Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING APPLICATION OF CERCLA SECTION 127 WANGER, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff, the State of California Department of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”), brings this motion for partial summary judgment that newly enacted CERCLA Section 127, the Superfund Recycling Equity Act (“the Act”), a rider to H.R. 3194, the 2000 Consolidated Appropriation Act, signed into law by the President November 29, 1999, see Pub.L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-598 (1999), does not apply to this pending action. The issue of the Act’s application to pending cost-recovery , actions for past transactions has not been decided in this Circuit. Three oppositions were filed on behalf of Defendants and Third Parties; the three lead defendants are: Augustine Metals, Inc., Certain Original Sellers (“Sellers”), and the Steinmeyer Corporation. The Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries, Inc. (“Amicus”) filed an opposition as amicus curiae. II. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Maffei v. Northern Ins. Co. of New York, 12 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir.1993). A genuine issue of fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir.1995); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Plaintiffs move for “partial summary judgment regarding application of Section 127.” Such a request is more appropriately brought as a motion for summary adjudication: If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court ... shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). An order under Rule 56(d) narrows the issues and enables the parties to recognize more fully their rights, yet it permits the court to retain full power to completely adjudicate all aspects of the case when the proper time arrives. See 10A CHARLES A. Wright, Arthur R, Miller & Mary Kay KaNE, Federal Practioe And Procedure § 2737, at 455-56 (2d ed.1983). The procedure under Rule 56(d) is designed to be ancillary to a summary judgment motion. Unlike Rule 56(c), which allows for interlocutory judgment on a question of liability, Rule 56(d) does not authorize the entry of a judgment on part of a claim or the granting of partial relief. Id., § 2737, at 457. The obligation imposed on the court by Rule 56(d) to specify the uncon-troverted material facts is technically compulsory. See Woods v. Mertes, 9 F.R.D. 318, 320 (D.Del.1949). However, if the court determines that identifying indisputable facts through partial summary judgment would not materially expedite the adjudicative process, it may decline to do so. See 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, supra, § 2737, at 460. Here, the inquiry does not depend on facts. The facts attending the enactment of Section 127 are not disputed. The interpretation of legislation generally presents an issue of law appropriate for resolution by the Court as a matter of law. See City of St. Louis v. Department of Transportation, 936 F.2d 1528, 1535 (8th Cir.1991) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 864-66, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)); United States v. Carr, 66 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Moore, 38 F.3d 977, 979 (8th Cir.1994); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Rand & Reed Powers Partnership, 972 F.Supp. 1194, 1202 (N.D.Iowa 1997) (citing Carr and Moore for the principle: “[Sjtat-utory interpretation-particularly interpretation of the effect of a statute where facts are undisputed-is primarily a legal question amenable to summary judgment.”). A motion that presents only a question of law is appropriately resolved on summary adjudication. See Hulmes v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 924 F.Supp. 673, 678 (D.N.J.1996). III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On January 13, 1997, DTSC filed this suit for cost recovery and declaratory relief under CERCLA sections 107(a) and 113(g) for response, removal and remedial costs resulting from a release or threat of release of hazardous substances, and for injunctive relief to abate conditions at or around the site at Mojave, California, known as the “Mobile Smelting Property.” Of the eleven Defendants, ten are scrap metal dealers who brought scrap metal to the Mobile Smelting Site to have it burned or smelted in order to recover the metal. Two of the ten have settled with Plaintiff. The eleventh, the United States is alleged to have sold the scrap materials to the scrap metal dealers. Two years after the suit was filed, Congress passed the Act. See Pub.L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-598 (1999). Section 127, “SUPERFUND RECYCLING EQUITY,” is found in Title VI: (a) PURPOSES. — The purposes of this section are - (1) to promote the reuse and recycling of scrap material in furtherance of the goals of waste minimization and natural resource conservation while protecting human health and the environment; (2) to create greater equity in the statutory treatment of recycled versus virgin materials; and (3) to remove the disincentives and impediments to recycling created as an unintended consequence of the 1980 Superfund liability provisions. § 6001(a). To achieve these ends, Section 127 clarifies liability: (b) CLARIFICATION OF LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA FOR RECYCLING TRANSACTIONS. - (1) CLARIFICATION. — Title I of the Comprehensive Environmental .Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.) Is amended by adding at the end the following new section: “SEC. 127 RECYCLING TRANSACTIONS.” “(a) LIABILITY CLARIFICATION. -” “(1) As provided in subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e), a person who arranged for recycling of recyclable material shall not he liable under sections 107(a)(3) or section 107(a)(4) with respect to such material.” 1501A-598-99 (emphasis added). The effect of Section 127 is to exempt from arranger liability and transporter liability under CERCLA §§ 107(a)(3) and (a)(4), set forth below, recyclers who arrange for or transport recyclable material. In general, CERCLA liability attaches when a defendant is within one of the four classes of parties subject to CERCLA’s liability provisions. See Long Beach Unified School Dish v. Dorothy B. Godwin California Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir.1994). One such “class” is an “arranger;” who: by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). A second class is, a “transporter;” who: accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). The reason the four “classes” are listed is so that liability “reach[es] back through the causal chain from those who ultimately dispose of a hazardous substance to those who transport and generate it.” Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville and Denton Railroad Co., 142 F.3d 769, 774 (4th Cir.1998). Section 127(a)(1) exempts recyclers of “recyclable materials.” “Recyclable material” is defined as: scrap paper, scrap plastic, scrap glass, scrap textiles, scrap rubber (other than whole tires), scrap metal, or spent lead-acid, spent nickel-cadmium, and other spent batteries, as well as minor amounts of material incident to or adhering to the scrap material as a result of its normal and customary use prior to becoming scrap. See id. at § 127(b). Whether a transaction is “arranged for recycling” depends on the type of recyclable material: 1) scrap paper, plastic, glass, textiles, or rubber, see id. at § 127(c); 2) scrap metal, see id. at § 127(d); or 3) batteries, see id. at § 127(e). The burden is on the person who arranged for a transaction, by selling recyclable material or by otherwise arranging for the recycling of recyclable material, to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the statutory criteria are met. See id. §§ 127(c)-(e). Title VI expressly addresses the temporal reach of Section 127: EFFECT ON PENDING OR CONCLUDED ACTIONS.