Full opinion text
OPINION & ORDER WILLIAM M. CONLEY, District Judge. In this patent lawsuit, plaintiff Split Pivot, Inc. alleges that defendant Trek Bicycle Corporation (“Trek”) infringes claims in two of its patents, both of which involve suspension systems for bicycles. As is common in patent cases, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Split Pivot seeks summary judgment of infringement on claim 22 of U.S. Patent No. 7,717,212 (“the '212 patent”). Trek seeks summary judgment of non-infringement on all asserted claims of the '212 patent, as well as summary judgment for invalidity based on inadequate written descriptions in various claims of the '212 patent. Trek also seeks summary judgment of non-infringement and invalidity due to anticipation on all asserted claims of Split Pivot’s other patent, U.S. Patent No. 8,002,301 (“the '301 patent”). As part of these motions, the parties also ask the court to construe various terms shared by the patents in suit. For the reasons set forth below, the court will deny Split Pivot’s motion for summary judgment of infringement and will grant Trek’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement of both patents. BASIC ALLEGATIONS OF FACT I. The Parties Plaintiff Split Pivot, Inc. is a Massachusetts corporation engaged in the business of holding patents. Its owner and sole employee is David Weagle, the putative inventor of the '212 patent and the '301 patent. Defendant Trek Bicycle Corporation is a privately-held' Wisconsin company with its principle place of business in Waterloo, Wisconsin. Trek designs, manufactures and sells bicycles, including road bikes, mountain bikes, town bikes and specialty bikes. Within the mountain bike category, Trek designs, manufactures and sells mountain bikes with and without rear suspensions. II. The Technology and Patents in Suit The technology at issue in the patents in suit involves rear suspension systems for vehicles generally, though the patents’ specifications depict only rear suspension systems for bicycles. Bicycles without rear suspension systems usually consist of a frame made up of tubes that are welded or otherwise integrally connected to one another. A bicycle with a rear suspension system uses instead a set of links that are pivotally connected to one another and that support the rear wheel. Those links are generally connected to some form of shock absorber. The end result of using a rear suspension system on a bicycle is that the rear wheel is capable of moving up and down as it encounters rough terrain, increasing rider comfort and control. (Pictured: Figure 1 of the '212 patent, which features a bicycle design with a rear suspension system. The shock absorber is located at 12; the links are located at 1, 2 and 3.) The distance a rear wheel can move up and down in a bicycle with shock absorbers is known as the “compressible wheel suspension travel distance,” with the beginning travel point being where the suspension is completely uncompressed, such that it cannot extend further, and the end travel point where the suspension is completely compressed, such that it cannot compress further. At the beginning travel point, the shock absorber is necessarily in the state of least compression, so it is relatively easy to compress the suspension. Measuring the travel distances of both the wheel and the shock absorber allows for calculation of the “leverage ratio” (also called “leverage rate”), which is the ratio of the compressive wheel travel change to the measured length change in the shock absorber over the same wheel travel distance. As the suspended wheel moves compressively — that is, as it moves closer to the end travel point — the shock absorber force at the wheel changes in relation to shock absorber force multiplied by that leverage ratio. The leverage ratio does not necessarily remain the same throughout the wheel travel distance. A “leverage ratio curve,” also known as a “leverage rate curve,” is a graphical representation of leverage ratio versus wheel travel, plotted on a Cartesian graph, where the leverage ratio (as defined above) is shown on the Y axis, and vertical wheel travel is shown on the X axis: (Pictured: Figure 18 of the '301 patent, showing the leverage ratio curve of certain embodiments of the invented suspension system. The curve itself is labeled 35.) To graph a leverage ratio curve, as the wheel is compressed, incremental vertical compression distance measurements of the wheel are taken. At each one of those points, the length of the shock absorber is also measured. The leverage ratio can then be calculated at each point in the suspension system’s compression and graphed as shown above. Leverage ratios can be manipulated to achieve a desired force output at the wheel. This is because shock absorber length, which serves as the denominator of the leverage ratio, can be changed by the movement of wheel, brake and/or control links as the suspension compresses. Thus, while every suspension system inherently has a leverage ratio — and therefore inherently has a leverage ratio curve — different suspension systems may be designed to have particular leverage ratio curves. While suspension systems increase rider comfort and control over rough terrain, a side effect is that acceleration or deceleration forces may cause a suspension system to react in unwanted ways. According to the patents, systems exist to reduce unwanted suspension movement during acceleration or deceleration, but those systems are both complex and correspondingly expensive. Less expensive systems, in contrast, are more cost-effective but do not allow for the separation of acceleration forces under powered acceleration and braking. Weagle claims “suspension systems that can provide separated acceleration and deceleration responses while remaining cost effective to produce.” ('212 patent, 1:48-50; '301 patent, 1:52-54.) A. The'212 Patent The application that resulted in the '212 patent was filed on August 25, 2006, and the '212 patent itself issued on May 18, 2010. The abstract of the '212 patent states that the invention relates to “suspension systems comprising, in certain embodiments, a pivoting means concentric to a wheel rotation axis so that braking forces can be controlled by placement of an instant force center, and so that acceleration forces can be controlled by a swinging wheel link.” Split Pivot asserts infringement of claims 1, 3, 4, 5, 6,12, 14, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 32, 34, 41, 42, 43, 44 and 64 of the '212 patent. Claims 1, 22 and 43 are independent; the other claims at issue depend from those claims. Claim 1 provides: A suspension system for a vehicle comprising a wheel link floating pivot, a control link fixed pivot, a wheel rotation axis, a wheel link, a brake link and a shock absorber, wherein said wheel link floating pivot is concentric with said wheel rotation axis; wherein said shock absorber is mounted to a link selected from the group consisting of a brake link, a control link, and a wheel link; wherein said shock absorber is selected from the group consisting of a compression gas spring, a leaf spring, a coil spring, and a fluid; and wherein force that compresses said shock absorber is transmitted through said brake link; and wherein said brake link passes on two sides of a frame member. ('212 patent, 19:64-20:8.) Claim 22 provides: A suspension system for a vehicle comprising a wheel link floating pivot, a control