Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge: In this multi-defendant case, the Government seeks a protective order governing the discovery materials it has produced and will be producing. Three of six Defendants oppose the Government’s Application. For the reasons discussed herein, the Government’s Application is granted, though with some modifications. I. Background A. Factual Background 1. The Arrests and the United States Attorney’s Press Conference The Defendants in this case were arrested on April 2, 2013, and charged in a 28-page, 75-paragraph criminal complaint. The Complaint contained six counts and described in extensive detail allegations of bribery and fraud involving all six Defendants. Defendant Daniel J. Halloran (“Halloran”) alleges that he was arrested in the early-morning hours and taken from his residence “before a throng of reporters.” (Letter from Vinoo P. Varghese, Esq., to the Ct., Oct. 16, 2013 (“Oct. 16 Varghese Dr.”) 2.); see also Josh Margolin, State Sen. Malcolm Smith, City Councilman Halloran Arrested in ‘Bribery Plot’ To Rig Mayor Race, N.Y. Post (Apr. 2, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/04/02/ state-sen-malcolm-smith-city-councilmanhalloran-arrested-in-bribery-plot-to-rigmayor-raee/ (noting that a handcuffed Halloran was asked by reporters at his residence about his arrest and that Smith made no comment as “he was hauled off’). Later that day, the United States Attorney held a press conference to announce the arrests. Defendants base their opposition to the Government’s Application, in part, on statements made by the United States Attorney at this press conference (and on other occasions). The United States Attorney began the press conference by introducing himself and then stating that “[t]oday is another sad and disappointing day for every New Yorker who hasn’t yet given up on the dream of honest government.” Preet Bharara, U.S. Att’y for the S. Dist. of N.Y., United States v. Malcolm Smith et al., Prepared Remarks (Apr. 2, 2013), available at http://www. justice.gov/usao/nys/pressconference/ malcolmsmith/remarks.pdf. The United States Attorney then stated that this case “demonstratefd], once again, that a show-me-the-money culture seems to pervade every level of New York government.” Id. He also said that this case involved “an unappetizing smorgasbord of graft and greed.” Id. The United States Attorney then described in some detail the allegations in the criminal complaint that had been filed. Id. After noting that the “case against these defendants will unfold in federal court, and each is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty,” the United States Attorney went on to “make a general point” about how common corruption was in New York. Id. After citing the public-corruption cases the United States Attorney’s Office has brought as proof of how common corruption was in New York, the United States Attorney said, “don’t take my word for it,” and asked those in attendance to “[cjonsider the words of [Defendant] Halloran, caught on tape in this case.” Id. After quoting from Halloran, the United States Attorney observed that “[p]utting dirty politicians in prison may be necessary but it is not sufficient.” Id. He then went on to explain that “even after a parade of politicians have been hauled off to prison,” “it’s time for others to step up” to also combat public corruption. Id. 2. The Indictment On April 18, 2013, a grand jury returned an Indictment in ten counts, (See Dkt. No. 42.) Count One charges Defendants Halloran, Malcolm A. Smith (“Smith”), Vincent Tabone (“Tabone”), and Joseph Savino (“Savino”) with conspiring, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, to commit honest-services wire fraud and to violate the Travel Act related to an alleged scheme to bribe leaders of the New York City Republican Party in exchange for a so-called Wilson Pakula certificate that would have allowed Smith to seek the Republican nomination for New York City mayor. (Id.) Count Two charges these same four Defendants with substantive honest-services wire fraud and attempt to commit honest-services wire fraud as part of the same bribery scheme, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343, 1346, 1349, and 2. Count Three charges these same Defendants with a substantive violation of the Travel Act in connection with the same bribery scheme, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1952 and 2, and New York Penal Law Sections 200.45 and 200.50. Count Four charges only Smith with extortion under the Hobbs Act, Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951, in connection with his alleged promise to obtain state funding for a community-center project in Spring Valley, New York, in exchange for bribes related to the scheme charged in Counts One through Three, Counts Five and Six charge Halloran with honest-services wire fraud and a Travel Act violation, in connection with his alleged acceptance of bribes in exchange for discretionary funds from the New York City Council. Counts Seven through Ten charge Defendants Noramie Jasmin (“Jasmin”) and Joseph Desmaret (“Desmaret”) with honest-services mail fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343 and 1346, and Hobbs Act extortion, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951, in connection with a scheme in which Jasmin and Desmaret allegedly accepted bribes in exchange for their help in completing the community-center project to which Smith allegedly agreed to send state money. S. Discovery Production At the initial appearance before the Court, on April 23, 2013, the Government described the discovery materials it would be producing in this case. This discovery included line sheets, recordings, text messages, and transcripts from both court-authorized and consensually recorded electronic surveillance, (See Apr. 23, 2013 Initial Conference Tr. (“Apr. 23 Conference Tr.”) 4-5.) The discovery also included financial records, the fruits of physical searches (including several computers), and the affidavits and other documents submitted in support of the court-authorized electronic surveillance and searches. (See id.; see also Letter of Douglas B. Bloom, Esq. to the Ct., June 3, 2013 (“June 3 Bloom Ltr.”).) These materials were mostly provided to Defendants in electronic format by copying them onto a hard drive. (See Apr. 23 Conference Tr. 4.) Also, at this initial conference, counsel for Defendant, referring to a “local rule,” shared his concern about public statements that had been made by the United States Attorney for this District and the District Attorney for Rockland County. (Id. at 9, 11 (noting that “there were a number of interviews given by law enforcement [in connection with this case],” and then specifically commenting, “I shouldn’t say ‘law enforcement[ ]’[;] [t]he United States Attorney, the District Attorney of Rockland County”).) Counsel specifically expressed his concern about the possibility that the recorded conversations in this case might be leaked to the media. (Id. at 9-10.) While counsel acknowledged that he trusted the Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) assigned to this case, he noted that “there is a press office in the United States Attorney’s Office,” and that the AUSA could not “guarantee that the press office wouldn’t have a different view of things.” (Id. at 10.) Regarding the possibility that the recorded conversations might be leaked to the media, the Court inquired of the Government whether it would be seeking a protective order of