Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS MARGARET M. MORROW, District Judge. Calop Business Systems, Inc. (“Calop”) filed this action against the City of Los Angeles (“COLA”) and certain fictitious defendants on September 4, 2012. The complaint alleged a claim for violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and for violation of Article 1, Section 7 of the California Constitution; as well as claims for violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); the Airline Deregulation Act (“the Deregulation Act”), 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1); the Railway Labor Act (“the RLA”), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.; and California Labor Code §§ 90.5(a), 223, and 2810. On July 16, 2013, COLA filed a motion for summary judgment, which Cal-op opposed. On July 25, 2013, Calop filed a motion for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which COLA opposed. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. The Living Wage Ordinance Calop asserts that Los Angeles City Ordinance Number 171,547, the Living Wage Ordinance (“LWO”), which is codified in §§ 10.37 et seq. of the Los Angeles Administrative Code, and took effect on May 5, 1997, is invalid. The LWO requires employers who do contract or subcontract work for the City to pay their employees a minimum living wage, the amount of which depends on whether the employer also provides health benefits. L.A.Admin.Code, § 10.37.2(a). The legislative findings that supported enactment of the LWO state: “Experience indicates that procurement by contract of services has all too often resulted in the payment by service contractors to their employees of wages at or slightly above the minimum required by federal and state minimum wage laws. Such minimal compensation tends to inhibit the quantity and quality of services rendered by such employees to the City and to the public. Underpaying employees in this way fosters high turnover, absenteeism, and lackluster performance. Conversely, adequate compensation promotes amelioration, of these undesirable conditions. Through this article the City intends to require service contractors to provide a minimum level of compensation that will improve the level of services rendered to and for the City. The inadequate compensation typically paid today also fails to provide service employees with resources sufficient to afford life in Los Angeles. It is unacceptable that contracting decisions involving the expenditure of City funds should foster conditions placing a burden on limited social services. The City, as a principal provider of social support services, has an interest in promoting an employment environment that protects such limited resources. In requiring the payment of a higher minimum level of compensation, this article benefits that interest.” Id., § 10.37. Only certain employers are bound by the LWO. Among these are airport employers and subcontractors of airport employers who perform work on contracts subject to the LWO. Id., §§ 10.37.1(b), (g), (j), (n). The LWO requires that airport employers and subcontractors pay their employees “ten dollars and thirty cents ($10.30) per hour with health benefits or, if health benefits are not provided, then fourteen dollars and eighty cents ($14.80) per hour.” Id., § 10.37.2(a). Airport employers who provide health benefits must pay at least $4.50 per hour to the health benefit plan. Id., § 10.37.3(a). Airport employers can therefore choose one of two options under the LWO: they can pay their employees at least $14.80 per hour without providing health benefits or they can pay $10.30 per hour and contribute $4.50 per hour to a health benefit plan. Regardless of the option they choose, airport employers’ out-of-pocket expense is $14.80 per hour. The LWO also requires that employers provide at least twelve compensated days off per year for sick leave, vacation, or personal necessity at the employee’s request, and, if that time is exhausted, an additional ten days per year of uncompensated time for sick leave to deal with an illness of the employee or a member of the employee’s immediate family. Id., § 10.37.2(b). The LWO has a supersession clause providing that “[pjarties subject to [the ordinance] may by collective bargaining agreement provide that such agreement shall supersede the requirements of this article.” Id., § 10.37.12. The Los Angeles Bureau of Contract Administration is responsible for investigating employee complaints of noncompliance with the LWO. Id., §§ 10.37.1(h), 10.37.6. If the bureau “determine^] that an employer has violated this article, [it must] issue a written notice to the employer that the violation is to be corrected within ten (10) days.” Id., § 10.37.6(d). If the employer does not demonstrate within that ten-day period that it has cured the violation, the bureau may request that the awarding contract authority declare a material breach of the service contract, request that the city council debar the employer from receiving future City contracts, or request that the City Attorney bring a civil action against the employer. Id. B. Facts Underlying the Parties’ Dispute Calop is a California corporation that offers security and passenger services subcontract work to several airlines operating at the Tom Bradley International Terminal (“TB Terminal”) at Los Angeles International Airport (“LAX”). These include Asiana Airlines, Singapore Airlines, EVA Air, Air Tahiti Nui, China Eastern, China Southern, Japan Airlines, Phillippine Airlines, Quantas Airways, Thai Airways, and Cathay Pacific. Calop subcontracts with the carriers to provide employees who guard warehouses, screen the cargo warehouse, guard aircraft, and serve as passenger service security agents, baggage handling agents, “TUB operation agents,” and catering screener agents. Calop is thus a subcontractor to an airport employer, and is bound by the LWO. On February 1, 2010, Calop entered into an Agreement of Wage and Healthcare Package with the Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”). The agreement provided that new employees would be paid $9.00 per hour from July 1, 2010 to November 30, 2012. On June 17, 2010, Calop received a letter from the Equal Enforcement Opportunity (“EEO”) Enforcement Section of the Los Angeles Bureau of Contract Administration stating that it had “received a complaint regarding the payment of [a] living wage to [Calop’s] employees.” The Bureau asked that Calop submit various documents so that it could verify Calop’s compliance with the LWO. On August 24, 2010, the EEO Enforcement Section sent a second letter reporting its finding that Calop needed to make “corrective retroactive payments to several employees for underpayment of the Living Wage rate” between January 19 and February 1, 2010 — the date its collective bargaining agreement with the SEIU became effective. The letter asked that Calop calculate the amount it owed employees and issue back wages to those employees within ten days of its receipt of the letter. On October 21, 2010, the EEO Enforcement Section sent Calop a final letter, noting that it had previously “determined that Cal[o]p was not in compliance with