Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER JESSE M. FURMAN, District Judge. INTRODUCTION...............................................................595 FINDINGS OF FACT...........................................................597 A. Emergency Planning for People with Disabilities............................597 B. The City’s Emergency Planning Structure .................................598 C. Involving People with Disabilities in Emergency Planning....................600 D. Evacuations............................................................601 a. Building Evacuations................................................602 b. Transportation......................................................604 c. The HEO..........................................................606 d. Evacuations During Hurricane Sandy..................................609 E. The Shelter System and Sheltering in Place................................613 a. The Architectural Accessibility of Shelters..............................614 b. The Programmatic Accessibility of Shelters.............................617 e. The Shelter Survey..................................................622 d. Refuges of Last Resort..............................................622 e. Sheltering in Place..................................................623 F. Power Outages.........................................................624 G. Recovery Operations....................................................626 a. Resource Provision..................................................626 b. Debris Removal.........................................’............627 c. Interim Housing....................................................628 H. Education and Outreach.................................................629 I. Communications........................................................630 a. Traditional Media...................................................631 b. Websites...........................................................632 c. The 311 System.....................................................632 d. The Special Needs Advance Warning System...........................634 e. Notify NYC........................................................635 f. On-the-Ground Communication.......................................636 g. The Content of Communication.......................................637 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.......................................................639 A. Legal Standards........................................................639 a. The ADA and Rehabilitation Act......................................639 b. The NYCHRL......................................................642 B. Discussion.............................................................643 a. Evacuations........................................................643 b. The Shelter System and Sheltering in Place............................646 i) Architectural Accessibility......................................646 ii) Programmatic Accessibility.....................................650 iii) Sheltering in Place.............................................652 e. Power Outages .....................................................652 d. Recovery Operations ................................................653 i) Resource Provision ............................................653 ii) Debris Removal...............................................653 iii) Interim Housing...............................................653 e. Communications....................................................654 i) Outreach and Personal Emergency Planning......................654 ii) Communications During an Emergency...........................655 f. Other Issues .......................................................656 i) Inclusion of People with Disabilities in the Planning Process.........656 ii) Fundamental Ateration and Undue Hardship Defenses.............657 CONCLUSION.................................................................658 INTRODUCTION The task of planning for, and responding to, emergencies and disasters is one of the most important, and challenging, tasks any government faces. Emergencies can take many forms—from power outages, to hurricanes, to terrorist attacks—and a government, particularly a local government, must be prepared for them to strike at almost any moment. Such preparedness requires considerable planning, resources to execute those plans, and a willingness to learn from experience and revise plans that do not sufficiently accomplish their goals. Even then, each emergency is different and, to some extent, unpredictable, and no amount of planning or resources can fully prepare a local government to respond to what may come. Moreover, ultimately, there are limits to what the government can do on its own: Not only must a local government be prepared, but its residents must also prepare themselves. In recent years, New York City (the “City”) has faced more than its fair share of emergencies and disasters, from the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001; to Hurricane Irene in August 2011; to Hurricane Sandy, just over one year ago. Separate and apart from that tragic record, the task of planning for, and responding to, emergencies and disasters is especially challenging in New York City, given, among other things, the size and density of the City’s population, its island geography, and its large daily commuter and tourist populations. Given those challenges, and what New York City has had to face in recent years, the City’s planning and response have been remarkable in many ways. In particular, the array and detail of its plans for every imaginable kind of emergency is impressive; and the valor and sacrifice of those who have come to the aid of New Yorkers in times of emergency, from first responders to volunteers, have been nothing short of extraordinary. This lawsuit does not challenge those facts. Far from it: In many respects, this lawsuit has confirmed them. Instead, the question in this lawsuit, certified as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), is whether in planning for, and responding to, emergencies and disasters, the City has adequately addressed the needs of people with disabilities—a segment of the population for which emergency planning is even more challenging and, some argue, more important. The Plaintiff class comprises all people with disabilities, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12102, who are within the City and the jurisdiction served by the City’s emergency preparedness programs and services. See Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of the Disabled v. Bloomberg, 290 F.R.D. 409, 420-21 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (Docket No. 66). (See also Docket No. 69 (noting the lack of objections to the Court’s proposed definition of the class and ordering the certification of that class)). These Plaintiffs contend that the City’s emergency preparedness program fails to accommodate their needs by, among other things, inadequately planning for the evacuation of people with disabilities, from multi-story.buildings and generally; failing to provide a shelter system that is accessible within the meaning of the ADA; ignoring the unique needs of people with disabilities in the event of a power outage; failing to communicate adequately with people with special needs during an emergency; and failing to account for the needs of people with disabilities in recovery operations following a disaster. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief under the ADA, Title 42, United States Code, Section 12131 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, Title 29, United States Code, Section 794 et seq.; and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), New York City Administrative Code, Section 8-101 et seq. In March 2013, only months after Hurricane Sandy devastated the City, the Court held a six-day bench trial limited to the question of liability—that is, whether the City’s emergency preparedness program does, in fact, fail to sufficiently accommodate people with disabilities. At trial, the Court heard from at least thirty-five witnesses, including City officials involved in emergency planning at the City’s Office of Emergency Management (“OEM”), the New York City Fire Department (“FDNY”), and the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”); City officials involved in addressing the needs of people with disabilities, at the Mayor’s Office for People with Disabilities (“MOPD”) and elsewhere; experts on emergency planning with respect to people with disabilities; and several people with disabilities who testified about their needs with respect to emergency planning as well as their experiences in recent emergencies, including Hurricane Sandy. In addition, the parties introduced approximately 25,000 pages of documentary exhibits, including over twenty plans developed by the City to address everything from providing shelter during an emergency to responding to a flash flood. Following trial, the parties and the United States Department of Justice, as an interested party, see 28 U.S.C. § 517, filed several hundreds of pages of briefing and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, a process that was completed in late May 2013. This mountain of evidence and argument confirms that planning for, and responding to, emergencies and disasters is a Herculean task, and that, in many—perhaps most—respects, the City has done an outstanding job. But it also reveals that while the City’s emergency preparedness program adequately accommodates the needs of people with disabilities in some respects, it fails to do so in others. Most significantly, the City’s plans are inadequate to ensure that people with disabilities are able to evacuate before or during an emergency; they fail to provide sufficiently accessible shelters; and they do not sufficiently inform people with disabilities of the availability and location of accessible emergency services. Notably, there is no evidence that these failures are a result of intentional discrimination by the City against people with disabilities. But the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the NYCHRL seek to prevent not only intentional discrimination against people with disabilities, but also—indeed, primarily—discrimination that results from “benign neglect.” Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985). Moreover, these laws require that a government entity do more than provide a program on equal terms to those with and without disabilities; they require “affirmative accommodations to ensure that facially neutral rules do not in practice discriminate against individuals with disabilities.” Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 275 (2d Cir.2003). The evidence shows that the City has not done so in various ways. Based on the evidence and testimony presented at trial, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial did not, and this Opinion does not, address the actions the City must take to remedy the deficiencies in its emergency preparedness program. Those actions will be addressed in the next phase of the case. FINDINGS OF FACT A. Emergency Planning for People with Disabilities 1. According to New York City, of the more than eight million people living in the City, “it is estimated that there are 889,219 individuals with disabilities, making up 11% of the population.... [Of these,] 183,-651 individuals have a serious hearing difficulty, 210,903 have serious vision difficulties, and 535,840 individuals have difficulty walking or climbing stairs.” (Ex. 120, at P003738; see also Ex. 7, at CNY000361-62 (providing social vulnerability statistics by evacuation zone based on 2000 census data); Ex. 24 at CNY018522 (providing statistics about the numbers of people with various disabilities living in New York City); Tr. 286:1-3 (Special Needs Coordinator Aaron Belisle discussing a “rule of thumb” that twenty percent of the City’s population has some form of disability)). The City estimates that, within just the area that was subject to the mandatory evacuation order during Hurricane Sandy, “there are at least 118,000 people with disabilities.” (Ex. 120 at P008738). 2. People with disabilities face unique challenges in responding to emergencies. (See, e.g., Ex. 65, at CNY020238). They may, for example, rely on the availability of elevators, accessible transportation, accessible communication, or electricity-powered medical devices, any or all of which may be compromised in an emergency. (See Blanck Decl. ¶ 28; see also Bell Decl. ¶ 18 (“As a result of my blindness and PTSD, I am unable to react as quickly and easily to new and dangerous situations without accommodations. Because of my [disabilities], I need to plan ahead to make sure that my needs would be met during travel and at a shelter....”); Buckner Decl. ¶ 13 (“Being blind and unable to drive, if I cannot arrange transportation, I am stuck wherever I happen to be.”); Halbert Decl. ¶ 9 (“There are things that I cannot do as quickly or at all as compared to people without disabilities. For example, I cannot run out of a high-rise building in an emergency.”); Morales Decl. ¶ 10 (“If I am at home and the power goes out, I do not know how I could evacuate because I have to use a motorized lift to get up and down the stairs at my house.”)). 3. Thus, as the City itself concedes, it is particularly important to account for the needs of people with disabilities in emergency planning. (See Defs.’ Response to Statement of Interest of United States 6 n. 1 (Docket No. 157); see also, e.g., Ex. 65, at CNY020275 (“Planners must compensate for their increased vulnerability by addressing, specifically, the needs of peopie with disabilities during the planning process.”); id. at CNY020277 (“Emergency planners must plan ahead to effectively provide services and communicate with people with disabilities before, during, and after an emergency.”); Ex. 153, at P001974 (“The importance of advanee[] planning in developing and implementing [accommodations for people with disabilities] in general population shelters cannot be overstated.... [Accommodations for people with disabilities] cannot wait to be identified and put into place once an emergency or disaster occurs.”); see also McKinney Dep. 90:9-24 (OEM Deputy Commissioner for Planning testifying that it is important to plan for the needs of people with disabilities)). Indeed, the National Council on Disability, an independent federal agency charged with advising the President, Congress, and other agencies regarding policies, practices, and procedures that affect people with disabilities, has opined that the failure to address the specific vulnerabilities of people with disabilities in emergency planning “often leads to increased injury and death rates among this segment of the population during disasters.” (Ex. 65, at CNY020275; see also Blanck Decl. ¶ 34 (“When there is a lack of system-wide disaster planning for persons with disabilities ... persons with disabilities are vulnerable to significant life-threatening harm.”)). B. The City’s Emergency Planning Structure 4.The City’s emergency preparedness program consists of numerous plans, guides, strategies, playbooks, scripts, and protocols designed, among other things, to educate the public about emergency preparedness; to guide evacuation, transportation, and shelter during an emergency; to disseminate emergency information during a disaster; and to aid the City and its residents in recovering from an emergency. (See, e.g., McKinney Decl. ¶ 14; Exs. 1-4A, 6-26, 28-36, 40-42, 113). The City’s primary planning documents include the Area Evacuation Plan (Ex. 245A), the Coastal Storm: Evacuation Plan (Ex. 6), and the Coastal Storm: Sheltering Plan (Ex. 7). These general plans are supplemented by many other more specific plans, as well as by playbooks, manuals, and field guides, detailing how the plans should be implemented. 