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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART BANK OF AMERICA AND WELLS FARGO’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE FAC; GRANTING FIRST AMERICAN’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE FAC; DISMISSING THE FAC IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND JOSEPH C. SPERO, United States Magistrate Judge I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs Rockridge Trust and Ray K. Shahani, trustee, (“Shahani”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this action against Defendants Wells Fargo, N.A. (‘Wells Fargo”), Bank of America, N.A. (“Bank of America”), First American Trustee Servicing Solutions LLC (“First American Trustee”), and First American Loanstar Trustee Services LLC (“First American Loanstar”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging twenty causes of action arising out of a series of loan modification negotiations followed by foreclosure. The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), the operative pleading, contains eighteen causes of action. Presently before the Court are (1) a Motion to Dismiss the FAC jointly filed by Wells Fargo and Bank of America (‘Wells Fargo Motion”); and (2) a Motion to Dismiss the FAC filed by First American Trustee (“First American Motion”). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons set out below, the Court (1) grants in part and denies in part the Wells Fargo Motion; (2) grants the First American Motion; and (3) dismisses the FAC, in part, with leave to amend as specified below. II. BACKGROUND A. The June 24, 2013 Order In its June 24, 2013 Order (“Order”), the Court dismissed the Complaint without prejudice. Order, 2, 30. In so doing, the Court only addressed those causes of action over which it had subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of a federal question: (1) the “Federal Violations” cause of action; (2) the “Violation of Anti-Trust Laws” cause of action; and (3) the breach of contract cause of action, which the court found was a pure attempt to enforce the Servicer Participation Agreement (“SPA”) Wells Fargo and Bank of America entered into with Fannie Mae in which they agreed to apply the Home Affordable Mortgage Program (“HAMP”) criteria to all loans they service. Id. at 25-28. The Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Id. at 28-30 The Federal Violations cause of action arguably included a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a claim under the Fair Housing Act, and a claim for breach of two settlement agreements. Id. at 25-26. In dismissing that cause of action, the Court gave Plaintiffs “leave to amend to clearly plead a federal violation with supporting factual allegations.” Id. at 26. Likewise, the “anti-trust claims [were] dismissed with leave to amend.” Id. at 27. Moreover, Plaintiffs were “given an opportunity to amend their Complaint if they wish[ed] to elaborate a breach of written contract under a [theory other than violation of the SPA].” Mat28. B. The FAC 1. Factual Background On or about February 23, 2007, Shahani executed a consumer loan transaction in the amount of $755,250 with Wells Fargo to re-finance his single family residential property located at 82 Roekridge Drive, San Francisco, CA. FAC, ¶20. Wells Fargo took a security interest in the subject property in a Deed of Trust (“DOT”). Id. at ¶ 20 and Ex. I. Fidelity National Title Insurance Company (“Fidelity National”) was named as the trustee under the DOT. Id. at Ex. 1. On March 13, 2007, Wells Fargo executed a Substitution of Trustee (“First Substitution”) substituting itself for Fidelity National as trustee. Id. at ¶ 22 and Ex. 2. Plaintiffs made payments pursuant to the mortgage agreement for close to two years. Id. at ¶ 23. Shortly thereafter, Wells Fargo and/or Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (“Home Mortgage”) represented that Home Mortgage was the servicer of Plaintiffs’ loan. Id. at ¶ 24. However, Home Mortgage ceased to exist as a separate entity in May 2004. Id. at ¶ 26. In February 2009, Shahani requested a loan modification to reduce the fixed loan interest rate of 6.375% to one commensurate with the then-available rates of between 2% and 4%. Id. at ¶¶ 25, 140(a). At the time, Shahani was less than 30 days late on his monthly mortgage payments but feared the possibility of multiple claims for late and/or unpaid payments. Id. at ¶ 25. Shahani entered the loan modification process with Home Mortgage that month. Id. Pursuant to the loan modification negotiations, Shahani submitted financial information pertaining to his income and expenses in March 2009. Id. at ¶ 140(c). In April 2009, Defendants requested additional documentation. Id. at ¶ 140(e). In May 2009, Defendants informed Shahani that all requested documentation had been received and was in process. Id. at ¶ 140(f). In July 2009, Shahani was informed by telephone that the loan modification was denied. Id. at ¶ 140(g). Shahani was invited to re-fax further financial information to update his file. Id. During negotiations that month, Shahani spoke to Lupeta, Leslie, Doris, Dante, and Gordon, all separate agents for Defendants regarding his loan modification request. Id. at ¶ 140(j). Shahani also received a letter, dated July 1, 2009, incorrectly stating that his expenses exceeded his income by close to $4,100. Id. at ¶ 140(h). A July 14, 2009 letter to Shahani indicated that “the loan file ha[d] been referred to our attorney with instructions to begin foreclosure proceedings.” Id. at ¶ 140(k). In a letter, Shahani received an unsigned, incomplete, and unrecorded Notice of Default (“NOD”). Id. at ¶ 140(1) and Ex. 3. The mailing, attached to the Complaint as Exhibit 3, recites that the contents are a “copy of the ‘notice,’ the original of which was filed for record on July 20, 2009 in the Office of the Recorded of San Francisco, California.” Id. at Ex. 3 (capitalization omitted). On the signature line of the mailed copy of the NOD, the document reads: “original document signed by authorized agent.” Id. (capitalization omitted). The NOD was executed by First American Loanstar as agent for the “current beneficiary” and by First American Title Insurance Company as Attorney-in-Fact. Id. (capitalization omitted). The mailing also contained a copy of the Notice of Default Declaration (“NOD Declaration”), completed by Home Mortgage as the “mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent.” Id. The copy states: “Original document executed by authorized agent.” Id. (italics omitted). Also included in Exhibit 3 is a letter, dated July 23, 2009, from First American Loanstar stating: (1) that the creditor to whom the debt is owed is Bank of America; (2) Home Mortgage is the servicer; and (3) First American Loanstar has been authorized by either the servicer o the creditor to initiate foreclosure proceedings. Id. The letter also states that the outstanding debt is $783,383.70. Id. On July 28, 2009, Shahani was informed by the “Loss Mitigation” department that Defendants were suspending foreclosure and no foreclosure sale date was set. Id. at ¶ 140(n) Shahani received a July 28, 2009 letter indicating that Defendants were reviewing the information he had provided and working quickly to respond to his request for assistance with his mortgage payment challenges. Id. at ¶ 140(m). On August 5, 2009, a person named David