Full opinion text
Opinion SWEET, District Judge. Plaintiff Adrian Schoolcraft (“School-craft” or “Plaintiff’); Defendants Christopher Broschart, Timothy Caughey, Kurt Duncan, Elise Hanlon, Theodore Lauter-born, Michael Marino, Gerald Nelson, Frederick Sawyer, The City Of New York, Timothy Trainer (“City Defendants”); Defendant Deputy Inspector Steven Mauriel-lo (“DI Mauriello”); Defendant Jamaica Hospital Medical Center (“Jamaica Hospital” or “JHMC”); Defendant Dr. Lillian Aldana-Bernier (“Dr. Bernier”), and Defendant Dr. Isak Isakov (“Dr. Isakov”) (collectively “the Attending Physicians”); all move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Based upon the facts and conclusions set forth below, the parties’ motions are granted in part and denied in part. I. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS Plaintiff initiated this action - alleging Section 1983 and a number of state law causes of action, by filing a summons and complaint on August 10, 2010. Plaintiff filing an Amended Complaint on September 13, 2010¿ in response to which Jamaica Hospital filed a motion to dismiss. The Court dismissed Schoolcraft’s Section 1983 claim against Jamaica .Hospital with leave to replead, and retained supplemental jurisdiction with respect to the state law claims against Jamaica Hospital. Schoolcraft v. City of New York, No. 10 CIV. 6005 RWS, 2011 WL 1758635 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2011). On May 9, 2012, Schoolcraft submitted a motion seeking leave to amend his complaint to, inter alia, include a First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating to his internal reporting of improper conduct at the 81st Precinct. That request was denied in this Court’s Opinion dated June 14, 2012 on the basis that Schoolcraft’s internal reporting was made in his capacity as a public employee, and therefore not protected under the First Amendment. Schoolcraft v. City of New York, No. 10 CIV. 6005 RWS, 2012 WL 2161596 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2012). On June 20, 2012, Plaintiff submitted a letter to the Court requesting reconsideration. The motion to reconsider was also denied in the Court’s Opinion dated July 20, 2012 on the basis, that Plaintiff, in his briefing regarding the motion to amend, never raised the issue of protected speech made after his suspension on October 31, 2009 and did not raise the argument that he had no duty to report misconduct following his suspension. Schoolcraft v. City of New York, No. 10 CIV. 6005 RWS, 2012 WL 2958176 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2012). On August 1, 2012, Plaintiff wrote to the Court requesting leave to amend his complaint to add a First Amendment claim relating to the NYPD’s alleged harassment after October 31, 2009 and for unlawful seizure and detention on October 31, 2009. The Court granted him leave to plead a First Amendment claim with respect to the instances of harassment and suspension. Schoolcraft v. City of New York, No. 10 CIV. 6005 RWS, 2012 WL 3960118 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2012). On October 1, 2012, Schoolcraft filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) that included the First Amendment claim. DI Mauriello filed a motion seeking leave to amend his answer and assert counterclaims against Schoolcraft on September 24, 2013. The Court denied his request as part of an Opinion filed November 21, 2013. Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 296 F.R.D. 231, 233 (S.D.N.Y.2013). DI Mauriello moved for reconsideration, and the Court granted his motion on March 14, 2014. Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 298 F.R.D. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y.2014). On March 18, 2014, DI Mauriello filed his amended Answer and Counterclaims. The SAC remained the operative complaint through the end of 2014, including for the extensive period of fact and expert discovery. On December 4, 2014, Plaintiff moved for permission to amend the SAC. While that motion was pending, all parties moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff received leave to file a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) on January 16, 2015. Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 81 F.Supp.3d 295, 298-99, No. 10 CIV. 6005 RWS, 2015 WL 252413, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2015). Subsequently, all parties save Plaintiff filed amended motions for summary judgment. The motions were heard on submission and marked fully submitted on March 6, 2015. Subsequently, Plaintiff requested that a reply affidavit from Dr. Bernier be stricken, which City Defendants opposed, and DI Mauriello requested that he be allowed to reopen discovery to obtain information regarding Plaintiffs involvement in a film relating to the substance of this case. II. FACTS The facts are principally derived from Schoolcraft’s and Defendants’ Statements of Undisputed Facts submitted in support of their motions for summary judgment pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, read in conjunction with the parties’ responses to the 56.1 Statements. Denials that the evidence cited in support of a particular statement does not support that statement, in instances where the evidence uncontrovertibly does support that statement, are treated as admissions. Denials without support or explanation are treated as admissions. Statements characterized as “additional undisputed facts” included in Dr. Bernier’s responses to Schoolcraft’s 56.1 statements but absent from Dr. Bernier’s 56.1 Statement are considered in dispute. (Compare Dr. Bernier’s Response to Plaintiffs Rule 56.1 Statement and Statement of Additional Undisputed Facts, pp. 41-53, ¶¶ 1-53 with Dr. Bernier’s Statement Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1.) Finally, the inclusion of statements in this Opinion that were challenged oh admissibility grounds, by the parties reflect a ruling that the admissibility challenge is overruled. The following facts are not in material dispute except as noted below. A. Schoolcraft’s Career with NYPD 1. On July 1, 2002, Schoolcraft joined the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), and for most of his career, he was assigned as a Patrol Officer in the 81st Precinct, which is located in the Bedford Stuyvesant neighborhood of Brooklyn. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 1.) 2. The 81st Precinct is one of ten precincts that are located in the geographical area known as “Patrol Borough Brooklyn North” (“PBBN”). All Defendants save DI Mauriello admit that, as a Patrol Officer, Schoolcraft was a fine officer who ably and satisfactorily performed his duties and received satisfactory or better performance reviews for most of his career. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 2.) 3. In October of 2006, the NYPD assigned DI Mauriello to be the Executive Officer of the 81st Precinct. As the Executive Officer, DI Mauriello was the second in command at the 81st Precinct. According to DI Mauriello, he requested that transfer because it was his stated desire to earn an appointment as a Commanding Officer as well as a promotion to Inspector and perhaps Assistant Chief. (Pl.’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 3.) 4. After being the Executive Officer at the 81st Precinct for one year, DI Mauriel-lo was promoted to Commanding Officer of the 81st Precinct on December 1, 2007, and he later received a promotion to the title of Deputy Inspector (“DI”). (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 8.) B. Schoolcraft’s 2008 Performance Review 4. During the course of second, third, and fourth quarters of 2008, Schoolcraft’s performance reviews referenced his low “activity” and his failure to meet activity standards. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 10.) 6. Schoolcraft received a failing evaluation of 2.5 in his 2008 performance evaluation, which was delivered in January of 2009. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 11.) 7. DI Mauriello’s 2008 performance evaluation recommended that Schoolcraft be transferred. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 12.) 8. Schoolcraft objected to this evaluation and informed his superiors that he wanted to appeal the failing evaluation. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 13.) 9. At around this time, a poster appeared on Schoolcraft’s locker containing the words: “IF YOU DON’T LIKE YOUR JOB, THEN MAYBE YOU SHOULD GET ANOTHER JOB.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 15.) 10. Another handwritten note that later appeared on his locker stated: “shut up, you idiot.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 16.) 11. Schoolcraft believes that he was isolated from his fellow officers in the 81st Precinct. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 11). 12. The appeal process involved the transmission of paperwork to the next level of the command structure, which was the Brooklyn North Patrol Borough, headed by Defendant Assistant Chief Gerald Nelson and Defendant Deputy Chief Michael Marino. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 14.) 13. On February 25, 2009, Schoolcraft met with several supervisors at the 81st Precinct (the “February Appeal Meeting”), including DI Mauriello, and his new Executive Officer, Defendant Captain Theodore Lauterborn. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 17.) 14. At the February Appeal Meeting, Schoolcraft did not expressly discuss illegal quotas and crime misclassification. Instead, he spoke about not knowing how much activity was needed and that the numbers on his evaluation were not adding up correctly. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 1.) 15. During the February Appeal Meeting, Schoolcraft confirmed his intent to appeal the failing 2008 performance evaluation and repeatedly asked for information about what numbers were required of him. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 18.) 16. At the end of the February Appeal Meeting, another of the 81st Precinct supervisors, Sergeant Steven Weiss specifically asked Schoolcraft if he was recording the meeting. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 19.) 17. In or around early March of 2009, DI Mauriello attended a meeting at the main office for Patrol Borough Brooklyn North with Deputy Chief Marino and Sergeant Weiss from the 81st Precinct (the “March Evaluation Meeting”). DI Mau-riello discussed, inter alia, Schoolcraft’s appeal of his failing 2008 evaluation and DI Mauriello’s wish to transfer Schoolcraft out of the Precinct. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 20.) 18. During the March Evaluation Meeting, DI Mauriello requested that Schoolcraft be transferred, and Deputy Chief Marino denied that request at that time for lack of paperwork. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 21.) 19. On March 11, 2009, a labor attorney representing Schoolcraft, James A. Brown, Esq., wrote DI Mauriello a letter regarding Schoolcraft’s appeal of his failing evaluation. Among other things, the letter stated:. “We are concerned that our client’s negative evaluation is based not on the factors set forth in Patrol Guide 205-48, but rather on his alleged lack of ‘activity’ related to his number of arrests and summons issued.” (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 22.) 20. After receiving the letter, DI Mau-riello told Assistant Chief Nelson about it and forwarded it to Patrol Borough Brooklyn North as part of the appeal process. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 23.) C. March 2009 Disciplinary Incident 19. On or about March 16, 2009, while Schoolcraft was on patrol, Sergeant Weiss issued a command discipline to Schoolcraft for being “off post” and having “unnecessary conversation” with another patrol officer. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 24.) 22. Schoolcraft believed that he was being punished for the letter from his labor attorney and for appealing his evaluation. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 25.) 23. Schoolcraft made a formal request on his radio that the Duty Captain for Patrol Borough Brooklyn North respond to the scene. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 25.) 24. In response to Schoolcraft’s radio request, Captain Lauterborn, who was serving as Duty Captain at the time, had Schoolcraft brought back to the 81st Precinct. According to Schoolcraft’s recording of the meeting with Captain Lauter-born, Captain Lauterborn told Schoolcraft that after the February Appeal Meeting. Captain Lauterborn said that Schoolcraft should not be surprised by the fact that he was going to get a lot more “supervision” by the 81st Precinct supervisors and that the 81st Precinct supervisors were now paying “closer attention” to him as a result of Schoolcraft’s performance. (PL’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 26.) 25. During his conversation with Captain Lauterborn, Schoolcraft explained his feelings as follows: “I just feel my safety and the public’s safety is being compromised because of the acts of retaliation ... because of [the] appeal.” (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 6.) 26. Captain Lauterborn also told Schoolcraft that “this is gonna go on;” that he had “a long road ahead” of him; that going forward, he needed to “cross your t’s and dot your i’s;” and that the “supervision” was “coming down hard” on him not just in the past two nights but since the day he walked out of the February'Appeal Meeting. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 27.) D. Psychological Evaluation, Restricted Duty Placement 27. Schoolcraft believes that he was the victim of a conspiracy to falsely portray him as psychologically unbalanced. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 12.) 28. On or about March 16, 2009, Sergeant Weiss began reviewing police procedures on how to have Schoolcraft psychologically evaluated. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 28.) 29. Shortly after that, Sergeant Weiss contacted the NYPD’s Early Intervention Unit and reported that he was “concerned” about the level of Office Schoolcraft’s “mental distress.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 29.) 30. Sergeant Weiss also did Internet research on Schoolcraft and found a news article in a local upstate newspaper about a burglary at his father’s home and forwarded that article to the Early Intervention Unit. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 30.) 31. On April 3, 2009, Schoolcraft went to a hospital emergency room because of chest pain and received an injection of medication commonly used to treat anxiety. The hospital also gave Schoolcraft a prescription for two more doses of the same medication in pill form. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 8.) 32-. On April 6, 2009, Schoolcraft went to see his private physician, Dr. Sure, who indicated Schoolcraft should not return to work until April 14, 2009. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 9.) 33. On April 6, 2009, Dr. Sure wrote a letter to the NYPD excusing Schoolcraft from work for eight days. (City’s Consol. 56.1Statement, ¶ 15.) 34. As required by NYPD procedures, after being out sick on the advice of Dr. Sure, Schoolcraft then had to be seen by an NYPD doctor before returning to work. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 10.) 35. Dr. Catherine Lamstein-Reiss (“Dr. Lamstein”), an NYPD psychologist, testified that she was consulted in connection with placing Schoolcraft on restricted duty on April 13, 2009. She concluded that Schoolcraft was suffering from the physical manifestations of stress. Based on that opinion, she recommended cognitive behavioral therapy or stress management training to improve coping skills and to reduce the physical symptoms of stress. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 32.) 