Full opinion text
DECISION AND ORDER WILLIAM M. SKRETNY, Chief Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................354 II. BACKGROUND.........................................................355 A. The SAFE Act ......................................................355 1. Assault Weapons................................................355 2. Magazines and Ammunition.......................................356 B. Procedural History...................................................357 III. DISCUSSION...........................................................357 A. Legal Standards.....................................................357 B. Standing............................................................358 C. The Second Amendment & Heller......................................359 D. Standard of Review..................................................361 1. Common Use & Substantial Burden ...............................363 2. Intermediate Scrutiny ...........................................363 E. Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to the SAFE Act....................367 1. Assault Weapons................................................368 2. Large-capacity Magazines........................................371 3. Seven-round Limit ..............................................371 F. Vagueness..........................................................373 1. The “conspicuously protruding” pistol grip..........................374 2. The threaded barrel.............................................375 3. Magazine-capacity restrictions....................................375 4. The five-round shotgun limit......................................375 5. “Can be readily restored or converted”.............................375 6. The “and if’ clause of Penal Law § 265.36 ..........................376 7. Muzzle “break” .................................................377 8. ‘Version” of an automatic weapon.................................377 9. Manufactured weight............................................377 10. Commercial transfer.............................................378 G. Dormant Commerce Clause...........................................378 IV. CONCLUSION..........................................................381 V. ORDERS...............................................................381 I. INTRODUCTION On January 15, 2013, New York’s Governor, Andrew M. Cuomo, signed into law the New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act of 2013. Commonly known by its acronym, the SAFE Act makes broad and varied changes to firearm regulation in New York State. The Act amends or supplements various aspects of New York law, including, among others, the criminal procedure law, the correction law, the family court law, the executive law, the general business law, the judiciary law, the mental hygiene law, and, of course, the penal law. According to its drafters, this network of new laws, which generally enhances regulation and increases penalties for the illegal possession of firearms, is designed to “protect New Yorkers by reducing the availability of assault weapons and deterring the criminal use of firearms while promoting a fair, consistent and efficient method of ensuring that sportsmen and other legal gun owners have full enjoyment of the guns to which they are entitled.” (Senate, Assembly, and Gov. Memos in Supp., Bill No. S22302013.) Plaintiffs, comprising various associations of gun owners and advocates, companies in the business of selling firearms, and individual gun-owning citizens of New York, challenge several aspects of the law. Principally, Plaintiffs maintain that certain restrictions codified in the SAFE Act, like those concerning large-capacity magazines and those regulating assault weapons, violate their right “to keep and bear arms” under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. They also assert that several aspects of the law are unconstitutionally vague and that certain provisions violate the Equal Protection and “dormant” Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution. Three motions are currently before this Court. Plaintiffs first filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. That motion raised several — but not all — the challenges outlined above. In response to that motion, Defendants Andrew Cuomo, Eric Schneiderman, and Joseph D’Amico cross-moved to dismiss the case under Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Then, Plaintiffs responded with their own motion for summary judgment. Because both sides have subsequently filed dispositive motions, this Court deems Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction moot. In resolving the pending motions, this Court notes that whether regulating firearms is wise or warranted is not a judicial question; it is a political one. This Court’s function is thus limited to.resolving whether New York’s elected representatives acted within the confines of the United States Constitution in passing the SAFE Act. Undertaking that task, and applying the governing legal standards, the majority of the challenged provisions withstand constitutional scrutiny. As explained in more detail below, although so-called “assault weapons” and large-capacity magazines, as defined in the Safe Act, may — in some fashion — be “in common use,” New York has presented considerable evidence that its regulation of these weapons is substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest. Accordingly, the Act does not violate the Second Amendment in this respect. Further, because the SAFE Act’s requirement that ammunition sales be conducted “face-to-face” does not unduly burden interstate commerce, it does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The Act, however, is not constitutionally flawless. For reasons articulated below, the seven-round limit is largely an arbitrary restriction that impermissibly infringes on the rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment. This Court therefore strikes down that portion of the Act. Finally, this Court must strike three provisions of the SAFE Act as unconstitutionally vague because an ordinary person must speculate as to what those provisions of the Act command or forbid. II. BACKGROUND A. The SAFE Act In response to the tragic and incomprehensible shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary in Sandy Hook, Connecticut on December 14, 2012, the New York State Legislature and Governor Andrew Cuomo quickly enacted the New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act of 2013. The 39-page Act makes broad changes to existing firearm regulation in New York State. Section 17 of the Act, for instance, expands an existing requirement by adding a new article to the general business law that requires background checks for all gun sales — including private sales (except those made to immediate family members). Section 48 of the Act amends the penal law to require counties within the state to re-certify gun licenses every five years. Previously, gun licenses never expired. Section 49 establishes a statewide gun-license and record database. Other provisions relate to firearm storage; others still amend the mental hygiene law, strengthening provisions meant to curtail access to weapons. But those provisions are not the subject of Plaintiffs’ challenge here; their concerns principally involve the Act’s two main provisions, which directly regulate firearms and ammunition. 