Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER WILLIAM C. BRYSON, UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE. In this patent infringement action, defendant Safeway, Inc., has moved for summary judgment of invalidity on the ground that the asserted claims of Kroy’s patent are directed to ineligible subject matter. Dkt. No. 140. The Court GRANTS the motion. ' I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Kroy IP Holdings, LLC, is the record owner of U.S. Patent No. 7,054,830 (“the ’830 patent”), which relates to a method and system for providing incentive award programs over a computer network. The concept underlying the ’830 patent is that it creates a computerized means for companies to design or select incentive programs and to provide prizes to consumers who participate in the programs. Kroy asserts that defendant Safeway, Inc., infringes claims 1, 19, 20, 21, 23, and 24 .of the ’830 patent. The two independent claims of the ’830 patent are claims' 1 and 19. Those claims recite the following: 1. A system for incentive program participation and automated award fulfillment, comprising: a host computer coupled to a network; a first database accessible from said host computer; and an automated- award fulfillment application program executed on said host computer for participation in incentive programs of a plurality of providers in communication with an inventory management system associated with each of said plurality of providers wherein said automated award fulfillment application program provides sponsor-selected fulfillment, said automated award fulfillment application program comprising: - code adapted to provide a sponsor-selected specific award unit item, said sponsor-selected specific award unit item being tailored to demographic and psychographic preferences of a sponsor-selected consumer user; and code adapted to provide a sponsor-selected geographic location for fulfillment. 19. A method for providing an incentive programs [sic] and automating [sic] award fulfillment, comprising: providing a host computer; providing an incentive program on the host computer, wherein a participant may participate in said incentive program; providing a database of awards on the host computer associated with the incentive program; and providing automated award fulfillment of said awards to participants, including providing communication with an inventory management system associated with each of a plurality of providers wherein said automated award fulfillment comprises providing a sponsor-selected specific award unit item, providing said sponsor-selected specific award unit item tailored according to demographic and psycho-graphic preferences of a sponsor-selected consumer user, and providing a sponsor-selected geographic location for fulfillment. In plain English, claim 1 recites a program-based system for providing incentive awards to consumers. The program, which is run on a “host computer,” has several required features: it contains a database of awards in communication with an inventory management system of the company offering the incentive awards (referred to as a “provider”); it provides for a company that wishes to offer an incentive program or promotion (referred to as a “sponsor”) to select customer awards tailored to the demographic and psycho-graphic preferences of customers selected by the sponsor; and it provides for the sponsor to select the geographic location where the awards can be redeemed. According to Kroy, a sponsor and a provider can be the same entity, in which case all of the functions set forth in the claim are performed by the company that offers the incentive award program. Claim 19 is directed to a method instead of a system, but the limitations of claim 19 otherwise parallel those of claim 1. The asserted claims that depend from claim 19 add that the database of awards includes awards from a plurality of sponsors (claim 20), that the method comprises the additional steps of “associating an award with the incentive program” and “associating a fulfillment method with the award” (claim 21), and that the method comprises the additional step of “providing a card comprising memory for storing data associated with a user” (claim 23). The asserted claims that depend from claim 23 add that the data is “a personal identification number” (claim 24), and that the data is “information relating to a user’s participation- in said incentive program” (claim 25). The .asserted claim that depends from claim 21 adds that “associating a fulfillment method” comprises providing a program that “identifies an award based on the geographic proximity of an award winner to a redemption location of an award in the database of awards” (claim ■22)., The ’830 specification acknowledges that “[i]ncentive award programs, in which companies contract with sponsoring companies for programs to promote sales of the sponsoring companies’ products or services, are well-known.” ’830 patent, col. 1, ll. 30-33; col. 7, ll. 51-53. Such programs “offer awards and incentives to modify behavior of individual customers and to.direct the consumers to some pre-determined action, such as purchase of products or services upon visiting a retail site, viewing advertising, testing a product, or the like.” Id., col. 1, ll. 3942. • The specification states that traditional, non-computerized incentive programs have various drawbacks for sponsors, including the costs of generating and administering the programs, tracking the participation of consumers in the programs, and fulfilling the awards "or prizes won in the programs. ’830 patent, col. 1, line 65, through col. 2, line 10. Traditional incentive programs also have drawbacks for consumers, such as the difficulty of tracking participation in multiple programs. Id., col. 1, ll. 49-64. The specification further points out that non-automated incentive programs, such as promotional mailings and coupon distribution and redemption systems, can be expensive and cumbersome to operate, and can result in low consumer participation because of distribution and redemption problems. Id., col. 2, ll. 24-56. According to the specification, the introduction of digital computers and computer networks has eliminated “some of the inconveniences of conventional incentive programs, particularly those that relate to data tracking and manipulation.” ’830 patent, col. 2, ll. 57-60. Although acknowledging that, computers have been used in connection with incentive programs in the past, the specification asserts that known computer incentive programs “address some, but not all of the drawbacks of traditional promotions.” Id., col. 2, line 64, to col. 3, line 1. In particular, the specification states, computer-based systems have been used to merge information for various promotions and to track consumer participation in incentive programs. Id., col. 3, line 3, through col. 4, line 9. However, according to the specification, “none of the existing systems address all of the problems inherent in known incentive programs, particularly the problem of the need for an incentive program system that conveniently tracks participation while offering automated generation of incentive programs and automated fulfillment of awards won