Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM & ORDER MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge. Plaintiff Lori Ellis brings the above-captioned action against Defendant Century 21 Department Stores, alleging claims of gender discrimination based on failure to promote and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. (“NYSHRL”), and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. (“NYCHRL”). Defendant has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied. I. Background a. Defendant’s Management Structure Defendant operates a chain of retail department stores that sell designer apparel and accessories to the public at discount prices. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 1; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 1.) Defendant was founded in the early 1960’s by the Gindi families and currently operates seven stores that employ approximately 4,000 employees. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 2-3; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 2-3.) Defendant’s business is divided between merchandising and operations. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 5; Pl. 56.1 ¶5.) Merchandising involves the purchase, presentation and sale of the goods that Defendant sells in its stores, while operations involves running the stores and the overall business, including staffing of the stores and “profit and loss.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 6; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 6.) The merchandising side of the business is run by co-CEO I.G. Gindi, and the operations side of the business is run by co-CEO Raymond Gindi. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 7; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 7.) On the merchandising side of the business, a Divisional Merchandise Manager (“DMM”) leads each of the different departments, such as Men’s, Ladies’, Children’s, Lingerie, Linens, Housewares, Cosmetic and Handbags. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 8; PI. 56.1 ¶ 8.) The DMMs decide where to purchase the merchandise, how to price it and how to display it in stores, and they have direct financial responsibility for their department. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 9-10; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 9-10.) The DMMs report to I.G. as the head of merchandising, and I.G. also functions as the DMM of the Men’s department. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 11; PI. 56.1 ¶ 11.) The Buyers and Coordinators report to the DMMs. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 12; PI. 56.1 ¶ 12.) The Buyers locate and purchase merchandise for their department, while the Coordinators act as a liaison between the DMM and the sales staff in the stores to “ensure that there is sufficient merchandise on the selling floor and that merchandise is displayed and priced properly.” (Def. 56.1 ¶1¶ 13-14; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 13-14.) b. Plaintiffs Initial Employment— 1997 to 2007 Plaintiff was hired by Defendant on December 15, 1997, as a Handbags Coordinator, reporting to DMM Jamie Barry. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 16-19; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 16-19.) Plaintiff was “responsible for making sure that the managers in the Handbags department in the stores were properly trained and scheduled and that the Company’s standards were being met.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 20; PI. 56.1 ¶ 20.) In or about July 1998, Plaintiff was promoted to Men’s Operations Coordinator, reporting directly to I.G. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 16, 20; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 16, 20.) As Men’s Operations Coordinator, Plaintiff performed the same duties for the Men’s department as she had for the Handbags department. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 21; PI. 56.1 ¶ 21.) She also oversaw scheduling for the holiday season, the operation of the department fitting rooms and stockrooms, and “certain operational aspects of [the department’s] buying office, including devising and administering various training programs for its assistant buyers and training and supervising its clerical staff.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 21; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 21, 229.) Plaintiff claims that her responsibilities began to branch out beyond the Men’s department, as she began “serving as an all-purpose resource for DMMs seeking help in connection with issues they encountered,” and she assisted the director of the human resources department at job fairs, troubleshooting operational issues at the company warehouse, “tending to [D]efendant’s most important, or ‘VIP,’ vendors,” and running Defendant’s “VIP Night.” (PI. 56.1 ¶ 230.) In 2001 or May 2002, Plaintiff became the Senior Operations Coordinator. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 22; PI. 56.1 ¶ 22.) Plaintiff continued to report to I.G. and her responsibilities expanded to include working with the Lingerie and Shoes departments. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 22; Pi. 56.1 ¶ 22.) According to Plaintiff, she actually assumed the role of Coordinator for those two departments, as they were operating without Coordinators at that time. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 22.) As part of this new role, she was entrusted to communicate I.G.’s vision for the company to other departments and “cultivate an interdepartmental consistency and cohesion.” (PL 56.1 ¶ 231.) Plaintiff also began assisting with the opening of new stores. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 234-37.) In 2002, Plaintiff assisted with the opening of the Morristown store. (PL 56.1 ¶¶ 235-37.) According to General Store Manager (“GSM”) Bill O’Malley, Plaintiff was charged with orchestrating the store opening and her efforts in preparing Morris-town for its launch were invaluable. (O’Malley Dep. 25:13-29:21.) O’Malley was so impressed with Plaintiffs ability to coordinate between the various divisions and her efforts to open the Morristown store successfully and on a timely basis that he saw the Morristown opening as “her success.” (O’Malley Dep. 25:13-26:25, 56:6-20.) In July 2005, Plaintiff was promoted to Senior Merchandise Coordinator and given authority to coordinate the operational functions from the buying offices to all of the branch stores for the Men’s, Ladies’, Children’s, Lingerie, Shoes and Handbags departments. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 23; PL 56.1 ¶ 23.) According to Plaintiff, in this new role she worked with the Buyers, DMMs, and store and department managers. (PL 56.1 ¶¶ 256-58, 272-74.) Whenever a particular department’s “numbers” were down, I.G. instructed the department’s DMM and Coordinator to meet with Plaintiff to review any operational matters contributing to the decline and to partner with Plaintiff to address them. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 275.) I.G. “made it known to the company’s employees that ‘if they needed anything to get done’ related to operations, ‘they should call [Plaintiff].’ ” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 276 (citation omitted).) Plaintiff became responsible for training and developing managers at all levels and exercising “dotted-line supervision” over the Coordinators and GSMs, and began spending more time in the stores. (PL 56.1 ¶¶ 255-63.) As part of her new role, Plaintiff served to “facilitate dialogue and cooperation among these many actors,” and to “bring[ ] these various individuals together to fashion the necessary solutions.” (PL 56.1 ¶ 256.) In 2006-2007, Plaintiffs role expanded even further, as she took over for Terri Schoot who had served as Project Coordinator in regard to store openings. (PL 56.1 ¶¶ 251, 254-61.) According to O’Malley, as the GSM of the Morristown store, he relied on Plaintiff as the “person to go to” for the corporate office, with whom he “would interact to figure out solutions” when the store or any of its departments were “not functioning to the standards of the company.” (O’Malley Dep. 27:9-15, 54:5-18, 58:4-59:21.) He turned to Plaintiff “on a daily basis,” sought her counsel on personnel matters, and enjoyed “a great working relationship” with her, particularly because of her “ability] to transcend the positive.” (Id. at 67:8-70:14.) In each of her Coordinator positions, Plaintiff was responsible for ensuring that I.G.’s directions for merchandising were implemented in the stores and that the presentations in the stores were consistent with company standards. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 24; PL 56.1 ¶ 24.) While I.G. supervised Plaintiff, he gave her “a great deal of freedom.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 26; PL 56.1 ¶ 26.) According to Plaintiff, I.G. assigned her “dotted-line supervision” over the other Coordinators, an arrangement that was formalized in mid-August 2010. (PL 56.1 ¶ 27.) According to Defendant, I.G. assigned Plaintiff to convey his instructions to the other coordinators beginning in 2006, but she did not formally supervise them. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 27.) c. Director of Stores — 2003 to 2008 From October 20, 2003 to October 11, 2008, Jeffrey Jasner was the Director of Stores, one of the top management positions, (Def. 56.1 ¶ 61; PL 56.1 ¶ 61.) The Director of Stores exercises operational oversight of each of Defendant’s stores, developing a strategic vision for the company and supervising the top person from the human resources department. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 55; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 55.) The Director of Stores manages the operations side of the business and reports directly to Raymond. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 56; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 56.) In 2008, Raymond heard a rumor that Jasner had an affair with Cheryl Corigliano, the GSM of Defendant’s Brooklyn store. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 73; Pl. 56.1 ¶73.) Raymond confronted Jasner, and Jasner denied having any relationship with Corigliano. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 74; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 74.) Raymond later learned that the allegations were true, and Defendant terminated Jasner’s employment on the basis of his dishonesty and poor judgment. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 73-75; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 73-75.) At that time, Defendant was heading into the “all-important fourth quarter,” the months between October and December, in which “[fjailure to meet holiday sales projections would significantly affect [Defendant’s] operations for the coming year.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 77; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 77.) According to Plaintiff, during this period she filled in as Director of Stores. (Pl. Dep. 171:19-173:2, 184:3-185:8.) She “walk[ed] the stores with the general store managers,” ensured that the operational calendars were adhered to and that the stores were running operationally, spent more time in the stores, worked with the managers to ensure that they had everything they needed, and collaborated with Raymond on “everything between holiday decorations, holiday timelines, truck deliveries, meeting with vendors, [and] taking over some of the meetings.” (Id. at 184:3-186:24.) According to Defendant, although Plaintiff may have taken on some of the responsibilities of the position, Plaintiff did not “fill in” as Director of Stores. (R. Gindi Dep. 49:2-51:23.) Instead, Stacy Brasner, the most senior GSM, filled in when the position was vacant. (Id.) The parties agree that Plaintiff was never officially named Acting Director of Stores. Plaintiff claims that after Jasner’s termination, she spoke to Raymond and I.G. about becoming Defendant’s permanent Director of Stores. Specifically, two days after Jasner was terminated, she told I.G. that she was “ready to step up and take on the responsibility of [Director of [S]tores.” (Pl. Dep. 171:7-24.) I.G. told her that he needed to ask his brother. (Id. at 171:19— 24.) Raymond called Plaintiff and emailed her to set up a meeting. (Id. at 171:25-172:8) Plaintiff told Raymond that she was “here to support [them] through this” and “[she]’d really like to talk about becoming [D]irector of [S]tores.” (Id. at 172:9-17.) Raymond told her that he would speak with his brother, and stated, “Thank you so much for helping us. It is going to be a difficult time. I know you can handle it and won’t let anything fall through the cracks.” (Id. at 172:18-173:6.) Both Raymond and I.G. deny that Plaintiff ever expressed interest in the Director of Stores position. (I.G. Dep. 111:20-112:15; R. Gindi Dep. 48:12-49:6.) d. Interim Director of Stores— 2008 to 2009 After Jasner was terminated, Mark Gittler, a former GSM of the Westbury store, contacted Raymond for a business reference. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 79-81; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 79-81.) Gittler had previously been terminated by Defendant for poor performance. (R. Gindi Dep. 54:17-21, 78:16-84:16; I.G. Dep. 166:12-21.) Raymond viewed Gittler as having strong analytical skills, the ability to keep within budgets, and the operational background that was a necessary part of serving as the Director of Stores. (Def. 56.1 ¶84.) In October 2008, Raymond hired Gittler as the Interim Director of Stores because Defendant was heading into the fourth quarter, and Gittler “was available,” had previously worked for Defendant, and knew Defendant’s employees. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 85; Pl. 56.1 ¶85; R. Gindi Dep. 84:17-88:12.) Raymond did not consider anyone else for the position because Gittler was available, and he did not feel it was necessary to consider other candidates. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 87.) Gittler was hired on an interim basis while Defendant proceeded to interview individuals for the permanent position, but Raymond did tell Gittler that he would have an opportunity to prove himself in the position through the fourth quarter. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 85-86; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 85-86; R. Gindi Dep. 87:20-88:12.) Plaintiff claims that when she learned of Gittler’s rehire, she protested to Raymond, because Gittler had previously been terminated for poor work performance and because sexual harassment complaints had been filed against him. (PI. Dep. 209:23-210:11.) Defendant did not offer Gittler the permanent Director of Stores position, and Gittler’s last day as Interim Director of Stores was April 3, 2009. (PI. Ex. 33.) With the Director of Stores position again available, Plaintiff approached I.G. about her interest in the position, and I.G. put her off, this time telling her that in order to earn the position, she just needed to “keep doing what [she] was doing.” (PI. Dep. 177:2-179:11, 346:2-12.) e. Selection Process of Permanent Director of Stores — 2008 to 2009 Defendant retained DHR International (“DHR”), an executive recruiting firm, to find suitable candidates for the permanent Director of Stores position. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 88; PI. 56.1 ¶ 88.) The parties dispute what requirements existed for this position. According to Defendant, Raymond required that the person holding the Director of Stores position have experience managing large and high volume retail stores, preferably with multiple locations, experience preparing and meeting budgets, the ability to design and implement large scale improvements, proven leadership and motivational skills, and the ability to develop and implement a plan for the growth of the company and the strengthening of its brand. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 58-59.) Raymond instructed DHR to concentrate on locating candidates with a high level of management experience. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 88-89; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 88-89.) DHR presented a number of male and female candidates to Defendant, and in January 2009, Defendant hired Jim Copeland. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 90-92; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 90-92.) Copeland started working as Director of Stores in April 2009. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 90-95; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 90-95.) The parties disagree about the process for selecting the permanent Director of Stores. Plaintiff alleges that “[tjhough the [Director of Stores] reported directly to Raymond, I.G., as well as Isaac and Eddie, were as owners deeply involved in the process by which individuals were considered and hired for the position, interviewing candidates therefore and then providing Raymond with their input as to who in their respective opinions should be awarded the job.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 370; see also R. Gindi Dep. 12:12-22, 42:8-19, 112:4-113:6; I.G. Dep. 38:3-42:6, 183-84; Pl. Dep. 180:22-25). Defendant alleges that although Raymond sought I.G.’s feedback on the final candidates, the ultimate decision was his. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 99; Def. Reply 20-21.) According to Coordinator Shirley Bigord, because Plaintiff filled in as Director of Stores, she and DMM Lisa Aqualino wondered why Plaintiff was not awarded the permanent position. (Bigord Dep. 93:17-95:22.) Jonathan Schwartz, Defendant’s former Chief Information Officer, testified that he and other directors also wondered why Plaintiff was not given the position. (Schwartz Dep. 54:4-56:5.) After Copeland was hired, Plaintiff claims that she again approached I.G. about the position. (Pl. Dep. 166:8-167:21.) Plaintiff said to I.G., “We’ve discussed before about becoming Director of Stores, and I need to understand for my business growth what I need to do to obtain that position. It’s opened several times and you haven’t allotted me the opportunity to go forward with that.” (Id. at 167:7-21; see also id. at 175:17-180:2.) I.G. replied, “Lori, you are young, you have young children. It’s a lot of hours. You don’t want the position. You are the mom.” (Id. at 167:23-168:2.) I.G. denies making this statement. (I.G. Dep. 184:23-186:4.) f. Plaintiffs 2009 Promotions In April 2009, Plaintiffs role expanded and she was placed in charge of the Purchasing Department. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 31; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 31.) In that role, Plaintiff supervised Raymond Kassin, Defendant’s Purchasing Buyer, the eleven employees of the purchasing department, and a clerical staff of five employees. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 32; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 32; Pl. Dep. 140:13-141:18.) Plaintiff was also responsible for ensuring that Defendant had sufficient supplies and fixtures for the stores. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 32; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 32; Pl. Dep. 140:13-141:18.) For these duties, Plaintiff reported directly to Raymond. (Def. 56.1 ¶32; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 32; Pl. Dep. 98:23-99:20, 104:7-9.) According to Raymond, Plaintiffs long record of effective performance for Defendant, coupled with her involvement at the time with “fixtures,” made her “a good fit” for this “trust level position.” (R. Gindi Dep. 22:15-23:11.) Plaintiff became the Senior Stores and Merchandise Operations Manager in June 2009. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 29; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 29.) On June 2, 2009, Copeland announced Plaintiffs new role, stating that the Coordinators would follow Plaintiffs “leadership and guidance.” (Pl. Ex. 21.) Plaintiff continued to report to I.G. but also “had a dotted line” to Director of Stores Copeland. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 30; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 30.) According to Plaintiff, in this position her oversight over the Coordinators was officially recognized. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 292; see also O’Malley Dep. 27:9-28:8; Sewere Dep. 26:18-28:18.) Plaintiffs interaction with the stores and the GSMs increased, pursuant to Copeland’s direction that she “get in the stores” and “fix them” by holding the GSMs more accountable for their operations. (Pl. Dep. 102:3-104:6, 142:9-145:5, 246:9-25; see also Sewere Dep. 31:12-33:6; R. Gindi Dep. 114:1-25.) g. March 2010 Rego Park Opening In March 2010, Plaintiff assisted with the preparation for the grand opening of Defendant’s Rego Park store. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 108; Def. 56.1 ¶ 108.) Plaintiff visited the store once or twice a week leading up to the opening. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 110; PI. 56.1 ¶ 110.) Defendant claims that Bruce D’Agata, the store manager for the Rego Park store, began receiving complaints from his staff that Plaintiff would yell at them and intimidate them. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 110.) During the first few days of the opening, D’Agata believed that Plaintiff usurped his authority by telling his staff what to do without consulting him. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 111.) D’Agata was also told by his employees that Plaintiff gave them conflicting instructions. (Id.) D’Agata brought these complaints to Copeland and told Copeland that Plaintiff was undermining his authority and was of little assistance. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 112.) Copeland discussed these complaints with I.G. and with Plaintiff. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 113-14.) Copeland told Plaintiff that D’Agata felt that Plaintiff was not letting him run his store and that she was intrusive. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 114.) Plaintiff denies D’Agata’s allegations that she yelled or intimidated his staff, gave his staff instructions without consulting him, and gave his staff conflicting instructions. (PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 110-112.) According to Plaintiff, her work with regard to the Rego Park opening was strongly praised by Copeland and I.G., and she was rewarded with a $5,000 bonus. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 108; see also id. ¶¶ 558-562, 565.) I.G. told her she had done “such a great job” and had “truly worked so hard and really contributed big time” to the Rego Park opening. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 558; I.G. Dep. 88:12-89:9, 258:4-259:18.) In Plaintiffs performance evaluation Copeland prepared for the year of the Rego Park opening, Copeland thanked Plaintiff “for [her] leadership on many front[s] including ... [the] Rego grand opening,” and included the opening among Plaintiffs “Accomplishments.” (PI. Ex. 20.) h. Plaintiffs Performance Reviews I.G. testified that he “was a fan of’ Plaintiff; whatever tasks he gave her, she was good at getting done; he “felt [he] was in good hands” with Plaintiff; he “felt comfortable that she was capable of taking [on] more” responsibility; and he was, during the years Plaintiff reported to him, “happy” with her — in fact, “very happy with her” — and “happy with her performance.” (I.G. Dep. 35:24-36:24, 89:2-9, 100:2-101:14, 105:6-107:15, 141:23-142:17, 249:4-12, 251:4-7, 258:4-259:17.) According to Plaintiff, during I.G.’s annual reviews of her, he would discuss his plans for the company’s expansion, the role he envisioned her playing, and her career prospects generally, regarding which he told her the “[s]ky’s the limit.” (PL Dep. 158:10-164:23.) Copeland sent Plaintiff emails in June and July 2009 in which he praised her leadership and work on certain projects. (Id.) For example, on June 2, 2009, he sent her an email stating that he was “very confident in [her] abilities,” and on July 13, 2009, he sent her an email stating that her “logical and sequencing approach to everything is awesome and is key to a great deal of things we need to go forward.” (Id.) In his 2009 Performance Review Scorecard dated March 23, 2010, Copeland praised Plaintiffs “leadership on many fronts” and stated her ability to execute is “amazing and continues to be a great strength of [hers] and benefit to the company.” (PL Ex. 20.) He noted that it would be important for Plaintiff to “focus [her] energy on Attitude and Teamwork” in order to accomplish her objectives, because as a “Senior Leader,” everyone looks to her for a “great attitude even when things become stressful and overwhelming.” (Id.) He graded Plaintiff a perfect 10 in each of the “Core Values” of “Accountability,” “Proactivity,” and “Excellence.” (Id.) In addition to salary increases, Plaintiff received merit-based bonuses. (I.G. Dep. 100:6-25; R. Gindi Dep. 35:12-17; PI. Ex. 12.) According to Coordinator Bigord, her supervisor DMM Aqualino would urge her to be more like Plaintiff. (Bigord Dep. 29:9-31:24, 36:3-16, 96:11-19.) According to Coordinator Sewere, Plaintiff was “very supportive,” “a good mentor” and “professional,” and she never witnessed Plaintiff “yell[ ][at] or be[ ] unpleasant to people at the company.” (Sewere Dep. 96:2-97:15.) i. Plaintiffs 2010 Promotion On June 1, 2010, Copeland promoted Plaintiff to the position of Senior Manager of Operations. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 44; PI. 56.1 ¶ 44.) In this capacity, Plaintiff reported directly to Copeland and was responsible for implementing and executing the everyday operational needs of the stores and to help grow Defendant through implementing best practices. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 38, 44; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 38, 44.) According to Plaintiff, Copeland emphasized to her that all operational matters would be directed to her, not him, in the first instance. (PI. Dep. 109:23-10:8, 561:7-15.) Copeland initially wanted to hire someone outside Century 21 for the position of Senior Manager of Operations, but I.G. suggested Plaintiff to Raymond, who suggested her to Copeland. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 39-41; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 39-41.) According to I.G., Copeland promoted Plaintiff because “he knew that [I.G.] was ... very happy with her and ... valued [I.G.’s] opinion” of Plaintiff, and “thought she would do a good job in her new position.” (I.G. Dep. 190:10-193:25, 216:7-11.) Defendant claims that Copeland was reluctant to select Plaintiff, as he believed she had difficulty working with people, lacked the ability to build trust and relationships, needed to improve her analytical skills, and was often reactive rather than proactive. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 42.) However, Copeland agreed to give Plaintiff “a chance” on the condition that Defendant retain an outside “job coach” to assist Plaintiff in improving her interpersonal skills. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 39-43.) Plaintiff denies that Copeland was reluctant to promote her and maintains that the “job coach” was a resource and an opportunity that she was offered, not a condition of her promotion. (PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 39-43.) In her role as Senior Manager of Operations, Plaintiff acted as a liason between Copeland, Senior Merchandising Executives and the GSMs, in order to “fully support the implementation of [Defendant’s] Mission and Objectives, Best Practices and the execution of operating procedures that Promote and Protect [Defendant’s] Brand.” (PI. Ex. 17.) Plaintiff 'also “continue[d] to manage the centralized procurement function and lead vital operations projects that prepare[d] [Defendant] for future growth.” (Id.) The nine coordinators officially began reporting to Plaintiff in August 2010. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 49; PL 56.1 ¶ 49.) According to Plaintiff, she served as Copeland’s “right hand” and was effectively the “Assistant Director of Stores,” charged with handling all of the operational aspects of the Director of Stores position, as Copeland sought to shed day-to-day involvement in order to concentrate on “strategic initiatives” geared toward Defendant’s growth. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 46^8, 294-301.) j. Plaintiffs August 2010 Complaint on Behalf of Corigliano In August 2010, Copeland asked Corigliano to join him for dinner at a local restaurant. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 139; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 139.) According to Plaintiff, while Copeland and Corigliano were in a bar following a recent staff dinner and Copeland had “had too much to drink,” Copeland told Corigliano that “his birthday was in August and that he was going to go to her store and take her to dinner that evening.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 139; Pl. Dep. 232:4-234:13; Pl. Decl. ¶ 21.) Corigliano contacted Plaintiff at home and conveyed to Plaintiff her discomfort over what she viewed as an untoward overture by Copeland, as well as her desire to avoid it and her fear that doing so would prompt Copeland — who had previously placed her on probation — to terminate her. (Pl. Dep. 226:6-236:23; Pl. Decl. ¶ 21.) In discussing these matters with Plaintiff, Corigliano stated that “she[’d] already been down that road before” with Jasner and did not “want to go down it again.” (Pl. Dep. 234:22-235:9.) Plaintiff interpreted “that road” to mean a sexual relationship with a supervisor. (Pl. Decl. ¶ 21.) Corigliano expressed concern about raising the matter with the human resources department and requested that Plaintiff do so on her behalf. (Pl. Dep. 228:13-230:24.) Plaintiff agreed. (Id.) Defendant claims that Copeland invited Corigliano to dinner in order to discuss company changes, and Copeland had asked each of the six store managers to lunch or dinner on an individual basis to discuss these business issues. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 139-40.) Defendants further assert that Corigliano told Plaintiff that Copeland had invited her to dinner and requested Plaintiffs opinion as to how she should handle the situation since she had previously lied to the Gindis about her affair with Jasner, and was concerned about how they might perceive her actions. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 141— 42.) According to Corigliano, she never told Plaintiff that she felt harassed by Copeland’s request or believed that it was sexual in nature. (Corigliano Decl. ¶ 9.) On August 24, 2010, Plaintiff called Jennifer Thoma of the human resources department to report “an issue of potential sexual harassment,” and advised her that Copeland had invited Corigliano to dinner and that Corigliano was unsure how she should handle the invitation given her pri- or affair with Jasner. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 143; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 143; Pl. Ex. 37.) Plaintiff claims that she told Thoma that she “hope[d] [she] d[id]n’t get fired for telling [Thoma] this.” (Pl. Dep. 237:5-8.) Defendant claims that Thoma advised Plaintiff that the issue did not appear to involve sexual harassment, and that if Corigliano was uncomfortable, she should decline the invitation. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 144.) Thoma also told Plaintiff that Corigliano could speak directly to Thoma if she wanted to discuss the matter further. (Id.) Thoma did not discuss Plaintiffs report with Copeland until a month later and at that time Copeland “had already known about it.” (Thoma Dep. 89:18-90:25, 93:11-94:7.) In or about the end of August 2010, Corigliano contacted Raymond directly to discuss Copeland’s invitation. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 145; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 145.) Raymond advised Corigliano that Copeland was inviting all of the GSMs to one-on-one dinners. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 146; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 146.) Raymond told Corigliano that he did not see a problem with the invitation but that she could simply decline the invitation if she felt uncomfortable. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 147; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 147.) Corigliano did not mention Plaintiff during this discussion. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 147; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 147.) Based on her conversation with Raymond, Corigliano accepted Copeland’s invitation and had dinner with him without incident. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 148; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 148.) According to Plaintiff, at the dinner, Copeland told Corigliano that they should “get the elephant out of the room. I’m not Jeff Jasner and what happened with Jeff Jasner has no basis of happening with me.” (Pl. Dep. 239:19-40:19.) Plaintiff argues that “immediately after she lodged the complaint [with Thoma], what had until then been a warm and positive relationship between she and Copeland utterly disintegrated, with Copeland abruptly at that point turning mean and hyper-critical toward [Pjlaintiff and condemning her to Raymond and then to I.G. as a performer so poor as to warrant discharge.” (PI. Opp’n 17.) k. August 2010 Complaints about Plaintiff According to Defendant, in mid-August 2010, David D’Amico, the Director of New Store Development and Construction, approached Copeland and expressed his view that Plaintiff was ruining the organization, especially since she had become Senior Manager of Operations. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 123; Copeland Decl. ¶ 35.) D’Amico told Copeland that Plaintiff took credit for things she did not do, told lies, and misrepresented the facts. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 123; Copeland Decl. ¶ 35.) D’Amico threatened to quit the company if something was not done about Plaintiff. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 124; Copeland Decl. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff argues that these alleged complaints “were never contemporaneously memorialized,” “were unsupported by even a single specific as to [Plaintiffs allegedly offending conduct,” and were never brought to her attention. (PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 123-24.) Plaintiff denies that she was “ruining the organization,” and claims that D’Amico is not credible. (Id.) At approximately the same time, Thomas Carhart, General Store Manager of the Paramus store, also approached Copeland and complained about the way Plaintiff treated his Assistant Store Managers who were afraid of her because of her connection with I.G. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 125; Copeland Decl. ¶ 36.) Copeland received similar complaints from Nikki Carpenter, one of the Coordinators, that Plaintiff was rude, talked down to people, including the Coordinators, and used her relationship with I.G. to inspire fear. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 126; Copeland Decl. ¶ 36; see also Carpenter Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff argues that these alleged complaints, like the others, were never contemporaneously memorialized or brought to her attention. (PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 125-26.) Plaintiff notes that one of Carpenter’s criticisms, that Plaintiff was harsh, rude, and “talked down to” people including the Coordinators, is inconsistent with Coordinator Shirley Bigord’s testimony of having “a very good relationship with Plaintiff.” (Bigord Dep. 10:18-12:23.) In late August 2010, Corigliano told Copeland that Plaintiff could not be trusted and that she was only friendly with Plaintiff because she knew there would be hell to pay if she got on Plaintiffs bad side. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 127; Copeland Decl. ¶ 40.) Similar concerns were raised to Thoma by several coordinators who complained of having to report directly to Plaintiff, and Thoma conveyed those concerns to Copeland. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 128; Tho-ma Decl. ¶¶ 6-8.) Plaintiff argues that these complaints were also never contemporaneously memorialized, were unsupported by specific details and were never brought to her attention. (PL 56.1 ¶¶ 127-28.) According to Defendant, Copeland was aware from his own observations that Plaintiff had communication, leadership and teamwork issues, but it was not until he began receiving these complaints that he became aware of the extent of the problem. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 129.) Defendant claims that it was not until Copeland began supervising Plaintiff directly that other employees felt comfortable voicing their complaints and concerns about Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 129.) On August 18, 2010, Plaintiff met with Rocco Montesano, Westbury General Store Manager, about reports she had received that Montesano was having an affair with the Cosmetics Manager and that the affair was disrupting operation of the Cosmetics Department. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 462.) Plaintiff claims she was sent to the meeting at Copeland’s direction, (id.), but Copeland claims that, although he knew about the meeting, Plaintiff elected to meet with Montesano on her own. (Copeland Dep. 141:2-144:22.) Plaintiff advised Copeland of Montesano’s hostile and defensive response during the meeting, and that Montesano was generally difficult to work with. (PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 466-79.) Between approximately August 22-25, 2010, Montesano advised Raymond that he could no longer work with Plaintiff, whom he described as a “cancer on Century 21.” (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 130-31; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 130-31, 480; see also Montesano Decl. ¶¶ 6-8; R. Gindi Deck ¶ 38.) Montesano claims that Plaintiff was not a “team player,” would “blow minor issues out of proportion and scream at managers and associates,” and “would disrespect [him] and other members of store management on a regular basis.” (Montesano Deck ¶ 2.) Plaintiff argues that Montesano’s complaints were not legitimate, and that Montesano and his staff never raised these issues with her or filed complaints against her, and that she was never counseled or reprimanded for any misbehavior. (PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 492-93, 502, 513-15.) Defendant asserts that although Raymond had previously been aware that Plaintiff was difficult to work with, Montesano’s complaint reflected a much larger problem. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 132.) Following his conversation with Montesano, Raymond spoke with other Century 21 employees who corroborated what he learned from Montesano. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 133.) For example, D’Amico told Raymond that he had “run-ins” with Plaintiff, and she was very difficult to work with. (Id. ¶ 134.) Director of Loss Prevention James Betesh advised Raymond that Plaintiff treated people poorly and she did not know what she was talking about. (Id.) Carhart, the GSM of the Paramus store, told Raymond that he was afraid of Plaintiff and feared retribution by her. (Id.) Alan Shrem, an assistant store manager, advised Raymond that he agreed with Montesano about Plaintiff and that morale was low for the people that worked with her. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 134.) Plaintiff argues that these reports were general complaints and that they did not contain allegations of specific conduct. (PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 494, 495; see also PI. Opp. Mem. 20 n. 23.) Raymond met with Copeland to discuss what to do about Plaintiff. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 135; PI. 56.1 ¶ 135.) Raymond and Copeland discussed various options, including termination, but decided to wait until after Labor Day when they could meet with I.G., who was a strong supporter of Plaintiff. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 135; PI. 56.1 ¶ 135.) As part of his supervision of Plaintiff, Copeland met with Plaintiff regularly. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 136; PI. 56.1 ¶ 136.) At a meeting on August 31, 2010, Copeland criticized Plaintiffs leadership and informed her that her position was in jeopardy. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 137; PI. 56.1 ¶ 137.) He requested that she return with a plan to correct her behavior. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 138; PI. 56.1 ¶ 138.) Plaintiff admits that these sentiments were expressed but asserts that Copeland’s critiques were not warranted. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 137.) Plaintiff also disputes that Copeland ever asked her for a plan to correct her behavior. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 158.) According to Plaintiff, until this point, Copeland had voiced no criticism of Plaintiff and there is no record of his alleged dissatisfaction prior to her “sexual harassment complaint against him on behalf of Corigliano.