36. According to Dr. Lamstein, School-craft complained that he had recently re-eéived a poor performance evaluation and that his superiors had met with him in an effort to have Schoolcraft be a more active police officer. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 22.) 37. Dr. Lamstein indicated in her Consultation Report a diagnosis of “stress/anxiety” and recommended “psychotherapy”, specifically cognitive behavioral therapy “to improve coping skills [and] reduce physical symptoms of stress.” Dr. Lam-stein indicated that she was concerned that Schoolcraft’s primary care physician had recently prescribed a medication known for being anti-psychotic, but still noted his prognosis was “good, with treatment.” (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 14.) 38. Dr. Lamstein also indicated in her notes that she urged Schoolcraft-to see a psychologist. Schoolcraft disputes this, contending that she “suggested books on the topic of stress management, and therapies such as yoga.” (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1Statement, ¶ 16.) 39. Schoolcraft was placed on restricted duty without any law enforcement or patrol duties, and his gun and shield were removed on April 13, 2009. (PL’s Consol. 56.1Statement, ¶ 31.) 40. As a result of being placed on restricted duty, Schoolcraft was assigned to work at the 81st Precinct as the Telephone Switchboard operator, essentially taking calls to the Precinct and handling walk-ins from members of the public. (PL’s Consol. 56.1Statement, ¶ 34.) 41. Schoolcraft held that position from April 2009 through the end of October 2009. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 35.) 42. All defendants save DI Mauriello admit that while on restricted duty, Schoolcraft continued his attempts to challenge his failing 2008 performance evaluation. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 36.) 43. Schoolcraft returned to see Dr. Lamstein on July 27, 2009. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 17.) 44. Schoolcraft returned again to see Dr, Lamstein on October 27, 2009. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 18.) 45. Dr. Lamstein concluded that Schoolcraft should continue on restricted duty on July 27, 2009 and on October 27, 2009. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 19.) 46. Dr. Lamstein testified that she repeated her recommendation that School-craft see a psychologist on October 27, 2009. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 20.) 47. Schoolcraft testified that he did not recall seeing a psychologist subsequent to his meetings with Dr. Lamstein. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 21.) E. Schoolcraft’s Report to Internal Affairs and NYPD’s Response 48. On August 20, 2009, Schoolcraft reported to the Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB” of “Internal Affairs”) on “corruption involving the integrity control program” at the 81st Precinct by the Integrity Control Officer, Defendant Lieutenant Timothy Caughey and Assistant Integrity Control Officer, Sergeant Weiss. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 38.) 49. On August 31, 2009, a former member of the NYPD, David Durk, reported that Schoolcraft was the victim of retaliation by his supervisors. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 39.) 50. On September 2, 2009, Schoolcraft spoke with IAB and reported that- DI Mauriello was pressuring his staff to downgrade or suppress crime reporting and that under the direction of DI Mau-riello, police officers were being directed to make arrests and issue summonses “in violation of people’s civil rights.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 40.) 51. According to the IAB report, Schoolcraft also stated that he received his failing evaluation “because he doesn’t believe in summons and arrest quotas” and that police officers “are being forced to sign the training log even though they don’t get the necessary training.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 41.) 52. On October 7, 2009, Schoolcraft met with investigators from the NYPD’s Quality Assurance Division (“QAD”). At the meeting, Schoolcraft made assertions about the nature of the alleged downgrading and suppression of major crime reporting at the 81st Precinct. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 42.) In a recorded conversation between Schoolcraft and his father discussing the QAD meeting, School-craft stated that “this is the way to fuck [DI Mauriello] over.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement Mauriello Countercl. ¶ 1.) At the actual meeting, Schoolcraft stated he was not looking to “burn anyone” or “for vengeance,” and that “this isn’t because I don’t like Inspector Mauriello, he is a jovial guy.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement Mauriello Countercl. ¶ 2.) 53. While QAD undertook to conduct an investigation into those allegations, it also referred Schoolcraft’s other misconduct allegations to IAB. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 43.) 54. During his recorded interviews with internal investigators at the NYPD, Schoolcraft told NYPD investigators that he was not reporting the alleged reporting abuses anonymously. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 93.) 55. According to an IAB report, on September 2, 2009, Schoolcraft told IAB that, “he doesn’t feel he is being retaliated against from the Members of his Command and has no problems with his supervisors and peers.” (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 27.) 56. In addition, towards the end of October, an 81st Precinct Sergeant told DI Mauriello that QAD was calling down officers and DI Mauriello called up an Inspector from QAD, who confirmed that there was an investigation. 57. Additionally, Captain Lauterborn testified that he allegedly received complaints from other officers interviewed by QAD that Schoolcraft was asking them questions about their QAD interviews and informed DI Mauriello about School-craft’s alleged conduct. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 46.) 58. Captain Lauterborn testified that he learned from DI Mauriello of a QAD investigation of the 81st Precinct. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 45.) 59. Captain Lauterborn testified that certain supervisors at the 81st Precinct, including DI Mauriello, knew that School-craft’s memo book contained the name of an LAB officer prior to October 31, 2009. On October 19th Lieutenant Caughey, as Integrity Control Officer, issued a written order to all officers in the command that all inquiries from IAB must be reported to the Integrity Control Officer. (PL’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 49.) F. October 31, 2009 — Schoolcraft’s Tour of Duty 60. Schoolcraft recorded his entire tour of duty on October 31, 2009. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 35.) 61. October 31, 2009 was the last day that Schoolcraft reported to the 81st Precinct. He worked the day tour and conducted his regular duties at the Telephone Switchboard desk before leaving work early. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 50.) 62. In conversation with colleagues, Schoolcraft stated, “look at what they did to me ... they fucked me over on my evaluation.” Schoolcraft also said that he asked supervisors to put it in writing to which they responded, “no, go fuck yourself. That’s your buddy Mauriello.” Schoolcraft then said “That’s your buddy Mauriello, that fat miserable fuck. If I could get him.... If I could get him, I would fucking sell him out faster than anything, for free. I would give him away for free.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement Mauriello Countercl. ¶ 3.) 63. During the course of the morning of October 31, 2009, Lieutenant Caughey took Schoolcraft’s memo book to “scratch it,” i.e., to make a copy of it. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 51.) 