-The exemptions provided in this section shall not affect any concluded judicial or administrative action or any pending judicial action initiated by the United States prior to enactment of this section. Id. § 1270) at 113 Stat. 1501A-602. This provision does not expressly address pending judicial actions filed by parties other than the United States. Technically speaking, the DTSC is an entity “within” the California Environmental Protection Agency. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 58000. The California Environmental Protection Agency is a state agency. See Cal. Govt. Code § 12800. Although termed a “Department,” DTSC has been characterized by the California Supreme Court as a state agency. See Foster-Gardner Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 18 Cal.4th 857, 889, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 107, 959 P.2d 265 (Cal.1998). Here, a state agency seeks cost-recovery for past and future transactions in a pending judicial action. On January 28, 2000, Plaintiff sought partial summary judgment for an interpretation that Section 127’s relief from liability provisions do not apply to this pending judicial action. All oppositions seek a statutory interpretation that Section 127 applies to all past, present, and future transactions. IV. WHEN CAN A STATUTE BE APPLIED TO PENDING CASES? A. RETROSPECTIVE v. RETROACTIVE To answer the question whether a statute can be applied to pending cases, the Supreme Court set forth an analytical construct in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). See Resolution Trust Carp. v. Bayside Developers, 43 F.3d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir.1994). This analysis discusses statutes in terms of whether they are retroactive. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at -. “Retroactivity is generally disfavored in the law, in accordance with ‘fundamental notions of justice’that have been recognized throughout history.” Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 532, 118 S.Ct. 2131, 141 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998) (citations omitted). Landgraf prescribes a two-part test: 1) has Congress expressly prescribed the temporal reach of the statute?; and, if not, 2) does the statute have retroactive effect? The Ninth Circuit has refined its analysis of the term “retroactive,” in United States v. $811,251.76, 51 F.3d 207, 210 & n. 3 (9th Cir.1995); as explained by the dissent in Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc): “[cjontrary to popular misconception, not all laws that apply to pending cases are ‘retroactive,’ ” Id. at 1502. If a statute applies to pending cases, it is termed “retrospective.” See $811,251.76, 51 F.3d at 210 n. 3. “[A] retrospective statute is retroactive if it attaches new legal consequences to prior acts so as to justify the presumption against retrospective application.” Id. at 210 n. 3. This suggests the first Landgraf inquiry determines if a statute is retrospective, and the second inquiry examines if it is retroactive. “Landgraf teaches that courts should not apply ‘retroactive’ statutes ‘retrospectively’ absent clear congressional intent.” United States ex rel Lindenthal v. General Dynamics Carp., 61 F.3d 1402, 1407 (9th Cir.1995). “Laws that have no ‘retroactive effect’ when applied to pending cases are deemed, in our circuit, ‘retrospective’ laws.” Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1502 (in dissent) (citing Lindenthal, 61 F.3d at 1408). Following the retrospective distinction, district courts have adopted varying analyses. See Mannatt v. United States, 951 F.Supp. 172, 176 (E.D.Cal.1996) (“[T]o determine whether [a statutory amendment] applies retrospectively, the court must consider whether the statute would have a ‘retroactive effect’ if applied retrospectively.”); Sousa v. Chater, 945 F.Supp. 1312, 1328 (E.D.Cal.1996) (“[0]ne clear principle stands out: If Congress has indicated that a statute is to have effect in cases pending at the time of the statute’s enactment, the analysis ends, except in situations where retroactive effect of the statute would work unfairness of constitutional magnitude.”); Madrid v. Gomez, 940 F.Supp. 247, 249 (N.D.Cal.1996) (“[C]ourts must first determine “whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach,” and, if so, “that ends the matter and we follow Congressional command (assuming such command does not itself violate the Constitution).”). 1. • The Landgraf Test “Deciding when a statute operates ‘retroactively’ is not always a simple or mechanical task,” Landgraf 511 U.S. at 268, 114 S.Ct. 1483: when a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events giving rise to the suit, a court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done so, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. Where the statute in question unambiguously applies to preenactment conduct, there is no conflict between the antire-troactivity presumption and the principle that a court should apply the law in effect at the time of decision. Even absent specific legislative authorization, application of a new statute to cases arising before its enactment is unquestionably proper in many situations. However, where the new statute would have a genuinely retroactive effect — i.e., where it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase his liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed — the traditional presumption teaches that the statute does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result. Id. at 269-70, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Landgraf prescribes a two-part test: 1) has Congress expressly prescribed the temporal reach of the statute?; and,, if not, 2) does the statute have retroactive effect? 2. Landgraf Applied a. Express Language Prescribing 127’s Temporal Reach To determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach, a court first examines the statute’s language to ascertain whether Congress has given an “express command,” see Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483, or an “unambiguous directive” that the law apply retrospectively, see Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 119 S.Ct. 1998, 2004, 144 L.Ed.2d 347 (1999). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) observes, “Landgraf did not speak to the rules for determining” whether a statute contains an “express command” or an “unambiguous directive.” Lindh, 521 U.S. at 327, 117 S.Ct. 2059. “In determining a statute’s temporal reach generally, our normal rules of construction apply.” Id. at 326, 117 S.Ct. 2059. Even without ambiguity in the statute, direct or implied evidence of legislative intent is discerned from the statute’s structure, legislative history, and the context in which the statute was passed. See Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2004 (structure and legislative history); Magana-Pizano v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 200 F.3d 603, 611 (9th Cir.1999) (legislative history); Tworivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987 (9th Cir.1999) (plain language and legislative history); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d at 1495 (context in which the statute was passed). “[E]ven absent explicit statutory language mandating retroactivity, laws may be applied retroactively if courts are able to discern ‘clear congressional intent favoring such a result.’ ” United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1512-13 (11th Cir.1997). b. Does the statute have retroactive effect? Absent Congress’ “unambiguous directive” or “express command” for a statute’s retrospective application and if Congressional intent is not clearly stated, the second Landgraf inquiry asks whether the statute has retroactive effect. See Landgraf 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1488; Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2003 (“If there is no congressional directive on the temporal reach of a statute ... then in keeping with our ‘traditional presumption’ against retro-activity, we presume that the statute does not apply to that conduct.”). This inquiry starts with a presumption against retro-spectivity. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Tests to decide if the statute operates retroactively include: “... whether it would impair rights a party possessed when [the party] acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. These three categories are not exclusive, they qualify as a “sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition for invoking the presumption against retroactivity.” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 947, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); accord Tworivers, 174 F.3d at 993 (quoting Hughes). Retroactive application of a procedural statute has been consistently rejected when such application would “result in manifest injustice.” Tworivers, 174 F.3d at 994. Landgraf identifies three types of laws that generally do not have retroactive effect: 1) those authorizing prospective relief; 2) those conferring or removing jurisdiction; and 3) those statutes properly characterized as procedural. See Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914-15 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting Tworivers, 174 F.3d at 994 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483)). The label, i.e., procedural or jurisdictional, is not, in and of itself, dis-positive. See Fink, 192 F.3d at 915 (quoting Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2006). Ultimately, inquiry into whether a statute operates retroactively “demands a common sense, functional judgment,” Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2006, which “should be informed and guided by ‘familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations,’ ” id. B. CLARIFICATION OR CHANGE OF EXISTING LAW A second, separate analytical approach to whether a new statute can be applied to pending cases has developed in the case law, premised on whether the statute is a clarification or a change of existing law. If the statute is a clarification, it “accurately restates the prior law” and there is no need for a Landgraf analysis because the statute has no retroactive effect. Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir.1999), cert. denied, — U.S. -, -, 120 S.Ct. 980, 980, 145 L.Ed.2d 930 (2000), is a leading example: “[C]oncerns about retroactive application are not implicated when an amendment that takes effect after the initiation of a lawsuit is deemed to clarify relevant law rather than effect a substantive change in the law.” Id. at 1283 (citing Beverly Community Hosp. Assoc. v. Belshe, 132 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir.1997), Liquilux Gas Corp. v. Martin Gas Sales, 979 F.2d 887, 890 (1st Cir.1992), and Boddie v. American Broadcasting Co., 881 F.2d 267, 269 (6th Cir.1989)). Piamba Cortes does not discuss Landgraf, Lindh, Martin, or any other Supreme Court statutory retroactivity case. “Several factors are relevant when determining if an amendment clarifies, rather than effects a substantive change to, prior law:” A significant factor is whether a conflict or ambiguity existed with respect to the interpretation of the relevant provision when the amendment was enacted. If such an ambiguity existed, courts view this as an indication that a subsequent amendment is intended to clarify, rather than change, the existing law. Id. at 1283-84 (citing Liquilux Gas Carp, v. MaHin Gas Sales, 979 F.2d 887, 890 (1st Cir.1992)). Weight is given to “[a] declaration by the enacting body that its intent is to clarify the prior enactment,” the importance of the statute’s text and its legislative history. Id. at 1284. After Landgraf, the Ninth Circuit, has primarily applied the clarification v. change principle to determine if modifications to the Sentencing Guidelines have retroactive effect. See e.g., Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861,'863-64 (9th Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Felix, 87 F.3d 1067, 1060 (9th Cir.1996) (clarifications to the Sentencing Guidelines apply retroactively). The Ninth Circuit has applied the clarification v. change principle in other types of cases. See Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470, 475 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732, 754-55 (5th Cir.1990), vacated on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 112 S.Ct. 2727, 120 L.Ed.2d 575 (1992)). V. THE LANDGRAF ANALYSIS A. DOES SECTION 127 CONTAIN AN ‘EXPRESS COMMAND” OR “UNAMBIGUOUS DIRECTIVE” AS TO TEMPORAL REACH? 1. Plain Language of Section 127(i) “In statutory interpretation, the starting point is always the language of the statute itself.” Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1495. Section 127(i), the most explicit temporal reach provision of the Act, prescribes: (i) Effect On Pending OR Conoluded AcTiONS.-The exemptions provided in this section shall not affect any concluded judicial or administrative action or any pending judicial action initiated by the United States prior to enactment of this section. Plaintiff argues that because there is no explicit statement that Section-127 applies to pending judicial proceedings brought by a state agency before the date of the enactment, Section 127 does not apply to this case: “[Congress] merely needed to state that the amendment applied to all pending actions, except those brought by the United States.” Lindh expressly rejected this argument; that for a new statute to apply to a pending case, it must affirmatively state it so applies: In determining whether a statute’s terms would produce a retroactive effect, however, and in determining a statute’s temporal reach generally, our normal rules of construction apply. Although Landgraf s default rule would deny application when a retroactive ef-feet would otherwise result, other construction rules may apply to remove even the possibility of retroactivity (as by rendering the statutory provision wholly inapplicable to a particular case). 