Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION BERYL A. HOWELL, United States District Judge The plaintiff Abraxis Bioscience, LLC, brought this lawsuit against David Kappos, in his official capacity as Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), seeking a judgment that the patent term adjustment (“PTA”) for United States Patent No. 7,820,788 (“'788 patent”) be increased by at least 122 days from the 199 days awarded by USPTO, for a total PTA of at least 321 days or, alternatively, 323 days. Pending before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. See Pl.’s Renewed Mot. Summ. J. Re PTA for Patent '788 (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 20; Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. and Opp’n PL’s Renewed Mot. Summ. J. Re PTA for Patent '788 (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 21. For the reasons explained below, the USPTO’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding the Calculation of Part B Delay for the United States Patent No. 7,820,788 is denied. 1. BACKGROUND A. Legal Framework The plaintiff challenges the USPTO’s interpretation of a statutory provision at 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B)©, which governs the determination of PTA when the patent applicant files a request for continued examination (“RCE”), as authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 132(b), more than three-years from the filing date of the patent application. Since a fundamental tenet of statutory construction is to examine the challenged text in context, an overview of the legal framework for determining a patent term is necessary. See United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 937 (D.C.Cir.2013) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). United States patent law originates from a constitutional grant of authority to the Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for a limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966) ( references to “useful Arts” and “Discoveries” creates the right to patent protection). The brevity of this Patent Clause belies the complexity of defining the scope of the “exclusive Right” of inventors to their discoveries. At the outset, inventors do not automatically hold patent rights to their inventions. See 35 U.S.C. § 111. Inventors must submit applications to the USP-TO for review and assessment whether a patent should issue. See 35 U.S.C. § 131. Upon issuance, the patent term in the United States was, until 1994, seventeen years, beginning from the date the patent was issued. See Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 16, 12 Stat. 246, 249 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 154). In order to harmonize the U.S. patent laws with those of America’s leading trading partners, Congress amended this regime in 1994 to adjust the term of a patent from seventeen to twenty years, beginning from the date the application was filed. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”), Pub. L. No. 103-465, 102 Stat. 4809 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1547 (Fed.Cir.1996) (noting that the “purpose of URAA was not to extend patent terms, although it had that effect in some cases”). Despite the addition of three years to the patent term in the URAA, measuring the patent term from the patent application filing date, rather than the date of patent issuance, could consume “some of the effective term of a patent ... by the time it takes to prosecute the application.” Wyeth v. Dudas, 580 F.Supp.2d 138, 139-40 (D.D.C.2008). To mitigate the effect of administrative delays on the patent term, Congress provided in the URAA for patent term extensions of no more than five years due to (1) “interference delay or secrecy orders,” under 35 U.S.C. §§ 135(a) and 181, respectively, or (2) appellate review. URAA § 532, 108 Stat. at 4984. These periods of patent extension were not only subject to a five year cap, but also to other limitations. For example, any period of extension was required to be reduced “by any time attributable to appellate review before the expiration of 3 years from the filing date of the application” and “for the period of time during which the applicant for patent did not act with due diligence.” Id. (originally codified at 35 U.S.C. § -154(b)(3)(B) & (C) (1994)). USPTO was authorized to determine when the applicant failed to act with due diligence. .Id. Both the bases for extensions of patent terms and the limitations on those extensions were further refined in 1999 with passage of American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (“AIPA”). AIPA included, as Subtitle D of Title IV, the “Patent Term Guarantee Act of 1999,” which provided for the patent term adjustment that is at issue here. See AIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 4401-02, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-557 (1999) (codified, as amended, at 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)). While the five year cap on any PTA imposed by the URAA was eliminated, other limitations were retained in slightly different form. The key provisions of AIPA and implementing regulations implicated by the plaintiffs challenge to the USPTO’s PTA calculation are summarized below. 1. Patent Term Adjustments Under AIPA The AIPA amendments, inter alia, authorized “guarantee^]” adjustments to the patent term in three circumstances set out in section 154(b)(1); imposed “limitations” on those adjustments in section 154(b)(2); and outlined the “procedures for patent term adjustment determination[s]” in section 154(b)(3). 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1), (2) & (3). The interplay among these guarantees, limitations and determination procedures provide significant interpretative fodder for the parties in this litigation. a. PTA “Guarantees” in Section 154(b)(1) The statute frames the three circumstances extending the patent term as “guarantees” designed to guard against diminution of a patent term due to enumerated administrative delays during consideration of the patent application. First, to “[guarantee [ ] prompt patent and trademark office responses,” a patent term is extended one day for each day that the USPTO fails to meet certain examination deadlines. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(A) (“Part A”). For instance, most notably for purposes of the instant case, the patent term is extended under Part A for each day the issuance of the patent is delayed “due to the failure of the [USPTO] to ... issue a patent within 4 months after the date on which the issue fee was paid ... and all outstanding requirements were satisfied.” Id. at § 154(b)(1)(A)(iv). This provision provides the USPTO with a 4-month “grace” period to issue a patent after issue fee payment before days begin to be counted as Part A delay. Second, to “[gjuarantee [ ] no more than 3-year application pendency,” the patent term is extended one day for each day after the 3-year period after the application filing date “due to the failure of the [USPTO] to issue a patent within 3 years after the actual filing date of the application.” 