64. Schoolcraft’s recording of his entire day tour does not reveal anything said to Schoolcraft by Lieutenant Caughey other than a request to see his memo book so Caughey could “scratch” it. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 62.) 65. While in his office, Lieutenant Cau-ghey made two photocopies of the entire memo book because he saw “unusual” entries in it. Lieutenant Caughey kept one copy for himself and put the other copy in DI Mauriello’s office desk. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 52.) 66. Schoolcraft testified that, when Lieutenant Caughey returned the memo book to Schoolcraft later that day, School-craft noticed, and became alarmed, that several pages of the memo book containing his entries about corruption or misconduct were earmarked or folded down. The City and DI Mauriello dispute that several pages of the memo book -containing his entries about corruption or misconduct were earmarked or folded down, and DI Mauriello disputes characterization that pages reflected corruption or misconduct. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 57.) Schoolcraft contends, and City Defendants and DI Mauriello dispute, that Lieutenant Caughey later started behaving in an unusual manner towards Schoolcraft. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ ¶ 54-56.) 67. One of the civilian workers at the Precinct, Police Administrative Aide (“PAA”) Curtis Boston (“PAA Boston”) testified that she saw Lieutenant Caughey walk by Schoolcraft that day in an unusual manner, and that twice during the course of that morning, PAA Boston and School-craft discussed Lieutenant Caughey’s unusual behavior toward Schoolcraft. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 55.) 68. PAA Boston testified that School-craft told her that he felt uncomfortable about Lieutenant Caughey’s behavior and that Schoolcraft asked her to document her reasons for why she believed Lieutenant Caughey was acting in a suspicious manner. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 56.) 69. About one hour before the end of his scheduled day, Schoolcraft told his supervisor, Sergeant Rasheena Huffman (“Sergeant Huffman”) that he was not feeling well and was going home. 70. Schoolcraft also submitted a sick report to Sergeant Huffman, which could have been a basis for Sergeant Huffman authorizing him to take “administrative sick” for the day. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 58.) 71. As Schoolcraft was leaving the precinct, Sergeant Huffman told Schoolcraft that he had the option of taking “lost time,” but did not give him written approval for either lost time or administrative sick time. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 59.) 72. Sergeant Huffman called the NYPD centralized Sick Desk to inquire whether Schoolcraft had called for permission to leave work early, and was told he had not done so. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 44.) 73. As Schoolcraft walked out of the precinct, DI Mauriello was walking in and said hello to Schoolcraft. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 41.) G. October 31, 2009 — Events Subsequent to Schoolcraft’s Departure 74. Following Schoolcraft’s departure, Captain Lauterborn contacted the NYPD sick desk supervisor. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 26.) 75. After leaving work on October 31, 2009, at approximately 2:30 p.m., School-craft recorded conversations and events in his apartment throughout the rest of that day until the first entry was made by NYPD into his apartment at approximately 9:40 p.m. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 36.) 76. At about 3:30 p.m., Schoolcraft got home, which was located at 82-60 Eighty-Eighth Place, Queens, New York, and tele-phonically notified IAB of what Schoolcraft characterized as Lieutenant Caughey’s menacing behavior. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 60.) 77. Schoolcraft specifically informed IAB that he felt threatened, retaliated against, and in danger as a result of what Schoolcraft characterized as Lieutenant Caughey’s menacing behavior. (PL’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 61.) 78. Shortly after Schoolcraft left the precinct, the desk officer called School-craft’s cell phone, but the calls were not answered. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 45.) 79. The 104th Precinct was notified about Schoolcraft’s status, and was asked to send an officer to his home. (Mauriel-lo’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 47.) 80. About one hour later, at about 4:20 p.m., a Sergeant Krohley, from the 104th Precinct, went to Schoolcraft’s home with his driver. Sergeant Krohley rang the bell for Schoolcraft’s apartment, which was on the second floor of a three-family house, and when there was no answer, he spoke to the landlady, Carol Stretmoyer (“Stret-moyer”), who told him that she believed that Schoolcraft had left about thirty minutes before. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 62.) 81. Stretmoyer also informed Sergeant Krohley that Schoolcraft had a car, which was parked on the street. Sergeant Kroh-ley determined that the car was registered in the name of Schoolcraft’s father. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 68.) 82. On October 31, 2009, Captain Lau-terborn was the Executive Officer of the 81st Precinct, i.e., the position below Commanding Officer in the chain of authority. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 50.) 88.On October 31, 2009, Captain Lau-terborn was also assigned for the day to be the PBBN Duty Captain, for the entire Brooklyn North area. (Declaration of Walter A. Kretz, Jr. dated March 6, 2015, hereinafter “SM,” Ex. AB, Brooklyn North Duty Sheet; Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 51.) 84. At all relevant times, Deputy Chief Marino (now retired) was the PBBN Assistant Chief, or second in command, with supervisory authority over all of the precincts in PBBN, including the 81st Pre7 cinct. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 53.) 85. Defendant Lieutenant Christopher Broschart from the 81st Precinct was instructed by Captain Lauterborn to go with his driver to Schoolcraft’s apartment and check to see if Schoolcraft had returned home. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 46.) 86. At about 5:00 p.m. Lieutenant Broschart arrived at the scene, and Sergeant Krohley briefed Lieutenant Brosc-hart on the facts he had determined since arriving at the scene. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 64.) 87. After Lieutenant Broschart and Captain Lauterborn arrived at School-craft’s home, they periodically knocked on the door from the early afternoon until it was dark out. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 32.) 88. Schoolcraft did not answer the door. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 33.) 89. Lieutenant Broschart updated Captain Lauterborn by telephone that School-craft was not home and that Stretmoyer had told him that Schoolcraft might have left. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶66.) 90. Captain Lauterborn told Lieutenant Broschart to stand by and wait to see if Schoolcraft returned. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 67.) 91. Later that evening, Captain Lau-terborn spoke with Dr. Lamstein. According to Dr. Lamstein’s notes of the call, Captain Lauterborn told her that School-craft left early that day and the “underlying issue” was that Schoolcraft “has made allegations against others” and the “dept’s investigation of those allegations picked up this week & it snowballed from there.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 68.) 