521 U.S. at 326,117 S.Ct. 2059. Augustine argues that 127(i)’s language “confirms that Section 127 applies to all actions pending at the time of enactment, except those initiated by the United States;” presumably, because Congress had no reason to identify actions to which Section 127 does not apply, unless it intended Section 127 to apply to all other pending cases. The express language of Section 127(i) does not mention retrospective application to pending cases. What the express temporal language does say is that Section 127’s exemptions do not apply to any concluded administrative or judicial action, regardless of the identity of the party who initiated the action; or to any pending judicial action initiated by the United States. Steinmeyer’s “plain language” argument relies on the statement of purpose that appears in Section 6001. This addresses structure, not plain language and is addressed below. Sellers argue that Section 127(i) states three limited exceptions to retrospectivity. It expressly mentions three types of actions to which the statute does not apply. To find Section 127 applicable to all other pending actions, it must be inferred that Congress intentionally omitted mention of pending cases to which Section 127 does apply, because it intended the Act to apply retrospectively to all such cases and instead expressly defined the cases to which the Act does not apply. Sellers contend this “is not merely a ‘negative inference.’ ” Plaintiff responds this interpretation is analogous to the Lindh negative inference argument; ie., if Congress intended retro-spectivity, it would have said so. Even assuming this is a “negative inference” interpretation, it is permissible to consider “negative inference” in a retroactivity analysis. See United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d at 1513 (“Landgraf ‘did not preclude all future use of a negative inference analysis in support of retroactive intent.’”) (quoting State of Nevada v. United States, 925 F.Supp. 691, 693 (1996)). Jeffries compared two chapters of the AEDPA, one expressly retrospective, the other not, to justify not drawing a negative inference to make both retrospective. Section 127 does not have a comparable statutory composition. The application Sellers seek here is “positive” inference; ie., the absence of language specifying Section 127 applies to pending actions means Congress intended it to apply; not the converse, since Congress did not say it, the statute cannot apply to pending cases. The language of the Act alone does not contain an express command or unambiguous directive that the statute is to be applied retrospectively to pending judicial actions brought a State. Amicus and Augustine cite Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340-42, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997), and United States v. Lewis, 67 F.3d 225, 228-29 (9th Cir.1995), describing that the first step in statutory interpretation “is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning.” Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340, 117 S.Ct. 843. The “inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989)). “Canons of statutory construction dictate that if the language of a statute is clear, we look no further than that language in determining the statute’s meaning.” Lewis, 67 F.3d at 228. These cases, do not explicitly address legislative retrospectivity and use differing terms to define the review standard.. Compare Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340, 117 S.Ct. 843 (“plain and unambiguous”) and Lewis, 67 F.3d at 228 (“clear”), with Martin, 527 U.S. at 353, 119 S.Ct. 1998 (“unambiguous directive” or “express command”). Steinmeyer cites three cases as authority that the statutory interpretation ceases if the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous: Kaiser Aluminum v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990), United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992), and Olin, 107 F.3d at 1512. Kaiser Aluminum holds, “Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [the statute’s] language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.’” Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 835, 110 S.Ct. 1570 (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)). Nordic Village explicates the “settled rule that a statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has some operative effect.” Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 36, 112 S.Ct. 1011. Neither case discusses retroactivity. Olin recognizes that Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1569 (11th Cir.1996) (en banc), “left open the question of whether ‘evidence of legislative intent other than in an express statutory command’ would satisfy Landgraf s first prong.” Olin, 107 F.3d at 1512 (quoting Hunter, 101 F.3d at 1569) (emphasis added). It concluded “even absent explicit statutory language mandating ret-roactivity, laws may be applied retroactively if courts are able to discern ‘clear congressional intent favoring such a result.’ ” Id. at 1512-13 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483). 2. Structure of the Statute A court must “interpret the statute to give effect to all of its parts.” Estate of Magnin, 184 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.1999). This includes giving effect, if possible, to every word Congress used, see National Labor Relations Bd. v. A-Plus Roofing, Inc., 39 F.3d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir.1994); considering “the purpose of the statute ‘in its entirety,’ ” United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir.1999) (citing Alarcon v. Keller Industries, Inc., 27 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir.1994))’ and examining “whether the proposed interpretation would frustrate or advance that purpose,” id. (citing Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (9th Cir.1997)). a.Historical Retrospectivity of CERC-LA Amendments Amicus applies a parity of reasoning: since CERCLA is retroactive, it “logically follows” that its amendments, and therefore the Act, are retrospective. Reference is made to how other statutory amendments to CERCLA have been held retrospective, specifically, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”). United States v. Tyson, Civ. A. No. 84-2663, 1989 WL 159256 at *8 (E.D.Pa.1989), held “there is no question that [SARA’s] provisions apply retroactively.” Id. Tyson found: The legislative history of SARA recognized that courts had previously determined that CERCLA contained an inherent federal common law right to contribution, but Congress thought • it necessary to clarify and confirm such right. H.R. 99-253(1) (Energy and Commerce Comm.), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Congr. & Admin. News 2861. The legislative history of SARA makes clear that the statute’s explicit right for contribution was designed to encourage settlements and cleanups. Id. The historical retrospectivity theory is entitled to some weight, but is not conclusive. It is evidence Congress was on notice that courts have retrospectively applied CERCLA amendments. b. Verb Tense Amicus argues every word tense should be given effect; specifically: “[T]he courts have already ruled on numerous occasions that Congress’ consistent use of the past tense in outlining the statutory requirements of CERCLA suggest the view that this law was intended to apply retroactively.” It contends: [t]his rationale should apply with equal validity to the operation of Section 127; just as Congress employed the past tense, in such words as ‘operated,’ ‘arranged,’ and ‘incurred,’ to provide the basis for the pre-enactment retroactive application of CERCLA’s liability provisions, Congress has again used the past tense to specify the requirements of Section 127, relying on Nova Chemicals, Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F.Supp. 1098 (E.D.Tenn.1996), which held an amendment to CERCLA retrospective, based, in part, on the recognition that “CERCLA’s liability provisions are written in the past tense.” Id. at 1103. Nova cited Cooper Indus. v. Agway, Inc., 1996 WL 550128 at *8-*9 (N.D.N.Y.1996) [Cooper I ], an unpublished New York district court case that concluded the choice of past tense in CERCLA’s liability provisions “suggests that Congress intended for CERCLA liability to reach back before the enactment date.” See Nova, at 1103 (quoting Cooper I at *9). The use of past verb tense in CERCLA-amendment retro-spectivity analysis is not conclusive; it is circumstantial evidence of legislative intent that favors retrospectivity. c. Statute Headings The introductory provision of the Act, Section 6001(a), headed “Superfund Recycling Equity,” describes the purposes of the amendment. Section 6001(b) is titled: (b) CLARIFICATION OF LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA FOR RECYCLING TRANSACTIONS. - (1) CLARIFICATION — Title I of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.) Is amended by adding at the end the following new section, followed by Section 127: “SEC. 127. RECYCLING TRANSACTIONS.” “(a) LIABILITY CLARIFICATION -” “(1) As provided in subsection (b), (c), (d), and (e) ... shall not be liable When Congress clarifies a statute, it adds language to show how the law originally was intended to operate. See Meyerhoff v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 968 F.2d 1498, 1502 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111, 121 (6th Cir.1980): “An amendment to an existing statute is not an acknowledgment by Congress that the original statute is invalid. It is a common and customary legislative procedure to enact amendments strengthening and clarifying existing laws”). Congress is presumed to understand the legal import of words it uses in light of existing case law. See Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1495. Congress’ use of the term “clarification” three times in the operative liability provisions of the statute’s text is strong evidence that it intended retrospective effect. It is presumed “Congress legislate[s] with awareness of relevant judicial decisions.” Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1495. In this Circuit, judicial decisions clearly establish the retrospective effect of a statutory amendment that is a clarification. See United States v. Innie, 77 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 67 F.3d 855, 856 (9th Cir.1995): “The Ninth Circuit has consistently stated that when an amendment is a clarification, rather than an alteration, of existing law, then it should be used in interpreting the provision in question retroactively.”) A clarification is enacted for the benefit of the courts and the parties to provide interpretative guidance as to the underlying statute. See Means v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court, 154 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir.1998) (stating in the concurrence: a clarification is a statement “of what [Congress] believed the law already was” and is applicable “to all cases, past, present and future”). Repeated use of the word “clarification” in the headings of Section 127 is clear, unambiguous, and commanding evidence in favor of retrospeetivity. d. Statutory Purpose The purposes of Section 127 are to: (1) “promote the reuse and recycling of scrap material;” (2) “create greater equity in the statutory treatment of recycled versus virgin materials;” and (3) “remove the disincentives and impediments to recycling created as an unintended consequence of the 1980 Superfund liability provisions.” Sec. 6001(a). Additional goals of the Recycling Act are to correct improper application of CERCLA’s liability scheme and to maintain a healthy recycling industry. Retrospective application is said to “level the playing field,” by eliminating the competitive disadvantage for recycled materials compared to virgin materials and the adverse impact of CERCLA liability on recyclers and scrap processors. See §§ 6001(a)(1), (2) and (3). The statute effectuates its purposes by granting recyclers an exemption from CERCLA liability. Sellers overreach in their contention that by the Act, Congress intended to clarify that certain parties “were not to be sued by the State or private parties under CERCLA either in pending or future cases.” This suggests Section 127 confers absolute immunity from suit. It does not. Absolute immunity is only granted in extremely rare eases. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49, 118 S.Ct. 966, 140 L.Ed.2d 79 (1998) (state and regional legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for their legislative activities); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 733, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) (holding a former President is entitled to absolute immunity from damages as to conduct within the scope of his official duties). By prescribing elements of the recycler exemptions that must be proved, and a burden of proof standard (preponderance), Congress made clear the recycler’s exemption must be raised as an affirmative defense that requires participation in CERCLA litigation. The Act does not provide immunity from suit, which prohibits a party’s inclusion and participation in a lawsuit. Congress recognized the need to remove “disincentives and impediments to recycling.” Expressly carving-out pending judicial actions filed by the United States, supports an inference that there is no reason for Section 127(i)’s specific command excluding such actions from its exemptions, unless the statute retrospectively applies to other pending judicial actions. Retrospective application of the Act advances its purposes by removing the unintended burden and expense on recyclers of CERCLA liability. Congress’ declared intent that recyclers were not intended to be liable is advanced by 127’s retrospective application. A prospective interpretation to all pending actions would frustrate its purpose that “all other lawsuits brought by private parties or against third party defendants in lawsuits originally brought by the U.S. government will no longer proceed under this legislation.” 