the LWO from the period of January 19, 2010 to February 1, 2010 [because] Calop was paying wages of $11.55 per hour and not providing health benefits,” but that Calop had recognized its non-compliance and paid back wages to its employees. As a consequence, the letter stated, the EEO Enforcement Section had “determined that Cal[o]p [was] in compliance [for] the period in question.” II. DISCUSSION A. The Parties’ Request for Judicial Notice COLA requests that the court take judicial notice of four documents that are relevant to its motion: (1) The LWO, Los Angeles City Ordinance Number 171,547, (2) the LWO, as codified in §§ 10.37 et seq. of the Los Angeles Administrative Code; (3) Los Angeles City Ordinance Number 180,877, which, as mentioned, raised the minimum wage mandated by the LWO to its current level; and (4) a February 26, 2010 letter from John L. Reamer Jr., Director, Bureau of Contract Administration, to Ms. Gina Marie Lindsey. Calop asks that the court take judicial notice of five documents: (1) Frequently Asked Questions about the LWO; (2) a June 17, 2010 letter from Sophy Teng, EEO Enforcement Section, to Connie Chong; (3) an August 24, 2010 letter from Helmut Peindl, EEO Enforcement Section, to Connie Chong; (4) an October 21, 2010 letter from Sophy Tzeng, EEO Enforcement Section, to Connie Chong; and (5) Los Angeles Municipal Code § 104.110. Both requests are unopposed. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court may consider evidence that can be judicially noticed under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under Rule 201, courts can take judicial notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute, either because they are “(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned.” Fed. R.Evid. 201; see Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 546 (3d Cir.2012) (taking judicial notice of the fact that commercial buildings have emergency exits as a “matter of common knowledge” in affirming a grant of summary judgment); American Alternative Ins. Corp. v. Hudson Specialty Ins. Co., 938 F.Supp.2d 908, 911 n. 1 (C.D.Cal.2013) (taking judicial notice of public filings in deciding a motion for summary judgment). Under Rule 201, municipal ordinances are proper subjects of judicial notice because they are not subject to reasonable dispute. Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 938 n. 1 (9th Cir.2007) (“Municipal ordinances are proper subjects for judicial notice”); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 498 F.3d 1031, 1039 n. 2 (9th Cir.2007) (taking judicial notice of a municipal ordinance and stating that “[mjunicipal ordinances are proper subjects for judicial notice”); Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n. 2 (9th Cir.2006) (taking judicial notice of Santa Monica Ordinances Nos. 2116 and 2117). The court accordingly takes judicial notice of the various versions of the LWO COLA submitted by COLA and of Los Angeles Municipal Code § 104.110, which Calop asks that the court notice. The court may also take judicial notice of “[pjublic records and government documents available from reliable sources on the Internet.” Hansen Beverage Co. v. Innovation Ventures, LLC, No. 08-CV-1166-IEG, 2009 WL 6597891, *1 (S.D.Cal. Dec. 23, 2009) (citing Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir.1999)). See also Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association, 629 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.2010) (taking judicial notice of information displayed on the website of two school districts because they were government entities); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. McPherson, No. C 06-4670, 2008 WL 4183981, *5 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 8, 2008) (“Information on government agency websites has often been treated as properly subject to judicial notice”). The court could therefore take judicial notice of Reamer’s February 26, 2010 letter to Lindsey, submitted by COLA, and of the document titled LWO — Frequently Asked Questions, submitted by Calop. These documents are both available on the LWO website and neither party disputes their authenticity. The court thus takes judicial notice of the LWO — Frequently Asked Questions document. Because the court does not find the February 26, 2010 letter relevant to its analysis, however, it declines to take judicial notice of that document. As respects the three letters from the EEO Enforcement Section to Connie Chong that Calop asks that the court judicially notice, the documents are attached as exhibits either to the declaration of Juan Hong or the declaration of Young Chong in opposition to COLA’s motion. The documents are more properly considered evidence authenticated by Hong and Chong than proper subjects for judicial notice. Consequently, the court declines to take judicial notice of the documents, but will consider them as evidence submitted in opposition to the motion. B. Standard Governing Motions for Summary Judgment A motion for summary judgment must be granted when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56. A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. On an issue as to which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, however, the movant can prevail merely by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. See id. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(e)(2). Evidence presented by the parties at the summary judgment stage must be admissible. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e)(1). In reviewing the record, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. Rather, it draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See T.W. Electrical Service, Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir.1987). C. Whether the Court Should Grant Summary Judgment on Calop’s First Claim under the Due Process Clause and Article 1, Section 7 of the California Constitution 1. Legal Standards Regarding Unconstitutional Vagueness “It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). “An ordinance may be void for vagueness because either it (1) fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited; (2) impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application; or (3) abut(s) upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, [ ] operating] to inhibit the exercise of (those) freedoms.” Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 712 (9th Cir.2011) (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (internal citations omitted)). Where criminal sanctions are involved and/or the law implicates First Amendment rights, ... a “more demanding” standard of scrutiny applies. Id. (citing Maldonado v. Morales, 556 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir.2009) (where criminal sanctions are involved, “[t]he standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in those depending primarily on civil sanction for enforcement”)); Information Providers’ Coalition for the Def. of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir.1991) (stating that where statutes provide criminal penalties, “the requirement for clarity is enhanced”). In applying this heightened requirement, however, “due process does not require impossible standards of clarity.” Id. (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “We can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that the void for vagueness doctrine should be used sparingly. See Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1346 (1984) (noting that “ ‘under our constitutional system courts are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation’s laws.’ This consideration limits the strong medicine of striking down statutes as facially vague,” quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a particular party. See United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1256-59 (9th Cir.2009). “Outside the First Amendment context, a plaintiff alleging facial vagueness must show that the enactment is impermissibly vague in all its applications.” Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Treasury Department, 578 F.3d 1133, 1146 (9th Cir.2009) (internal citation omitted). See also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (holding that a plaintiff mounting a facial challenge must establish that “no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged] Act would be valid”). Because a plaintiff mounting a facial attack must show that a law is invalid in all of its applications, he must first show that the law is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Castro v. Terhune, 712 F.3d 1304, 1311 (9th Cir.2013). See also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (“One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness”). 2. Whether the LWO is Unconstitutionally Vague Calop contends that the LWO is unconstitutionally vague for two reasons; first, because the supersession clause allows a collective bargaining agreement to set wages lower than the minimum wage set by the LWO, and second, because the LWO does not define “health benefits.” Calop does not clearly articulate whether its due process challenge is facial or as applied. In its motion, however, COLA argues that the challenge is facial, and Calop does not refute, or even address, this argument in opposition. The court accordingly deems Calop’s challenge to the LWO a facial one. Calop must therefore show that the two sections of LWO it challenges are invalid in all of their applications, starting with their application to Calop. See Castro, 712 F.3d at 1311. In determining whether the LWO is unconstitutionally vague, the court uses a lower standard of scrutiny because the LWO does not impose criminal sanctions or implicate first amendment rights. Hunt, 638 F.3d at 712. As noted, Calop first argues that the terms of the LWO are unclear because it purports to set a minimum compensation level but also contains a supersession clause that allow employers to pay less than the minimum compensation established. COLA contends Calop cannot prevail on this challenge because it cannot show that, as applied to it, the terms of LWO are unconstitutionally vague. The EEO Enforcement Section required Calop to pay back wages to its employees for the period that preceded its entry into a collective bargaining agreement with the SEIU because, during that period, Calop did not pay its employees the minimum wage mandated by the LWO for employers that did not provide health benefits to their employees. The EEO Enforcement Section found that Calop paid its employees $11.55 per hour and no health benefits from January 19 to February 1, 2010. Courts examining whether the language of an ordinance is unconstitutionally vague on its face frequently begin their analysis by looking to the dictionary definition of the terms used in the ordinance that are allegedly vague. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 500-01, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 862 (1982) (looking to Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language to determine the meaning of the term “design”); Hunt, 638 F.3d at 711 (looking to the dictionary definition of “ideology” after concluding an ordinance was ambiguous because “it fails to define or provide any examples of when merchandise carries a ‘religious, political, philosophical or ideological’ message, and these terms have such amorphous meanings that it makes it difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to determine whether his conduct is proscribed by the ordinance”). Where the terms are clear however, the court need not look to the dictionary, but can determine from the plain words of the ordinance that the language is not vague. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 500-01, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (“Whatever ambiguities the ‘design! ] • • • ’ standard may engender, the alternative ‘marketed for use’ standard is transparently clear: it describes a retailer’s intentional display and marketing of merchandise. The guidelines refer to the display of paraphernalia and to the proximity of covered items to otherwise uncovered items”); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968) (“the statute prohibits only ‘picketing ... in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to and from any ... county ... courthouses----’ The terms ‘obstruct’ and ‘unreasonably interfere’ plainly require no ‘guess[ing] at [their] meaning.’ Appellants focus on the word ‘unreasonably.’ It is a widely used and well understood word and clearly so when juxtaposed with ‘obstruct’ and ‘interfere.’ We conclude that the statute clearly and precisely delineates its reach in words of common understanding. It is ‘a precise and narrowly drawn regulatory statute evincing a legislative judgment that certain specific conduct be ... proscribed’ ” (ellipses original)). Here, the court need not look to a dictionary because the terms used in the LWO are clear and unambiguous. The ordinance provides that “Employers shall pay Employees ... ten dollars and thirty cents ($10.30) per hour with health benefits or, if health benefits are not provided, then fourteen dollars and eighty cents ($14.80) per hour for Airport Employees.” L.A. Ajdmin. Code, § 10.37.2(a). The LWO sets forth detailed definitions of Employer, Employee, Airport Employer, and Airport Employee. The supersession clause states that “[pjarties subject to this article may by collective bargaining agreement provide that such agreement shall supersede the requirements of this article.” Id,, § 10.37.12. The plain language of the ordinance is transparently clear with respect to employers like Calop, who are not parties to a collective bargaining agreement and who do not provide health benefits for their employees. Such employers must pay their employees $14.80 an hour. The language leaves even less to be interpreted than “picketing in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere,” the phrase the Supreme Court held was not unconstitutionally vague in Cameron, 390 U.S. at 616, 88 S.Ct. 1335. Enforcing these unambiguous terms, the City sent Calop a notice of non-compliance requiring that it calculate and pay back wages owed for the period from January 19 to February 1, 2010; it did so because Calop did not have a collective bargaining agreement in force during that