1. Assault Weapons Before the SAFE Act was enacted, New York already regulated those weapons it considered to be “assault weapons.” 2000 N.Y. Laws, ch. 189, § 10. In 2000, New York enacted a law regulating assault weapons in a manner modeled after the now-expired federal assault weapons ban. That law, enacted in 1994 as the Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, established a prohibition on semiautomatic weapons — that is, weapons designed to fire once each time the trigger is pulled — with two “military-style” features. Pub.L. No. 103-322, tit. XI, sub-tit. A, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996-2010 (1994) (repealed by Pub.L. 103-322, § 110105(2), effective Sept. 13, 2004). Those features were defined in the statute, and weapons meeting the listed criteria were deemed “semiautomatic assault weapons” subject to stringent regulation. Id. This model thus became known as the “two-feature” test, because, as the name suggests, the law outlawed semiautomatic weapons that had two military-style features, and, in the case of rifles and pistols, had the capacity to accept a detachable magazine. Before the SAFE Act, New York State regulated weapons under this rubric. But the SAFE Act expands the reach of New York’s regulation to include semiautomatic weapons that have only one feature “commonly associated with military weapons” and, in the case of rifles and pistols, have the ability to accept a detachable magazine. Put simply, the SAFE Act institutes a “one-feature” test. Those features are set out in Penal Law § 265.00, and, as they apply to rifles with detachable magazines, are as follows: • a folding or telescoping stock; • a pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon; • a thumbhole stock; • a second handgrip or a protruding grip that can be held by the non-trigger hand; • a bayonet mount;' • a flash suppressor, muzzle break, muzzle compensator, or threaded barrel designed to accommodate a flash suppressor, muzzle break, or muzzle compensator; • a grenade launcher., Weapons meeting this criteria are defined as “assault weapons”, and, subject to certain exemptions, the possession of such a weapon constitutes a “Class D” felony. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 265.02(7); 265.00(22)(g) (identifying exempt weapons). Although colloquially referred to as a “ban,” the SAFE Act does not prohibit all possession of these firearms. Current owners of these weapons can keep them, but they must register them. And while current owners are permitted to transfer and sell the weapons, transfers and sales must be made to firearm dealers or out-of-state buyers. Id. § 265.00(22)(h). 2. Magazines and Ammunition The SAFE Act also tightens regulation of magazines and ammunition. Section 38 of the Act amends Penal Law Section 265.00(23), making it unlawful to possess or sell magazines that have the capacity to hold more than 10 rounds of ammunition. Though this restriction was a part of the prior law, the SAFE Act eliminates the “grandfather” clause, which had exempted such “large-capacity” magazines that were manufactured before September 13, 1994 (the date of the federal law). Now, all large-capacity magazines (defined as “a magazine, belt, drum, feed strip, or similar device, that [] has a capacity of, or that can be readily restored or converted to accept, more than ten rounds of ammunition”), regardless of their date of manufacture, are subject to regulation. Id. § 265.00(23). And, unlike the assault weapons described above, current owners cannot retain these large-capacity magazines in their current form. Owners of this type of magazine must sell it out of state, transfer it to an authorized in-state dealer or law enforcement, modify it, or discard it before January 15, 2014. Id. §§ 265.00(22)(h), 265.00(23). Moreover, unless used at a firing range or during a shooting competition, 10-round magazines may not be fully loaded. Instead, the SAFE Act prohibits users from loading more than seven rounds of ammunition into “an ammunition feeding device.” Id. § 265.37. Possession of a large-capacity magazine is a “Class D” felony, and, depending on the circumstances, penalties for possession of a magazine loaded with more than seven rounds of ammunition range from a “violation” to a “Class A” misdemeanor. Id. § 265.37. Restrictions on the sale of ammunition have been tightened as well. All ammunition dealers conducting business in New York must register with New York State or be otherwise licensed to sell ammunition, and no sale can legally be completed without a state background check. The seller must also send a record of the sale to the State Police. The Act also bans the sale of ammunition over the Internet, imposing a requirement that any ammunition transaction be conducted “face-to-face” and compelling the purchaser to present valid photo identification. Id. § 400.03 (effective Jan. 15, 2014). B. Procedural History On March 21, 2013, roughly three months after the SAFE Act was enacted into law, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this Court alleging that the law violated several of their constitutional rights. (Docket No. 1.) On April 11, 2013, they filed an amended complaint (Docket No. 17), and shortly thereafter, a motion for a preliminary injunction (Docket No. 23), in which they sought to enjoin enforcement of several aspects of the law. Defendants Andrew Cuomo, Joseph D’Amico, and Eric Schneiderman then filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment oh June 21, 2013. (Docket No. 64.) Defendant Gerald Gill joined that motion the same day. (Docket No. 70.) Plaintiffs responded with their own motion for summary judgment on August 19, 2013. (Docket No. 113.) All briefing concluded on October 18, 2013. In addition, this Court has permitted various amici curiae, supporting both sides of the litigation, to file briefs advocating for their interests in the outcome of this case. III. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standards The various motions pending before this Court implicate two Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rules 12(b)(1) and 56. Rule 12(b)(1) applies to Defendants’ jurisdictional arguments. A motion under this rule “challenges the district court’s authority to adjudicate a case, and, once challenged, the burden of establishing that the Court in fact retains such authority lies with the party who asserts jurisdiction.” Loew v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 03-CV-5244, 2007 WL 2782768, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007) (citing Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 F.Supp.2d 132, 136 (E.D.N.Y.2004)). Dismissal of a case under Rule 12(b)(1) is proper “when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000). Both Plaintiffs and Defendants seek summary judgment. Under Rule 56, the plaintiff generally must produce evidence substantiating his claim, and the court can grant summary judgment only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A “genuine” dispute exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id. In determining whether a genuine dispute regarding a material fact exists, the evidence and the inferences drawn from the evidence “must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1609, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (internal quotations and citation omitted). When both parties move for summary judgment, “each party’s motion must be examined on its own merits, and ... all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir.2001). The function of the court is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Nonetheless, “disputed legal questions present nothing for trial and are appropriately resolved on a motion for summary judgment.” Flair Broad. Corp. v. Powers, 733 F.Supp. 179, 184 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (quoting Holland Indus. v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 550 F.Supp. 646, 648 (S.D.N.Y.1982)) (modifications omitted). B. Standing As in every case, this Court must “satisfy itself that the case comports with the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of Article III standing.” Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 204 (2d Cir.2013). Here, Plaintiffs Horvath and Galvin testify that they own rifles, pistols, and large-capacity magazines that the SAFE Act regulates. They further testify that, but for the Act, they would acquire weapons and ammunition-feeding devices that the Act renders illegal. As such, these plaintiffs clearly “face a credible threat of prosecution and should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.” See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2717, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010). They have thus established Article III standing for the purposes of their Second Amendment and vagueness claims. See id.; see also Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 695 (7th Cir.2011) (plaintiffs had standing to bring challenge under Second Amendment because “the very existence of a statute implies a threat to prosecute, so pre-enforcement challenges are proper”). Further, because at least one plaintiff has standing, “jurisdiction is secure and [this Court] can adjudicate the case whether the additional plaintiff[s] ha[ve] standing or not.” Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 n. 2 (2d Cir.2012). C. The Second Amendment & Heller Plaintiffs contend that New York’s restrictions on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines violate the Second Amendment. That Amendment, adopted in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights, provides that “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Before 2008, most courts to address the scope and import of the Second Amendment relied heavily on United States v. Miller, one of the few Supreme Court decisions to have expressly addressed the Amendment. 307 U.S. 174, 179, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939). Those courts concluded that the Second Amendment confers no individual right to firearm ownership, but extends only to use or possession of a firearm that has “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.” See id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161, 1164-66 (10th Cir.2001) (“We hold that a federal criminal gun-control law does not violate the Second Amendment unless it impairs the state’s ability to maintain a well-regulated militia”); Gillespie v. Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710-11 (7th Cir.1999); Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir.1971) (“There can be no serious claim to any express constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm”); Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 100, 248 A.2d 521 (1968) (“[R]egulation ... which does not impair the maintenance of the State’s active, organized militia is not at all in violation of [ ] the terms or purposes of the [S]econd [A]mendment.”). But see United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir.2001) (rejecting both the “collective rights” model and the proposition that Miller mandates such an approach). In other words, the Second Amendment was read by an overwhelming majority of courts to offer no protection for the right of individuals to possess and use guns for private and civilian purposes. But in 2008 that rationale was deemed flawed in the seminal Supreme Court case, District of Columbia v. Heller, where the Court addressed a District of Columbia law that essentially prohibited the possession of handguns. 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). In Heller, the first Supreme Court case since Miller to expressly address the Second Amendment, the Court noted that “[t]he Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts: its prefatory clause and its operative clause.” Id. at 577,128 S.Ct. 2783. It held that the prefatory clause of the Amendment — that which reads, “a well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State” — “announces the purpose for which the right was codified” but does not restrict the right to own guns to the circumstances of militia service. Id. at 599, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The Supreme Court explained that the Second Amendment codified a pre-existing “individual right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 592, 622,128 S.Ct. 2783 (emphasis added). The Court did not, however, find that the prefatory clause was meaningless or decoupled from the operative clause of the provision. Indeed, “[l]ogic demands that there be a link between the stated purpose and the command.” Id. at 577, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Rather, the Heller Court found that because “the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens ... who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty,” the prefatory clause informs and limits the right to those weapons in “common use at the time” — those weapons, that is, that a typical citizen would own and bring with him when called to service. The Court further found that this notion must be adapted and updated to include “all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.” Id. at 582, 128 S.Ct. 2783. And it went on to stress that the core component of the Amendment secures an individual right to own weapons for self defense, most notably in the home. Id. at 592-95, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The salient question for the Heller Court, then, was not what weapons were in common use during the revolutionary period, but what weapons are in common use today. Weapons that meet that test — that are “in common use at the time” — are protected, at least to some degree, by the Second Amendment. But other weapons, “not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes” like self-defense, are not. Id. at 625,128 S.Ct. 2783. In Heller, the Court concluded that “the American people have considered the handgun to be the quintessential self-defense weapon” and that “handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home.” Id. at 629, 630, 128 S.Ct. 2738. Therefore, the majority had no trouble finding that the District of Columbia’s “complete prohibition of their use is invalid.” Id. at 629, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The Supreme Court decided Heller in 2008. As many courts and commentators have noted, in many ways Heller raised more questions than it answered. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir.2011) (Wilkinson, J.) (ground opened by Heller is a “vast ‘terra incognita’ ”). Indeed, the Heller Court candidly remarked that the decision was never meant “to clarify the entire field” of Second Amendment jurisprudence. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Among the questions left open by Heller is the standard courts should apply when evaluating the constitutionality of gun restrictions. Some restrictions are surely valid: the Court emphasized that, “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Id. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783. It even explicitly identified some “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” that were meant to be illustrative, “not exhaustive”: [NJothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Id. at 626-27 & n. 26,128 S.Ct. 2783. But what other regulations, restrictions, and prohibitions are constitutionally sound? And under what framework, or level of scrutiny, must they be analyzed? Heller did not answer these questions. “Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights,” wrote Justice Scalia for the majority, “this law would fail constitutional muster.” Id. at 628-29, 128 S.Ct. 2783. That task was left, for now, to the lower courts. Since Heller was decided, the Second Circuit has had occasion to consider and interpret that decision. Although none of the cases addresses restrictions like those in the SAFE Act, they remain instructive in determining the appropriate standard of review. D. Standard of Review First, some background. Throughout its jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has developed varying levels of scrutiny, which, depending on the circumstances, apply to statutes that affect constitutional rights. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938) (introducing the levels-of-judieial-scrutiny concept). Some laws are subject to the most deferential standard: rational-basis review. See Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2073, 2079, 182 L.Ed.2d 998 (2012) (applying this standard for a classification that did not implicate a fundamental right, and concerned a local, economic, and commercial subject matter). Others, like content-neutral restrictions' on speech, are subject to intérmediate scrutiny. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) (requirement that cable television systems dedicate some of their channels to local broadcast television stations analyzed under intermediate scrutiny). And others still, like race-based classifications, are reviewed under the most rigorous standard: strict scrutiny. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2751, 168 L.Ed.2d 508 (2007) (school district relied on race to determine what public schools children attended). In two recent decisions, United States v. Decastro and Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, the Second Circuit shed considerable light on the standard applicable to gun restrictions under the Second Amendment. 682 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2012); 701 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir.2012). In Decastro, the court addressed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922, which prohibits anyone other than a licensed importer, manufacturer, dealer or collector from transporting into his state of residence a firearm obtained outside that state. Analogizing the right to bear arms to other rights embodied in the Constitution, including the right to marry, the right to vote, and the right to free speech, the court held: [W]e do not read [Heller ] to mandate that any marginal, incremental or even appreciable restraint on the right to keep and bear arms be subject to heightened scrutiny. Rather, heightened scrutiny is triggered only by those restrictions that (like the complete prohibition on handguns struck down in Heller) operate as a substantial burden on the ability of law-abiding citizens to possess and use a firearm for self-defense (or for other lawful purposes). Decastro, 682 F.3d at 166 (parentheses in original). Thus, in this Circuit, some form of heightened scrutiny (that is, intermediate or strict, or, possibly, something in between) is reserved for those “regulations that burden the Second Amendment right substantially.” Id. The Decastro court was clear that “[reserving heightened scrutiny for regulations that burden the Second Amendment right substantially is not inconsistent with the classification of that right as fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty.” Id. at 167. This approach accords with other circuits’ reasoning in the wake of Heller. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1262 (D.C.Cir.2011) (“Heller II”); Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702; United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir.2010). In Ezell, for example, the court found parallels to First Amendment jurisprudence, noting that “some categories of speech are unprotected as a matter of history and legal tradition. So too with the Second Amendment.” 651 F.3d at 702. Thus, according to both the Ezell and Decastro courts, just as some forms of speech — obscenity, defamation, fraud — are outside the reach of the First Amendment, some forms of gun restrictions are outside the reach of the Second. Applying this standard, the Decastro court found that the prohibition on importing out-of-state firearms was among those restrictions that did not implicate the Second Amendment The Second Circuit built on this foundation in Kachalsky, where it faced the following issue: “Does New York’s handgun licensing scheme violate the Second Amendment by requiring an applicant to demonstrate ‘proper cause’ to obtain a license to carry a concealed handgun in public?” Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 83. Drawing from its earlier ruling in Decastro, the court found that New York’s licensing scheme — unlike the challenged law in Decastro — did impose a substantial burden on the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights. It held, “New York’s proper cause requirement places substantial limits on the ability of law-abiding citizens to possess firearms for self-defense in public.” Id. at 93. The court’s next holding is critical in determining the correct standard of review here. It found that the proper sequence of analysis required it to review the law under the familiar three-tiered scrutiny system. Specifically, it held: Although we have no occasion to decide what level of scrutiny should apply to laws that burden the “core” Second Amendment protection identified in Heller, we believe that applying less than strict scrutiny when the regulation does not burden the “core” protection of self-defense in the home makes eminent sense in this context and is in line with the approach taken by our sister circuits. Id. The court concluded that “because our tradition so clearly indicates a substantial role for state regulation of the carrying of firearms in public,” and because the restriction did not burden a “core” right, intermediate scrutiny was appropriate. Id. at 96. The licensing requirement, which was substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest, survived under that standard. Extrapolating from these holdings, this Court finds that it must engage in a three-part inquiry. First, it must determine whether any of the regulated weapons or magazines are commonly used for lawful purposes. If any are, it must next determine if any of the challenged provisions of the SAFE Act substantially burden a Second Amendment right. Finally, if any do, it must then decide what level of scrutiny to apply. Contrary to the urging of some amici, the Second Circuit has eschewed any test under the so-called “history-and-tradition” model. Espoused most prominently by Judge Kavanaugh in dissent in Heller II, this model would test the constitutionality of certain gun laws by asking whether they were “rooted in history and tradition.” 