, as well as her unsuccessful complaints about such conduct to the management of the Sheriffs Office. See id. On May 25, 2010, Ms. Murphy-Taylor and Mr. Taylor were married. See State-Plaintiffs Motion at 21. On July 22, 2010, Ms. Murphy-Taylor went on medical leave from the Sheriffs Office due to the emotional stress of her working conditions. US Complaint ¶ 35. She did not return to work because the Sheriff and his senior management failed to provide her with a work environment that precluded contact with Hofmann, and continued to perpetuate rumors that she had filed her sexual harassment complaints because she and Hofmann had broken off a consensual affair. Id. On or about August 25, 2010, Hofmann was arrested and charged with second-degree assault and a fourth-degree sexual offense, in a case styled State of Maryland v. John Dennis Hofmann, No. 07-K-10-001955, in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, in connection with his assault of Ms. Murphy-Taylor a year earlier, in August 2009, and other incidents in which he had assaulted Ms. Murphy-Taylor. Amended Complaint ¶ 23. On May 12, 2011, Mr. Hofmann pleaded guilty to second-degree assault in that proceeding. US Complaint ¶ 36; see also Tr. of Plea Hrg. of May 12, 2011, Ex. 3 to State-US Opposition (ECF 64-3). One day later, on May 13, 2011, Ms. Murphy-Taylor received a letter from the Sheriffs Office informing her that her employment was terminated, ostensibly because she had exhausted her leave time. See U.S. Complaint ¶ 7; Amended Complaint ¶ 25. According to plaintiffs, this proffered reason for Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s termination was “a blatant he.” Amended Complaint ¶ 25. Ms. Murphy-Taylor never received a pre-termination hearing, to which plaintiffs contend she was entitled under the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBR”), Md.Code (2011 RepLVol., 2012 Supp.), §§ 3-101 et seq. of the Public Safety Article (“P.S.”), despite her several requests for such a hearing. See Amended Complaint ¶ 27. In addition, Ms. Murphy-Taylor was not warned before she was terminated that failure to return to work would result in termination, nor was she offered any options in lieu of termination, such as taking leave without pay. See U.S. Complaint ¶ 38. During a workers’ compensation hearing for Ms. Murphy-Taylor on August 3, 2011, the Sheriff offered Ms. Murphy-Taylor the option to return to work at the Sheriffs Office. However, this offer entailed returning to work in a demoted position and under Hofmann’s supervision, without a guarantee of no contact with Hofmann. See U.S. Complaint ¶ 39; Amended Complaint ¶ 29. Ms. Murphy-Taylor declined the offer. Amended Complaint ¶ 29. Despite Hofmann’s guilty plea to the second-degree assault of Ms. Murphy-Taylor, the Sheriff retained him in a supervisory position. US Complaint ¶ 40. In or about November 2011, the Maryland Police Training Commission conducted a hearing to evaluate whether Hofmann had the moral character to remain a Maryland police officer in light of his conviction for second-degree assault. Id. ¶ 41. The panel voted 12-0, with one abstention, to decertify Hofmann, and his police license was revoked in December 2011. Id. Nevertheless, after Hofmann was decertified, he continued to work for the Sheriffs Office for a period of time. Id. On or about April 3, 2012, Ms. Murphy-Taylor filed with the EEOC a supplemental charge of discrimination so as to amend Charge No. 531-2020-00776C to assert additional allegations of retaliation. See April 2012 Supplemental Charge of Discrimination, Ex. 4 to County-Plaintiffs Reply (ECF 37-2). In particular, she asserted claims of retaliatory constructive discharge, retaliatory termination, and a claim that she had been retaliatorily blacklisted from employment with law enforcement agencies in Queen Anne’s County and surrounding counties. Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this Court on August 23, 2012. See ECF 1. On December 10, 2012, the EEOC issued a Right-to-Sue Letter to Ms. Murphy-Taylor. See Right-to-Sue Letter, Ex. 2 to County Motion (ECF 24-4). Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint two days later, on December 12, 2012. The only substantive change between the Amended Complaint and the original Complaint was the addition of the County as a named defendant. Additional facts will be included in the Discussion. Discussion A. Standard of Review The defendants’ motions are premised in part on Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), which governs dismissal for failure to state a claim, and in part on Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), which pertains to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by the defendant that, even if the facts alleged by the plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). It provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and the “grounds” for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 n. 3, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A plaintiff need not include “detailed factual allegations” in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. But, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Id.; see Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir.2013). To satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if ... [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and ... recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint that provides no more than “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” is insufficient. Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Both Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), make clear that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’ .... ”); see also Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., 634 F.3d 754, 768 (4th Cir.2011); Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir.2009); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir.2008). Thus, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be granted if the “well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citation omitted). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “‘must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,’ ” and must “ ‘draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.’ ” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir.2011) (citations omitted). However, the court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. See Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986); Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 385-86 (4th Cir.2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 992, 130 S.Ct. 1740, 176 L.Ed.2d 214 (2010). “A court decides whether [the Rule 12(b)(6) ] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer” that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy he or she seeks. A Society Without A Name v. Virginia, 655.F-3d 342, 346 (4th Cir.2011), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 132 S.Ct. 1960, 182 L.Ed.2d 772 (2012). “ ‘Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.’ ” Hartmann v. Calif. Dept, of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir.2013) (citation omitted); accord Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d 1194, 1201-02 (10th Cir.2011) (“When reviewing a 12(b)(6) dismissal, ‘we must determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed.’ Dismissal is appropriate if the law simply affords no relief.”) (internal citation omitted). A motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) typically “does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses,” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted), unless such a defense can be resolved on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint. In addition, on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court “[o]rdinarily ... may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein.... ” Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir.2013). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, however, the court may properly consider documents “attached or incorporated into the complaint,” as well as documents attached to the motion to dismiss, “so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir.2009); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d at 448. To be “integral,” a document must be one “that by its ‘very existence, and not the mere information it contains, gives rise to the legal rights asserted.’” Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 794 F.Supp.2d 602, 611 (D.Md.2011) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). The jurisdictional issues that must be resolved under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) are those concerning whether plaintiffs adequately exhausted their Title VII claims with the EEOC before filing suit. Fourth Circuit precedent indicates that failure to exhaust administrative remedies under Title VII should be addressed by way of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir.2013) (“[FJederal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over Title VII claims -for which a plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies.”); Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300-01 (4th Cir.2009). A test of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may proceed “in one of tyro ways”: either a facial challenge, asserting that the allegations pleaded in the complaint are insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction, or a factual challenge, asserting “ ‘that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint [are] not true,’ ” or that other facts, outside the four corners of the complaint, preclude the exercise of' subject matter jurisdiction. Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir.2009) (citation omitted); see also Buchanan v. Consol. Stores Corp., 125 F.Supp.2d 730, 736 (D.Md.2001). This case presents a factual challenge. Defendants have submitted certain filings arising from plaintiffs administrative claim proceeding with the EEOC in order to demonstrate that plaintiffs failed to exhaust the claims they assert in this proceeding. In opposition, plaintiffs and the United States have submitted some additional EEOC filings. In a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, “the plaintiff bears the burden of proving” that subject matter jurisdiction is satisfied “by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 875, 130 S.Ct. 229, 175 L.Ed.2d 129 (2009). In that circumstance, the court “may regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue[,] ... may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment,” Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir.2004), and may also “resolve the jurisdictional facts in dispute by considering [the] evidence outside the pleadings .... ” Vuyyuru, 555 F.3d at 348 (citation omitted). If necessary, the court may also “hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the facts support the jurisdictional allegations,” United States v. North Carolina, 180 F.3d 574, 580 (4th Cir.1999), at which it may “decide disputed issues of fact with respect to subject matter jurisdiction.” Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192. However, as there is no factual dispute regarding what was filed in the EEOC proceeding and when, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing in this case. B. Title VII: Administrative Exhaustion and Timeliness Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex, among other illegitimate considerations. Under Title VII, a “person aggrieved” by an alleged unlawful discriminatory employment practice must file a “charge” of discrimination with the EEOC or an appropriate state or local agency within a specified time “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l), and “cannot bring suit until he has exhausted the administrative process.” Chacho v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 509 (4th Cir.2005). The time allotted to file a charge under Title VII depends on whether the complainant files the charge in a jurisdiction that has a state or local law prohibiting employment discrimination on the same bases that are covered by Title VII and authorizing a state or local agency to grant or seek relief from such discrimination. Such a state or local jurisdiction is sometimes called a “deferral” jurisdiction. See, e.g., Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 300 F.3d 400, 404 & n. 3 (4th Cir.2002); Prelich, supra, 813 F.Supp.2d at 661-62 (D.Md.2011). In a deferral jurisdiction, the limitations period is 300 days; otherwise, the period is 180 days. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l); see also Prelich, 813 F.Supp.2d at 661-62. Maryland is a deferral state under Title VII. See EEOC v. R & R Ventures, 244 F.3d 334, 338 n. * (4th Cir.2001). Therefore, Ms. Murphy-Taylor was required to file an administrative charge of discrimination within 300 days after the occurrence of the alleged employment discrimination. Once a charge is filed with the EEOC in a deferral jurisdiction, as in this case, the EEOC must refer the charge to the state or local enforcement agency in the jurisdiction, and ordinarily must “afford [the state or local agency] a reasonable time, but not less than sixty days ... to act under ... State or local law to remedy the practice alleged.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d). Thereafter, the EEOC must notify the employer against whom the charge has been filed of the pendency of the charge and must investigate the charge to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that unlawful discrimination has occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If the EEOC makes a finding of reasonable cause, it must “endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” Id. The federal government (acting through the EEOC or, in a case such as this involving a respondent that is a “government, governmental agency, or political subdivision,” through the Justice Department) may initiate litigation if conciliation is unsuccessful. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). On the other hand, if the EEOC does not find reasonable cause, it must dismiss the charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). As the Fourth Circuit explained in Sydnor v. Fairfax County, 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir.2012) (internal citations omitted): Rather than “a formality to be rushed through,” [the] exhaustion requirement is “an integral part of the Title VII enforcement scheme.” For one thing, requiring a party to file a charge with the EEOC “ensures that the employer is put on notice of the alleged violations,” thereby giving it a chance to address the alleged discrimination prior to litigation. This means that injured parties can often obtain relief far earlier than they would be able to in the courts, where “the ponderous pace of formal litigation” can force “victims of discrimination ... to wait while injustice persists.” For another, the requirement places the resolution of employment discrimination disputes initially in the hands of the EEOC. Allowing this agency the first crack at these cases respects Congress’s intent “to use administrative conciliation as the primary means of handling claims, thereby encouraging quicker, less formal, and less expensive resolution of disputes.” If the EEOC dismisses a charge of discrimination or if the federal government has neither filed suit against the respondent nor achieved a conciliation agreement within 180 days after either (1) the charge is filed or (2) the sixty day reference period in a deferral jurisdiction expires, whichever is later, the EEOC must give notice to the complainant of the complainant’s right to file suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)- This notice is commonly called a “right-to-sue letter.” See, e.g., Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 416 (4th Cir.2006). A complainant has ninety days to file suit in federal or state court after being notified of the right to sue. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(f)(1); see also Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 110 S.Ct. 1566, 108 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990) (holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to adjudicate Title VII claims). In this case, plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Ms. Murphy-Taylor filed her charge of discrimination on February 15, 2010, and that “[tjhis suit is proper because it has been more than 180 days and the EEOC has not yet issued a decision.” Amended Complaint ¶ 14. As noted, plaintiffs filed their original complaint on August 23, 2012. It is undisputed that the EEOC did not issue a right-to-sue letter to Ms. Murphy-Taylor until December 10, 2012. The County and the State Defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ Title VII claims because plaintiffs filed suit before a right-to-sue letter was issued. Plaintiffs counter that issuance of a right-to-sue letter is not a prerequisite to suit. Rather, plaintiffs maintain that a Title VII complainant may file suit in federal court once he or she is entitled to receive a right-to-sue letter, regardless of whether one has actually been issued. As indicated, after a claim of discrimination is filed in regard to a Title VII matter, the EEOC is directed to issue a right-to-sue letter in a deferral jurisdiction within, at the latest, 180 days plus the sixty-day deferral period (ie., 240 days), if the EEOC does not earlier dismiss the claim for lack of probable cause, achieve a conciliation agreement, or initiate litigation. Because well over 240 days (indeed, 920 days) elapsed between February 15, 2010, when Ms. Murphy-Taylor filed her claim of discrimination, and