link fixed pivot, a wheel rotation axis, a wheel link, a brake link, a control link and a shock absorber, wherein said wheel link floating pivot is concentric with said wheel rotation axis and where said wheel link and said control link are arranged so that an instant center of the suspension system is located below the control link when the suspension is uncompressed and the vehicle is on even ground; wherein said shock absorber is mounted to a link selected from the group consisting of a brake link, a control link, and a wheel link; wherein force that compresses said shock absorber is transmitted through said brake link; wherein said shock absorber is selected from the group consisting of a compression gas spring, a leaf spring, a coil spring, and a fluid; and wherein said suspension system further comprises a wheel link fixed pivot, a control link floating pivot and a control link fixed pivot. ('212 patent, 21:22-38.) Claim 43 provides: A suspension system for a vehicle comprising a wheel link floating pivot, a control link fixed pivot, a wheel rotation axis, a wheel link, a brake link, and a shock absorber, wherein said wheel link floating pivot is concentric with said wheel rotation axis; wherein said shock absorber is selected from the group consisting of a compression gas spring, a leaf spring, a coil spring, and a fluid; and wherein force is transmitted to said shock absorber through said brake link; wherein said brake link passes on two sides of a frame member. ('212 patent, 22:54-62.) Split Pivot has moved for summary judgment of infringement on claim 22 of the '212 patent. It alleges that Trek’s Fuel EX and Superfly 100 products infringe this claim literally and under the doctrine of equivalents. (See dkt. # 114.) Trek has cross-moved for summary judgment of non-infringement on all the independent claims of the '212 patent (which necessarily includes the dependent claims as well, since a dependent claim is “construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers,” 35 U.S.C. § 112). Trek also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment based on inadequate written descriptions under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in independent claims 1 and 22, as well as those that are dependent on them. B. The '301 Patent The '301 patent is a continuation in part of the '212 patent. Filed on August 23, 2007, and issued on August 23, 2011, the '301 patent claims certain suspension systems for vehicles; its abstract reads that the “invention relates to suspension systems comprising, in certain embodiments, a pivoting means concentric to a wheel rotation axis so that braking forces can be controlled by placement of an instant force center, and so that acceleration forces can be controlled by a swinging wheel link.” ('301 patent, abstract.) Split Pivot asserts infringement of claims 29, 30, 31, 37, 38, 39 and 43 of the '301 patent. Claims 29 and 37 are independent; the other claims depend from those two claims. Claim 29 reads: A suspension system for a vehicle comprising a wheel link floating pivot, a wheel rotation axis, a wheel link, a control link, a brake link, a control link floating pivot, a control link fixed pivot, and a shock absorber; wherein the distance between said wheel link floating pivot and control link floating pivot is greater than the distance between said control link fixed pivot and control link floating pivot; wherein said wheel link is pivotally connected to said brake link; wherein said brake link is pivotally connected to said control link; wherein said wheel link floating pivot is concentric with said wheel rotation axis; wherein said shock absorber is selected from the group consisting of a damper, a compression gas spring, a leaf spring, a coil spring, and a fluid; wherein force is transmitted to said shock absorber through an element selected from the group consisting of the brake link, the control link, a wheel link fixed pivot, the control link floating pivot and the control link fixed pivot; wherein said suspension system further comprises a compressible wheel suspension travel distance that features a beginning travel point where the suspension is completely uncompressed to a point where no further suspension extension can take place, and an end travel point where a suspension is completely compressed to a point where no further suspension compression can take place; and wherein a leverage ratio curve of said suspension system has a negative or a positive slope in the beginning 1/3 (third) and in the end 1/3 (third), and a change in slope value in the middle 1/3 (third). ('301 patent, 36:60-37:19.) Claim 37 reads: A suspension system for a vehicle comprising a wheel link floating pivot, a wheel rotation axis, a wheel link, a control link, a control link fixed pivot, a brake link, a shock absorber, and a removable pivot axle; wherein said wheel link floating pivot is concentric with said wheel rotation axis; wherein said brake link is pivotally connected to said control link; wherein said removable pivot axle has a feature for positioning a rear hub in relation to said wheel rotation axis; wherein said removable pivot axle can receive a thru axle selected from the group consisting of a solid axle, a thru axle, a hollow axle, a quick release, a skewer, a quick release skewer, and a through bolt; wherein said shock absorber is selected from the group consisting of a damper, a compression gas spring, a leaf spring, a coil spring, and a fluid; wherein force is transmitted to said shock absorber through said brake link; and wherein a leverage ratio curve of said suspension system has a negative or a positive slope in the beginning 1/3 (third) and in the end 1/3 (third), and a change in slope value in the middle 1/3 (third). ('301 patent, 37:56-38:7.) Trek also seeks summary judgment of non-infringement and invalidity due to anticipation on all asserted claims of the '301 patent. III. Trek’s Allegedly Infringing Products Trek markets and sells a wide variety of bicycles with rear suspension systems. The allegedly infringing products fall into two basic categories: (1) those with what Trek calls “Active Brake Pivot” (“ABP”); and (2) those with both ABP and what Trek calls “Full Floater.” ABP refers to the ability of the rear suspension to remain active while the brake is applied. ABP bicycles include, among other features, some pivotal connection that is concentric with the rear wheel rotation axis. Bicycles with ABP only have a shock absorber that is mounted parallel to the top tube and connected on one side to the frame. They are sometimes called “swing link” bikes, which refers to the short link hanging from the top tube of the frame. ABP bicycles include Trek’s Superfly 100, HiFi, Rumblefish and Roscoe. The 2010 Superfly 100 is pictured below: Bicycles including ABP and Full Floater include Trek’s Fuel EX, Scratch (including Scratch Air), Top Fuel, Session, Slash, Lush and Remedy. “Full Floater” is so named because a bicycle including Full Floater has a generally vertically mounted shock absorber connected to two moving links; the shock absorber “floats” between the two links instead of being fixed to the frame on one side. The 2010 Fuel EX 9.9 is pictured below: PROCEDURAL MATTER Split Pivot asks the court to strike as untimely (1) Trek’s construction of “wherein said shock absorber is selected from the group consisting of a compression gas spring, a leaf spring, a coil spring, and a fluid” (“the '212 Shock Absorber Element”); and (2) Trek’s related contention that this element is a missing limitation from its accused bicycles. Trek argues its disclosure was timely and that Split Pivot has not been prejudiced in any event. The current dispute began when Split Pivot sexwed Trek with untimely supplemental claim charts on January 4 and January 24, 2018. The January 24 charts were served in response to Trek’s production of previously undisclosed drawings of some of its accused bicycles on December 5 and 10, 2012, and added assertions of infringement of three claims upon which Split Pivot had not previously relied: claims 43, 44 and 64 of the '212 patent. Trek moved to strike the January 24 supplemental claim chart on February 1, 2013. (Dkt. # 46.) On May 2, 2013, the court denied the motion, finding that while Split Pivot’s supplement was untimely, Split Pivot had acted with reasonable diligence in responding within a month and a half to Trek’s newly-disclosed drawings; that the supplement appeared to be a direct response to these newly-disclosed drawings; and that the new contentions were unlikely to prejudice Trek materially. (Opinion & Order (dkt. # 90) 5-6.) ■ To ameliorate any arguable prejudice, the court also gave Trek 28 days to supplement its own infringement and invalidity contentions, “provided any newly asserted disclosures respond[ed] directly to the supplemental infringement claim charts served on January 24, 2013.” {Id. at 8.) On May 30, 2013, within the court-imposed 28 day deadline, Trek responded to Split Pivot’s supplemental infringement contentions. The response included, among other things asserted, a missing limitation not previously disclosed: the '212 Shock Absorber Element. On June 3, 2013, Trek served a supplemental claim construction as to this limitation. It is undisputed that the '212 Shock Absorber Element appears in independent claim 43, and accordingly in claims 44 and 64, which depend from it. To that extent, it does directly respond to Split Pivot’s newly asserted claims. Split Pivot points out that the Shock Absorber Element also appears in independent claim 1 ('212 patent, 20:3-5) and independent claim 22 ('212 patent, 21:34-36), as well as in all claims that depend from them — in essence, in every claim of the '212 patent that Trek has allegedly infringed. {See Def.’s Br. in Support of Summ. J. Exh. A (dkt. # 133-1).) The allegedly infringed claims of the '301 patent — claims 29 and 37, and certain claims that depend from them' — also include a version of the Shock Absorber Element (“the '301 Shock Absorber Element”), which simply adds “a damper” to the enumerated list of possible shock absorbers. {See '301 patent, 37:3-6; 37:67-38:2.) At this point, the court will not preclude Trek from arguing for non-infringement based on the Shock Absorber Element. While Trek could have asserted non-infringement based on this element earlier, the court recognized in allowing Split Pivot’s untimely assertions of infringement that Trek might choose to “rethink its strategy,” just as apparently had Split Pivot. (Opinion & Order (dkt. #90) 7.) Moreover, the Shock Absorber Element is directly responsive to the newly asserted claims, insofar as it appears in all three of them. Finally, the court is not inclined to disallow one of Trek’s principal defenses when Split Pivot has been aware of that defense since May, choosing (likely tactically) to lie in the weeds until filing a motion for summary judgment in August. If Split Pivot was prejudiced — which it does not even argue — the proper time to bring it to the court’s attention was not at summary judgment but at the time of the allegedly prejudicial event. Split Pivot’s motion to strike is, therefore, denied. OPINION I. Overview of Issues Analysis of patent infringement is a two-step process: “first, the scope of the claims are determined as a matter of law, and second, the properly construed claims are compared to the allegedly infringing device to determine, as a matter of fact, whether all of the limitations of at least one claim are present, either literally or by a substantial equivalent, in the accused device.” Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1323 (Fed.Cir.2002). Invalidity of the patent in suit serves as a defense to infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 282. II. Claims Construction The court begins its claim construction analysis, “as always, with the words of the claim.” Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1324. The claims “define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim.” Id. (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed.Cir.1998)). In order to interpret the words of the claims, courts look to “the intrinsic evidence of record, including the written description, the drawings, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” Id. (citing Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2001)). Generally speaking, “all terms in a patent claim are to be given their plain, ordinary and accustomed meaning to one of ordinary skill in the relevant art.” Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2001). There are exceptions to this general rule, however. For example, patent law does “permit[ ] the patentee to choose to be his or her own lexicographer by clearly setting forth an explicit definition for a claim term that could differ in scope from that which would be afforded by Its ordinary meaning.” Id. Once the court has ascertained the plain meaning of a term to the person of ordinary skill in the art, “the next step is to examine the written description and the drawings to confirm that the patentee’s use of the disputed terms is consistent with the meaning given to it by the court.” Id. In this step, the court seeks to determine whether the patentee has expressed a different meaning for the language; whether the preferred embodiment is consistent with the court’s initial interpretation; and whether the inventor has explicitly disclaimed subject matter or limited the scope of the claims. Id. at 1342-43. Although claims must be construed in light of the specification for these reasons, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), “limitations from the specification are not to be read into the claims,” Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2004). Regardless, the specification is the “single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed.Cir.2005). “After examining the written description and the drawings, the same confirmatory measure must be taken with the prosecution history.” Rexnord Corp., 274 F.3d at 1343. This is because “a patentee may limit the meaning of a claim term by making a clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope during prosecution.” Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2008) (quoting Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1136 (Fed.Cir.2006)); see also Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 480 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed.Cir.2007) (“Prosecution history estoppel prevents a patentee from recapturing under the doctrine of equivalents subject matter surrendered during prosecution to obtain a patent.”). Such a limitation might arise, for instance, if the patentee “clearly characterizes] the invention in a way to try to overcome rejections based on prior art.” Computer Docking Station Corp., 519 F.3d at 1374. Even if the patent prosecutor does not rely on the patentee’s statements in subsequently approving a patent, the patentee may nevertheless “be held to what he declares during the prosecution of his patent.” Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., L.P., 323 F.3d 989, 995 (Fed.Cir.2003); see also Desper Prods., Inc. v. QSound Labs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1325, 1336 (Fed.Cir.1998) (“That the prosecution shifted to a different focus does not blunt the impact of those remarks made to overcome the prior rejection.”). District courts may also rely on extrinsic evidence in claim construction, such as expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries and learned treatises. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Extrinsic evidence “can shed useful light on the relevant art,” but it is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.” Id. (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed.Cir.2004)). “In sum, extrinsic evidence may be useful to the court, but it is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.” Id. at 1319. A. Wheel Link Floating Pivot The parties agree that the term “wheel link floating pivot” is one for which Weagle served as his own lexicographer, rather than a term of art to which the court may ascribe an ordinary and customary meaning. “[T]erms coined by the inventor are best understood by reference to the specification,” 3M Innovative Properties Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed.Cir.2013), though the rule that “limitations discussed in the specification may not be read into the claims” remains in effect. Id. The parties offer the following constructions of “wheel link floating pivot”: Split Pivot Trek “a pivot that changes its vertical and horizontal position relative to the frame of the vehicle when the rear suspension is compressed, is concentric with a rear wheel rotation axis of the vehicle, and pivotally connects to the brake link” ”a pivot axle connected to the wheel link that allows a link to rotate about the pivot axle and changes its position relative to a frame member when the suspension is compressed” Split Pivot asserts that its construction is correct because it incorporates language “nearly verbatim” from the specification. (PL’s Br. for Summ. J. (dkt. # 114) 8.) First, the specification notes that “a floating pivot changes its position relative to the frame when the suspension is compressed.” ('212 patent, 4:6-8.) Additionally, the specification provides that a wheel link floating pivot “is concentric with a wheel rotation axis of the vehicle, preferably the wheel rotation axis of a driven wheel, a rear wheel, a front wheel, or a suspended wheel of a vehicle.” ('212 patent, 11:15-19.) Finally, the specification indicates that the “wheel link floating pivot pivotally connects the wheel link to the brake link.” ('212 patent, 4:65-66.) These portions of the specification, Split Pivot asserts, clearly demonstrate how Weagle, as the inventor, intended to define the term “wheel link floating pivot,” and so its construction makes use of those descriptors while adding additional detail to correspond to this particular invention (i.e., the “vertical and horizontal” nature of the movement of the floating pivot, and the focus on the “rear” suspension and wheel). Trek includes the general language from the specification defining “floating pivot” in its construction. Trek also asks the court to construe “wheel link floating pivot” as requiring a pivot axle. In support, Trek argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term “pivot” to require a pivot axle, bolstering this argument with citations to multiple dictionaries. (Def.’s Resp. (dkt. # 149) 7 (citing to definitions of a pivot as a “short shaft or pin,” “an axle on which a wheel turns,” “a fixed pin or short axis,” etc.).) Additionally, Trek construes “wheel link floating pivot” as being “connected to the wheel link.” As support for that interpretation, Trek points to a portion of the specification, which states that “[pjivots of a suspension system of the invention are named after a component that connects with the pivot.” ('212 patent, 4:2-4.) By this logic, then, a “wheel link floating pivot” must be connected to the wheel link. Taking the last argument first, the court agrees with Trek insofar as a floating pivot without any connection to the wheel link could not be a “wheel link floating pivot.” Nothing in the patent, however, suggests that a wheel link floating pivot may not have multiple connections; indeed, even the sentence that Trek identifies states that pivots are named after a component that connects with them, which leaves open the possibility for a pivot to be connected to multiple components but named after just one. In addition, the specification unambiguously contemplates a wheel link floating pivot serving as the “connection point” between the wheel link and the brake link. In describing the preferred embodiments of the invention, for example, the specification states that “[t]he wheel floating link pivot (sic) 6 pivotally connects the wheel link 1 to a brake link 2.” (See '212 patent, 4:65-67 (figure 1); 5:59-61 (figure 2); 7:14-15 (figure 5).) Thus, the context of the specification makes clear that a wheel link floating pivot serves as a “connecting point” between the wheel link and the brake link. Rather than dispute this fact, Trek takes a different tack by arguing that a pivot can only be “connected ” to a component when it is permanently fastened to that component, meaning that a link which merely “rotates about” the pivot is not connected to it. In essence, without disputing that the wheel link floating pivot is pivotally connected to the wheel link and brake link, Trek argues that within this connection, the pivot itself may only be fastened to the wheel link. Thus, Trek’s construction, which states that the wheel link floating pivot is “connected to the wheel link,” would support only arrangements in which the pivot is fastened to the wheel link: It would exclude any arrangement in which the pivot is fastened to the brake link: The court sees no reason, and Trek offers none, to limit an interpretation of “connected” to mean “permanently” or “immovably fastened.” Moreover, the detailed description of the invention contradicts Trek’s proposed interpretation: “[a] wheel link, in certain embodiments, is connected to a wheel link floating pivot and/or a wheel link fixed pivot” ('212 patent, 8:37-39) (emphasis added), and “[a] brake link, in certain embodiments, is connected to a wheel link floating pivot, a control link floating pivot and/or a first shock pivot” ('212 patent, 9:10-12) (emphasis added). Thus, Weagle described a wheel link and a brake link as “connected to” a wheel link floating pivot. ('212 patent, 8:37-38; 9:10-11.) Nowhere did Weagle suggest that the nature of these connections need vary between the wheel link and the brake link. Rather, he used exactly the same term to describe the wheel link floating pivot’s relationship to the wheel link as he did to describe its relationship to the brake link. While the overall connection of the wheel link to the brake link must be pivotal, the patent simply does not evince an intention to limit the definition of “wheel link floating pivot” to arrangements wherein the wheel link floating pivot is immovably fastened to the wheel link, with the brake link turning around it. Trek points out that the drawings of Figures 7 and 8 show only