some kind, without suggesting that such an order was necessary or appropriate. (Id. at 12.) In response, the AUSA said that it was not the Government’s intention to seek such an order, but noted that if “defense counsel have concerns about other defense counsel’s conduct,” then the issue could be re-visited. (Id.) The Court then reminded all counsel about the local rule of this District regarding extrajudicial statements by counsel, specifically citing the concern that no extrajudicial statements jeopardize the Parties’ right to a fair trial. (Id. at 13-12; see also S.D.N.Y. Local Crim. R. 23.1 (“Free Press-Fair Trial Directives”).) The Court held a second conference on July 19, 2013. At that conference, the Government represented that it had produced the discovery it had promised to produce at the April 23 conference. (July 19, 2013 Conference Tr. (“July 19 Conference Tr.”) 4-5.) The Government also stated that it had been receiving “additional documents, audiotapes, et cetera,” which it would be producing on a rolling basis. (Id.) As to “some” of these materials, the Government indicated that it would be “seeking a protective order,” which it had been discussing with counsel for the Defendants. (Id. at 5 (“There are some materials that the government has recently received that we are seeking a protective order.”).) B. Procedural History As noted, the Indictment in this case was returned on April 18, 2013. (See Dkt. No. 42.) On August 21, 2013, the Government filed an Application requesting that the Court enter a protective order pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(d)(1) “governing the use and disclosure of discovery materials containing personal, proprietary or other confidential information produced by the Government in this action.” (Letter of Justin Anderson, Esq. to the Ct., Aug. 21, 2013 (“Aug. 21 Anderson Ltr.”) 1.) The proposed protective order would deem “[a]ll materials ... provided by the Government to the defense in this action pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title 18 United States Code Section 3500; Brady v. Maryland; or United States v. Giglio” to be considered “Confidential Information.” (Letter of Deborah N. Misir, Esq. to the Ct., Aug. 28, 2013 (“Aug. 28 Misir Ltr.”) Ex. A.) Under the protective order, this “Confidential Information” is to be used by Defendants and their counsel “only for purposes of defending this criminal action,” but it may be disclosed to certain individuals (investigators, paralegals, etc.) who are called “Designated Persons” and who are assisting in the defense. (Id.) These “Designated Persons” are to sign an acknowledgment memorandum, to be kept by counsel for Defendants, indicating that they have read the protective order and have agreed to be bound by it. (Id.) Moreover, counsel for Defendants are not to attach any “Confidential Information” to any public filings without prior notice to the Government, and must return or destroy such information at the end of the Case. (Id.) Three Defendants (Halloran, Tabone, and Jasmin) submitted letters opposing the Government’s request for this protective order. (See Letter of Benjamin Ostrer, Esq. to the Ct., Aug. 27, 2013 (“Aug. 27 Ostrer Ltr.”); Aug. 28 Misir Ltr.; Letter of Vinoo P. Varghese, Esq. to the Court, Aug. 30, 2013 (“Aug. 30 Varghese Ltr.”).) The Court held oral argument on October 7, 2013. On October 15, 2013, at the Court’s direction, the Government submitted ex parte and for in camera review a letter outlining the Government’s ongoing investigation of “possible misconduct connected to this case,” which the Government contends would be at risk in the absence of a protective order. On October 16, 2013, counsel for Defendant Halloran submitted a letter to the Court arguing that the United States Attorney had committed “multiple infringements of the local rules, which have severely prejudiced Mr. Halloran’s absolute right to a fair trial.” (Oct. 16 Varghese Ltr. 1.) The Government responded to this letter on October 21, 2013. (See Letter of Douglas B. Bloom, Esq. to the Ct., Oct. 21, 2013 (“Oct. 21 Bloom Ltr.”),) II. Discussion A. Standard of Review 1. Right of Access The Government seeks a protective order limiting the dissemination of the discovery materials it has produced, and will be producing, to Defendants. In particular, the Government’s proposed protective order seeks to prevent Defendants from making the discovery materials available to the public, including the media. The Supreme Court has held that “the press and general public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982) (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980)). This right serves a vital function in our government: “The presumption of access is based on the need for federal courts, although independent — indeed, particularly because they are independent — to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration of justice.” United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir.1995) (“Amodeo II”); see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 584, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he First Amendment protects the public and the press from abridgment of their rights of access to information about the operation of their government, including the Judicial Branch.... ”); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 518, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) (“Press-Enter. I”) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that First Amendment access should be promoted where it “makes a positive contribution to th[e] process of self-governance”); In re Providence Journal, 293 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002) (“Courts long have recognized that public monitoring of the judicial system fosters the important values of quality, honesty, and respect for our legal system.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Subsequent to Globe Newspaper, the Supreme Court has used the same rationale to extend the First Amendment right of access to certain other criminal proceedings. In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (“Press-Enter. II”), the Supreme Court explained that in determining whether a First Amendment right of access attaches to a particular proceeding or filing, courts should consider (i) whether the proceeding or filing at issue has “historically been open to the press and general public” (the “experience” prong), and (ii) whether “public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question” (the “logic” prong). Id. at 8-9, 106 S.Ct. 2735. In that case, for example, the Supreme Court recognized a qualified right of access to preliminary criminal hearings. Id. at 10-13, 106 S.Ct. 2735. The Second Circuit has applied the “ ‘experience-and-logic’ approach ... to both judicial proceedings and documents, and asks ‘both whether the documents have historically been open to the press and general public and whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.’ ” Newsday LLC v. Cnty. of Nassau, 730 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir.2013) (emphasis removed) (quoting Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir.2006)). The Second Circuit uses another approach when analyzing only judicial documents related to judicial proceedings themselves covered by the First Amendment. Id. Under this approach, the Second Circuit “asks whether the documents at issue ‘are derived from or are a necessary corollary of the capacity to attend the relevant proceedings.’ ” Id. (quoting Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120). Applying these approaches, the Second Circuit has held that the First Amendment right of access applies to pretrial suppression hearings, see In re Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir.1984); voir-dire proceedings, see ABC, Inc. v. Stewart, 360 F.3d 90, 105-06 (2d Cir.2004); plea hearings, see United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir.1988); and sentencing hearings, see United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 191-92 (2d Cir.2005). In In re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110 (2d Cir.1987) (“New York Times I”), the Second Circuit extended the constitutional right to “written documents submitted in connection with judicial proceedings that themselves implicate the right of access,” which in that case involved papers related to a motion to suppress an electronic-surveillance order. Id. at 114. Indeed, the Second Circuit has consistently affirmed that the right of access applies to “judicial documents” in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 81-82 (2d Cir.2008) (applying the First Amendment right of access to a court order and legal memoranda filed with the court); United States v. Gerena, 869 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir.1989) (extending right of access to “briefs and memoranda” filed in connection with pre-trial and post-trial motions); Haller, 837 F.2d at 86 (applying the qualified right of access to plea agreements); In re New York Times Co., 834 F.2d 1152, 1154 (2d Cir.1987) (“New York Times II”) (applying right of access to suppression-motion papers). See generally Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that the “qualified right of access to judicial documents” is a “necessary corollary of the capacity to attend the relevant proceedings”); United States v. Madoff, 626 F.Supp.2d 420, 423-24 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (discussing the First Amendment right of access to certain judicial documents); Di Pietro v. United States, No. 02-CR-1237, 2009 WL 801609, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2009) (“The right of access to judicial documents stems from the right of access to criminal trials”), Apart from a constitutional right of access to court proceedings and documents, the Supreme Court has held that the public has a common law “right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978); see also United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 949 (2d Cir.1980) (“The existence of the common law right to inspect and copy judicial records is beyond dispute.”); United States v. Gotti, 322 F.Supp.2d 230, 239 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (“The common law right of access to judicial documents under American jurisprudence traces its origin to the general English common law right of access to public records .... ”). In determining if a document should be publicly accessible, a court should: (i) determine if it is a judicial document; (ii) determine the weight of the presumption of access attached to it; and (iii) balance the countervailing interests against the presumption of access. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119-20. To be designated a judicial document, “the item filed must be relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.” United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.1995) (“Amodeo I”). Relatedly, the weight of the presumption of access is determined by the role the material plays “in the exercise of Article III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal courts.” Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049. For example, the presumption of access is high for documents submitted as part of dispositive-motion practice, see Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 123 (summary-judgment motion papers), or offered as evidence at trial, In re Application of Nat'l Broad. Co., 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir.1980) (exhibits admitted into evidence at public-corruption criminal trial). However, “[djocuments that play no role in the performance of Article III functions” are accorded little weight as presumptively accessible. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050. Under the qualified right of access, whether as a matter of common or constitutional law, “[i]t is beyond dispute that ... members of the media and the public may bring third-party challenges to protective orders that shield court records and court proceedings from public view.” Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1074 (7th Cir.2009); see also Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (“It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.”). However, neither the First Amendment nor the common law right of access is absolute. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984) (noting that the constitutional right of access may “give way ... to other rights or interests”); Stewart, 360 F.3d at 98 (“The constitutional right of access ... is not absolute.... ”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned that access may be denied “where court files might ... become a vehicle for improper purposes,” such as “to gratify private spite or promote public scandal.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598, 603, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also New York Times I, 828 F.2d at 116 (noting that criminal proceedings may be closed and documents may be sealed if there are specific findings demonstrating that closure “is essential to preserve higher values”) (internal quotation marks omitted).- In keeping with this point, the Second Circuit has held that the qualified right of access may yield to, among other things, the “privacy interests of innocent third parties” and “the danger of impairing law enforcement.” Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120 (same). While protective orders related to judicial documents and criminal proceedings are subject to constitutional and common law scrutiny, protective orders related to discovery are not. This is because experience and logic show that there is no right of access to discovery materials. With respect to experience, pre-trial discovery, “unlike the trial itself, is usually conducted in private,” Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir.1999); see also Bond, 585 F.3d at 1074 (“At common law, pretrial proceedings were closed to the public, and the federal discovery rules have not changed this common-law tradition.