Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER RAMOS, District Judge. Plaintiff Carol Potash (“Plaintiff’) brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging gender discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against the Florida Union Free School District (the “District”), Douglas Burnside, Superintendent of the District, and Michael Rheaume, Principal of the District’s middle and high schools (collectively, “Defendants”). Doc. 1. Defendants now bring a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs Complaint in its entirety pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Doc. 21. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. I. Background a. Factual Background The following facts are based on the Court’s independent review of the record, including: (1) the Reply Affirmation of Mark C. Rushfield, Esq., in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Rushfield Reply Aff.”), Doc. 32; (2) the Affidavit of Paula Aston in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Aston Aff.”), Doc. 24; (3) the Affidavit of Douglas W. Burnside in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Burnside Aff.”), Doc. 25; (4) the Affidavit of Michael H. Sussman, Esq., in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Sussman Aff.”), Doc. 29; (5) the Affidavit of Carol Potash in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Potash Aff.”), Doc. 30; (6) Plaintiffs Response Statement of Material Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 (“Pl.’s Resp. 56.1”), Doc. 27; and (7) Defendants’ Reply Statement of Material Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 (“Defs.’ Reply 56.1”), Doc. 34. The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. i. 2000-Oi School Years In September 2000, Plaintiff was hired by the District’s Board of Education (the “Board”) as a “Technical Assistant,” contingent upon successful completion of the required Civil Service exam. Potash Aff., Ex. 1. The Technical Assistant job was a 10-month position with a salary of $24,515 for the 2000-01 school year. Id. Plaintiff was responsible for assisting the Orange-Ulster Counties Board of Cooperative Educational Services (“BOCES”) personnel with the maintenance and repair of computers and computer networking systems within the District, supporting computer technicians and computer network specialists, installing basic computer software, and assisting technical personnel with manual work such as moving equipment and installing electronic wires. Id.; see Potash Dep. 8. Plaintiff was supervised by Maureen Flaherty, then-Superintendent of the District (“Flaherty”) through the 2002-03 school year, and by interim Superintendent Edward Rhine (“Rhine”) for 2003-04. Potash Dep. 14-15. Within five or six months of working at the District, Plaintiff began to suspect that she was being underpaid. She found the job much more demanding than she had initially expected and felt that while she “was called upon to resolve all computer-related issues in the school district,” she was not “provided the staff [she] needed to handle all district-related IT functions.” Postah Aff., ¶ 5; Potash Dep. 12, 14, 45. Plaintiff testified that she was told by Flaherty and Rhine that she was underpaid; however, she thought that during the first two years, Flaherty was trying to raise her salary to be comparable to employees in other districts performing the same job functions. Potash Dep. 39, 43-44. During her second year, 2001-02, Plaintiff began to suspect that she was being underpaid because of her gender. Id. 45. During this time, “[she] started to learn about what other people were making,” and “[s]ome of them” were men. Id. Plaintiff also began to suspect discrimination because she was paid on the District’s custodian pay scale, even though she was not part of the custodial staff, and “kept getting compared to” Tom Andryshak (“Andryshak”), the District’s Buildings and Grounds Coordinator “on the [custodial] salary scales.” Id. 46. However, Plaintiff admits that she was placed on the custodian pay scale because there was no pay scale for computer personnel. Id. 80. Plaintiff further admits that Andryshak’s duties were completely distinct from hers, that he had been employed by the District for “many more years” than she, that he “was a 12-month employee and supervised or coordinated a staff of between five and ten custodians. Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 11; Potash Dep. 79. Under Flaherty’s supervision, Plaintiff began receiving a yearly stipend of approximately $1,500. She believed the stipend amount reflected gender discrimination by Flaherty because Andryshak received a higher stipend. Potash Dep. 61-62. Other than by reference to Andryshak, Plaintiff testified that she had no reason to believe that the District was paying her less based on her gender. Id. 49-50. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs wages increased to $32,876 during the 2001-02 school year, to $40,711 during 2002-03, and to $41,086 during 2003-04. Id. 33-34, 36, 38, 51. ii. 200h-05 School Year In summer 2004, Defendant Douglas Burnside was hired as the District Superintendent (“Superintendent Burnside”). Superintendent Burnside was Plaintiffs direct supervisor during the 2004-05 school year. Id. 16-17; Burnside Aff. ¶ 1. Shortly after he began, Plaintiff informed him that she considered herself to be underpaid. In response, he approached the Board to request a stipend. Burnside Aff. ¶ 3; Potash Dep. 55. On September 24, 2004, Superintendent Burnside informed Plaintiff that the Board had appointed her to the position of “Information Technology Coordinator” for the 2004-05 year and would provide her with a stipend of $2,500. Burnside Aff., Ex. A. Plaintiff testified that she did not believe that any of her duties had changed by being appointed to this new position and she considered the stipend to cover duties that she had already been performing. Potash Dep. 55-56, 58. She also testified that the stipend amount reflected gender bias because Andryshak was receiving a larger stipend, even though she understood that he was receiving a stipend for coordinating a custodial staff of five to ten full-time District employees while she was only responsible for overseeing one BOCES employee one day per week. Id. 60-61. Plaintiff also believed that Superintendent Burnside’s “attitude” and the fact that “he wasn’t coming in and questioning ... Andryshak’s stipend [amount]” reflected gender animus on his part. Id. 68. She also testified that before Superintendent Burnside was hired, the union had been negotiating with Rhine for a higher stipend for Plaintiff of $4,500 for the 2005-06 school year and $9,000 for 2006-07. Id. 58, 65; Potash Affi., Ex. 10. During 2004-05, Plaintiffs salary increased to $47,319.94. Potash Dep. 49-50, 52; see Burnside Aff. ¶ 4. iii. 2005-06 School Year In September of 2005, Plaintiff alleges that she met with Defendant Michael Rheaume, Principal at the District’s middle and high schools (“Principal Rheaume”), and Susan Moore. During the discussion, Principal Rheaume complained to Plaintiff about the state of the computer network and was “belligerent and loud” to her. Potash Dep. 382-38. Afterwards, Plaintiff went to Superintendent Burnside and “complained about Mr. Rheaume’s level of anger towards [her] and feeling berated