embodiments in which the wheel link floating pivot is fastened to the wheel link, with the brake link able to turn around it. {See Def.’s Br. for Summ. J. (dkt. # 125) 16-17.) Figure 7 shows “a three-dimensional cutaway view of a wheel link floating pivot 6 as shown in FIG. 2, 4, 5 and FIG. 6.” ('212 patent, 7:63-64.) Turning to the description of Figure 5, Trek is correct that the wheel link floating pivot of that particular embodiment “comprises a pair of clevis[es] that ... are structural components of wheel link 1, and a pair of hitches to be received by the clevises, where the hitches are structural components of the brake link 2.” ('212 patent, 7:16-19.) This would allow the brake link to turn, while the wheel link remains stationary. While Trek accurately describes the construction of the wheel link floating pivot of Figures 7 and 8, “limitations from parts of the written description, such as the details of the preferred embodiment, cannot be read into the claims absent a clear intention by the patentee to do so.” MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1256 (Fed.Cir.2012). In light of the detailed description, which expressly contemplates that a wheel link floating pivot may be “connected” to a wheel link in certain embodiments and a brake link in certain embodiments, the court finds no “clear intention” to limit the definition to the embodiment of Figures 7 and 8, even if it did find that the word “connect” mandated an immovable connection (which it does not). The court likewise rejects Trek’s contention that the court must construe the word “pivot” to mean “pivot axle.” As a preliminary matter, the court declines to isolate and construe a single word to limit a claim, when that word is indisputably part of a term for which Weagle served as his own lexicographer. Additionally, the specification never hints at an intent by Weagle to limit a wheel link floating pivot to a single pivot axle. Rather, the detailed description of Figure 7 indicates that “[c]ertain embodiments of the wheel link floating pivot 6 can comprise a pivot bearing 20.” ('212 patent, 8:4-5.) While the description goes on to note that “[a] pivot axle 21 acts as a bearing surface for the pivot bearing 20” ('212 patent, 8:14-15), this simply states that certain embodiments of the wheel link floating pivot may contain a pivot axle, not that the pivot itself must be a pivot axle and nothing else. Despite rejecting Trek’s proposed construction, the court also declines to adopt Split Pivot’s construction in two respects. First, Split Pivot asks that the court construe “wheel link floating pivot” to include the requirement that it be “concentric with a rear wheel rotation axis of the vehicle.” As Trek points out, every independent claim of the '212 patent includes not only the phrase “wheel link floating pivot” but also a separate requirement that “said wheel link floating pivot is concentric with said wheel rotation axis.” (See, e.g., '212 patent, 19:64-20:1.) To hold that the wheel link floating pivot must inherently be concentric with the wheel rotation axis would render this element of the claims meaningless. Claims construction standards do not generally allow for such a result. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“A claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”); cf. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (“To take a simple example, the claim in this case refers to ‘steel baffles,’ which strongly implies that the term ‘baffles’ does not inherently mean objects made of steel.”). Trek also points to the specification, which describes a wheel link floating pivot as concentric with the wheel rotation axis “in certain embodiments,” and “nearly concentric” “[i]n certain other embodiments.” ('212 patent, 11:14-21.) Thus, like the language in the claims themselves, the specification contradicts any notion that “wheel link floating pivot” should be construed to require a “concentric with a rear wheel rotation axis of the vehicle.” Second, Split Pivot asks the court to construe “wheel link floating pivot” as “pivotally connected] to the brake link.” While Split Pivot claims this language has been taken “nearly verbatim” from the specification, the referenced language actually requires that the “wheel link floating pivot 6 pivotally connect[] the wheel link 1 to a brake link 2.” ('212 patent, 4:65-67 (emphasis added).) This does not mean the same thing as construing the “wheel link floating pivot” itself to be pivotally connected to the brake link. Such a construction would be essentially the same as Trek’s erroneous contention that the pivot must be fastened to the wheel link, with the brake link able to pivot around it. As already discussed, the specification provides no support for that limited construction. Thus, the court rejects both parties’ proposed constructions of “wheel link floating pivot.” Instead, the court construes that term to mean “a pivot that changes its position relative to a frame member when the suspension is compressed and pivotally connects the wheel link to a brake link.” B. Brake Link Passes on Two Sides of a Frame Member The parties also ask the court to construe the limitation “wherein said brake link passes on two sides of a frame member.” This limitation is present in claims 1 and 43 of the '212 patent and their respective dependent claims. Trek contends this limitation is missing from all but a small subset of its accused bicycle models. The parties offer the following construction for this element: _Split Pivot_Trek_ “brake link that moves next to or beyond two ’’brake link extends beyond both lateral sides sides of a physical boundary of a frame of a structural support for components of a member”_suspension system”_ The parties agree that the term “passes” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, but disagree on what that meaning is, citing to various definitions in support their own interpretation. (See Def.’s Br. for Summ. J. (dkt. # 125) 28-29 (citing definitions such as “to go by: proceed or extend beyond”; and “to go by, beyond, over, through, or the like; to proceed from one side to the other of’); Pl.’s Resp. (dkt. # 153) 26 (citing definitions such as “to move in a particular direction or to a particular place or position”; “to go past something or someone or move in relatiop to it or them”; and “to go onwards or move by or past”).) Split Pivot argues that “passes” is “susceptible to multiple meanings,” and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would read it in this context to require only that the brake link “move to occupy a particular place next to the frame member or beyond it.” (Pl.’s Resp. (dkt. # 153) 26.) Split Pivot’s central support for its construction is the specification, but its arguments are muddled at best. While the specification sheds no light on the word “passes” as it relates to the brake link passing on two sides of a frame member, Split Pivot points out that the specification also uses “passes” in a similar context. For example, the description of Figure 2 states that “[t]he brake link 2 can consist of a single sided strut that passes next to only one side of a rear wheel 17 or a double sided strut that passes next to both sides of a rear wheel.” ('212 patent, 6:2-5.) If Trek’s construction of “passes” were applied' to that portion of the specification, Split Pivot argues, the brake link would have to extend “both above and in front of and below and