Full opinion text
DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. # 7); PLAINTIFF’S FOURTH CLAIM (MALICIOUS PROSECUTION UNDER STATE LAW), TENTH CLAIM (MALICIOUS PROSECUTION UNDER FEDERAL LAW), SEVENTH CLAIM AND ALL STATE LAW CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT THE CITY OF HUBER HEIGHTS, AND THIRTEENTH CLAIM (PUNITIVE DAMAGES) ARE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; PLAINTIFF’S FIRST CLAIM (ASSAULT), SECOND CLAIM (FALSE IMPRISONMENT), THIRD CLAIM (FALSE ARREST), FIFTH CLAIM (INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS), SIXTH CLAIM (INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS), EIGHTH CLAIM (UNLAWFUL SEIZURE), ELEVENTH CLAIM (DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE), AND TWELFTH CLAIM (FAILURE TO TRAIN) ARE DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; PLAINTIFF GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS TO REPLEAD CLAIMS DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, WITH NOTICE OF DEFENDANTS’ INVOCATION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AGAINST PLAINTIFF’S FEDERAL CLAIMS; ALL AMENDMENTS MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE STRICTURES OF RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. WALTER H. RICE, District Judge. Plaintiff Patsy J. Shoup (“Shoup” or “Plaintiff’) filed suit against the City of Huber Heights, Ohio (“City”), police officers Brian M. Doyle (“Officer Doyle”), Shawn F. Waler (“Officer Waler”), Anthony W. Ashley (“Officer Ashley”), and firefighter/paramedics Clifford B. Koss (“Koss”) and James N. Kuntz (“Kuntz”) (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging deprivation of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various Ohio common law tort claims. The Court has original jurisdiction over Shoup’s federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), which allows for the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 7), brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff Shoup is a resident of Greene County, Ohio, and is employed by the Veteran’s Administration in Dayton, Ohio. On Friday, October 22, 2010, sometime after 4:00 p.m., Shoup left work and traveled to the home of her adult daughter, Carrie A. Sports (“Sports”). Sports lived in Huber Heights with her two children, a twelve year old daughter and a one year old son. After Shoup arrived, while inside her daughter’s house, a home invasion occurred. Two males and one female, unknown to either Shoup or Sports, forced their way into Sports’s house and violently assaulted both of them. Shoup instructed her granddaughter to take the baby into the laundry room and hide. Sports was “pulled outside, beaten, kicked, and sexually assaulted by the assailants,” resulting in “visible injuries on her face, neck, and arms.” Shoup herself was “beaten, kicked, and struck violently in the face by the assailants,” which caused both “serious visible injuries to her face,” as well as “traumatic brain injury, specifically, subarachnoid hemorrhage and cerebral concussion.” Shoup was able to call 911 during the ordeal, and neighbors called as well. Upon arrival, Officer Doyle was approached by Sports, who was visibly injured. Sports informed him that both she and her mother had been attacked. As Officer Doyle and Sports approached the house, Shoup emerged onto the porch holding Sports’s baby son. Officer Doyle asked Shoup to hand the baby to a neighbor. Shoup, who did not know the neighbor and was afraid for her grandson’s safety, did not want to hand him over. Officer Doyle then “grabbed Plaintiffs arm, threw her to the ground and handcuffed her” before placing her in the back of a police car. He told her that she was “under arrest for obstructing justice.” Shoup made repeated pleas to Officer Doyle to release her so that “she could go back and check on her daughter and grandchildren,” but his only response was to “tell her she was going to be charged with a crime.” Officer Doyle then left her in the cruiser, “unattended,” and still in handcuffs. From where the car was parked, Shoup could not see any of the police officers. During this time, one of the assailants, who was armed with a gun, was still at large. Shoup states that she “was injured, very upset, could hardly breath [sic], and was terrified to be left alone in the cruiser.” After Officer Doyle returned, Shoup asked to be taken to the hospital. Koss and Kuntz, two firefighter/paramedics who had been dispatched to the scene, approached Officer Doyle’s car and “looked at” Shoup while she was still inside. In front of Koss and Kuntz, Officer Doyle asked Shoup why should thought she needed to go to the hospital. Shoup, who was crying, had a lip split open, and felt a “terrible pressure on her chest,” could not respond before Officer Doyle said: “See there, she can’t even think of why she needs to go to the hospital.” After Shoup stated that she needed to go to the hospital because of her “badly cut” mouth, Officer Doyle responded: “That’s because you got busted in the mouth!” Shoup alleges that he had a “very belligerent and disrespectful” tone of voice when talking to her. Koss and Kuntz completed an incident report stating the following: Shoup told them that several people had attacked her; she had been “punched in the jaw,” and her jaw hurt; she “was very upset and crying almost hysterically;” after asking if she was okay, Shoup answered, three times, that she could not breathe; she had “dried blood around her lips;” she complained of chest pain and asked to go to the hospital “immediately;” and, in a statement that Shoup characterizes as an attempt “to ridicule” her, that she “was playing games with ems and police trying to get out of arrest.” At this time, Shoup alleges that she was “experiencing a hypertensive crisis,” because her blood pressure was 180/90. Koss and Kuntz left the scene without providing Shoup with medical care or taking her to the hospital. Shoup was “eventually released” and taken by her family to Kettering Hospital. There, she reported the injuries she had suffered, including being punched and kicked in the head. Shoup complained of dizziness, nausea, head pain, and a loss of consciousness. After concluding that Shoup had suffered a concussion, a cerebral contusion, a contusion to her right shoulder, and a lacerated lip, the physicians concluded that the “seriousness of her injuries” required her transfer to the trauma center at Miami Valley Hospital. There, her diagnosis was augmented to include a contusion to her left chin and a subarachnoid hemorrhage. After two days at Miami Valley Hospital, Shoup was discharged on October 24, 2010. Shoup filed suit on October 21, 2011, in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Ohio, and originally alleged only state law claims against Defendants. Doc. # 1. After Shoup was granted leave to amend, she filed an Amended Complaint on October 12, 2012, in which she also alleged violations of her federal constitutional