Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION BERYL A. HOWELL, United States District Judge TABLE OF CONTENTS I. BACKGROUND ... 5 A. Factual Overview ... 5 B. Procedural History ... 10 1. Plaintiffs Initiation of Two Lawsuits ... 11 2. Key Judicial Decisions ... 12 3. Pre-Trial Motions in Limine ... 26 4. Trial ... 27 II. LEGAL STANDARDS ... 29 A. Law Applicable to FTCA Claim ,.. 29 1. Federal -Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) Applicable to Findings and Conclusions by the Court ... 30 B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 Applicable to Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial ... 31 - III. FINDINGS OF FACT FOR PLAINTIFF’S FTCA CLAIM ... 34 A. Initiation and Progression of Investigation into Illegal Scheme ... 34 1. Brief Overview of Pertinent Components of USPS ... 34 2. USPS Automation Program ... 36 , 3. Summer of 1985' Initiation of Investigation of BOG Vice Chairman Voss ... 39 4. Plaintiff and REI’s Dealings with USPS Through Summer 1985 ... 44 B.’ Investigation of Plaintiff ... 52 1. November 1985 Interview with AEG Officials ... 53 2. November 20, 1985 Interview ■ of Plaintiff and Subordinates ... 54 3. Postal Inspectors Learn of Relationship between REI and GÁI .... 55 4. January 6, 1986 Firing of Postmaster General Carlin ... 56 5. Postal Inspection. Service Request for Initiation of Grand Jury. Investigation ... 57 6. April 1986 Confession of William Spartin About Illegal Scheme ... 59 7. April 8, 1986 Postal Inspector Interview with Plaintiffs Subordinates ... 62 8. May 1986 Guilty Plea and Cooperation by Vice Chairman Voss ... 63 9. July 25-26, 1986 Follow-up Interviews of Plaintiff and Subordinates and Review of Plaintiffs Notebooks ... 68 10. Subsequent Interviews of Co-Conspirators ... 70 C, Consideration of Indictment by D.C. U.S. Attorney’s Office ... 80 D. Plaintiffs Alleged Damages ... 85 IV.CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON PLAINTIFF’S FTCA CLAIM ... 90 A. Postal Inspectors Did Not Procure Indictment Against Plaintiff ... 91 1. . Postal Inspectors Did Not Violate Rule 6(e) ... 93 2.Mr. Spartin’s Testimony Did Not Cause Indictment of Plaintiff ... 107 3. Interview Summaries Did Not Cause Mr. Spartin to Implicate Plaintiff ... 108 4. Mr. Spartin’s Opinion Did Not Procure Indictment ..'. Ill B. Plaintiff Failed to Prove Absence of Probable Cause ... 113 1.Plaintiff Has Not Rebutted Indictment’s Presumption of Probable Cause ... 115 2.Indictment Against Plaintiff Was Supported by Probable Cause ... 120 C. Postal Inspectors Did Not Act With Malice ... 123 1. Alleged USPS Animosity Towards REI and Plaintiff -... 127. 2. Initiation of Investigation of REI and Plaintiff Was Warranted ... 131 3. Subpoenas Issued to REI ... 134 4. Documents Prepared by Postal Inspectors ... 137 D. ■ FTCA Judgment Entered in Favor of United States ... 145 V. THE FTCA JUDGMENT BAR ... 146 VI. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ... 149 A. Procedural Rulings Prior to Trial ... 150 B. Evidentiary Rulings ... 153 1. Exclusion of Indemnification Evidence .... 153 2. Exclusion of Prior Judicial Opinion ... 160 3. Plaintiffs Country Club Member- • ship ... 164 4. Admission of Hearsay Evidence ... 3.67 C. Jury Instructions ... 172 1. Concert of Action Instruction ... 172 2. Probable Cause Instruction ... 176 3. Inducement Instruction ... 178 D. Judicial Conduct .■.. 186 1. Questioning of Witnesses ... 187 2. Instruction Concerning Deposition Questions ... 188 3. Instruction ..Following Summation ... .189 VII. CONCLUSION ... 194 Over twenty years ago, the plaintiff, William G. Moore, Jr., filed these consolidated cases after his acquittal on serious felony charges. The ensuing years of litigation generated no fewer than sixteen judicial opinions and, more recently, a four-week concurrent jury and bench trial, in which the plaintiff sought over $235,000,000 for lost compensation, emotional and reputational damages. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff now seeks a new jury trial on his claim against four living and one deceased former United States Postal Inspectors for retaliatory inducement to prosecution, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), Pl.’s Mot. for New Trial (“PL’s Mot.”), Case No. 92-2288, ECF No. 511, and judgment in his favor on his claim against the United States for malicious prosecution, under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq. See generally PL’s Proposed Findings of Fact (“PL’s FOF”), ECF No. 126-1; PL’s Proposed Concl. of Law (“PL’s COL”), ECF No. 127. Other Judges on this Court previously dismissed the plaintiffs Bivens claim against the Postal Inspectors twice and his FTCA claim against the United States three times, but the two claims at issue at trial and addressed in this Memorandum Opinion were revived each time on appeal. See Moore v. Hartman, Nos. 92-CV-2288 (NHJ), 93-CV-0324 (NHJ), 1993 WL 405785 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 1993) (1993 Decision) (granting motion to dismiss the plaintiffs Bivens and FTCA claims), affd in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Moore v. Voider, 65 F.3d 189 (D.C.Cir.1995) (Moore I) (affirming dismissal of Bivens malicious prosecution claim, reversing dismissal of Bivens retaliatory prosecution claim and dismissal of FTCA claim); Moore v. Voider, No. 92-CV-2288, Mem. Op. (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 1998) (1998 Decision) (denying summary judgment on Bivens claim against the Postal Inspector defendants, granting summary judgment on the Bivens claim against federal prosecutor, and granting summary judgment on the FTCA claim against the United States), ajfd in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Moore v. United States, 213 F.3d 705 (D.C.Cir.2000) (Moore II) (affirming dismissal of Bivens retaliatory prosecution claim against federal prosecutor and FTCA abuse of process claim against the United States, and reversing dismissal of FTCA malicious prosecution claim against United States); Moore v. Hartman, 569 F.Supp.2d 133, 137 (D.D.C.2008) (2008 Decision) (granting summary judgment on the Bivens claim against the Postal Inspectors and the FTCA claim against the United States), rev’d, Moore v. Hartman, 644 F.3d 415, 426 (D.C.Cir.2011) (Moore V) vacated sub nom. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006) (vacating Moore V and remanding); Moore v. Hartman, 704 F.3d 1003 (D.C.Cir.2013), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 250, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2013) (Moore VI) (reinstating Moore V). This prolonged procedural history is set out below, after a brief overview of these cases, to provide context, first, for the factual findings and legal conclusions reached by this Court on the plaintiffs FTCA malicious prosecution claim against the United States and, second, for resolution of the plaintiffs motion for a new trial on his Bivens retaliatory inducement to prosecution claim against five former Postal Inspectors. For the reasons discussed below, the Court reaches the same conclusion as the jury that heard the plaintiffs Bivens claim: The plaintiff has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, his FTCA claim of malicious prosecution by the United States. Moreover, the plaintiff is not entitled to un-do the jury verdict against him and re-do in a new trial his Bivens claim for retaliatory prosecution against the former Postal Inspectors. I. BACKGROUND Set