Full opinion text
ORDER DENYING GPNE’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, OR FOR A NEW TRIAL; DENYING APPLE’S MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW LUCY H. KOH, United States District Judge On October 22, 2014, after seven days of trial and four and a half hours of deliberation, a jury concluded that Defendant Apple, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Apple”) did not infringe two patents owned by Plaintiff GPNE Corp. (“Plaintiff’ or “GPNE”), and that GPNE’s patents were not invalid. See ECF No. 559 (Jury Verdict). Before the Court are the parties’ post-trial motions. Specifically, GPNE seeks judgment as a matter of law on infringement, or in the alternative, a new trial. ECF No. 572 (GPNE JMOL Br.). Apple seeks judgment as a matter of law on its indefiniteness defense. ECF No. 574 (Apple Indefiniteness JMOL). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES each of the parties’ requests. 1. BACKGROUND A. Asserted Patents GPNE alleges that Apple infringes U.S. Patent Nos. 7,570,954 (the “ ’954 Patent”), and 7,792,492 (the “ ’492 Patent”) (collectively, “Asserted Patents”). The Asserted Patents share the same specification, which provides that the “invention pertains to communications paging, and particularly to two-way paging method and apparatus.” ’492 Patent at 1:32-33; see also id. at 1:66-67 (describing “[a] two-way paging system [that] utilizes four local frequencies for transmissions.... ”). The specification describes the use of “four local frequencies for transmissions between pager units and a central control station.” Id. at 1:66-2:1. As set forth in the specification, frequencies one and two are used to transmit downstream, from the control station to the paging unit, while frequencies three and four are used to transmit upstream, from the paging unit to the control station. See id. at 1:66-2:9. This four frequency system enables two-way data communications between the paging unit and the control station. Id. at 1:66-2:9. GPNE accuses nine Apple products of infringing the Asserted Patents.. The accused Apple devices, certain models of Apple iPhones and iPads, allegedly infringe based on their compatibility with General Packet Radio Service (“GPRS”) and Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution (“EDGE”) networks, and/or Long-Term Evolution (“LTE”) networks. GPRS, EDGE, and LTE are standards for cellular communications promulgated by the telecommunications standard setting associations 3GPP and ETSI. According to GPNE, these communications standards rely on the two-way paging system disclosed in the Asserted Patents, and the accused devices’ compatibility with these standards renders the accused Apple devices infringing. B. Procedural Background This litigation began in May 2012, when GPNE filed a complaint in the District of Hawaii against fifteen separate defendants, including Apple. ECF No. 1 (Compl.). Subsequently, the District Court in Hawaii severed GPNE’s cases against each of the defendants in the Hawaii action and transferred several of the separate actions to this District. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 246, 295; GPNE Corp. v. Nokia Corp., Case No. 12-CV-00250 SOM RLP, ECF No. 14; GPNE Corp. v. Pantech Co., Ltd. and Pantech Wireless, Inc., Case No. 12-CV-00251 SOM RLP, ECF No. 10; GPNE Corp. v. Amazon Inc., Case No. 12-CV-00426 SOM-RLP, ECF No. 295; GPNE Corp. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., Case No. 12-CV-00249 SOM-RLP, ECF No. 246. After holding a tutorial and claim construction hearing on June 6, 2013, this Court issued an order construing disputed claim terms. See ECF No. 87 (Order Construing Claims). On February 27, 2014, Apple moved for summary judgment of noninfringement and invalidity. ECF No. 187. The Court held a hearing on Apple’s motion for summary judgment on April 3, 2014. On April 9, 2014, the Court granted Apple’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement as to indirect infringement, and denied as to direct in-Mngement. ECF No. 239 (Order on Summary Judgment). The Court also granted Apple’s motion for partial summary judgment of invalidity as to claims 13, 18, 30, 31, and 39 of the ’267 Patent for lack of written description and enablement. Id. at 22. Trial began on October 6, 2014. At trial, GPNE presented the following experts: Dr. Esmael Dinan, Dr. Neil Birkett, and Michael Dansky. Dr. Dinan was GPNE’s sole infringement expert. Dr. Birkett testified as to the components and capabilities of the accused products, including Cetecom testing. Mr. Dansky was GPNE’s damages expert. Apple presented the following experts: Dr. Sarah Wilson, Peter Rysavy, and Paul Meyer. Dr. Wilson testified as to nonin-fringement. Mr. Rysavy testified as to Apple’s defenses of obviousness and invalidity. Mr. Meyer was Apple’s damages expert. The trial lasted seven days, and the jury deliberated for four and a half hours before returning a verdict. The jury found that none of the accused Apple products infringed Claim 44 of the ’492 Patent or Claims 19 and 22 of the ’954 Patent. See Jury Verdict. The jury also found the claims to be not invalid. Id. II. LEGAL