and belittled.” Id. 493. Plaintiff testified that Superintendent Burnside responded by laughing at her and told her that if she wanted to be a director of technology, she would have to learn how to handle administrators. Id. 494. In November 2005, Plaintiff completed her Master of Education/Curriculum and Educational Technology. At some point thereafter, she notified Superintendent Burnside that she had obtained an advanced degree and should be compensated accordingly. Id. 85-86. On January 12, 2006, Plaintiff told Superintendent Burnside that she was qualified for the Civil Service position of “Director of Technology,” a position which did not currently exist in the District. Burnside Affi., Ex. B. Plaintiff testified that she believed that Superintendent Burnside might not select a woman as a Director of Technology because she had a “feeling” that “he wasn’t confident” in putting a woman in that role. Potash Dep. 96-99. In April 2006, Plaintiff wrote a letter directly to the Board complaining of her salary. In response, Superintendent Burnside decided that he would no longer negotiate with Plaintiff personally and would instead negotiate with the Florida Teachers Association (“FTA”), which represented both teachers and a separate bargaining unit for non-teaching personnel (“SRP”). Burnside Aff. ¶ 5. Then, on April 10, Superintendent Burnside informed her that, as she had requested, the District created the “Director of Technology” position with an anticipated start date of September 1, 2006 and would be eliminating her current position. He further stated, “I am hoping that you are interesting in applying” and provided her with a copy of the job posting that the District had created for the position. The new position was to have to have a salary range of $55,000 to $60,000 for the 2006-07 year. Burnside Aff., Ex. C. According to Plaintiff, she understood that this position was created to fit the duties that she had already been performing and there was no intention to increase the duties of her job. Potash Dep. 104, 111. On April 12, Plaintiff met with Superintendent Burnside to discuss the new position. According to Plaintiff, he was “angry and irate” and she had a “feeling” that he had been “forced” to create the position for her. Id. 115. Nevertheless, Plaintiff applied for the position. By letter dated May 4, the Orange County Department of Personnel notified Plaintiff that her application to take the Civil Service exam had been rejected for lack of work experience. Burnside Aff., Ex. D. The letter explained that they were unable to credit her work experience at her previous employer, Greenwood Lake Union Free School District, and at the District because she had been given the Civil Service title of “Teacher’s Aide” while employed at Greenwood Lake and of “School Monitor” by the District. Id. On May 12, Plaintiff informed Superintendent Burnside that while she did not qualify for the Civil Service exam for Director of Technology, she qualified for the position of Instructional Technology Specialist, but the District would need to create this position. Id., Ex. E. In response, Superintendent Burnside recommended that the Board create this position and the Board complied. Burnside Aff. ¶ 11; Potash Dep. 182-38. During the 2005-06 school year, Plaintiff received a salary of $48,218.60, including the $2,500 stipend. Potash Dep. 77, 86; Burnside Aff. ¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges that Andryshak received a stipend of approximately $6,000, which reflected gender discrimination. Potash Dep. 77-78. iv. 2006-07 School Year On August 23, 2006, the Board appointed Plaintiff as an Instructional Technology Specialist, contingent upon passing the Civil Service exam. Burnside Aff., Ex. F. Plaintiff passed the Civil Service exam and at its December 21 meeting, the Board appointed her to the Instructional Technology Specialist position, with a six month probation period, effective December 22, 2006. Her annual salary was set at $50,000, retroactive to September 1. Id., Ex. G; Burnside Aff. ¶ 15; Potash Dep. 160-62. Plaintiff testified that she earned $50,705 in 2006-07. Potash Dep. 169-70. According to Superintendent Burnside, the Board imposed a six month probation period at his recommendation; it was his practice to impose the longest probationary period available upon any appointments that he recommended. Burnside Aff. ¶ 15. Plaintiff argues that “a janitor” received a shorter probationary period and that this was “a further indication of Burnside’s hostile attitude towards [her].” Potash Aff. ¶ 14; Potash Dep. 227. She alleges that $50,000 is less than what she would have made if she had remained a Technical Assistant. Potash Dep. 87, 165— 66, 169-70. Plaintiff further alleges that her salary was “discriminatory” because “it was much lower than the salary others performing the same function in other school districts were provided.” Potash Aff. ¶ 16. Beginning that school year, Plaintiffs immediate supervisor was Dr. Paula Aston (“Dr. Aston”), a female and the Director of Instructional Support Services. Aston Aff. ¶ 2. At the end of 2006-07, Dr. Aston performed an annual evaluation of Plaintiffs performance, which she considered to be “a very positive evaluation of plaintiffs performance that year.” Id. ¶ 5; Aston Aff., Ex. B. However, Dr. Aston did note a need for Plaintiff to improve her cooperation with administrators, by which she was primarily referring to communications with the elementary school principal, Ronald DePace (“DePace”) and Principal Rheaume. According to Dr. Aston, DePace and Principal Rheaume had complained about Plaintiffs lack of responsiveness and inability to meet their schools’ technology demands. Aston Aff. ¶ 5. v. 2007-08 School Year During the 2007-08 school year, Plaintiffs salary increased to $62,200.75. Potash Dep. 172; Burnside Aff. ¶ 16. In the annual evaluation of Plaintiff performed at the end of that year, Dr. Aston reduced Plaintiffs grades from “Exceeds Expeetations” to “Meets Expectations” in the following areas: “Responds to tech problems in a timely and thorough manner,” “Organizes tasks to achieve maximum results,” and “Promotes efficient operation of technology program through expertise and personal commitment.” Aston Aff., Ex. C. According to Dr. Aston, these reductions were the result of reports from teachers and administrators, including DePace and Principal Rheaume, and of ongoing problems regarding Plaintiffs failure to promptly respond to teacher requests and address the schools’ technology needs. Aston Aff. ¶ 6. Dr. Aston further noted that Plaintiffs responses to the complaints were that she was “too busy to respond more promptly, that she needed more help to perform all the duties her job entailed and that she was underpaid for the level of work required of her____” Id. Additionally, Dr. Aston downgraded Plaintiff from “Exceeds Expectations” to “Needs Improvement” in the category “Communicates with supervisor in a timely manner,” as a result of Plaintiffs habitual failure to advise Dr. Aston of problems and failing to promptly respond to Dr. Aston’s communications. Id.; Aston Aff. ¶ 7. Plaintiff disputes this rating. Potash Aff. ¶ 24. In April 2007, Dana Castine (“Castine”), a tenured female elementary school teacher employed by the District, commenced working with Dr. Aston as her administrative intern and teacher on special assignment. Aston Aff. ¶ 11; Burnside Aff. ¶ 33. vi. 2008-09 School Year 1. Discovery of Unused Smart Boards On September 2, 2008, District staff discovered 5 unused, unopened Smart Boards in the elementary school. Dr. Aston alleges that teachers and administrators had made repeated demands for Smart Boards each year. Aston Aff. ¶ 8. By email that same day, Dr. Aston expressed to Plaintiff her surprise at learning about the existence of the Smart Boards. Aston Aff., Ex. D. Plaintiff responded via email that she had “no idea what they [were] or why they [were] there.” Id. Dr. Aston stated that the installation of the Smart Boards became the subject of ongoing problems during the 2008-09 school year. Aston Aff. ¶ 8; Aston Aff., Ex. E. Plaintiff disputes Dr. Aston’s account and claims that Andryshak was responsible for advising her of the receipt of the Smart Boards and he had failed to do so. Potash Aff. ¶ 25. 