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 137.) To the contrary, Copeland had been highly complimentary of Plaintiffs leadership abilities. (Id.) After Labor Day, Raymond and Copeland met with I.G. to discuss Plaintiff and told I.G. about Raymond’s meeting with Montesano and his conversations with other employees. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 150; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 150.) I.G. recognized the serious nature of the issue but believed that, because of Plaintiffs long history with the company, they should give her another chance to see if the problems could be improved. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 151; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 151.) Raymond and Copeland decided Copeland should put Plaintiff on probation and tell her of the serious concerns regarding her performance that she would have to rectify to keep her job. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 152; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 152.) I.G. agreed. (Def. 56.1 ¶152; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 152.) According to Defendant, at the time of this decision, neither Raymond nor Copeland was aware that Plaintiff had spoken with Thoma regarding Corigliano. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 153.) Plaintiff disputes this fact. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 153.) I. Plaintiffs Performance Improvement Plan Following the meeting, Thoma and Copeland prepared a 90-day performance improvement plan (“PIP”) for Plaintiff. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 156; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 156.) The goals outlined were organized around five core values and consisted of improving Plaintiffs accountability, attitude, teamwork, proactivity, and excellence. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 157; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 157.) Plaintiff asserts that there was no cause to improve her performance and that the motivating reason for the PIP was retaliation for her speaking to Thoma about the sexual harassment issue on behalf of Corigliano. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 157.) On September 14, 2010, Copeland met with Plaintiff and, according to Defendant, told her that he was disappointed that she had not provided him with a plan to correct her behavior and build better relationships and trust with the managers. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 158.) According to Plaintiff, Copeland requested a plan on “how she viewed her role in the company and how she intended to execute her responsibilities in stores,” and she submitted a plan that addressed those matters. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 158; see also Pl. Ex. 35.) Copeland told Plaintiff he was not pleased with her work on certain projects, including the weekly newsletter, a new store signage program, the fitting room stool bids, the “Email Pads” project, and the cleanup of the 700 building, an e-commerce warehouse. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 159.) According to Defendant, after Copeland shared his concerns, Plaintiff began to object to the manner in which Copeland conveyed this information and expressed her belief that Copeland was not partnering with her or supporting her and nothing he said was positive. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 163.) Plaintiff asserts that she did not respond defensively, but that, to the contrary, her complaints were caused by Copeland’s “contriving critiques,” cutting off contact with her, and verbally abusing her when they did interact. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 163.) Plaintiff told Thoma, I.G. and Raymond about this sudden and severe shift by Copeland, and notes that it occurred only after her complaint on behalf of Corigliano against Copeland. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 163.) m. Meeting Regarding the PIP On September 28, 2010, Copeland and Thoma met with Plaintiff to advise her that her performance was not up to Defendant’s standards and placed her on probation. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 165; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 165.) According to Plaintiff, prior to this meeting, Plaintiff met with Thoma, and Thoma gave her a “heads-up” that Copeland wanted to speak with her. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 166.) The day before, Plaintiff had “set out in writing for Thoma the difficulties [she] had been experiencing with Copeland since having raised Corigliano’s sexual harassment concerns about him,” and Plaintiff “assumed [that] it was about those difficulties” that Copeland wanted to meet with her. (PI. Decl. ¶ 25.) Since Copeland’s “behavior toward [P]laintiff had changed so markedly for the worse after having complained about him at the behest of someone else, and in light of his tendency to generally fly off the handle with others ... [Plaintiff] gr[e]w fearful as to how he would respond now that [she] had complained about him on [her] own behalf’ regarding his treatment following her complaint on behalf of Corigliano, so she decided that, before meeting with him, she would discuss the situation with I.G. (Id.) Plaintiff met with I.G. and Thoma and discussed the abrupt deterioration of Copeland’s treatment of her, and how Copeland’s allegations were baseless and “outright ludicrous” in light of her performance under I.G. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 167.) According to Defendant, when Thoma advised Plaintiff that Thoma and Copeland would be meeting with Plaintiff to review her performance issues and areas that Copeland wanted to see improved, Plaintiff became upset, calling Copeland a “mother f* * *er,” and demanded to see I.G. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 166.) During the meeting with I.G. and Thoma, Plaintiff stated that she did not understand how she could not be doing a good job after 13 years and wanted to return to working for I.G. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 167.) During the September 28, 2010 meeting with Copeland and Thoma, Plaintiff was given a copy of the PIP and advised that she needed to improve her performance to avoid termination. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 168; PI. 56.1 ¶ 168.) Plaintiff claims that Copeland read the document out loud and refused her request for details, examples or the identities of those she had “issues” with. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 169.) According to Defendant, Copeland reviewed several examples of what he viewed as Plaintiff’s unsatisfactory performance, including the trust and conflict issues with the GSMs, Coordinators, and key senior leaders, and her failure to take accountability for or learn from her mistakes. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 169.) Copeland also told Plaintiff that her performance on certain projects was unacceptable. (Id. ¶ 170.) Plaintiff refused to sign a copy of the PIP. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 171; PL 56.1 ¶ 171.) Plaintiff asserts that she exercised her right to not sign the document because she disputed the grounds on which it was based. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 171.) However, Copeland ultimately strong-armed her into signing the document by threatening her with termination if she did not sign it. (Id.) Copeland viewed Plaintiffs initial refusal to sign the PIP as an example of Plaintiffs refusal to take responsibility for her own shortcomings. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 171.) He believed Plaintiff had a difficult time accepting constructive criticism and making the requested changes. (Id. ¶ 172.) He viewed her performance as continuing to deteriorate after she was put on probation. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that Copeland requested changes out of retaliation but she nonetheless worked diligently to comply with Copeland’s requirements. (PL 56.1 ¶ 172.) Copeland offered her no constructive criticism, and her performance did not continue to deteriorate since it had never been deficient. (Id.) Plaintiff believes Copeland was not happy with anything she did after she raised the issue about him asking Corigliano to dinner with Thoma of the human resources department, in contrast to his prior satisfaction with her work, and that he embarked on a course of retaliation leading to her termination. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 173.) Plaintiff asserts that Copeland isolated her by canceling store visits and business meetings with her and refusing to return her calls. (PL 56.1 ¶ 630.) In one instance, Copeland did not return several of Plaintiffs calls, did not respond to her email requesting a meeting, told her he did not have time to meet when she visited in person, and cancelled her scheduled meeting, and then criticized her for not obtaining his approval on a “sign shop manual” before passing it along. (Pl. Ex. 59.) When Copeland did meet with Plaintiff to “touch-base” on her progress, the meetings “played out as what [Pjlaintiff came to call ‘beatdowns.’ ” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 630.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff never acknowledged that she was in an entirely different role, reporting to a different supervisor who had different expectations and continued to go to I.G. with problems or complaints after he stopped supervising her. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 176.) Plaintiff asserts that she understood her new role, how it differed, who her new direct supervisor was, and what the expectations were of her. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 176.) She claims that she continued to meet with I.G. because she continued to report to him on certain projects and that it was only on September 28, 2010, that she specifically approached I.G. regarding her issues with Copeland. (Pl. 56.1¶ 176.) n. Plaintiffs Medical Leave On September 29, 2010, Thoma received a doctor’s note excusing Plaintiff from work through October 1, 2010. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 177; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 177.) Plaintiff states that she worked from home during this time. (Pl. 56.1 ¶207.) Plaintiff thereafter remained out of work on the advice of her doctors until November 1, 2010, when Plaintiff returned to work. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 177-79; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 178.) Plaintiff claims that she missed work because she was anxious regarding Copeland’s abusive treatment. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 177.) o. Plaintiffs Complaints Against Copeland Plaintiff complained to Thoma that Copeland was treating her unfairly, and Thoma began an investigation into Plaintiff’s allegations. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 208; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 208.) While Thoma was conducting this investigation, she received a letter from Plaintiffs attorney, dated October 28, 2010, alleging that Plaintiff was discriminated against as a result of her gender and retaliated against for her complaint against Copeland on behalf of Corigliano. (Pl. Ex. 61.) Thoma interviewed 29 employees and reviewed numerous documents as part of her investigation. (Thoma Decl. ¶ 41.) Plaintiff declined to be interviewed. (Id.) Thoma concluded that there was no evidence to support Plaintiffs allegations that she was harassed or retaliated against by Copeland, was denied a promotion to Director of Stores, or was discriminated against on the basis of her gender. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 212.) According to Plaintiff, she declined to be interviewed because of the “inherent conflict of interest” arising out of “any effort by [Thoma] to investigate her direct supervisor” Copeland. (Pl. Decl. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff challenges the investigation on three grounds: (1) the investigation report was created after Plaintiff had initiated legal proceedings against Defendant at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (2) the report was based on “witness statements” that were not supported by primary materials, and (3) the witness statements are not credible, as the statement attributed to Carpenter has been refuted by Carpenter herself, the D’Agata statement regarding the Rego Park opening is inaccurate, and the statement attributed to Chandra Santiago must have been fabricated because Santiago denies being interviewed. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 210.) p. November 2010 Review Plaintiff met with Raymond and Thoma at the beginning of November 2010. (Def. 56.1¶ 192; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 192.) According to Plaintiff, she explained Copeland’s mistreatment of her following her conversation with Thoma regarding the sexual harassment issue on behalf of Corigliano. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 193.) Raymond asked Plaintiff if she had known that Copeland had taken all of his GSMs to dinner, and she replied that she had not. (Id.) Plaintiff then reviewed her employment history with Defendant, including her promotions and positive reviews, and asked Raymond how she was suddenly subjected to numerous criticisms and placed on a 60-day performance warning. (Id.) During the meeting, Plaintiff did not acknowledge that she needed to improve her performance, because she felt the criticisms were retaliatory and fabricated, rather than genuine feedback. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 194.) On November 8, 18, and 23, 2010, Copeland and Thoma met with Plaintiff to discuss her performance and probationary goals. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 199; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 199.) Plaintiff asserts that these meetings merely consisted of Copeland summarily condemning everything she did, ignoring her requests for particulars, and browbeating her. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 199.) Defendant asserts that during these meetings, Copeland reviewed Plaintiffs projects in detail and provided her with feedback. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 199.) At the November 8, 2010 meeting, Copeland expressed his disappointment in the weekly newsletter as it did not look professional, and noted that the new store sign project did not occur on a timely basis. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 202-03.) Plaintiff asserts that Copeland’s dissatisfaction with the newsletter was not genuine since he had not previously complained, and that the signage program was delayed because Copeland himself required more time to review and approve part of the project. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 202-03.) At the November 18, 2010 meeting, Copeland stated he did not like Plaintiffs format for the presentation of the stockroom standards project and that it was months behind schedule. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 204.) According to Plaintiff, the project was completed prior to the meeting and the format was modeled on an appraisal form created by Copeland. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 204.) At the November 28, 2010 meeting, Copeland told Plaintiff that he thought her leadership skills in overseeing the preparation of the merchandise manuals was poor and that the manuals needed to be more structured and organized. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 205.) According to Plaintiff, Copeland himself had ordered that the project be placed on hold, but had approved the portion of the book that was already prepared. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 200(b), 205.) q. Plaintiffs Termination By the beginning of December, Copeland concluded that he did not believe that Plaintiff had satisfactorily improved her performance or met her probationary goals. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 206.) However, Defendant was willing to extend Plaintiffs probationary period as she had been out of work for medical issues. (Id.) Plaintiff declined the extension, (Def. 56.1 ¶ 207; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 207), because she felt it was unnecessary since she had worked from home during those absences, (PL 56.1 ¶ 207.) Plaintiff was terminated on December 17, 2010. (Def. 56.1 ¶213; Pl. 56.1 ¶213.) Plaintiff argues that Copeland’s decision was in retaliation for her speaking to Tho-ma on behalf of Corigliano. (PL 56.1 ¶ 214.) According to Defendant, Copeland decided to terminate Plaintiff because she failed to improve her performance and failed to take responsibility for her actions and deficiencies in work product. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 214.) In May 2011, Copeland left Defendant’s employ for personal reasons. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 102; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 102.) After reviewing a number of candidates, Defendant offered the. job to Karen Peters, who was Senior Vice President and Director of Stores at Saks Off Fifth Avenue Outlet Stores. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 104; PL 56.1 ¶ 104.) Peters accepted the position, but after Saks made a counteroffer, she decided to remain at Saks. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 105; PL 56.1 ¶ 105.) Defendant then hired Larry Mentzer, the District Vice President of Macy’s Metro NYC District. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 106; PL 56.1 ¶ 106.) II. Discussion a. Standard of Review Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir.2013); Redd v. N.Y. Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 174 (2d Cir.2012). The role of the court is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A genuine issue of fact exists when there is sufficient “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment; “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. The court’s function is to decide “whether, after resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, a rational juror could find in favor of that party.” Pinto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir.2000). The Second Circuit has “cautioned that ‘[wjhere an employer acted with discriminatory intent, direct evidence of that intent will only rarely be available, so affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination.’ ” Taddeo v. L.M. Berry & Co., 526 Fed.Appx. 121, 122 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Gorzynski v. Jet-Blue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir.2010)). b. Gender Discrimination Plaintiff claims that Defendant failed to promote her to the Director of Stores position in October 2008 because of her gender in violation of Title VII, NYSHRL and NYCHRL. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating “against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Thus, “[a]n employment decision ... violates Title VII when it is ‘based in whole or in part on discrimination.’ ” Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Feingold, v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir.2004)). Title VII claims are assessed using the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Dowrich-Weeks v. Cooper Square Realty, Inc., 535 Fed.Appx. 9, 11-12, 2013 WL 4437071, at *1 (2d Cir.2013) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to gender discrimination claim); Yu v. New York City Hous. Dev. Corp., 494 Fed.Appx. 122, 125 (2d Cir.2012) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to failure to promote claim). Under the framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); see also DowrichWeeks, 535 Fed.Appx. at 11-12, 2013 WL 4437071 at *1. Plaintiffs burden at this stage is “minimal.” Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742). If Plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, the burden then shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742; Ruiz v. County Of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 492 (2d Cir.2010). Defendant’s burden “is not a particularly steep hurdle.” Hyek v. Field Support Servs., 702 F.Supp.2d 84, 93 (E.D.N.Y.2010). It “is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.’ ” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509, 113, S.Ct. 2742). If Defendant offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its action, summary judgment must still be denied, however, if Plaintiff can show that “the evidence in plaintiffs favor, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is sufficient to sustain a reasonable finding that [the adverse employment action] was motivated at least in part by [gender] discrimination.” Adamczyk v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 474 Fed.Appx. 23, 25 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp., Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir.2007)); see also Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S.-,-, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2522-23, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (“An employee who alleges status-based discrimination under Title VII need not show that the causal link between injury and wrong is so close that the injury would not have occurred but for the act. So-called but-for causation is not the test. It suffices instead to show that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s decision.”); Edwards v. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 11-CV-1408, 957 F.Supp.2d 203, 210, 2013 WL 3785620, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2013) (explaining the burden shifting analysis for Title VII claims). Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that she had the necessary qualifications for the position, and, even if she could establish her qualifications, she cannot show that the hired individual was less qualified. (Def. Mem. 27-32.) For the following reasons, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff suffered gender discrimination based on Defendant’s failure to promote her to the temporary Director of Stores position in October 2008. i. Plaintiffs Prima Facie Case To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on a failure to promote claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she applied and was qualified for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants, (3) she was not selected for the position, and (4) that the failure to promote occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. See Yu, 494 Fed.Appx. at 124-25; Tanvir v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 480 Fed.Appx. 620, 621 (2d Cir.2012); Lomotey v. Conn.-Dep’t of Transp., 355 Fed.Appx. 478, 480 (2d Cir.2009); Sandor v. Safe Horizon, Inc., No. 08-CV-4636, 2011 WL 115295, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2011). “Although plaintiffs burden at the prima facie stage is minimal, [s]he must provide some competent evidence that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer a discriminatory motive.” Dent v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, No. 08-CV-1533, 2011 WL 308417, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2011). Defendant concedes that Plaintiff has established the first and third elements of her prima facie case. (Oral Arg. 36:15-21.) Plaintiff has established that she is member of a protected class based on her gender, satisfying the first element. See Alexander v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-4638, 957 F.Supp.2d 239, 246, 2013 WL 3943496, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013) (“There is no dispute that plaintiff, as a female, is a member of a protected class.”). In addition, Plaintiff was not promoted to the Director of Stores position, satisfying the third element. See Sandor, 2011 WL 115295, at *9 (finding third element established where plaintiff was not selected for the position). Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not apply for the position and, in any event, was not qualified for the position. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff cannot show that the failure to promote her occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. 1. Plaintiffs Application and Qualification for the Position A. Plaintiffs Application In order to establish the second element of her prima facie case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she applied and was qualified for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants. See Yu, 494 Fed.Appx. at 125 (listing second element as requiring the plaintiff to establish that he “applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants” (citation omitted)). Although a plaintiff generally must file a formal application in order to demonstrate that she a