in incentive programs.” Id., col. 4, ll. 11-16. The specification also acknowledges that computerized incentive programs are offered on the Internet, but it asserts that such systems “are generally offered by a single sponsor and are generally limited to offering consumers the ability to participate in incentive programs,” while not offering sponsors “the ability to conveniently generate incentive programs, to track participation of consumers in multiple incentive programs, or to provide for automated fulfillment of awards.” Id., col. 4, ll. 17-24. Such systems, according to the specification, also lack efficient means for fulfilling awards promised in promotional campaigns. Id., col. 4, ll. 2532. In summary, the specification states that the prior art did not satisfy the need for an incentive program and award fulfillment system “that provides easy access to consumers who have standard computer hardware and software, that permits sponsors to build or purchase incentive programs easily and efficiently, and that provides for convenient tracking of participation and convenient, automated award fulfillment.” Id., col. 5, ll. 37-43. The advantages of the patented invention, according to the specification, are that it provides “consumer access to expanded incentive programs, using a conventional computer”; it permits “sponsors to build, buy, store, modify, offer, track and administer incentive programs”; and it permits sponsors and retailers “to offer improved award fulfillment for participants in incentive programs.” ’830 patent, col. 5, ll. 47-54. The specification touts the Internet’s “increased processing power and ability to access remote users” who have “standard equipment such as a personal computer, without requiring specific hardware or software” and its “dynamic opportunities to transmit, store and retrieve data, so that new or different incentive programs may be conducted on a much more frequent basis than is the case with traditional paper systems.” Id., col. 5, ll. 55-65. According to the specification, the invention permits consumers to participate in incentive programs by connecting to a website located on a server of a host system. Id., col. 6, ll. 1-5. It also permits sponsors “to list incentive programs on* an Internet site, to obtain prepackaged incentive programs from a host, to build incentive programs using computer software provided by the host, to associate prizes with incentive programs offered through the site, and to fulfill awards won by consumers.” Id., col. 6, ll. 13-19. In addition, the invention envisions the creation of databases of items that permit automated fulfillment of specific items as incentive rewards. Id., col. 6, at 24-27, 40-45. II. DISCUSSION Safeway argues that the asserted claims of the ’830 patent are directed to an abstract concept — the idea of conducting inventive programs and fulfilling the awards in those programs through the use of general purpose computers and networks such as the Internet. The claims are therefore invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101, according to Safeway, because they fail to recite patent-eligible subject matter. Section 101 provides that “[wjhoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” The Supreme Court has interpreted section 101 to bar the issuance of patents on “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2204, 65 L.Ed.2d 144 (1980). Safeway contends that Kroy’s claims are unpatentable because they are drawn to the abstract idea of using incentive award programs to promote sales. Reciting the use of computers to implement that abstract idea does not rescue Kroy’s claims, Safeway argues, because “[ujsing a computer to apply the ancient idea of incentivizing a customer to buy more products through awards and prizes does not turn a basic business method into patentable subject matter.” Dkt. No. 140, at 1-2. A. Patentable Subject Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 Over the past several years, as a result of a series of decisions from the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, the law of unpatentable subject matter has developed to the point that it is possible to discern a number of governing principles applicable to cases such as this one. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010), Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012), and Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 189 L.Ed.2d 296 (2014), deserve particularly close attention in determining whether the patent in this case is directed to unpatentable subject matter under section 101. 1. Recent Supreme Court Decisions a. Bilski In Bilski, the Supreme Court addressed the patentability of an invention claiming a method for buyers and sellers of commodities to hedge against the risk of price fluctuations. As the Court explained, claim 1 of the application at issue in Bilski described a series of steps instructing how to hedge against risk, and claim 4 put the concept articulated in claim 1 into a simple mathematical formula. Claim 1 in Bilski provided as follows: (a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical •averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said consumers; (b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to said consumers; and (c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer transactions. 130 S.Ct. at 3223-24. The Supreme Court characterized the claims in Bilski as efforts to patent “both the concept of hedging risk and the application of that concept to energy markets.” 130 S.Ct. at 3229. Applying principles drawn from several of its prior decisions, the Court held that the inventions claimed in Bilski “are not patentable processes because they, are attempts to patent abstract ideas. Id. at 3229-30. The Court pointed out that the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk, is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any introductory finance class; as such, the Court held, it “is an unpatentable abstract idea.” Id. at 3231. “[A]llowing a party to patent the principle of -risk hedging, the court explained, would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.” Id. The Court added that the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas “ ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or by adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity.’ ” 130 S.Ct. at 3230, quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981). Accordingly, after holding the two principal claims to be unpatentable because they were drawn to the basic concept of hedging, the Court held that the remaining claims were merely examples of “how hedging can be used in commodities and energy markets,” and were therefore also unpatentable. “[L]imiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components,” the Court explained, “did not make the concept patentable.” 