out below is a brief overview of the factual background underlying these cases as well as a summary of the lengthy procedural history. A. Factual Overview In November 1989, another Judge on this Court granted the plaintiffs motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, on criminal charges, inter alia, that he engaged in a conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. United States v. Recognition Equip., Inc., 725 F.Supp. 587, 58788 (D.D.C.1989). Rather than end the litigation between the parties, however, the plaintiffs acquittal triggered over twenty years of continuing litigation culminating in the concurrent bench and jury trial before this Court. As detailed in the factual findings set out in Part III, infra, in July 1985, the Chief Postal Inspector opened an investigation into possible corruption at the highest level of the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). Over the course of the next three years, Postal Inspectors uncovered an illegal bribery and kickback scheme in which Peter Voss, the Vice Chairman of the USPS Board of Governors (“BOG”), took bribes from an outside consulting group to use his influence on a key subcommittee of the BOG to award a sole source contract for up to $400,000,000, to the consultants’ client. If the scheme were successful, the Vice Chairman expected a percentage kickback from the sole source contract. The consultants’ client and the source of the bribe monies paid to the BOG Vice. Chairman was. Recognition Equipment, -Inc. (“REI”), a -Dallas, Texas company headed by the plaintiff. When the plaintiff took over as Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of REI in 1982, he initiated a multi-pronged campaign to increase the company’s business with USPS and, specifically,, to obtain a sole source contract from USPS for the purchase of REI’s mail sorting equipment, which used a different technology than that widely deployed by USPS. As part of what the plaintiff himself described as “aggressively pursuing] [the] contract,” 6/25/14 AM Tr. at 97, the plaintiff (1) met with the highest management levels within USPS, including the Postmaster General and BOG members; (2) engaged members of the Texas congressional delegation to pressure USPS to alter its choice of mail-sorting technology and to introduce a bill designed to make REI the sole procurement contract winner; (3) testified before congressional committees and contributed to press reports critical of USPS’s mail-sorting technology; and (4) hired, internally to REI, a new Vice President of Sales and Marketing, Robert W. Reedy, who was subsequently indicted with the plaintiff, to enhance the company’s government contracting effort, as well as outside consultants to facilitate obtaining USPS contracts. At the recommendation of, and under pressure from, the corrupt BOG Vice Chairman, the plaintiff hired a small, Detroit-based consulting group, called Gnau and Associates, Inc. (“GAI”), at rates and terms far more expensive than comparative arrangements with REI’s other outside consultants. The plaintiffs aggressive efforts to obtain a sole source contract for USPS mailsorting equipment has been the centerpiece of his theory that he was targeted for prosecution due to his First Amendment protected activities. The public aspect of his campaign may have also made him an obvious target for the corrupt BOG Vice Chairman as a'potential source of illegal payments, in return for steering to REI the USPS business so publicly and aggressively sought by the plaintiff. In April 1986, a GAI employee, William Spartin, entered into a cooperation and nonprosecution agreement and unveiled the illegal bribery and kickback scheme to the Postal Inspectors. The following month, in May 1986, the BOG Vice Chairman pleaded guilty to criminal charges arising from his receipt of illegal payments from GAI, which had served as the conduit to funnel fees paid to GAI by REI to the BOG .Vice Chairman. In the ensuing months, two additional co-conspirators from GAI, John Gnau and Michael Marcus, pleaded guilty, in October 1986 and January 1987, respectively, to charges relating to the illegal scheme. Rather than rest on them laurels with the revelation -of the illegal bribery and kickback scheme and the successful convictions of three co-conspirators, the Postal Inspectors, under the direction of the Chief Postal Inspector, continued their investigation by following the corrupt money to its source. This led the Postal Inspectors directly to REI, which had retained the convicted consultants under a lucrative retainer arrangement and which stood to benefit from the sole source contract that was one of the goals of the illegal scheme. As the plaintiff himself admitted during his testimony in this case, the connection between the conspirators and his company, REI, “looked suspicious,” 6/25/14 AM Tr. at 24, and presented such a “lousy set of circumstances,” id. at 25, that even the plaintiff agreed the investigation of REI and himself “would certainly be justified by the circumstances,” id. at 26. Between the time of the guilty pleas of three co-conspirators in the illegal scheme and October ■ 1988, Postal Inspectors collected additional documentary and other evidence, which they presented to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (“DC USAO”) in support of an indictment of the plaintiff, REI and Mr. Reedy. The DC USAO spent over a year considering whether to indict the company and two of its officers, holding' at least seventeen internal meetings about this issue and providing defense counsel for the plaintiff and his codefendants the opportunity to present, in writing and orally, reasons against an indictment. Nevertheless, after a meeting on September 22, 1988, between the then-U.S. Attorney for'the DC USAO and' defense counsel, the U.S. Attorney approved the indictment. Less than a month after this meeting, in October 1988, the grand jury returned the indictment, charging REI, the plaintiff and Mr. Reedy as co-conspirators in the illegal scheme. As noted, the plaintiff and his co-defendants were acquitted at the criminal trial after the trial court concluded that the government had presented insufficient evidence in its case-in-chief “to establish a prima facie case that the Defendants conspired to defraud the United States.” Recognition Equip., Inc., 725 F.Supp. at 587. Notably, in what may have been a strategic blunder, the trial prosecutor, former Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”) Joseph Valder testified at the trial of the instant matter that he had held back evidence regarding a substantial number of missing pages from the notebook, labeled “Postal,” in which the plaintiff recorded notes about the USPS contracting effort, from the -government’s case-in-chief and, consequently, this evidence was not before the trial court for consideration during resolution of the Rule 29. motion for a judgment of acquittal. 7/17/14 AM Tr. at 30 (Valder testifying: “we had made a conscious judgment not to introduce in our case in chief in the criminal trial the fact of missing — Mr. Moore’s missing pages from his ‘Postal’ notebook. It’s a litigation strategy to hold it back for what we expected to be a vigorous cross-examination of Mr. Moore. So Judge Revercomb didn’t have that fact before him or that set of information, but that was huge in the inspectors’ judgment, the reviewers’ judgment that Mr. Moore or someone under his direction or someone at the corporation had intentionally torn out” pages from his notebook). These missing pages from the plaintiffs notebook raised significant suspicion, due to information that participants in the illegal conspiracy had purged their files to cover-up their illegal scheme. 