5. OEM is the City agency responsible for coordinating the City’s emergency planning and responses to emergency situations. Among other things, OEM is responsible for preparing the City’s emergency plans, conducting training and exercises, and overseeing the City’s extensive education and outreach program. (See McKinney Decl. ¶ 9; Ex. 113, at P001941). See also N.Y.C. Charter, Ch. 19-A, §§ 495-497. OEM has more than 200 employees, and is divided into at least six levels of management. (See Tr. 281:14-16; Ex. 44, at CNY006811). 6. The City has a Special Needs Coordinator, whose role it is to advocate within OEM for people with special needs and to provide guidance on incorporating the needs of people with disabilities into the City’s emergency plans. (See Belisle Decl. ¶ 2). Aaron Belisle was the full-time Special Needs Coordinator until August 2012, when he moved to a different position at OEM. (Tr. 282:10-14). As of the time of trial in this case, the City still had not replaced Belisle with a full-time Special Needs Coordinator. (Id. at 282:20-23). Instead, from August 2012 until at least the time of trial—a period that included Hurricane Sandy—Belisle performed both his new job and the role of Special Needs Coordinator on an acting basis. (See Belisle Decl. ¶ 4; Tr. 282:10-23). 7. Belisle testified that he is involved in many facets of OEM’s work, that he feels empowered to raise issues regarding the needs of people with disabilities, and that he believes his input is valued. (See Belisle Decl. ¶¶ 13, 20, 21). Belisle also testified that he participated in drafting several of the City’s plans, operational documents, and online trainings. (Belisle Decl. ¶ 33). Belisle had no involvement, however, in drafting some of the City’s core emergency plans, including its sheltering and evacuation plans. (Tr. 285:1-5). And while the Special Needs Coordinator may make suggestions about the City’s emergency plans, Belisle testified, he does not have the authority to approve (or reject) them. (See Tr. 284:8-20 (“Ultimately, the plans are not approved by me. I would say that my suggestions are taken under advisement, and used or not used. Ultimately, I do not sign off on the plans.”); id. at 357:24-358:1). 8. In fact, the OEM Special Needs Coordinator is on the lowest rung of OEM’s organizational chart. (Ex. 44). Moreover, the position of Special Needs Coordinator has no staff. (Ex. 44; Tr. 281:23-25). Besides the Special Needs Coordinator, there is no one else at OEM whose job specifically includes representing people with disabilities in disaster preparedness. (Tr. 282:1-4). Nor is there a central coordinator for the City who represents people with special needs in the event of an emergency. (Tr. 282:25-283:4). 9. In addition to the Special Needs Coordinator, who represents the interests of people with disabilities within OEM, the MOPD helps to ensure that City services and programs more generally address the needs of people with disabilities. (See Calise Decl. ¶ 3). Although the Office responded, and continues to respond, to the needs of people with disabilities related to Hurricane Sandy (see id. ¶¶ 10-17, 19, 23-33, 35), the Commissioner of the MOPD, Victor Calise, acknowledged that he does not have a substantial role in emergency planning (see Tr. 437:15-438:9). 10. There was no evidence that either the Police or the Fire Department employs anyone responsible for ensuring that the department’s emergency plans and policies accommodate the needs of people with disabilities. (See Tr. 341:9-16; Maniotis Dep. 34:5-24; Villani Dep. 12:17-21; Wahlig Dep. 51:15-52:16). OEM Assistant Commissioner Dina Maniotis testified that she was not aware of anyone in either department who is “a liaison specific for persons with disabilities.” (Maniotis Dep. 34:5-24). NYFD Division Chief Fredrick Villani testified that the FDNY’s Bureau of Operations—the unit responsible for working with OEM (see Villani Decl. ¶ 3)—does not have a person responsible for ensuring that the Bureau’s plans and policies comply with the ADA. (See Villani Dep. 12:17-21). And James Wahlig, an NYPD Deputy Inspector in the Operations Division— the division responsible for the Police Department’s emergency response (see Wahlig Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5)—testified that he did not know if the Police Department had anyone responsible for addressing the needs of people with disabilities in an emergency. (See Wahlig Dep. 51:15-52:16). C. Involving People with Disabilities in Emergency Planning 11. One way in which emergency planners can help ensure that the needs of people with disabilities are incorporated sufficiently into emergency plans is to include people with special needs in the planning process. (See, e.g., Belisle Decl. ¶ 30 (“One of the ways we ensure the plans are reflective of those they serve is to include community members in the planning process.”); Blanck Decl. ¶ 57 (“Meaningful participation by the disability community is central to effective disaster planning.”); Railes Decl. ¶ 128 (similar)). 12. The parties disagree about the extent to which people with disabilities are included in the City’s emergency planning process. The City’s expert Elizabeth Davis testified that the City’s planning process is “collaborative and inclusive” and that its emergency plans “are developed in conjunction with a [sic] multiple stakeholders, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, a number of which have direct experience working with the disability community.” (Davis Decl. ¶ 4). By contrast, Plaintiffs’ expert Peter Blanck testified that “the disability community has not been meaningfully and effectively engaged by New York City in the emergency planning process.” (Blanck Decl. ¶ 58; see also Kailes Decl. ¶ 129 (“[T]he City has not actually engaged the disability community in a way that the community views as legitimate, meaningful, or in a way that uses their input and expertise.”)). 13. The City maintains a Special Needs Advisory Group (“SNAG”), composed of approximately fifty representatives of agencies, service providers, and advocacy groups that represent and work with people with special needs. (See Belisle Decl. ¶¶ 3, 34). The group, which is chaired by the Special Needs Coordinator, meets quarterly to discuss emergency planning and to offer feedback and suggestions to the City. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 34, 37). Its members have participated in emergency training, given presentations, and advised OEM on some of its outreach materials. (Id. ¶ 36). In particular, SNAG helped develop the Ready New York: My Emergency Plan guide (Ex. 3), an emergency preparedness guide, the goal of which is to help people, particularly those with special needs, develop a personal emergency plan. (See Belisle Decl. ¶ 38; Tr. 377:21-379:18). 14.SNAG’s role is merely advisory. (See Tr. 347:8-22). The group has no decisionmaking authority and, indeed, has not even seen any of the City’s emergency plans in their entirety. (Id. at 347:11-22). Some SNAG participants expressed frustration at what, in their view, is a lack of opportunity for the group to meaningfully contribute to the City’s core emergency plans. (See, e.g., Trapani Decl. ¶ 29 (testifying that in her time at SNAG, she was not given the opportunity to comment on the adequacy of the City’s emergency plans with respect to people with disabilities); Tr. 145:9-24,146:6-147:25 (employee of Plaintiff organization CIDNY, Margi Trapani, testifying that CIDNY stopped sending a representative to SNAG because she “felt, and [CIDNY’s] executive director concurred, that the time there was not valuable to [CIDNY’s] interests in helping people prepare for emergencies or disasters, [and] that [SNAG was] having very limited effects on anything to do with the real needs of people with disabilities as they experience emergencies and disasters”); Tr. 509:11-25 (Executive Director of Plaintiff organization BCID, Joan Peters, testifying that “the concerns of the disability community” were not being addressed by SNAG and that she therefore decided that BCID would no longer attend SNAG meetings)). D. Evacuations 15. The City has two principal plans for evacuation: the Coastal Storm Evacuation Plan (Ex. 6) and the Area Evacuation Plan (Ex. 245A). The former is the City’s plan for evacuations in advance of a coastal storm or any other large-scale event with advanced warning. The latter is its general evacuation plan for emergencies that occur without warning, including but not limited to terrorist attacks. (See Wahlig Decl. ¶ 10; Tr. 784:25-785:2; Ex. 245A). Its “purpose” is to “coordinate evacuations of one or more neighborhoods due to large-scale, no-notice incidents.” (Ex. 245A, at 6). 16. The Area Evacuation Plan in effect at the time this case was filed was approved in 2005. (See Ex. 5). In September 2012, the plan was revised; a draft version of the revised plan that had not yet been approved was entered into evidence at trial. (See Ex. 245; Tr. 727:3-7). Some of the witnesses’ declarations were based on the 2005 Area Evacuation Plan, and some were based on the 2012 draft. (Compare, e.g., Blanck Decl. ¶70 (citing 2005 plan), and Kailes Decl. ¶ 37 (same), with McKinney Decl. ¶ 19 (citing 2012 draft); Davis Decl. ¶ 77 (same)). The plan was revised again in February 2013. (Ex. 245A). That version of the plan was formally approved on March 4, 2013—one week before trial. (Ex. 245A; Tr. 863:9-15). 17. Eight pages of the 107-page Coastal Storm Evacuation Plan are devoted to the “Homebound Evacuation Operation” (“HEO”), the purpose of which is “to coordinate evacuation assistance for home-bound individuals who have no other options for evacuation.” (Ex. 6, at CNY000139). With the exception of the HEO, which is discussed in more detail below, the Coastal Storm Evacuation Plan fails to provide any specific details about how the City will ensure that people with disabilities are able to evacuate. 18. The 2005 version of the Area Evacuation Plan did not include any information regarding the evacuation of people with disabilities. (See Ex. 5). Although the version of the plan that was approved on the eve of trial states that “[e]very operational strategy must account for populations with special needs and mobility impairments” (Ex. 245A, at 8), it provides little information about exactly how such populations will be accommodated. It contains a “Special Needs and Mass Care operational strategy” (Ex. 245A, at 33), but it does little more than incorporate the HEO, which had been developed for evacuation of homebound individuals during coastal storms (see McKinney Decl. ¶ 19). With the exception of the HEO, there is no information in the Area Evacuation Plan about how the City will evacuate people with disabilities from multi-story buildings or how it will ensure sufficient accessible transportation. a. Building Evacuations 19. FDNY is the lead City agency responsible for building evacuations. (Villani Decl. ¶ 34). The NYPD is also involved in emergency evacuations and, in particular, in canvassing buildings to identify and rescue those who may be unable to evacuate without assistance. (Wahlig Decl. ¶ 20). 20. As Defendants’ expert Elizabeth Davis testified, New York is “a vertical, not a horizontal city.” (Tr. 917:10-13). The City has thousands of multi-story buildings. (See Kailes Decl. ¶ 57). Naturally, evacuation from these buildings may be more challenging for people with disabilities than for others. (See, e.g., Blanck Decl. ¶ 63; Halbert Decl. ¶¶ 9, 12; Kailes Decl. ¶¶ 55, 57; Tr. 462:18-23, 715:23-716:5; Ex. 65, at CNY020324). For example, many people with disabilities are unable to navigate stairs independently and therefore need assistance evacuating during an emergency in which elevators are rendered inoperable or may not be used. (See Trapani Decl. ¶ 27(e); Kailes Decl. ¶ 55; Tr. 462:18-23). In addition, many people with disabilities rely on wheelchairs or other assistive devices or service animals that, where possible, should be evacuated with them. (See Ex. 65, at CNY020335, CNY020341). As Plaintiffs expert Peter Blanck testified, because of these challenges, “[ejffective and adequate evacuation planning from high rise structures is important to the needs of people with mobility impairments, and other disabilities, in the event of large scale or localized evacuations.” (Blanck Decl. ¶ 63). 21. The City’s plans generally assume that people will be able to evacuate their buildings without assistance. (See, e.g., McKinney Dep. Vol. Ill 28:11-13 (“[W]e rely on individuals to be prepared and to leave when they’re asked to leave.”); see also Ex. 1, at CNY000040 (Ready New York emergency planning guide for seniors and people with disabilities instructing readers to not to use elevators during an emergency, but failing to suggest an alternative for those whose disabilities prevent them from navigating stairs)). 22. With the exception of the HEO, the City’s emergency plans fail almost entirely to address the needs of people with disabilities during an evacuation of a multi-story building. Belisle, OEM’s Special Needs Coordinator, testified that there is nothing in the written plans “[s]pecific to [the evacuation of] people with disabilities” from high-rise buildings. (Tr. 309:21-24; see also Tr. 358:18-22 (Belisle testifying that he is not aware of any Eire or Police Department plans that address the evacuation of people with disabilities from highrise buildings)). Representatives of the NYPD and FDNY testified that they do not have any plans that address “high-rise evacuations for people with disabilities in the City of New York.” (Tr. 789:9-12 (FDNY Division Chief Villani); Tr. 731:4-7 (NYPD Deputy Inspector James Wahlig); see also Manahan Dep. 96:13-25; Wahlig Dep. 59:12-16,100:3-7). 