rights and sought recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, Defendants removed the case to this Court. Shoup’s Amended Complaint presents thirteen claims. Doc. # 2. The first seven allege claims under Ohio law, to wit: assault and battery against Officer Doyle (First Claim); false arrest against Officer Doyle (Second Claim); false imprisonment against Officer Doyle (Third Claim); malicious prosecution against Officer Doyle (Fourth Claim); intentional infliction of emotional distress against Officers Doyle, Waler, and Ashley (Fifth Claim); intentional infliction of emotional distress against Koss and Kuntz (Sixth Claim); and a claim against the City, stating that it has a duty to indemnify Koss, Kuntz, and Officers Doyle, Waler, and Ashley (Seventh Claim). Shoup’s remaining claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: a claim for unlawful seizure against Officer Doyle (Eighth Claim); a claim of excessive force against Officer Doyle (Ninth Claim); a claim for malicious prosecution against Officer Doyle (Tenth Claim); a claim of deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs against Doyle, Koss, and Kuntz (Eleventh Claim); a claim against the City for failure to train Officer Doyle (Twelfth Claim); and a claim against Doyle, Koss, and Kuntz for punitive damages (Thirteenth Claim). Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 10, 2012, arguing that Shoup’s claims, as stated, fail to establish any constitutional violation against her and cannot overcome the qualified immunity defense to which Defendants are entitled. Doc. # 7. Shoup filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 16) on December 21, 2012, and Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 17) on January 7, 2013. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW — MOTION TO DISMISS Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must present “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ to satisfy the pleading standard of the federal courts. “Specific facts are not necessary,” as the statement need only provide the defendant fair notice of the nature of the claim and upon what grounds it rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Nevertheless, Rule 8(a)(2) “imposes both legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd. Partnership v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502 (6th Cir.2013) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). Thus, a plaintiff must “plead enough ‘factual matter’ to raise a ‘plausible’ inference of wrongdoing. The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567, 127 S.Ct. 1955 and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937). A complaint that fails to meet the pleading requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) is vulnerable to dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” under Rule 12(b)(6). The party moving for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) bears the burden of showing that the non-moving party’s pleading has failed to adequately state a claim for relief. Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir.2007) (citing Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir.1991)). The Rule 12(b)(6) analysis requires a court to “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir.2012) (quoting Treesh, 487 F.3d at 476); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). However, “[t]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. In accordance with the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the plaintiffs complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “Although this standard does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ it does require more than ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’ ” Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Unless the facts as alleged show that the plaintiffs claim crosses “the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. III. ANALYSIS Although Shoup’s Amended Complaint pleads her state law claims (Claims One through Seven) before her federal claims (Claims Eight through Thirteen), the Court will first consider her federal law claims before moving to an analysis of her state law claims. A. Shoup’s Federal Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Defendants argue that Shoup’s case should be dismissed because her claims fail as a matter of law and because the doctrine of qualified immunity applies. “Dismissals on the basis of qualified immunity are generally made pursuant [to] summary judgment motions, not 12(b)(6) sufficiency of pleadings motions.” Grose v. Caruso, 284 Fed.Appx. 279, 283 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, “this circuit permits a reviewing court to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) based on qualified immunity.” Jackson v. Schultz, 429 F.3d 586, 589 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Dominque v. Telb, 831 F.2d 673, 677 (6th Cir.1987)). Thus, two issues arise. The first issue is whether Shoup has stated viable claims, which the Court may answer by applying the familiar 12(b)(6) standards of construing her Amended Complaint in a light favorable to her, assuming the truth of all facts therein, and drawing any reasonable inferences in her favor. Handy-Clay, 695 F.3d at 538. Furthermore, “[qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, and a plaintiff does not need to anticipate it to state a claim.” Jackson v. Schultz, 429 F.3d at 589. In other words, there is no heightened pleading standard for claims brought under Section 1983. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166-67, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). Iqbal, which concerned a Bivens action, the “federal [actor] analog” to a Section 1983 action, located the “plausibility” requirement within the scope of Rule 8’s pleading requirements and tested the sufficiency of the plaintiffs complaint accordingly. 556 U.S. 662, 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006)). Thus, the “liberal notice pleading standards” still apply, and the plaintiff is only required to meet the “plausibility” gloss on the notice pleading standard described by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal. See supra Section II. Defendants, therefore, still have the burden of demonstrating that Shoup has failed to allege facts that plausibly suggest that she was deprived of a federally protected right, privilege or immunity by actions that Defendants took under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants’ qualified immunity challenge, however, raises the second issue, because it imposes a burden on Shoup beyond simply stating a viable claim under Section 1983. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The qualified immunity test is often formulated as a two-part test, requiring a court to decide both “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged (see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), (c)) or shown (see Rules 50, 56) make out a violation of a constitutional right,” as well as “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of [the] defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). Thus, even if Shoup states a viable Section 1983 claim, she must, in addition, demonstrate that the constitutional rights were “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation to survive Defendants’ qualified immunity challenge. See Jackson, 429 F.3d at 589 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) and stating that “once the [defendants] raise qualified immunity, Jackson must plead the violation of a clearly established constitutional right”)). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), the Supreme Court created a mandatory procedure for deciding whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity: a court must always consider first whether the plaintiff has alleged that the state actor’s conduct violated a constitutional right, before asking whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. However, in Pearson, the Supreme Court retreated from Saucier’s “inflexible procedure,” concluding that courts “should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” 555 U.S. at 234, 129 S.Ct. 808. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court “eontinue[d] to recognize that it is often beneficial” to perform the analysis in the order previously required by Saucier. Id. For example, “[i]n some cases, a discussion of why the relevant facts do not violate clearly established law may make it apparent that in fact the relevant facts do not make out a constitutional violation at all.” Id. The foregoing justification seems particularly appropriate for retaining the Saucier’s order when, as here, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of a plaintiffs Section 1983 claim with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted brought under Rule 12(b)(6). Furthermore, as articulated by the Supreme Court in Pearson, the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis is basically collapsed into the first part of the qualified immunity inquiry anyway, as it asks “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged (see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), (c)) or shown (see Rules 50, 56) make out a violation of a constitutional right,” in the first place. 555 U.S. at 232, 129 S.Ct. 808. For these reasons, the Court will analyze each of Shoup’s claims by first examining whether the facts, viewed as Shoup alleges them and in her favor, are sufficient to state a claim for a violation of a particular constitutional right. If she has not, the claim fails as a matter of law, and is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). If she has sufficiently alleged a violation of a constitutional right, the Court will then determine whether the right in question was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, such that a reasonable officer should have known of the violation, in order to answer the question of qualified immunity on each of her federal claims. 1. Unlawful seizure claim against Officer Doyle (Eighth Claim) Shoup claims that because Officer Doyle lacked probable cause to justify detaining her in the back of his cruiser, his actions amounted to an unreasonable seizure, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. #2 at 10. Defendants argue that Officer Doyle’s detention of Shoup was not unreasonable, and provide two alternate justifications: either the seizure was an objectively reasonable exercise of Officer Doyle’s duties as a community caretaker, or the seizure was a reasonable investigative stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Doc. #7 at 12-16. Shoup’s unlawful seizure claim arises under the Fourth Amendment, which protects a person’s right to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures,” those unsupported by a warrant or probable cause. U.S. Const, amend. IV. “A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains his freedom of movement.” United States v. McCauley, 548 F.3d 440, 443 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007)). A seizure occurs if an examination of all the surrounding circumstances shows that “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 778 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)). Here, the parties do not dispute that the facts adequately allege that a seizure occurred when Officer Doyle restrained Shoup’s freedom of movement by grabbing her arm, handcuffing her, and placing her in the back of his squad car. The question is whether the seizure itself (not the manner in which it was accomplished, i.e., by-throwing her to the ground), was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. U.S. Const, amend. IV; United States v. Jones, 562 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir.2009). “Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuari, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) (citations omitted). “Lists of recognized exceptions are inclusive rather than exclusive.” Johnson v. City of Memphis, 617 F.3d 864, 868 (6th Cir.2010). Among the most familiar exceptions are exigent circumstances, which “arise when an emergency situation demands immediate police action that excuses the need for a warrant.” Id. (citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit has “repeatedly recognized four situations that may rise to the level of exigency,” including: “(1) hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, (2) imminent destruction of evidence, (3) the need to prevent a suspect’s escape, and (4) a risk of danger to the police or others.” Id. (citing Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 252 (6th Cir.2003)). Defendants argue that Officer Doyle’s seizure of Shoup falls under the “community-caretaking” exception to the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment. That exception “applies only to actions that are ‘totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.’” United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 508 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973)). The community-caretaking function of the police may come into play when there is a risk of danger to the police or others, and may, therefore, be properly classified as an example of exigent circumstances. See Ziegler v. Aukerman, 512 F.3d 777, 785 (6th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the risk of danger “exigency has been most frequently applied in cases where the government actors were performing ‘community-caretaker’ functions rather than traditional law-enforcement functions”). The Supreme Court recognizes that “[o]ne exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 405, 126 S.Ct. 1943. In Brigham City, police outside a house saw a juvenile strike an adult through a kitchen window, which provided “an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the violence in the kitchen was just