145 Cong. Rec. S.15028. e. Express Prospective Language Two subsections of 127 address burden of proof, fixing different requirements based on when the transaction occurred. i. Scrap paper, glass, textiles, or rubber Subsection 127(c) exempts arrangers for recycling, who prove: (1) The recyclable material met a commercial specification grade, (2) a market existed for the recyclable material, (3) A substantial portion of the recyclable material was made available for use as feedstock for the manufacture of a new saleable product, and (4) the recyclable material could have been a replacement or substitute for a virgin raw material, or the product to be made from the recyclable material could have been a replacement or substitute for a product made, in whole or in part, from a virgin or raw material. Subsections (1) thorough (4) apply to recycling transactions before 127’s enactment. Subsection 127(c)(5) applies to transactions “occurring ninety days or more after date of enactment of section” (emphasis added). For such prospective transactions only, the required proof is that the recycler: exercised reasonable care to determine that the facility where the recyclable material was handled, processed, reclaimed, or otherwise managed by another person (hereinafter in this section referred to as a “consuming facility”) was in compliance with substantive (not procedural or administrative) provisions of any Federal, State or local environmental law or regulation, or compliance order or decree issued pursuant thereto, applicable to the handling, processing, reclamation, storage, or other management activities associated with recyclable material. Subsections (c)(l)-(4), which define the nature and past use of the recyclable material, are clarifying and retrospective. If not, there is no reason for Congress to prospectively impose only on post-enactment transactions, the additional requirements of § 127(c)(5). This is additional circumstantial evidence from which retrospective temporal reach can be inferred. ii. Difference in Proof Standards for Scrap Metal Scrap metal recycling is also subject to different burdens of proof if the transaction is before or after Section 127’s enactment. Subsection 127(d)(1)(A) requires a person who arranged for recycling scrap metal to prove compliance with subsection 127(c), making applicable the temporal requirements of subsections (l)-(5) discussed above. In the next subsection, 127(d)(1)(B), Congress specifies that proof of compliance with the newly enacted laws is only required “with regard to transactions occurring after the effective date of such regulations or standards.” If Congress intended section 127 in its entirety to apply prospectively, there is no reason for subsection 127(d)(1)(A) to incorporate 127(c)’s past-transaction requirements, nor for subsection 127(d)(1)(B) to specify its applicability solely to post-enactment transactions. A statute should be interpreted to give effect to all of its provisions. See Estate of Magnin, 184 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.1999). This is further evidence of intent that favors retrospectivity. C. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY Legislative history also aids the interpretation of a statute’s language and effect. See Landgraf 511 U.S. at 249, 263, 114 S.Ct. 1483. In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which “represent!] the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.” Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 73, 105 S.Ct. 479, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984) (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186, 90 S.Ct. 314, 24 L.Ed.2d 345 (1969)) (emphasis added); accord Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc., 191 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir.1999) (“This circuit relies on official committee reports when considering legislative history, not stray comments by individuals or other materials unrelated to the statutory language or the committee reports.”). Sellers argue that any finding other than Section 127 is retrospective: “simply ignores the fact that every statement of legislative intent that informed Congress’ vote, including the official Legislative History, made clear that Section 127 was meant to apply retrospectively. There was no debate about this point because there was no disagreement.” However, there is no pre-enactment legislative debate of record for Section 127. The “legislative history,” to which Sellers refer are the entries into the Congressional Record for Section 127. See 145 Cong. Rec. S15048-49. S.1528 was introduced by Senator Lott on August 5, 1999. See id. at S10431. The bill was immediately referred to the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, see id. at S10389, there is no evidence that the committee reported on it. References to S.1528 in the Congressional Record were made almost exclusively when co-sponsors were added. The remarks of Senator Lott, the primary sponsor of S.1528, cannot be ignored. Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263, 106 S.Ct. 1834, 90 L.Ed.2d 248 (1986), holds that “statements by individual legislators should not be given controlling effect, but when they are consistent with the statutory language and other legislative history, they provide evidence of Congress’ intent.” Brock, 476 U.S. at 263, 106 S.Ct. 1834. Here, the statements of Senator Lott are consistent with the “legislative history.” This is not surprising, because Senator Lott introduced the legislative history. S.1528, was a rider to the Omnibus Appropriations Act. There was no committee, House, or Senate floor debate. Brock does not address such a situation. Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564, 96 S.Ct. 2295, 49 L.Ed.2d 49 (1976), directs that an explanation provided by one of the legislation’s sponsors during floor debate “deserves to be accorded substantial weight in interpreting the statute.” Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 564, 96 S.Ct. 2295. Senator Lott’s statements are entitled to such weight. Assuming Algonquin applies, Senator Lott was not the only “chief’ sponsor; he was joined by Senate Minority Leader Daschle, Senators Warner, Chafee, Baucus, and Lincoln, in introducing the Act. See 145 Cong. Rec. 10431. Under Algonquin, the statements of each of these Senators are also considered. Accord Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95, 71 S.Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035 (1951) (“The fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation. It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt”) (emphasis added). In at least one circumstance, the Ninth Circuit has given “greater weight” to the statements of individual legislators. See Mount Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1453-54 (9th Cir.1992). Mount Graham interpreted Section 602(a) of the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act, see id. at 1451-52, for which the legislative history was “exceedingly sparse:” the legislation was passed quickly; no committee hearings were held. The bill originated in the Senate where it was sponsored by both Arizona Senators. One week after the bill’s passage in the Senate, it was adopted by the House with hardly any discussion. In total, the Congressional Record reports the statements of only three Senators and three Representatives. Both Arizona Senators commented on the bill during Senate deliberations, and two of the five Arizona Representatives did so during consideration in the House. Id. at 1453-54 (footnote omitted). The court gave “greater weight than [they] otherwise might” to the statements of individual legislators who spoke on behalf of the legislation because the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act was: special legislation relating to a special project in a particular state, because there were no committee reports and instead the legislators from the affected state explained the project and its impact on the floor, and because no legislator spoke in opposition to the bill. Id. at 1454. Mount Graham has been interpreted to mean where other statutory tools are not determinative, legislative statements can be helpful to determine statutory meaning and Congressional intent. See United States v. van den Berg, 5 F.3d 439, 443 (9th Cir.1993) (citing Mount Graham, 954 F.2d at 1453). Here, the legislative history is even more sparse. All legislative statements, including those by non-sponsors, are considered. 