STANDARD Rule 50 permits a district court to grant judgment as a matter of law “when the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion and the conclusion is contrary to that reached by the jury.” Ostad v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 327 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir.2003). A party seeking judgment as a matter of law after a jury verdict must show that the verdict is not supported by “substantial evidence,” meaning “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., 427 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed.Cir. 2005) (citing Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir.1992)). The Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” See E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir.2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A new trial is appropriate under Rule 59 “only if the jury verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.” DSPT Int’l, Inc. v. Nahum, 624 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir.2010). A court should grant a new trial where necessary “to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir.2007). III. GPNE’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL GPNE makes several arguments in support of its motion for judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, a new trial. GPNE first argues that the Court made five errors related to the claim term “node.” GPNE then argues that Apple did not present substantial evidence of noninfringement on the “independent paging network” aspect of “node,” or on the following limitations: “count value,” “clocking/aligning signal,” or “differing frequencies.” In addition to responding to these arguments, Apple also contends that the jury could have reasonably discredited Dr. Dinan’s testimony and concluded that GPNE failed to satisfy its burden of proof as to infringement. The Court addresses each argument in turn, beginning with GPNE’s “node” arguments. A. GPNE’s Arguments Related to “Node” GPNE’s five arguments related to the term “node” are that: (1) the Court failed to properly construe the term “node”; (2) the Court left the scope of the term “node” to the jury, in violation of 02 Micro; (3) Apple made improper arguments to the jury about the scope of the term “node”; (4) Apple argued that the jury could apply a “person on the street” standard to the jury’s infringement determination; and (5) the Court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding claim construction. GPNE JMOL Br. at 9-10. Apple disputes that there was any error with regard to “node,” argues that certain of GPNE’s arguments were waived, and finally argues that even if the Court erred with respect to “node,” GPNE’s motion should be denied. The Court addresses each argument in turn. 1. The Court Properly Construed the Claim Term “Node” GPNE’s first argument is that the Court’s construction of the term “node” was improper. GPNE JMOL Br. at 9. The term “node” appears in each asserted claim, both in the preamble and in the body of the claim. For example, Claim 22 of the ’954 Patent, which depends from claim 13, reads in pertinent part: 13. A first node in a data network, the data network including a plurality of nodes including a first node, the first node comprising: at least one processor; a memory providing code to the at least one processor; and an interface controlled by the at least one processor ... 22. The first node of claim 13, wherein the interface is further controlled by the processor to: transmit randomly generated information created by the first node; and receive said randomly generated information returned from the communication controller to enable identification of the first node. ’954 Patent, cl. 13, 22 (emphases added). In its claim construction briefing, GPNE proposed construing “node” as “a device in a network that can transmit and receive information.” ECF No. 69 (Opening CC Br.) at 3. Apple proposed “a pager in a network operating independently of a telephone network.” ECF No. 72 (Resp. CC Br.) at 4. The dispute over the term involved both (1) whether a node was limited to a pager and (2) whether the node must operate independently from a telephone network. Order Construing Claims at 9. The Court construed the term “node” as a “pager with two-way data communications capability that transmits wireless data communications on a paging system that operates independently from a telephone network.” Order Construing Claims at 9. GPNE argues that this construction errs in three respects: (1) the construction imports limitations from the specification; (2) the construction ignores the purpose of the invention; and (3) the construction violates principles of claim differentiation. GPNE JMOL Br. at 9-13. Apple argues that these arguments were waived, as GPNE failed to raise them in connection with the jury instructions, and that the Court’s claim construction is correct. Apple Opp. at 13-14. The Court first reviews the construction of “node,” and concludes that the construction adopted at the Markman stage is correct. Next, the Court addresses Apple’s waiver arguments, and concludes that (1) GPNE never sought construction of the terms “pager,” “paging system,” or “telephone network”; (2) GPNE waived two of the claim construction arguments it now asserts; and (3) GPNE never sought reconsideration of the Court’s construction of “node,” and instead consistently advocated for an overbroad construction. a. The Court’s Construction of “Node” is Correct i.The Court correctly limited “node” to pagers The Court correctly limited “node” to pagers. GPNE’s primary argument at the Markman stage, and in its post-trial briefing, is that the invention is not limited to legacy one-way pagers. GPNE JMOL Br. at 11; Opening CC Br. at 4-5. The Court agreed, and construed “node” as a two-way pager with specific network independence characteristics. Order Construing Claims at 9. GPNE’s contention that the Court limited node to pager “based entirely on the presence of the words ‘paging unit’ and ‘pager’ in the preferred embodiments” is both incorrect and unpersuasive. GPNE JMOL Br. at 12. As discussed in depth in the Court’s Markman Order, the Court used the term “pager” within the construction of “node” for at least the following eleven reasons: 1. The term “node” appears only in the claims, abstract, and title of the Asserted Patents; 2. The term “node” does not appear anywhere in the original parent patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,542,115 (the “ 115 Patent”); 3. The term “pager” is used over 200 times in each Asserted Patent; 4. The Asserted Patents repeatedly refer to “the invention” or “this invention” as a “two-way paging” system. See, e.g., ’276 Patent at 1:32-33; 14:14-15; 5. The “Related Art” portion of the specification discusses problems with prior art one-way and two-way pagers. ’267 Patent at 1:41-62; 6. The only exemplary embodiments in the specification describe “pager units.” ’267 Patent Figs. 2, 5, and 8. 7. The specification distinguishes pagers and cell phones. Id. at 5:31-35; 8. The specification provides no hint as to what a non-pager node could be; 9. The prosecution history refers to the invention as a pager with certain features that are indicative of a paging device in contrast to a cell phone or other device. ECF No. 72-10 at GPNECorp. 00000323 (discussing light weight, compact size, and low power consumption of the invention); 10. GPNE’s expert, Dr. Dinan, testified that a person of ordinary skill would consider a “node” a “pager type apparatus enhanced with pre-programmed software and appropriate hardware to allow for two-way data packet communications through a central control station.” ECF No. 69-6 (Dinan CC Decl.) ¶ 28 (emphasis added); and 11. At his deposition, Dr. Dinan further testified that the patent claimed an “enhanced pager.” ECF No. 72-6 (Dinan CC Depo.) at 126:2 (emphasis added). Order Construing Claims at 9-15 (discussing support of the construction of node as pager). Having reviewed the prior Order Construing Claims, the Court finds that GPNE does not present any convincing argument that the claimed nodes are not pagers with two-way data capability. ii. The Court correctly limited node to devices that communicate “on a paging system that operates independently firom a telephone network.” The Court correctly limited nodes to devices that communicate “on a paging system that operates independently from a telephone network.” Order Construing Claims at 9. At the Markman stage Apple argued that a “node!’ could not be capable of use on a telephone network. Id. at 16. The Court disagreed, and acknowledged that while the claimed node could operate on both a telephone and pager network, the node must operate on a pager network that is independent of a telephone network. Id. at 16-17. GPNE argues that this construction was in error and is only supported “by a single sentence” in the specification. GPNE JMOL Br. at 13. This argument is contradicted by the record. At the Markman stage, GPNE conceded that its node/pager must return a page without a telephone call: What is disclosed in the patents in suit is a device that ‘can transmit and receive information’ — two-way data packet communication that can obviate the need for telephony voice calls to communicate, which was necessary for one-way pagers of the time. This is undeniable. ECF No. 75 (Reply CC Br.) at 4 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Moreover, GPNE’s Opening Claim Construction Brief also conceded that “where the prior art required use of a telephone system to return a page call, the two-way data communication system of the invention obviates that need and can operate — to that extent — independent from the telephone network.” Opening CC Brief at 6. At the Markman hearing GPNE’s counsel also confirmed that the patent “depicts the design of a two way paging system which operates independently from the telephone systems for wireless.” Markman Tr. at 93:16-18 (quoting an invention disclosure document in the ’267 Patent file history, ECF. No. 69-7 at GPNECorp. 