from a call center in Milwaukee requested proof of income and statements of profit and loss for the past three months to be sent to Mary Mulholland in Norfolk. Id. at ¶ 140(o). That month, Shahani was informed numerous times that his application was in the review stage. Id. On August 25, 2009, the loan modification was denied due to expenses greater than income by over $7,543. Id. at ¶ 140(p). The next day, Shahani was orally informed that a work director would re-review the file if he resubmitted a number of documents, which he did. Id. Shahani spoke to Travis, Marion, and Jessica between September 4 and 11, 2009. Id. at ¶ 140(q). Meanwhile, on August 19, 2009, Wells Fargo executed a Second Substitution of Trustee (“Second Substitution”) naming First American Loanstar as Trustee. Id. at ¶ 28 and Ex. 4. Plaintiffs attach a copy of the Second Substitution accompanied by an affidavit stating that “[a] copy of the attached substitution has been mailed prior to the recording thereof ...” Id. at Ex. 4. The copy of the substitution states, on the signature line: “original document signed, dated, and notarized by current beneficiary.” Id. (capitalization omitted). Directly above that line is written: “Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.” Id. (capitalization omitted). On or about September 3, 2009, Wells Fargo recorded an Assignment of Deed of Trust (“Assignment”) assigning all beneficial interest to Bank of America. Id. at ¶ 30, Ex. 5. The Assignment was dated August 25, 2009, and signed by a putative agent of First American Loanstar as Wells Fargo’s attorney-in-fact. Id. at Ex. 5. An October 5, 2009 letter from Defendants offered Plaintiffs yet another loan modification and requested a number of pieces of information. Id. at ¶ 140(r). The next day, Defendant instructed Shahani to submit an initial payment of $5,412.27, due in two weeks, and financial documentation. Id. at ¶ 140(s). Shahani wired the requested payment on the deadline. Id. at ¶ 140(t). A letter dated October 16, 2009 stated that the loan modification was denied because Shahani failed to provide requested documentation within the time frame provided in his trial modification period workout plan Id. at ¶ 140(u). No time frame had been provided. Id. Shortly thereafter, on or about October 21, 2009, First American Loanstar recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale (“First NOTS”), listing the sale date as November 10, 2009. Id. at ¶ 31 and Ex. 6. Nevertheless, on October 26, 2009, Shahani was informed that he had been approved for modification and should re-submit certain documents. Id. at ¶ 140(w). A week later, on November 2, Shahani learned that his initial payment had been declined. Id. at ¶ 140(x). That same day, Shahani re-submitted documentation. Id. at ¶ 140(y). On November 9, 2009, Defendants sent Shahani a letter that he had been denied modification because he did not provide the requested documentation within the time frame required by his trial modification period workout plan. Id. at ¶ 140(z). Two days later, Shahani filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition for personal business reorganization. Id. at ¶ 140(aa). Thus, from his request for modification in February 2009 to his bankruptcy filing in November 2009 his modification requests had been denied. Id. at ¶ 32. Nearly two years later, on August 13, 2011, Wells Fargo, as servicing agent for Bank of America, obtained relief from the bankruptcy stay. Id. at ¶¶ 24,140(bb) and Ex. 7. Wells Fargo immediately invited Shahani to enter loan modification negotiations. Id. at ¶ 35. Shortly after Shahani submitted a battery of financial documentation, he was informed that he needed to be a minimum of three months current on his loan payments to qualify for modification pursuant to the investor guidelines. Id. Wells Fargo accepted monthly payments in the amount of $4,012.27 beginning in September 2011. Id. The payments were based on an interest rate of 6.375%, two to three times greater than the then-prevalent rates. Id. Ten months later, Defendants denied Shahani’s modification request stating “as per investor guidelines” they could not find “affordability” for Shahani’s requests. Id. Shahani was never provided a copy of the investor’s guidelines. Id. Soon after, on August 16, 2012, First American Loanstar recorded a second Notice of Trustee’s Sale (“Second NOTS”) stating that the property would be sold on September 11, 2012. Id. at ¶ 36 and Ex. 8. Exhibit 8 is a copy of the recording request made by First American Loanstar, dated August 20, 2012; indicating that the original document was signed by an authorized agent. Id. at Ex. 8. At the same time, Wells Fargo ceased accepting mortgage payments. Id. at ¶ 140(jj)-(ll). Nevertheless, loan modification negotiations continued. After Shahani obtained assistance from the office of Congresswoman Jackie Speier, he received a letter, in mid-August 2012, indicating that Christine Mak (“Mak”) of Wells Fargo’s Office of Executive Complaint would be his single point of contact for his loan modification request. Id. at ¶ 140(mm)-(nn). Shahani submitted a large amount of updated documents to Mak over the course of the next two weeks. Id. at ¶ 140(oo). In late August, Mak sent Shahani a letter stating that Wells Fargo would respond to his request for a loan modification on September 11, 2012. Id. at ¶ 140(pp). After numerous requests to postpone the September 11, 2012 sale, Mak promised to request its continuance on September 5, 2012 but did not do so. Id. at ¶¶ 140(qq)-(rr). Two days later, on the seventh, the sale was postponed. Id. at ¶ 140(ss). Wells Fargo did not postpone the sale date on its online posting until September 10, 2012. Id. at ¶ 140(tt)-(uu). A subsequent sale date was set and postponed until March 4, 2013. Id. at ¶¶ 38, 140(w) and Ex. 9. On February 18, 2013, Keri Peck (“Peck”), an agent of Wells Fargo, told Shahani in writing that “[w]e anticipate that we will be able to provide you with resolution by March 07, 2013.” Id. at ¶¶ 39, 140(ww) and Ex. 10. The next day, Wells Fargo requested additional information from Shahani. Id. at ¶ 140(xx). Shahani responded with 128 pages of documents within a week. Id. Three days later, on February 28, 2013, Wells Fargo requested several additional and/or duplicate items. Id. at ¶¶ 41, 140(yy) and Ex. 12. Over the next two days, Shahani sent Wells Fargo 284 pages of responsive documentation. Id. On March 7, 2013, Wells Fargo requested several additional and/or duplicate items needed to review Shahani’s request for loan modification. Id. at ¶¶ 42, 140(zz) and Ex. 12. Shahani provided additional documentation and a line-item letter response on March 8, 2013 and March 11, 2013. Id. On March 4, 2013, during the negotiations, the foreclosure sale was held and the property was sold back to the beneficiary, Bank of America, for $972,843.08. Id. at ¶ 44 and Ex. 14. Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that none of the Defendants holds the original note or has any legal interest in the loan or the property. Id. at ¶¶ 45-46. 