23. FDNY Division Chief Villani testified that there was no need to plan specifically for the evacuation of people with disabilities, because the Fire Department “treat[s] everybody the same way.” (Tr. 945:10-11; see also id. at 307:2-5 (testimony of Belisle that his “understanding of the fire department’s plans is that they treat everyone who they help evacuate from a high-rise building as having a special need”); id. at 945:10-11 (FDNY Assistant Chief Manahan testifying that “[i]f somebody is stuck and needs to be removed, we treat everybody the same way”)). Villani explained that “FDNY personnel use their training and experience to respond to and evacuate individuals with disabilities in much the same way as with able-bodied individuals: firefighters, paramedics and EMTs quickly assess the needs of the individual and transport them out of harm’s way—whether to a hospital or other safe place—depending on the needs of the individual and the dictates of the particular emergency situation.” (Villani Deck ¶ 36). NYPD Deputy Inspector James Wahlig testified that the NYPD conducts evaluations in a similar manner, treating people with disabilities who require evacuation on a “case-by-case basis.” (Tr. 732:17-20). 24. The City has several resources that may be used to assist in evacuating people with disabilities. For example, firefighters carry stokes baskets, backboards, and skids, all of which allow them to transport people who are unable to evacuate on their own. (See Tr. 958:3-10). Every ambulance in the City is equipped with a stair chair, a device that allows emergency responders to assist non-ambulatory evacuees down stairs. (Villani Deck ¶¶ 39-40). While NYPD police cars do not carry stair chairs, the Emergency Services Unit, NYPD’s special operations division, has special equipment, including stair chairs, necessary to assist non-ambulatory evacuees. (See Tr. 751:12-17). 25. Although FDNY Chief Villani testified that the Fire Department’s Emergency Medical Services “protocols allow the transportation of a wheelchair, a home health aide, or service animal” with an evacuee (Villani Deck ¶ 42; see Tr. 797:4-15), NYPD Deputy Inspector Wahlig testified that the Police Department provides no such guidance (see Tr. 731:8-732:20). 26. There is little doubt that the FDNY and the NYPD are capable of rescuing individuals with disabilities from high-rise buildings under ordinary circumstances. (See, e.g., Villani Deck ¶¶ 34, 35, 45; Tr. 923:1-22). It is less clear, however, that they would be able to do so during a large-scale evacuation, particularly one that occurs with little or no notice. (See Kailes Decl. ¶ 61). As Plaintiffs’ expert June Kailes testified, “[i]n a mass evacuation, it may be impossible for fire personnel to get to the numbers of people who will need evacuation assistance, and responding fire personnel may not be able to coordinate with ambulance services. Moreover, first responders may need to fight against the tide of people going down and out of the building in order to get [their] equipment to the correct location.” (Id.). 27. The City does not require most high-rise buildings to maintain emergency evacuation devices for people with disabilities and, indeed, most buildings do not have them. (See id. ¶ 60; Tr. 307:23-308:7). Nor does the City have any plan for making these devices available during an emergency. (Tr. 307:20-24). As noted above, with the exception of the HEO, the City does not, in fact, have any plan for how people who cannot evacuate on their own, such as people with mobility disabilities, will be evacuated in these circumstances. (See Kailes Decl. ¶ 60; Blanck Decl. ¶ 68; see also Delarosa Decl. ¶ 38 (class member testifying that she called 911 in advance of Hurricane Sandy and “the 911 operator told [her] that [the operator] did not know what the emergency plans were for people who use wheelchairs”)). Plaintiffs’ expert Peter Blanck testified that without such a plan, “it will be difficult for the City to effectively evacuate people with disabilities from [highrise] structures, .... particularly ... during a large scale evacuation and for emergencies with no advance warning.” (Blanck Decl. ¶ 68). b. Transportation 28. The City’s emergency evacuation plans rely heavily on the use of public transportation. (See, e.g., Ex. 6, at CNY000130 (“[A] successful evacuation will depend on the efficient use of mass transportation.”); id. (noting that, “[i]n the worst case scenario, .... about 1.83 million [people] are expected to use public transportation” to evacuate during an emergency); Ex. 245A, at 25 (“[Public transportation] will be a key component of many evacuation options, both for moving evacuees from the evacuation area, and for redistributing those displaced by the incident.”); Tr. 318:19-22 (Belisle testifying that “the emergency plans operate under the assumption that people are going to use the existing transportation resources”); Tr. 735:20-736:2 (Wahlig testifying that an emergency evacuation would rely on the City’s existing public transportation infrastructure); see also Ex. 68, at CNY00023744 (Mayor stating during press conference in advance of Hurricane Sandy that, “[i]f you are going to” a shelter, “we strongly urge you to get there via public transportation”)). Accordingly, the City encourages people to use public transportation to evacuate during an emergency. (See, e.g., Tr. 318:11-18; Ex. 4A, at CNY000028 (directing people to “[u]se public transportation if possible” to evacuate in an emergency)). In fact, Belisle testified that, with the exception of the HEO, the City was “not responsible for transportation of people to evacuation centers” and that the City plans for “people [to] find their [own] way to evacuation centers.” (Tr. 318:23-319:3). 29. Most of the City’s public transportation, however, is inaccessible to people with disabilities. (See, e.g., Tr. 315:11-15 (Belisle testifying that “the majority of subway stops in New York are not accessible”); id. at 461:8-11 (testimony of MOPD Commissioner Calise that public transportation in New York “presents challenges” to people with disabilities); Kailes Decl. ¶ 39; see also Ryan Decl. ¶ 18 (“[T]he usual ways of traveling in New York City are extremely inaccessible to wheelchair-users....”); Conner Decl. ¶ 15 (class member testifying that “the types of public transportation available to [her] are very limited” because she is blind)). The vast majority of the New York City subway system is inaccessible; indeed, less than twenty percent of all subway stations are accessible. (See Ex. 157, at P002127, P002130-37; Curry Decl. ¶ 29; Halbert ¶ 15; Torres Decl. ¶ 23). Public buses have only two seats that can accommodate wheelchairs (Tr. 187:8-11, 188:15-18), and during an emergency may be too full to accommodate passengers with disabilities. (See Tr. 187:12-23; Martinez Decl. ¶ 35.) Only about two percent of the City’s yellow taxicabs are accessible to people with disabilities, see Noel v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 687 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir.2012), and those that are accessible pick up passengers only in Manhattan. (See Tr. 315:16-18, 455:20-456:19, 460:20-461:1). 