behind the entire[t]y of the rear wheel as illustrated below:” (Pl.’s Resp. (dkt. # 153) 27-28.) While consistent use of a term in the written description can inform claims construction, Split Pivot appears to fundamentally misinterpret Trek’s proposed construction. Trek’s construction of “passes,” if applied to this portion of the specification, would require only that the brake link extend beyond the left and right lateral sides of the wheel at the front, not that it extend beyond both front and back ends of the wheel. The context of the specification supports this interpretation, since the specification itself contemplates a brake link that can pass next to one or both “sides” of the rear wheel. If “sides” meant the front and back ends of the wheel, then Split Pivot’s own patent would contemplate the above arrangement, which its expert has called “unorthdox, unnecessary, and counterproductive.” (Expert Report of Tony Foale (dkt. # 111) ¶ 85.) Split Pivot cannot ask the court to construe “passes” consistently throughout the patent while asking it to construe “sides” differently — at least not without reason, and it offers none. Insofar as the portion of the specification Split Pivot identifies helps either party, it helps Trek. The drawings in the '212 patent contain a brake link that not only “moves next to” the rear wheel but also extends entirely beyond it on both lateral sides of the wheel at the front end. This is to say, the drawings are at least consistent with Trek’s narrower interpretation. On the other hand, the drawings are also consistent with Split Pivot’s broader construction. Thus, these drawings do not definitively resolve the parties’ disagreement, and the specification provides no further context for how “passes” should be interpreted. While acknowledging the term “passes” is susceptible to multiple meanings in general, Trek argues that definitions of the transitive form of “passes” support its interpretation. Unfortunately, like Split Pivot’s arguments, Trek’s attack suffers from its own flaw: Trek contends that Split Pivot relies on an “intransitive form of ‘passes,’ ” while the claims at issue “use ‘passes’ in its transitive form’ ” (def.’s Reply (dkt. # 176) 9-10), but this is not quite grammatically correct. A transitive verb takes a direct object, and the claim here has none, at least technically. Rather, “frame member” is the object of the preposition “of,” part of an adjectival, prepositional phrase that modifies “sides.” Even though Trek’s reasoning is flawed, the court finds its construction persuasive based on the ordinary meaning of the word “pass.” Even definitions of the intransitive form of “pass” — indeed, even some of the definitions Split Pivot cites — carry with them the sense of proceeding beyond, or leaving something behind. See, e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1284 (4th ed. 2000) (defining the intransitive form of “pass” as “to move on or ahead; proceed,” “to extend; run,” “to move by,” “to move past another vehicle”) (emphasis added); see also PL’s Resp. (dkt. # 153) 26 (citing definitions including “to go past something” and “to go onwards or move by or past”). A person of ordinary skill in the art, confronted with this element, would read it to require that the brake link pass — that is, go past— on two sides of a frame member. Trek also argues that this limitation must be present in all states of compression; that is, the brake link must extend beyond a frame member on both sides regardless of how much the suspension has been compressed. As support, Trek points out that claims 1 and 43, in which the limitation appears, are silent as to the state of compression. In contrast, some of the other claims in the '212 patent specify the state of compression of the suspension. {See, e.g., '212 patent, 20:15-18 (“The suspension system of claim 3, said suspension system further comprising an instant center that is below the shock absorber when the suspension is uncompressed”); 20:31-33 (“The suspension of claim 7, wherein the second perpendicular distance of the instant center to the ground is measured when the suspension is 50 percent compressed”).) Thus, Trek argues, Weagle obviously knew how to provide for specific states of compression in his claims, and the court should not construe this limitation to include embodiments in which the brake link “moves into” position upon compression. Trek’s claim differentiation argument is superficially appealing, but the implications are troubling: to hold that the brake link must pass on two sides of a frame member in all states of compression based on the dependent claims would be to narrow the claim by virtue of the absence of an additional limitation. This strikes the court as problematic, particularly since the case to which Trek cites in support not only observes that differences among claims can help guide a court in construing particular terms, but also that “the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives -rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (emphasis added); cf. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“The juxtaposition of independent claims lacking any reference to a pressure jacket with dependent claims that add a pressure jacket limitation provides strong support for Liebel’s argument that the independent claims were not intended to require the presence of a pressure jacket.”). Trek seems to be arguing the opposite: that is, since some dependent claims recite different states of compression, the independent claim necessarily incorporates all of those limitations. While an uncompressed shock absorber may well have been what the inventor contemplated for purposes of this limitation, nothing in the patent language dictates or even provides context for this reading. The specification is silent as to the shock absorber’s state of compression in regard to this element. More importantly, the claim itself is silent as to the state of compression. Ultimately, Trek is inviting the court' to read in additional limitations and further narrow the scope of Split Pivot’s claims where nothing in the patent supports those limitations. This does not end the court’s construction of this element, however, since there is also a dispute as to what constitutes a “frame member.” The central disagreement between the parties is whether components of the suspension system are considered “frame members” for the purposes of this limitation. Split Pivot argues that “frame member” need not be construed, and that its plain meaning can include the links that make up the suspension system. Trek contends that frame members are separate from components of the suspension, and draws upon language from the specification defining the “frame” to offer a proposed construction of “frame member” as “structural support for components of a suspension system,” presumably intended to exclude the components of the suspension system itself. Split Pivot argues that, should the court adopt Trek’s construction of “frame member,” the wheel link, brake link and control link nevertheless are “frame members” since they provide structural support for one another and, thus, for other “components of a suspension system.” The court agrees, at least insofar as Trek’s proposed construction would introduce ambiguity into the term “frame member” that is not supported by the specification. Determining the ordinary meaning of “frame member,” as understood in the context