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B) (“Part B"). The extension of the patent term authorized under Part B does “not includ[e]” five enumerated time periods (set out in three clauses). These five time periods are described, in clauses (i) and (ii), as “any time consumed by” the applicant’s RCE under section 132(b), and proceedings under sections 135(a), 181, or appellate review, id. at § 154(b)(l)(B)(ii) and (ii); and, in clause (iii), as “any delay in” application processing requested by the applicant, “except as permitted by paragraph (3)(C),” id. at § 154(b)(l)(B)(iii). The USPTO’s interpretation of both subparagraph (B) and its clause (i) are the focus of the instant dispute. Section 154(b)(1)(B) provides in pertinent part: (B) Guarantee of no more than 3-year application pendency. — Subject to the limitations under paragraph (2), if the issue of an original patent is delayed due to the failure of the [USPTO] to issue a patent within 3 years after the actual filing date of the application ... in the United States ..., not including— (i) any time consumed by continued examination of the application requested by the applicant under section 132(b); (ii) any time consumed by a proceeding under section 135(a), any time consumed by the imposition of an order under section 181, or any time consumed by appellate review by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board or by a Federal court; or (iii) any delay in the processing of the application by the [USPTO] requested by the applicant except as permitted by paragraph (3)(C), the term of the patent shall be extended 1 day for each day after the end of that 3-year period until the patent is issued. Id. The Federal Circuit in Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d 1364 (Fed.Cir.2010), addressed the calculation of Part B delay within the framework of section 154(b), noting that each period of delay in Parts A, B and C “has its own discrete time span whose boundaries are defined in section 154(b)(1),” with “a start and an end.” Id. at 1369-70. “[A] violation of the “B guarantee ... begins when the PTO fails ‘to issue a patent within 3 years after the actual filing date of the application in the United States’ ” and “[i]t ends when ‘the patent is issued.’” Id. at 1369 (quoting section 154(b)(1)(B)). The court rejected USPTO’s “strained interpretation” that “B delay can occur anytime after the application is filed,” and made clear that “[t]he ‘period of delay’ under the express language of the B clause therefore runs from the three-year mark after filing until the application issues.” Id. at 1370 (emphasis in original); see also id. (“the language of section 154(b) does not even permit B delay to start running until three years after the application is filed”) (emphasis in original). Third, to “[g]uarantee [] adjustments for delays due to derivation proceedings, secrecy orders, and appeals,” the patent term is extended one day for each day that a “proceeding, order, or review, as the case may be,” under sections 135(a), 181 or an appeal, is pending. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(C) (“Part C”). Thus, these specific periods of delay excluded from the PTA determination under Part B when they occur three years after the filing of an application, are expressly restored to the patent term under Part C. b. PTA Limitations in Section 154(b)(2) PTA is subject to several limitations laid out in section 154(b)(2). The limitation pertinent to the instant case is that any PTA set out in paragraph 1, which sets forth the three patent term “guarantees” under Parts A, B and C, is limited to the “extent [those] periods ... overlap” but not to “exceed the actual number of days the issuance of the patent was delayed.” 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(A). In considering the proper construction of the limitation set out in section 154(b)(2)(A), the Federal Circuit in Wyeth rejected the USPTO’s practice, ostensibly to avoid “double-counting” when “A delays ‘cause’ B delays,” 591 F.3d at 1370, of computing the adjustment using “either the greater of the A delay or B delay ... but never combining] the two,” id. at 1368. Instead, the court made clear that the limitation in section 154(b)(2) operates to ensure that when overlapping periods occur, “no such day [is] counted twice,” id. at 1371. c. PTA Determination Procedures in Section 154(b)(3) In order to implement the patent term “guarantees,” Congress provided the USP-TO with an express grant of authority to “prescribe regulations establishing procedures for the application for and determination of patent term adjustments.” 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(3)(A). The determination of how much PTA has accrued is made by the USPTO and communicated to the patent applicant at the time the patent issues. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(3)(B). 2. RCE Proceedings The AIPA amendments permitted, for the first time, a patent applicant to request continued examination of an application after the USPTO had issued a final notice of rejection or notice of allowance of the claim by submitting an RCE. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(b); 37 C.F.R. § 1.114(b). As the USPTO explains, an “RCE is not a new patent application; it merely continues the examination of the same application” and, consequently, “retains (1) the filing date of the underlying application and (2) the amount of patent term adjustment that the underlying application accrued due to delays by the USPTO during the examination.” Def.’s Opp’n at 12-13 (citing Changes to Implement Patent Term Adjustment Under Twenty-Year Patent Term, 65 FR 56,366 (Sept. 18, 2000) (“Final Rule”) (discussing § 1.704(c)(ll)). An RCE may include “an information disclosure statement, an amendment to the written description, claims, or drawings, new arguments, or new evidence in support of patentability,” 37 C.F.R. § 1.114(c), but may not “introduce new matter into the disclosure of the invention,” 35 U.S.C. § 132(a). An RCE is initiated at the applicant’s request and, therefore, “any time consumed” by an RCE is excluded from Part B delay, which is designed to compensate for administrative delay attributable to the agency. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B)®. 3. Challenged USPTO Regulations Following notice and comment, the USPTO promulgated two final rules interpreting the proper calculation of PTA under section 154(b)(1)(B). First, 37 C.F.R. § 1.702(b) describes the USPTO’s interpretation of the grounds for PTA due to the agency’s failure to take certain actions within specified time frames. Specifically, this regulation provides that “the term of an original patent shall be adjusted if the issuance of the patent was delayed due to the failure of the Office to issue a patent within three years after the date on which the application was filed ..., but not including: (1) [a]ny time consumed by continued examination of the application under 35 U.S.C. § 132(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 1.702(b)(1). This regulation also provides that “any time consumed by” proceedings under sections 135(a), 181 and appellate review are similarly “not included.” Id. at (b)(2)-(4). The second regulation, 37 C.F.R. § 1.703(b), specifies the beginning and end dates of the periods for which there are grounds for PTA. Thus, while § 1.702(b)(1) provides that time consumed by an RCE is excluded in determining Part B delay, § 1.703(b) details how that excluded time is determined. Specifically, the time consumed by an RCE is described as “(1) the number of days, if any, in the period beginning on the date which a request for continued examination of the application ... was filed and ending on the date the patent was issued.