00000314). As the Court explained in its Order Construing Claims, the Asserted Patents refer to a “two-way paging system.” Order Construing Claims at 16-18. The inventors disclosed that this system “operates independently from the telephone system for wireless data communication,” and GPNE’s expert testimony supported the conclusion that “pager networks and telephone networks are distinct and ... the electronic componentry and programming that permits a device to communicate on each is generally different.” Id. Consequently, the Court’s construction properly included the two-way data communication feature of the claimed nodes, and permitted GPNE to argue that a combination pager-telephone device infringed the claims, if the accused device met the independent networks limitation. Accordingly, based on the Markman submissions, oral arguments, and the post-trial briefing, the Court rejects GPNE’s argument that the Court erred in construing the term “node.” The construction of “node” as a “pager with two-way data communications capability that transmits wireless data communications on a paging system that operates independently from a telephone network” is correct. Order Construing Claims at 9. b. Waiver Arguments Apple’s opposition brief heavily emphasizes GPNE’s waiver of certain claim construction arguments. GPNE JMOL Opp’n at 13-15. Based on the briefing and the record, the Court agrees that (1) GPNE never sought construction of the terms “pager,” “paging system,” or “telephone network”; (2) GPNE waived two of the claim construction arguments it now asserts; and (3) GPNE never sought reconsideration of the Court’s construction of “node,” and instead consistently advocated for an overbroad construction, i. GPNE never sought construction of terms within the construction of “node” Apple argues that GPNE never requested a construction of the terms “pager,” “paging system,” or “telephone network,” which are in the Court’s construction of “node.” GPNE JMOL Opp’n. at 14. GPNE takes the position that because its own proposed construction did not include the terms “pager,” “paging system,” and “telephone network” GPNE was not required to propose any further construction of those terms. See GPNE JMOL Reply at 7 (“Apple’s argument makes no sense; GPNE at all times sought a construction of the term “node” that did not include “pager” or “paging system” whatsoever.”). GPNE’s briefing belies this argument. Each of the five alleged errors regarding “node” deal with the “pager” terms. GPNE JMOL Br. at 9-10. In fact, GPNE’s entire 02 Micro argument is premised on the argument that the Court should have further construed “pager.” See GPNE JMOL Br. at 14 (“Having chosen the words “pager” and “paging system” for the construction of the claim term “node,” it was still error to leave the scope of those terms undefined when presented to the jury.”). However, the Court agrees with Apple that GPNE’s arguments suggesting that the Court should have construed “pager,” “paging system,” and “telephone network” were waived as GPNE never requested construction of those terms. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Sys., Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1320-21 (Fed.Cir.2003); see also GPNE JMOL Reply Br. at 7 (recognizing that GPNE never sought construction of pager, paging system, or telephone network). GPNE failed to raise the issue at the Markman stage, in the Joint Pretrial Statement, and in connection with the jury instructions. Beginning at the Markman stage, the words “pager” and “telephone network” were at issue. Apple’s proposed construction of “node” was “a pager in a network operating independently of a telephone network.” Resp. CC Br. at 4. .At the Markman hearing the Court specifically asked the parties to address the issue of whether “pager” would need to be construed. See Markman Tr. at 81:19-82:2 (“Are we going to need to have a subsequent claim construction [of the] term [pager]?”). In response, Apple contended that the question of what a pager was to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time would be a “fact-based issue,” and therefore not require additional construction. Id. at 85:10-15. When GPNE interjected, GPNE objected only to Apple’s arguments regarding the plain and ordinary meaning of the “independent of a telephone [network]” language, but failed to otherwise address or dispute Apple’s contention that whether the accused devices were “pagers” was a factual dispute that did not go to the scope of the claims. See id. at 88:5-89:25. To the contrary, GPNE told the Court that “if you call it a ‘[two-way] paging system,’ ” that would be “perfectly fine.” See Markman Tr. at 89:12-17. Next, as Apple points out, GPNE failed to raise the “pager” issue in the parties’ statement of “Disputed Legal Issues” within the Joint Pretrial Statement. Apple JMOL at 14 (citing ECF No. 305 (Joint Pretrial Statement) at 9-11). Apple’s list of issues included a claim construction dispute over the terms “slot” and “packet.” Id. at 10. GPNE did not raise any claim construction issues, including any issues related to “node” or “pager.” Id. Furthermore, as set forth below, a review of the parties’ submissions to the Court on the jury instructions confirms that GPNE did not seek further clarification of the terms “pager,” “paging system,” or “telephone network,” and instead only advocated for its