7/11/14 AM Tr. at 3738 (Hartman testimony); 7/14/14 PM Tr. -at 69 (Kormann testimony). Following his acquittal, the plaintiff has relentlessly pursued damages claims against five Postal Inspectors, who had varying degrees of involvement in the investigation of the illegal bribery and kickback scheme, and against the United States. From the plaintiffs perspective, his five years of service in the U.S. Army and six years of service-as CEO of a relatively small • public- company were poised to catapult him into a future career as CEO of a Fortune 100 or 500 company and for eligibility to be Secretary of Defense. 6/25/14 AM Tr. 62, 64. These career aspirations were quashed, according to the plaintiff, because of his indictment and warranted the damages he sought of over a quarter billion dollars. The past twenty-five years of- consideration of the plaintiffs claims by the District Courts of the Northern -District of Texas and > the District of Columbia, the' Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on six separate appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court on two appeals, left two claims for trial: the plaintiffs Bivens claim for retaliatory indüeement to prosecution against five Postal Inspectors and an FTCA action for malicious prosecution against . the • United States. - - . B. Procedural History Two years after his acquittal, the plaintiff filed, in the Northern District of Texas, a Bivens action for retaliatory prosecution against six Postal Inspectors and' the AUSA who represented the government at trial, and an FTCA. action against the United. States. From the initiation of these lawsuits through 2008, two separate Judges on this Court concluded that the plaintiffs elaims should be summarily resolved in favor of. the defendants. See 1993 Decision (Holloway Johnson, J.); 2008 Decision (Urbina, J.). Each time, the district court’s summary disposition rulings in favor of the defendants on the two claims at issue in the trial were reversed by the D.C. Circuit. See Moore I; Moore II; Moore IV. After the second remand, the district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Moore v. Hartman, Case. No. 922288, Order, dated,Aug. 8, 2003, ECF No. 283, and reconsideration with respect to the FTCA claim, Moore v. Hartman, Case No. 92-2288, 332 F.Supp.2d 252 (D.D.Cir.2004), ECF No. 296, which decisions were ■ affirmed on appeal, see Moore IV. The Supreme Court, however, vacated the appellate decision and remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit for further consideration in light of a decision in an unrelated case. Hartman v. Moore, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct 2740, 183 L.Ed.2d 612 (2012). .Upon reconsideration, the D.C. Circuit, in 2013, reinstated its prior 2011 holding, see Moore VI, prompting this matter to proceed to trial on the plaintiffs Bivens retaliatory inducement to prosecution claim against the Postal Inspectors and his FTCA malicious prosecution claim against the United States. After hearing four weeks of evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant Postal Inspectors on the plaintiffs Bivens retaliatory prosecution claim. See Jury Verdict, ECF No. 507. This procedural history is more fully discussed below. 1. Plaintiff’s Initiation of Two Lawsuits In November 1991, the plaintiff and his wife, Blanche K. Moore, filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against six Postal Inspectors and an AUSA. None of these defendants were senior level managers or. even supervisors within the USPS, the Postal Inspection Service or the DC USAO but, instead, were front-line agents and the trial prosecutor, who participated in the investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators of the illegal scheme. Although this complaint asserted five causes of action, only the Fifth Cause of Action, under Bivens, for retaliatory prosecution due to the plaintiffs exercise of his First Amendment rights survived the subsequent years of litigation to reach a jury. This claim alleged that “the defendants attempted to punish Plaintiff William G. Moore, Jr., because he directed criticism against the. USPS, thereby depriving the Plaintiffs of their rights to free expression and to petition the government for redress of grievances guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bivens Compl. ¶36 (“Fifth Cause of Action”), Civ. No. 3:91-ev-02491-G (N.D.- Tex. filed Oct. 14, 1992), ECF No. 1. Shortly after the Bivens action was transferred to this Court, the plaintiff and his spouse filed a second complaint in the Northern District of Texas seeking damages against the United States under the FTCA for the same allegedly unlawful conduct with the identical causes of action set out in the Bivens action. See FTCA Compl.; Moore, et al. v. United States, Civ. No. 3:92-cv-02129-R, at 2 n.l (N.D.Tex.), Mem. & Order, dated September 21, 1992, ECF No. 55. This case was also transferred to this Court and consolidated with the plaintiffs Bivens action. See Stipulated Order, Case No. 93-0324 (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 1993) (consolidating cases). Only the Second Cause of Action for malicious prosecution in the FTCA complaint survived for trial. 2. Key Judicial Decisions The plaintiffs claims have received consideration from Judges and Justices at every level of the federal judicial system, resulting in multiple judicial opinions. This body of case law frames the issues for the conclusions of law on the plaintiffs • FTCA claim and evaluating the plaintiffs motion for a new trial on his Bivens claim, necessitating review of the key decisions in this lengthy procedural history. a. 1993 District Court Dismissal of Claims In 1993, the first Judge on this Court to consider the plaintiffs claims dismissed both .suits. Specifically, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs Bivens claim for malicious prosecution ■ against the defendant Postal Inspectors for failure to assert more than “bare allegations of malice,” which were insufficient “to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.” 1993 Moore, 1993 WL 405785 at *3-4 (internal quotations and citation omitted). As support for the plaintiffs contention that he was prosecuted to punish him for “aggressive lobbying” of the USPS and Congress to adopt REI’s technology and “for suggesting qualified candidates for the position of Postmaster General,” the plaintiff offered six sources of purported “direct evidence:” “(1) the complaint itself, (2) the indictment in Moore’s criminal case, (3) the testimony of Frank Bray at Moore’s criminal trial, (4) Judge Revereomb’s opinion entering a judgment of acquittal, (5) Moore’s own affidavit, and (6) an affidavit executed by William Hittinger, a member of REI’s board of directors.” Id. at *4. The district court found that the first five evidentiary sources amounted to indirect evidence providing “only inferential proof of malice” insufficient to support the heightened standard required for a Bivens action. Id. The last item of evidence, the Hittinger Affidavit, recounted a lunch time conversation at which AUSA Valder and two of the defendant Postal Inspectors were present. According to the affidavit, AUSA Valder allegedly stated “that the merits.of the case or whether the persons involved were guilty or not did not concern him. He explained that it was important to him that he win the case because he wanted to get a track record or some notoriety which would help him obtain a good position in private practice.” Id. at *5. This evidence could not save the plaintiffs ■ malicious prosecution Bivens claim against the Postal Inspectors because, although the court deemed this affidavit to be direct evidence of AUSA Valder’s alleged improper motivation, “it provide[d] no evidence of the Inspectors’ intent.” Id. at *5 (“Nothing in-the affidavit suggests that the Inspectors shared [AUSA] Valder’s alleged motivations.”). Given the insufficiency of the proffered evidence, the court dismissed the Bivens malicious prosecution claim against the Postal Inspectors. Id. at *6. The court also dismissed the FTCA claims brought against the government, finding that the claims of constitutional violations of the First Amendment and the Fifth Amendment were barred by sovereign immunity since only common law tort claims were cognizable under the FTCA, id' at *7, and the remaining common law claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest and abuse of discretion were barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, id.- at *9. In applying the discretionary function exception, the court examined the plaintiffs allegations of prosecutorial misconduct “relating to the presentation of evidence to the grand jury,” “fail[ure] to disclose Brady material,” and that the “government harassed and intimidated witnesses,” id. at *8, and concluded that the alleged misconduct was so “closely linked to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,” id., that “the discretionary function exception thus exempted] the United States from liability for all the common law claims alleged in both the plaintiffi’s] lawsuits.” Id. at *9. Upon concluding that ’ (1) the Bivens claims against the Postal Inspectors failed to meet the heightened pleading standard required for malicious prosecution tort claims, (2) the claimed constitutional violations against the United States were precluded by the FTCA, and (3) the common law claims against the United States, under Bivens and the FTCA, were barred by the discretionary function exception, the court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the consolidated actions' brought by the plaintiff. b. 1995-2000 Appellate Reversal of First Dismissal of Claims, Followed by District Court’s Second Dismissal of FTCA Claim On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the 1998 Decision. Moore I, 65 F.3d at 197. First, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Bivens malicious prosecution claim against (1) AUSA Valder since “absolute immunity shield[ed] Valder from liability for the decision to prosecute Moore,” id. at 192, and (2) the Postal Inspector defendants because “it had not been clearly established that malicious prosecution .violates any constitutional or statutory right” and, therefore, “qualified immunity defeated] Moore’s malicious prosecution claim,” id. at 195-96. While the Bivens malicious prosecution claim was dismissed as to all defendants, the D.C. Circuit reversed the dismissal of the Bivens retaliatory prosecution claim in Fifth Cause of Action in the Bivens complaint as to all of the defendants. Id. at 196. . With respect to AUSA Valder, the Circuit acknowledged that “a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from section 1983 liability when he acts as an advocate by engaging in activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 193 (internal quotations and citation omitted). As a result, “Valder’s prosecutorial immunity insulate[ed] him from liability for his unquestionably advocatory decision to prosecute Moore” as well as “from liability for allegedly concealing exculpatory evidence from the grand jury and for allegedly manipulating evidence before the grand jury to create a false impression of what Moore knew about the alleged fraudulent schemes.” Id. at 194. Nevertheless, the Circuit found that AUSA Valder had “not met his burden of establishing that absolute immunity protect[ed] him from potential liability for the other instances of misconduct alleged,” id., including allegations that he (1) “intimidated and coerced witnesses into changing their testimony to incriminate Moore,” id. at 191, and (2) “disclos[ed] grand jury, testimony to unauthorized third parties,” id. at 192, 197. The Court opined that neither of these alleged actions would be the type of advocatory conduct that would shield a prosecutor from liability. Id. at 194-95. Regarding the defendant Postal Inspectors, the D.C. Circuit found that the plaintiff’s retaliatory prosecution claim “alleg[ed] the violation of clearly established law” with sufficient factual allegations “to" meet any applicable heightened pleading standard” required for a viable Bivens claim. Id. at 196. Specifically, the Circuit pointed to the allegations hr the complaint that: (1) “[i]n publicly criticizing the’USPS Moore unquestionably exercised his first amendment rights,” and (2) “[t]wo of the .postal inspectors, who reported to USPS management, heard and did not repudiate Valder’s declaration that Moore’s innocence was irrelevant to the prosecution he intended to pursue,” referring to the lunch conversation recounted in the Hittinger Affidavit. Id. As a result, the Court reversed the dismissal of and remanded the Fifth Cause of Action in the Bivens complaint for retaliatory prosecution against all of the defendants. Finally, the Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs FTCA1 claim against the United States. The discretionary function exception shielded the United States from “Moore’s claims that Valder and the postal inspectors pressured witnesses into’ incriminating him, concealed and distorted exculpatory evidence to create a false impression of what he knew about the fraud schemes-and withheld material exculpatory information from him after the grand jury returned an indictment.” Id. at 197. By contrast, “[disclosing grand jury testimony to unauthorized third parties” was found not to be a “discretionary activity nor ... inextricably tied to matters requiring the exercise of discretion.” Id. at 197. Thus, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the FTCA claim in its entirety for lack of subject matter, jurisdiction, since not all of the plaintiffs allegations of misconduct fell under the FTCA “discretionary function” exception. Id. In reversing and remanding the FTCA claim for malicious prosecution against the United States, the Circuit “expressfed] no view whether the allegation is otherwise cognizable under the FTCA or whether it is supported by the evidence.” Id. In sum, in its 1995 decision, the Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Bivens malicious prosecution claim against all defendants, but reversed both the dismissal of the Bivens retaliatory prosecution claim against all defendants, and the dismissal of the FTCA .malicious prosecution claim against the United States based upon the alleged unauthorized disclosure of grand jury testimony. On remand, the district court for the second time dismissed the Bivens claim for retaliatory prosecution against. AUSA Valder as well as the FTCA claim for malicious prosecution against the United States. See 1998 Decision. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claims and the D.C. Circuit addressed the case for a second time. c. 2000-2004 Appellate Reversal of District Court’s Second Dismissal of FTCA Claim In 2000, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiffs Bivens retaliatory prosecution claim against AUSA Valder and the FTCA abuse of process claim against the United States, but reversed the dismissal of the FTCA malicious prosecution claim against the United States. Moore II, 213 F.3d at 710, 713. The FTCA malicious prosecution claim required proof of four elements under local law: “(1) the defendant’s initiation or procurement of a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff; (2) absence of probable cause for the proceeding; (3) malicious intent on the part of the defendant; and (4) termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. at 710 (citations omitted). The Court first noted the significant obstacles to satisfying the first element of the malicious prosecution claim in this case since “none of Valder’s conduct can be the basis for a malicious prosecution claim against the government because he is not an investigative or law enforcement officer” and, other than “the conduct of the postal inspectors in disclosing grand jury material,” the “remainder of the postal inspector’s conduct fell within the FTCA’s discretionary function exception.” Id. Thus, to satisfy the first element that the defendants procured the indictment, the plaintiff must establish “ ‘a chain of causation’ linking the defendant’s actions with the initiation of criminal proceedings,” which the plaintiff tried to show by alleging that “the postal inspectors’ releasing of grand jury testimony to Spartin ... caused Spartin to incriminate him, which led to his indictment and then his prosecution.” Id. Since the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant Postal Inspectors made any misrepresentations to the grand jury, however, he needed to show that “but for the postal inspectors’ disclosure of grand jury testimony to Spar-tin, he would not have implicated Moore before the grand jury.” Id. at 711. “On the other hand, if Moore would have been indicted and prosecuted anyway, even without the postal inspectors’ alleged misconduct and Spartin’s testimony, then the United States cannot be held liable.” Id. at 712. Since “the case [was] still at the pleading stage” where “there is no telling how the evidence will turn out” and the “complaint sufficiently set forth the first element of the malicious prosecution tort,” the Circuit remanded the F.TCA malicious prosecution claim.. Id. ' On remand, the Postal Inspectors again moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs Bivens retaliatory prosecution claim, arguing that qualified immunity shielded them from suit because the prosecution of the plaintiff was supported by probable cause. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Moore v. Hartman, Case No. 92-2288 (D.D.C. July 30, 2001), ECF No. 254. Alternatively, they argued that summary judgment was proper because the plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence of retaliatory motive. Id. The district court denied the Postal Inspectors’ motion in a one-paragraph order, citing material disputed facts “surrounding the presentation of evidence • to the grand jury and the disclosure of grand jury testimony as to a key prosecution witness.” Order, Moore v. Hartman, Case No. 92-2288 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2003), ECF No. 283. On interlocutory appeal, the D.C. Circúit affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the plaintiffs Bivens retaliatory prosecution claim, rejecting both grounds posited by the defendant Postal Inspectors. Moore v. Hartman, 388 F.3d 871, 872-3 (D.C.Cir.2004) (Moore III). With respect to the first ground, the Court cited an earlier decision in Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245 (D.C.Cir.1987), stating that “[n]owhere does [that decision] suggest that lack of probable cause is an element of the claim, nor does- its silence imply such a requirement.” Moore III, 388 F.3d at 878. ’ Rather, “[t]he standard Haynes-worth articulated is this: once a plaintiff shows protected conduct to have been a motivating factor in the decision to press charges, the burden shifts to the officials to show .that they would have pursued the case anyway. Given that probable cause usually represents only one factor among ■many in the decision to prosecute — some others being the strength of the evidence, the resources required for the prosecution, the relation to enforcement priorities, and the defendant’s culpability — there is no reason to expect that the mere existence of probable cause will suffice under Haynes-worth to protect government officials from liability.” Id. Accordingly, the Circuit held that lack of probable cause is not required to -establish &■ Bivens retaliatory prosecution claim in this Circuit. Id. at 879 (“several other circuits require lack of probable cause in retaliatory prosecution actions ... these cases, however, are not the law of this circuit — Haynesworth is”) (citations omitted). With respect to the second ground on which the defendant Postal Inspectors sought summary judgment, the Court explained that, while “[qualified immunity generally shields public officials from civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” id. at 872-73 (internal quotations and citations omitted), this was not the circumstance presented. Instead, “the clearly established law of this circuit barred government officials from bringing charges they would' not have pursued absent retaliatory motive, regardless of whether they had probable cause to do so.” Id. at 872. As applied in this case, the Court found that “what the inspectors were doing — prosecuting a case they otherwise would have left alone — violated the First Amendment.” Id. at 885. Thus, the Court affirmed the district court’s finding that the defendant Postal Inspectors were not entitled to'qualified immunity on the plaintiffs Bivens retaliatory prosecution claim and remanded the case “reassuring] both sides” that “the next step, presumably, will be preparation for trial.” Id. at 886 (emphasis in original). d. 2006 Supreme Court Review Requiring Proof of No-Probable Cause for FTCA Malicious Prosecution Claim The next .step, however, was not trial but , rather consideration by the Supreme Court, which agreed with the defendant Postal Inspectors that “want of probable cause must be alleged and proven” to establish that a prosecution was induced in retaliation for protected speech. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 252, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441. (2006). Moreover, the Supreme Court placed the onus on the plaintiff to “show that the criminal action was begun without probable cause for charging the crime in the first place.” Id. at. 258, 126 S.Ct. 1695. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned that “the need to prove a chain of causation from animus to injury, with details specific to retaliatory-prosecution cases, ... provides the strongest justification, for the no-probable-cause. requirement.” Id. at 259, 126 S.Ct. 1695. The Court recognized that proving this causal connection is difficult, id. 261-265, 126 S.Ct. 1695, but nevertheless specifically stated that “a plaintiff like Moore must show that the nonprosecuting official acted in retaliation, and must also show that he induced the prosecutor to bring charges that would not have been initiated without his urging.” Id. at 262, 126 S.Ct. 1695. Accordingly, having found absence of probable cause to be an element of the plaintiffs claim, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the action. e. 2007-2009 Appellate Reversal of District Court’s Dismissal of Both Bivens and FTCA Claims On remand to the district court, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the two claims remaining — the Bivens claim of retaliatory prosecution against the Postal Inspectors and the FTCA malicious prosecution claim against the United States — on the ground that “the plaintiff cannot prove the ■ absence of- probable cause.” 2008 Decision, 569 F.Supp.2d at 134. .While recognizing that “[o]rdinarily, when the facts are in dispute, the question of probable cause is one for the jury,” the district- court concluded that, in this case, “[a] valid indictment. conclusively determines the existence of probable cause to bring charges against a suspect.” Id. at 137. “Because the plaintiff is. unable to establish lack of probable cause,” id. at 134, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed both the plaintiffs Bivens retaliatory. prosecution claim against the Postal Inspector defendants as well as the FTCA malicious prosecutions claim against the United States. Id. at 141. On appeal, in its fourth opinion pertaining to this action, the D.C. Circuit again disagreed with the district court’s reasoning for dismissing the plaintiffs claims and remanded the case. Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d. 62, 65 (D.C.Cir.2009) (Moore IV). With regards to the Bivens claim, the Circuit explained that “[ujnder the Supreme Court’s decision, the three elements of a retaliatory prosecution claim are that: (1) the appellant’s conduct allegedly retaliated against or sought to be deterred was constitutionally protected; (2) the government’s bringing of the criminal prosecution was- -motivated at least in part by a purpose to retaliate for or to deter that conduct; and .(3) .the government -lacked probable cause to bring the criminal prosecution against the appellant.” Id. at 65 (citing Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265-66, 126 S.Ct. 1695 and Moore II, 213 F,3d at 709 (describing the first two elements of a retaliatory prosecution claim)). Likewise, the Circuit recognized that a' malicious prosecution claim requires, among other elements, proof of “lack of probable cause for the underlying' prosecution.” Id. at 66 (citations omitted). The Circuit rejected the district court’s finding that an indictment is conclusive evidence of probable cause and held that an indictment is prima facie evidence of probable cause and merely creates a presumption, which may then be rebutted by contrary evidence. Id. at 67-68. The case was reihanded with'instructions to “take into account the rebuttable presumption in favor of probable cause” and “consider whether appellant has offered enough evidence to create a genuine-issue of material fact as to the legitimacy, veracity, and sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury.” Id. at 69. Under this standard the plaintiff needed to “present evidence that the indictment was produced by fraud, corruption, • perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith” to overcome the prima facie evidence of probable cause presented by the indictment. Id. f. 2010-2013 District and Circuit Courts’ Denial of Summary Judgment on Both Bivens and FTCA Claims Upon remand, all defendants moved again for summary judgment on both the Bivens retaliatory prosecution and FTCA malicious prosecution claims, arguing that even under the Circuit’s “newly articulated standard” the plaintiff could not establish lack of probable cause for his indictment. Moore v. Hartman, 730 F.Supp.2d 174, 177 (D.D.C.2010) (2010 Decision). Specifically, the defendants contended that “no evidence” shows that the alleged improper conduct of the defendants “resulted in the grand jury indictment” and, in any event, “probable cause existed to prosecute [the plaintiff].” Id. at 178. The court denied the defendants’.renewed motion for summary judgment because of the existence of “a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the' government lacked, probable cause to prosecute him.” Id. at 175. This conclusion rested on the foliowing evidentiary proffer, from which a “reasonable factfinder could conclude the government procured the plaintiffs indictment through wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith and that the government lacked probable cause to prosecute the plaintiff,” id. at 179 (internal quotation and citations omitted): (1) “-‘the prosecutor made statements to grand jury witnesses to ‘not reveal’ certain portions of their testimony to the grand jury;’” (2) “‘sénior attorneys in the U.S. Attorney’s Office allegedly stated in memoranda that the government’s evidence against [the plaintiff] was ‘extremely thin,’ and openly questioned whether charges should be brought against [him];’ ” (3) “ ‘the postal inspectors stated in a memorandum after the grand jury investigation that witnesses could testify that [the plaintiff] .was not aware of the conspiracy;’ ” and (4) “ ‘the postal inspectors improperly showed GAI Officer Spartin other witnesses’ grand jury statements, intimidated Spartin by threatening to prosecute his son and tearing up his plea agreement, and lobbied the U.S. Attorney’s Office to prosecute [the plaintiff].’ ” Id. (brackets in original; quoting Moore IV, 571 F.3d at 65). The defendant Postal Inspectors appealed the denial of summary judgment on the Bivens claim, on grounds that, even if probable cause were lacking, their mistaken belief that- probable cause was present — “termed ‘arguable - probable cause’ ” — entitled them to qualified immunity. Moore V, 644 F.3d at 422. • Although in the Fourth Amendment, context, arguable., probable cause • “shields a defendant from a Fourth Amendment wrongful prosecution claim as well as a Fourth Amendment arrest claim,” the D.C. Circuit concluded in its fifth opinion in this case that “arguable probable cause does not apply to a First Amendment retaliatory inducement to prosecution case because probable cause is not an element of the First Amendment right allegedly violated.” Id. at 423 (“Unlike the Fourth Amendment claim, however, the First Amendment does riot itself require lack of probable case in order to establish a retaliatory inducement to prosecution claim.”); id. at 426 (“we conclude that the doctrine of arguable probable cause does not apply to a First Amendment retaliatory inducement to prosecution claim.”). The Circuit stressed that, per the Supreme Court’s 2006 holding, “‘probable cause’ (not arguable probable cause) must be pleaded and proven as an element of a plaintiffs case in order to establish a causal link between those inducing the prosecution and the prosecutors themselves” — and “[w]hether the Postal Inspectors had probable cause is a disputed issue of fact to be decided by the-jurors at . trial.” Id. Accordingly, the Circuit affirmed the-district-court’s conclusion that the Postal Inspectors were not entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds of arguable probable cause. Id. The Postal Inspectors appealed this ruling that they were not entitled to qualified immunity to the Supreme Court, which, on June 11, 2012, vacated the 2011 D.C. Circuit opinion in Moore V and remanded the case with instructions to give the matter further consideration