130 S.Ct. at 3231. The Bilski Court addressed the “machine-or-transformation” test that the Federal Circuit had relied on to determine whether a claim was drawn to a patentable process. The Court held that the machine-or-transformation test, which asks whether the process at issue “is tied to a particular machine or apparatus or it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing,” 130 S.Ct. at 3225, is a “useful and important clue” in determining whether some claimed inventions are patentable under section 101, but is “not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’ ” Id. at 3227. b. Mayo In Mayo, decided two years after Bilski, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of patentable subject matter. The claims in Mayo were directed to methods of optimizing the therapeutic ■ efficacy of certain treatment protocols for an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder. The claims were embodied in certain diagnostic tests, and the patentee claimed that the unlicensed use of those tests infringed the claims. The method recited in the claims included the steps of administering a particular form of the drug thiopurine to a patient, determining the amount of the drug in the patient, and then, if the drug was present in the patient’s red blood cells in less than a particular concentration, concluding that the amount of the drug given to the patient should be increased, while if the drug was present in the patient’s red blood cells in more than a particular concentration, concluding that the amount of the drug given to the patient should be reduced. The Supreme Court held that the claims in Mayo were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Court began with the proposition that the claims were drawn to laws of nature— “namely, relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm.” 132 S.Ct. at 1296. The question to be decided, as the Court described it, was “whether the claims do significantly more than simply describe these natural relations.” That is, “do the patent claims add enough to their statements of the correlations to allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws?” Id. at 1297 (emphases in originál). The Court held that they did not. Instead, the Court held, the steps in the claimed processes, other than, the natural laws themselves, “involve well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field.” Id. at 1294. Although the technology in Mayo was quite different from the technology at issue in this case, the Mayo case nonetheless bears significantly on this case in several respects. First, the Court restated the point made in Bilski that the fact that an abstract idea (like a natural law) is limited to a particular “field of use” or added “token postsolution components” does not make the concept patentable. 132 S.Ct. at 1301. Second, the Court stated that merely implementing an abstract idea, such as a mathematical principle, “on a physical machine, namely a computer,” is not a patentable application of that principle. Id. Third, the Court emphasized that the risk of preempting later inventive contributions — a risk that underlies the policy against allowing patents on abstract ideas or laws of nature — is not avoided simply because the abstract ideas or laws of nature at issue “are narrow laws that may have limited applicability.” Id. at 1302. Finally, discussing the line between natural laws and the patentable inventions that employ those natural laws, the Court noted that a process that-focuses upon the use of a natural law must “contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.” Id. at 1294. c. Alice Four years after Bilski and two years after Mayo, the Supreme Court again returned to the issue of unpatentable subject matter in Alice. The Alice case was similar in many respects to Bilski, with the important difference that Alice involved claims to methods and systems of doing business implemented on a computer. The claims at issue in Alice were drawn to a computerized system for mitigating “settlement risk,” i.e., the risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will fail to satisfy its obligation. As the Court explained, the claims were “designed to facilitate the exchange of financial obligations between two parties by using a computer system as a third-party intermediary.” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2352. The claims involved “a method of exchanging financial obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement risk. The intermediary creates and updates ‘shadow’ records to reflect the value of each party’s actual accounts held at ‘exchange institutions,’ thereby permitting only those transactions for which the parties have sufficient resources. At the end of each day, the intermediary issues irrevocable instructions to the exchange institutions to carry out the permitted transactions.” Id. at 2356. The Alice Court began by noting that Mayo had constructed a two-step framework for determining patent eligibility for claims challenged under section 101 as based on abstract ideas. First, the Court explained, “we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts [including an abstract idea]. If so, we then ask ‘[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?’ To answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually and as an ordered combination to determine whether the additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application. We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an inventive concept — i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” 134 S.Ct. at 2355 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court held that the claims before it in Alice were drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement. Like risk hedging in Bilski, the Court held that intermediated settlement is a fundamental economic practice that qualifies as an “abstract idea” and thus is beyond the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101. 134 S.Ct. at 2356. Both concepts, the Court held, “are squarely within the realm of ‘abstract ideas’ as we have used that term.” Id. at 2357. Quoting Mayo, the Court explained that “[s]imply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality” is not enough to supply an inventive concept. Id. On one important issue, the facts of Alice required the Court to go beyond Bilski. The claims in Bilski did not require the use of computers, while the claims in Alice did. Significantly, the Court held that introducing the use of a computer into the claims did not render the claims in Alice patentable. To the contrary, “the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” 134 S.Ct. at 2358. The relevant question, the Court explained, “is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer.” Id. at 2359. The Court concluded that they did not, because the function performed by the computer at each step of the claims was “purely conventional,” id., quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1298. As the Court explained, the claims before it did not “purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself, [nor did] they effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field---- Instead, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer,” which the Court held was not enough to render the abstract idea patentable. Id. at 2360 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2. Recent Federal Circuit Precedents a. Ultramercial The Federal Circuit has applied the guidance from Bilski, Mayo, and Alice in a number of cases, several of which have set forth