original construction of node halfway through trial. See ECF No. 505 (Objections to Final Annotated Jury Instructions) at 2 (“As the Court is aware, at Markman, GPNE proposed construing the claim term “node” as “a device in a network that can transmit and receive information.” See Dkt. 69 at 3. GPNE maintains that this construction was the proper one.”). In the parties’ various versions of their “Joint Proposed Jury Instructions,” and in GPNE’s objections to the Court’s jury instructions, GPNE either accepted the Court’s construction of “node” and requested that the Court instruct the jury to apply plain and ordinary meaning to “pager,” or requested that the Court adopt GPNE’s original proposed construction. See Objections to Final Annotated Jury Instructions at 1-5. Specifically, in the first Joint Proposed Jury Instructions, filed June 19, 2014, GPNE proposed instructing the jury that “node” means “pager with two-way data communication capability that transmits wireless data,” while Apple proposed including the Court’s entire construction of “pager with two-way data communications capability that transmits wireless data communications on a paging system that operates independently from a telephone network.” ECF No. 316 (Joint Proposed Jury Instructions) at 50. GPNE offered no additional or contrary proposals. In the next set of proposed jury instructions, filed June 25, 2014, the parties agreed to include the Court’s entire construction of “node.” ECF No. 320 (First Amended Joint Proposed Final Jury Instructions) at 22. Again, GPNE offered no additional or contrary proposals. The parties also agreed that the Court should instruct the jury that “For claim language where I have not provided you with any meaning, you should apply the claim language’s plain and ordinary meaning.” The parties submitted Second Amended Joint Proposed Final Jury Instructions on July 15, 2014, where the parties again agreed to the Court’s construction of node and the plain and ordinary meaning instruction. ECF No. 335, at 22. As with the previous two sets of proposed jury instructions, GPNE offered no additional or contrary proposals with respect to “node.” It was three months later, on October 13, 2014, during the second week of trial that GPNE first requested that the Court instruct the jury to apply the “plain and ordinary meaning to a person of skill in the art after reading the entire patent and file history” to the terms “pager” and “paging system.” ECF No. 461 (Third Joint Amended Proposed Jury Instructions) at 25-26. GPNE also requested additional language purporting to explain the Court’s construction of “node.” The propriety of this request is discussed further infra. Apple objected to this new, additional language. See id. at 30-31. On October 18, 2014, the Court issued tentative final jury instructions, which included the Court’s full construction of “node” and instructed the jury to apply the “plain and ordinary meaning” to unconstrued claim terms. ECF No. 501 (Final Annotated Jury Instructions [Tentative]) at 24. GPNE’s next submission, on October 19, 2014, “maintain[ed]” that its construction of “node” as “a device in a network that can transmit and receive information” was correct. Objections to Final Annotated Jury Instructions at 2. These submissions, from October 13 and October 19, 2014, were GPNE’s first objections in connection with the jury instructions on claim interpretation or on the construction of “node.” After considering GPNE’s submissions, the Court instructed the jury that “For claim language where I have not provided you with any meaning, you should apply the claim language’s plain and ordinary meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” ECF No. 529 (Final Annotated Jury Instructions) at 24. Although GPNE had belatedly objected to the Court’s construction of “node” halfway through trial, the Court overruled GPNE and used the construction of “node” adopted at the Markman stage. In sum, the Court concludes that GPNE failed to request a construction of “pager,” “paging system,” or “telephone network,” over the course of more than two years: from the Court’s August 13, 2013 Order Construing Claims until the second week of trial when GPNE first objected to the Court’s instructions on claim interpretation or the construction of “node” on October 13, 2014. Accordingly, the Court agrees with Apple that GPNE’s arguments requesting construction of “pager,” “paging system,” or “telephone network” are waived. ii. GPNE raises two new claim construction arguments in its briefing GPNE’s motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law raises three arguments related to the construction of “node”: (1) the Court improperly imported limitations from the specification or preferred embodiments into the claims; (2) the Court’s construction ignored the purpose of the invention; and (3) the Court’s construction violated principles of claim differentiation related to the ’115 Patent, the parent patent of both Asserted Patents. GPNE JMOL at 10-14. GPNE’s first argument, that the Court’s construction improperly imported limitations from the specification, is not waived, and was the central argument