30. To address these deficiencies, New York State’s Metropolitan Transit Authority (the “MTA”) provides paratransit services—that is, accessible public transportation—through the Aecess-A-Ride program. (See Morales Decl. ¶ 28; Ryan Decl. ¶ 19; Tr. 337:23-25, 338:1-5, 459:20-22). See also 49 C.F.R. § 37.121 (requiring that “each public entity operating a fixed route system” to “provide paratransit or other special service to individuals with disabilities”). Because “[m]uch of New York City’s public transportation system is not accessible to persons who use wheelchairs ...., persons with mobility disabilities rely disproportionately on paratransit for travel around New York City.” (Trapani Decl. ¶ 67). Unlike other forms of public transportation, however, paratransit ordinarily requires a user to reserve a ride at least twenty-four hours in advance. (See Bell Decl. ¶ 28; Buckner Decl. ¶ 19; Conner Decl. ¶ 16; Morales Decl. ¶ 28; Ryan Decl. ¶ 19; Torres Decl. ¶ 23; Tr. 193:13-15, 251:19-21, 337:5-9, 458:1-6). 31.The City directs people with disabilities to continue to rely on paratransit in an emergency. (See, e.g., Tr. 608:2-8; see also Ex. 58, at CNY00025360, CNY00025362 (scripts from 311, the City’s government information hotline, for Hurricanes Irene and Sandy informing callers that “Access-A-Ride should be able to help [people with disabilities] get to an evacuation center”)). There is nothing in the City’s plans, however, to ensure that people with disabilities are actually able to use paratransit during an emergency. The City’s plans do not, for example, mandate that paratransit be available without reservations during an emergency; that it remain open for a certain amount of time after the issuance of an evacuation order; or even that it be available at all during an emergency. (See, e.g., Tr. 789:3-5 (FDNY Chief Yillani testifying that the plans do not contain any directive about the availability of paratransit during an emergency)). Nor may the City direct Access-a-Ride’s operations during an emergency: Access-a-Ride is not run by the City but rather by the MTA, a public corporation chartered by the state, and the City has no agreement with the MTA to provide services during an emergency. (See Kailes Decl. ¶ 46; Tr. 335:20-23, 336:6-9, 336:18-21, 337:1-4, 337:20-21, 374:23-375:9). 32. In fact, the City has no meaningful plan whatsoever to ensure sufficient accessible transportation to evacuate people with disabilities during an emergency. With the exception of the HEO, the Coastal Storm Evacuation Plan contains no information at all about the transportation of people with disabilities during an emergency evacuation. (See Ex. 6). And the Area Evacuation Plan states that, in the event of an emergency, the “MTA may reroute paratransit vehicles to support special needs evacuations”; that the Taxi and Limousine Commission “may request support from private ambulette operators”; that “MTA Paratransit may be asked to implement shuttle routes to hospitals or Evacuation Staging Areas”; and that “[b]uses and paratransit vehicles may be given special or prioritized access on restricted routes if used for evacuation operations.” (Ex. 245A, at 28 (emphases added); see also Tr. 788:9-789:5 (FDNY Chief Villani testifying that the plans contain no directives requiring support from the MTA or the Taxi and Limousine Commission in an emergency)). The City has not even determined whether sufficient accessible transportation would be available in the event of an emergency. (See Tr. 293:19-23 (Belisle testifying that he is not aware “of any surveys of the sufficiency of accessible transportation in the event of an emergency”)); id. at 743:1-3 (testimony of NYPD Deputy Inspector Wahlig that “[t]he NYPD doesn’t know how many paratransit vehicles could be available to it” in an emergency). c. The HEO 33. As noted, the purpose of the HEO is to “coordinate evacuation assistance for homebound individuals who have no other options for evacuation” in an emergency. (Ex. 6, at CNY000139). Although it was developed as part of the Coastal Storm Evacuation Plan, the City now views the Operation as an all-hazards plan to be implemented, when needed, in any kind of emergency. (See Villani Decl. ¶ 9; Ex. 245A, at 36). 34. The HEO is designed to begin when the City’s shelter system, discussed below, opens and to end six to eight hours before a storm makes landfall. (See Ex. 6, at CNY00140). The HEO does not resume after a storm has cleared. 35. People are referred to the HEO when they call 311, the City’s government information hotline, during an emergency and state that they require evacuation assistance. (See Ex. 6, at CNY000139 (“Public messaging will inform homebound individuals in need of transportation assistance to call 311.”); Morrisroe Decl. ¶ 41 (stating that homebound individuals are directed through “mayoral press conferences and press releases, NYC.gov, 311’s online Web site and texting services, the MOPD and its Web site,” and emails to nongovernmental partners to call 311 if they need assistance evacuating)). 36. When someone calls 311 to inquire about assistance evacuating, the 311 representative determines which of three levels of assistance the caller requires. (See Ex. 6, at CNY000140; Morrisroe Decl. ¶42; Villani Decl. ¶¶ 10-11). First, people who are capable of getting to the sidewalk in front of their building are transferred to MTA paratransit dispatchers. (See Ex. 6, at CNY000142; Villani Decl. ¶¶ 11-12). Second, for callers who can sit up unassisted for an extended period of time but cannot exit the building on their own, 311 dispatchers take their contact information and forward it to the FDNY. (See Ex. 6, at CNY000142; Villani Deck ¶¶ 11-12). The FDNY compiles a list of those who need assistance, and dispatches teams of firefighters on a school bus to evacuate them. (See Ex. 6, at CNY000193-94; Manahan Deck ¶¶ 16-19; Villani Deck ¶ 12). If an evacuee does not answer the door, the FDNY evacuation team makes one attempt to contact the evacuee by phone and, if the evacuee cannot be reached, it moves on. (See Ex. 6, at CNY000193). Finally, those who are incapable of sitting up unassisted and must be transported on a stretcher are transferred to the Emergency Medical Service (“EMS”) through the 911 system to be transported by ambulance to a hospital outside the evacuation zone. (See Ex. 6, at CNY000142; Villani Deck ¶¶ 11-12). 37. The HEO does not allow evacuees to choose their destination. As described in the Coastal Evacuation Plan, all of those evacuated by the HEO are transported to an evacuation center or a hospital, depending on the level of care they require. (See Ex. 6, at CNY000142; Tr. 314:11-15). FDNY Chief Villani testified that those who require assistance evacuating from their building may also request that they be left in front of the building and not be transported anywhere. (Tr. 793:22-794:11). 38. The HEO is not intended to meet the needs of all people with disabilities during an evacuation. Instead, it is designed to be a limited program, a “last resort” for those who are homebound and unable to evacuate without assistance. (Ex. 6, at CNY000107; Villani Deck ¶ 9; Davis Deck ¶81; Tr. 776:8-10, 895:6-9; see also Kailes Deck ¶ 40 (“The scale of the program appears to be designed to provide individualized assistance to a small number of people.”)). During Hurricane Irene, in which approximately 370,000 residents were ordered to evacuate (see Ex. 154, at P001703), only about 200 people were evacuated via the HEO (Manahan Deck ¶ 13); and during Hurricane Sandy, in which approximately 375,000 people were ordered to evacuate (see Ex. 78, at CNY00022673), the HEO evacuated fewer than 100 people (McKinney Dep. Vol. Ill, at 18:12-16). 