principles that are pertinent to this case. The Federal Circuit case that is perhaps most directly applicable to this one is Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed.Cir.2014). That case involved a patent on a method of distributing copyrighted media products over the Internet. The claimed method provided that a consumer would receive a copyrighted media product for free, in exchange for viewing an advertisement, and the advertiser would pay for the copyrighted content. The claim addressed by the court divided the method into 11 steps that recited the process in detail, from the receipt of the copyrighted materials from the content provider, through the sale of the product at an Internet site, through the display of the advertising to the customer (after which the customer is offered access to the product), and finally to the receipt of payment from the sponsor of the advertising message. The Federal Circuit had previously held the claims in Ultramercial to be patent-eligible, see Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed.Cir.2011), vacated and remanded, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2431, 182 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2012); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335 (Fed.Cir.2013), vacated and remanded, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 2870, 189 L.Ed.2d 828 (2014). However, in its most recent opinion in Ultramercial, issued after the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Alice, the Federal Circuit held that the claims in Ultramercial were directed to unpatentable subject matter. Following the analytical path set out in Mayo and Alice, the Ultramercial court first held that the recited method was directed to an abstract idea. The court explained that “receiving copyrighted media, selecting an ad, offering the media in exchange for watching the selected ad, allowing the consumer access to the media, and receiving payment from the sponsor of the ad all describe an abstract idea, devoid of a concrete or tangible application.” 772 F.3d at 715. Focusing on the additional limitations in the claims, the court noted that most of them simply described “the abstract idea of showing an advertisement before delivering free content.” Id. As to other limitations, the court ruled that “the addition of merely novel or non-routine components to the claimed idea [does not] necessarily turn[ ] an abstraction into something concrete.” Rather, the court explained, “any novelty in implementation of the idea is a factor to be considered only in the second step of the Alice analysis.” Id. Addressing that second step, the court considered whether the claims contained “‘an inventive concept’ to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.” 772 F.3d at 715. The limitations of the patent in suit, the court found, “do not transform the abstract idea that they recite into patent-eligible subject matter because the claims simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea with routine, conventional activity.” Id. Addressing the 11 steps set forth in the claim, the court held that they constituted merely “routine additional steps such as updating an activity log, requiring a request from the consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public access, and use of the Internet,” which were not sufficient to “transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.” Id. at 716. “That some of the eleven steps were not previously employed in this art is not enough — standing alone — to confer patent eligibility upon the claims at issue.” Id. (citations omitted). Finally, the court looked to the “machine or transformation” test that the Supreme Court in Bilski said was an “important clue” in determining whether some inventions are patent eligible under section 101, Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604, 130 S.Ct. 3218. The claims of the patent at issue were not directed to a machine, within-the meaning of that test, because they were “not tied to any particular novel machine or apparatus, only a general purpose computer.” 772 F.3d at 716. The limitations relating to the Internet and to the addition of a general purpose computer to otherwise conventional steps were not sufficient to make .an invention patent-eligible. Id. Moreover, the court stated, a transaction such as the one at issue in that case, involving “manipulations of ‘public or private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet the [transformation] test because they are not physical objects or substances, and they are not representative of physical. objects ■or substances.’ ... We therefore hold that the claims of the . [patent at issue] do not transform any article to a different state, or thing.” Id. at 717 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the court concluded .that-the patent claims were directed to “no more -than a patent-ineligible abstract idea.” Id. b. Content Extraction A month after the decision in Ultramerdal, the Federal Circuit again addressed the application of section 101 in a case involving a patent to a computerized business method, and again it held that the claims were not patent eligible. That case, Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed.Cir.2014), involved patents to a method of extracting data from hard copy documents using an automated digitizing unit such as a scanner, recognizing specific information from the extracted data, and storing.that information in a memory. The method could be used, for example, in an automated teller machine that recognizes information on a scanned check. Summarizing the doctrine of “abstract ideas” as applied to business method patents, the court in Content Extraction acknowledged that there is “no categorical business-method exception,” but noted that “claims directed to the mere formation and manipulation of economic relations may involve an abstract idea.... We have also applied the Supreme Court’s guidance to identify claims’directed to the performance of certain financial transactions as involving abstract ideas.” 776 F.3d at 1346. The Content Extraction court held that the claims before it were drawn to the abstract idea of collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and storing that- recognized data in memory. The concept of data collection, recognition, -and storage, the court noted, are well known and have Tong been performed by humans. The plaintiff first argued that the claims were not directed to abstract ideas because they required not only .a computer but a scanner, and because a human could not process the stream of bits output from a scanner and could not recognize the data contained in that stream of bits. Based on Alice, the court rejected that argument, and held that claims were drawn “to the basic concept of data recognition and storage.” Id. at 1346-47. For the second step of its analysis, the court looked to whether the limitations present in the claims represented a patent-eligible application of the abstract idea, i.e., whether the claims involved “more than performance of - ‘well-understood, routine,- [and] conventional activities previously’known to the industry.’” 