beginning.” Id. at 405, 126 S.Ct. 1943. Under such circumstances, a warrantless entry does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 406, 126 S.Ct. 1943. Brigham City also affirms the principle that the actions of law enforcement must be evaluated under a standard of objective reasonableness. Id. at 405-06, 126 S.Ct. 1943. Thus, “regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind” or the “subjective motivation” that the officer harbors, if the actions that he or she takes are objectively reasonable under the circumstances, they are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing and quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) and Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n. 2, 120 S.Ct. 1462, 146 L.Ed.2d 365 (2000)). The Sixth Circuit has expressly associated the exigency described in Brigham City with the community-caretaking function of law enforcement. See Ziegler v. Aukerman, 512 F.3d 777 (6th Cir.2008); United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279, 287 (6th Cir.2009). The community-caretaking function usually arises in the context of a warrantless entry or search. E.g., United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506 (6th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that loud music emanating from home justified warrantless entry in order for law enforcement to perform community-caretaking function due to ongoing nuisance). However, exigent circumstances may also require the warrantless seizure of a person in order to accomplish the community-caretaking function of law enforcement. United States v. Brown, 447 Fed.Appx. 706 (6th Cir.2012). In Broion, after a minor was reported missing, police stopped and questioned a defendant who was the last person to have seen the missing minor. The defendant later challenged the seizure, which was found to have been consensual. However, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that, even if the stop had been non-consensual, it would have been a justified as a community-caretaking function of the police. The officer in Brown was “responding to a distress call rather than investigating a crime complaint,” and the Sixth Circuit noted that even a non-consensual stop would be justified if it “would permit an officer to stop a key eyewitness when prompt inquiry may assist in finding the minor before he [came] to harm.” Id. at 709-710. “No Fourth Amendment violation results when an immediate caretaking interest justifiably compels an officer’s intrusions.” Id. at 710. Brown appears to be the sole occasion on which the Sixth Circuit has recognized that the community-caretaking function of the police may justify a warrantless seizure. Opinions of other Circuit Courts of Appeals, however, provide further examples of the application of the communitycaretaking function to warrantless arrests. The Eighth Circuit addressed the issue in Winters v. Adams, 254 F.3d 758 (8th Cir.2001), holding that officers properly exercised their role as community caretakers when they detained a “highly agitated” and “potentially intoxicated” man who refused to exit a locked, parked car in order to prevent him from driving away and possibly harming himself or others. Furthermore, in United States v. Garner, 416 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir.2005), a police officer responded to reports of a man seen unconscious and slumped over. After locating him, the man attempted to leave, and the officer directed the man to return so that he could be examined by medical personnel. The Tenth Circuit recognized that the officer “had reasonable grounds to conclude that [the man] might be in need of medical assistance,” and therefore held that he properly exercised his role as community caretaker when he briefly detained the man. Id. at 1214. See also Gupta v. Crane, No. 1:09-cv-573, 2010 WL 775222 (W.D.Mich. Feb. 26, 2010) (“Under the community-caretaker exception, it was eminently reasonable for Defendants to stop and question” the stumbling, possibly intoxicated plaintiff “in order to determine whether he was in need of assistance or posed a danger to himself or others”). Here, Officer Doyle’s actions must be examined in light of what actions were objectively reasonable for a law enforcement officer in the role of a community caretaker to take under the circumstances. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 405-06, 126 S.Ct. 1943. So examined, Shoup fails to state a plausible, as opposed to merely possible, Fourth Amendment violation. According to Shoup, Officer Doyle threw her to the ground and handcuffed her immediately after she refused to hand the baby to a neighbor. If Shoup’s refusal were the only cause for the seizure, she would undoubtedly state a plausible Fourth Amendment violation. However, the seizure cannot be divorced from all of the circumstances surrounding it, which, as Shoup describes them, present Officer Doyle arriving at and dealing with a fluid and dangerous situation. As in Brown, the officer was responding to a distress call, not conducting an investigation. 447 Fed.Appx. at 710. According to Shoup, Officer Doyle arrived on the scene and encountered Sports, who had just been “pulled outside, beaten, kicked and sexually assaulted.” Sports informed Officer Doyle that her mother had also been assaulted. Officer Doyle and Sports approached the house, and Shoup emerged holding Sports’s baby. Shoup refused his request to hand the baby to a neighbor, and he then “threw her to the ground and handcuffed her” before putting her in the back of his police car. The crucial fact overhanging the encounter, however, is Shoup’s allegation that, during this entire time, “one of the assailants, who was believed to have a gun, was still at large.” Although the Court views all facts in a light favorable to Shoup and draws all inferences in her favor, that standard does not allow the Court to ignore a fact, alleged by her, that makes Officer Doyle’s actions appear objectively reasonable. When he arrived, an armed assailant was still at large, and the possibility of violence to Shoup, Sports, Sports’s children, and Officer Doyle remained real. Shoup, who was injured and traumatized, was understandably not communicating or acting rationally, but Officer Doyle needed to secure a tense and dangerous situation. Under these circumstances, it was objectively reasonable to seize Shoup in order to prevent further harm to her or anyone else. Furthermore, it was objectively reasonable for Officer Doyle to temporarily detain Shoup in order for her to be examined by the paramedics. Shoup was visibly injured and in need of medical treatment, but refusing to cooperate with Officer Doyle. Furthermore, firefighter/paramedics Koss and Kuntz came to examine Shoup while she was in Officer Doyle’s custody. That allegation also supports Defendants’ argument that her seizure was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. In response to Defendant’s argument that the