92. Dr. Lamstein told Captain Lauter-born that she had seen Schoolcraft a few days ago and that she “had no reason to think [Schoolcraft] was a danger to himself or others.” She also stated that her “assessment of his suicide risk is only as good as the last time [she] saw him. If something happened after that and led him to be so upset that he left work without permission an hour before the end of his tour, said to have stomach pains, etc., then [she is] unable to say with any reasonable amount of certainty that he is not at risk of S/I [suicidal ideation] under present circumstances.” While Dr. Lamstein further testified that she thought the NYPD “absolutely needed” to find Plaintiff and “make sure that he was ok,” Plaintiff contends that her testimony implies she did not so informed Captain Lauterborn, while City Defendants contend she explicitly communicated this impression to Captain Lauterborn. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 69; City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 30.) 93. Captain Lauterborn asked Dr. Lamstein to see if she could try to reach Schoolcraft over the telephone. (Mauriel-lo’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 70.) 94. On October 31, 2009, Dr. Lamstein attempted to contact Schoolcraft by calling him on his cell phone. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 34.) 95. At about 7:40 p.m., after speaking with Dr. Lamstein, Captain Lauterborn also called Schoolcraft’s father and told him that Schoolcraft left without permission and had to return to the 81st Precinct that night. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 70.) 96. Schoolcraft listened to Dr. Lam-stein’s message and recorded it. (Mauriel-lo’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 74.) 97. Dr. Lamstein’s message was as follows: Hi Schoolcraft, Dr. Lamstein. I am the pager duty psychologist today and I got a call from Captain Lauterborn. I know I’m not the first call you’re receiving so I’m sure you’re aware that they’re all looking for you and very concerned because you ran off without doing proper, procedure and they’re not sure if you’re OK. So right now they are trying to figure out if they supposed to do a whole citywide high-level mobilization to find you or if you’re OK and they’re not sure if they are supposed to be doing that. So there are other people who left you a message asking you to return to the 8-1. I asked if it would also be OK if you just returned to your home and to send a Lt. there hoping to find you. So I don’t know what to tell them because as long as I’ve known you, I’ve had no concerns about you having thoughts about hurting yourself, I really really want to urge you to return to your home or call your Captain or you can call me. Whatever this is, if you just return to your home and just resolve whatever this is quickly and easily otherwise it’s just going to blow up to a bigger mess than you would want and I would really really hate to see that happen. I would much rather this, whatever this is, get reconciled very quickly and easily without a whole big city wide mobilization and suspensions and whatever else is being considered because this is not necessary, it can be resolved in two minutes. [Gives phone numbers]. You can also just return home and resolve it with you there instead of at the precinct because I suggested that might be embarrassing for you. So hope everything is OK and please give me a call. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 75.) 98. Schoolcraft did not answer Dr. Lamstein’s phone call. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 35.) 99. Captain Lauterborn also spoke with Schoolcraft’s father over the telephone. Schoolcraft’s father told him that he had spoken to Schoolcraft earlier that day, that his son told him he felt sick with a “tummy ache” and was going home and would call Schoolcraft’s father when Schoolcraft woke up. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 70.) 100. Lauterborn told Schoolcraft’s father that he needed to “physically talk to” Schoolcraft and “resolve things” and the situation was not going to “wait until the morning.” Captain Lauterborn insisted that he had to talk to Schoolcraft “in person” and not “over the phone.” He also stated that the “situation [is] going to escalate as the night goes on” and that “no one is going in or out of that house he lives in because there is police all over it.” If Schoolcraft was there, Captain Lauterborn said that “we are eventually going to make our way in.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 72.) 101. Although Schoolcraft’s father assured Captain Lauterborn that his son was fíne and was probably sleeping, Captain Lauterborn insisted that it was not going to “end here” and that Schoolcraft should report to the Lieutenant on the scene outside his home. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 73.) 102. While alone in his apartment with NYPD personnel gathered outside on the street, Schoolcraft spoke several times over the telephone with his father, who was in upstate New York. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 68.) 103. Lieutenant Broschart remained outside of Schoolcraft’s apartment for approximately four hours, and never saw or heard Schoolcraft. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 37.) Deputy Chief Marino believed that Schoolcraft was still in his apartment. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 38.) 104. Despite knowing that various persons were attempting to reach him during that seven-hour period, Schoolcraft did not respond to any of the telephone calls or to the numerous knocks on his apartment door. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 71.) 105. The City Defendants and Plaintiff disagree as to the level of Assistant Chief Nelson’s involvement during this time. Plaintiff contends that DI Mauriello kept Assistant Chief Nelson informed of the NYPD’s activities throughout the evening, and understood the conduct to be in response to an “AWOL officer,” i.e., and officer absent without leave. (See City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 58.) 106. Lieutenant Broschart, Captain Lauterborn, and DI Mauriello were aware on October 31, 2009 that Schoolcraft’s gun and shield had previously been removed from him. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 39.) 107. Prior to arriving at Schoolcraft’s apartment, Captain Lauterborn was informed by Lieutenant Broschart that Stretmoyer had heard creaking sounds from Schoolcraft’s apartment, which was indication of activity in the apartment. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 59.) 108. NYPD officers also noticed that Schoolcraft’s television set was on. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 23.) 109. At approximately 8:30 p.m., Captain Lauterborn and Lieutenant Gough, Sergeant Duncan, and Sergeant Hawkins, arrived at Schoolcraft’s residence. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 58.) 110. Deputy Chief Marino directed that the NYPD Operations division be notified and that arrangements be made to have an Emergency Services Unit (“ESU”) also respond to Schoolcraft’s residence. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 55.) 111. The role of ESU is to provide specialized assistance to other units of the NYPD. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 56.) 112. An NYPD ESU crew was requested at 9:09 p.m. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 63.) 113. Deputy Chief Marino, driving his own car, and DI Mauriello, driven by Lieutenant Crawford, arrived at the scene at approximately 9:30 p.m. By the time Deputy Chief Marino arrived, ESU had already arrived at Schoolcraft’s apartment. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 64.) 114. Deputy Chief Marino met with Captain Lauterborn and ESU officers, Lieutenant Gough and Sergeant Duncan, who had gathered at the 81st Precinct, in the precinct parking lot, as they prepared to go to Schoolcraft’s apartment. ■ (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 54.) H. October 31, 2009 — NYPD’s First Entry into Schoolcraft’s Apartment 115. On October 31, 2009, Schoolcraft had a voice-activated recorder in his bedroom. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 78.) 