2. Complaints Regarding Plaintiffs Performance On August 27, 2008, Plaintiff failed to appear at the new teacher orientation as expected. According to Dr. Aston, Plaintiff had committed to attending the orientation and failed to tell her in a timely manner that she would not be able to attend. Aston Aff. ¶ 16. On September 2, Dr. Aston issued a memorandum to Plaintiff concerning her failure to attend the new teacher orientation and making clear that she expected Plaintiff to respond to communications from her within 24 hours during the school year. Id.; Aston Aff., Ex. I. Plaintiff disputes Dr. Aston’s account. Potash Aff. ¶ 25. During the 2008-09 school year, Dr. Aston again received complaints from both school principals concerning Plaintiffs lack of responsiveness and failure to perform. Aston Aff. ¶ 17. On April 7, 2009, she received an email from DePace concerning Plaintiffs failure to honor a commitment that she had made to him to send out certain reminders to his teachers and her failure to fix a nonfunctioning Smart Board for an entire year. He noted that Plaintiffs reaction to the Smart Board incident was to offer a “flip response.” Aston Aff., Ex. J. During summer 2009, Plaintiff advised Dr. Aston that she had arranged for a training video, titled “Right to Know,” to be ready for viewing on the District’s network at the beginning of September. However, as a result of multiple access problems, non-teaching staff were still unable to watch the video on September 10, 2009. Aston Aff. ¶ 24; Aston Aff., Ex. N. On September 2, 2009, the network was down in the middle school wing and Plaintiff reported to Dr. Aston that “the wing was running'off of the oldest switches we have.” Aston Aff., Ex. L. According to Dr. Aston, while a person in Plaintiffs position should have been capable of dealing with the issue, Plaintiff instead contacted BOCES to have them do the work. Aston Aff. ¶ 22. 3. Plaintiff’s Exclusion from the Technology Grant Committee During 2008-09, in light of the District’s growing technology needs, and Plaintiffs claims that the duties of her position were too much for one person, Dr. Aston placed Castine, her administrative intern, on a committee to assist with the implementation of a federal technology grant. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Plaintiff alleges that Superintendent Burnside excluded her from participating on the committee although she admits that she does not actually know whether he had any involvement in such decision. Potash Dep. 218, 224. 4. Creation of the Senior Computer Network Specialist Position On October 2, 2008, Plaintiff and Dr. Aston made a presentation to the Board which highlighted the District’s increasing technology needs, Aston Aff. ¶ 9, and proposed two options related to staffing: (1) Option A, under which the District would hire a Network Specialist as a 12-month employee to manage the District’s servers and infrastructure and share troubleshooting responsibilities with a 10-month Instructional Technology Specialist; and (2) Option B, under which the District would not only hire a Network Specialist and maintain the Instructional Technology Specialist, but would also hire a part-time technician to assist with daily work order requests, monitor hardware, software, wiring and supplies, all of which were currently Plaintiffs responsibility. Id.; Aston Aff., Ex. F. Both proposals would allow the District to cease paying for the BOCES computer network specialist who assisted Plaintiff. Aston Aff. ¶ 10; Burnside Aff. ¶20. The Board ultimately rejected the proposal to employ both a Network Specialist and Instructional Technology Specialist as too expensive. Instead, the Board decided to abolish Plaintiffs position, Instructional Technology Specialist, to create the Civil Service position of Senior Computer Network Specialist as a 12-month position, and to appoint a full-time Computer Technician to assist the Senior Computer Network Specialist. Aston Aff. ¶ 10. In February 2009, Superintendent Burnside and Dr. Aston met with Plaintiff to inform her of the Board’s decisions. They also told her that she was going to be offered the higher paying Senior Network Specialist position, and that the District would cease using BOCES because the full-time technician would take over much of the troubleshooting. Id. ¶ 19; Burnside Aff. ¶ 22; Potash Dep. 231, 234-36, 240. They also informed Plaintiff that she would be the only person taking the Civil Service exam for this new position and that she would be promoted subject to passing the exam. Aston Aff. ¶ 19; Burnside Aff., Ex. H; Potash Dep. 242-44. According to Dr. Aston, dining the meeting, Plaintiff claimed that the District was making this change to get rid of her because she would not be able to pass the Civil Service test. Aston Aff. ¶ 20; Burnside Aff. ¶ 23. In her deposition, Plaintiff testified that the District created this position so that they could give her an additional probationary term and then fire her. Potash Dep. 237, 378. When asked to explain why she thought this position was created to get rid of her, Plaintiff testified: “This was a ... job that the BOCES personnel came in and did. I never wanted to be a senior computer network specialist per se. I wanted to be a director of technology. I feel they created that position that I never talked about or wanted, knowing they were going to get rid of BOCES and make me now do all of that work as well.” Id. 238. Plaintiff also testified that while she understood that the new position added additional responsibilities, some of the website responsibility would be reassigned. Id. 376-77. Dr. Aston alleges that despite the problems she had had with Plaintiffs perfoimance during the preceding months and years, she did not oppose Plaintiffs assignment to the new position and stated, “I hoped that with the assistance of a full-time Computer Technician to take over much of the troubleshooting ... and the expansion of her position to a 12-month position, she would be able to perform the new job.” Aston Aff. ¶ 18. On June 18, 2009, the Board appointed Plaintiff as Senior Computer Network Specialist effective July 1. The appointment was contingent upon passing the Civil Service exam, carried a six month probationary period, and her salary, to be adjusted through union negotiations, would be increased to $65,152. Burnside Aff. ¶ 25; Burnside Aff., Ex. J. After negotiations, her salary was increased to over $73,000. Burnside Aff. ¶ 26; Potash Dep. 264. According to Plaintiff, this salary was still too low because Rich MacAluso, a male, had asked, but not received, $98,000, for that position. Potash Dep. 265. 