39. Despite this limited mandate, the City’s expert Elizabeth Davis testified that the Operation has “served the needs of the people who requested its services” and that “the FDNY has the capacity to successfully fulfill all requests during its implementation.” (Davis Deck ¶ 80). In support of this conclusion, Davis cited the deposition testimony of Kelly McKinney, OEM’s Deputy Commissioner of Planning and Preparedness, that, theoretically, there is no “upper bound to the capacity” of the HEO; the capacity of the Operation at any given point, McKinney explained, depends on the resources available to it at that point, and the availability of such resources is a “function of time.” (McKinney Dep. Vol. I, at 75:11-25; see Davis Deck ¶ 80). But McKinney did not, in his deposition or otherwise, state what the capacity of the Operation as currently resourced is, whether he believed such capacity was sufficient to evacuate all those who might require evacuation through the HEO during an emergency, and, if not, how long it would take to acquire the resources to make the HEO sufficient. (See McKinney Dep. Vol. I, at 74:9-75:25). And Davis testified that she had not seen any assessment of the capacity of the HEO. (Tr. 895:23-896:3). 40. The evidence presented at trial does support the conclusion that FDNY was able to fulfill all the requests it received for evacuation as part of the HEO during Hurricanes Irene and Sandy. FDNY Assistant Chief Manahan testified that, during Hurricane Irene, the Fire Department was able to safely evacuate everyone who requested its assistance through the HEO. (See Manahan Decl. ¶ 13). He testified that, during Hurricane Sandy, he did not “receive any reports of any problems or disruptions involving [the FDNY’s] evacuation activities.” (Manahan Decl. ¶ 21). Plaintiffs did not introduce any evidence to the contrary. 41. Notwithstanding the FDNY’s ability to serve all of those who requested its assistance during Hurricanes Irene and Sandy, there are several reasons to believe that the HEO could be insufficient to meet the needs of people with disabilities in future emergencies. First, the evidence at trial related solely to the Fire Department’s resources. The Fire Department, however, is not involved in transporting those who are able to exit their buildings unassisted, but who need assistance getting to a shelter or other location. (See Ex. 6, at CNY000140-42). Instead, the HEO depends upon paratransit to evacuate these people. (See Ex. 6, at CNY000142). The Fire Department’s capacity is therefore irrelevant to the HEO’s ability to accommodate them. And, as explained above, there is nothing in the City’s emergency plans to ensure that paratransit will remain available in an emergency. 42. Second, the City does not inform the public about the existence of the HEO. (See Tr. 293:13-16; Railes Decl. ¶41). Homebound individuals are directed to call 311 if they are unable to evacuate. (See, e.g., Ex. 6, at CNY000140; Ex. 61 (email to service providers of people with special needs before Hurricane Sandy stating that “[clients who cannot evacuate their homes independently and who do not have any other options can call 311 to coordinate transportation to an evacuation center”); Ex. 67, at CNY 00023739 (mayoral press conference before Hurricane Sandy stating “[i]f you can’t get to a shelter by yourself, you can request transportation by calling 311”); Morrisroe Decl. ¶ 41; see also Ex. 3, at CNY001091 (“Call 911 if you are stranded and need emergency assistance to evacuate your home.”)). But they are not informed that there is a City program that could help them do so, or that that Operation is available before—and, indeed, only before—a storm actually makes landfall. 43. It is difficult to know how many more people would have requested the assistance of the HEO during Hurricanes Irene and Sandy if they had known that it was available, or whether the Operation would have been able to accommodate an increase in requests. (See Railes Decl. ¶ 40 (noting that while the HEO evacuated 200 people during Hurricane Irene and fewer than 100 people during Hurricane Sandy, “[i]n a major coastal storm, thousands of people with disabilities, if not more, might need to evacuate”); Villani Decl. ¶ 22 (“It is not possible to predict with precision the number of individuals who will require evacuation assistance during an emergency.”); Tr. 779:1-10 (Villani testifying that the Fire Department has not assessed how many wheelchair-accessible vehicles would be available for the HEO; that he did not know how many vehicles of any kind are available for the Operation; and that there is no “predefined number of vehicles” available to support homebound evacuations); Id. at 781:10-14 (Villani testifying that the Fire Department has not determined the greatest number of people it could evacuate through the HEO)). 44. Third, the HEO is triggered by a request for evacuation assistance. Some people with disabilities, however, may not be able to request such assistance (and may not have someone who could request assistance on their behalf). Moreover, the City depends on the 311 system, discussed below, to “serve as the single point of intake for all homebound individuals requesting evacuation assistance.” (Ex. 6, at CNY000140). Indeed, it provides no other method for people with disabilities to request assistance. (See, e.g., Tr. 744:1-7). As explained below, however, 311 may be unreliable or unavailable during an emergency. The City has not even evaluated the capacity of 311 to assist those who might require evacuation assistance. (See Tr. 313:15-18). 45. Finally, and most fundamentally, it is hard to know whether, or how, the HEO could function in a no-notice emergency, such as a terrorist attack. As noted above, the HEO was originally conceived as part of the Coastal Storm Evacuation Plan for use in emergencies with advance notice. (See McKinney Decl. ¶ 19). And, by its terms, it appears to depend on such advance notice. As currently written, for example, the Operation ends at least six hours before an emergency actually strikes, and does not reactivate after-wards. (See Ex. 6, at CNY00140; Tr. 779:15-23, 952:10-12; Manahan Dep. 88:6-18; 101:12-15). It is designed, therefore, to assist homebound individuals in evacuating before a storm makes landfall, not after. (See Ex. 6, at CNY000139-CNY000140; Manahan Dep. Tr. 100:16-17; id. at 101:7-17 (testifying that the Home-bound Evacuation Operation is a pre-event plan)). 46. As noted above, earlier versions of the Area Evacuation Plan—the City’s plan for evacuations in no-notice events—did not include the HEO or any other provisions to evacuate people with disabilities. (See Ex. 5). Although the version of the Area Evacuation Plan adopted on the eve of trial incorporates the HEO and provides that it will be implemented “if necessary,” it does not detail how the Operation would be implemented in an emergency without warning. (Ex. 245A, at 36). It is unclear how an evacuation operation that is intended to begin and end before an emergency actually strikes can be applied to an emergency that occurs without warning. Indeed, FDNY Chief Villani conceded at his deposition that because the HEO is “designed specifically for something in advance,” he did not know whether it could be implemented in an emergency without warning and that the Fire Department had neither planned nor prepared for such implementation. (Villani Dep. 15:6-20). d. Evacuations During Hurricane Sandy 47. Hurricane Sandy provided some indication of how the City’s evacuation plans operate in the event of an emergency with advance notice. 