2. Alleged Causes of Action Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action: (1) Violation of the Security First Rule against Wells Fargo and Bank of America: Plaintiffs allege that Shahani tendered eleven payments of $4,012.27 from September 2011 through July 2012 to Home Mortgage pursuant to a trial modification agreement. Id. at ¶ 51. Plaintiffs allege that the acceptance of these funds violated the security first rule, California Code of Civil Procedure § 726, because Wells Fargo, Home Mortgage, and Bank of America had already chosen to foreclose on the subject property. Id. at ¶ 53. Plaintiffs allege that this renders the DOT void, and destroys any interest Wells Fargo, Home Mortgage, or Bank of America purported to exercise in proceeding with foreclosure, rendering the sale invalid and void. Id. at ¶ 54. (2) Breach of Oral Contract against Wells Fargo. and Bank of America: Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo and Home Mortgage assured Shahani that they would not proceed with the foreclosure sale while they were reviewing his request for loan modification. Id. at ¶ 57. Plaintiffs allege that Shahani waited for the results of their review since February 2009, during which time Wells Fargo assured him that they would continue to postpone the Trustee’s Sale as long as he continued providing requested information regarding modification. Id Although no final determination had been made, Wells Fargo, Home Mortgage, and/or Bank of America instructed First American Loanstar to foreclose on March 4, 2013. Id at ¶ 58. “Accordingly, Wells Fargo and Home Mortgage breached the oral agreement it entered into with Plaintiff not to proceed with the foreclosure process while it was reviewing Plaintiffs request for a loan modification and while Plaintiff made monthly payments of $4,012.27.” Id As a result, Plaintiffs have suffered consequential damages of not less than $1,000,000. Id at ¶ 59. (b) Wrongful Foreclosure Based on Statutory Violations against Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and “First American”: Plaintiffs allege that their mortgage loan is subject to California Civil Code §§ 2923.5, 2923.52, and 2923.6 because it was created in March 2007, when Shahani refinanced his original home loan. Id at ¶¶ 67, 71. Plaintiffs state the requirements of §§ 2923.5 and 2923.52. Id. at ¶¶ 68-74. Plaintiffs allege that those provisions were violated. Id. at ¶ 75. Plaintiffs allege that the NOD is void because it lacks required information including the book and recordation number, instead containing in the relevant section the above-referenced statement that the document was a copy of the notice. Id at ¶ 75 and Ex. 3. Plaintiffs also allege that the NOD Declaration is void because it has no date and signature, instead reciting that the original document was executed by the authorized agent. Id. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the NOD is void because First American Loanstar stated, in the accompanying letter, that Bank of America was the beneficiary, but Plaintiffs are unaware of any assignment or other transaction up to that point that transferred the beneficial interest under the DOT to Bank of America. Id at ¶¶ 75, 77-81 and Ex. 3. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that the NOD Declaration is deficient in that it does not identify which statutory requirement was met by the beneficiary. Id. at ¶ 75. Plaintiffs also allege that the First NOTS scheduled the sale far less than the six months after the NOD required by statute. Id Plaintiffs further allege that the NOTS was never posted in accordance with California Civil Code § 2924f(b)(l). Id. at ¶ 83. Plaintiffs allege that § 2923.6 creates in loan servicers a duty to accept loan modification proposals where the loan is in payment default and the anticipated recovery under the workout plan exceeds the anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a net present value basis. Id. at ¶¶ 85-86. Plaintiffs allege that Shahani offered, and was willing and able to execute, a modification to a new loan amount of $700,000, at a new interest rate of 3%, over a new 30-year term, with monthly payments of $2,824.75. Id at ¶ 89. Plaintiffs estimate that the net present value of that plan is $700,000, which would exceed their estimate of the net present value of foreclosure by $118,380. Id at ¶¶ 90-94. Plaintiffs arrived at the net present value of foreclosure by subtracting the outstanding property taxes and estimated costs of foreclosure from the present fair market value of the home. Id. at ¶¶ 90-93. As a result, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are required to accept the loan modification. Id. at ¶ 95. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Homeowner’s Bill of Rights (“HBOR”) in several ways: (1) by dual tracking the modification negotiations and the foreclosure process; (2) by failing to properly respond to documents Shahani submitted; (3) by failing to comply with the single point of contact requirements; (4) by charging application fees for loan modification; and (5) by charging late fees during consideration of the loan modification. Id. at ¶¶ 96-100. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, statutory damages, and attorney’s fees pursuant to the HBOR. Id. at ¶ 101. As a result of all of the alleged violations, Plaintiffs allege that the foreclosure is void, rather than voidable, and seek to have the sale rescinded. Id. at ¶¶ 102-104. Alternatively, Plaintiffs seek special damages. Id. at ¶ 105. In addition, Plaintiffs seek general damages. Id. at ¶ 106. (7) Civil Harassment against Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and First American: Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have engaged in nearly four years of harassing telephone calls and correspondence constituting civil harassment in violation of California Civil Code § 527.6. Id. at ¶¶ 133-34. Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order and injunction. Id. at ¶ 135. (8) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing against Wells Fargo. Bank of America, and First American: Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to disclose the terms and conditions of the loan modification and by utilizing underwriting techniques that prevented Shahani from ever having any hope of repaying their loan. Id. at ¶¶ 138-39. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants acted in bad faith throughout the modification negotiations, including by carrying out the foreclosure sale prior to making a determination regarding Shahani’s most recent attempt to obtain" a modification. Id. at ¶¶ 140 — 41. Plaintiffs further allege that Shahani reasonably relied on representations made by Defendants that he would be considered for loan modification by failing to plan for foreclosure. Id. at ¶ 142. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that the terms of the loan were unconscionable due to the excessive and discriminatory interest rate. Id. at ¶ 143. (9) Civil Conspiracy against Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and First American: Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conspired to enter a fraudulent sales scheme wherein they directed an inflated appraisal process to make Shahani’s loan exceed the market rate and falsely represented to Shahani that he could not qualify for any other financing. Id. at ¶ 145. As a result, Plaintiffs were damaged in excess of $220,000. Id. at ¶ 146. (10) Quiet Title against Wells Fargo. Bank of America, and All Persons Unknown Claiming Any Legal or Equitable Right. Title. Estate. Lien, or Interest in the Property: Plaintiffs seek to quiet title in the property as of October 15, 2012. Id. at ¶¶ 149-51. Plaintiffs seek a ruling that the property belongs to them and an award of consequential damages of no less than $1,000,000. Id. at ¶ 153. (11) Slander of Title against All Defendants: Plaintiffs allege that First American, purportedly b.ut falsely acting as either the trustee or the agent of the beneficiary of the DOT, wrongfully and without privilege caused a NOD, Substitution, Assignment, and two Notices of Trustee’s Sale to be recorded against the subject property. Id. at ¶¶ 155-56. In addition, First American -wrongfully refused to cancel the Trustee’s Sale. Id. at ¶ 157. None of the Defendants had authority to execute any of those documents. Id. at ¶ 158. By causing the documents to be executed, they slandered Plaintiffs’ title, Id. at ¶ 159. Those actions are not privileged. Id. at ¶ 160. Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount not less than $ 1,000,000. Id. at ¶ 161. (12) Cancellation of Instruments against All Defendants: Plaintiffs seek cancellation of both Substitutions of Trustee, the NOD, the Assignment, and both Notices of Trustee’s Sale because they are wrongfully recorded and if left outstanding will cause Plaintiffs to suffer damages. Id. at ¶¶ 163-64. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants caused the documents to be prepared and recorded with the specific intent to defraud Shahani. Id. at ¶ 165. Plaintiffs seek $1,000,000 in damages as well as punitive and exemplary damages. Id. at ¶ 167. (13) Promissory Estoppel against Wells Fargo and Bank of America: Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo and Bank of America promised not to foreclose on the subject property if Shahani completed an application for a loan modification and made monthly payments in certain amounts. Id. at ¶ 169. Plaintiffs allege that Shahani justifiably relied by acting as required, as Wells Fargo and Bank of America should have reasonably expected. Id. at ¶¶ 170-71. In addition, Shahani relied by failing to explore the possibility of refinancing or marketing and selling the property himself. Id. at ¶ 171. Plaintiffs also allege that Wells Fargo and Bank of America should be estopped from violating the SPA by proceeding to foreclosure without completing a HAMP analysis. Id. at ¶ 172-74. Plaintiffs seek a recovery of not less than $1,000,000. Id. at ¶ 175. (Ip) Negligence against All Defendants: Plaintiffs allege that, as lender and servicer, Wells Fargo and Bank of America owed Plaintiffs a reasonable duty to maintain proper and accurate loan records. Id. at ¶ 177. Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo and Bank of America breached that duty by foreclosing while telling Shahani it was not doing so and by misleading Shahani into believing that Home Mortgage was a distinct entity. Id. at ¶ 178. Further, Plaintiffs allege that First American, acting as trustee under the DOT, has a duty to exercise reasonable care to follow California law with regard to foreclosures, to avoid conflicts of interest, and to refrain from taking any action against Plaintiffs that it had no right to take. Id. at ¶ 179. Plaintiffs allege that First American breached its duty by failing to properly train its employees with regard to execution of each of the recorded documents. Id. at ¶ 180. Plaintiffs seek $1,000,000 in general and special damages. Id. at ¶ 181. (15) Negligent Misrepresentation against Wells Fargo and Bank of America: Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and Home Mortgage made representations to Shahani that they would postpone the foreclosure sale and complete a loan modification based on the current fair market value of the subject property and that they would modify the loan and reduce the principal in an amount of the loan and that they would lower the interest rate and that they would forgive and waive the arrearage and/or roll the arrearage into the principal and amortize it for as long as forty years or more if Shahani completed an application for a loan modification, made monthly payments in a specified amount, and agreed to continuously provide financial information. Id. at ¶ 183. These representations were not true, and there were no reasonable grounds for believing them to be true at the time they were made. Id. at ¶¶ 184-85. Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and Home Mortgage had no intention of modifying the loan when they made those representations, but intended that Shahani rely on them. Id. at ¶¶ 185-86. Plaintiffs reasonably relied and as a result suffered damages of not less than $1,000,000. Id. at ¶¶ 187-88. (16)Fraud against Wells Fargo and Bank of America: Plaintiffs allege fraud based on the following misrepresentations: (1) Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and Home Mortgage represented to Shahani that they would not foreclose on the subject property during the time that a loan modification was being reviewed and he was making monthly payments while intending to foreclose in any event; (2) Wells Fargo representatives represented themselves as being employed by Home Mortgage leading Shahani to believe that Home Mortgage was a separate entity; (3) Defendants misrepresented, in connection with a broader scheme to make commissions, kickbacks, and other profits, to Shahani and others that they owned the DOT and mortgage note causing Shahani to pay substantial sums of money; (4) Defendants misrepresented that the loan terms given to Shahani were the best that they could obtain and well within the economic value of the property, causing him to enter the mortgage agreement; and (5) Defendants refused to provide the loan modification based on misrepresentations that Shahani did not qualify for modification and on inflated estimates of the value of the subject property. Id. at ¶¶ 190-98. Shahani justifiably relied on the above representations, all of which were made with the intent to induce reliance, by entering the loan, making mortgage payments, and failing to explore alternative remedies during the foreclosure process. Id. at ¶¶ 190-98, 204, 207. Shahani seeks recovery for his emotional distress, damage to his credit, and punitive damages. Id. at ¶¶ 199, 206, 209. (17) Violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act”) against Wells Fargo and Bank of America: Plaintiffs allege that the debt owed pursuant to the DOT is a consumer debt pursuant to the Rosenthal Act. Id. at ¶ 211. Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and Home Mortgage are mortgage servicing companies in the business of collecting and processing mortgage payments. Id. at ¶ 212. Their representatives misrepresented that they would not foreclose if Shahani applied for loan modification and made monthly payments of $4,012.27, and Shahani made eleven payments as a result of that misrepresentation. Id. at ¶ 213. Plaintiffs seek actual and statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. Id. at ¶ 214. (18) Violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. (“UCL”) against All Defendants: Plaintiffs allege that, by the above described conduct, and also by failing to disclose the principal for which documents were being executed and recorded and failing to record powers of attorney in connection with recorded documents, Defendants committed unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices in violation of the UCL. Id. at ¶¶ 216-19, 225. This conduct is ongoing, unjustly enriched Defendants at Plaintiffs’ expense through the collection of mortgage payments, and causes harm to the public that outweighs any utility it may have. Id. at ¶¶ 220-23. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, and restitution. Id. at ¶¶ 223, 26. (20) Injunctive Relief against All Defendants: Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are acting in violation of statute and will continue to do so without injunctive relief. Id. at ¶¶ 231-33. Plaintiffs further allege that they do not have an adequate remedy at law. Id. at ¶ 234. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief. (21) Violation of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) Against Wells Fargo and First American Trustee: Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo and First American Trustee violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f. Id. at ¶ 237. Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo and First American Trustee are debt collectors because (1) they are in the business of regularly collecting debts and use the instrumentalities of interstate commerce in that business; (2) one of their principal businesses is debt collection; (3) they service thousands and thousands of residential mortgages owned by Bank of America and other mortgagees; and (4) they have conducted foreclosure proceedings on behalf of Bank of America and other mortgagees. Id. at ¶ 238. Plaintiffs allege that, as outlined in their prior allegations, Wells Fargo and First American Trustee made deceptive and misleading representations and used unfair and unconscionable means in connection with the collection of the debt owed to Bank of America. Id. at ¶ 240. (22) Violation of the Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) Against All Defendants: Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the ECOA by offering to accept payments from Plaintiffs before refusing to accept further payments, revoking their agreement and accelerating the debt, without notice. Id. at ¶¶ 245-46. Plaintiffs allege that in the second instance, Shahani made ten complete and timely payments before an eleventh payment was rejected, and Shahani was told that the full mortgage amount was due. Id. at ¶ 246. C. The Motions 1. Wells Fargo Motion Wells Fargo and Bank of America begin by addressing the two federal causes of action in the FAC. Wells Fargo Motion, 3-4. First, they argue that Plaintiffs did not allege debt collection because the only conduct alleged is an attempt to take back collateral. Id. at 3. Second, they contend that Plaintiffs have not alleged a violation of the ECOA because they have not pled that Shahani is a member of a protected class. Id. at 4. Next, Wells Fargo and Bank of America address Plaintiffs’ state statutory claims. Id. at 4-9. First, they assert that Plaintiffs do not state a claim for violation of the security first rule because the payments allegedly made pursuant to a loan modification trial plan were not a set off. Id. at 4-5 (citing Mehta v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 737 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1202-03 (S.D.Cal.2010)). Second, they posit that the cause of action for wrongful foreclosure fails to identify any statutory violations because (1) California Civil Code § 2923.5 does not apply to Plaintiffs’ deed of trust, nor does it create a right to a loan modification or have any effect on a completed foreclosure sale; (2) California Civil Code § 2923.6 does not require a lender to give a borrower a loan modification; (3) California Civil Code § 2923.6(g) does not require a lender to re-review a borrower multiple times after issuing a denial of a modification; and (4) according to the allegations in the FAC, Wells Fargo reviewed and denied five applications and there is no allegation that Shahani’s financial circumstances have changed since the most recent denial. Id. at 5-7 (citing Roberts v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 2011 WL 864949, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 11, 2011); Winterbower v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 1232997, at *3 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 27, 2013)). Third, they contend that the civil harassment claim fails because the allegations in the FAC make it clear that all of Defendants’ communications were legitimate, as they were related to loan modification and the foreclosure process. Id. at 8. They also assert that Shahani has not provided factual allegations showing that he suffered substantial emotional distress. Id. Fourth, they argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged debt collection for the purposes of the Rosenthal Act because the FAC alleges nothing beyond Defendants’ attempts to nonjudicially foreclose without granting a loan modification. Id. at 8-9. Fifth, they contend that Plaintiffs cannot show a violation of the UCL because, as discussed in other portions of their Motion, Plaintiffs have not pled unlawful conduct or fraud. Id. at 9. Wells Fargo and Bank of America turn to Plaintiffs’ state common law claims. First, they assert that the FAC demonstrates that Wells Fargo did not breach any February 2009 oral contract to consider Shahani. for a loan modification, because it denied his request. Id. at 10 (citing FAC, ¶ 140(a), (g)). In any event, they contend that the breach of oral contract claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Id. (citing Cal.Code. Civ. Proc. § 339). Second, they argue that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because they have not identified a contractual obligation, a breach of that obligation, or any conduct that interfered ■with Plaintiffs’ rights under that obligation. Id. at 11. Third, they posit that the promissory estoppel claim fails because it is not supported by an allegation of a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms. Id. at 11-12. Fourth, they argue that Plaintiffs’ fraud allegations do not meet the heightened pleading standard. Id. at 12-13. Fifth, they contend that the action for slander of title is barred by privilege because Plaintiffs have not credibly alleged facts supporting a finding of malice or slander. Id. at 13 (citing Kachlon v. Markowitz, 168 Cal.App.4th 316, 333, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 (2008)). Sixth, they assert that Plaintiffs cannot allege the existence of a legal duty, such that their negligence claim is barred. Id. at 14 (citing Nymark v. Heart Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1093, 283 Cal.Rptr. 53 (1991)). Finally, Wells Fargo and Bank of America reach Plaintiffs’ equitable causes of action. Id. at 15-16. They argue that each equitable claim is barred by the tender rule. Id. Wells Fargo and Bank of America also state that there are no allegations specific to Bank of America in the FAC. Id. at 16. 