August 25, 2012, when plaintiffs filed suit, she reasons that she was entitled to receive a right-to-sue letter and therefore was entitled to sue, despite the fact that an actual right-to-sue letter had not yet been issued. Governing Fourth Circuit law forecloses defendants’ position. In Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690 F.2d 1091, 1093 (4th Cir.1982), the Fourth Circuit squarely held that “it is entitlement to a ‘right to sue’ notice, rather than its actual issuance or receipt, which is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the federal courts” under Title VII. The Perdue Court reasoned: Section 2000e — 5(f)(1) requires EEOC to issue a “right to sue” notice if, within 180 days after a charge is brought, the Commission has neither filed suit in its own name nor achieved a private settlement. Thus, a charging party is entitled to such notice if the appropriate conditions exist. The Commission’s failure actually to issue the notice cannot defeat the complainant’s statutory right to sue in the district court, for ‘(a) Title VII complainant is not charged with the commission’s failure to perform its statutory duties’.... Nothing in [Supreme Court case law] precludes this rule, which is simply an application of the maxim that equity regards as done that which ought to have been done. Perdue, 690 F.2d at 1093 (internal citations and footnote omitted); accord Davis v. N.C. Dept. of Correction, 48 F.3d 134, 140 (4th Cir.1995) (“[R]eceipt of, or at least entitlement to, a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite that must be alleged in a [Title VII] plaintiff’s complaint.”) (emphasis added); Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100, 1104 n. 1 (4th Cir.) (“Entitlement to the letter, without actual receipt of it, is sufficient to support federal jurisdiction.”), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021, 105 S.Ct. 3489, 87 L.Ed.2d 623 (1985); Veliaminov v. P.S. Business Parks, 857 F.Supp.2d 589 (E.D.Va.2012) (holding that plaintiff “was entitled to a right-to-sue letter regarding his Title VII claims at the time he filed the Complaint in this Court” and thus the court had “subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs Title VII claim”; and “[additionally, Plaintiffs receipt of the right-to-sue letter from the EEOC prior to dismissal cures any potential defect”); see also EEOC v. W.H. Braum, Inc., 347 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th Cir.2003) (stating that, “where an aggrieved employee files suit after the expiration of the 180 days, ... jurisdiction over his or her claim exists, even if a right-to-sue letter was not actually received,” and that “jurisdiction arises at this time in order to protect the employee”) (citing Perdue). To be sure, some subsequent decisions have, in passing, described receipt of a right-to-sue letter as a prerequisite to suit. See, e.g., Puryear v. County of Roanoke, 214 F.3d 514, 518 (4th Cir.2000) (“[T]he aggrieved person may initiate a civil action based on the Title VII claims made in her EEOC charge only after receipt of a right-to-sue letter.”); Austin v. Owens-Brock-way Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 878 (4th Cir.) (recounting defendant’s argument that plaintiff “failed .to file her claim with the EEOC and had not obtained a right to sue letter, both prerequisites to filing ... Title VII claims in court”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980, 117 S.Ct. 432, 136 L.Ed.2d 330 (1996); Long v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 9 F.3d 340, 342 (4th Cir.1993) (“Long satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites for Title VII ‘(i) by filing timely charges of employment discrimination with the [EEOC] and (ii) by receiving and acting upon the [EEOC’s] statutory notice of the right to sue.’ Title VII ‘specifies with precision’ these two prerequisites. They are the only prerequisites a claimant must satisfy.”) (internal citations omitted). But, none of these cases addressed the issue of whether entitlement to a right-to-sue letter, without actual issuance of the letter, was sufficient to satisfy the statutory prerequisite to litigation, and none of them discussed Perdue or its progeny. I am satisfied that statements in the case law, cited above, are merely oversimplifications of the rule that is more accurately stated in Perdue. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ initiation of this suit before the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter presents no jurisdictional impediment. The State Defendants next contend that the claims of retaliatory termination and retaliatory constructive discharge asserted both by plaintiffs, as a component of their Title VII count, and by the United States, in Counts III and IV of its complaint, were not administratively exhausted with the EEOC. The State Defendants’ argument is that the retaliation claims were not asserted in Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s original Charge of Discrimination, filed on February 15, 2010. “The scope of the plaintiffs right to file a federal lawsuit [under Title VII] is determined by the ... contents” of the charges filed by the plaintiff with the EEOC or corresponding state agency during the process of exhaustion. Jones, supra, 551 F.3d at 300 (citation omitted). Put another way, “ ‘[o]nly those discrimination claims stated in the initial charge, those reasonably related to the original complaint, and those developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint may be maintained in a subsequent ... lawsuit.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Of course, there is a good reason that these retaliation claims were not asserted in the February 2010 charge: the facts giving rise to the retaliation claims had not yet come to pass. As to the retaliatory termination claims, plaintiffs employment was not terminated until May 2011, over a year after the original Charge of Discrimination was filed. As to constructive discharge, in order “[t]o establish constructive discharge, a plaintiff must be able to show that [her] former employer ‘deliberately made an employee’s working conditions intolerable, and thereby forced [her] to quit.’ ” James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 378 (4th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 959, 125 S.Ct. 423, 160 L.Ed.2d 323 (2004). The theory underlying the constructive discharge claims in this case is that Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s decision to go on an extended medical leave from which she never returned was tantamount to quitting due to the intolerable conditions of her employment. However, Ms. Murphy-Taylor did not take medical leave until July 2010, several months after she filed her original charge of discrimination. The State Defendants acknowledge that Ms. Murphy-Taylor asserted her retaliation claims in her supplemental charge of discrimination, filed with the EEOC on April 3, 2012. However, they argue that the supplemental charge was untimely because it was filed more than 300 days after the termination of Ms. Murphy-Taylor. Accordingly, the State Defendants reason that the claims are time-barred. The State Defendants rely on National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), in which the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff cannot recover “for discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that occur outside the statutory [300-day] time period,” id. at 105, 122 S.Ct. 2061, even if the discrete act is “related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” Id. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061. In other words: “Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.” Id. A “discrete act” or “incident of discrimination” includes such actions as “termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire.” Id. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061; accord Gilliam v. S.C. Dept. of Juvenile Justice, 474 F.3d 134, 140-41 & n. 8 (4th Cir.2007). The State Defendants’ argument is unfounded for two reasons. First, while Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s original charge was pending before the EEOC, the supplemental charge of discrimination was filed for the express purpose of amending the original charge. In Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106, 122 S.Ct. 1145, 152 L.Ed.2d 188 (2002), the Supreme Court upheld, as an “unassailable interpretation” of Title VU’s charge requirements, id. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 1145, the EEOC’s regulatory “relation-back” provisions, see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b), which dictate that a petitioner may supplement or amend a charge after it is filed so as to include “amendments alleging additional acts which constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge.” Id. Those supplements or amendments “will relate back to the date the charge was first received.” Id. Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s original charge was still pending with the EEOC when she filed her supplemental charge, and her supplemental charge was filed under the same charge number, amending the original charge to add new allegations of unlawful employment practices that clearly related to the subject matter of the original charge. Therefore, it is of no moment that the supplemental charge was filed more than 300 days after the incidents it alleges. Second, even if Ms. Murphy-Taylor had not filed the supplemental charge, binding circuit precedent indicates that her original charge would have been sufficient, for exhaustion purposes, as to claims of subsequent retaliatory termination and constructive discharge. In Jones, supra, 551 F.3d 297, the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected the interpretation of Morgan that is advanced by the State Defendants. As the Jones Court explained, Morgan “does not purport to address the extent to which an EEOC charge satisfies exhaustion requirements for .claims of related, post-charge events.” Id. at 303. In Jones, the plaintiff filed an EEOC charge claiming that, in retaliation for filing an earlier EEOC charge that had been resolved by conciliation, she was being “ ‘forced to work in a hostile environment and subjected to differential treatment’ ” by her employer. Id. at 299 (quoting charge). The EEOC issued the plaintiff a right-to-sue letter. Id. Between the date that the right-to-sue letter was issued and the date that the plaintiff sued in federal court, she was fired by her employer. Id. In the federal suit that followed, plaintiff alleged that her employer had discharged her in further retaliation for her EEOC charges. Id. Despite the fact that the retaliatory discharge claim had not been asserted and, indeed, could not have been asserted in the plaintiffs EEOC charge, the Fourth Circuit held that the retaliatory discharge claim had been administratively exhausted. Id. at 304. According to the Court, “the alleged retaliatory termination was merely the predictable culmination of [the employer’s] alleged retaliatory conduct,” and so “the claim of retaliatory termination was reasonably related to the allegations of the [EEOC], charge.” Id. So too here. In her original charge of discrimination, Ms. Murphy-Taylor marked the box indicating that she was complaining of retaliation for engaging in protected activity, and also checked the box for discrimination on the basis of sex. See Feb. 2010 Charge of Discrimination at 1. Moreover, in Paragraph 13 of the charge, she alleged an act of “[c]ontinuing [r]etaliation” with respect to her complaints to Sheriffs Office management regarding her sexual harassment and assault by other officers. Specifically, she asserted that she was singled out to receive an assignment of road patrol under snowy conditions, an assignment that “[n]o one else from a specialized division” received. Id. ¶ 13. As in Jones, defendants’ subsequent alleged further retaliation against Ms. Murphy-Taylor by terminating or constructively discharging her was the “predictable culmination” of the earlier alleged course of discriminatory and retaliatory conduct. Jones, 551 F.3d at 304. Jones is an example of the general principle that an EEOC charge “ ‘does not strictly limit a ... suit which may follow; rather, the scope of the civil action is confined only by the scope of the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow the charge of discrimination.’ ” Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir.2005) (quoting Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir.2002)). Put another way, the scope of a subsequent lawsuit may be broader than the language of the EEOC charge. “If a plaintiffs claims in her judicial complaint are reasonably related to her EEOC charge and can be expected to follow from a reasonable administrative investigation, the plaintiff may advance such claims in her subsequent civil suit.” Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir.2000). When an employer discharges a Title VII plaintiff during the pendency of her EEOC charge, allegedly as part of a continuing practice of retaliation by the employer against the plaintiff, a claim of retaliatory discharge “can be expected to follow from a reasonable administrative investigation” of the original charge. Id. Accordingly, the retaliation claims brought by plaintiffs and the United States are not subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. As a final challenge to plaintiffs’ administrative exhaustion of their claims, the County asserts that it was not named as a respondent in plaintiffs’ claim of discrimination and that there is no “substantial identity” between it and the Sheriff so as to support the filing of a civil action against a defendant not named in the plaintiffs EEOC charge. See County Motion at 19-22. Thus, the County maintains that plaintiffs did not administratively exhaust their claims with respect to the County, even if they did so with respect to other defendants. This argument is dead on arrival, because plaintiffs’ original charge of discrimination in February 2010 clearly named “Queen Anne’s County, John P. Borders, Jr., County Manager” as a respondent to the charge, in addition to the “Queen Anne’s Co. Office of the Sheriff.” See Feb. 2010 Charge of Discrimination at 2. After plaintiffs pointed this out in their opposition to the County Motion, the County’s only rejoinder was to state, in reply, that “[c]onspicuous in its absence ... is any mention of the fact that when [Ms. Murphy-Taylor] amended her Charge of Discrimination of April 3, 2012, the County was not named as a Respondent.” County-Plaintiffs Reply at 6 n. 2. To be sure, the respondent in the supplemental charge of discrimination is listed, ambiguously, as “Queen Anne’s County — Office of Sheriff.” April 2012 Charge of Discrimination at 1. But, as the United States points out, the EEOC sent notice of both the original charge and the supplemental charge to the County via the County Administrator and also sought to engage the County in the investigation and conciliation process. Despite the EEOC’s efforts, the County declined to participate in the EEOC proceeding because it maintained that the Sheriff, rather than the County, was Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s employer. See County-US Opposition at 9-10; see also Ex. 2, 3, 4 & 5 to County-US Opposition (ECF 47-3, 47-4, 47-5 & 47-6) (notices of charges of discrimination sent to County and correspondence between EEOC and County). Accordingly, I see no merit in the County’s argument. Having addressed defendants’ arguments concerning the prerequisites to suit under Title VII, I turn to their arguments concerning the sufficiency of the complaints to state substantive claims for relief. C. Title VII: State Defendants’ Liability At the outset, the State Defendants correctly assert that the Individual Defendants are not subject to suit under Title VII in their individual capacities. See Lissau v. Southern Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177,181 (4th Cir.1998) (“[Supervisors are not liable in their individual capacities for Title VII violations.”). Accordingly, individual-capacity claims under Title VII, to the extent asserted by plaintiffs, will be dismissed. Aside from their challenge to any individual-capacity claims, the State Defendants do-not contest the sufficiency of the pleadings filed by plaintiffs and the United States as to the claims of a hostile work environment under Title VII. However, they level three challenges against the United States’ claims of retaliatory termination and retaliatory constructive discharge (i.e., Counts III and IV of the United States’ complaint). First, the State Defendants argue that Counts III and IV do not plausibly plead causation. Under Title VII’s prohibition of retaliation, it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In order to state a claim of retaliation under Title VII, “plaintiffs must allege (1) that they engaged in protected conduct, (2) that they suffered an adverse action, and (3) that a causal link exists between the protected conduct and the adverse action.” A Society Without A Name, supra, 655 F.3d at 350; accord Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 337 (4th Cir.2011). With respect to the causation element, ordinarily there must be “some degree of temporal proximity to suggest a causal connection.” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir.2005). Therefore, a “ ‘lengthy time lapse between the [defendant’s] becoming aware of the protected activity and the alleged adverse ... action’ ” often “ ‘negates any inference that a causal connection exists between the two.