116. The hidden recorder recorded every sound heard in Schoolcraft’s bedroom on the evening of October 31, 2009. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 79.) 117. Captain Lauterborn obtained a key to Schoolcraft’s apartment from Stret-moyer. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 40; Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 65.) 118. At 9:45 p.m. that night, after, waiting approximately four or five hours outside Schoolcraft’s home, the NYPD used Stretmoyer’s key to enter the apartment. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 74.) 119. Several supervisory NYPD officers, including Deputy Chief Marino, DI Mauriello, Captain Lauterborn, Lieutenant Broschart, and three members of the Brooklyn North Investigation Unit, Lieutenant William Gough, Sergeant Kurt Duncan, and Sergeant Raymond Hawkins, entered Schoolcraft’s home without a warrant. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 75.) 120. At the time of their- entry, several other members of the NYPD, including DI Keith Green, the commanding officer of the 104th Precinct, Lieutenant Thomas Crawford (81st Precinct); Sergeant Kevin Scanlon (104th Precinct); and several Police Officers were waiting outside of Schoolcraft’s apartment. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 77.) 121. Also responding to the scene was FDNY Lieutenant Elise Hanlon and two Jamaica Hospital Emergency Medical Technicians (“EMTs”). (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 78.) Plaintiff contends that Lieutenant Hanlon testified that she reported in connection with a “barricaded EDP,” while the 911 operator listed the purpose of the EMT dispatch as “unknown condition.” 122. According to Deputy Chief Marino and DI Mauriello, the warrantless entry into Schoolcraft’s home was justified by their concerns for his “well-being.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 79.) 123. Deputy Chief Marino testified that he had no information that Schoolcraft had threatened to hurt himself or others, though Mauriello contends that he only lacked “specific” information and points to a portion of his testimony where he states that he had been briefed about the events of day and Schoolcraft’s “psychological history.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 80.) 124. Upon entry, the ESU officers moved into Schoolcraft’s bedroom wearing bulletproof vests and helmets and carrying tactical shields. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 82.) 125. On the recording, ESU is heard knocking on the apartment door and calling out “Adrian.” As the door apparently opens, a comment is made by one of the officers in a low voice, saying “He’s on the bed.” In response, another officer asks “Is he alright?” (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 80.) 126. The Emergency Services Unit officers moved into Schoolcraft’s bedroom with their guns drawn. DI Mauriello disputes this statement. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 82.) 127. Schoolcraft was awake lying on his bed. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 83.) 128. The ESU officers then addressed Schoolcraft directly, asking him to show his hands and asking him to assure them he was OK. There is no indication of any aggressive conduct or the exertion of any physical force against Schoolcraft. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 81.) 129. As reflected by the recording captured by Schoolcraft’s voice-activated digital recorder, one of the ESU officers asked Schoolcraft, “You okay?” to which School-craft replied, “Yeah, I think so.” (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 84.) 130. Once entry was made into the apartment and Schoolcraft appeared to be in reasonably good condition, Deputy Chief Marino, then DI Mauriello, and then Captain Lauterborn explained to him that he was being directed to return to the precinct. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 91.) 131. The exchange between Deputy Chief Marino and Schoolcraft was as follows: Marino: Adrian, you didn’t hear us knocking on this door for a couple hours? Schoolcraft: I drank some Nyquil. Unidentified male voice: Adrian, sit up. Marino: Adrian, you didn’t hear us knocking on that door ... for the last couple hours? Schoolcraft: No, why would I be expecting anyone knocking at my door Chief? Marino: I don’t know Adrian, but normally if you hear someone knocking you get up and answer it. They were kicking on that door loud and yelling. Schoolcraft: I wasn’t feeling well. Marino: You got a million people downstairs worried about your welfare, spending hours out here, worried about you. We’ve talked to your father, we’ve called your phone. Schoolcraft: What did my father say? Marino: I don’t know Adrian, I didn’t talk to him personally. Alright, sit down. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 82.) 132. After speaking with Schoolcraft for less than a minute, Deputy Chief Mari-no said “Steve,” indicating to DI Mauriello that Deputy Chief Marino wanted him to step into the bedroom and deal with the situation. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 84.) 133. DI Mauriello ordered Schoolcraft to return to the 81st Precinct along with two officers — Sergeant Huffman and a “Rodriguez” — who had witnessed his early departure from work and were being detained at the precinct. (Mauriello’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 85, 92.) 134. The exchange between DI Mau-riello and Schoolcraft, lasting approximately forty-five seconds, was as follows: Mauriello: Adrian, what happened today? Adrian: I wasn’t feeling well, I left. Mauriello: That’s it? You weren’t feeling well. Your sergeant told you to stay, right? Schoolcraft: No, she didn’t say anything. She was talking on her cell phone. Mauriello: You got everybody worried, we are worried about your safety. Schoolcraft: Worried about what? Mauriello: What do you mean, worried about what? They tried calling you, everybody(s) been calling you. Captain Lauterborn’s been calling, everyone has been calling you, your father has been calling you. You’re not answering. We were worried about anything that happens. That’s what we are worried about. God forbid. You just walk out of the precinct. I say hello to you today that was the last I saw you. You know, that’s what we are worried about, your safety, your well-being. Schoolcraft: Alright, I’m fine. Mauriello: Well, you are going to come back to the precinct with us. Schoolcraft: Well ... if I’m forced to. It’s against my will. Mauriello: Against your will? OK Teddy [referring to Captain Lauterborn], you handle this. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 85.) 135. DI Mauriello did not have any physical contact with Schoolcraft. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 88.) 136. Captain Lauterborn then spoke with Schoolcraft over the course of the next several minutes. Their conversation included the following exchange: Lauterborn: Get your stuff on, we are going back to the precinct. Schoolcraft: I’m not going back to the precinct. Lauterborn: Adrian, we are going to go back to the precinct. Schoolcraft: For ... ? Lauterborn: Because we are going to do it the right way. You can’t just walk out of the command. Schoolcraft: And do what? Lauterborn: You can’t just walk out of the command. Schoolcraft: What’s going to be done if I go back to the 8-1? Lauterborn: What’s gonna be done? We are going to investigate why you left. Schoolcraft: I’m telling you why I left, I was feeling sick. Lauterborn: Adrian, that’s not the reason why you leave. Alright, you know that. You just don’t put a thing on a desk, you ask for permission. Schoolcraft: I did ask permission. Lauterborn: No you didn’t. Schoolcraft: She denied it. Lauterborn: Alright, so you can t leave. You weren’t given permission. Schoolcraft: Well ... I wasn’t feeling well. Lauterborn: She denied it, that’s it. You have to sit there and wait until your permission is granted. Alright, if it’s that bad then you’re gonna go to the hospital from the precinct. You know better than to just slap a sick report on a desk and walk out. Schoolcraft: I didn’t do that. She embellished that I ... she was on the cell phone. Lauterborn: Alright, so then what did you do? Set it down? She told you [that] you can’t leave and you left anyway, right? Schoolcraft: I was going sick. Lauterborn: And you left anyway? She told you [that] you can’t leave? Right. You can’t leave. That’s the way it rolls. You can’t go. Alright? So we have to go back. So get your clothes on, whatever you have to do. People have been calling you all day, I talked to your father. Alright? (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 89.) 