in light of the decision in Reichle v. Howards, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012); see Hartman, 132 S.Ct 2740, 183 L.Ed.2d 612. In Reichle, the Supreme Court found that its 2006 Moore v. Hartman decision and subsequent appellate decisions had muddied the legal waters and “injected uncertainty into the law governing retaliatory arrests,” id. at 2096, making it unclear to a reasonable person, at the time of the alleged First Amendment retaliatory arrest in the Reichle case, that “an arrest supported by probable cause could [still] give rise to a First Amendment violation,” thereby entitling the officer in Reichle to qualified immunity. Id. at 2097. On remand, in a single page opinion, the D.C. Circuit provided its final word before trial on this matter, reinstating the 2011 opinion in Moore V, with the following explanation: Because retaliatory arrest and retaliatory prosecution are distinct constitutional violations and because the precedent in this Circuit clearly established in 1988, when the challenged conduct by the Postal Inspectors took place, the contours of the First Amendment right to be free from retaliatory prosecution, nothing in Reichle changes our conclusion that the absence-of-probahle-cause requirement is not “an element of a First Amendment retaliation violation.” Moore V, 644 F.3d at 424. If the Postal Inspectors believe that the Court in Reichle meant to decide what it refused to decide in Hartman and bring to a halt this three decades old case involving evidence that, unlike in Reichle where probable cause was conceded, ‘comes close to the proverbial smoking gun,” Moore v. Hartman, 388 F.3d 871, 884 (D.C.Cir.2004) (‘Moore III’), they are free to once again petition for certiorari and ask the Supreme Court if it wishes to end this saga. Moore VI, 704 F.3d at 1004. The defendants took the Circuit up on its invitation, again petitioning the Súpleme Court for certiorari, which request was denied in October 2013. The case then proceeded to the jury trial on the plaintiffs remaining two Bivens and FTCA claims. 3. Pre-Trial Motions in Limine Prior to trial, the parties filed multiple motions in limine, regarding, inter alia, at least .eighteen separate evidentiary issues. See, e.g., Defs.’ Omnibus Motion in Li-mine, ECF No. 417, 419; Pl.’s Mot. Concerning Source of Payment of Any Judgment, ECF No. 422; Pl.’s Mot. to Exclude References to “Presumption” of Probable Cause, ECF No. 420; Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude the Testimony of PL’s Damages Experts, ECF No. 418; Pl.’s Mot. to Exclude Certain Testimony by Defense Expert Witness Jerald Udinsky, ECF No. 423. These pre-trial motions were promptly resolved in order for the trial to commence on June 23, 2014. See Minute Order, dated June 17, 2014; Minute Order, dated June 20, 2014. The plaintiff seeks to re-litigate three of the pretrial motions in limine as part of his motion for a new trial, which motion challenges the rulings: (1) excluding indemnification evidence; (2) granting the defendants six rather than three preemptory challenges; and (3) excluding a prior judicial opinion. See, infra, Part VI. A. and B.l. & 2. 4. Dial At the concurrent four week FTCA bench and Bivens jury trial the plaintiff presented a total of twenty-three witnesses, only eleven of whom provided live testimony, and over 200 trial exhibits. For the majority of his witnesses, the plaintiff presented lengthy portions of depositions by screening videotapes of the depositions or reading aloud from the deposition transcripts. The plaintiff presented the testimony of: (1) the plaintiff; (2) the five Postal Inspector defendants, via pretrial depositions; (3) two former colleagues of the plaintiff at REI; (4) Peter Voss, .the former Vice Chairman of USPS BOG, who was convicted for his participation in the illegal scheme, via de bene esse deposition; (5) the former Chairman of the USPS BOG, the former Postmaster General and other senior managers at USPS; (6) former AUSA Valder, via pretrial deposition, and one of his supervisors from the DC USAO; (7) Charles Stillman, the plaintiffs defense counsel at his criminal trial; (8) Helene Goldberg, a former Director of the Constitutional and Specialized Torts Branch at the Department of Justice, who testified via deposition as the government’s witness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6); and (9) five witnesses on the alleged damages sustained by the plaintiff, including three persons .proferred as experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as well as the plaintiffs son and a longtime friend. The defendants presented over 100 trial exhibits and the testimony of nine witnesses, including the live testimony of the four living defendant Postal Inspectors, former 'AUSA Valder, two former 'supervisors from the DC USAO, and a witness proffered as a damages expert. Following- presentation of the twenty-six unique witnesses and admission of 305 trial exhibits, the jury returned a verdict for the Postal Inspectors, finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence that he was criminally prosecuted in retaliation for his First Amendment protected activities. Thereafter, the parties filed approximately 400 pages of proposed findings of fact as well as their respective proposed conclusions of law on the FTCA claim, and the plaintiff moved for a new jury trial. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 511; Pl.’s COLs, ECF No. 125; Defs.’ Proposed Concls. of Law (“Defs.’ COLs”), ECF No. 127; Defs.’ Errata on its Proposed Concls. of Law (Defs.’ Errata COLs”), ECF No. 128; PL’s Reply in Supp. of COLs (“PL’s Reply COLs”), ECF No.131. The plaintiffs FTCA claim for malicious prosecution is addressed first before turning to the plaintiffs motion for a new jury trial on the Bivens claim for retaliatory prosecution. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Law Applicable to FTCA Claim The-United States, as a sovereign, is absolutely immune from suit and, unless Congress has unequivocally consented to permit a cause of action, no court has jurisdiction to entertain a claim against the United States. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586-87, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976). Congress created a limited waiver of sovereign immunity of the United States by enacting the FTCA, the provisions of which must be strictly construed in favor of the United States. See Dep’t of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525. U.S. 255, 261, 119 S.Ct. 687, 142 L.Ed.2d 718 (1999); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980); United. States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979); Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C.Cir.2003); Girdler v. United States, 923 F.Supp.2d 168, 186 (D.D.C.2013). The FTCA creates liability for certain torts committed by agencies of the United States or their employees “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances .... ” 28 U.S.C. § 2674; see Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 217-18, 128 S.Ct. 831, 169 L.Ed.2d 680 (2008) (“In the FTCA, Congress waived the United States’ sovereign immunity for claims arising out of torts ■ committed by federal employees.”). The Supreme Court has explained that “the effect of the Tort Claims Act is to waive immunity from recognized causes of action, not to visit the Government with novel and unprecedented liabilities.” United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112-13, 