raised at the Markman stage. However, this argument is not persuasive, as explained supra. The latter two claim construction arguments were not raised at the Markman stage or in briefing regarding the jury instructions. GPNE provides no citation to prior efforts to raise the latter two arguments, and does not otherwise argue that it properly preserved those arguments for post-trial consideration. The Court therefore concludes GPNE’s arguments with respect to the purpose of the invention and claim differentiation are waived. See Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2009) (“[Ljitigants waive their right to present new claim construction disputes if they are raised for the first time after trial,” quoting Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Envtl. Int’l, L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed.Cir.2006)). A party may not raise new claim construction arguments for the first time in post-trial briefing. See also Cordis, 561 F.3d at 1331 (finding that district court correctly declined to consider new claim construction arguments raised in a JMOL brief). Accordingly, the Court does not address these arguments, iii. GPNE never sought reconsideration of the construction of “node” Finally, the Court notes that GPNE never sought reconsideration of the construction of “node.” Indeed, GPNE has consistently tried to avoid any limiting construction of “node” in an effort to maintain as much breadth as possible in the claims. At the Markman stage, GPNE interpreted the term “node” broadly, in an effort to capture diverse after-arising technology. See, e.g., Markman Tr. at 80:14-16 (“It’s just some broad term to describe any electronic device that transmits and receives, over the radio, .and is capable of being programmed with this unique protocol.”). In addition to smartphones and cell phones, GPNE also wanted to capture Amazon’s e-readers within the scope of “node.” See Markman Tr. at 59:13-21 (Amazon’s counsel confirming that GPNE accused Amazon e-readers that use GPRS networks). Accordingly, GPNE proposed a construction of “a device in a network that can transmit and receive information.” Opening CC Br. at 3. As evidence of the breadth of this construction, GPNE acknowledged at trial that it sought licenses from “farms,” “dairies,” “insurance companies,” “soda companies,” “butter makers,” “chocolate makers,” “bakeries,” “cell phone makers,” and “trucking companies.” See Tr. at 436:15-438:7. GPNE acknowledged that it sought licenses from these companies “because all of them conform to the GPRS standard.” Id. at 443:89. Given GPNE’s desire to maintain an overbroad construction of “node,” its arguments that the Court’s construction did not provide “fixed, unambiguous, legally operative meaning to the claim,” Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 355 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2004), are especially unpersuasive, as discussed infra. 2. The Court Did Not Leave the Scope of the Terms “Pager” and “Paging System” to the Jury GPNE’s second argument is that the Court left the scope of the term “node” to the jury, in violation of 02 Micro. GPNE JMOL Br. at 14. GPNE focuses on the terms “pager” and “paging system” within the construction of “node,” and argues that the “parties heavily contested the ‘ordinary’ meaning of ‘pager’ and ‘paging system,’ ” necessitating a construction of those terms. GPNE Reply Br. at 4. GPNE argues that the construction of “node” was not fixed because “the parties disputed fundamental questions including inter alia whether a ‘pager’ operated on a cellular network vs. a simulcast network, used low power vs. high power, and transmitted high data rates vs. low data rates.” GPNE JMOL Reply Br. at 3. Having reviewed the Federal Circuit’s statements on the specificity required in claim construction, the Court does not find this argument persuasive, and concludes that the construction of node, including the use of the terms “pager,” “paging system,” and “telephone network” provided a “fixed, unambiguous, legally operative meaning to the claim.” Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 355 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2004). At the outset, as discussed supra, the Court notes that GPNE never requested that the Court provide a more detailed construction of “pager” or “node” until well into the trial. See Third Joint Amended Proposed Jury Instructions at 25-26. This delay significantly diminishes the persuasive value of GPNE’s 02 Micro argument. Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1325 (Fed.Cir.2013) (distinguishing 02 Micro and noting that “[i]n 02 Micro, the parties disagreed during claim construction.”) (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit has held that “district courts are not (and should not be) required to construe every limitation present in a patent’s asserted claims,” O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362, especially where the parties do not raise a dispute until after the Markman stage. See Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Virginia, Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1334 (Fed.Cir.2010) (“Unlike 02 Micro, where the scope of a specific claim term was in dispute beginning at the Markman hearing and continuing throughout the trial, Verizon never identified at any time during the proceedings before the district court any specific claim term that was misconstrued or that needed further construction.”). As in ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 520 (Fed.Cir.2012), “if [GPNE] desired such a narrow definition, it could (and should) have sought a construction to that effect. In the absence of such a construction, however, the jury was free to rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of the term.” Second, the Court finds 02 Micro distinguishable. In 02 Micro, the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in failing to construe the claim limitation “only if,” because the parties’ claim construction dispute went to the scope of'the claim. 521 F.3d at 1352. More specifically, the claims in 02 Micro required that a “feedback control loop circuit control the conduction state of the switches ‘only if said feedback signal is above a predetermined threshold.’ ” Id. at 1356. The defendants’ noninfringement theory was based on the fact that the accused products’ feedback control loop circuits would briefly continue to control the conduction state of the switches even after the feedback signal fell below a predetermined threshold. Id. at 1356-57. At Markman, the defendants argued that the district court should construe “only if’ to mean either “exclusively or solely in the event that” or “never except when.” Id. at 1357. Instead, the district court declined to construe the limitation, and the parties presented expert testimony and argument to the jury “regarding whether or not the ‘only if claim language allowed exceptions.” Id. at 1365. As the parties had presented a “fundamental dispute regarding the scope of a claim term,” the district court erred as a matter of law in failing to resolve it. Id. at 1362. Here, in contrast, the Court did construe the operative claim limitation: “node.” Much of GPNE’s argument is based on ignoring the entirety of the Court’s construction. The Court did not construe “node” as “pager.” Instead, the complete construction, which was provided to the jury, is a “pager with two-way data communications capability that transmits wireless data communications on a paging system that operates independently from a telephone network.” Order Construing Claims at 18-19; Final Jury Instructions at 24. This is significant because at the Markman hearing the parties both recognized that the network issue would be central to determining whether a device was a pager. Apple’s counsel represented that “[i]f we’re setting up a construction of the term ‘pager,’ then we would look to what kind of network does that device connect to? What kind of componentry is within that device? Wfhat kind of data would it be capable of sending and receiving?” Markman Tr. at 85:2-6. The issue of how to interpret the term “pager” consistently circled back to the issue of whether the accused device “is intended to operate independent of a telephone network.” Id. at 85:21-22. Moreover, GPNE did not dispute that the additional network language would clarify what a pager is, and did not contest Apple’s argument that this was a fact issue that would turn on whether the accused devices operate independently from a telephone network. See id. at 85:10-15, 88:5-89:17. Unlike in 02 Micro, where the failure to construe a limitation materially impacted the scope of the claim, here the Court’s construction as a whole provided a clear issue of infringement for the jury to decide. Order on Summary Judgment at 8 (“The infringement question presented here, then, is whether a ‘pager’ can use GPRS and-LTE systems.”); see also Lazare Kaplan Int’l v. Photoscribe Techs., Inc., 628 F.3d 1359, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2010) (“[T]he parties’ dispute concerns factual questions relating to the test for infringement and not the legal inquiry of the appropriate scope of the [relevant] limitation.”). Third, to the extent GPNE now argues that the definition of “pager” was in dispute, the Court concludes that GPNE’s complaints do not relate to the scope of the claims, but to the application of the construed claims to the accused devices. Under these circumstances, PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351 (Fed.Cir.1998), is instructive. In PPG, the patentee alleged infringement of a glass composition. 