776 F.3d at 1347-48, quoting Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359. The court held that they did not. It noted that the claims merely recited the use of existing scanning and processing technology to' recognize and store data from specific data fields, and that there was nothing inventive about the plaintiffs “use of a generic scanner and computer to perform well-understood, routine and conventional activities.” 776 F.3d at 1348. The use of those components in a particular technological environment was insufficient to save the claims from invalidation. Id. Because “the basic character of [the plaintiffs] claims is the abstract idea of extracting and storing data from hard copy documents using generic scanning and processing technology,” the court held the patents invalid. Id. at 1349. c. buySAFE In buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed.Cir.2014), another post-Aiice decision, the Federal Circuit again held a computer-implemented invention to be unpatentable, based on the Supreme Court’s “abstract idea” jurisprudence. The claims at issue in buySAFE recited a method in which the provider of a safe transaction service would receive a request for a performance guarantee for an online commercial transaction, and a computer would process the request by underwriting the requesting party and offering a transaction guaranty that would be binding upon the closing of the transaction. Citing Mayo, the buySAFE court stated that an abstract idea is unpatentable even if the abstract idea is narrow. 765 F.3d 1350. Moreover, quoting both Alice and Mayo, the court ¿xplained that a claim that is directed to an abstract idea is unpatentable unless “additional elements” of the claim supply “an ‘inventive concept’ in the physical realm of things and acts — a ‘new and useful application’ of the ineligible subject matter in the physical realm— that ensures that the patent is on something ‘significantly more than’ the ineligible subject matter itself.” Id. Addressing the question of what constitutes “an abstract idea,” the court pointed out that the relevant Supreme Court cases found an abstract idea “in certain arrangements involving contractual relations, which are intangible entities.” 765 F.3d at 1353. Moreover, those cases relied on the fact that in each instance the abstract idea constituted “a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.” Id. at 1354. The court in buySAFE noted that the claims before it “were squarely about creating a contractual relationship — a ‘transaction performance guaranty’ — that is beyond question of ancient lineage.” Id. at 1355. As such, the court held, the claims were plainly directed to abstract ideas. The court then turned' to the second question: what constitutes “enough extra” for a “business method” to pass muster under section 101?- The court stated that it was not enough that the claim limited the abstract idea “to a particular technological environment.” 765 F.3d at 1354-55. Nor did the invocation of computers add any inventive concept to the claims, as the recited computer functionality was “quite generic.” Id. The court further concluded that it “cannot be enough that the transactions being guaranteed are themselves online transactions.” At best, the court explained, that narrowing is “an ‘attempt to limit the use of the abstract guarantee idea to a particular technological environment,’ which has long been held insufficient to save a claim in this context.” Id. Finally, the fact that the dependent claims narrowed the invention “to particular types of such relationships, themselves familiar,” did not change the analysis, because that kind of narrowing “of such long-familiar commercial, transactions does not make the idea non-abstract for section 101 purposes.” 765 F.3d at 1355. d. Accenture Accenture Global Services, GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336 (Fed.Cir.2013), involved claims to a computerized system and method for generating tasks to be performed in conducting insurance transactions. The invention provided for the computer to store information about insurance transactions in a database and then, upon the occurrence of an event relating to the insurance, to determine what tasks need to be accomplished for the transaction at issue, and to assign those tasks to various individuals to complete them. In response to a claim that the invention was patent-ineligible, Accenture argued that the patent implemented the general idea of generating tasks for insurance claim processing, “but narrows it through its recitation of a combination of computer components including an insurance transaction database, a client component, and a server component, which includes an event processor, a task engine, and a task assistant.” 728 F.3d at 1344. Accenture also argued that the complexity and detail of the specification demonstrated that the patent embodied an advance in computer software and not simply a claim to an abstract idea. The Federal Circuit rejected those arguments and held the claims unpatentable. The court first held that the “abstract idea at the heart” of the claimed invention is “generating tasks [based on] rules ... to be completed upon the occurrence of an event.” 728 F.3d at 1344. The court then rejected Accenture’s arguments that the claims imposed meaningful limitations on that abstract idea sufficient to find the invention patentable. First, the court rejected Accenture’s arguments that the abstract idea was limited by being applied in a computer environment and within the insurance industry. The court held that simply implementing an abstract idea on a computer does not transform a patent-ineligible claim into a patent-eligible one, and that limiting the application of the idea to a single field of use did not render it patentable. Second, with respect to Accenture’s argument concerning the complexity of the specification and the detailed software implementation guidelines found in the specification, the court explained that “the important inquiry for a § 101 analysis is to look to the claim.” Id. at 1345. The court noted that although the specification contained “very detailed software implementation guidelines, the system claims themselves only contain generalized software components arranged to implement an abstract concept on a computer____ [T]he complexity of the implementing software or the level of detail in the specification does not transform a claim reciting only an abstract concept into a patent-eligible system or method.” Id. e. Bancorp Services In Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed.Cir.2012), the claims at issue were drawn to methods and systems for tracking the value of insurance policies by computer. The court observed that the recited computer functions were simply basic digital computations that were interchangeable with mental processes that could be performed, albeit less efficiently, by humans. Id. at 1278. That was not sufficient to make the claims patent eligible. “To salvage an otherwise patent-ineligible process,” the court said, “a computer must be integral to the claimed invention, facilitating the process in a way that a person making calculations or computations could not.... [The computer] must play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly.” Id., quoting SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed.Cir.2010). The Bancorp court distinguished the prior case of Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed.Cir.2010). The patent in that case claimed a process for enabling a computer to render a halftone image of a digital image by comparing the digital image, pixel by pixel, against a two-dimensional array called a mask. 687 F.3d at 1279. The Bancorp court explained that the patent in Research Corp. “represented improvements to computer technologies in the marketplace,” which constituted “a technological advance”; it did not simply entail employing computers to track, reconcile, and administer a life insurance policy, thus using a computer to perform more efficiently what could otherwise be accomplished manually. Id. The court added that the method in Research Corp. required the manipulation of computer data structures (the pixels of a digital image and the mask), and the output of the modified computer data structure was dependent upon the computer components that were required to perform it. Id. f. DDR Holdings A case that helps define the limits of the doctrine of unpatentable abstract ideas is DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed.Cir.2014). The claims in that case recited systems used to enable host websites to avoid losing visitors when those visitors click on an advertisement on the host site. Instead of directing the visitor to the advertiser’s website, the claimed invention provided for the host to serve a composite web page to the visitor computer having the “look and feel” of the host web page, along with content based on product information from the advertiser’s product catalog. The Federal Circuit held that the patents were' not invalid under section 101. The court distinguished the case before it from cases such as Ultramercial, buySAFE, and Bancoyp on several grounds. First, it noted that the claims did not embody a fundamental economic principle or longstanding commercial practice. Rather, it noted, the challenge of retaining website visitors is one “particular to the Internet.” 773 F.3d at 1257. Moreover, the court held that the claimed solution does not simply use computers to serve a conventional business purpose; instead, it “is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specially arising in the realm of computer networks.” Id. The invention entails the storage of visually perceptible elements of numerous websites and the construction of new, hybrid web pages that “merge the content associated with the products of the third-party merchant with the stored ‘visually perceptible elements’ from the identified host website.” Id. The court distinguished Ultramercial on the ground that the claims in the DDR Holdings case did not “broadly and generically claim ‘use of the Internet’ to perform an abstract business practice,” but instead specified “how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result.” Id. at 1258. Moreover, the court observed that the claims at issue included a specific way to automate the creation of a composite web page and did not preempt “every application of the idea of increasing sales by making two web pages look the same.” Id. at 1259. In short, DDR Holdings dealt with a patent that required doing something to a web page, not simply doing something on a web page, a difference that the court regarded as highly important to the issue of patent eligibility. 3. Recent District Court Decisions In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bilski, Mayo, and Alice — and particularly Alice — district courts have decided a number of cases involving challenges under section 101 to patents involving computer implementations of methods of doing business. In the great majority of those cases, the courts have held the claims unpatentable, either on summary judgment or on motions to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or 12(c), based on the Supreme Court’s two-part test adopted in Mayo and Alice. The decisions are too numerous to discuss individually, but those dealing with' business methods in the field of marketing are instructive, as the subject matter of those , cases relates closely to that of the inventions at issue in this case. In each of the district court cases dealing with computerized business methods in the field of marketing, the courts have held the claims patent-ineligible after finding that the claimed computerized activities involved actions that had previously been performed, albeit less efficiently, without the aid of computers. Those cases involve, for example, a computerized method for conducting business transactions over the Internet that allows the buyer to- reduce the price-of an item by participating in an auction and a competitive activity, Priceplay.com, Inc. v. AOL Advertising, Inc., Civil Action No. 14-92, 83 F.Supp.3d 577, 2015 WL 1246781 (D.Del. Mar. 18, 2015); a computer-implemented method of generating a customized proposal for selling equipment to particular customers by obtaining and storing specialized information about the equipment and the customers’ needs, Clear With Computers, LLC v. Altec Indus., Inc., Case No. 6:14-cv-79, 2015 WL 993392 (E.D.Tex. Mar. 3, 2015); a method of allowing advertisers to target online advertising to consumers fitting desired demographic, geographic, and psychographic criteria, Morsa v. Facebook, Inc., Case No. SACV 14-161, 77 F.Supp.3d 1007, 2014 WL 7641155 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 23, 2014); a telemarketing system that allows an agent to use a mixture of prerecorded scripts and live voice to selectively respond to customers and to use personal information to select scripts relating to the customer, KomBea Corp. v. Noguar L.C., Case No. 2:13-cv-957, 73 F.Supp.3d 1348, 2014 WL 7359049 (D.Utah Dec. 23, 2014); a method to “upsell” consumers by using information about the consumer, including information about the consumer’s purchases, to offer additional items to the consumer, Tuxis Techs., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., Civil Action No. 13-1771, 2014 WL 4382446 (D.Del. Sep. 3, 2014); and a- computer program that allows the user to create meals from a database of food objects according to the purchaser’s preferences and dietary goals, DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 33 F.Supp.3d 271 (S.D.N.Y.2014). The courts in each of those cases found the marketing concept underlying the patent to be an “abstract idea” that had previously been employed in marketing and was simply being “updated” by the use of computers or the Internet. After finding no “inventive concept” sufficient to render the abstract idea patentable, the courts in each of those eases held that the claimed inventions were drawn to unpatentable subject matter. B. Applying the Governing Section 101 Precedents to This Case The claimed systems and methods of the ’830 patent are drawn to the use of generic computers and familiar computer networks, such as the Internet, in constructing and operating incentive award programs. ’830 patent, col. 1, ll. 23-28. The core idea of the ’830 patent — providing a computer-based incentive award program — is plainly an unpatentable abstract