1. Senator Lott Senator Lott’s initial statement about the Act was made October 25, 1999: “The bill is not intended to plow new Superfund ground, nor is it intended to revamp existing Superfund law.” 145 Cong. Rec. S13086 (Oct. 25, 1999). Among Senator Lott’s relevant statements: • “We had one and only one purpose in introducing the Superfund Recycling Equity Act-to remove from the liability loop those who collect and ship recyclables to a third party site.” • “While the bill proposes to amend Superfund, Mr. President, it is really a recycling bill. Recycling is not disposal and shipping for recycling is not arranging for disposal-it is a relatively simple clarification, but one that is necessary to maintain a successful recycling effort nationwide.” • “S.1528 addressed only one Superfund issue-the unintended consequence of law that holds recyclers responsible for the actions of those who purchase their goods.” Senator Lott explicitly emphasizes the corrective purpose of S.1528: CERCLA has created a competitive disadvantage between virgin materials used as manufacturing feedstocks and recyclable material used for precisely the same purpose ... our bill corrects this unintended, consequence of Superfund. It recognizes that recycling is not disposal. That recyclers are not subject to Superfund’s liability scheme should the owners of * * *mills, foundries, or refineries, to which recyclers ship their material, contaminate their facilities. 145 Cong. Rec. S10431 (emphasis added). He observed that throughout the “negotiations” on the bill’s language, “there ha[d] been quite a bit of misrepresentation of the purpose of the bill,” id. at S15048, however: S.1528 was negotiated in 1993 between representatives of the industry that recycles traditional materials-paper, glass, plastic, metals, textiles and rubber-and representatives of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Justice, and the national environmental community. At the end of his remarks, he requested “unanimous consent that the legislative history be inserted in the RECORD,” id. It was. The legislative history includes a statement of purpose: “The [Act] (the language of S.1528) seeks to correct the unintended consequence of CERCLA that actually discourages legitímate recycling.” 145 Cong. Rec. S15048. Specific “legislative history” addresses the Act’s temporal reach provision: Section 127 shall not affect any pending judicial action brought by the United States prior to enactment of this section. Any pending judicial action, whether it was brought in a trial or appellate court, by a private’ party shall be subject to the grant of relief from liability. For the purposes of this section, Congress intends that any third party action or joinder of defendants brought by a private party shall be considered a private party action, regardless of whether or not the original lawsuit was brought by the United States. Additionally, any administrative action brought by any governmental agency but not yet concluded as set forth above, shall be subject to the grant of relief from liability set forth in this 127. 145 Cong. Rec. S15050. This explicitly provides for Section 127’s retrospective application to judicial proceedings brought by private parties and to any administrative action brought by any “governmental agency,” such as the DTSC. No mention is made of pending judicial actions brought by any governmental agency anywhere in the statute or its legislative history. This could be an unintended oversight or an intended omission. State agency administrative actions can result in investigation, remediation, and response orders which have adverse financial consequences to PRPs. It is reasonable to infer that the same retrospective treatment should be applied to pending State judicial actions. No party suggests relief from liability in a state agency administrative action has a substantively different effect from relief from liability in a State judicial action. That - Congress knew this and so intended, can further be implied from its recognition in other pre-127 sections of CERCLA that States and their governmental agencies bring CERCLA actions, independent of the United States. See Washington State Dep’t of Transp. v. Washington Natural Gas Co., Pacificorp, 59 F.3d 793, 801 (9th Cir.1995). After the November 19 reading of the “legislative history,” the Senate agreed to the Conference Report of the omnibus bill, which includes the text of the Act, but no commentary about it. See id. at S15059. See id. at S15048 & S15059. On November 29, 1999, the President signed the bill into law. This legislative history reflects Senator Lott’s “understanding” and intent that the bill was retrospective, except as the statute specifically states to the contrary in 127(i). 2. Senator Lincoln Senator Lincoln’s November 19, 1999 remarks explicitly address retrospectivity: [T]his Superfund Recycling Equity Act is both retroactive and prospective. Slightly different standards must be met for recyclers to be relieved of Superfund liability for recycling transactions that occurred prior to the date of enactment than for those that occur after the date of enactment. But in either scenario, legitimate recyelers ... will no longer be treated as if they were “arranging for disposal of materials containing hazardous substances each time they sell their materials as manufacturing feedstocks Recognizing that this issue has been the focus of much litigation, the Congress intended that the recycling situation be clarified through [this] Act, that is why we have written this legislation in such a fashion that virtually all lawsuits that deal with recycling transactions of paper, glass, plastic, metals, textiles, and rubber are extinguished by this legislation. Only those lawsuits brought prior to enactment of this legislation directly by the United States government against a person will remain viable. 145 Cong. Rec. S15028 (emphasis added). 8. Senator Daschle The commentary of Senator Daschle, made on the Senate floor January 26, 2000, is post-enactment, almost two months after the bill became law. See 146 Cong. Rec. S76. In the Ninth Circuit, “post-enactment legislative history is generally considered to be of minimal assistance in interpreting a statute.” Slaven v. BP America, Inc., 973 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir.1992). Nonetheless, since Senator Daschle was a cosponsor of S.1528, his remarks are considered: Mr. President, I take this opportunity to correct an inadvertent but significant error in the CongRessional Record of November 19, 1999, the last day of the first session of this Congress. It concerns a statement submitted for the Record by Senator Lott (145 Congressional Record S150048) regarding the Superfund Recycling Equity Act ... The statement erroneously was attributed to both Senator LOTT and me. In fact, the statement did not then and does not now reflect my understanding of the Superfund recycling amendments. I make this clarification at the earliest opportunity, in order to minimize the possibility of any mistaken reliance on the statement as the consensus view of two original cosponsors, particularly with respect to the availability of relief in pending cases. Id. (emphasis added). Although he appears to disagree with Senator Lott’s legislative history about availability of relief in pending cases, he does not set forth his interpretation. His statements are of minimal assistance to the analysis. He also suggested courts use S. 1834 from the 103d Congress, which had an extensive Senate Committee Report, as an interpretative tool. See id. at S76. The Supreme Court disavows reliance on introduced bills or even bills passed by prior Congresses, but not enacted. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 263, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Amicus correctly notes pre-Landgraf Ninth Circuit authority held: “In ascertaining the intent of Congress, we see no objection to giving some weight to clear legislative histories of prior bills that are identical to the law we are called on to interpret.” State of Arizona v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Co., 656 F.2d 398, 404 n. 6 (9th Cir.1981) (emphasis added). Senator Daschle’s suggestion that S. 1834 from the 103d Congress should be used as legislative history is not probative. Accord United States v. The Atlas Lederer Co., No. C-3-91-309 (S.D.Ohio Feb. 16, 2000). From Senator Daschle’s post-enactment comments, it may be inferred that one chief co-sponsor was not uniform in his interpretation of Section 127(i). However, no other legislative history, sponsor statement, or other legislator’s comment suggests Section 127 is not retrospective. Senator Daschle’s late comments are entitled to no more than minimal weight. They do not diminish the fact and substance of Section 127’s pre-enactment “legislative history” favoring retrospectivity nor the post-enactment statements of Senators Lott and Lincoln to the same effect. 4. Nortr-Sponsors Generally, the remarks of individual, non-sponsor legislators as to the legislative history of a statute are not accorded great weight, see Hoonah Indian Ass’n v. Morrison, 170 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir.1999) (“The remarks of an individual legislator on the floor are not part of the statute passed by both houses and signed by the President, so they lack the force of law.”). The remarks of other legislators are relevant indica as to unity, or lack of it, as to interpretation. Id. at 1228. Two other legislators made remarks concerning Section 127. On November 18, 1999, the date the Omnibus Appropriations Act was sent to the President, Representative Obey commented on the House Floor about the Recycling Equity Act: This bill reminds me of what Churchill said about Russia, “A riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” We do not have any idea what that bill is really going to do in the fine print. 145 Cong. Rec. H12732. Representative Obey’s statement is an opinion that suggests he believed the statute was subject to differing interpretations. Representative Michael G. Oxley specifically addressed Section 127(i) in his December 3,1999 comments: One reason for this amendment is to ensure that where a judicial or administrative action has been fully complied with, this bill will not force persons who believed that they had fully settled their liability and claims to revisit those issues. However, where a consent decree or other judicial order requires enforcement of its terms after the date of enactment, nothing in this section should be interpreted to prevent a person subject to such future obligations in light of the passage of this legislation.... Nothing in this legislation prevents parties from filing motions under rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to reopen the consent decree with respect to future obligations. 145 Cong. Rec. E2536. These comments address the finality of concluded judicial or administrative actions, but leave open the right of recyclers, subject to a consent decree or other judicial order imposing CERCLA obligations, to challenge and inferentially to seek to limit their future obligations in light of Section 127, regardless of who filed the suit. Neither non-sponsor’s statements detract from retrospectivity-favoring legislative intent. On balance, the statements of all individual legislators weigh heavily in favor of retrospectivity. The language and discernable legislative intent that Section 127 is retrospective, are interpretable as an express command. Only pending judicial actions by United States and concluded judicial and administrative CERCLA actions have been carved out from retrospective application. Arguably, the Landgraf inquiry ends. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483; accord United States Securities and Exchange Commission v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir.1996) (“If Congress has [expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach], ‘there is no need to resort to judicial default rules,’ since the statute guides its application.”). D. APPLICATION OF THE SECOND LANDGRAF INQUIRY: RETROACTIVE EFFECT Assuming, arguendo, the express language analysis is inconclusive, the focus turns to: Does the law have retroactive effect? This is determined by: whether the statute ‘would impair rights a party possessed when [the party] acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to a transaction already completed.’ Tworivers, 174 F.3d at 993 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483). A finding of one or more of these conditions is not a prerequisite to finding retroactive effect. Tworivers, 174 F.3d at 993 (these three conditions are a “sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition for invoking presumption against retroactivity”) (quoting Hughes, 520 U.S. at 947, 117 S.Ct. 1871). It also must be determined if retroactive application “results in ‘manifest injustice.’ ” Fink, 192 F.3d at 915. Manifest injustice is measured by the effect Section 127 has on the rights, duties, and liabilities of the parties. A statute is not retroactive because it applies to transactions that precede the statute’s enactment or “upsets expectations based on prior law.” Landgraf, 511 at 269, 114 S.Ct. 1483. DTSC does not suggest its liability for past conduct is increased or that the statute imposes new duties on it. DTSC argues that its “rights” are impaired because the amendment “has potentially eliminated a cause of action that existed previously and has deprived [it] of the right to seek recovery against a certain class of parties.” The answer to this contention is that recyclers who can satisfy the requirements of Section 127 should not have been liable under the pre-127 law, and are not proper sources of recovery. Nor are DTSC’s rights impaired if other defendants, as third-party plaintiffs or third-party defendants, inter sese, cannot recover indemnity or contribution from each other; if they are recyclers engaged in environmentally responsible activities. No defendant or third-party has argued against retroactivity, even assuming, arguendo, different liability would have attached under the pre-Section 127 law. No new duties are imposed with respect to already completed transactions that underlie this case. The DTSC seeks cost recovery for site investigation and remediation. It was not a participant in any transaction for which it seeks to hold parties liable. The DTSC incurs costs in its CERCLA enforcement efforts. No one suggests the DTSC will incur more costs or suffer g