670 F.3d at 1284; see also Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L.Rev. 1443, 1463 (2009). But the Second Circuit categorically “disagree^]” with this approach, stating unequivocally: Heller stands for the rather unremarkable proposition that where a state regulation is entirely inconsistent with the protections afforded by an enumerated right — as understood through that right’s text, history, and tradition — it is an exercise in futility to apply means-end scrutiny. Moreover, the conclusion that the law would be unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny” applicable to other rights implies, if anything, that one of the conventional levels of scrutiny would be applicable to regulations alleged to infringe Second Amendment rights. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89 n. 9. Accordingly, this Court will analyze the law under the rubric set forth in Heller, and as further developed by the Second Circuit. 1. Common Use & Substantial Burden Under Heller, the Second Amendment does not apply to weapons that are not “in common use at the time.” Thus, inherent in the substantial-burden analysis is the question whether the SAFE Act affects weapons in common use. Much of Plaintiffs’ briefs are dedicated to the topic of the popularity and lawfulness of the firearms that New York defines as assault weapons. Both sides attempt to point to empirical evidence that suggests the weapons are — or are not — in common use for lawful purposes. And, in turn, much of that evidence deals with the archetypal AR-15. This weapon, first manufactured by ArmaLite (thus, “AR”), then sold to and popularized under Colt, is representative of the type of weapon the SAFE Act seeks to regulate. Though the mark “AR-15” is Colt’s, many manufacturers make a similar firearm. Generally, it is a semiautomatic rifle that has a detachable magazine, has a grip protruding roughly four inches below the action of the rifle, and is easily accessorized and adapted. (See Overstreet Deck, ¶¶ 3-5; Docket No. 23-2); (National Shooting Sports Foundation survey, at 7, attached as Ex. B; Docket No. 23-3,4,5) (84% of owners of AR-15 type rifles have at least once accessory on their rifle). It is also popular. According to Plaintiffs, since 1986 (when record-keeping began) “at least 3.97 million AR-15 type rifles have been manufactured in the United States for the commercial market.” (Overstreet Deck, ¶ 5.) In 2011, AR-15s accounted for 7% of all firearms sold. (Id., ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs also assert that the AR-15 rifles are regularly used for self defense, hunting, and sporting competitions. As the Heller II court found, “in 2007 this one popular model accounted for 5.5 percent of all firearms, and 14.4 percent of all rifles, produced in the U.S. for the domestic market.” 670 F.3d at 1261. Although the Heller II court could not determine if this type of weapon is used for lawful purposes, it “th[ought] it clear enough in the record that semi-automatic rifles ... are indeed in ‘common use.’ ” Id. Defendants paint a different picture, contending that assault weapons “are a tiny percentage of the firearms available.” (Def.’s Br., at 29; Docket No. 77.) According to the testimony of Professor Laurence Tribe before the United States Senate in February of 2013, Americans own roughly 310 million firearms and roughly 7 million assault weapons. (Tribe Testimony, at 24, attached as Ex. 28; Docket No. 78-3.) Using these rough numbers, assault weapons account for only about 2% of the guns owned in this country. But these statistics leave many questions unanswered. The Brady Center for the Prevention of Gun Violence, as amicus curiae, points out that the Heller Court did not specify what “time” it meant when it held that protected weapons are those that are “in common use at the time.” There is no dispute that there has been a surge in the popularity of this type of firearm in the last decade. (Brady Center Br., at 8; Docket No. 121.) The Brady Center argues that it is anomalous that a weapon could be unprotected under the Second Amendment one moment, then, subject only to the whims of the public, garner protection in the next moment. (Id., at 9.) It contends that this Court must look to a “historically representative period of time” and that there is no evidence that the weapons regulated by the SAFE Act were in common use for such a period. (Id.) Regardless, ownership statistics alone are not enough. The firearm must also be possessed for lawful purposes, like self-defense. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (“Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”). On this point, too, the parties are deeply divided. And, as the Heller II court noted, reliable empirical evidence on this point is elusive. 670 F.3d at 1261 (“[We cannot be certain whether these weapons are commonly used or are useful specifically for self-defense or hunting and therefore whether the prohibitions ... meaningfully affect the right to keep and bear arms.”). Although Defendants argue that the regulated weapons are not suitable for self-defense due to, among other things, their excessive firepower, there can be little dispute that tens of thousands of Americans own these guns and use them exclusively for lawful purposes such as hunting, target shooting, and even self-defense. See Christopher S. Koper et al, U. Penn. Jerry Lee Ctr. of Criminology, An Updated Assessment of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban: Impacts on Gun Markets and Gun Violence, 1991-2003 at 1 (2004) (around 1990, “there were an estimated 1 million privately owned [assault weapons] in the U.S.”); see also Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1287-88 (Kavanagh J., dissenting) (A “brief perusal of the website of a popular American gun seller” underscores that “[s]emi-automatic rifles are commonly used for self-defense in the home, hunting, target shooting, and competitions”); (King Aff. ¶¶ 16-18; Docket No. 116.) Despite the inherent ambiguities in making such a determination, for purposes of this Decision, this Court will assume that the weapons at issue are commonly used for lawful purposes: Further, because the SAFE Act renders acquisition of these weapons illegal under most circumstances, this Court finds that the restrictions at issue more than “minimally affect” Plaintiffs’ ability to acquire and use the firearms, and they therefore impose a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights. ' Large-capacity magazines are also popular, and Defendants concede they are in common use nationally. See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261 (“There may well be some capacity, above which magazines are not in common .use but, if so, the record is devoid of evidence as to what that capacity is; in any event, that capacity surely is not ten.”); Koper, supra, at 10 (as of 1994, roughly 20% of civilian owned handguns were equipped with large-capacity magazines); (Defs.’ Br., at 36; Docket No. 77). Indeed, the “standard magazine” for an AR-15 holds 20 or 30 rounds. (Overstreet Deck, ¶ 4.) Given their popularity in the assumably law-abiding public, this Court is willing to proceed under the premise that these magazines are commonly owned for lawful purposes. Further, this Court finds that a restraint on the amount of ammunition a citizen is permitted to load into his or her weapon— whether 10 rounds or seven — is also more than a “marginal, incremental or even appreciable restraint” on the right to keep and bear arms. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93 (New York’s proper cause requirement for a concealed carry permit places a substantial burden on the Second Amendment right); see also Koper, supra, at 1 (A [large capacity-magazine] is arguably the most functionally important feature of most [assault weapons], many of which have magazines holding 30 or more rounds). Certainly, if the firearm itself implicates the Second Amendment, so too must the right to load that weapon with ammunition. Round restrictions, whether seven or 10, are therefore deserving of constitutional scrutiny. Thus, under Second Circuit precedent, this Court must next ask under what standard the restraints ought to be judged. 2. Intermediate Scrutiny In Kachalsky, the Second Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to restrictions on the possession of a gun outside the home, but noted that it did not have occasion to consider what standard would apply to restrictions inside the home, where “Second Amendment guarantees are at their zenith.” 701 F.3d at 89. Although the SAFE Act unquestionably affects Plaintiffs’ ownership rights in then-home, for three reasons, this Court finds that intermediate scrutiny remains the appropriate standard under which to evaluate the law. First, although addressing varied and divergent laws, courts throughout the country have nearly universally applied some form of intermediate scrutiny in the Second Amendment context. See, e.g., id.; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96; United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641-42 (7th Cir.2010); United States v. Walker, 709 F.Supp.2d 460 (E.D.Va.2010); see also United States v. Lahey, No. 10-CR-765 KMK, 2013 WL 4792852, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2013) (“The emerging consensus appears to be that intermediate scrutiny is generally the appropriate level of scrutiny for laws which substantially burden Second Amendment rights.”). Second, application of strict scrutiny would appear to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holdings in Heller and McDonald, where the Court recognized several “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27, 128 S.Ct. 2783; McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3047 (“Incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”). These types of restrictions are presumably justified because of the unique ability of firearms to upset and disrupt public order. The four dissenting justices in Heller point out that “the majority implicitly, and appropriately, rejects [a] suggestion [that strict scrutiny should apply] by broadly approving a set of laws — prohibitions on concealed weapons, forfeiture by criminals of the Second Amendment right, prohibitions on firearms in certain locales, and governmental regulation of commercial firearm sales — whose constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard would be far from clear.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 688, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (Breyer, J.). The Western District of Pennsylvania later reiterated this sentiment, writing that “the Court’s willingness to presume the validity of several types of gun regulations is arguably inconsistent with the adoption, of a strict scrutiny standard of review.” United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F.Supp.2d 596, 604 (W.D.Pa.2009). The district court in Heller II similarly noted that “a strict scrutiny standard of review would not square with” the majority’s holding in Heller. Heller v. District of Columbia, 698 F.Supp.2d 179, 187 (D.D.C.2010). Accordingly, not only does this level of scrutiny lack precedent, but the Supreme Court’s own holdings suggest that it is incongruous with extant, presumptively valid restrictions. Last, this Court finds that First Amendment jurisprudence provides a useful guidepost in this arena. As the Third Circuit has held, “[T]he right to free speech, an undeniably enumerated fundamental right, is susceptible to several standards of scrutiny, depending upon the type of law challenged and the type of speech at issue.... We see no reason why the Second Amendment would be any different.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96 (internal citations omitted). When considering restrictions that implicate the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is triggered only by content-based restrictions on speech in a public forum. By contrast, content-neutral restrictions that affect only the time, place, and manner of speech trigger a form of intermediate scrutiny. See Hobbs v. Cnty. of Westchester, 397 F.3d 133, 149 (2d Cir.2005); see also Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 791, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 2537, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (concurring in part and dissenting in part) (intermediate scrutiny “applicable to so-called ‘time, place, and manner regulations’ of speech”). Like the Heller II court, which applied intermediate scrutiny to firearm restrictions similar to those at issue here, this Court finds that the burden here is akin to a time, place, and manner restriction. As described by the Heller II court, “[Rjestrictions that impose severe burdens (because they don’t leave open ample alternative channels) must be judged under strict scrutiny, but restrictions that impose only modest burdens (because they do leave open ample alternative channels) are judged under a mild form of intermediate scrutiny.” 670 F.3d at 1262 (quoting Volokh, supra, at 1471) (parentheses in original). The court concluded that because “the prohibition of semiautomatic rifles and large-capacity magazines does not effectively disarm individuals or substantially affect their ability to defend themselves” — because, in other words, alternative channels for the possession of substitute firearms exist — the restrictions should be judged under intermediate scrutiny. Id. Calling the SAFE Act’s restrictions “a ban on an entire class of firearms,” Plaintiffs liken the SAFE Act to the ban struck down by the Supreme Court in Heller. But unlike the handgun ban, the SAFE Act applies only to a subset of firearms with characteristics New York State has determined to be particularly dangerous and unnecessary for self-defense; it does not totally disarm New York’s citizens; and it does not meaningfully jeopardize their right to self-defense. Current owners of the now-regulated weapons may lawfully possess them so long as they register the weapons with the State. They may also possess 10-round magazines, and, most places, they may load those magazines with up to seven rounds of ammunition. And, at certain designated areas, they may load the weapon with 10 rounds. Although the Act does make unlawful future purchases or sales of assault weapons, New Yorkers can still purchase, own, and sell all manner of semiautomatic weapons that lack the features outlawed by the SAFE Act. Indeed, Plaintiffs themselves concede that attributes of the banned weapons are “present in easily-substituted unbanned, counterpart firearms.” (Pis.’ Br. at 22; Docket No. 23-1.) Accordingly, this Court finds that intermediate scrutiny is the most suitable standard under which to evaluate each challenged aspect of the law. E. Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to the SAFE Act Under intermediate scrutiny, this Court must ask whether the challenged restrictions are “substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest.” Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96. The Second Circuit recently observed and reaffirmed that “New York has substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention.” Id. at 97. There is no dispute that the SAFE Act is clearly intended to further this goal. (See Senate, Assembly, and Gov. Memos in Supp., supra.) Thus, the only remaining question is whether the challenged provisions are substantially related to the governmental interest in public safety and crime prevention. Starting with New York’s definition of assault weapons, moving to the ban on large-capacity magazines, and concluding with the seven-round limit, this Court next undertakes that analysis. 1. Assault Weapons There is much debate, both in the community at large and in this litigation, whether the banned “military-style features” of semiautomatic weapons will be effective in reducing crime and violence. Plaintiffs contend that many of the outlawed features do not make firearms more lethal; instead, according to Plaintiffs, several of the outlawed features simply make the firearm easier to use. For instance, they argue that a telescoping stock, which allows the user to adjust the length of the stock, does not make a weapon more dangerous, but instead, like finding the right size shoe, simply allows the shooter to rest the weapon on his or her shoulder properly and comfortably. Another outlawed feature, the pistol grip, also increases comfort and stability. The same goes for the “thumbhole stock,” which, as the name suggests, is a hole in the stock of the rifle for the user’s thumb. It too increases comfort, stability, and accuracy according to Plaintiffs. But Plaintiffs later argue that the banned features increase the utility for self-defense — which is just another way of saying that the features increase their lethality. Plaintiffs make this explicit: “Where it is necessary for a crime victim to shoot the aggressor, and lethal or incapacitating injury will stop him, the lethality of the defender’s firearm is a precondition to her ability end the criminal attack.” (Pis.’ Br. at 22; Docket No. 23-1.) The National Rifle Association of America, as amicus curiae, make a similar argument, describing how the banned features improve a firearm’s usability. (NRA Br. at 10; Docket No. 46.) There thus can be no serious dispute that the very features that increase a weapon’s utility for self-defense also increase its dangerousness to the public at large. See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3107 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Just as [firearms] can help homeowners defend their families and property from intruders, they can help thugs and insurrectionists murder innocent victims.”). Pointing to the benefits of these features to those who might use them defensively, Plaintiffs argue that the SAFE Act ought to be struck down. But under intermediate scrutiny, this Court must give “substantial deference to the predictive judgments of the legislature.” Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97. And “[i]n the context of firearm regulation, the legislature is ‘far better equipped than the judiciary to make sensitive policy judgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the dangers in carrying firearms and the manner to combat those risks.” Id. (quoting Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 665, 114 S.Ct. 2445). To be sure, this Court’s deference is not without bounds. New York must rely on evidence that “fairly support[s]” its rationale in passing the law. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438, 122 S.Ct. 1728, 1736, 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002). Here, New York has met that burden; substantial evidence supports its judgment that the banned features are unusually dangerous, commonly associated with military combat situations, and are commonly found on weapons used in mass shootings. The recent mass shooting in Newtown, CT, which prompted the quick passage of this law, was no exception. The shooter armed himself with a .223-caliber Bushmaster Model XM15 rifle and a 30-round magazine. See Connecticut State Police Press Release, Jan. 18, 2013, available at http://www.ct.gov/despp/cwp/view.asp?Q= 517284 (“The shooter used the Bushmaster .223 to murder 20 children and six adults inside the school; he used a handgun to take his own life inside the school. No other weapons were used in this crime.”). Of course, this is only one incident. But it is nonetheless illustrative. Studies and data support New York’s view that assault weapons are often used to devastating effect in mass shootings. (See Koper Deck, ¶¶ 11-14; Zimring Deck ¶¶ 15-22; Docket Nos. 67, 68). For example, an exhaustive study of mass shootings in America, defined as the murder of four or more people in a single incident, found that there have been at least 62 mass shootings across the country since 1982. Mark Follman, et al., A Guide to Mass Shootings in America, Mother Jones, updated Feb. 27, 2013, http:/Avww.motherjones.com/politics/2012/ 07/mass-shootings-map. Frighteningly, “twenty-five of these mass shootings have occurred since 2006, and seven of them took place in 2012.” Id. In the mass shooting with the most victims, at an Aurora, Colorado movie theater, police say the shooter used an AR-15 type weapon until its 100-round barrel magazine jammed. In all, the study found that assault weapons, high-capacity magazines, or both were used in over half of all mass shootings. Id. The State points to other evidence as well. It suggests that it should come as no surprise that assault weapons produced carnage in Aurora and Newtown, as The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms found that these weapons “were designed for rapid fire, close quarter shooting at human beings” — or, as the report called it, “mass produced mayhem.” (ATF, Assault Weapons Profile, at 19 (1994), attached as Ex. 40.) The Supreme Court has previously described the AR-15 as “the civilian version of the military’s M-16 rifle.