137. As reflected by the recording, Schoolcraft refused to return to the Precinct. After the colloquy with Captain Lauterborn and Lieutenant Gough, School-craft stated he would go under protest. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 86.) 138. After agreeing to return the 81st Precinct, Schoolcraft spoke on the phone with his father, then indicated he did not feel well. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 98.) 139. Schoolcraft stated that he had to sit down' because he was not feeling well and agreed to receive medical attention. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 87.) 140. Upon hearing that Schoolcraft was not feeling well, NYPD officers offered Schoolcraft medical aid. (Mauriello’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 99.) 141. Jamaica Hospital EMT Salvatore Sangeniti has been a trained EMT since 1980. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 46.) 142. While Schoolcraft was being examined by EMT Sangeniti, Deputy Chief Marino spoke with Schoolcraft about his leaving the precinct and stated that Schoolcraft disobeyed an order, and informed him that he was suspended. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 88.) 148.Immediately following Deputy Chief Marino’s statement that Schoolcraft would be suspended, EMT Sangeniti measured Schoolcraft’s blood pressure. When informed that his pressure was high, Schoolcraft responded that he had been feeling sick all day. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 89.) 144. Schoolcraft’s pulse was 120 beats per minute. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 47.) 145. Schoolcraft’s blood pressure was 160 over 120. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 48.) 146. EMT Sangeniti told Lieutenant Hanlon that Schoolcraft’s medical condition required medical attention at a hospital. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 37.) 147. Schoolcraft agreed to go to the hospital for an evaluation. Medical personnel were recorded discussing Jamaica Hospital and Forest Hills Hospital (also referred to as LaGuardia) as potential options. Schoolcraft stated that he wanted to go to Forest Hills and EMT Sangeniti explained that Jamaica Hospital would be better. Schoolcraft reiterated that he wanted to go to Forest Hills. (Pl.’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 90.) 148. A total of sixteen minutes had elapsed from the time ESU first opened the door to the apartment until the remaining officers and EMTs left the apartment with the expectation the ambulance would take Schoolcraft to the hospital for a medical exam. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement,' ¶ 104.) 149. Schoolcraft walked out of the apartment and approached the ambulance. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 103.) 150. From a distance out on the street, DI Mauriello saw Schoolcraft walk out of the house and toward the ambulance. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 108.) 151. Schoolcraft eventually refused further medical attention and went back to his apartment. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 91.) 152. Schoolcraft did not suffer any physical harm during the period DI Mau-riello was in the apartment during the first entry, and DI Mauriello is unaware of any such harm being suffered by Schoolcraft any time during the remainder of the first entry. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 106.) 153. Defendants did not use any force against Schoolcraft prior to the second entry. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 110.) 154. The EMTs remained by the ambulance, and did not enter Schoolcraft’s apartment again. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 30.) I. October 31, 2009 — NYPD’s Second Entry into Schoolcraft’s Apartment 155. As reflected in the second part of the recording of the events in Schoolcraft’s home on October 31, 2009, Schoolcraft returned to his apartment, laid back down in his bed and refused further orders first by Captain Lauterborn and then by Deputy Chief Marino who returned to the apartment and again entered without permission. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 92.) 156. When Schoolcraft returned to his apartment, DI Mauriello saw Chief Mari-no, Captain Lauterborn and Sergeant Duncan, Sergeant Hawkins, and Lieutenant Gough, follow Schoolcraft back inside. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 103.) 157. DI Mauriello did not re-enter the apartment. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 115.) 158. Deputy Chief Marino declared Schoolcraft an “emotionally disturbed person” (also known as an “EDP”) and Captain Lauterborn, Lieutenant Broschart, Lieutenant Gough and Sergeant Duncan handcuffed Schoolcraft with his hands behind his back. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 93.) 159. After Schoolcraft was declared an EDP, Deputy Chief Marino was in charge at the scene as the highest ranking NYPD officer present. Prior to that declaration, Schoolcraft disputes that Deputy Chief Marino was in charge. (Mauriello’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 83.) 160. While Schoolcraft was prone on the floor, Lieutenant Broschart held down his shoulders and Captain Lauterborn held him down by his legs. All Defendants save the City also admit that Deputy Chief Marino put his boot on Schoolcraft’s face as he tried to turn his neck around to see what was being done to his body. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 94.) 161. DI Mauriello did not arrest Schoolcraft, did not direct anyone to arrest him, and was not present when, if ever, he was placed under arrest. However, Schoolcraft contends that DI Mauriello ordered his Executive Officer, Captain Lau-terborn, to “take care of this” .when Schoolcraft refused to voluntarily return to the 81st Precinct immediately, which was, Schoolcraft contends, an order to bring Schoolcraft back to the precinct involuntarily. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 120.) 162. DI Mauriello was not present when Schoolcraft was handcuffed, and he had not directed .anyone to apply handcuffs. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 117.) 163. DI Mauriello waited outside of the house until he saw everyone exit the house with Schoolcraft being carried in a chair to the ambulance. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 124.) 164. The entire time that elapsed from the time Schoolcraft went back into his apartment until everyone left the apartment was approximately fifteen minutes. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 125.) 165. DI Mauriello was not present when Schoolcraft was suspended. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 117.) 166. DI Mauriello was not present when Schoolcraft was declared an EDP. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 119.) 167. DI Mauriello was not in School-craft’s apartment when all of the events allegedly occurred that form the basis for Schoolcraft’s claims, whether for the remainder of the first entry or during the second ■ entry. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 96.) 168. DI Mauriello did not know what had happened in the apartment during the second entry, and he did not ever again speak to or interact with Schoolcraft. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 126.) 169. Lieutenant Broschart rode in the back of the ambulance with Schoolcraft. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 96.) 170. While the NYPD officers were in Schoolcraft’s apartment, they searched his person and his apartment and found a voice-activated digital recorder belonging to Schoolcraft. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 97.) 171. DI Mauriello was not present for the removal of any of Schoolcraft’s personal property, including any alleged removal of evidence Schoolcraft claims to have gathered of NYPD corruption. (Mauriel-lo’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 122.) 172. DI Mauriello did not direct anyone to remove any property and did not direct or participate in the alleged forcible removal of Schoolcraft from his apartment during the second entry. (SM Ex. S, recording of first and second entries; SM Ex. C, Mauriello Dep. pp. 376-81; Mau-riello Affidavit ¶ 123.) 173. There have been no substantiated incidents involving any allegation that any physical force whatsoever was used by Deputy Chief Marino in any incident. Schoolcraft contends that City Defendants successfully precluded inquiry on this subject in discovery and should not be permitted to assert this contention. (City’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 97.) 174. There are no substantiated allegations of unlawful search or seizure, conspiracy, or retaliation against Deputy Chief Marino, DI Mauriello, or Assistant Chief Nelson. Schoolcraft contends that City Defendants successfully precluded inquiry on this subject in discovery and should not be permitted to assert this contention. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 98.) J. Arrival at Jamaica Hospital 175. Schoolcraft was taken to Jamaica Hospital’s Emergency Room. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 98.) 176. Jamaica Hospital is a not-for-profit hospital. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 2.) 177. In 2009, Jamaica Hospital had a mental health clinic, a psychiatric emergency department, and two psychiatric inpatient units. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 3.) 178. Schoolcraft was held at Jamaica Hospital, pretextually according to School-craft, pursuant to New York State Mental Hygiene Law Section 9.39 until November 6, 2009. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 51.) 179. Hospital medical records, or the “chart,” reflect that Schoolcraft was in custody of the NYPD at the time he was admitted. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 99.) 180. Medical records state that “EMS said the patient was behaving irrationally.” (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 37.) 181. Following Schoolcraft’s arrival at the Jamaica Hospital Medical Emergency Department, he was triaged at approximately 11:03 p.m. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 36.) 182. Schoolcraft was handcuffed by one hand to a gurney and under the custody of Lieutenant Broschart until the Lieutenant was relieved at about midnight by Defendant Sergeant Shantel James. Sergeant James remained there until the morning. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 100.) 183. On November 1, 2009, Defendant Sergeant Frederick Sawyer (“Sergeant Sawyer”), another supervisor from the 81st Precinct, was sent to Jamaica Hospital to relieve Sergeant James. When Sergeant Sawyer got to the hospital, he saw Schoolcraft on the telephone and, according to Sergeant Sawyer, he ordered him to get off the telephone. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 101.) 184. Subsequently, Sergeant Sawyer, Sergeant James, and two other officers forced Schoolcraft onto the gurney and handcuffed his other hand to the gurney, leaving him in a fully shackled position on the gurney. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 102.) All parties save the City Defendants do not deny that when Sergeant Sawyer applied the cuffs to Schoolcraft, he used both hands to squeeze the cuffs tighter and said “this is what happens to rats.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 103.) 185. Schoolcraft was examined and laboratory tests were taken. In addition, a CT scan was ordered. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 39.) 186. No physical problems were found, other than the impression of handcuffs on both wrists. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 40.) 187. At 12:03 a.m. on November 1, Dr. Silas Nwaishieny examined Schoolcraft and requested a psychiatric consultation. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 41.) 188. In October and November 2009, non-party Dr. Khin Mar Lwin (“Dr. Lwin”) was a physician in the first year of her residency at Jamaica Hospital. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 6.) 189. Dr. Lwin performed the psychiatric consultation, which had been requested because Schoolcraft had purportedly been acting “bizarre.” (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 42.) 190. Schoolcraft, underwent the initial psychiatric examination/assessment at approximately 6:30 a.m. on November 1, 2009. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 23.) 191. According to Dr. Lwin’s notes, Schoolcraft told Dr. Lwin that he was “worried about the situation.” He told her that “this is happening” because he had been discussing the internal affairs of the police department with his superiors and the Police Commissioner, that his .supervisors were hiding information about robbery and assault cases to improve their statistics for their own advancement, that he has “documentation” about “this crime,” and that he has been reporting his supervisors’ actions for the past year. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 43.) 192. Dr. Lwin’s note indicated that as per a Sergeant James of the 81st Precinct, Schoolcraft complained about not feeling well the prior afternoon and left work early after becoming agitated and cursing a supervisor. The police followed School-craft to his home. Schoolcraft barricaded himself in his apartment and the door had to be broken down to get him. Schoolcraft initially agreed to go with them for evaluation, but once outside, he ran and had to be chased and brought to the medical emergency room. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 24.) . 193. The NYPD officers who remained with Schoolcraft at that time informed Dr. Lwin of Schoolcraft’s history and the events that occurred throughout October 31st, and said that that Schoolcraft had left work early “after getting agitated and cursing [his] supervisor.” (Jamaica’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 44.) 194. Dr. Lwin was also told that Schoolcraft had “barricaded himself’ in his apartment, which required the NYPD to break the door down, and that Schoolcraft had initially agreed to go to the Hospital for evaluation, but that once he was outside his house, he began to run, after which a chase ensued, and he was brought to the Emergency Department (“ED”) in handcuffs. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 45.) 195. Dr. Lwin was also advised that Schoolcraft had previously been evaluated by an NYPD psychologist and that as a result, Schoolcraft had not carried a gun or a badge for almost a year. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 46; Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 25.) 196. Dr. Lwin noted that while School-craft was in the ED before Dr. Lwin saw him, Schoolcraft had become agitated, uncooperative and verbally abusive due to a discussion about using the telephone, and that he had told his treating physician that “they are all against me.” (Jamaica’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 47.) 197. Dr. Lwin performed a mental status examination and determined that Schoolcraft was coherent and relevant, with goal-directed speech (E