idea by itself. Incentive award programs designed to encourage sales of products and services have been familiar aspects of marketing for many years, as the ’830 patent itself acknowledges. See ’830 patent, col. 1, ll. 30-33 (“Incentive award programs, in which incentive companies contract with sponsoring companies for programs to promote sales of the sponsoring companies’ products or services, are well-known.”). The patent further notes that incentive award programs have traditionally offered “awards and incentives to modify • behavior of individual consumers and to direct the consumers to some predetermined action, such as purchase of products or services upon visiting a retail site, viewing advertising, testing a product, or the like.” ’830 patent, col. 1, ll. 39-43. Using a computer and a computer-based network to provide and operate such an incentive award program does not render the idea any less abstract or any more patentable. See Alice, 134 S.Ct. 2358-60. The use of incentive award programs in marketing is indistinguishable in principle from the kinds of financial or business operations that were at issue in Bilski and Alice, as well as similar financial or business operations that were at issue in various Federal Circuit decisions in which the claims have been held patent-ineligible under section 101. See buySAFE, 765 F.3d 1350 (guaranty service for on-line transact tions); Accenture, 728 F.3d 1336 (“system for generating tasks to be performed in an insurance organization”); Bancorp, 687 F.3d 1266 (method for managing a life insurance policy, including generating the policy, calculating fees, and determining the surrender value and investment value of the policy); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed.Cir.2012) (method for processing credit applications); Fort Properties, Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317 (Fed.Cir.2012) (method for creating a real estate investment instrument adapted for performing tax-deferred exchanges). Kroy does not have any convincing answer to Safeway’s contention that using incentive programs in marketing is an abstract idea, as the Supreme Court has used that term in Bilski and Alice. Kroy argues, instead, that its invention is far more than the simple abstract idea of an incentive award program, and that its invention has solved problems relating to incentive award programs that had never been solved before. Kroy contends that the various narrowing limitations recited in the claims of the ’830 patent distinguish the claimed incentive award programs from the kinds of abstract ideas that 'were before the courts in the cases cited above. In fact, however, while the "additional limitations set forth in the ’830 claims may make those claims narrower, they don’t make them any less abstract. As the Federal Circuit explained in Ultramercial, the addition of novel or non-routine components to an abstract idea do" not necessarily “turn an abstraction into something concrete.” 772 F.3d at 715. Rather, any novelty in implementation of the idea is a factor to be considered only in the secónd step of the Alice decision.” Id. In substance, then, Kroy’s arguments are directed mainly at the second step of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Mayo, which asks whether the claims contain “an inventive concept” sufficient “to transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent eligible application.” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2357, quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294. However, a careful examination of Kroy’s arguments and the evidence it has offered in opposition to Safeway’s summary judgment motion reveals that the claims contain no such “inventive concept.” The various components of Kroy’s. argument are addressed separately below. 1. The Use of Computers and the Internet . Although Kroy emphasizes the importance of the use of computers in its invention, the fact that the claimed system and methods employ computers or a network such as the Internet is clearly insufficient to make the claims patent eligible. The computers and computer-related features recited in the claims are generic, commonplace components; the claims are not directed to an improvement in computer technology or to the manipulation of a website, as in the DDR Holdings case. See also Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed.Cir.2010) (claim to a process for enabling a computer to render a halftone image of a digital image is patent eligible because it represented an improvement to computer technology, not simply the use of computers to perform some conventional function more efficiently). Instead, the role of computers in the ’830 claims is directly comparable to the role of computers in many cases in which the claims have been held unpatentable, including Alice, Ultramercial, Content Extraction, buySAFE, Bancorp, and Accenture. As the Supreme Court explained in some detail in Alice, the introduction of a generic computer does not render an invention patentable if, absent the use of a computer, it would not have been. 134 S.Ct. at 2357-59. Those cases, according to the Alice Court, “demonstrate that the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” 134 S.Ct. at 2358. “Given the ubiquity of computers, ... wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featurfe]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’ ” Id., quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1297. That analysis applies directly to the claims in this case. The role of the computer in the claims of the ’830 patent is limited to the basic functions of a generic computer, including storing, transmitting, and displaying information. Nothing in the claims purports to improve the functioning of the computer itself, and the computer-related elements of the claim add nothing that is not already present in the steps of the claimed system and methods, other than the speed and convenience of basic computer functions such as calculation, communication, and the display of information. See Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d at 1333, quoting SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed.Cir.2010) (“In order for the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a computer for performing calculations.”). It is clear that each of the functions that the ’830 patent assigns to computers could be performed by a human being without the aid of a computer of any kind. Thus, humans could operate a simple incentive reward system in conjunction with a simple inventory management system, in which the operator to the system would keep track of his inventory of awards, would select recipients of those awards based on known characteristics (such as their purchasing history), and would select the awards and the location for redeeming them. Kroy disputes that the claimed functions recited in the ’830 claims could be performed by humans. In making that argument, however, Kroy relies on the presumed volume of information and speed required in large, commercial incentive award programs, which a human armed with only a pencil and paper could not keep up with. But the claims apply to incentive award programs "without regard to their