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). However, in “cases where ‘temporal proximity between protected activity and allegedly retaliatory conduct is missing, courts may look to the intervening period for other evidence of retaliatory animus.’ ” Lettieri v. Equant, Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650 (4th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). Conversely, mere temporal proximity is not necessarily enough to create a jury issue as to causation. “ ‘Where timing is the only basis for a claim of retaliation, and gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected activity, an inference of retaliation does not arise.’ ” Fran cis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 309 (4th Cir.2006) (citation omitted) (affirming summary judgment where the “actions that led to [plaintiffs] probation and termination began before her protected activity, belying the conclusion that a reasonable factfinder might find that [defendant’s] activity was motivated by [plaintiffs] complaints”). Moreover, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling this past term in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, — U.S.—, 133 S.Ct. 2517,186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013), decided after the completion of the briefing of the instant motions, “a plaintiff making a retaliation claim under [Title VII] must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Id. at 2534. It is insufficient merely “to show that the motive to [retaliate] was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s decision.” Id. at 2523. According to the State Defendants, the United States has failed to allege facts that plausibly suggest causation. As the State Defendants see it, “the latest action by Ms. Murphy-Taylor that could be construed as a protected activity is her April 8, 2010, complaint to Major Williams about continued contact with Dennis Hofmann,” which was “more than 11 months before the alleged retaliatory discharge.” State-US Motion at 7. Furthermore, “[i]f the protected activity in question is her filing of a charge of discrimination on February 15, 2010, then there is an even longer gap — 15 months — between her discharge and the protected activity.” Id. However, the State Defendants suggest that, because a “plaintiff cannot prove causation without showing that the decisionmaker actually had knowledge of the protected activity at the time the decisionmaker decided to take the adverse action,” Mezu v. Morgan State Univ., 2010 WL 1068063, at *10 (D.Md. Mar. 18, 2010) (citing Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 278 (4th Cir.2001), and Gibson v. Old Town Trolley Tours of Wash., D.C. Inc., 160 F.3d 177, 181-82 (4th Cir.1998)), the correct date to evaluate should be the date of the latest protected activity of which Sheriff Hofmann was aware. State-US Motion at 8. The State Defendants note that the complaint does not specifically allege that Sheriff Hofmann was aware of Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s February 2010 EEOC claim or her internal complaint of April 5, 2010. Rather, according to the State Defendants, “the only protected activity that Sheriff Hofmann knew of’ was “the August 2007 complaint to the Sheriff of sexual assaults by Dennis Hofmann.” Id. The gap between that date and Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s termination was 51 months, a span of time that, as the State Defendants see it, is not suggestive of a causal link. In my view, the United States has plausibly alleged a causal nexus between Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s protected complaints regarding sexual harassment and assault and both her alleged constructive discharge (when Ms. Murphy-Taylor went on medical leave in July 2010) and her actual termination (in May 2011). As to the constructive discharge claim, Ms. Murphy-Taylor engaged in a series of protected activities in the first half of 2010, including the filing of her charge of discrimination in February, and her complaint to Major Williams regarding continued contact with Hofmann in April. She alleges a host of retaliatory actions taken against her throughout this time period, culminating in a negative performance review on July 20, 2010, only two days before she went on medical leave. As to plaintiff’s actual termination, the plausible inference of causation is stronger still. Ms. Murphy-Taylor was fired one day after Hofmann pleaded guilty to the second-degree assault of Ms. Murphy-Taylor. As the United States observes, “Sheriff Hofmann had a very significant reason to wait until after the sentencing — Ms. Murphy-Taylor had the right as the victim of his brother’s crime to object to his guilty plea and to testify at his sentencing, which could have resulted in his brother receiving a harsher sentence.” State-US Opposition at 23. Moreover, I disagree with the State Defendants’ contention that the complaint does not permit the inference that the Sheriff knew of Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s protected activities after August 2007. Indeed, the opposite inference is far more readily drawn; it is hard to conceive that the Sheriff did not know of Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s subsequent protected complaints, given that she made them to members of his senior staff; that her EEOC charges were directed to the Office of the Sheriff; and that many of Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s complaints, and the most serious of them, concerned Hofmann, the Sheriffs own brother, and resulted in Hofmann’s criminal conviction. Especially in the context of a motion to dismiss, when all plausible inferences from the well-pleaded facts must be drawn in plaintiffs’ favor, there is no basis to conclude that the United States failed adequately to plead causation. The State Defendants’ other two challenges pertain specifically to the United States’ claim of constructive discharge. The State Defendants argue that constructive discharge does not constitute an independent cause of action under Title VII, and that a constructive discharge claim is not viable if Ms. Murphy-Taylor was actually discharged. “A constructive discharge involves both an employee’s decision to leave and precipitating conduct....” Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 159 L.Ed.2d 204 (2004). “To establish constructive discharge, a plaintiff must be able to show that [her] former employer ‘deliberately made an employee’s working conditions intolerable, and thereby forced [her] to quit.’ ” James v. BoozAllen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 378 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 959, 125 S.Ct. 423, 160 L.Ed.2d 323 (2004); see McCain v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 568, 574 (D.Md.2000) (“To advance a claim for ‘constructive discharge,’ the plaintiff must establish: (1) the employer deliberately made an effort to force the employee to quit; and (2) that the working conditions were intolerable.”) Accord Heiko v. Colombo Sav. Bank, 434 F.3d 249, 262 (4th Cir.2006). With regard to tolerability, courts look objectively at the working conditions. Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 272 (4th Cir.2001); see Heiko, 434 F.3d at 262 (“Whether an employment environment is intolerable is determined from the objective perspective of a reasonable person.”). For instance, “mere ‘dissatisfaction with work assignments, a feeling of being unfairly criticized, or difficult or unpleasant working conditions are not so intolerable as to compel a reasonable person to resign.’ ” James, 368 F.3d at 378 (quoting Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir.1994)); accord Heiko, 434 F.3d at 262; see Williams v. Giant Food, Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 434 (4th Cir.2004). “Even a ‘slight decrease in pay coupled with some loss of supervisory responsibilities, is insufficient evidence of constructive discharge.’ ” James, 368 F.3d at 378 (quoting Carter, 33 F.3d at 459). With regard to deliberateness, “[a]n employer’s actions are deliberate only if they ‘were intended by the employer as an effort to force the plaintiff to quit.’ ” Heiko, 434 F.3d at 262 (quoting Matvia, 259 F.3d at 272). In support of their assertion that constructive discharge is not an independent cause of action, the State Defendants rely on a statement in an unreported decision in this district, in which the court stated that “[c]onstructive discharge ... is not an independent basis for relief, but rather a legal fiction under which an employee’s voluntary resignation may be deemed a termination by the employer.” Reed v. Action Prods., Inc., Civ. No. JKB-12-409, 2012 WL 2711051, at *2 (D.Md. July 6, 2012). According to the State Defendants, “constructive discharge is simply another way of alleging a retaliatory discharge.” State-US Motion at 12. If this case involved two counts based on exactly the same facts as each other, one labeled “retaliatory discharge” and the other labeled “retaliatory constructive discharge,” as was essentially the case in Reed, I might well agree with defendants that one of the two was redundant, and that a single count could serve as the vehicle for both theories of liability. See Reed, 2012 WL 2711051, at *2 (“Count II merely restates the claim that the alleged facts constitute constructive discharge.”). However, Counts III and IV of the United States’ complaint each assert a different factual basis for liability. The retaliatory actual discharge count (Count IV) is based on Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s receipt of a letter expressly terminating her employment on May 13, 2011; the retaliatory constructive discharge count (Count III) is based on Ms. Murphy-Taylor’s decision on July 22, 2010, to take medical leave rather than remain at her workplace. In evaluating a complaint under the pleading standard established by Iqbal and Twombly, a court must focus on whether the complaint contains “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, that “is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. How a claim is labeled is of secondary importance, because a reviewing court must disregard “labels and conclusions.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Even if plaintiff had titled both Count III and Count IV as claims of “retaliatory discharge” under Title VII, both state separate, non-redundant claims for relief because the two counts rely on separate factual foundations. In this regard, White v. Honeywell, Inc., 141 F.3d 1270, 1279 (8th Cir.1998), is instructive. There, in a case of apparent first impression for the federal appellate courts, the Eighth Circuit held that under Title VII “a situation where allegedly intolerable working conditions force an employee into an unpaid medical leave of absence from which she is allegedly unable to return is essentially the same as forcing an employee to ‘quit’ for purposes of proving a constructive discharge claim.” The court explained, id.: We are not prepared to say that “quit” is the magic word in a constructive discharge instruction. A person who has suffered a forced unpaid medical leave of absence, from which she is unable to return and which resulted from objectively intolerable working conditions, is in no better position than one who was forced to quit as a result of objectively intolerable conditions. In either case, the employer has, through objectively intolerable conditions, forced the employee out of active service. We believe it is sufficient for a plaintiff to prove that an employer deliberately rendered working conditions intolerable and thus forced the employee to permanently “leave” the employment; the employee need not prove that she technically “quit” in every case. Viewed in the light cast by White, the allegation that Ms. Murphy-Taylor was constructively discharged is not incompatible with the fact that thereafter she was actually discharged. Rather, the United St