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir.1986) (“Discovery, whether civil or criminal, is essentially a private process because the litigants and the courts assume that the sole purpose of discovery is to assist trial preparation. That is why parties regularly agree, and courts often order, that discovery information will remain private.”); Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L.Rev. 1, 37 (1983) (“[TJhere simply is no tradition of public access to discovery.”). Because discovery is a private process between the parties to an action (even if governed by specific rules and managed by trial judges), courts generally view the documents or materials shared between them as outside the judicial function and therefore not presumptively accessible. See Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050 (noting that because documents “passed between the parties in discovery” “play no role in the performance of Article III functions,” they “lie entirely beyond” the common law presumption of access); accord Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984) (noting that “restraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of information”); United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir.2013) (“[T]here is no tradition of access to criminal discovery.”); Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir.2002) (noting that “[s]ecrecy is fine at the discovery stage, before the material enters the judicial record.”); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 343 (3d Cir.1986) (stating that “discovery ... which is ordinarily conducted in private, stands on a different footing than does a motion filed by a party seeking action by the court”); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Excalibur Reinsurance Corp., No. 11-CV-1209, 2013 WL 4012772, at *11 (D.Conn. Aug. 5, 2013) (“Put simply, the public has no constitutional, statutory or common-law right of access to unfiled discovery.”); United States v. Gangi, No. 97-CR-1215, 1998 WL 226196, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1998) (noting that there is no common law tradition of public access to discovery in criminal cases). Indeed, even discovery materials filed with the court in connection with discovery-related disputes are not covered by the qualified right of access. See SEC v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 (2d Cir.2001) (rejecting claim that deposition testimony became a “judicial document” “because the Court reviewed it in order to decide whether or not to enter [a] protective order”); United States v. Wolfson, 55 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir.1995) (“We are not aware ... of any common-law principle that documents submitted to a court in camera for the sole purpose of confirming that the refusal to disclose them to another party was proper, are to be deemed judicial records open to the public.”); accord United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 209 (3d Cir.2007) (noting that “documents filed with the court are generally subject to the common law right of access, unless attached to a discovery motion”); Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 165 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that “there is a presumptive [common law] right to public access to all material filed in connection with nondiscovery pretrial motions, ... but no such right as to discovery motions and their supporting documents”). See generally Newsday, 730 F.3d at 167 n. 15 (noting that “the category of ‘judicial documents’ should not be readily expanded,” and “the fact that a document is relevant to the subject matter of a judicial proceeding, or that the proceeding was in some way stimulated by the document, does not make it public”). With respect to logic, the courts have recognized the pitfalls in allowing unfettered public access to discovery materials. For one, the purpose of the discovery rules — to encourage the disclosure of information and materials to avoid unnecessary surprise and to level the playing field — might be undermined. See Kravetz, 706 F.3d at 54 (noting that decisions restricting public access to criminal discovery materials “are grounded largely on the concerns surrounding the deleterious effect that public access would have on the parties’ search for and exchange of information in the discovery process”); Anderson, 799 F.2d at 1441 (“If ... discovery information and discovery orders were readily available to the public and the press, the consequences to the smooth functioning of the discovery process would be severe.”). For another, there is the risk that disclosure of some of the discovery materials could taint a trial. See United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 813 (10th Cir.1997) (upholding district court’s sealing of discovery materials deemed inadmissible at trial, holding that “disclosure of such [materials] would play a negative role in the functioning of the criminal process, by exposing the public generally, as well as potential jurors, to incriminating evidence that the law has determined may not be used to support a conviction”); United States v. White, No. 04-CR-370, 2004 WL 2399731, at *5 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 22, 2004) (noting that “[i]f the prosecutors and/or defense counsel had a practice of disclosing discovery materials to the media, this could be disruptive to a fair trial for all parties.... ”). And, because the discovery rules are reciprocal, there is the risk that unfettered public access could jeopardize a defendant’s trial strategy. See Kravetz, 706 F.3d at 54 (noting, in context of journalist’s request for materials obtained by Rule 17(c) subpoena, that “there is scant value and considerable danger in a rule that could result in requiring counsel for a criminal defendant to prematurely expose trial strategy to public scrutiny”). In the end, there is no presumptive right of access to the discovery materials provided in this Case. Thus, “an order prohibiting dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First Amendment scrutiny.” Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33, 104 S.Ct. 2199. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that “the trial court can and should, where appropriate, place a defendant and his counsel under enforceable orders against unwarranted disclosure of the materials which they may be entitled to inspect.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 185, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969); see also Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32, 104 S.Ct. 2199 (noting that “continued court control over the discovered information does not raise the same specter of government censorship that such control might suggest in other situations”); United States v. O’Keefe, No. 06-CR-249, 2007 WL 1239204, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2009) (“Protective orders in criminal cases are not uncommon....”). 2. Rule 16(d) and Good Cause The sought-after protective order would restrict public dissemination of discovery materials. “Rules authorizing discovery ... are a matter of legislative grace.” Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32, 104 5.Ct. 2199; see also Pub. Citizen v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 788 (1st Cir.1988) (noting that the Supreme Court, in evaluating the legality of discovery protective orders, has “focused on the fact that discovery is a ‘matter of legislative grace’ ”). As a general matter, these rules are meant to foster “the use of compulsory process to facilitate orderly preparation for trial, not to educate or titillate the public.” Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir.1982). Here, as in all federal criminal cases, it is Rule 16 that principally governs pre-trial discovery. See Fed.R. Crim.P. 16; see also United States v. Briggs, No. 10-CR-184S, 2011 WL 4017886, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2011) (“Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 governs discovery in criminal cases.”); United States v. Louis, No. 04-CR-203, 2005 WL 180885, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2005) (“Rule 16 is ... the sole authorized vehicle under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for pre-trial discovery in criminal cases.”); United States v. Sturman, No. 93-CR-167, 1993 WL 262458, at *5 (N.D.Ill. July 12, 1993) (“It is only by virtue of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that pretrial discovery is generally provided for in criminal cases.”). See generally Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (observing that “[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case”). This rule requires that the prosecution provide, among other things: “certain statements made by the defendant; the defendant’s criminal record; access to certain physical evidence; and reports related to expert, scientific, and medical evidence.” United States v. Tucker, 249 F.R.D. 58, 61 (S.D.N.Y.2008); see also United States v. Saunders, No. 07-CR-341, 2008 WL 1886089, at *4 (M.D.Pa. Apr. 28, 2008) (“Under Rule 16 .... the defendant is entitled to receive from the government certain discovery material such as statements of the defendant, defendant’s prior record, documents and tangible objects, reports of examinations and tests and expert witnesses that the government intends to use in its case-in-chief at trial.”). Rule 16 also imposes reciprocal discovery obligations on defendants. See United States v. Knight, No. 12-CV-50035, 2013 WL 5930030, at *1 (W.D.Ark. Nov. 1, 2013) (“The discovery obligations of the government and a defendant under Rule 16 are reciprocal.”); United States v. Jasper, No. 00-CR-825, 2003 WL 223212, at *3 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2003) (“Under Rule 16(b)(1)(A), if defendant requests disclosure from the government under Rule 16(a)(1)(E), then upon compliance with a similar request by the government, defendant is required to permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph documents and tangible objects which are ‘within the possession, custody or control of the defendant and which the defendant intends to introduce at trial.’ ” (quoting Fed.R. Crim.P. 16(b)(1)(A))). Rule 16 also contains a provision governing protective orders related to the production of pretrial discovery. Indeed, it is this provision, Rule 16(d)(1), that the Government cites in support of its request for a protective order. See Fed. R. Crim P. 16(d)(1) (providing that “[a]t any time the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief.”); see also In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93, 122 (2d Cir.2008) (noting that Rule 16(d) grants district courts the discretion to establish conditions “under which the defense may obtain access to discoverable information”); United States v. Delia, 944 F.2d 1010, 1018 (2d Cir.1991) (noting that because the language of Rule 16(d)(1) “is ... permissive,” the district court may “limit or otherwise regulate discovery had pursuant to the Rule”); United States v. Bulger, 283 F.R.D. 46, 51 (D.Mass.2012) (“Where ... a defendant seeks unlimited access to discovery that is subject to a protective order, the federal rules provide the framework to adjudicate the disclosure and dissemination issue.”); United States v. Lindh, 198 F.Supp.2d 739, 741 (E.D.Va.2002) (“Analysis of the government’s request for a protective order ... appropriately begins with Rule 16(d).... ”). Under the explicit terms of Rule 16(d), “good cause provides the basis to enter a protective order.” Bulger, 283 F.R.D. at 52; see also United States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637, 652 (8th Cir.2004) (applying “good cause” standard to Rule 16(d) analysis). “As the party seeking a protective order, the Government bears the burden of showing good cause.” United States v. Carriles, 654 F.Supp.2d 557, 565-66 (W.D.Tex.2009); see also Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir.2004) (“The party seeking a protective order [under Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(c) ] has the burden of showing that good cause exists for issuance of that order.”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); United States v. Jones, No. 06-CR-149, 2007 WL 4404682, at *2 (E.D.Tenn. Dec. 13, 2007) (rejecting government’s request for a Rule 16(d) protective order where government failed to “make the requisite showing” of good cause). Indeed, good cause remains the standard “even where parties consent to a stipulated protective order.” United States v. Luchko, No. 06-CR-319, 2006 WL 3060985, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 27, 2006). Good cause exists “when a party shows that disclosure will result in a clearly defined, specific and serious injury.” In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 454 F.Supp.2d 220, 222 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (quoting Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir.2005)). A finding of harm “must be based on a particular factual demonstration of potential harm, not on conclusory statements.” Gangi, 1998 WL 226196, at *2 (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1986)); see also Wecht, 484 F.3d at 211 (“Broad alle gations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not support a good cause showing.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The nature of the showing of particularity, however, depends upon the nature or type of protective order at issue.” Bulger, 283 F.R.D. at 52. Protective orders come in all shapes and sizes, “from true blanket orders (everything is tentatively protected until otherwise ordered) to very narrow ones limiting access only to specific information after a specific finding of need.” Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 532 (1st Cir.1993). “A blanket protective order ‘extend[s] broad protection to all documents produced by [a party], without a showing of good cause for confidentiality as to any individual documents.’ ” Bulger, 283 F.R.D. at 52-53 (quoting Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at 790) (alterations in original); see also In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 454 F.Supp.2d at 222 (“In cases of unusual scope and complexity ... broad protection during the pretrial stages of litigation may be warranted without a highly particularized finding of good cause.”). “Examining [a] protective order under the framework of Rule 16(d) ... does not ehminate the First Amendment as a relevant concern.” Bulger, 283 F.R.D. at 50. Rather, “[t]he existence of the protective order ... confines First Amendment scrutiny, including defendant’s right to disseminate the discovery material, to the framework of Rule 16(d)’s good cause requirement.” Id.; see also Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir.2001) (“The district court required Firestone to meet a compelling interest standard. To the extent this was predicated on a constitutional right of access, it was error.”); Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at 788 (noting that Seattle Times did not eliminate the First Amendment “as a relevant consideration in protective order,” but rather established that protective orders must be considered “within the framework of [the] requirement of good cause”); Anderson, 805 F.2d at 7 (noting that under Seattle Times, if the good-cause standard is met, then a protective order “does not offend the First Amendment”). Applying this standard requires courts to balance several interests, including whether dissemination of the discovery materials inflicts “hazard to others,” Carriles, 654 F.Supp.2d at 566 (quoting Alderman, 394 U.S. at 185, 89 S.Ct. 961), and whether “the imposition of the protective order would prejudice the defendant,” id.; see also United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194, 1210 (6th Cir.1987) (requiring the defendant to “demonstrate substantial prejudice” from “imposition of a Rule 