48. The Mayor issued a mandatory evacuation order for the areas of the City most likely to be most affected by Hurricane Sandy—denominated Zone A—at 11:30 a.m. on Sunday, October 28, 2012. (See Ex. 68, at CNY00023743; Ex. 76, at CNY00023346). The Mayor directed residents of Zone A to evacuate by the end of the day. (See Ex. 76, at CNY0Q023346). The City directed people who needed assistance evacuating to call 311. (See, e.g., Ex. 61 (email to service providers of people with disabilities stating “[e]lients who cannot evacuate their homes independently and who do not have any other options can call 311 to coordinate transportation to an evacuation center.”); Ex. 67, at CNY00023739 (Mayor’s statement that “[i]f you can’t get to a shelter by yourself, you can request transportation by calling 311. But I would stress that your first option should be to stay with family and friends.”); Ex. 68, at CNY00023744 (May- or’s statement that “[i]f you cannot evacuate yourself and need assistance, call 311 and we will be sure to make sure somebody comes and helps you”); Morrisroe Decl. ¶ 43). 49. In advance of the evacuation order, Access-a-Ride was available to people with disabilities who made reservations at least twenty-four hours in advance. (Ex. 397, at CNY00022779 (October 26, 2012 Situation Report stating that, as Hurricane Sandy approached, MTA paratransit was “[s]etting up schedules from two-day to one-day booking for clients”)). Paratransit began to shut down almost immediately after the evacuation order was issued on October 28, 2012, with the MTA website announcing that “[ojutbound Access-A-Ride trips” would be “scheduled only until 12 p.m...., and return trips [would] continue until 5 p.m.” (Ex. 160, at CNY00382). Any trips scheduled to take place after that time were cancelled. (Id.). By contrast, subway service did not begin to shut down until 7:00 p.m. on October 28, 2012, and MTA bus service was not curtailed until at least 9:00 p.m. (Ex. 76, at CNY00023346; see also Ex. 79, at CNY00022662 (indicating that some subways ran until 10:00 p.m., and some buses did not stop running until 11:00 p.m.)). 50. The NYPD requisitioned thirty MTA buses, and for several hours after public transit had shut down, police officers drove through the evacuation zone providing transportation to those who had no other way to evacuate. (See Wahlig Deck ¶ 19; Tr. 747:4-23). The buses traveled along a designated route, but also responded to calls for assistance via 311 and 911 as well as reports from patrol officers of people who needed help evacuating. (See Tr. 748:1-6). The bus drivers were not instructed to ensure that the buses did not get too full to allow wheelchair users to access them, and no wheelchair users were evacuated in this way. (Id. at 749:10-12, 750:6-12). 51. The HEO began at 9:00 a.m. on Sunday, October 28, 2012, the same time the City’s shelter system opened (see Ex. 76, at CNY00023346; Tr. 950:9-12), and was deactivated at 10:00 p.m. that same night (see Tr. 952:1-9 (testimony of FDNY Assistant Chief Manahan that the Operation concluded at 10:00 p.m. on October 28, 2012); Manahan Deck ¶ 17 (same); see also Ex. 79, at CNY00022656 (Hurricane Sandy situation report stating that by 3:00 a.m. all HEO activities had ceased); Manahan Dep. 70:10-15 (confirming that the HEO concluded at 10:00 p.m. on October 28, 2012)). Those who called 311 after that time requesting evacuation assistance were advised not to leave their locations and to shelter in place. (Ex. 79. at CNY00022651, CNY00022659; see Ex. 58, at CNY00025363). The HEO did not reopen after the hurricane passed. (See Tr. 952:3-12). 52. The storm made landfall at approximately 7:30 p.m. on Monday, October 29, 2012, and by the night of October 30, 2012, it had subsided. (See Ex. 116, at 31; Ex. 81, at CNY00022463). See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Service Assessment: Hurricane/Post-Tropical Cyclone Sandy, October 22-29, 2012, at 12 (May 2013), available at http:// www.nws.noaa.gov/os/assessments/pdfs/ Sandyl3.pdf (visited on October 31, 2013); see also, e.g., Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Kelleher, No. 92 CV 4484(CBA), 2006 WL 2711543, at *4, n. 2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2006) (taking judicial notice of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s records reflecting the date Hurricane Wilma struck a certain region in Florida); Mamiye Bros. v. Barber S.S. Lines, Inc., 241 F.Supp. 99, 116 (S.D.N.Y.1965) (taking judicial notice of forecasts from the United States Weather Bureau published in the newspaper). 53. In the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, the Fire and Police Departments conducted a search-and-rescue operation. (See Manahan Decl. ¶ 23). The operation was limited to rescuing those in life-threatening situations. (See Manahan Dep. 108:13-14 (“[W]e were searching for people who desperately need to be saved.”); Tr. 946:17-19 (FDNY Assistant Chief Manahan testifying that “a rescue is when there’s—if you didn’t show up at the scene, that the person could suffer serious injury or death”); Kass Decl. ¶ 9). It did not aid those who were in need of evacuation assistance but otherwise safe. (See Manahan Dep. 109:6-15). 54. The record demonstrates that some people with disabilities were unable to evacuate because of insufficient transportation. (See, e.g., Bell Decl. ¶ 30 (class member testifying that during Hurricane Sandy, he “tried to use Access-A-Ride, but the Access-A-Ride dispatch did not answer the phone”); Martinez Decl. ¶ 35 (class member testifying that the evacuation buses were too crowded for him to board in his wheelchair)). 55. Even after Hurricane Sandy had passed, some class members were unable to access public transit. (See Bell Decl. ¶ 30 (testifying that “[w]hen Access-[A]Ride started to operate again, [he] was told that only those individuals who had medical emergencies” would be provided transportation); Morales Decl. ¶ 24 (testifying that several days after Hurricane Sandy, she needed to go to the hospital to speak with her doctor, but she was unable to get there because the MTA buses were too crowded for her to board in her wheelchair, and Access-A-Ride did not answer the phone)). 56. MTA buses resumed modified service on Tuesday, October 30, 2012 at 5:00 p.m. (Ex. 81, at CNY00022461, CNY00022468), and bus service was as close to fully operational as possible by October 31, 2012. (Ex. 83, at CNY00022418). Subway service was partially restored on November 1, 2012. (Ex. 85, at CNY00022379). Access-A-Ride began offering limited paratransit service in cases of “medical necessity” on October 31, 2012, and resumed regular service on November 1, 2012, although it did not resume most transportation within Zone A for several more days. (See, e.g., Exs. 365, 367, 375, 378). 57.There is substantial evidence that people with disabilities were stuck in highrise buildings after the storm. For example, MOPD Commissioner Calise testified that he received calls from people who were stranded in their buildings and, more generally, that it was “known” that people who used wheelchairs were stuck in highrise buildings in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. (Tr. 444:8-24; see Calise Decl. ¶ 26). Belisle also testified that he was aware that people with disabilities had been stranded in their apartments after Hurricane Sandy, but that he did not know how many had been stranded. (See Tr. 310:23-311:4; see also Lekas Miller Dep. 54:12-24 (testifying that in a building she had visited after Hurricane Sandy, there were many people with limited mobility who could not leave their apartments