size, and there is no room for doubt that if the incentive program were small, humans could perform each of the tasks that the claims assign to computers without the need for processing assistance. Computers can, of course, be useful in managing a large volume of transactions, doing so at great speed, and efficiently communicating the results of those transactions to system users. But the basic functions recited in the ’830 patent — selecting awards based on consumers’ demographic and psychographic preferences, ensuring that those awards are available in inventory, and directing the consumers to a particular location to redeem their awards — all constitute conventional conduct that could be performed by a human being. The greater efficiency with which the computer can perform tasks that a human could perform does not render the inventions patentable. See Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278-79; Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed.Cir.2011) (method steps unpatentable because “they can be performed in the human mind or by a human using a pen and paper”); Planet Bingo LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 Fed.Appx. 1005, 1007-08 (Fed.Cir.2014) (managing a bingo game “can be carried out by a human using pen and paper”). Adding a computer to perform those mental steps “does not transform a patent-ineligible claim into a patent-eligible one.” Accenture Global Servs. GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed.Cir.2013); Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1333 (“Simply adding a ‘computer aided limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render the claim patent eligible:”). Kroy attempts to avoid the effect of that line of cases by arguing that this case does not involve generic computers. Instead, according to Kroy, this case involves novel computing functions. That argument is wholly unconvincing. Nothing in the claims or the specification of the ’830 patent indicates that specific recited tasks require anything other than generic computers programmed in a conventional method to perform those tasks. The claims simply recite the conventional computer functions of (1) coupling a host computer to a network, (2) making a database accessible to the host computer, (3) providing a program on the host computer that allows communication with the inventory management systems of a plurality of providers, (4) designating awards selected by the sponsor, and (5) designating the location for redeeming those awards, also selected by the sponsor. The specification describes, in some detail, the computer components and programs that can perform those functions, but the described computer components and operations are well-known and conventional, frequently identified by their commercial designations. For example, the specification states that if a consumer wishes to participate in the system, the consumer logs on to the consumer computer 12, which may be any ‘client’ computer in a client/server system. The consumer computer 12 includes the CPU 20, ROM 22, I/O interface 28, I/O Device 24, RAM 40, modem 54, and storage device 45---- [T]he operating system 42 is preferably an operating system capable of supporting such an interface, such as WINDSOWS 95, UNIX or the Macintosh. ’830 patent, col. 22, line 51, through col. 23, line 4. The apparatus and method that permits a retailer to participate in the host system is described in similar fashion. ’380 patent, col. 37, ll. 19-55. That description refers to the typical components of the retailer’s computer, including standard components present in many computers and what the patent refers to as “any conventional browser.” The specification reads as follows, in pertinent part, referring to the simple flow charts found in the accompanying figures: In order to participate in the system, the retailer logs on to the retailer computer 16, which may be any “client” computer in a client/server system. The retailer computer 16 may include the typical components of a client computer, as depicted in Fig. 5, including the CPU 92, ROM 94, I/O interface 100, I/O Device 98, RAM 102, modem 124, and storage device 109. The retailer computer 16 further includes the operating system, 42, which controls the applications running on the retailer computer 16, such as the data management, storage and retrieval application 44, the web browser 50, the communications application 52, and the other applications. The retailer computer 16 is preferably equipped with a graphical user interface, permitting the user to click on icons, buttons, highlighted text, or the like in order to initiate functions. Thus, the operating system 42 is preferably an operating system capable of supporting such an interface, such as WINDOWS 95, or the Macintosh. The retailer computer 16 is connected by the modem 124 to the telecommunications connection 38 of a network, which may be the Internet, an intranet, or any other computer network. In order to participate, the retailer logs onto the retailer computer 16 and initiates the web browser 50, which may be any conventional browser, such as NetScape Navigator, Microsoft Explorer, or the like. Due to the graphical nature of many Incentive program games, the browser is preferably one that supports a graphical user interface. The browser 50 permits the retailer computer 16 to connect to the host gateway 19 over the telecommunications connection 38. ’830 patent, col. 37, ll. 21-50. Thus, nothing in the claims or the specification reveals any novel computing functions, as Kroy alleges. While Kroy contends that computer functions were employed to perform tasks that had not been performed by computers in the prior art, there is nothing novel or distinctive about the individual tasks that the computer system are described as performing. Thus, as in Ultramercial, Content Extraction, buySAFE, Accenture, Bancorp and Cybersource, the computers in the claimed system and methods simply perform tasks that could be performed by a human if the scale of the incentive program were small and there were no premium on the speed and efficiency that are typically offered by generic computers. Citing a passage from the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3226-27, Kroy makes the same argument in favor of the patentability of the ’830 patent under the so-called “maehine-ortransformation” test. That is, Kroy contends that the ’830 claims are patentable because the invention involves the usé of a machine, in that the claimed system and methods involve computerized operations. However, as the Supreme Court made clear in Alice, and as this court has repeatedly ruled, the mere use of conventional computer functions as part of a claimed invention does not satisfy the maehine-or-transformation test. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2358 (“the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-ineligible invention”); Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1333 (“Simply adding a ‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to- render the claim patent eligible.”); SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed.Cir.2010) (“In order for the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a signif