of the entire patent by a person of ordinary skill in the art, avoids the questions that would arise under Trek’s proposed construction. Therefore, what remains for this court to decide is whether the ordinary meaning of “frame member” includes links of the suspension system. As a starting point, the court notes that the specification does not suggest that the wheel, brake or control links are part of the “frame” as Weagle used that term. In fact, the specification consistently differentiates the frame and the links. For example, in describing one of the preferred embodiments, the specification states that “[a] frame 11 provides the structure for the vehicle.... The frame 11 provides a support or mounting location for power-train components such as[:] engines, gears, transmissions, and fuel tanks; suspension parts such as forks, rear suspension and front suspension; operator interfaces such as handlebars and seats; and accessories such as water bottles and batteries for lights.” ('212 patent, 4:45-53 (emphasis added).) It goes on to specify that in that embodiment, “[a] wheel link 1 is mounted to the frame 11” ('212 patent, 4:53-54) and “the brake link 2 will transmit force to the frame 11 via the control link 3 and wheel link 1.” ('212 patent, 5:5-7.) Similarly, a “control link 3 is attached to the frame 11” ('212 patent, 4:11-12), and “[t]he shock absorber 12 is mounted to the frame 11” ('212 patent, 4:18-19). This language is repeated in the description of the other preferred embodiment. {See '212 patent, 4:39, 42-47, 47-48, 66-67, 5:5-6, 12-13.) The consistent differentiation 6f the “frame” from the components of the rear suspension system throughout the specification strongly suggests that those suspension components are not part of the “frame,” and thus they would not be “frame members” as a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that term in context. Still, as Split Pivot points out, the specification states that “[a] frame, in certain embodiments, may be comprised of ... seatstays, chainstays, a seatstay, [and] a chainstay.” ('212 patent, 17:23, 59.) The court agrees that in light of this explicit definition, seatstays and chainstays would be considered “frame members,” since they are specifically listed as components of which a frame may be comprised. Even so, this does not prove, as Split Pivot further contends, that wheel links and brake links are “frame members,” because the court does not read “seatstay” and “chainstay” to be synonymous with “brake link” and “wheel link.” As Trek’s expert explained: While non-suspension bicycles include chainstays and seat stays, these frame parts are replaced by links in rear suspension bicycles. While it is common to continue to refer to these links as chain-stays and seat stays for convenience, it is my opinion that one of ordinary skill in the art:reading the above list in the context of the specification would not understand the listed “ehainstay(s)” and “seatstay(s) to refer to a “wheel link,” a “brake link,” or any other link specifically named in the, patent. (Expert Report of Edward M. Caulfield (dkt. # 139) ¶ 49.) Certainly, in some contexts, a person of ordinary skill in the art would read “seat-stay” and “chainstay” to refer to the components in a suspension bicycle. Indeed, Caulfield indicates that it is “common” to do so, but what is important for claims construction purposes is what a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood those terms to mean in light of the context of the entire patent. The '212 patent never uses the word “seatstay” or “chainstay” in connection with the brake link and wheel link, respectively. Rather, Weagle clearly identifies the suspension components in his invention as links, consistently refers to them as such, and never equates “links” to “stays.” Given this context, the court does not believe a person of ordinary skill in the art would then read the terms “seatstay” and “chainstay” to mean the same thing as “brake link” and “wheel link,” respectively. On the contrary, the terms are neither explicitly equated, nor implicitly associated -with one another, in this context. The remainder of the specification provides further support for this interpretation. For example, in describing further embodiments of the invention, the patent provides an extensive list of components that can comprise “[a] moving suspension component of a suspension system of the invention.” ('212 patent, 17:63-18:32.) Nowhere in the list does the patent identify a “seatstay” .or “chainstay” as a moving suspension component. Likewise, the specification states that “[a] vehicle using a suspension of the invention may, in certain embodiments, comprise ... a frame, [and] a moving suspension component.” ('212 patent, 15:65-16:2.) Ultimately, the court finds no support for Split Pivot’s argument that a “frame member” includes the components of the suspension system itself, and só in finding that “frame member” takes its ordinary and customary meaning, the court proceeds with this distinction in mind. C. Markush Group Limitations Some of the claims the court has been asked to construe contain so-called Markush groups. “A Markush group is a listing of specified alternatives of a group in a patent claim, typically expressed in the form: a member selected from the group consisting of A, B, and C.” Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1280 (Fed.Cir.2003). By the use of this traditional “consisting of’ language, “members of the Markush group are used singly.” Id. at 1280-81 (quoting Meeting Held to Promote Uniform Practice In Chemical Divisions, 28 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 849, 852 (1946)). Thus, while typically an indefinite article such as ‘a’ or ‘an’ carries the meaning of “one or more,” “such an indefinite article used in conjunction with a Markush grouping does not receive such latitude because a proper Markush group is limited by the closed language term ‘consisting of.’ ” Id. at 1281 (emphasis added). “If a patentee desires mixtures or combinations of the members of the Markush group, the patentee would need to add qualifying language while drafting the claim.” Id. Without such express language, “a patentee does not claim anything other than the plain reading of the closed claim language.” Id. The '212 patent contains two different Markush groups. One is present in independent claims 1 and 22, which requires that the “shock absorber is mounted to a link selected from the group consisting of a brake link, a control link, and a wheel link” ('212 patent, 20:1-3; 21:30-32) (“the Mounting Element”). The other is present in independent claims 1, 22 and 43 of the '212 patent, which requires that “said shock absorber is selected from the group consisting of a compression gas spring, a leaf spring, a coil spring, and a fluid” ('212 patent, 20:3-5; 21:34-36; 22:58-60) (“the Shock Absorber Element”). The court will address the requirements of these Markush groups in turn. i. The Mounting Element The parties offer the following construction of the element “wherein said shock absorber is mounted to a link selected from the group consisting of a brake link, a control link, and a wheel link”: _Split Pivot_Trek_ “wherein said shock absorber is mounted to ’’wherein said shock absorber is mounted to one or more links selected from the group one and only one link, and no other link, consisting of a brake link, a control link, and selected from the group