time and had paid its employees $11.55 per hour without providing health benefits. Calop has adduced no evidence, and has not even argued, that it did not understand the terms of the ordinance or the exemption for companies that had entered into a collective bargaining agreement. The terms of the LWO are clear and afford a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what it prohibited. Cal-op has therefore failed to show that these aspects of the LWO are unconstitutionally vague as applied to it. Consequently, the court grants summary judgment in favor of COLA on this aspect of Calop’s due process challenge. To the extent Calop challenges the supersession clause as unconstitutionally vague, the court also grants summary judgment in COLA’s favor because Calop lacks standing to assert such a claim. A party must have Article III standing to challenge an ordinance. Hunt, 638 F.3d at 709-10 (“To maintain their challenge to the ordinances at issue in this action, Plaintiffs ‘must establish constitutional standing with regard to the provisions challenged,’ ” quoting Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir.2006)). At a minimum, “Artficle] III requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, and that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979)); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). Calop cannot show that it suffered an injury as a result of COLA’s enforcement of the LWO’s supersession clause because COLA never attempted to enforce that clause against Calop. The court accordingly grants summary judgment in COLA’s favor on this aspect of Calop’s due process claim as well. As mentioned, an ordinance can also be deemed void for vagueness if it impermissibly delegates basic policy matters. Hunt, 638 F.3d at 712. Calop argues that “[t]he LWO supersession clause delegates the City of Los Angeles’s police power to employers and unions.” It also asserts that the LWO is unconstitutionally vague because it allows a collective bargaining agreement to undercut and supersede the LWO, and the City could participate in that process by approving a wage lower than the minimum required by the LWO. Calop does not explain how the City might “approve” a wage to which a union on behalf of its members and an employer otherwise subject to the LWO agree. COLA contends that opt-out provisions of living wage and other minimum wage regulations do not invalidate laws under the due process clause. In RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir.2004), the Ninth Circuit considered a facial challenge to a living wage ordinance that allowed employers who had entered into bona fide collective bargaining agreements to opt out of the ordinance. Id. at 1156. The court rejected plaintiffs argument that such a provision was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the unions because “a provision allowing employees bargaining collectively to opt out of the provisions of a labor regulation is not a delegation of legislative power at all.” Id. at 1156-57 (citing New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109, 99 S.Ct. 403, 58 L.Ed.2d 361 (1978) (“An otherwise valid regulation is not rendered invalid simply because those whom the regulation is designed to safeguard may elect to forgo its protection”)). The court found that the Berkeley City Council had validly exercised its legislative power by enacting an ordinance that only covered businesses in a certain geographic location, with a certain number of employees, and that did not have a collective bargaining agreement in place expressly waiving its applicability. Id. at 1157. The court noted that “[l]abor unions negotiating collective bargaining agreements with employers are not legislating, but rather negotiating on behalf of their members; if they reach an agreement with the employer for certain employee benefits and employment conditions that they consider superior to, but incompatible with, the Living Wage Ordinance, the parties can decide to waive its applicability.” Id. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in RUI is controlling, and compels the same conclusion here. As the Berkeley City Council did in RUI, the Los Angeles City Council exercised its legislative authority to make certain employers subject to the LWO — namely, those that perform work under a city contract or subcontract and that do not have a collective bargaining agreement expressly waiving the protections of the ordinance. In deciding the scope of the LWO, the Los Angeles City Council properly exercised its legislative authority and did not impermissibly delegate that authority to unions, employers, or employees. Calop has therefore not shown that it merits summary judgment as a matter of law on this aspect of its due process challenge, and the court accordingly grants summary judgment in favor of COLA. Calop argues finally that the LWO is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define the term “health benefits.” Specifically, it questions whether this includes vision and dental plans, and whether it includes insurance policies with deductibles. The LWO states that “[t]he health benefits required by this article shall consist of the payment of at least four dollars and fifty cents ($4.50) per hour by Airport Employers ... towards the provision of health care benefits for Employees and their dependents.” L.A. Admin. Code, § 10.37.3(a). As mentioned, a party must have Article III standing to raise a challenge to an ordinance. Hunt, 638 F.3d at 709-10. “Beyond these general standing requirements, constitutional claims also trigger special standing principles.” Id. Included in these requirements is the fact that, “to raise a vagueness argument, Plaintiffs’ conduct must not be ‘clearly’ prohibited by the ordinances at issue.” Id. Calop lacks standing to assert that the term “health benefits” is unconstitutionally vague because paying its employees $11.55 without providing health benefits from January 19 to February 1, 2010 was clearly prohibited by the LWO. Calop has not argued or adduced any evidence that it provided any type of health benefit to its employees during that period. Thus, whether “health benefits” includes vision and dental plans or insurance policies with deductibles did not affect the sanction imposed on Calop. Calop thus lacks standing to challenge the vagueness of this aspect of the LWO, and has not demonstrated that it can prevail on this aspect of its due process claim. The court therefore grants summary judgment in favor of COLA on all aspects of Calop’s due process claim. D. Whether the Court Should Grant Summary Judgment on Calop’s Second Claim Alleging That the LWO is Preempted by ERISA 1. Legal Standard Governing ERISA Preemption Calop next contends that the LWO is preempted by ERISA. “Congress enacted ERISA to ‘protect ... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries’ by setting out substantive regulatory requirements for employee benefit plans and to ‘provid[e] for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.’ ” Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)). Section 502(a) of ERISA, set forth at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), provides “a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans.” Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987). Because “[t]he purpose of ERISA is to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans[,] ... ERISA includes ... pre-emption provisions, which are intended to ensure that employee benefit plan regulation [will] be ‘exclusively a federal concern.’ ” Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004) (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523, 101 S.Ct. 1895, 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981) and citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144). Except for state laws regulating insurance, banking, or securities, ERISA “superseded any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). “State laws” include “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law____” Id., § 1144(c)(1). Initially, the Supreme Court held that ERISA’s preemption provision was “deliberately expansive,” see Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 46, 107 S.Ct. 1549, that it extended beyond state laws “specifically designed to affect [employee welfare benefit] plans,” and that it included laws whose effect was only “indirect,” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139, 111 S.Ct. 478, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990). Thereafter, however, the Court “ ‘c[a]me to recognize that ERISA preemption must have limits when it enters areas traditionally left to state regulation.’ ” Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 153 F.3d 949, 953 (9th Cir.1998) (quoting Operating Engineers Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. JWJ Contracting Co., 135 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir.1998) (citing De Buono v. NYSAILA Medical & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 813-14, 117 S.Ct. 1747, 138 L.Ed.2d 21 (1997))); see also New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995) (“[I]f ‘relate to’ were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course, for ‘[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere’”). The Court has thus directed that courts look “to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive,” Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. at 656, 115 S.Ct. 1671, as well as “to the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.” California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325, 117 S.Ct. 832, 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997). Applying the standard set forth by the Supreme Court, a court seeking to determine whether a state law claim falls within the scope of ERISA preemption must examine whether the law has a “reference to” or a “connection with” an ERISA plan. Emard, 153 F.3d at 954 (citing Operating Engineers, 135 F.3d at 677); see also Providence Health Plan v. McDowell, 385 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir.2004) (“Generally speaking, a common law claim ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA ‘if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan,’ ” quoting Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655-56, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995)). State laws have “reference to” ERISA plans when they “act[] immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans, ... or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation.” Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325, 117 S.Ct. 832; see also McDowell, 385 F.3d at 1172 (“In evaluating whether a common law claim has ‘reference to’ a plan governed by ERISA, the focus is whether the claim is premised on the existence of an ERISA plan, and whether the existence of the plan is essential to the claim’s survival. If so, a sufficient ‘reference’ exists to support preemption,” citing Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 324-25, 117 S.Ct. 832); Emard, 153 F.3d at 954. State laws do not have reference to ERISA plans by simply “explicitly mentioning] a covered employee welfare benefit plan.” WSB Electric, Inc. v. Curry, 88 F.3d 788, 793 (9th Cir.1996). Rather, they must also “ha[ve] some effect on the referenced plans.” Id. State laws have “a connection with” ERISA plans if they [ (1) ] regulate the types of benefits provided by ERISA welfare benefit plans, [ (2) ] require the establishment of a separate employee benefit plan, [ (3) ] impose reporting, disclosure, funding or vesting requirements on ERISA plans, or [ (4) ] regulate ERISA relationships such as those between the plan and the employer, or the employer and employee. Emard, 153 F.3d at 958 (citing Operating Engineers, 135 F.3d at 678; Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Ahue, 12 F.3d 1498, 1504 (9th Cir.1993)); see also McDowell, 385 F.3d at 1172 (“In determining whether a claim has a ‘connection with’ an employee benefit plan, courts in this circuit use a relationship test. Specifically, the emphasis is on the genuine impact that the action has on a relationship governed by ERISA, such as the relationship between the plan and a participant,” citing Abraham v. Norcal Waste Sys., Inc., 265 F.3d 811, 820-21 (9th Cir.2001), and Blue Cross of Cal. v. Anesthesia Care Assocs. Med. Group, Inc., 187 F.3d 1045, 1052-53 (9th Cir.1999)). If there is neither “reference to” nor a “connection with” ERISA employee welfare benefit plans, the state law claim is not preempted. Employee Staffing Services, Inc. v. Aubry, 20 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir.1994) (“Is the state telling employers how to write their ERISA plans, or conditioning some requirement on how they write their ERISA plans? Or is telling them that regardless of how they write their ERISA plans, they must do something else outside and independently of the ERISA plans? If the latter ..., there is no preemption. If the former, additional questions might need to be asked”). 2. Whether the LWO is Preempted by ERISA The LWO is not per se subject to ERISA because it is a minimum wage regulation. Wages are a traditional subject of the state’s police powers. See WSB Electric, Inc. v. Curry, 88 F.3d 788, 791 (9th Cir.1996) (“It is well settled that wages are a subject of traditional state concern, and are not included in ERISA’s definition of ‘employee benefit plan,’ ” citing Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 118, 109 S.Ct. 1668, 104 L.Ed.2d 98 (1989) (holding that ERISA does not preempt a state law regulating vacation pay)). Nonetheless, ERISA could preempt the LWO if it refers to, or has a connection with, employee welfare benefit plans. COLA argues that the LWO does not refer to ERISA plans because it does not require employers to provide particular benefits or plans, to alter existing plans, or even to provide plans or employee benefits. It cites WSB Electric, in which the court held that the California prevailing wage law, although it referenced ERISA plans, did not have an effect on them, but “simply [took] them into account when calculating the cash wage that [had to] be paid.” 88 F.3d at 793. The wage law at issue in WSB Electric required that public works contractors pay employees a prevailing wage; they were able to