5. Payment for 2008 Summertime Work The Plaintiff worked for 10 days during July and August 2008 while she was still in the 10-month position of Instructional Technology Specialist. She sought reimbursement for this work months later on April 16, 2009. Potash Dep. 173-77; Potash Aff., Ex. 51. On April 30, Superintendent Burnside denied her request for payment because there was no record of any request being made for her to work on the dates specified. Potash Aff., Ex. 51. Plaintiff contends that in prior years she had not been required to request permission before performing summer work. Potash Dep. 183. Nevertheless, the FTA entered into an agreement with the District whereby Plaintiff received payment for 5 days. Potash Aff., Exs. 5, 53. Plaintiff alleges that at some point during the dispute regarding the summer pay, she spoke to Superintendent Burnside, who accused of her of lying. Potash Dep. 192-94. Plaintiff testified that during this conversation, she asked him if Andryshak was required to establish that he had worked on particular days and that this question made him “angrier,” and he later told Plaintiff that he would have paid her for all 10 days of work if she had “sucked up.” Id. 195. Superintendent Burnside contends that as a 12-month employee, Andryshak was required to work throughout the summer. Burnside Aff. ¶ 43. 6. May 22, 2009 Telephone Call On May 22, 2009, Plaintiff sent Superintendent Burnside an email discussing a telephone call that they had had, in which she stated, “I just want you to know that I will work on the things you have discussed with me.” Potash Aff., Ex. 54. According to Plaintiff, during the call, Superintendent Burnside told her that she needed to “suck up” and learn to work with administrators.” Potash Dep. 398. He further told Plaintiff that she needed to “act more like” Rob Gravelle, a male athletic director, because “he took everything in stride.” Id. vii. 2009-10 School Year 1.Hiring of Support Staff for Plaintiff During summer 2009, the District created a part-time position to manage the District’s website. The Board hired Brian Slevin (“Slevin”), a male teacher, who according to Superintendent Burnside, was the only person who applied for the position. Burnside Aff. ¶ 28; see also Potash Dep. 272. According to Superintendent Burnside, Slevin was hired to address concerns that Plaintiff had expressed about the quantity of the work she would have to perform in her new position. Burnside Aff. ¶ 28. Before Slevin’s hire, Plaintiff was responsible for managing the website. Potash Dep. 268. On August 19, the District provisionally appointed Richard Klein (“Klein”) as the Computer Technician to assist Plaintiff. Aston Aff. ¶ 21; Burnside Aff., Ex. K. Plaintiff took issue with the fact that she was not allowed to “supervise or evaluate him,” unlike Andryshak “who was permitted to supervise his subordinates.” Potash Aff. ¶20. She further alleges that Dr. Aston “interfered and essentially assigned Klein as she saw fit.” Id. Plaintiff finally contends that Dr. Aston and Principal Rheaume gave Klein preferential treatment, despite the fact that Klein had been subjected to verbal counseling by Dr. Aston in November 2009. Potash Dep. 279. Additionally, Plaintiff testified that on several occasions, when Klein did not complete an assignment, Principal Rheaume “did not react explosively” with him as he did with Plaintiff, with whom he would take a “more aggressive” tone. Id. 281-82. 2.Dr. Aston’s 2008-09 Evaluation On September 11, 2009, Dr. Aston prepared Plaintiffs evaluation for the 2008-09 school year. Aston Aff., Ex. H. In comparison with the prior year’s evaluation, Plaintiffs grades were reduced from “Meets Expectations” to “Needs Improvement” in the categories “Responds to tech problems in a timely and thorough manner” and “Organizes tasks to achieve maximum results.” Id. In Dr. Aston’s summary section, she noted the Smart Board problems that had arisen in September 2008 and had not been resolved by May 2009, nor had the problems that she had reaching Plaintiff. Dr. Aston once again classified Plaintiff as “Needs Improvement” in the category “Communicates with supervisor in a timely manner.” According to Dr. Aston, the grade was not based solely on Plaintiffs failure to inform her of problems on a timely basis, but also on Plaintiffs failure to attend the new teacher orientation. Aston Aff. ¶ 16. The evaluation also noted that Dr. Aston had previously mentioned to the Plaintiff that it was “important that [Plaintiff] make people feel that she was interested in their problems.” Id. ¶ 17. 3.Meetings & Memoranda Regarding Plaintiffs Job Performance As issues arose with Plaintiffs performance, Dr. Aston expressed her concerns to Superintendent Burnside. He instructed her to meet with and communicate her concerns to Plaintiff and, if warranted, to formally document her concerns in counseling memoranda. Superintendent Burnside also advised Dr. Aston that under the Civil Service Law, he had to receive a memorandum concerning the Plaintiffs performance at least two weeks prior to the end of her probationary period for the purposes of making a determination as to whether she had successfully completed probation. Aston Aff. ¶ 25; see also Burnside Aff. ¶¶ 29-30. On September 18, 2009, Dr. Aston issued Plaintiff a memorandum concerning issues from the first two weeks of the school year. Aston Aff., Ex. O. Dr. Aston’s concerns included, inter alia, Plaintiff “[r]epeatedly being inaccessible,” “[n]ot complying with administrative requests in a timely fashion,” responding to requests with sarcasm, hostility, or disinterest, and failing to make the video Right to Know available for all personnel. Id. On November 13, Dr. Aston met with Plaintiff and issued a formal counseling memorandum which reiterated her performance concerns, and specifically noted: • “When you are asked to make arrangements for things, you need to check everything out in advance and make sure that your part is taken care of, so there are no delays or snags. For example, Tuesday, November 3 was Superintendent’s conference day. You had assured us that removing ‘blocks’ at Golden Hill for the day would be no problem. However, at 7:30, when ... [the] conference day began, the ‘blocks’ had not been removed. Further, we had been unable to get a hold of you on either cell phone: yours or the [District’s.” • “You must be accessible at all times. This is a recurring problem. It was only recently, when I asked about it, that you informed me that your cell phone had ‘no service.’ ” Aston Aff., Ex. P. Dr. Aston further noted: The [District has taken pains to remove a number of responsibilities from your plate, re: instructional technology. I personally interface with people in such a way as to defer demands away from you. My greatest frustration is that I never hear you say: ‘Yes, I need to pay a little more attention to that.’ Instead of figuring out how to work ‘smarter,’ ... you get angry about your perception of being asked to work ‘harder.’ Id. Plaintiff disputes Dr. Aston’s allegations. For example, Plaintiff testified that she had asked BOCES to remove the ‘blocks’ for Superintendent’s Day and that she was unaware that they had failed to do so. Potash Dep. 333-34. Thereafter, as a result of what Dr. Aston describes as Plaintiffs “continuing inability to resolve” the Right to Know video issues, she met with Plaintiff on November 20 and on November 24 issued a second counseling memorandum. Aston Aff. ¶ 28; Aston Aff., Ex. Q. The memorandum discussed the problems with the video set-up and stated that as a result of Plaintiffs failure to follow through with assigned tasks, Dr. Aston was being forced to assume some of Plaintiffs responsibilities. Aston Aff., Ex. Q. Also on November 24, Dr. Aston met with Plaintiff for another counseling session concerning her failure to properly set up a Smart Board for a teacher as directed since September 1, and followed up with another counseling memorandum on November 25. Aston Aff. ¶ 29; Aston Aff., Ex. R. Meanwhile, during the second or third week of November, Dr. Aston requested that Principal Rheaume provide her with a letter discussing Plaintiffs performance at his school. Aston Aff. ¶ 30. She requested the letter because she “was aware that Mr. Rheaume, whose school had greater technology demands than the elementary school, had suffered multiple disappointments with the [P]laintiffs performance in that position over recent months.” Id. On November 25, Principal Rheaume provided Dr. Aston with a letter addressing three issues that had arisen since August 2009: • Plaintiff failed to conduct a thorough check of the system prior to providing a training session on SchoolTool. As a result, during training, staff could not log on, nor could the system handle the volume of usage. • Plaintiff failed to provide wireless access in the cafeteria for Back to School Night by 2 p.m. that day. The access was not provided until 2:50 p.m. This resulted in a delay of the presentation to 300 parents. The request had been made at least one week prior. • When installing a Smart Board, Plaintiff did not have the hardware required to complete the installation. When it was installed, it was not in working condition. It was then replaced by one that was too small. In addition, the wiring was left in an unsafe condition. Aston Aff., Ex. S. He further noted that Plaintiff: [I]n my opinion, does not perform the necessary background work to successfully accomplish a task. When she is questioned about the lack of follow through, she becomes defensive and increasingly uncooperative. There is a consistent pattern of this behavior, accompanied by a negative attitude. Id. Plaintiff disputes the content of Principal Rheaume’s letter. For example, she testified that the problem with SchoolTool was that the teachers were not properly following her instructions, Potash Dep. 466-67, and that the Smart Board installation issue was Klein’s job, and not hers. Id. 461. On December 3, Dr. Aston spoke with Plaintiff and discussed Principal Rheaume’s letter. She also “made clear” that Plaintiff had not satisfactorily completed her probationary period and that she would provide the various counseling memoranda and Principal Rheaume’s letter to Superintendent Burnside for his review. Aston Aff. ¶ 31. Dr. Aston followed up the conversation with a counseling memorandum dated that same day. Aston Aff., Ex. T. According to Plaintiff, during the December 3 meeting, Dr. Aston told Plaintiff that Principal Rheaume’s letter would get her fired. Potash Dep. 498. On December 4, Dr. Aston provided a memorandum to Superintendent Burnside which advised him that Plaintiffs performance had not improved and attaching the September 18 memorandum, the four counseling memoranda, and Principal Rheaume’s November 25 letter. Aston Aff. ¶ 32; Burnside Aff., Ex. L. Dr. Aston intended by her memorandum to recommend to Superintendent Burnside that Plaintiff be terminated at the conclusion of her probationary period. Aston Aff. ¶ 32; see also id. ¶ 2. Based on Dr. Aston’s recommendation, Superintendent Burnside recommended to the Board that it terminate Plaintiffs employment. Burnside Aff. ¶ 31. On December 17, the Board adopted a resolution terminating Plaintiffs probationary employment effective December 28, 2009. Id. ¶ 32; Burnside Aff., Ex. M. After Plaintiffs termination, Castine assumed Plaintiff’s duties for the remainder of the 2009-10 school year with the assistance of BOCES technicians. Burnside Aff. ¶ 36; Aston Aff. ¶ 33. In a June 30, 2010 evaluation of Castine, Dr. Aston noted: “In the area of technology, you voluntarily assumed most of the job tasks of our previous technology manager after that person left the district mid-year. You did this with the blessing and appreciation of the superintendent and me, saving the district from chaos and a financial squeeze ... People are already commenting on the vast improvement in services.” Aston Aff., Ex. V. The following year, the District created the position of Director of Technology Integration for Castine, and upon Superintendent Burnside’s recommendation, the Board appointed Castine to the position. The position had starting base salary of $87,500 and was subject to a three year probationary period. Burnside Aff. ¶ 37; Burnside Aff., Ex. P. viii. Additional Allegations of Discrimination Plaintiff alleges that at some unspecified point in time, she told Dr. Aston that she felt that Superintendent Burnside was not paying her what she deserved because she was a woman and that Dr. Aston allegedly responded, “[W]e have all felt it, don’t you think we all feel it[?]” Potash Dep. 251-52. Dr. Aston then “spread her hand in front her,” by which Plaintiff understood her to be pointing to the office of Lisa Tiger, another woman. Id. 254-55. Plaintiff further alleges that, at some point when discussing her pay and job duties, Dr. Aston told Plaintiff that “people were out to get [her].” Id. 255. Dr. Aston denies telling Plaintiff that she had experienced sexism or that people were out to get her. Aston Aff. ¶ 36. Plaintiff testified that over a three-year period she saw Principal Rheaume “speak aggressively or with aggression or irritation in his tone” to two female teachers, each on one occasion. Id. 284. She further testified that other female teachers at the high school, naming five and stating that there were “several others,” had told her that they had been subjected to discriminatory treatment by Principal Rheaume. Id. 494-95. Specifically, these teachers all told her that Principal Rheaume was a “woman hater.” Id. 496. She also testified that two male employees, and “several others over the years,” complained about Principal Rheaume being a “woman hater.” Id. Plaintiff also believes that Principal Rheaume engaged in gender discrimination by telling her five or six times over the course of four years that he wanted to bring in the BOCES technician, who was male, when there were IT problems. However, Plaintiff admitted that there were no female BOCES technicians at the District. Id. 299-301. She also testified that Principal Rheaume expressed gender discrimination through “lots of body language and mannerisms [and he] could not look [Plaintiff] in the eye.” Id. 303. Finally, Plaintiff testified that when she was an Instructional Technology Specialist, Principal Rheaume yelled at her and said “I know people like you, you just want my job.” Id. 384. According to Plaintiff, Dr. Aston was present during this incident and afterwards Plaintiff told Dr. Aston that Principal Rheaume hated her because she’s a woman. Dr. Aston responded that Plaintiff should never have to sit and listen to those comments. Id. 386-87. II. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment Motions a. General Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is only appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Senno v. Elms-ford Union Free School Dist, 812 F.Supp.2d 454, 467 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (citing SCR Joint Venture L.P. v. Warshawsky, 559 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir.2009)). A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the litigation under the relevant law. Id. The party moving for summary judgment is first responsible for demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “When the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmoving party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.” Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, 575 F.3d 199, 204 (2d Cir.2009) (citing Celotex Corp., All U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548). The burden then shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to present evidence that is sufficient to satisfy every element of the claim and “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp., All U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quotation marks omitted). “Summary judgment is properly granted when the non-moving party ‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Abramson v. Pataki, 278 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Celotex Corp., All U.S. at 322,106 S.Ct. 2548). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must “ ‘construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.’ ” Brod v. Omya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir.2011) (quoting Williams v. R.H. Donnelley, Corp., 368 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir.2004)). However, in opposing a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving part may not rely on unsupported assertions, conjecture or surmise. Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995). A motion for summary judgment cannot be defeated on the basis of mere denials or unsupported alternative explanations of facts. Senno, 812 F.Supp.2d at 467. The non-moving party must do more than show that there is “ ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ ” McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586,106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)), “[she] must set forth significant, probative evidence on which a reasonable fact-finder could decide in [her] favor.” Senno, 812 F.Supp.2d at 467-68 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., All U.S. 242, 256-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). b. Summary Judgment Standards for Employment Discrimination Cases Courts are cautious in granting summary judgment in employment discrimination cases where the employer’s intent is at issue, Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir.2008); however, “ ‘[s]ummary judgment is appropriate even in discrimination cases, for ... the salutary purposes of summary judgment— avoiding protracted, expensive and harassing trials — apply no less to discrimination cases than to other areas of litigation.’ ” Hongyan Lu v. Chase Inv. Serv. Corp., 412 FecLAppx. 413, 415 (2d Cir.2011) (quoting Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir.2000), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Ochei v. Col-er/Goldwater Mem’l Hosp., 450 F.Supp.2d 275, 282 (S.D.N.Y.2006)). Indeed, “ ‘[i]t is now beyond cavil that summary judgment may be appropriate even in the fact-intensive context of discrimination cases.’ ” Feingold v. N.Y., 366 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir.2001)). Furthermore, “[e]ven in the discrimination context ... a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations to resist a motion for summary judgment.” Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 137; (citing Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.1985)). A “nonmoving party ‘must offer some hard evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful.’ ” Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting DAmico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir.1998)). “[Sjummary judgment may not be granted simply because the court believes that the plaintiff will be unable to meet his or her burden of persuasion at trial. There must either be a lack of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position, or the evidence must be so overwhelmingly tilted in one direction that any contrary finding would constitute clear error.” Danzer v. Norden Sys. Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir.1998) (internal citations omitted). “Nonetheless, when an employer provides convincing evidence to explain its conduct and the plaintiffs argument consists of purely conclusory allegations of discrimination, the Court may conclude that no material issue of fact exists and it may grant summary judgment to the employer.” Walder v. White Plains Bd. of Educ., 738 F.Supp.2d 483, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citation omitted); see also Stem v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir.1997) (same); Meloff v. NY. Life Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir.1995) (same). III. Discussion Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting her to inferior terms and conditions of employment and terminating her position on the basis of her gender. Compl. ¶¶ 66-67. As explained above, supra note 1, counsel fails to cite to evidentiary support for Plaintiffs allegations and includes only limited citations to relevant legal authority. Accordingly, the Court has reviewed the entire record in order to ensure that Plaintiffs claims receive thorough and just consideration. a. Legal Standard for Equal Protection Clause Discrimination Claims An employee is deprived of her equal protection right to be free from gender discrimination “when she is treated differently from other similarly situated employees, thus suffering ‘disparate treatment because of gender.’ ” Annis v. Cnty. of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 1993)). In the Second Circuit, employment discrimination claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause are analyzed under the same three-step McDonnell Douglas test for claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Flaherty v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 752 F.Supp.2d 286, 295-96 (E.D.N.Y.2010), affd, 462 Fed.Appx. 38 (2d Cir.2012) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)); Feingold, 366 F.3d at 159 (“[Plaintiffs] equal protection claim parallels his Title VII claim. The elements of one are generally the same as the elements of the other and the two must stand or fall together.”). Under the McDonnell Douglas test, a plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. In order to do so, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position in question; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 491-92 (2d Cir. 2010). The Second Circuit has explained that a plaintiffs burden at this stage is de minimis. Abd/w-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 467. Nonetheless, in order to state a prima facie case of discrimination, “a plaintiff must proffer some admissible evidence of circumstances that would be sufficient to permit an inference of discriminatory motive,” Bennett v. Watson Wyatt & Co., 136 F.Supp.2d 236, 246 (S.D.N.Y.2001), affd, 51 Fed.Appx. 55 (2d Cir.2002), and cannot meet its burden through reliance on unsupported assertions, Goenaga, 51 F.3d at 18, or “[statements that are devoid of any specifics, but replete with conclusions.” Griffin v. Ambika Corp., 103 F.Supp.2d 297, 308 (S.D.N.Y.2000). If a plaintiff successfully presents a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises, which the defendant must then rebut by offering legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action demonstrated in the plaintiffs prima facie ease. Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 468 (citing Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Edüd 207 (1981)). The defendant’s burden at this step of the analysis is also “light.” Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir.1998). “The employer need not persuade the court that it was motivated by the reason it provides; rather, it must simply articulate an explanation that, if true, would connote lawful behavior.” Id. The Supreme Court has explained that defendant’s burden “is one of production, not persuasion; [and] it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.’ ” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)). If the defendant satisfies its burden at the second step of the test, “the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted” and “drops from the case,” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 255 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089, “and the sole remaining issue [is] discrimination vel non.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983)). Under the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s articulated reason for the adverse employment action is merely a pretext for actual discrimination. Mandell v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 380-81 (2d Cir.2003). Under Title VII, a plaintiff can establish an unlawful employment practice by demonstrating that sex was “a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). It is important to note, that “[ajlthough intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework, ‘[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.’ ” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089). In determining whether the plaintiff has satisfied this burden, the Court must consider the sum of all evidence of discrimination in its totality, and “examine the record as a whole, just as a jury would, to determine whether a jury could reasonably find an invidious discriminatory purpose on the part of an employer.” Bymie v. Town of Cromwell Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93,102 (2d Cir.2001). b. Plaintiffs Pay Discrimination Claims Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to pay-based discrimination on account of her gender in the following instances: (1) she was grouped for salary purposes with Andryshak and received lower stipends and salary, Pl.’s Opp. Mem. 6; (2) the District gave her replacement, Castine, a salary of $87,500 “for the discharge of fewer functions” while Castine “had far fewer years doing Instructional Technology and was unqualified ... to do systems or network administration,” id. at 20; (3) other individuals performing similar duties in other districts were “paid more,” id. at 19-20; (4) the District gave Slevin a stipend for managing the District website and running teacher support workshops while eliminating Plaintiffs stipend for performing these duties in 2006, id. at 7; and (5) Flaherty and Rhine told Plaintiff that she was underpaid. Id. at 6. When a plaintiff seeks to establish a prima facie case of disparate pay under Title VII, she must show: (1) that she was a member of a protected class; (2) that she was paid less than similarly situated nonmembers of her protected class; and (3) evidence of discriminatory animus. Kearney v. ABN AMRO, Inc., 738 F.Supp.2d 419, 426 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (citing Thomas v. iStar Financial, Inc., 438 F.Supp.2d 348, 367 (S.D.N.Y.2006)). Defendants concede that, as a woman, Plaintiff is a member of a protected class. However, they contend that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the “similarly situated” and “discriminatory animus” prongs. Defs.’ Mem. 10. When a plaintiff seeks to meet her prima face ease by reference to the disparate treatment of an allegedly similarly situated employee, “the plaintiff must show that she shared sufficient employment characteristics with that comparator so that they could be considered similarly situated.” McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir.2001). “This means that such an employee must be similarly situated in all material respects— not in all respects and that a plaintiff is not obligated to show disparate treatment of an identically situated employee.” Kearney, 738 F.Supp.2d at 426 (quoting McGuinness, 263 F.3d at 54) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, such employee “must have a situation sufficiently similar to plaintiffs to support at least a minimal inference that the difference of treatment may be attributable to discrimination.” Id. (quoting McGuinness, 263 F.3d at 54) (internal quotation marks omitted). Employment characteristics which can support a finding that two employees are “similarly situated” include “similarities in education, seniority, performance, and specific work duties,” DeJesus v. Starr Technical Risks Agency, Inc., 03 Civ. 1298(RJH), 2004 WL 2181403, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2004), and similar requirements for skill, effort and responsibility for jobs performed “under similar working conditions.” DeJohn v. WalMart Stores E., LP, 09 Civ. 01315(GTS), 2013 WL 1180863, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2013); see also Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir.2000) (“What constitutes ‘all material respects ... varies somewhat from case to case,” but “there should be an ‘objectively identifiable basis for comparability.’ ”) (citations omitted). This is generally a question of fact for the jury, but “[t]his rule is not absolute, however, and a court can properly grant summary judgment where it is clear that no reasonable jury could find the similarly situated prong met.” Britt v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 08 Civ. 5356(GBD), 2011 WL 4000992, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2011) (quoting Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 791 (2d Cir.2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). i. Plaintiffs Claim That She Was Paid Less Than Andryshak Plaintiff first alleges that she was paid less in stipends and salary than Andryshak, a male custodial employee. Pl.’s Opp. Mem. 6. However, Plaintiff is not similarly situated to Andryshak, whom Plaintiff admits had duties that were completely distinct from hers, had been employed by the District for “many more years” than her, “was a 12-month employee and supervised or coordinated a staff of between five and ten custodians. PL’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 11; Potash Dep. 79. She further admits that Andryshak “lacked [her] educational attainment or technical responsibilities.” Potash Aff. ¶ 4. In her opposition papers, Plaintiff merely speculates that “a reasonable jury could conclude that [P]laintiff properly contrasted herself to Andryshak because the [District chose to couple her with him for salary purposes [and] he was an administrator who supervised individuals .... ” PL’s Opp. Mem. 15. Accordingly, because Plaintiff “has adduced no evidence demonstrating equal job content with [Andryshak], she did not satisfy her prima facie burden,” Byrne v. Telesector Res. Grp., Inc., 339 Fed.Appx. 13, 15-16 (2d Cir.2009), and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs disparate pay claim regarding Andryshak. Quarless v. Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 228 F.Supp.2d 377, 385 (S.D.N.Y.2002), affd sub nom. Quarless v. Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 75 Fed.Appx. 846 (2d Cir.2003) (“The Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory pay because he has put forward no evidence that he was paid less than other similarly situated employees. As a consequence, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs disparate pay claims.”). ii. Plaintiffs Claim That She Was Paid Less Than Castine Second, Plaintiff compares herself to Castine, the tenured female elementary school teacher who assumed Plaintiffs duties after December 2009 with the help of BOCES technicians, and who was appointed to the new position of Director of Technology Integration in June 2010 at a salary of $87,500. Burnside Aff. ¶¶ 36-37; Burnside Aff., Ex. P. Plaintiff alleges that “a reasonable jury, understanding that Castine was given a salary of $87,500 the year following plaintiff was compensated at $75,000 for a technically more complex position and understanding that plaintiff had nine years’ experience doing the job compared to barely one for Castine, could conclude that her title and salary prove that plaintiff was under-compensated and undervalued by [the District],” Pl.’s Opp. Mem. 14, but provides no legal authority for her proposition. Plaintiffs attempt to compare herself to Castine must fail because, inter alia, she fails to account for Castine’s positive performance history since Plaintiffs termination, see PL’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 103, Burnside Aff., Ex. Q. In this regard, it is important to note that Castine had a director-level position and was appointed to the position after having performed Plaintiffs job function for six months to very favorable reviews. In addition, Castine, unlike Plaintiff, was a tenured District employee. Thus, Castine is also not similarly situated to Plaintiff. See Simpson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 04 Civ. 2565(PAC), 2006 WL 2056366, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2006) (plaintiffs disparate pay claim failed because employees were not similarly situated regarding “seniority and performance history”); B'ryant, 2013 WL 2359109, at *3 (finding that another individual with whom plaintiff sought to compare himself was not similarly situated with plaintiff because they had different performance histories at Merrill Lynch); DeJesus, 2004 WL 2181403, at *9 (evidence that comparator “performed better” was a material difference). iii. Plaintiffs Claim That She Was Paid Less Than Individuals at Nearby Districts Performing Her Job Functions Third, Plaintiff argues that she received a lower salary than individuals performing her job function at local school districts. Potash Aff. ¶ 16. In October 2006, Plaintiff prepared a “comparative salary analysis” for Directors of Technology at several Orange and Ulster County School Districts for 2005-06. Potash Aff. ¶ 36; Potash Aff., Ex. 30. However, as noted by the District, Plaintiff was never employed as a Director of Technology. Rushfield Reply Aff. ¶ 10. Moreover, Plaintiff lists her salary at the District in this “analysis” as $44,653, which was the salary that she initially received for 2006-07 when she was appointed as Instructional Technology Specialist and, after negotiations, Plaintiff earned $50,705 that year. Burnside Aff., Exs. F, G; Burnside Aff. ¶ 15; Potash Dep. 157, 160-62, 164, 169-70. Even if Plaintiff had been employed as a Director of Technology by the District, she has nevertheless utterly failed to provide any information of the other Directors’ duties, performance histories, tenure or other such relevant information. Chan v. NYU Downtoum Hosp., 03 Civ. 3003(RMB), 2006 WL 345853, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2006) (“While Plaintiff lists various Hospital employees and their salaries and annual increases, she fails to raise a material issue that they were similarly situated in terms of responsibilities, tenure, experience, background, qualifications, education, etc.”); Quarless, 228 F.Supp.2d at 384 (“While the Plaintiff offers some statistical data regarding the pay rates of various employees at the hospital ... Plaintiff fails to show that these employees were similarly situated. The Plaintiff offers only unanalyzed lists of the salaries of other Bronx-Lebanon employees, without accounting for differences in education, seniority, performance, or specifie work duties____”) (internal citations omitted). The District has also submitted evidence that the student population and teaching staff at the District is one of the smallest among the 17 districts in Orange County. Rushfield Reply Aff. ¶ 10; Rush-field Reply Aff., Ex. B. iv. Plaintiffs Claim That Slevin Received a Stipend Which Had Been Taken Away From Her Fourth, Plaintiff claims that the District’s action of giving Slevin, a male teacher, a stipend starting in summer 2009 for managing the District’s website and running teacher support workshops, while eliminating her stipend for performing these duties in 2006, is evidence of discrimination. Potash Dep. 269; Potash Aff. ¶ 21; Pl.’s Opp. Mem. 7. As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff testified that the District stopped paying her a stipend in 2006 when she was promoted to Instructional Technology Specialist, a position whose duties included supporting the District webpage and running teacher support workshops. Potash Dep. 269. Furthermore, Slevin was provided a stipend for performing these duties in addition to his job as a teacher. See id. 272; Burnside Aff. ¶ 28. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiffs attempt to compare her position to that of Slevin untenable. However, even if Slevin’s duties concerning the website and teacher support workshops were sufficiently similar for a prima facie case, the District has met its burden of producing a non-discriminatory explanation for its , decision to pay Slevin a stipend. According to Superintendent Burnside, during the summer of 2009, in order to reduce Plaintiffs workload as the District’s Senior Computer Network Specialist, he “proposed, posted and negotiated with the Florida Teacher’s Association a stipend position that would include assignment of the [District’s web site management to a teacher in the Florida Teachers Association teachers bargaining unit.” Burnside Aff. ¶ 28 (emphasis added). In other words, the position was created as a stipend position expressly for the purpose of addressing Plaintiffs repe