16 protective order”). Finally, “[t]he good cause determination must also balance the public’s interest in the information against the injuries that disclosure would cause.” Wecht, 484 F.3d at 211 (citing Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787-91 (3d Cir.1994)). Thus, “courts should take care to ensure that the protection afforded to [discovery] information is no broader than is necessary to accomplish the [proffered] goals” of the protective order. Lindh, 198 F.Supp.2d at 741-42. B. Discussion 1. Government’s Claim of Good Cause The Government seeks a blanket protective order in this case, claiming it is necessary to further two interests. One is the protection of third parties whose interests might be jeopardized by being associated with the Defendants and their alleged misconduct. The other is the integrity of what the Government contends are ongoing investigations into the criminal conduct of others connected to this case. a. Privacy Interests of Third Parties The Government asserts that a protective order is appropriate here because the “discovery ... includes recorded conversations of and references to third parties who have not been charged with any criminal offenses.” (Aug. 21 Anderson Ltr. 3.) According to the Government, the “use of the discovery to besmirch the character and reputation of uncharged third parties should not be allowed,” (Id.) The Government is correct that courts have recognized that the interests of third parties may justify restrictions on public access to judicial and other documents and materials. See, e.g., Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050-51 (noting that the “privacy interests of innocent third parties ... should weigh heavily in a court’s balancing equation” in determining the public’s access to judicial documents) (quoting Gardner v. Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 79-80 (2d Cir.1990)); TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 232 (same); United States v. Gerena, 869 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir.1989) (noting, in context of disclosure of Title III intercepts, that district courts must “balance the public’s right of access against the privacy and fair trial interests of defendants, witnesses and third parties”); New York Times I, 828 F.2d at 116 (“Certainly, the privacy interests of innocent third parties as well as those of defendants that may be harmed by disclosure of Title III material should weigh heavily in a court’s balancing equation in determining what portions of motion papers in question should remain sealed or should be redacted.”); Carriles, 654 F.Supp.2d at 567 (“It is well settled that preventing harm to a person’s economic interests is an appropriate purpose of a protective order.”); United States v. Simpson, No. 09-CR-249, 2010 WL 3633611, at *2 (N.D.Tex. Sept. 20, 2010) (“Simpson I ”) (“The court can order the redaction of [third-party] names if it finds that substantial privacy interests would be violated by disclosure ......”). As the Second Circuit has explained, courts “have long declined to allow public access simply to cater ‘to a morbid craving for that which is sensational and impure.’ ” Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051 (quoting In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 29 A. 259, 259 (1893)). Just as poignant is the Supreme Court’s admonition that judicial documents, not be “used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal,” and, therefore, that courts may refuse “to permit their files to serve as reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants do not contest the general authority of courts to enter protective orders to protect innocent third parties, but they reject the need for any such order here. First, Defendants argue that because the third parties in this case are public officials, any misconduct on their part should not be shielded from the public. (See Aug. 28 Misir Ltr. 3.) In support of this point, Defendants rely on United States v. Huntley, 943 F.Supp.2d 383 (E.D.N.Y.2013), In Huntley, members of the media sought the unsealing of a memorandum filed by a defendant in anticipation of sentencing in a public-corruption case. See Huntley, 943 F.Supp.2d at 384-85. The letter argued for a lower sentence because of the defendant’s cooperation, and listed the state legislators and other elected officials who were recorded by the defendant as part of her cooperation. Id. In granting the media’s request for access to the letter, the court noted that the privacy interests of the elected officials were at their “lowest,” because these officials were “well-equipped” to “respond to any accusations of wrongdoing.” Id. at 387; see also Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787 (noting that “privacy interests are diminished when the party seeking protection is a public person subject to legitimate public scrutiny”); White, 2004 WL 2399731, at *5 (holding that disclosure of grand-jury testimony of city employees was proper because “they cannot be expected to have any personal privacy interest in their duties as [c]ity employees”). Huntley, however, provides limited support to Defendants’ position. First, that case involved a sentencing letter filed with the court and thus was a judicial document that was presumptively accessible to the public as a matter of constitutional and common law. See Huntley, 943 F.Supp.2d at 385-88 (explaining why defense letter filed in advance of sentencing was presumptively accessible under First Amendment and common law). Here, on the other hand, the materials at issue are not judicial documents and, as explained above, are not presumptively accessible to the public as a matter of common and constitutional law. This difference is legally significant as discovery materials maybe subject to a protective order on a mere showing of good cause, but then become presumptively accessible under the First Amendment and/or the common law if they later become judicial documents. See Newsday, 730 F.3d at 166 (“[T]he facts necessary to show good cause for a protective order applicable to discovery documents that are not yet implicated in judicial proceedings will not necessarily meet the higher threshold imposed by the First Amendment with respect to judicial documents.”); Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir.2000) (“Much of what passes between the parties remains out of public sight because discovery materials are not filed with the court. But most portions of discovery that are filed and form the basis of judicial action must eventually be released .... ” (citation omitted)); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252-53 (4th Cir.1988) (“[Discovery [subject to a protective order] ... stands on a wholly different footing than does a motion filed by a party seeking action by the court.”). Second, the cases that recognize the interests of third parties as justifying nondisclosure of certain materials speak to the unfairness of being stigmatized from sensationalized and potentially out-of-context insinuations of wrongdoing, combined with the inability of these third parties to clear their names at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Ladd, 218 F.3d 701, 703 (7th Cir.2000) (“[T]he only reason for disclosing the identities was to stigmatize the individuals ____[B]ut [they] would have no opportunity to clear their names at trial.”); Simpson I, 2010 WL 3633611, at *2 (“The primary concern is that public disclosure of the persons associated with criminal