seizure was justified by the community-caretaking function of law enforcement, Shoup argues that her complaint makes no allegations that she herself “presented a risk of danger to the police or others!,] and therefore the exigency exception is inapplicable.” Doc. # 16 at 10. Shoup’s premise, for which she cites no case law in support, is that such a seizure is only justified if the person seized creates the risk of danger to which the community caretaker responds. It may often be the case that, as with an intoxicated person, it is the seized person who creates a risk of danger. E.g., Winters, 254 F.3d 758 (8th Cir.2001) (community-caretaking function justified seizure to prevent intoxicated, erratic man from driving car and harming himself or others). However, Shoup’s argument would place an artificial restriction on the community-caretaking function itself and the ability of law enforcement to effectively respond to exigencies. In Brown, for example, there was no indication that the defendant was responsible for the missing juvenile, and locating the juvenile was the reason for the application of the community-caretaker exception that justified the seizure. 447 Fed.Appx. 706. Although the Court agrees with Defendants that Shoup’s allegations describe an objectively reasonable exercise of Officer Doyle’s duties as a community caretaker, the Court cannot agree with their argument that the facts as alleged provided reasonable suspicion to justify Shoup’s seizure as a “stop” under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Terry makes it clear that “whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person,” and the action must be justified under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. Id. This standard allows that “a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Id. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868. However, “[i]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the seizure that the officer effects, without a warrant based on probable cause. Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848-49 (6th Cir. 2003) (characterizing Terry’s reasonable suspicion inquiry as “whether, at the moment that they initiated the stop, the totality of the circumstances provided the officers with the reasonable suspicion required in order to detain a citizen”). Defendants argue that when Officer Doyle seized Shoup, her behavior provided reasonable suspicion that Shoup was “hindering, or at least potentially about to hinder, Officer Doyle’s investigation of the crime, thus justifying at least [a] brief investigatory stop if not a full[-]fledged arrest.” Doc. #7 at 16. According to Defendants, there was reasonable suspicion to believe that Shoup was about to violate either Ohio Rev.Code § 2921.31, which prohibits the obstruction of official business, or Ohio Rev.Code § 2921.32, which prohibits the obstruction of justice. However, there were no facts from which to infer that Shoup harbored the specific intent that is an element of either offense. Ohio Rev.Code § 2921.31 states that “[n]o person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within the public official’s official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official’s lawful duties.” (emphasis added). Similarly, Ohio Rev.Code § 2921.32 states that “[n]o person, with purpose to hinder the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for crime” shall commit any of a series of actions — the only one possibly applicable here being to “[p]revent or obstruct any person, by means of force, intimidation, or deception, from performing any act to aid in the discovery, apprehension, or prosecution of the other person or child.” The statute also defines “purposely,” as used for either offense: “A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain result .... ” Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.22(A). Thus, Officer Doyle must have had reasonable suspicion to believe that Shoup had the specific intent to prevent, obstruct, or delay his duties, or the specific intent to hinder the discovery or apprehension of the persons who had assaulted her and her daughter. There was no basis for believing that Shoup had the specific intent to impede his investigation or duties, based only on her act of refusing to hand a baby to a neighbor. If anything, her refusal to relinquish the baby negligently hindered the performance of Officer Doyle’s duties, or negligently hindered the apprehension of the assailants, due to Shoup’s “fail[ure] to perceive or avoid a risk that [her] conduct may cause a certain result or may be of a certain nature.” Ohio Rev.Code § 2901.22(D) (defining culpable mental state of negligence). However, both offenses require purposeful intent, not mere negligence. Furthermore, both the Ohio cases that Defendants cite make it clear that the element of purposeful intent applies. Doc. # 7 at 16. In N. Ridgeville v. Reichbaum, 112 Ohio App.3d 79, 677 N.E.2d 1245, 1246 (1996), the defendant “repeatedly interrupted” officers trying to question his stepdaughter, told the officers that they did not have the right to be on his property, refused to provide identification, and yelled at the officers. These actions were sufficient to “conclude that the defendant had acted with purpose to impede the officers’ investigation of the disturbance complaint.” Id. at 1249. In State v. Fort, 2003-Ohio-1075, 2003 WL 930487 (Ohio Ct.App. March 7, 2003), a defendant was convicted of obstructing official business after he noticed officers conducting a traffic stop in front of a friend’s house, interrupted them, yelled at them to ask “what was going on,” refused to leave when requested, “continued to inquire,” and refused to provide identification when finally asked. The Ohio Court of Appeals upheld his conviction for obstructing official business, citing its requirement of specific intent to commit the offense. Id. at *3-4. Here, even allowing that Officer Doyle’s reasonable suspicion did not have to amount to probable cause, Shoup’s action of refusing to hand a baby to a neighbor is the only specific, articulable fact that Shoup alleges occurred before Officer Doyle seized her. That act provides no support for suspecting that she purposely intended to impede or obstruct his duties or investigation. Furthermore, Shoup alleges that the Officer knew that Shoup herself was the victim of the crime that had just occurred, making it more improbable he would suspect that she wished to impede the apprehension of the assailants. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ contention that Shoup’s seizure was a reasonable investigatory stop under Terry. Nevertheless, even construing the facts in Shoup’s favor, the Court cannot conclude that Officer Doyle’s actions were objectively unreasonable, in light of the community-caretaking function that he was performing. This removes Shoup’s seizure from the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Shoup’s unlawful seizure claim fails to state a constitutional claim, and therefore fails at the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis. “Although a district court should give plaintiffs an opportunity to amend a complaint once a qualified immunity defense is raised, plaintiffs cannot overcome a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds unless they allege facts necessary to show that a defendant has violated their constitutional rights.” Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 951 (6th Cir.2000). Because Shoup’s previous amendment to her complaint occurred in state court, before Defendants had raised their defense of qualified immunity, the Court DISMISSES her unlawful seizure claim without prejudice, with leave to amend her complaint in accordance with Cooper, provided that her Seconded Amended Complaint be filed no later than twenty (20) days from date, and, additionally, complies with the strictures of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2. Excessive force claim against Officer Doyle (Ninth Claim) The Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard applies to “all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force — deadly or not — in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); Schreiber v. Moe, 596 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2010). “A claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that a seizure occurred, and that the force used in effecting the seizure was objectively unreasonable.” Rodriguez v. Passinault, 637 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir.2011) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95, 109 S.Ct. 1865). As stated previously, there is no doubt that Shoup has alleged a seizure by Officer Doyle, based on her allegations of being handcuffed and placed in the back of his cruiser. The question, therefore, is whether Shoup has plausibly stated that the force Officer Doyle employed, i.e., grabbing her arm and throwing her to the ground in the process of seizing her, was objectively unreasonable .under the circumstances. The objective reasonableness standard in an excessive force claim “depends on the facts and circumstances of each case viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene and not with 20/20 hindsight.” Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 647 (6th Cir.2010) (quoting Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir.2007)). “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865. When analyzing an excessive force claim, a court must pay “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. The totality of the circumstances must demonstrate that the amount of force applied was objectively reasonable. Id. The Court believes that Shoup has plausibly stated a claim that Officer Doyle used an objectively unreasonable amount of force to accomplish a seizure that was otherwise justifiable as a community-care-taking action. According to Shoup, after she refused to hand the baby to a neighbor, Officer Doyle grabbed her arm, threw her to the ground, and handcuffed her before placing her in the back of his squad car. Even if a temporary detention was necessary for Officer Doyle to secure the scene, and to secure Shoup for examination by medical personnel, there are no facts alleged that suggest that Shoup was physically resistant to him, or that she posed a threat to anyone’s safety. Furthermore, Shoup’s daughter had just informed Officer Doyle that Shoup had been assaulted, and she was visibly injured when she appeared with the baby. The Court recognizes that Officer Doyle, who had just arrived at the scene of a home invasion, was forced to make split second decisions in a tense, rapidly evolving situation. Shoup may, therefore, have minimally aggravated Officer Doyle’s ability to deal with that situation by refusing to hand the baby to the neighbor. However, construing the facts as alleged in her favor, the response of grabbing her arm, throwing her to the ground, and handcuffing her appears disproportionate where there was no indication of resistance or physical threat from her. Shoup has alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for the excessive use of force against her, because it is a plausibly excessive use of force to throw an injured victim of violent crime to the ground and handcuff her, even if her temporary seizure was necessary to prevent harm to her and others. ? argue that Shoup’s excessive use of force claim fails because Shoup “does not allege that an extraordinary amount of force was used against her” and that the “minimal” amount of force employed was justified because “there was an objectively reasonable basis for seizing her.” Doc. # 7. However, there is no requirement that an excessive use of force claim allege an extraordinary amount of force. E.g., Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir.996) (recognizing that excessive force claim need not be “life threatening” or even “leave extensive marks in order for the amount of force used ... to be considered excessive”). Rather, the question is what is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Here, the objectively reasonable explanation for the seizure was an exercise of Officer Doyle’s responsibilities as community caretaker, and the person seized presented no threat to the officer. Harrison v. City of Dickson, No. 3:llcv01044, 2013 WL 1482950 (M.D.Tenn. Apr. 11, 2013), provides an example of a court’s rejection of a defendant’s assertion that force was justified in a similar situation. In Harrison, an officer struck an injured man in the face at an accident scene while trying to obtain a closed poeketknife from the man. The district court overruled the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on a claim of excessive force, finding that the government’s interest in securing the accident site could not justify the use of force where the subject was injured, not suspected of a crime, and posed no threat to the officer. Id. at *9. Like the plaintiff in Harrison, Shoup was injured and posed no threat to the officer when force was employed. The Court has rejected the Defendants’ argument that Officer Doyle had reasonable suspicion to believe that Shoup was obstructing justice, but even if there were, the force alleged was disproportionate to the offense. Furthermore, unlike the Harrison plaintiff, Shoup held no weapon, but only a baby. The Court concludes that the facts as alleged describe a plausible claim for Officer Doyle’s excessive use of force against Shoup. Furthermore, Officer Doyle is not entitled to qualified immunity on Shoup’s claim of excessive force. In the Sixth Circuit, “the right of people who pose no safety risk to the police to be free from gratuitous violence during arrest” is clearly established. Baker v. City of Hamilton, 471 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir.2006) (citing Shreve v. Jessamine Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 453 F.3d 681, 688 (6th Cir.2006)). Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Shoup’s claim of excessive force against Officer Doyle. 3. Malicious prosecution under federal law against Officer Doyle (Tenth Claim) Defendants argue that Shoup fails to allege the facts supporting the elements of a federal claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. Doc. # 7 at 17-18. The elements of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim are: First, the plaintiff must show that a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and that the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute. Second ... the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution. Third, the plaintiff must show that, as a consequence of a legal proceeding, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty ... apart from the initial seizure. Fourth, the criminal proceeding must have been resolved in the plaintiffs favor. Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308-09 (6th Cir.2010) (citations and quotations omitted). Here, Shoup’s Amended Complaint does not mention a criminal prosecution that was initiated against her, a deprivation of liberty apart from her time in Officer Doyle’s car, or that any criminal proceeding was resolved in her favor. Furthermore, Shoup, in her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, fails to defend this claim, and omits any mention of it from the list of federal claims that she argues are stated in her Amended Complaint. Doc. # 16 at 7-8. Thus, the Court considers her Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim to be abandoned. See, e.g., Scott v. Tennessee, 878 F.2d 382, 1989 WL 72470, at *2 (6th Cir.1989) (stating that “if a plaintiff fails to respond or to otherwise oppose a defendant’s motion, then the district court may deem the plaintiff to have waived opposition to the motion”); Mekani v. Homecomings Fin., LLC, 752 F.Supp.2d 785, 790 n. 2 (E.D.Mich.2010) (stating that “Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim, and the Court assumes he concedes this point and abandons the claim”). Accordingly, the Court will DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Shoup’s claim for malicious prosecution under federal law, the Tenth Claim of her Amended Complaint. 4. Deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs against Doyle, Koss, and Kuntz (Eleventh Claim) Shoup’s Eleventh Claim asserts that Officer Doyle and firefighter/paramedics Koss and Kuntz were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs during her detention in the back of Officer Doyle’s car, in violation of her Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Doc. #2 at 12. Defendants argue that Shoup fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, because the Due Process clause does not impose an affirmative duty to protect its citizens against acts of violence by third parties, such as the injury that resulted from the assault Shoup suffered. Doc. # 7 at 18. Even if the Defendants did owe Shoup a duty to provide medical care, Defendants argue, the facts fail to allege that Officer Doyle, Koss or Kuntz either knew of her brain injury or ignored it in a way that could support a claim of deliberate indifference to a known medical need. Id. at 19, 21-23. In response, Shoup argues that her need for medical treatment was obvious for anyone to recognize, even a lay person, and that Koss and Kuntz should be “held to a higher level of responsibility to recognize medical needs and risks because of their training as EMTs.” Doc. # 16 at 15. Defendants’ first argument, which argues that they had no duty to provide medical care for an injury arising from an act of violence by a private citizen, does not accurately address the factual basis for Shoup’s claim. Defendants are correct that the state has no affirmative constitutional duty to “protect an individual against private violence” perpetrated by other citizens. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). However, Shoup does not allege that Officer Doyle, Koss, or Kuntz failed to prevent the assailants from attacking her in the first place. Rather, she alleges that then-failure to provide medical care arose after her seizure, “[w]hile she was in custody,” at which point the protections of the Due Process Clause have attached. Doc. # 2 at 12; see DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S.Ct. 998 (holding that “it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf— through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty — which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause”) (emphasis added). In Estate ofOwensby v. City of Cincinnati 414 F.3d 596, 603 n. 3 (6th Cir.2005), the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that the village police officers who had not arrested a detainee, but merely “agreed to lock [him] in their cruiser” at the request of city police officers, owed him no constitutional duty. By placing him in their cruiser, the village police “maintained exclusive control and possession” of the detainee, and therefore “had custody of [him] — at least during the time that he was locked in their cruiser — thereby creating a constitutional duty to provide him with adequate medical care.” Id. Thus, once Officer Doyle seized Shoup, the constitutional protections afforded a pretrial detainee attached for the duration of her confinement in his cruiser, however limited its duration. “Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause ... pretrial detainees have a right to adequate medical treatment that is analogous to the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners.” Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685-86 (6th Cir.2001) (citing City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983)). In order to state a viable Section 1983 claim for failure to provide medical treatment, the “plaintiff must establish that the defendants acted with ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’ ” Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). Such a claim has both a subjective and an objective component. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). Under the subjective prong, the plaintiff must allege facts showing that the officer had “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” when denying medical care. Id. (citing Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir.2000)). A culpable state of mind requires something more than mere negligence, yet less than acts or omissions undertaken with the specific purpose to cause harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The standard lies somewhere in between: “the plaintiff must allege facts which, if true, would show that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the [detainee], that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970). In Cain v. Irvin, 286 Fed.Appx. 920, 927 (6th Cir.2008), the Sixth Circuit upheld a district court’s ruling that the plaintiff had satisfied the subjective prong of a deliberate indifference claim by alleging that she informed the officer that “she was in great pain and wished to go to the hospital,” and the officer “refused this request” and “mocked and insulted her.” Here, too, Shoup alleges that, while in the back of Officer Doyle’s cruiser, she “repeatedly asked to be taken to the hospital,” and that he mocked her requests. Shoup does not allege that Officer Doyle explicitly refused to allow her to go to the hospital, and she does allege that the paramedics “came and looked at her” while she was in Officer Doyle’s custody. Doc. # 2 at 5. However, Officer Doyle knew that she wanted to go to the hospital for treatment, based on Shoup’s requests, and he nevertheless continued to hold her there. Thus, the Court must draw the inference in her favor that he deliberately prevented her from going to the hospital. Furthermore, by alleging that Officer Doyle knew that she had just been “beaten, kicked, and struck violently in the face,” she has alleged facts which, if true, would show that he subjectively perceived facts from which to infer a substantial risk of harm beyond a mere split lip, and that he still prevented her from going to the hospital. The Court will construe the allegations in Shoup’s favor, and, following Cain, find that her requests to go to the hospital and Officer Doyle’s responses and failure to allow her to go allege facts that plausibly satisfy the subjective prong of a deliberate indifference claim. The objective component of a detainee’s claim for denial of medical care “requires the existence of a ‘sufficiently serious’ medical need.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970 and Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. 285)). The analysis requires “a two part inquiry” to determine whether the objective component is met. Cain v. Irvin, 286 Fed.Appx. 920, 927 (6th Cir.2008). First, a sufficiently serious medical need may be demonstrated by “facts [that] show an obvious need for medical care that laymen would readily discern as requiring prompt medical attention by competent health care providers.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 898 (6th Cir.2004). If the need for medical treatment is obvious, “then the court must determine whether the delay in securing that care was reasonable.” Cain, 286 Fed.Appx. at 927 (citing Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 899-900). Second, where “the injury is not apparent or relatively minor ... [the] plaintiff must provide ‘medical evidence’ demonstrating that the delay in treatment resulted in additional injury.” Id. (citing Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739 (6th Cir.2001)). Here, Shoup has failed to allege facts that satisfy the objective component of the claim against Officer Doyle. The Court does not agree with Defendants’ characterization of Shoup’s alleged, readily discernible injuries as consisting of “only visible wounds [such as] a lacerated left lip that required only a simple repair and a bruise on her left chin.” Doc. # 7 at 19-20. Shoup alleged that her daughter informed Officer Doyle that she had been assaulted, and alleged that she had been struck violently in the face. Construing the facts in her favor, a layman would have recognized that Shoup required medical treatment, and that she had a potential head injury from the assault. Nevertheless, the Court cannot conclude from Shoup’s allegations that the delay in treatment was “unreasonable,” as required to state a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 899-900. Shoup’s complaint does not allege how long she spent in custody, only that she was “eventually released and was taken to Kettering Hospital by her family.” Doc. # 2 at 6. The allegation suggests that she was taken to the hospital for treatment right after being released from the back of Officer Doyle’s car. Thus, the Court is unable to conclude that the delay attributable to her time in Officer Doyle’s car was unreasonable. Furthermore, Shoup has not alleged that any additional injury resulted from the delay. She has not alleged that the delay made her concussion worse, or that she has medical evidence to suggest that it did. Her alleged injuries all appear to have been caused exclusively by the assault. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that Shoup has plausibly stated a claim that satisfies objective prong of her Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Doyle for deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs. Because she has failed to state a claim against Officer Doyle for deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs, the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis is not required. For the same reasons, the Court concludes that Shoup has failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs against paramedics Koss and Kuntz. The Court does not reach the subjective prong of such a complaint, because Shoup’s failure to allege facts suggesting that the delay in treatment she suffered was unreasonable fails the objective prong of her claim against them, as with her claim against Officer Doyle. Accordingly, the Court will SUSTAIN Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, as it pertains to her claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical need against Officer Doyle, Koss, and Kuntz. The Court DISMISSES said claim without prejudice and, in accordance with Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 951 (6th Cir.2000), grants Shoup leave to amend her complaint to remedy its insufficiency, with notice of Defendants’ qualified immunity challenge, provided that her Seconded Amended Complaint be filed no later than twenty (20) days from date and, additionally, complies with the strictures of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5. Failure to train Officer Doyle against the City (Twelfth Claim) Local governments, such as municipalities and counties, are considered “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 814 (6th Cir.2003). However, “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents” on a theory of vicarious liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. Thus, a municipality may be held hable in a Section 1983 action for a violation of constitutional rights directly caused by its failure to train municipal employees, including its police officers, resulting from its official policy or custom. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). “The inadequacy of police training only serves as a basis for § 1 983 liability “where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.’ ” Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 457 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197). “To succeed on a failure to train or supervise claim, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury.” Ellis v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir.2006). Here, Shoup addresses the first element by alleging that the City “failed