consisting of a brake a wheel link”_link, a control link, and a wheel link”_ Split Pivot contends that regardless of the patent’s invocation of the Markush group language, the court should construe “a link selected from the group consisting of’ to read “a link or links selected from the group consisting of.” Split Pivot argues that no rigid rules of construction apply to Markush groups, and that in claims construction, the indefinite article “a” is generally construed as meaning “one or more.” Although Split Pivot recognizes that the word “a” used with the closed language “consisting of’ generally means “only one member of a Markush group,” Abbott Labs., 334 F.3d at 1281, it seizes on language in Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 432 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed.Cir.2005), in which the Federal Circuit noted that “the claim language ‘consisting of ... a sodium phosphate,’ on its own, suggests the use of a single sodium phosphate.” Id. (emphasis changed). Split Pivot also points out that the Norian court went on to analyze the specification and prosecution history of the patent at issue. In Split Pivot’s view, this broader analysis when coupled with the court’s use of the word “suggests,” indicates that (1) Markush group language alone does not conclude the analysis of the claim scope and (2) this court must ensure a closed construction is “consistent with the specification and the history” of the patent at issue. (Pi’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (dkt. # 153) 40.) Not surprisingly, in Split Pivot’s view, the specification here makes clear in two separate places that the '212 patent contemplates shock absorbers mounted to more than one link from the list. In contrast, Trek contends that, having admitted the subject limitation is drafted in the form of a Markush group, Split Pivot cannot ignore its legal effect on the claim language. In Trek’s view, Norian does not make the effect of the use of Markush group language a mere “suggestion”; in fact, Norian did not involve a traditional Markush group at all (because it lacked the “selected from a group consisting of’ language); and if anything Norian reaffirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding of Abbott Laboratories by citing it approvingly to support the relevant term’s ultimate construction. Trek argues that (1) the law remains unchanged: Markush groups claim “one and only one” of their listed alternatives, and (2) the intrinsic evidence here supports adherence to the accepted legal analysis of Markush groups. Split Pivot’s reliance on “scraps” in the specification, Trek argues, does not salvage a construction already in conflict with the legal effect of the language of the claims themselves. The court finds Trek’s construction more persuasive. Cases like Abbott Laboratories have unambiguously held that Markush groups are limited by the closed term “consisting of.” See Abbott Labs., 334 F.3d at 1280-81. They have also held that while a patentee may claim combinations of the elements listed in a Markush group, such a claim is not the default: “the patentee would need to add qualifying language while drafting the claim” in order to get that result. Id. at 1281 (quoting Meeting Held to Promote Uniform Practice In Chemical Divisions, supra, which provides qualifying language examples such as “and mixtures thereof’ and “at least one member of the group”). No such qualifying language is present here. The mounting element in the '212 patent claims a classic Markush group and, thus, it has “not claim[ed] anything other than the plain reading of the closed claim language.” Id.; see also 3 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 8.06[2], at 8-488 (2010) (“A trap for the unwary claim drafter using Markush group language is the severely closed nature of a Markush group.”). Split Pivot cites to two district court cases in which courts have found that Markush groups allow for the presence of multiple members: Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., No. 09-5675, 2010 WL 3620203 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 10, 2010), and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 10-5810(MLC), 2013 WL 1314733 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2013). In Teva Pharmaceuticals, the district court construed the claim language “having an amino acid sequence from the group consisting of’ to allow for the presence of more than one amino acid sequence. Teva Pharm., 2010 WL 3620203, at *7. It distinguished Abbott Laboratories on the grounds that Abbott Laboratories involved a claim for a Lewis acid inhibitor in an amount sufficient to prevent degradation. The mixture of two Lewis acid inhibitors to reach the efficacy level was therefore not what the patentee had claimed. See id. (interpreting Abbott Laboratories.). Thus, the Teva Pharmaceuticals court held that “[although Am-gen’s patents must have an effective amount of one of the versions of the patented polypeptide present in the product, it does not mean that only one of the patented versions may be present.” Id. As an initial matter, this court notes that the Federal Circuit has not yet endorsed the view of the Teva Pharmaceuticals court. As a result, this court remains bound by Abbott Laboratories, which states unambiguously enough that members of a Markush group, absent express qualifying language, are used singly. See Abbott Labs., 334 F.3d at 1281. Additionally, to the extent that the Teva Pharmaceuticals court’s reasoning is applicable, it is for the proposition that a Markush group indicates a single member of the group carries out the given junction. See Teva Pharm., 2010 WL 3620203, at *7. This is consistent with the long-standing purpose of Markush groups, which recite members that are “alternatively useable for the purposes of the invention.” Abbott Labs., 334 F.3d at 1280 (quoting In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1249 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (emphasis added)). Applying the reasoning of Teva Pharmaceuticals in light of the purpose of Markush group language in this case, the drafter here chose language indicating that the claimed suspension system requires the shock absorber to be mounted to a link; any one of the three enumerated links would be “alternatively useable” for the system’s purposes. Id. Two or more links serving that same function, in contrast, is- not what the inventor claimed. Though the plain language claims only suspension systems with a shock absorber mounted to one and only one of the listed links, Split Pivot contends that two places in the specification indicate that “a link selected from the group” must be construed as “one or more links selected from the group.” First, a general statement in the specification reads, “Throughout this application the singular includes the plural and the plural includes the singular, unless indicated otherwise.” ('212 patent, 19:59-61.) This statement does not help Split Pivot, since the Markush group language itself and the closed nature of “consisting of’ represents just such an indication to limit “a” to its singular sense. Cf. Norian Corp., 432 F.3d at 1359 (noting that though generally the word “a” means “one or more,” the general rule does not apply “when, as in this case, it has been used in conjunction with the closed transitional phrase ‘consisting of ”). Second, Split Pivot points to another statement in t