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.703(b)(1) (emphasis supplied). As reflected in § 1.703(b)(1), the USPTO considers the “time consumed by” RCE examination, whether filed before or after the three-year statutory deadline, to be the time period from the date the RCE is filed until the issuance of the patent. In other words, the USPTO construes section 154(b)(1)(B)® to command that if the applicant is successful in obtaining patent approval after an RCE, no matter whether the RCE is filed before or after the three-year statutory deadline, no Part B delay is accrued from the time the RCE is filed until the issuance of the patent. Def.’s Opp’n at 13 (“The USPTO has determined that the time consumed by examination of an.RCE includes every day the RCE is pending before the USPTO from the filing date of the RCE until the date of issuance of the patent”); see also Exelixis, Inc. v. Kappos, 906 F.Supp.2d 474, 480 (E.D.Va.2012) (“Exelixis 7”) (“[I]n the PTO’s view, any time consumed by an RCE is subtracted from the PTA awarded under subpara-graph (B), regardless of when the RCE is filed”). By contrast to the patent issue end date for an RCE filing, regulation § 1.703(b) provides that the “time consumed by” proceedings under sections 135(a), 181 and appellate review is measured from the date the proceeding is instituted until the date the proceeding is terminated, secrecy order is removed “or the date of the last decision” in an appeal.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.703(b)(2)-(4). B. Patent Term Adjustment for the '788 Patent The plaintiff filed the application for the '788 patent on October 26, 2006, as a continuation application of a prior application filed in 2003. Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts in Supp. of its Mot. for Summ. J. Regarding Calculation of Part B Delay (“Pl.’s Facts”) ¶1, ECF No. 20-2; PL’s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of its Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. Regarding Calculation of Part B Delay (“PL’s Mem.”) at 8, ECF No. 20-1; Def.’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Genuine Dispute (“Def.’s Facts”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 21-1. Three years after the initial application, on October 26, 2009, the application was still pending. Over two months later, on December 31, 2009, the examiner issued a final rejection of the application, rejecting all pending claims as being unpatentable. PL’s Facts ¶ 14; Def.’s Facts ¶ 3. At this point, the plaintiff had several options, “including: abandoning] the application, requesting] an interview with the [e]xaminer, filing] a request for continued examination, filing] a continuation or continuation-in-part application, or appealing] the final rejection.” Def.’s Opp’n at 5. Any continuation or continuation-in-part application filed by the plaintiff at that point would have been treated as a newly-filed application, resulting in loss of all the PTA that had previously accrued. Id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.704(c)(ll)). Filing an RCE, however, would permit continued examination of the same application and the concomitant retention of all previously accrued PTA. See id. The plaintiff met with the examiner and, subsequently, on April 14, 2010, filed an RCE that narrowed the scope of its claims. PL’s Facts ¶ 11; Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 4-5; see also Defi’s Opp’n at 6 (“[T]he Examiner suggested that ‘the broad claims be amended’ to overcome the prior art,” which advice the plaintiff followed when it “narrowed the scope of the claims as the Examiner ha[d] suggested.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted); id. at 18 (“Abraxis ... substantially amended its claims during the pendency of the RCE to obtain a determination of patentability by the USPTO”). Indeed, the plaintiffs RCE filing indicates that the plaintiff amended four claims (ie., Claims 2, 13, 24 and 25), added one new claim (¿a, Claim 26) and withdrew twenty-one of the original twenty-five claims. Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 6 (“Pl.’s RCE Filing”), Part 1, at 2-3, ECF No. 20-8. On June 1, 2010, the examiner concluded that the plaintiff was legally entitled to a patent and sent a notice of allowance. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 10; Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 7 (“Notice of Allowance and Fee(s) Due”), ECF No. 20-10. On June 3, 2010, the plaintiff paid the requisite issue fee and filed a petition, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.705(b), seeking a patent term adjustment under Part A and Part B. Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 8 (“Part B — Fee(s) Due”), ECF No. 20-11; Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 9 (“Application for Patent Term Adjustment under 37 C.F.R. 1.705”), ECF No. 20-12. Summarized below are the evolving patent term adjustments given to the '788 patent leading up the instant litigation and pending cross-motions for summary judgment. 1. Original Patent Term Adjustment On October 26, 2010, the USPTO issued the '788 patent. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 14. At that time, the USPTO determined that the patent was eligible for a 23-day patent term adjustment under Part A and a 169-day patent term adjustment under Part B. PL’s Mot., Ex. 13 at 2 (“Patent Term Adjustments”), ECF No. 20-16. On April 15, 2011, the plaintiff filed the instant suit, alleging that the USPTO improperly calculated the patent term adjustment for the '788 patent under both Parts A and B. Compl. ¶ 20. In particular with respect to Part B, the plaintiff claimed entitlement to a 316-day PTA, contending that the “time consumed by” the RCE under § 154(b)(l)(B)(i) does not extend from the date on which an RCE is filed to the date that the patent is issued, as set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 1.703(b), but rather extends from the date on which an RCE is filed to the date that the USPTO issues a notice of allowance. Id. ¶¶ 31, 39. In the alternative, the plaintiff argued that “the time consumed by” the RCE extends from the date on which an RCE is filed to the date that the applicant pays the issue fee. Compl. ¶ 49. 2. Patent Term Adjustment After Remand to USPTO On October 31, 2011, the parties jointly requested a remand to provide the USPTO with an opportunity to recalculate the PTA. See Order dated November 1, 2011, ECF No. 14. After reviewing its PTA determination, the USPTO granted the plaintiff the 135-day adjustment it sought under Part A. Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 15 (“Petition Decision”) at 3, ECF No. 20-18. With respect to Part B delay, however, the USPTO concluded that its prior determination of the patent adjustment period was correct given the periods of delay attributable to the USPTO and to the applicant. Id. at 4. The USPTO therefore granted the plaintiff a total of 199 days of adjustment. Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 15 at 5; Def.’s Opp’n at 7. 