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 603, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994). Indeed, there is no dispute that the AR-15 type rifle derives from a weapon designed for fully-automatic military use on the battlefield. As Brain Siebel testified, the military features of semiautomatic assault weapons “serve specific, combat-functional ends” and are “designed to enhance the capacity to shoot multiple human targets rapidly.” (Testimony of Brian J. Siebel, Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, at 1 (Oct. 1, 2008), attached as Ex. 29.) “The net effect of these military combat features is a capability for lethality — more wounds, more serious, in more victims — far beyond that of firearms in general, including other semiautomatic guns.” H.R. Rep. 103-489, at 19-20 (1994) (chronicling five years of congressional hearings on semiautomatic assault weapons); (see Bruen Deck ¶¶ 13-26; Docket No. 66.) The Chief of Police for the Rochester Police Department expresses similar sentiments, stating that assault weapons “are designed for one purpose — to efficiently kill numerous people.” (Shepard Deck, ¶ 14; Docket No. 72). In other words, evidence suggests that the banned features make a deadly weapon deadlier. And while there is not (and cannot be) a dispute that the outlawed features make semiautomatic weapons easier to use, New York identifies purposes of these features that are particularly unnecessary for lawful use. Of course, several of the banned features, like a grenade launcher, bayonet mount, or a silencer, require no explanation. Indeed, Plaintiffs do not explicitly argue that the Act’s regulation of firearms with these features violates the Second Amendment. But for the contested features, like a pistol grip and thumbhole stock, New York points to evidence that these features aid shooters when “spray firing” from the hip. (Bruen Deck, ¶ 19); see Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1262-63 (quoting Siebel Testimony, supra). As the Second Circuit has held, “This factor aims to identify those rifles whose pistol grips are designed to make such spray firing from the hip particularly easy.” Richmond Boro Gun Club, Inc. v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 681, 685 (2d Cir.1996). Folding and telescoping stocks aid concealability and portability. (See Bruen Decl., ¶ 18; 2011 ATF Study at 9, attached as Ex. 10); see also Richmond Boro, 97 F.3d at 684-85. A muzzle compensator reduces recoil and muzzle movement caused by rapid fire. (Bruen Deck, ¶ 20.) And New York further points to evidence that AR-15 type rifles are “not generally recognized as particularly suitable for or readily adaptable to sporting purposes,” nor used frequently for self-defense. See Dep’t of Treasury, Study on the Sporting Suitability of Modified Semiautomatic Assault Rifles, 38 (1998); Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 150, 185 (1995) (revolvers and semi-automatic pistols are together used almost 80% of the time in incidents of self-defense with a gun). What’s more, New York presents evidence that its regulations will be effective. Drawing from his comprehensive study of the 1994 federal ban (supra, at 364-65), Christopher Koper avows that the regulations will reduce the stock of “dangerous weaponry” in New York and are thus “likely to advance New York’s interests in protecting its populace from the dangers of [ ] shootings.” (Koper Deck, ¶ 65.) His analysis of the data “indicates that the criminal use of assault weapons declined after the federal assault weapons ban was enacted in 1994, independently of trends in gun crime.” (Id.) Because New York’s regulations are tighter than those in the federal ban, he believes, quite reasonably, that the affect will be greater. (Id., ¶ 60.) For their part, Plaintiffs point to conflicting opinions and argue that criminals will retain their assault weapons while law-abiding citizens will be unable to acquire them. They also argue that the ban is irrational because there are numerous legal substitutes offering the same firepower. Further, there is no dispute that semiautomatic handguns are also often used in mass shootings. In fact, according to the Follman study, handguns were used in greater numbers than assault rifles. But to survive intermediate scrutiny, the fit between the governmental objective and the challenged regulation need only be substantial, not perfect. And while these are legitimate considerations, “it is the legislature’s job, not [this Court’s], to weigh conflicting evidence and make policy judgments.” Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 99. New York, citing the undisputed potential for mass casualty that assault weapons present, is empowered to take action to reduce the quantity of such weapons in its state. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 211 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 105, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976)) (“It is well-settled that ‘a statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did, that a legislature need not strike at all evils at the same time, and that reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.’ ”). The ultimate merits of this judgment remain to be seen, but, considering especially that Plaintiffs themselves concede that the banned features increase the lethality of firearms — or as Brain Siebel has testified, that the military features of semiautomatic assault weapons are “designed to enhance the capacity to shoot multiple human targets rapidly” — this Court finds that New York has satisfied its burden to demonstrate a substantial link, based on reasonably relevant evidence, between the SAFE Act’s regulation of assault weapons and the compelling interest of public safety that it seeks to advance. 2. Large-capacity Magazines The same finding is true for the ban on large-capacity magazines. Indeed, the link between the SAFE Act’s restrictions on large-capacity magazines and the state’s interest in public safety is arguably even stronger here. Koper testifies that it is “particularly” the large-capacity magazine ban that will prevent shootings and save lives. (Koper Deck, ¶ 65.) Indeed, large-capacity magazines are used regularly in mass shootings — they were used in more than half of the mass shootings since 1982. And, more troubling, their use is on the rise. In the past year, guns with large-capacity magazines were used in at least five of the six mass shootings. (Allen DeclY 18; Docket No. 69.) Evidence also suggests that, quite simply, more people die when a shooter has a large-capacity magazine. According to analysis conducted by NERA Economic Consulting, the average number of fatalities or injuries per mass shooting more than doubles when a shooter uses a large-capacity magazine. (Id., ¶ 20.) Similarly, a 2013 study of mass shootings over the past four years using data collected by the FBI found that shooters who used assault weapons, high-capacity magazines, or both shot over twice as many people and killed 57% more people than shooters who did not use these weapons. (Mayors Against Illegal Guns, Analysis of Recent Mass Shootings, February 22, 2013, attached as Ex. 39.) Just as with assault weapons, Plaintiffs find policy and judgment flaws in New York’s decision to ban large-capacity magazines. Mass shooters, argues Gary Kleek in an affidavit submitted by Plaintiffs, often carry multiple firearms. (Kleck Deck, at 5; Docket No. 23-9.) So, according to Plaintiffs, any large-capacity-magazine ban would be ineffective, or worse, would only affect law-abiding citizens. But New York’s evidence — far more comprehensive than Plaintiffs’ — runs counter to this presumption, and again, “[i]n the context of firearm regulation, the legislature is ‘far better equipped than the judiciary’ to make sensitive public policy judgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the dangers in carrying firearms and the manner to combat those risks.” Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 665, 114 S.Ct. 2445.) This Court’s role is “to assure that, in formulating its judgments, New York has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Though by no means a panacea, in passing these provisions New York has made a public policy judgment that draws reasonable inferences from substantial evidence. It thus survives intermediate scrutiny. 3. Seven-round limit The same cannot be said, however, about the seven-round limit. The SAFE Act adds New York Penal Law § 265.37, which makes it “unlawful for