do so by combining cash wages with contributions to benefit plans. Id. at 791. Because the law did “not force employers to provide any particular employee benefits or plans, to alter their existing plans, or to even provide ERISA plans or employee benefits at all,” the court held that it did not refer to ERISA plans and was therefore not preempted by ERISA. Id. at 793-94. Here, as in WSB Electric, the LWO expressly references ERISA plans in that it mentions health benefits. Like the law at issue in WSB Electric, however, the LWO does not have an effect on any ERISA plan. The LWO sets a minimum wage that certain employers must pay, and permits them either to pay it all in cash or through a combination of cash and benefits contributions. Like the wage law in WSB Electric, the LWO “regulates wages generally, not wages that are part of a particular employee benefit plan.” Id. at 792. As the Ninth Circuit held in that case, “[t]he references to ERISA plans in the [LWO] have no effect on any ERISA plans, but simply take them into account when calculating the cash wage that must be paid.” Id. at 793. The LWO does not require that employers provide health benefits, dictate the level or type of health benefits an employer must provide, or state which health benefit plan an employer must choose. Where, as here, wage laws function irrespective of ERISA plans, they do not refer to ERISA plans and are not preempted by § 1144(a). Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 327, 117 S.Ct. 832 (stating that California’s prevailing wage statute “functions irrespective of the existence of an ERISA plan” and that, “[a]ecordingly, [it] does not make reference to ERISA plans”). COLA next contends that the LWO does not have a “connection with” ERISA plans because, under the four-factor test set forth in Ahue, 12 F.3d at 1504, the LWO does not regulate the type of benefits provided to employees, does not require the establishment of a separate employee benefit plan, does not impose reporting or other requirements on ERISA plans, and does not regulate the relationship between an ERISA plan and an employer. See also Emard, 153 F.3d at 958. The court agrees. The LWO clearly does not regulate the type of benefits provided to employees; it does not require that employers provide certain types of benefits or offer any benefits at all. The LWO therefore does not have a connection with ERISA under the first prong of the Ahue test. WSB Electric, 88 F.3d at 794-95. The second factor asks whether the law requires the establishment of a separate benefit plan. Ahue, 12 F.3d at 1504. Nothing in the LWO requires contractors to establish or maintain a benefits plan. The second Ahue factor is thus not implicated. See also Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 12-13, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding that a state law requiring companies to make a one-time, lump-sum severance payment when closing plants was not preempted by ERISA because the law did not require the establishment or maintenance of an employee benefit plan). The third Ahue factor is whether the law imposes reporting requirements on ERISA plans. Ahue, 12 F.3d at 1504. Calop argues that because the EEO Enforcement Section requested, as part of its investigation of Calop’s compliance with the LWO, that Calop provide its payroll registers, relevant portions of its employees’ handbook, a copy of its health policy, and employee information and subcontractor information forms, the LWO imposes reporting requirements on employers and therefore has a connection with ERISA plans. The LWO states that the EEO Enforcement Section shall “establish employer reporting requirements on employee compensation.” L.A. Admin. Code, § 10.37.7. This requirement, however, does not “impose[] reporting, [or] disclosure ... requirements for ERISA plans.” Ahue, 12 F.3d at 1504. Rather, it provides that employers shall report the amount of wages they are paying their employees. Whether the minimum wage is satisfied by a cash payment to employees or by the combination of a cash payment and a contribution to a health benefits plan, the ordinance simply requires that employers report the wages they have paid their employees, not information related to ERISA plans. None of the documents the EEO Enforcement Section requested from Calop, moreover, required the disclosure of or specifics concerning ERISA plans. As the WSB Electric court stated, the test under the third Ahue factor is not whether a wage law “imposes additional administrative burdens regarding benefits contributions on the employer.” 88 F.3d at 795 (emphasis original). The inquiry, rather, is whether the law “imposes additional administrative requirements for ERISA plans.” Id. Here, as in WSB Electric, the LWO does not impose additional administrative requirements on ERISA plans. That an employer’s disclosure of wages paid may include information regarding an ERISA plan does not mean the LWO requires that the ERISA plan to which the employer contributes report or disclose information not required by ERISA. Indeed, as noted previously, under the LWO, an employer need not contribute to an ERISA plan at all. For these reasons, the third Ahue factor does not demonstrate that the LWO has a connection with ERISA plans. The fourth, and final, Ahue factor test is whether the law regulates ERISA relationships such as those between a plan and the employer, or the employer and employee. Ahue, 12 F.3d at 1504. COLA contends that the LWO does not regulate any ERISA relationship because it leaves the choice whether to provide a health benefits plan in the employer’s discretion, and does not discourage employers from offering health benefits plans because they must pay the same wage whether they do so or not. Again, the court agrees. Where the economic effect of a state law on employee benefit plans is “tenuous, remote or peripheral,” the law does not have a connection with ERISA plans and is not preempted. WSB Electric, 88 F.3d at 796. Here, the LWO neither encourages nor discourages employers from providing health benefit plans for their employees. It therefore has no effect on such plans. Consequently, it has no connection with ERISA plans and is not preempted by ERISA. 3. Conclusion Regarding ERISA Preemption Because the LWO neither refers to nor has a connection with ERISA plans, it is not preempted by § 1144(a). The court therefore grants summary judgment in COLA’s favor on Calop’s second cause of action alleging that the LWO is preempted by ERISA. E. Whether the Court Should Grant Summary Judgment on Calop’s Third Claim Alleging That the LWO is Preempted by the Deregulation Act 1. Legal Standard Governing Deregulation Act Preemption COLA next contends that the court should grant summary judgment in its favor on Calop’s third cause of action, which asserts that the LWO is preempted by the Deregulation Act. Congress enacted the Deregulation Act in 1978 after “determining that maximum reliance on competitive market forces would best further efficiency, innovation, and low prices as well as variety [and] quality ... of air transportation services [ ].” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Rowe v. N.H. Motor Trans. Assoc., 552 U.S. 364, 367-68, 128 S.Ct. 989, 169 L.Ed.2d 933 (2008). To determine whether the Deregulation Act preempts a particular state law, the court must “start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the [Deregulation Act] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Air Transport Association of America v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir.2001). As noted, wage laws are within the state’s historic police powers. The court therefore begins its analysis assuming that Congress did not intend that the Deregulation Act would preempt the LWO, a local minimum wage ordinance. “Congress’s ‘clear and manifest purpose’ in acting the [Deregulation Act] was to achieve ... the economic deregulation of the airline industry.” Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc). The statute includes an express preemption provision, which states that “a State ... may not enact or enforce a law, regulation or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). The word “service” means “the prices, schedules, origins and destinations of the point-to-point transportation of passengers, cargo, or mail. In the context in which it was used in the Act, ‘service’ was not intended to include an airline’s provision of in-flight beverages, personal assistance to passengers, the handling of luggage, and similar amenities.” Charas, 160 F.3d at 1261. The Supreme Court has held that the framework that governs analysis of ERISA preemption should be used to analyze Deregulation Act preemption as well. Morales, 504 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 2031. Thus, the “key phrase” in the Deregulation Act’s preemption provision — related to — means having a connection with, or reference to, the prices, routes, or services of an air carrier. Id. “[S]tate enforcement actions [that have such a] connection with, or reference to, airline rates, routes, or services are [thus] pre-empted[.]” Id. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 2031 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A state law may “relate to” the subject matter of the Deregulation Act, and “run afoul of the [Deregulation Act’s] preemption clause, even though such law has only an indirect effect on the rates, routes, or services of an air carrier.” Californians for Safe & Competitive Dump Truck Transp. v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 385-86, 112 S.Ct. 2031); see also Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370-71, 128 S.Ct. 989 (holding that a state law may be preempted even if its effect on rates, routes, or services “is only indirect”). Some state action, however, affects an air carrier’s fares in “too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner” to trigger preemption. Mendonca, 152 F.3d at 1188 (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 390, 112 S.Ct. 2031). Where a state law has an indirect effect on the rates, routes, or services of an air carrier, it will be preempted only where that interference is acute. Id. at 1189. 2. Whether the LWO is Preempted by the Deregulation Act Calop’s complaint alleges that the LWO increases the price of labor, and therefore has an impact on an air carrier’s prices, routes, or services. COLA counters that Calop has adduced no evidence that the LWO increases labor costs or that it has had any impact on air carriers’ routes and services. It asserts that Calop has not shown the LWO has anything more than an indirect, remote, or tenuous relationship to an airline’s prices, routes, or services. Calop disputes this, arguing it has proffered evidence that the LWO has increased the price of labor. Specifically, it cites a Standard Security Handling Agreement (“Security Agreement”) between it and Nippon Cargo Airlines (“Nippon”) related to services it performs for Nippon. The agreement states that Calop is in compliance with the LWO and sets forth the agreed-upon price for Calop’s provision of guard services: $13.75 per hour. Calop signed the contract in 2002. The LWO has been in effect since 1997. Calop has adduced no evidence showing that its rates prior to the effective date of the LWO were lower than those set forth in the Security Agreement. Nor has it submitted a declaration stating that it would pay employees, less if the LWO were not in effect. Nonetheless, although neither party addresses the point, the court concludes there is evidence that the LWO has increased Calop’s labor costs, since it is undisputed that Calop paid its employees $11.55 from January 19 to February 1, 2010, rather than the $14.80 mandated by the LWO. This is circumstantial evidence that Calop would pay its employees less than the wage required by the LWO were the ordinance not in effect, and that the LWO has increased Calop’s labor costs as a result. Even drawing this inference, however, Calop has proffered no evidence that it has passed the increase on to the airlines or that its labor costs affect the prices, routes, or services of the air carriers with which it contracts. Calop has accordingly failed to raise triable issues of fact as to whether the LWO has any reference to or connection with the prices, routes, or services of an air carrier. Any connection Calop may have shown, moreover, is “too tenuous, remote, or peripheral” to trigger preemption. Calop has not demonstrated that the LWO has had an acute impact on the contract price it charges any air carrier, or on the prices, routes, or services of that carrier. Mendonca, 152 F.3d at 1188-89 (holding, although plaintiffs alleged that their rates for services were based on labor costs, including prevailing wage requirements, that a wage law was only indirectly related to plaintiff trucking company’s prices, routes, and services, that it did not “frustrate[] the purpose of deregulation by acutely interfering with the forces of competition,” and that it was therefore not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAA”)); Air Transport Association of America v. City and County of San Francisco, 992 F.Supp. 1149, 1183 (N.D.Cal.1998) (holding that an ordinance that prohibited the city from contracting with companies whose provision of employee benefits discriminated between employees with spouses and employees with domestic partners was not preempted by the Deregulation Act because any effect on service was too tenuous, and stating that “[i]f any string of contingencies is sufficient to establish a connection with price, route or service, there will be no end to ADA preemption.... Congress did not [ ] through the [Deregulation Act], exempt the airlines from generally applicable employment laws”), aff'd, 266 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir.2001); see also Alim v. Aircraft Service Intern., Inc., No. C 12-02133 WHA, 2012 WL 3647403, *3 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 23, 2012) (stating, without deciding whether various California wage and hours laws were preempted by the Deregulation Act, that “because ASII is not itself an airline, but rather a provider of contract services to airlines, it is possible that the application of California meal-and-rest break regulations to ASII’s employees would affect airline services ‘in too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner to have a preemptive effect’ ”). The court accordingly grants summary judgment in favor of COLA on Calop’s third cause of action because it concludes that the LWO is not preempted by the Deregulation Act. F. Whether the Court Should Grant Summary Judgment on Calop’s Fourth Claim Alleging That the LWO is Preempted by the RLA 1. Legal Standard Governing RLA Preemption Calop next asserts that the LWO is preempted by the RLA. The Supreme Court has cautioned that “[preemption of employment standards ‘within the traditional police power of the State’ ‘should not be lightly inferred.’ ” Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994) (citing Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211). The RLA regulates the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements in the railway and airline industries. Congress passed the RLA “to promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes.” Id. It “imposes a duty on employers and employees ‘to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions.’ ” Air Transport Association, 266 F.3d at 1064 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152). Unlike the Deregulation Act, the RLA does not contain an express preemption provision. Courts have interpreted the statute as preempting state law in three situations, however. “First, state laws prohibiting collective bargaining altogether by railway and airline employees are preempted because they directly conflict with the RLA’s express allowance of collective bargaining. Second, state law causes of action that depend upon the interpretation of [collective bargaining agreements] are preempted because the interpretation or application of existing labor agreements are the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrational bodies created by the RLA.... Third, state laws that frustrate the purpose of the RLA are preempted.” Id. at 1076. The RLA does not preempt state or local efforts to set minimum substantive requirements for contract terms. Id. In assessing whether a state law sets minimum substantive requirements, the Air Transport Association court stated that courts should look to cases interpreting the scope of the National Labor Relations Act’s (“NLRA”) preemption of state law “because the two laws treat the issue of whether minimum labor standards are preempted the same.” Id. at 1077 n. 5. The court cited Dillingham Construction N.A., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 190 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir.1999), which held that the NLRA did not preempt a California law requiring public works employers to pay prevailing wages to apprentices. Air Transport Association, 266 F.3d at 1077. 2. Whether the LWO is Preempted by the RLA COLA contends that the court must grant summary judgment in its favor on Calop’s claim that the LWO is preempted by the RLA because the LWO does not involve any of the three situations in which courts have found RLA preemption. The court agrees. The LWO obviously does not prohibit collective bargaining and it is not a state law cause of action that depends upon interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). The question thus is whether the LWO frustrates the purpose of the RLA. Calop contends only that the LWO is preempted by the RLA because it is a minimum wage statute. In support of this argument, it cites a California appellate court decision, which states that “[appellants’ claims for[, inter alia,] state minimum wages ... are preempted by the RLA.” Fitz-Gerald v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., 155 Cal.App.4th 411, 422, 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 913 (2007). Calop, however, overlooks the analysis of the Fitz-Gerald court, which held that the RLA preempts state law causes of action that depend on interpretation of a CBA; it concluded that the claim for violation of the minimum wage law at issue in that case required such an interpretation. Id. at 420-21, 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 913. Here, the LWO neither creates a cause of action nor requires interpretation of a CBA. Indeed, to the extent a CBA is in place, the provisions of the LWO are superseded. The LWO, moreover, does not frustrate the purpose of the RLA because it does not discourage collective bargaining or dictate the outcome of such a process. If anything, it encourages collective bargaining concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, because it provides that the terms of a CBA will supersede the requirements of the ordinance. In Fortuna Enterprises, L.P. v. City of Los Angeles, 673 F.Supp.2d 1000 (C.D.Cal.2008), the court held that a living wage ordinance for airport hotel workers did not frustrate the purpose of the NLRA because it “simply set[ ] the rate of the ‘living wage’ and then allow[ed] the hotels to enter into a collective bargaining agreement if they wish[ed to do so]. The[ordinance imposed] no restrictions on the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.... [Rather, it] allowed] a collective bargaining agreement to set wages at a rate higher or lower than the wage set by the Ordinance.” Id. at 1005. Similarly, here, the LWO sets a living wage that applies to employers performing work under city contracts and allows those employers to enter into collective bargaining agreements that set wages higher or lower than the living wage set forth in the LWO. Such provisions do not interfere with or frustrate the purpose of the RLA. The court therefore finds that the LWO is not preempted by the RLA and, for that reason, grants summary judgment in favor of COLA on Calop’s fifth cause of action. G. Whether the Court Should Grant Summary Judgment on Calop’s Fifth Claim Alleging That the LWO Violates California Labor Code §§ 90.5(a), 223, and 2810. California Labor Code § 2810 provides: “A person or entity shall not enter into a contract or agreement for labor or services with a construction, farm labor, garment, janitorial, security guard, or warehouse contractor, where the person or entity knows or should know that the contract or agreement does not include funds sufficient to allow the contractor to comply with all applicable local, state, and federal laws or regulations governing the labor or services to be provided.” CAL. LAB. CODE § 2810(a). The statute creates a private right of action for “[a]n employee aggrieved by a violation of subdivision (a).” Id., § 2810(g)(1). It expressly states, however, that “[a]n action under this section shall not be maintained unless it is pleaded and proved that an employee was injured as a result of a violation of a labor law or regulation in connection with the performance of the contract or agreement.” Id. Under § 2810, the cause of action lies not against the contractor that employs the employees, but against the other party to the contract. Castillo v. Toll Bros., Inc., 197 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1190 n. 11, 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 150 (2011) (“For clarity, we will use the term ‘contracting party’ to refer the ‘person or entit