2. First American Mlotion Like Wells Fargo and Bank of America, First American begins by addressing the FDCPA and ECOA claims. First American Motion, 4-7. First American contends that the state law claims should again be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 7. First American argues that the FDCPA only applies if the trustee or lender goes beyond statutory notices mandated by the foreclosure statutes. Id. at 5 (citing Natividad v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 2299601 (N.D.Cal. May 24, 2013)). It contends that Plaintiffs have not alleged that First American did anything beyond what was required to process a trustee sale proceeding under California law. Id. at 6. First American also posits that the ECOA does not apply to it because it is not a creditor, and Plaintiffs have not alleged that it is a creditor. Id. D. Opposition 1. Opposition to Wells Fargo Motion Like Defendants, Plaintiffs begin with their federal claims. Plaintiffs argue that, pursuant to the FDCPA, Wells Fargo is a debt collector because it was acting as a loan servicer on behalf of Bank of America. Opposition to Wells Fargo Motion, 9-10. Plaintiffs contend that Wells Fargo acted independently of any right to foreclose in evaluating Shahani’s financial status, accepting payments from Shahani and then denying them, and in denying Shahani’s request for a loan modification. Id. at 8-9 (citing Natividad, 2013 WL 2299601). Because Wells Fargo is a debt collector, Plaintiffs argue that it is liable for violation of the FDCPA. Id. at 10. Plaintiffs also assert that Bank of America and Wells Fargo are liable under the ECOA because they approved certain loan payments, but later without warning or explanation stopped accepting those payments and proceeded with foreclosure activity while simultaneously engaging in loan modification review. Id. (citing Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 720 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir.2013)). Next, Plaintiffs address their state statutory claims. First, they argue that they have stated a claim under the security first rule because Defendants elected nonjudicial foreclosure as their remedy by recording the NOD, but thereafter accepted payments pursuant to a trial loan modification agreement. Id. at 10-12 (citing Cal.Code Civ. Proc. § 726(a); Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal.2d 35, 38-39, 27 Cal.Rptr. 873, 378 P.2d 97 (1963); Security Pac. Nat’l Bank v. Wozab, 51 Cal.3d 991, 275 Cal.Rptr. 201, 800 P.2d 557 (1990); In re Prestige Ltd. P’ship-Concord, 234 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir.2000)). Second, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants violated the HBOR by (1) failing to grant the loan modification proposed by Shahani, which would have maximized net present value; and (2) proceeding with foreclosure while simultaneously considering Shahani’s loan modification application, or “dual tracking.” Id. at 12-14 (citing Cal. Civ.Code § 2923.6(a), (c)-(d)). Third, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants duplicate requests for information and documentation and refusal to acknowledge receipt of certain documents during the loan modification negotiations amounted to civil harassment, and satisfied the elements for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 14-15 (citing Cal. Civ.Code § 527.6). Fourth, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated the Rosenthal Act by making false reports to credit reporting agencies, falsely stating the amount of debt, falsely stating that debt was owed, attempting to collect debt through deceptive letters and phone calls demanding payment, making false promises, and increasing the debt by stating amounts not permitted including excessive service fees, attorneys’ fees, and late charges. Id. at 15-16 (citing Cal. Civ.Code § 1788.17; 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8)). Plaintiffs further assert that the Rosenthal Act claim has nothing to do with foreclosure. Id. Fifth, Plaintiffs argue that they have stated a claim under the UCL based on the unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent practices listed in the FAC. Id. at 16-17. Plaintiffs further contend that it is unfair and fraudulent for Defendants to represent that they intended to consider Shahani’s request for modification only to deny that request on a technicality or incorrect financial calculations, and further to agree to reconsider the request only to deny the request on representations that they have not received the information and documents they requested or that they do not have sufficient information to make a decision. Id. at 17. Turning to their state common law claims, Plaintiffs argue that they have stated a claim for breach of various oral agreements: (1) Defendants never offered Shahani a loan modification in compliance with their February 2009 agreement; (2) Wells Fargo agreed to grant Plaintiffs’ request for a loan modification after obtaining relief from the bankruptcy stay, although the agreement was never put in writing, and Plaintiffs made ten monthly payments of $4,012.27 to the agreement before Wells Fargo refused to accept further payments and proceeded to foreclosure; and (3) Wells Fargo repeatedly promised to postpone the Trustee’s Sale set for March 4, 2013 in exchange for further information and documentation, but failed to postpone the sale after Shahani sent the requested documentation. Id. at 17-18. Second, Plaintiffs argue that HAMP standards can be an ingredient in support of a cause of action for breach of written contract. Id. at 18-19. They further assert that Wells Fargo ignored HAMP standards by denying Shahani’s request for a loan modification even though he qualified under his estimated results of the “waterfall” method for calculating net present value employed pursuant to HAMP. Id. Third, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to consider Shahani’s request for a loan modification on the merits. Id. at 19-20. Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that Shahani relied on Defendants’ agreement to offer him a loan modification by making over $40,000 in payments between September 2011 and June 2012. Id. at 20. Fifth, Plaintiffs assert that they have pled fraud with specificity. Id. at 20-21. Sixth, Plaintiffs contend that the recordation of the Trustee’s Deed falsely and improperly asserted that Bank of America owned the Property — where Plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction to prevent such recordation. Id. at 21 (citing Cal. Civ.Code § 2924.12(a)). Sixth, Plaintiffs argue that their negligence claim is sufficient because they have alleged a duty of care in evaluating Shahani’s request for a loan modification. Id. at 21-22 (citing Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16 (1958)). Next, Plaintiffs argue that the tender rule does not bar their equitable claims because (1) they have a counter-claim or set off against Bank of America as a result of their claims brought here; (2) imposition of a tender requirement would be inequitable; and (3) the deed is void on its face. Id. at 22-23 (citing Natividad, 2013 WL 2299601). Finally, Plaintiffs argue that all of the challenged conduct implicates Bank of America because all of the other Defendants are its agents. Id. at 24. 2. Opposition to First American Miotion Plaintiffs contend that First American is a debt collector pursuant to the FDCPA because it filed the NOD, and “was brought in to assist with ‘debt collection,’ ” only after Plaintiffs were in default. Opposition to First American Motion-, 5-7 (citing Natividad, 2013 WL 2299601). Plaintiffs also note that the NOD states that “FIRST AMERICAN TRUSTEE SERVICES MAY BE ACTING AS A DEBT COLLECTOR ATTEMPTING TO COLLECT A DEBT, ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED MAY BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE.” Id. at 6 n.3. Plaintiffs argue that First American is liable for a violation of the ECOA because it assisted Bank of America in its decision not to extend, renew, or continue providing Shahani credit because it was Bank of America’s agent. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs proceed to make a series of arguments not responsive to any argument contained in First American’s Motion, asserting that: (1) First American’s liability is not barred by litigation privilege; (2) First American lacked authority to record the NOD or the Second Substitution, or any of the following documents; (3) the HBOR subjects trustees to liability; (4) Plaintiffs tendered full value of the amount due to Wells Fargo based on the estimated value of the property at the time; (5) First American engaged in civil harassment; (6) civil conspiracy is properly pled; (7) the recorded instruments are defective and should be cancelled; (8) Plaintiffs have pled a duty of care; and (9) Defendants violated the UCL. Id. at 7-20. E. Replies 1. Wells Fargo Reply Wells Fargo and Bank of America address only the federal claim in Reply, incorporating its arguments in Docket Number 21 to address the remaining claims. Reply in Support of Wells Fargo Motion (“Wells Fargo Reply”), 1-2; see also Order, 20-21 (summarizing Docket Number 21). They argue that they cannot be liable under the FDCPA for conducting a loan modification review upon Plaintiffs’ request because (1) complying with the borrowers request is not abusive debt collection; and (2) they were not obligated to grant Plaintiffs’ request for a modification. Reply, 2. Moreover, they argue that they have not engaged in debt collection because they did nothing beyond the scope of the ordinary foreclosure process. Id. at 3 (citing Natividad, 2013 WL 2299601, at *8; Schlegel, 720 F.3d at 1206). Further, they argue that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim under the ECOA because, unlike Schlegel, Shahani’s requests for a loan modification were denied such that Wells Fargo never extended Shahani additional credit that it could revoke by foreclosing on his property. Id. at 4. Finally, they contend that the foreclosure itself included multiple notices. Id. 2. First American Reply First American asserts that it is not subject to the FDCPA because it did nothing beyond what was statutorily required to enforce the security interest. Reply in Support of First American Motion, 3-4 (citing Natividad, 2013 WL 2299601). In addition, First American contends that Plaintiffs’ statement that it assisted Bank of America in its decision to extend, renew, or continue providing Shahani credit is not in the FAC and unsupported by any factual basis. Id. at 5. Accordingly, First American argues that it is not a creditor subject to the ECOA. Id. III. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE The parties seek judicial notice of the same documents for which they sought judicial notice in conjunction with the June 24, 2013 Order. See Dkt. Nos. 9, 16, 19, 23, 25, 48, 51, 56-57, 61. The Court adopts its reasoning and conclusions from the June 24, 2013 Order. See Order, 21-22. IV. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard 1. Rule 12(b)(6) A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir.1983). Generally, a plaintiffs burden at the pleading stage is relatively light. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[a] pleading which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12, the court analyzes the complaint and takes “all allegations of material fact as true and eonstrue[s] them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995). Dismissal may be based on a lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of facts that would support a valid theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990). A complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.1984)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The factual allegations must be definite enough to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. However, a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive dismissal. Id. Rather, a complaint need only include enough facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. That is, the pleadings must contain factual allegations “plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)” a right to relief. Id. at 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (noting that this requirement is consistent with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), which requires that the pleadings demonstrate that “the pleader is entitled to relief’). 2. Rule 9(b) Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). A court may dismiss a claim grounded in iraud when its allegations fail to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir.2003). The plaintiff must include “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the fraud. Id. at 1106 (citations omitted). “The plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false.” Decker v. GlenFed, Inc., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir.1994). A claim for fraud must be “specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular conduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir.1985). B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 1. Diversity Jurisdiction As discussed in the June 24, 2013 Order, complete diversity of the parties is lacking in this case. Order, 24. 2. Federal Question Jurisdiction and Supplemental Jurisdiction “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Generally, “[a] case arises under federal law where federal law creates the cause of action or where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turns on some construction of federal law.” Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8-9, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983)). Federal question jurisdiction is found only where a federal question appears on the face of a properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Here, there are two claims that fall within this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of a federal question: (1) the FDCPA claim; and (2) the ECOA claim. Because the Court denies Wells Fargo and Bank of America’s Motion as to the FDCPA claim, it exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims. a. Violation of the FDCPA Against Wells Fargo and First American i. Background Law “In enacting the FDCPA, Congress sought to counter the abusive, deceptive and unfair debt collection practices sometimes used by debt collectors against consumers.” Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1226-27 (9th Cir.2004). Plaintiffs allege violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f; 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides that a “debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt,” and 15 U.S.C. § 1692f provides that a “debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” Because the prohibitions in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f apply only to debt collectors, the complaint must plead factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendants are debt collectors. Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 720 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir.2013). The FDCPA defines the term “debt collector” to include: (1) “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts,” and (2) any person “who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due to another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Moreover, the prohibitions in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f apply to conduct “in connection with the collection of any debt” and conduct “to collect or attempt to collect any debt[,J” respectively. Although the Ninth Circuit has not addressed whether foreclosure proceedings constitute debt collection within the ambit of the FDCPA, courts in this Circuit have regularly held that nonjudicial foreclosure is not debt collection. Natividad, 2013 WL 2299601, at *5-*9; Ligon v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 2011 WL 2550836, at *3 (N.D.Cal. June 27, 2011) (collecting cases). This authority is persuasive. Under the FDCPA, claims are assessed from the perspective of the “least sophisticated debtor.” Herrera v. LCS Fin. Servs. Corp., 2009 WL 5062192, at *4 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 22, 2009) (citing Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir.1989)). “If the least sophisticated debtor would ‘likely be misled’ by a communication from a debt collector, the debt collector has violated the Act.” Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 934 (9th Cir.2007) (citing Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1225). “This objective standard ‘ensure[s] that the FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd ... the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.” Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., 460 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). ii. Wells Fargo Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss the FDCPA cause of action is denied because Wells Fargo has not identified any deficiencies in that cause of action. Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo is in the business of regularly collecting debt and uses the instrumentalities of interstate commerce in that business. FAC, ¶ 238. Plaintiffs further allege that one of Wells Fargo’s principal businesses is debt collection. Id. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo services the debts of thousands and thousands of residential mortgages owned by Bank of America and other mortgagees. Id. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo’s conduct described in the FAC violates 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f. Id. at ¶¶237, 240. Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to plead that Wells Fargo is a debt collector under the first definition because the FAC “does not expressly state that the ‘principal purpose’ of Wells Fargo’s business is debt collection.” Schlegel, 720 F.3d at 1208-09. Rather, the FAC alleges that “one of the principal businesses of [Wells Fargo] is debt collection on a regular basis.” FAC, ¶238. As in Schlegel, the FAC’s factual matter, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, establishes only that debt collection is some part of Wells Fargo’s business. See Schlegel, 720 F.3d at 1209. For Wells Fargo to be a debt collector under the first definition, Plaintiffs must allege that the principal purpose of Wells Fargo’s business is debt collection, not that one of Wells Fargo’s principal businesses is debt collection. On the other hand, the second definition is satisfied by the allegations in the FAC. Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due to another by servicing residential mortgage loans owned by Bank of America and other mortgagees. FAC, ¶ 238. In the present case, Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo, acting as loan servicer, attempted to collect a debt that was in default before it was transferred to Bank of America. Id. at ¶¶ 25-26, 30 (Shahani fell behind in payments by February 2009, NOD recorded on or about July 20, 2009, and Assignment of DOT recorded in September 2009). Wells Fargo raises only two arguments for dismissal of the FDCPA claim. First, Wells Fargo argues that the allegations in the FAC show that it sought only to foreclose on the property. Wells Fargo Motion, 3. Wells Fargo further argues that it sought only to take back collateral, not to collect any money from Shahani. Id. Second, in its Reply, Wells Fargo argues that its loan modification review, at Shahani’s request, cannot be an unfair debt collection practice because it was under no obligation to grant him a loan modification. Wells Fargo Reply, 2-3. Neither argument warrants dismissal. First, as Plaintiffs argue, the challenged wrongful acts relate to specific conduct in the loan modification negotiations, not the execution of the nonjudicial foreclosure process. Opposition to Wells Fargo, 8-9. Although Plaintiffs press the argument that Shahani was entitled to a loan modification, that argument is not necessary to state a claim under the FDCPA. The FAC alleges, essentially, that Wells Fargo induced Shahani to pay over $40,000 by leading him to believe he would be considered for a loan modification prior to refusing to accept payments unless he could pay an additional $138,440. Although the details of Plaintiffs’ allegations are fuzzy, Wells Fargo’s argument that it did not seek to collect any money from Shahani is contradicted by the FAC. Crediting Plaintiffs’ factual allegations, as it must, the Court denies Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss the FDCPA claim. iii. First American First American argues that the FDCPA claim against it should be dismissed because the only conduct it engaged in was the statutory nonjudicial foreclosure process. First American Motion, 5-6. • Plaintiffs provide only the unresponsive argument that the exception to the definition of “debt collector” under the FDCPA for eases in which the creditor, on whose behalf the defendant acts, obtained the debt before default does not apply in this case. Opposition to First American, 5-7. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not alleged any conduct by First American going beyond the standard foreclosure process. Accordingly, the FDCPA claim against First American is dismissed. Plaintiffs will be given leave to amend. If Plaintiffs choose to amend this claim, they should set forth specific facts showing that First American violated the statute. b. Violation of the ECOA Against Defendants i. Background Law The ECOA “makes it illegal ‘for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction ... on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age.’ ” Schlegel, 720 F.3d at 1210 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1)). “One way that the ECOA effectuates this goal is through its notice requirement.” Id. “Within thirty days (or such longer reasonable time as specified in regulations of the Bureau for any class of credit transaction) after receipt of a completed application for credit, a creditor shall notify the applicant of its action on the application.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(1). “Each applicant against whom adverse action is taken shall be entitled to a statement of reasons for such action from the creditor.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2). The ECOA defines an “adverse action” as a: denial or revocation of credit, a change in the terms of an existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested. Such term does not include a refusal to extend additional credit under an existing credit arrangement where the applicant is delinquent or otherwise in default, or where such additional credit would exceed a previo