75 S.Ct. 141, 99 L.Ed. 139 (1954) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, the FTCA does not allow for malicious prosecution claims against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (“The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to ... [a]ny claim arising out of ... malicious prosecution ... ”). An exception exists, however, “with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers.” Id. The D.C. Circuit has concluded that the Postal Inspectors involved in the investigation of the plaintiff are “investigative or law enforcement officers,” within the meaning of the FTCA. Moore II, 213 F.3d at 710-11, n. 4. When the exception does apply, the liability of the United States for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its employees, acting within the scope of their employment, is determined “in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (noting that Supreme Court has “consistently held that § 1346(b)’s reference to the ‘law of the place’ means law of the State — the source of substantive liability under the FTCA”) (collecting cases). In this case, the D.C. Circuit has already concluded that “[w]ith respect to Moore’s FTCA action against the United States for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, ‘the law of the place where the act or omission occurred’ is controlling,’ ” and that “District of Columbia law must be consulted.” Moore II, 213 F.3d at 710. 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) Applicable to Findings and Conclusions by the Court Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), “[i]n an action tried upon the facts without a jury,” the Court must “find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1); see Ascom Hasler Mailing Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 885 F.Supp.2d 156, 164 (D.D.C.2012); Foxtrap, Inc. v. Foxtrap, Inc., 671 F.2d 636, 638-39 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1982); FTC v. Beatrice Foods, Inc., 587 F.2d 1225, 1230 n. 1 (D.C.Cir. 1978); D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1259 n. 19 (D.C.Cir.1971). The “[f]indings and conclusions may be incorporated in any opinion or memorandum of decision the court may file.” De fenders of Wildlife, Inc. v. Endangered Species Scientific Auth., 659 F.2d 168, 176 (D C.Cir.1981). In setting forth the findings of fact,the court need not “address every factual contention and argumentative detail raised by the parties,” Mayaguez v. Corporacion Para El Desarrollo Del Deste, 824 F.Supp.2d 289, 295 (D.P.R.2011), or “discuss all evidence presented at trial,” Wachovia Bank N.A., Nat. Ass’n v. Tien, No. 13-11971, 598 Fed.Appx. 613, 617-18,2014 WL 7399064, at *4 (11th Cir. Dec. 31, 2014). Instead, according to the Advisory Committee Notes for Federal Rule 52, “a judge need only make brief, definite, pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested matters; there is no necessity for over-elaboration of detail or particularization of facts.” Caffey v. Togo, 159 F.3d 635 (D.C.Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Fasolino Foods Co. v. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 961 F.2d 1052, 1058 (2d Cir.1992) (“[ajll that is required by Rule 52(a) is that the trial court provide findings that are adequate to allow a clear understanding of its ruling”). Moreover, the court “[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous ...” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6); see Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (“Findings of fact shah not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the op-* portunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted);. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F,2d 325, 340 (D.C.Cir.1989). (the “clear error” standard applies at least with regards to “the particularized factual findings that underlay the district court’s determination”). B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 Applicable to Plaintiff s Motion for New Trial Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, following a jury trial, the court may grant a motion for a new trial “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). Rather than define the precise circumstances justifying a new trial, Rule 59 turns to case law and permits a new trial in those circumstances traditionally viewed as permitting a new trial. ABM Marking, Inc. v. Zanasi Fratelli, SRL, 353 F.3d 541, 543 (7th Cir.2003) (“Rule 59(a), in a bit of a circular way, allows new1 trials in cases where new trials have .been traditionally allowed at law.”). “The court has the power and duty to order a new trial whenever, in its judgment, this action is required in order to prevent injustice.” 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur. R. Miller, et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2805 (3d ed.2012). Accordingly, motions for a new trial are granted only when “the court is convinced that the jury verdict was a ‘seriously erroneous result’ and where denial of :the motion will result in a ‘clear miscarriage of justice.’ ” In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 467 F.Supp.2d 74, 87 (D.D.C.2006) (citation omitted); see also Rice v. Dist. of Columbia, 818 F.Supp.2d 47, 60, (D.D.C.2011) (“The standard for granting a new trial is not whether minor evidentiary errors were made but rather whether there was a clear miscarriage of justice.”); Nyman v. FDIC, 967 F.Supp. 1562, 1569 (D.D.C.1997) (same). The high threshold for a new trial reflects the “well-settled” principle that “Rule 59 is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a ‘second bite at the apple.’ ” Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir.1998); see also Aero Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 713 F.2d 1106, 1113 (5th Cir.1983). “Although parties may certainly request a new trial or amended findings where clear errors or manifest injustice threaten, in the absence of such corruption of the judicial processes, where litigants have once battled for the court’s decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.” Int’l Ore & Fertilizer Corp. v. SGS Control Servs., Inc., 38 F.3d 1279, 1287 (2d Cir.1994) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Moreover, a Rule 59 motion is not the appropriate vehicle, to revisit the strategic litigation decisions of counsel at trial. “The authority to grant a new trial ... is confided almost entirely to the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court.” Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36,101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980); McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc., 836 F.2d 637, 646 (D.C.Cir.1988) (“The decision whether to grant a motion for a new trial is ordinarily ‘entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” (quoting Grogan v. Gen. Maint. Serv. Co., 763 F.2d 444, 447 (D.C.Cir.1985)). In exercising this discretion, the court must “be mindful of the jury’s special function in our legal system and hesitate to disturb its finding.” Long v. Howard Univ., 512 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C.2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court has made clear that “ ‘[a litigant] is entitled tó'a fair trial but not a perfect one,’ for there are no perfect trials.” McDonough Power Equip, v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984) (quoting Brown v. United States, 411 U.S