3. Continued Dispute Over Part B Patent Term Adjustment Although the parties agree that the USPTO properly determined 135 days of Part A delay and 105 days of applicant delay, see Pl.’s Mem. at 18; Def.’s Opp’n at 30, they disagree about the amount of Part B delay to which the plaintiff is entitled. The parties agree on the counting of three time periods occurring after the 3-year statutory deadline: First, the parties agree that the 169 days beginning on the day after the three-year statutory deadline passed, on October 26, 2009, until April 13, 2010, which is the day before the plaintiff filed the RCE, should be added to the effective term of the '788 patent. Pl.’s Mem. at 18, Def.’s Opp’n at 30. Second, the parties agree that the 49 days beginning on the date the RCE was filed, on April 14, 2010, until the date the USPTO sent the notice of allowance, on June 1, 2010, should be excluded from the Part B calculation. Compl. ¶ 49; Pl.’s Mem. at 18; Def.’s Opp’n at 30. Finally, the parties agree that the 23-days, which elapsed following the four-month period after the payment of the issue fee until the issuance of the patent, should be added to the PTA as Part A delay. The parties disagree about whether Part B delay should be added for the period from the notice of allowance, or alternatively, payment of the issue fee, until issuance of the patent, part of which period (i&, 23 days) has already been added to the PTA as Part A delay. Figure 1, below, illustrates the '788 patent’s path to issuance and the parties’ agreements and contested views about the calculation of the Part B delay for PTA. Figure 1: '788 Patent Prosecution Time-line And Parties’ Dispute Over Part B Patent Term Adjustment To summarize with reference to Figure 1, the USPTO determined that Part B delay was 169 days [ie. Periods 1 and 2], starting from the date that the application had been pending for more than three years (October 27, 2009) up to the date the plaintiff filed the RCE (April 14, 2010). Def.’s Opp’n at 30. The USPTO interprets § 154(b)(l)(B)(i) to exclude all time after the filing of an RCE until the issuance of the patent, as reflected in its regulation at 35 C.F.R. § 1.703(b)(1). Id. Thus, under the USPTO’s interpretation, the plaintiff would be entitled to a total of 199 days of delay computed as follows: 135 days of Part A delay (including 23 days that occurred after the 3-year deadline), plus 169 days of Part B delay [ie. Periods 1 and 2], minus 105 days for applicant delay, for a total of 199 days of PTA. Id. The plaintiff concurs with USPTO that Part B delay starts from October 27, 2009, the day after lapse of the 3-year statutory deadline, but disagrees that the end date is the filing of the RCE. Compl. ¶ 39(a). Instead, the plaintiff contends that the end date of the Part B delay period is the issuance of the patent on October 26, 2010, for a total of 365 days. Id. The plaintiff initially argued, in its complaint and briefing in support of its pending summary judgment motion, that the only time period appropriate to deduct, under section 154(b)(1)(B)®, from this total of 365 days is the 49 days between the filing of the RCE (April 14, 2010) until the issuance of the Notice of Allowance (June 1, 2010) [ie. Period 3] (or, alternatively, 51 days to account for the 2 days until payment of the issue fee (June 3, 2010) [ie. Period 4]), resulting in a Part B-delay of at least 316 days (or, alternatively, 314 days). Compl. ¶¶ 39(b), 49, 51(b); Pl.’s Mem. at 17; see also Figure 1. After briefing was complete, however, the plaintiff asserted a new argument that because the RCE was filed more than three years from the application filing date, it is entitled to Part B adjustment for “every day from the end of the 3-year period after the filing of the patent application until issuance of its patent.” Pl.’s Notice of Recent Decisions (“Pl.’s Notice”), at 2-3, ECF No. 29. In other words, the plaintiffs revised position is that Part B delay encompasses the entire 365-day period, with no deduction for any period “consumed by” the RCE filing. According to the plaintiff, “[a]t the very least, [plaintiff] is entitled to the subset of that period it has requested, not only for the reasons set forth in its pending summary judgment motion, but also for the reasons set forth” in two recent decisions, which will be discussed in more detail below. Id. at 3 (citing Exelixis I and Novartis AG v. Kappos, 904 F.Supp.2d 58 (D.D.C.2012) (“Novartis”)). The parties agree that, upon determination of the correct number of days attributable to Part B delay, the statute requires, under the limitations set out in paragraph (2), that overlapping periods of delay must be reduced to reflect an accurate number of days delayed. 35 U.S.C. § 154(B)(2)(A). The USPTO’s position is straightforward: after the 3-year deadline, Part B delay accrued until, and ended upon, the filing the RCE and, since the 23 days of Part A-delay occurred thereafter, there is no overlap of Part A and B-delay periods. By contrast, predicated on its view that Part B delay continued until the patent issue date, the plaintiff argues that the 23-days following the four month period after the issue fee payment [i.e. Period 6] should be subtracted from the 314 days as overlapping Part A and B delay, resulting in 291 days of Part B delay. Pl.’s Mem. at 18; Figure 1. Thus, the plaintiff contends that it is entitled to at least a total PTA of 321 days derived from the following determinations: 135 days of Part A, plus 291 of non-overlapping days of Part B, minus 105 days of applicant delay. In short, based on the briefing for the summary judgment motion, the parties’ dispute boils down to whether the four-month plus 2-day period after the notice of allowance was issued [i.e., Periods 5 & 6] count as Part B delay. As the analysis that follows makes clear, the parties’ dispute about the correct interpretation of both section 154(b)(1)(B) and its clause (i) implicates the complex interplay among three provisions in the AIPA amendments: first, and most obviously, subparagraph (B), which guides the determination of Part B delay and excludes .from a patent term extension, under clause (i), the specific time period “consumed by continued examination of the application requested by the applicant ...;” second, section 154(b)(l)(A)(iv), which requires the USPTO to “issue a patent within four months after the date on which the issue fee was paid;” and, finally, the overlap provision in section 154(b)(2)(A), which requires that “the period of adjustment granted under this section shall not exceed the actual number of days the issuance of the patent was delayed.” II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Summary Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment may be granted when the Court finds, based upon the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits and other factual materials in the record, “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Wyeth Holdings Corp. v. Sebelius, 603 F.3d 1291, 1296 (Fed.Cir.2010); Immunocept, L.L.C. v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed.Cir.2007). To determine which facts are material, the Court looks to the substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The mere existence of a factual dispute does not bar summary-judgment; instead, the dispute must be “genuine,” insofar as its resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, thereby, affect the outcome of the action. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Summary judgment is properly granted against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In this case, the pending cross motions for summary judgment seek review of the plaintiffs legal challenge to USPTO regulations and their application to the '788 patent. “[W]hen an agency action is challenged! ] ... [t]he entire case on review is a question of law, and only a question of law.” Marshall Cnty. Healthcare Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 (D.C.Cir.1993). This Court need not and ought not engage in lengthy fact finding,! since “[generally speaking, district courts - reviewing agency action under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard do not resolve factual issues, but operate instead as appellate courts resolving legal questions.” James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F.Supp.2d 76, 90 (D.D.C.2006) (“Under the APA, it is the role of the agency to resolve factual issues to arrive at a decision that is supported by the administrative record, whereas the function of the district court is to determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); McDonough v. Mabus, 907 F.Supp.2d 33, 42 (D.D.C.2012); Wilson v. McHugh, 842 F.Supp.2d 310, 315 (D.D.C.2012); Caez v. United States, 815 F.Supp.2d 184, 188 (D.D.C.2011). The parties agree on the material facts related to the calculation of the patent term adjustment for the '788 patent. Each party maintains that it is entitled to judgment on the question of whether the USP-TO’s method of calculating the PTA for the '788 patent, under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B), is contrary to law. The Court concurs that no material facts are in dispute and that this case presents a purely legal issue, warranting the entry of summary judgment for the party entitled to prevail as a matter of law. B. Administrative Procedure Act A patent applicant “dissatisfied” with the USPTO’s patent term adjustment decision may seek judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to “change the period of the adjustment of the patent term.” 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(4)(A) (“Chapter 7 of title 5 shall apply to such action”). Under the APA, a district court shall set aside the agency’s decision if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). In explaining the factors that 'would warrant rejection of an agency rule, the Supreme Court has explained that, “[njormally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). The scope of review of an agency rule is “narrow” to guard against the court substituting “ ‘its judgment for that of the agency.’ ” Burandt v. Dudas, 528 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2008) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856)). C. Chevron Framework The familiar two-step process set out in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), applies to judicial review of a challenge to an agency’s construction of a statute administered by the agency. The court must begin at Chevron Step One by “ask[ing] whether Congress has directly addressed the precise question at issue.” Mayo Found, for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 131 S.Ct. 704, 178 L.Ed.2d 588 (2011) (internal citations omitted). “ ‘If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’ ” City of Arlington v. FCC, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1863, — L.Ed.2d - (2013) (quoting Chevron, at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778). A statute that is unambiguous “means that there is ‘no gap for the agency to fill’ and thus ‘no room for agency discretion.’ ” United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1836, 182 L.Ed.2d 746 (2012) (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005)). To discern whether Congress has addressed the precise question, the court applies “the traditional tools of statutory construction.” Id. These tools include evaluation of the plain statutory text at issue, the purpose and structure of the statute as a whole, while giving effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, and — where appropriate — the drafting history. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001); Bell Atl. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C.Cir.1997); Coal Employment Project v. Dole, 889 F.2d 1127, 1131 (D.C.Cir.1989). If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue under consideration, however, the analysis shifts to Chevron Step Two, where “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” City of Arlington, 133 S.Ct. at 1868. The job of the courts is not to engage in “their own interstitial lawmaking” and “mak[e] public policy by prescribing the meaning of ambiguous statutory commands.” Id. at 1873. Rather, the “archetypal Chevron questions, about how best to construe an ambiguous term in light of competing policy interests” belongs to the “agencies that administer the statutes.” Id. When Congress has delegated to the agency authority to make rules carrying the force of law, and the challenged agency interpretation was promulgated in the exercise of that authority, then the agency’s rule is entitled to deference “as long as it is a permissible construction of the statute, even if it differs from how the court would have interpreted the statute in the absence of an agency regulation.” Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 817, 184 L.Ed.2d 627 (2013); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 980, 125 S.Ct. 2688 (2005)(“If a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s construction is reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.”) Even when Congress has not provided the agency an express delegation of authority or responsibility “ ‘to implement a particular provision or fill a particular gap, [ ] it can still be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law, even one about which Congress did not actually have an intent as to a particular result.’ ” Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S.Ct. at 1843-44 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001)). Thus, agency rules that do not qualify for the high level of deference required under Chevron, are not placed “outside the pale of any deference whatever” and “may merit some deference whatever its form, given the specialized experience and broader investigations and information available to the agency, and given the value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law requires.” Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 234, 121 S.Ct. 2164. Courts may defer to such agency rules “only to the extent that those [agency] interpretations have the ‘power to persuade.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944); see also Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed.Cir.1996). The “power to persuade” depends on “ ‘the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’ ” Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 227-28, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161). D. Skidmore Deference Would Apply To the Challenged USPTO Regulations If section 154(b)(1)(B) and its clause (i) are found to be ambiguous, the USPTO takes the position that its interpretation would be entitled to Chevron deference. Def.’s Opp’n at 19 n.10, ECF No. 21. Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation “is warranted only ‘when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.’ ” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-56, 126 S.Ct. 904, 163 L.Ed.2d 748 (2006) (quoting Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164). The USPTO suggests that the -Court need not reach the issue of whether Chevron deference is appropriate because the USPTO’s interpretation would satisfy the criteria for Skidmore deference. Def.’s Opp’n at 20 (citing Brown v. United States, 327 F.3d 1198, 1205 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“Because we hold that [the agency’s] methodology satisfied the requirements for Skidmore deference, ... we need not reach the question of Chevron deference.”). Even if this suggestion were correct, however, this Court is bound by the precedent set in the Federal Circuit, which “has held that the PTO is not afforded Chevron deference because it does not have the authority to issue substantive rules, only procedural regulations regarding the conduct of proceedings before the agency.” Wyeth v. Dudas, 580 F.Supp.2d 138, 141 (D.D.C.2008) aff'd sub nom. Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d 1364 (Fed.Cir.2010) (citing Merck, 80 F.3d at 1549-50); see also Exelizis II, 919 F.Supp.2d at 695 (“The Federal Circuit has decided that the PTO’s regulations are not entitled to Chevron deference, but may be entitled to deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)”) (citing Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed.Cir.1996)); Univ. of Massachusetts v. Kappos, 903 F.Supp.2d 77, 84 (D.D.C.2012) (holding that the USPTO lacks the authority to issue substantive rules and construing 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(3)(A) to limit the USPTO’s authority to promulgate “only procedural regulations regarding the conduct of proceedings before the agency”). Indeed, the challenged USPTO regulations at issue in this case were issued pursuant to statutory authority to address procedural issues, not to determine substantive patent term rights. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(3)(A) (USPTO “shall prescribe regulations establishing procedures for the application for and determination of patent term adjustments under this section.”) (emphasis added); see also 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (tasking USPTO with developing regulations governing the proceedings before the agency). Thus, if the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous, only Skidmore deference is appropriate, and the Court would review the challenged USPTO regulations under that standard. III. DISCUSSION The plaintiff argues that the USPTO’s regulations improperly deprived it of a patent term adjustment under Part B, which extends the patent term for delays that occur three years after the application is filed. According to the plaintiff, the patent term for the '788 patent should be adjusted by at least an additional 122 days between the payment of the issue fee and the issuance of the patent, see Figure 1 (Period 5), or, in the alternative, for the 124 days between the notice of allowance and the issuance of the patent, see Figure 1 (Periods 4 and 5). As noted, the parties focus their disagreement on the proper construction of section 154(b)(1)(B) and its clause (i), which excludes from Part B delay “any time consumed by continued examination of the application requested by the applicant under section 132(b).” While the USPTO, as reflected in 37 C.F.R. § 1.703(b), construes the term “examination” as continuing up until issuance of a patent, the plaintiff contends that this interpretation “cannot be squared with the text, purpose, or structure of the Patent Term Guarantee Act.” Pl.’s Reply on Renewed Mot. Summ. J. and Opp’n to Defi’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Reply”) at 8, EOF No. 24. Rather, the plaintiff argues that the “examination” of a patent in an RCE proceeding “concludes when a notice of allowance issues (or, at the latest, when the issue fee is paid)” and that “[a]ny subsequent delay is not time ‘consumed by continued examination’ and should not count against the applicant for purposes of calculating Part B delay.” Id. Notwithstanding the plaintiffs position in the summary judgment briefing regarding the amount of time required to be excluded from Part B delay under by clause (i), as noted, the plaintiff has more recently argued that after the 3-year statutory deadline, Part B delay accrues regardless of any RCE filing. In evaluating the challenged USPTO regulations, the Court'first examines section 154(b)(1)(B) to determine how plainly Congress articulated its intent in both sub-paragraph (B) and clause (i). For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that this provision, generally, and clause (i), in particular, are ambiguous. Then, informed by the statutory analysis, the Court evaluates the reasonableness and persuasiveness of the challenged regulations. A. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B) is Ambiguous This Court has the benefit of the thoughtful opinions issued by three district court judges in evaluating any ambiguity in section 154(b)(1)(B) on the question of whether the filing of an RCE more than three years after the application filing stops the running of Part B delay. Two of these opinions concluded that subparagraph (B) was clear and unambiguous, and one opinion concluded the opposite. Compare Exelixis I, 906 F.Supp.2d at 480 (“Here, the plain language meaning of sub-paragraph (B) is clear, unambiguous, and in accord with both the statute’s structure and purpose.”); and Novartis, 904 F.Supp.2d at 72 (“[T]he PTO’s interpretation is contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of §'. 154(b)(1)(B), and ... contravenes the structure and purpose of the statute”); with Exelixis, Inc. v. Kappos, 919 F.Supp.2d 689, 697 (E.D.Va.2013) (“Exelixis II”) (“This Court parts ways with the reasoning in Exelixis I and declines to find that the statute’s silence as to RCEs filed after the three-year period expresses “plain and unambiguous” congressional intent on the issue”). With respect to clause (i) in subparagraph (B), only the court in Exelixis II considered the proper interpretation of this provision, implicitly finding that clause (i) was ambiguous by according Skidmore deference to the USPTO regulation interpreting it. 919 F.Supp.2d at 702. The divergent conclusions in these opinions regarding whether section 154(b)(1)(B) is ambiguous suggests that Congress may not have spoken directly or plainly on the issue. “A statute is considered ambiguous if it can be read more than one way.” Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong, of Indus. Org. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 333 F.3d 168, 173 (D.C.Cir.2003); see also AFL-CIO, 333 F.3d at 174 (“[T]he fact that [a] provision can support two plausible interpretations renders it ambiguous for purposes of Chevron analysis”); United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 446-47 (D.C.Cir.1989). At the same time, a difference in judicial opinions about whether a statute’s meaning is plain is not dispositive of the issue. See Harry T. Edwards & Linda A. Elliott, FedeRal StaNdaeds Of Review, at 148 (noting that, in some cases, “the search for a statute’s plain meaning is not so easy” and observing “the Supreme Court has issued many decisions resting on Chevron Step One that have been opposed by dissenting opinions”). The reasoning in the trilogy of opinions considering whether section 154(b)(1)(B) is ambiguous helps inform this determination. In Exelixis I, the court examined the USPTO’s determination of Part B delay when, as in the instant case, an RCE is filed after the 3-year statutory deadline, posing the question as follows: “Whether 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B) requires that an applicant’s PTA be reduced by the time attributable to an RCE, where, as here, the RCE is filed after the expiration of AIPA’s guaranteed three year period.” 906 F.Supp.2d at 475. The Exelixis I court found section 154(b)’s language “plain and unambiguous,” id. at 481, in supporting three conclusions: first, that the “not including” clause contained in section 154(b) “modifies and pertains to the three year period and does not apply to, or refer to, the day for day PTA remedy.” Id. at 481. In other words, the circumstances that are “not includ[ed]” in Part B delay, serve only to toll the “trigger,” or beginning date, for the 3-year deadline. Second, the Exelixis I court concluded that if the “trigger” has already occurred (i.e., the 3-year statutory deadline has already passed), the circumstances enumerated in the “not including” clause are simply irrelevant; only when the excluded circumstances, such as the filing of an RCE, occur before the 3-year deadline does this clause have any impact on the patent term adjustment for Part B delay. As the Exelixis I court explained, while “the clock is tolled for the processing of an RCE filed before the three year clock runs out, [ ] the provision does not refer to or mention RCE’s filed after the three year clock has run.” Id. at 481. From this legislative silence, the court found clarity, stating that “subparagraph (B) makes clear that once the three year clock has run, PTA is to be awarded on a day for day basis regardless of subsequent events.” Id. at 481. Finally, the Exelixis I court concluded that section 154(b) “does not treat an RCE filing as applicant delay.” Id. (“In other words, the statute does not consider an applicant’s submission of an RCE as ‘applicant delay’ that warrants reduction under § 154(b)(2)(C)”). This conclusion was significant in view of the provision’s “structure and purpose,” which “is to ensure that an applicant is provided with a PTA remedy for delays in examination and processing attributable to the PTO and to reduce any PTA by delays attributable to the applicant.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court looked to the limitation provision captioned “Reduction of period of adjustment” in section 154(b)(2)(C), which the court noted does not expressly refer to RCE’s but instead to periods of time when “the applicant failed to engage in reasonable efforts to conclude prosecution of the application.” 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(C)(i). Since the filing of an RCE is not among the listed categories of “applicant delay” set out in section 154(b)(2)(C), the court determined that the USPTO erred in construing Part B in a manner that would “punish the applicant for filing the RCE.” Id. at 482. Further elaborating on this point, the Exelixis I court explained that “[p]ut differently, § 154(b) does not treat an RCE as an applicant’s failure ‘to engage in reasonable efforts to conclude prosecution of the application,’ ” and instead “RCE’s are something for which the three year clock should be tolled, but not something that reduces the PTA.” Id. at 483. The Exelixis I court rejected the arguments advanced by the USPTO in favor of the agency’s interpretation. Specifically, the USPTO argued that the interpretation of section 154(b)(1)(B) adopted by the court renders the subsequent section — section 154(b)(1)(C) — superfluous. As noted, Part C provides for a PTA for delay caused by an interference proceeding, a secrecy order, or appellate review by the Board or a federal court. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(C). The USPTO explained that, under the plaintiffs interpretation of Part B, any interference proceeding, secrecy order, or appellate review occurring after the three-year statutory deadline would not be excluded from the patent term adjustment calculation. The PTO argued that this interpretation eliminated the need for Part C in many situations, thus rendering Part C superfluous. Exelixis I, 906 F.Supp.2d at 482 n.16. The court disagreed, without extensive discussion. Id. (“Although the plain language of subparagraph (B) may result in the PTO awarding C delay less often, this simply does not, as the USPTO argues, render subparagraph (C) superfluous.”). In addition, the court was not persuaded by the USPTO’s argument that the plaintiffs proposed construction could lead to disparate treatment of some similarly-situated applicants, depending on which side of the three-year statutory line the applicant files an RCE, noting that “this court does not take upon itself the role of correcting all statutory inequities.” Id. at 484 (quoting Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d at 1370). A subsequent decision by a Judge on this Court described the rationale in Exelixis I as “well-reasoned” and “persuasive,” and relied upon the case to reach the same conclusion that section 154(b)(1)(B) is “plain and unambiguous.” Novartis, 904 F.Supp.2d at 72. Like the Exelixis I court, the Novartis court rejected PTO’s interpretation that the “not including” clause in subparagraph (B) is part of the remedy provision rather than the “trigger” provision, and concluded that Part B delay accrues and requires an award of PTA following the three-year statutory deadline, without regard to whether an RCE is filed during the post-deadline period. Id. at 71. The Novartis court supplemented the reasons given in Exelixis I to bolster the rejection of USPTO’s interpretation of subparagraph (B) by pointing to what it characterized as a conflict between USP-TO’s regulation at 37 C.F.R. § 1.703(b) and the immediately preceding regulation at § 1.702(b). The court observed that section 1.703(b) provides, consistent with the USPTO’s position, that “the ‘remedy’ consists of day-for-day PTA after [the three-year deadline], but does not include any time consumed by an RCE.” According to the Novartis court, this provision is inconsistent with section 1.702(b), which “unambiguously provides that the three-year window will be tolled during the filing of an RCE, and says nothing about the remedy to be applied if and when that three-year mark is triggered.” Id. at 72-73. In the court’s view, “if both regulations were to be applied as written, time consumed by an RCE would apply to both the trigger and the remedy provisions of the statute, and would effectively result in the double-counting of the ‘not including’ clause of § 154(b)(1)(B).” Id. at 73. By contrast to the conclusions reached in Exelixis I and Novartis, the third court to consider the USPTO’s interpretation of Part B “declined to find that the statute’s silence as to RCEs filed after the three-year period expresses ‘plain and unambiguous’ congressional intent on the issue.” Exelixis II, 919 F.Supp.2d at 697. The Exelixis II court observed that “treating RCEs filed before and after the three-year period in directly opposite ways, ... will produce ‘absurd results,’ ” id. (quoting Ex-elixis I at 484), including the “paradoxical]” situation where an “earlier-filed RCEs would indefinitely postpone B-delay PTA as if there were applicant-caused delay, but later-filed RCEs would suddenly be treated like PTO-caused delay and arbitrarily result in accruing PTA.” Id. at 699. As the court noted, “[t]his consequence would violate the canon that ‘a statutory construction that causes absurd results is to be avoided if at all possible.’ ” Id. (quoting Timex V.I., Inc. v. United States, 157 F.3d 879, 886 (Fed.Cir.1998) (citing Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 394, 60 S.Ct. 337, 84 L.Ed. 340 (1940)). Instead, the Exelixis II court concluded that “a reasonable interpretation of the statute and its legislative history support the conclusion that there is no reason to treat RCEs differently based upon when they were filed.... ” Id. The court pointed out the obvious: section 154(b)(1)(B) “does not guarantee that a patent application will always be resolved within three years, as it specifically provides that certain events, such as the filing of an RCE by, an applicant, will toll that three-year guarantee.” Id. at 697. The court explained that 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.702(b) and I.703(b) are consistent with the overarching purpose of section 154(b) that an applicant should not be penalized by a delay attributable to the USPTO, but should also not benefit when the delay was “requested by” or otherwise attributable to the applicant. Exelixis II, 919 F.Supp.2d at 698; see also Exelixis I, 906 F.Supp.2d at 481; Novartis, 904 F.Supp.2d at 71. The Exelixis II court disputed the animating view in Exelixis I, adopted in Novartis, that an RCE is not counted as applicant delay, explaining that, to the contrary, “[t]he filing of an RCE is always done by the applicant to newly amend or enhance an application, and is therefore applicant-initiated delay whether filed before or after the three-year period has run.” Exelixis II, 919 F.Supp.2d at 699. Moreover, the Exelixis II court pointed out, based upon ample legislative history, that measuring the term of a patent from the date of filing instead of the date of issuance “was at least partly motivated by fear of so-called ‘submarine’ patents filed by applicants who had discovered that they could file ‘continuation prosecution applications’ (CPAs) to indefinitely delay the PTO’s completion of its examination, thereby keeping their applications ‘pending and secret until an industry with substantial investment in the technology can be targeted in an infringement suit.’ ” Id. at 699 and n.13 (citing, inter alia, H.R.Rep. No. 106-464, at 125) (“Only those who purposely manipulate the system to delay the issuance of their patents will be penalized ..., a result that the Conferees believe entirely appropriate.”); 140 Cong. Rec. 29,964 (1994) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[B]y focusing on the date of application rather than the date of issuanee, the disruptive tactics of some who have sought to manipulate the patent system through the use of so-called “submarine” patents will come to an end.”); 140 Cong. Rec. 29,608 (statement of Rep. Ballenger) (“ ‘Submarine patents’ allow a patent applicant to delay issuing of a patent for years-shutting down or demanding royalties from businesses that independently develop that technology in question.”)). Since the RCE process permits applicants to retain their accrued PTA with unlimited opportunities to file RCEs after a final notice of rejection has been issued, the potential exists “for the very abuses that spurred reform of the laws on patent terms in the first place.” Id. In short, the Exelixis II court determined that section 154(b) was ambiguous and that “the PTO’s regulation denying PTA from the time an RCE is filed comports with ‘a reasonable conclusion as to the proper construction of the statute’ under Skidmore.” Id. at 699. Although this trilogy of opinions reaches different conclusions about whether section 154(b)(1)(B) is ambiguous, these cases uniformly construe this provision as silent about the effect of an RCE filing in the post-three year statutory deadline period. See Exelixis I, 906 F.Supp.2d at 481; Novartis, 904 F.Supp.2d at 72; Exelixis II, 919 F.Supp.2d at 697. This Court agrees with the Exelixis II court that this silence makes section 154(b)(1)(B) susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation and, consequently, ambiguous. Close examination of the interaction of other subsections in this same statutory section further confirms this conclusion. The ambiguity inherent in section 154(b)(1)(B) is highlighted upon review of the impact on Part A delay, Part C delay and the limitations in section 154(b)(2) if subparagraph B were construed to require tolling of the three-year deadline only when an RCE is filed within that three-year period, but to award Part B delay after the three year clock has run “regardless of subsequent events.” Exelixis I, 906 F.Supp.2d at 481. This construction would render superfluous the operation of other adjustments provided in this section and, thereby, violate “one of the most basic interpretive canons, that ‘[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.’ ” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 159 L.Ed.2d 172 (2004) (quoting 2A N. Singer, Statutes and STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, pp. 181-86 (rev. 6th ed.2000)); see also D. Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208, 52 S.Ct. 322, 76 L.Ed. 704 (1932) (It is a “cardinal rule that, if possible, effect shall be given to every clause and part of a statute”); Safari Club Int’l v. Jewell (In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section 4(d) Rule Litig.-MDL No.1993), 720 F.3d 354, 362 (D.C.Cir.2013) (finding ambiguity since “provision cannot permit what [other] section [] expressly prohibits without rendering the latter superfluous”); Davis County Solid Waste Management v. EPA, 101 F.3d 1395, 1404 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“[I]t is of course a well-established maxim of statutory construction that courts should avoid interpretations that render a statutory provision superfluous.”). For example, if filing an RCE after the three-year statutory deadline has no effect on the accrual of Part B delay, the Part A adjustment under section 154(b)(11)(A)(iv) would not be given full effect. Specifically, section 154(b)(1)(A)(iv) only authorizes the accrual of Part A delay if the USPTO does not act “within 4 months after the issue fee was paid,” providing the agency a short four month “grace” period before the Part A delay begins. This “grace” period clause in section 154(b)(1)(A)(iv) is made superfluous and simply eliminated for Part A delay occurring after the three-year statutory deadline, if section 154(b)(1)(B) is interpreted to apply Part B delay for any and all time after the three-year statutory deadline. In other words, the Exelixis I and Novartis courts’ interpretation of the statute reads out a significant part of clause (iv) of section 154(b)(1)(A). While each delay period must be calculated according to its own beginning and end date, as the Federal C