activity may cause damage to the unindicted person’s reputation with no corresponding opportunity to defend his reputation at trial.”). Thus, while it may be that elected officials have easier access to the media, thus facilitating public denials of any wrongdoing, they are not able to clear their names through such denials with the same force as a favorable verdict might provide. The Eighth Circuit recognized this when it denied the media access to intercepted communications in a case involving “allegations of widespread fraud and bribery within the Department of Defense and the defense industry.” Certain Interested Individuals v. Pulitzer Publ’g Co., 895 F.2d 460, 461 (8th Cir.1990). In that case, the court explained the incurable damage that could be caused by disclosure of the intercepted conversations against those who are not charged and who therefore will not be tried: We think the lack of an indictment is critical because where no indictments have issued against persons allegedly involved in criminal activity, there is a clear suggestion that, whatever their truth, the Government cannot prove these allegations. The court of public opinion is not the place to seek to prove them. If the Government has such proof, it should be submitted to a grand jury, an institution developed to protect all citizens from unfounded charges. All citizens, whatever their real or imagined past history, are entitled to the protection of a grand jury proceeding.... Moreover, in the absence of an indictment and a pending criminal trial, individuals whose wiretapped conversations are disclosed have no judicial forum in which they may potentially vindicate themselves or their conduct. Without an indictment, there can be no trial and, from their perspective, no acquittal. Id. at 466-67 (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). A similar conclusion was reached by the Third Circuit in United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir.1985). In that case, the defendants were indicted on fraud and racketeering charges related to an alleged scheme to corruptly obtain certain government contracts from state and municipal officials. Id. at 1105. The defendants filed a motion for a bill of particulars, pursuant to Fed.R. Crim.P. 7(f), seeking, inter alia, the identity of the unindicted co-conspirators, which the trial court granted and which the government subsequently provided to the defendants and filed under seal with the district court. Id. at 1105— 06. Various newspapers sought access to the list of co-conspirators contained in the bill of particulars. Id. at 1106. The district court rejected the newspapers’ request, finding that the government had established “good cause” for keeping the identities of the co-conspirators under seal. In particular, while the district court found that disclosure would not jeopardize the fair-trial rights of the defendants and would not adversely affect any ongoing investigation, the district court concluded that risk “of serious injury to the persons named on the list” from disclosure outweighed any qualified right of access to the bill of particulars. Id. at 1107. In affirming, the Third Circuit determined that the bill of particulars was “more akin to the functions of an indictment than to discovery,” id. at 1111, and therefore was a judicial document that should be presumptively accessible under the First Amendment and common law, id. at 1112 (“[W]e hold that ... access [to the bill of particulars] is protected by the First Amendment and the common law....”). Nonetheless, the Third Circuit found that the privacy interests of the unindicted co-conspirators outweighed the public’s qualified right of access. Id. at 1105, 1113-14. The publication of the list, especially in the absence of sufficient facts to explain why these individuals might be viewed as co-conspirators in the alleged corruption scheme, was viewed as risking more “than mere embarrassment” to these third parties. Id. at 1114. Instead, because these individuals had not been indicted, “and, accordingly, [would] not have an opportunity to prove their innocence at trial,” the Smith court concluded that these individuals would suffer “clearly predictable injuries to [their] reputations” that were “likely to be irreparable,” and “career ending.” Id. at 1113-14. In reaching this conclusion, the court was “mindful of the fact that the list contains the names of some individuals who are public officials and some who are public employees,” and “that the public has a substantial interest in the integrity or lack of integrity of those who serve them in public office.” Id. at 1114. However, the court rejected the notion that “the subject matter of the particular information to which access is sought can control the issue.... ” Id. As the court explained: [T]he underpinnings of the First Amendment and common law rights of access are historical experience and societal utility. When resolving issues involving these rights, the Supreme Court has not examined whether there has been a tradition of access with respect to information of the particular character involved or whether that information is of significant public interest. Rather, it has inquired whether there has historically been public access to this particular part of the judicial process and whether access to that portion of the process will significantly enhance public understanding and appreciation of the judicial process or improve the process itself. If the ariswers to these questions are in the affirmative, the [Supreme] Court has recognized and protected the public interest involved by precluding closure in the absence of a compelling, countervailing government interest. Id. at 1114-15. There may well be, and indeed there should be, public interest in how our public officials behave. But, this does not mean that discovery materials, which have no tradition of being publicly accessible, should automatically become fodder for selective dissemination at the potential expense of the reputation even of public officials when those officials might not be able to vindicate themselves through the judicial process. Of course, this also does not mean that the interests of public officials necessarily should be on the same footing as non-public individuals. See Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051 (noting that courts should consider “the degree to which the subject matter is traditionally considered private rather than public”). Rather, the courts should evaluate the extent of the harm to public officials caused by the discovery materials on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the nature of the information in the discovery materials, as well as the public officials at issue. Moreover, in this case, it is far from clear that all the third parties whose reputations might be tainted from public disclosure of the discovery materials are, in fact, public officials. See United States v. Luchko, 2007 WL 1651139, at *7 (E.D.Pa. June 6, 2007) (noting that while “some of the persons involved in the[] discovery materials are certainly public officials for whom privacy interests are diminished, many of the persons referenced ... are private persons who have personal privacy interests”). Indeed, the Indictment contains allegations against non-government individuals whose connection to this case is that they are members of, or associated with, political parties. And, the Indictment contains other allegations relating to certain business transactions that could well involve non-public officials. This point, in fact, segues into Defendants’ second objection to the Government’s claim of good cause. Specifically, Defendants argue that the Government has not identified the third parties whose reputations might be affected by public disclosure of information, or how their interests would be compromised. (See Aug. 30 Varghese Ltr. 3.) This is a fair point, because to establish good cause based on the interests of third parties, the Government may not rely on conclusory allegations. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786 (“Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not support a good cause showing.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Simpson, No. 09-CR-249, 2010 WL 4282173, at *2 (N.D.Tex. Oct. 28, 2010) (“Simpson II”) (rejecting prosecutor’s request to redact certain portions of an affidavit because it included names of third parties, noting that “the government does not specifically establish how disclosure of these individuals’ names amounts to a firm accusation, or how disclosure violates substantial privacy interests”); HSqd, LLC v. Morinville, No. 11-CV-1225, 2013 WL 1149944, at *3 (D.Conn. Mar. 19, 2013) (rejecting request for protective order because movant’s “alleged example of injury is rife with speculative language”); United States v. Talco Contractors, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 501, 513 (W.D.N.Y.1994) (“Good cause must be established and not merely alleged”). Rather, the Government must provide specific information about the third parties whose interests might be at risk, and how dissemination of the discovery might jeopardize them. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786 (noting in civil context that “[g]ood cause is established on a showing that disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury.... The injury must be shown with specificity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Stone, No. 10-CR-20123, 2012 WL 137746, at *2 (E.D.Mich. Jan. 18, 2012) (applying same test for application for protective order in criminal case); United States v. Patkar, No. 06-CR-250, 2008 WL 233062, at *4 n. 5 (D.Haw. Jan. 28, 2008) (same). In its initial letter seeking a protective order, the Government argued that “the discovery in this matter includes recorded conversations of and references to third parties who have not been charged with any criminal offenses.” (Aug. 23 Anderson Ltr. 3.) As an example, the Government attached an article citing recorded conversations in this case of a Republican Party official. (Id. at Ex. A.) The article discussed the fact that another Republican party official was recorded discussing a possible bribe. See Carl Campanile, Manhattan GOP Leader Isaacs Caught on FBI Tape Entertaining $S0G Bribe from Agent — Pol Whines ‘I Have Never Been Charged’, N.Y. Post (Aug. 20, 2013), http:// nypost.com/2013/08/20/manhattan-gopleader-isaacs-caught-on-fbi-tape entertaining-30g-bribe-fromagent>-polwhines-i-have-never-been-charged. In its reply letter in further support of its application, the Government asserted that “the interests of uncharged third parties were implicated in the investigation,” that it had provided “a stark example of that in its application” (referring to the article about Isaacs), and that “[tjhere are others, which is plain from the materials already provided and to be provided in discovery----” (Letter of Justin Anderson to the Ct., Sept. 3, 2013 (“Sept. 3 Anderson Ltr.”) 3.) At oral argument, the Court invited the Government to provide these additional examples, if it wanted, in an ex parte submission. (Oct. 7, 2013 Discovery Conference Tr. (“Oct. 7 Conference Tr.”) 63 (The Court: “Do you want to submit something for in-camera review on the third-party issue and the ‘continuing investigation’ issue?”; AUSA: “We do, Judge.”).); see Luchko, 2007 WL 1651139, at *7 (noting that the government had submitted over 800 pages of discovery for in camera review in support of the claim that innocent third parties would be harmed in the absence of a protective order). However, as discussed below, in its one ex parte submission filed after oral argument, the Government focused it discussion on the ongoing investigations that were at risk from disclosure of the discovery in this case. It did not identify any third parties whose interests would be harmed separate and apart from the concerns raised about the ongoing investigations. The Court has no basis to accept or reject the Government’s claim that third parties could be tainted because they are picked up on the recordings in this ease, or otherwise appear in the discovery in this case. See Gerena, 869 F.2d at 86 (“Certainly, the privacy interests of innocent third parties as well as those of defendants that may be harmed by disclosure of the Title III material should weigh heavily in a court’s balancing equation .... ” (quoting New York Times I, 828 F.2d at 116)). However, the absence of specific examples beyond Isaacs (which cannot be undone) leaves a gap in the record that prevents the Court from making a finding, either way, as to whether there is good cause to enter a protective order. For example, the Government has not offered information about, among other things, the identities of the third parties, whether these other third parties are public officials or private citizens, which specific discovery materials would unfairly sully their reputation, and whether the conduct of these individuals would be proven at trial (which would be open to the public). Without this information, the Court cannot determine, for example, how much weight to give to the interests of the third parties, whether redactions to the discovery might alleviate the Government’s concerns, or instead, whether a blanket protective order would be the only way to protect the interests of the third parties. See, e.g., United States v. Swartz, 945 F.Supp.2d 216, 221 (D.Mass.2013) (“[Rjedaction of even judicial records may be appropriate when third-party privacy interests are jeopardized.”); Bulger, 283 F.R.D. at 57 (“[T]he government’s statement regarding privacy presents a viable argument. At this point, however, and without a description of the material or reviewing the documents at issue, it is difficult to make a determination.”). Thus, as it currently stands, the Government’s case for good cause is quint-essentially one based on conclusory allegations and cannot be the basis for the protective order the Government seeks. See S.E.C. v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 185 (2d Cir.2010) (“[A] definitive balancing of the interests at stake in this case is impossible, because the record is not adequately developed to support the broad order appealed from.”); Simpson I, 2010 WL 3633611, at *3 (“The government has not established that the unindicted persons will suffer injury to their reputations because of public disclosure of their names.”). If the Government wishes to augment the Record on this point, it may seek leave to do so. See Simpson I, 2010 WL 3633611, at *3 (providing the prosecution with additional time to establish good cause to keep sealed a post-indictment restraining-order application on the claim that disclosure of the application threatened the interests of unindicted third parties). For now, therefore, the Court will not enter a protective order on this basis. b. Ongoing Investigations In its initial application for the Protective Order, the Government asserted that disclosure of the discovery materials might “impedef ]” ongoing in