156 F.3d at 1352. The relevant claim included the term “consisting essentially of,” which the district court construed as “the claimed glass invention has in it the ingredients that are specifically identified ... Other ingredients may also be present ... so long as those other unlisted ingredients do not have a material effect on the basic and novel characteristics of the glass.” Id. at 1354 (emphasis added). The patentee argued that whether an ingredient had a “material effect” was a matter of claim construction and should not have been put before the jury. Id. In affirming the district court’s construction and rejecting the patentee’s argument, the Federal Circuit noted that while claim construction must delineate the scope of the claimed invention, it does not mean that a court “may give a claim whatever additional precision or specificity is necessary to facilitate a comparison between the claim and the accused product.” Id. at 1355. As in PPG, the Court here construed “node” with the “specificity and precision ... warranted by the language of the claim and the evidence bearing on the proper construction.” Id. That there is “some inherent imprecision resulting from the use of the term” is a “necessary consequence of treating infringement as a question of fact,” not an indication that the Court needed to further construe its construction of “node.” In further support of this argument, GPNE cites to Apple’s opening statement, where counsel for Apple accused GPNE of “stretching their claims.” Tr. at 216:17. Apple also elicited testimony from its witness suggesting the GPNE was “stretching” the claims. See id. at 1760:2224 (Apple’s closing); id. at 1303:5-7 (Dr. Rysavy: “My assignment was to determine if ... GPNE’s pager patents were valid if they were stretched to cover cell phones.”); id. at 1387:19-20 (A. “if you stretch the pager claims to cover phones, then the GSM is prior art.”). GPNE argues that by referring to “stretching” the claims, Apple was improperly arguing claim scope. Reviewing these statements in context, however, shows that Apple was arguing to the jury that if the jury found that iPads and iPhones were pagers within the claims (i.e. if the jury found infringement), then the jury should also find that the Asserted Patents were invalid. This argument did not ask the jury to stretch or narrow the claims, but rather to be consistent in applying the maxim “[t]hat which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier.” Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537, 9 S.Ct. 389, 32 L.Ed. 738 (1889). The “stretching” statements do not suggest that the scope of the term “pager” was left to the jury. Indeed, that this is a dispute over whether the accused devices infringe rather than a dispute as to claim scope, as was the case in PPG, is evidenced by GPNE’s arguments at the summary judgment stage. In opposition to Apple’s motion for summary judgment, GPNE focused on the additional clarifying language “independently from the telephone network” in the Court’s construction. Much of GPNE’s evidence in opposition to Apple’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement involved showing that GPRS and LTE networks include paging functions that are separate from their cellular functions. See Order on Summary Judgment at 9-10 (describing GPNE’s evidence). GPNE also presented evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that “modern-day cellular networks include paging technologies that allow devices on the networks to be properly called pagers .... ” Id. at 9. In support of this argument, GPNE cited FCC documents, dictionary definitions, and testimony from Dr. Dinan. Id. at 9-10. Thus, there was no dispute at the summary judgment stage that whether the accused devices were pagers could be determined by looking to the network capabilities of the devices. After considering GPNE’s evidence, the Court denied Apple’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that “GPNE presents sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the accused devices are ‘pagers.’ ” Id. at 10. Finally, as discussed further infra, any 02 Micro issue would be harmless error. As discussed below, the jury’s verdict of noninfringement could have been based on the jury’s reasonable determination that GPNE’s sole infringement expert was not credible or on GPNE’s failure to provide adequate proof on other claim limitations, including “count value,” the “aligning/clocking signal” and “differing frequencies.” Therefore, judgment as a matter of law or a new trial would not be warranted on an 02 Micro issue. See, e.g., Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2003) (finding that jury incorrectly imported a limitation into the claims, which required reversal because the imported limitation was the only possible basis for a finding of nonin-fringement). 3. Apple Did Not Make Arguments that Improperly Narrowed the Claim Scope GPNE’s next argument is that Apple’s trial presentation focused on importing limitations into the claims in an attempt to redefine pager and paging systems. GPNE JMOL Br. at 15. GPNE argues that Apple (1) told the jury that “node” was limited to “one-way legacy beepers”; (2) Apple introduced evidence and elicited testimony that contradicted the Court’s prior Order on Summary Judgement; and (3) Apple argued prosecution history disclaimer to the jury. GPNE argues that all of this testimony adds up to Apple improperly narrowing the claim scope of “node.” Turning to GPNE’s first argument, GPNE’s suggestion that Apple limited pagers to “one-way legacy beepers” is not supported by the record. See, e.g., Tr. at 194:6 (Apple referring to the invention as a two-way pager). The only times the jury was told about legacy “beepers” was argument from GPNE’s counsel and evidence from GPNE’s expert, Dr. Dinan. In GPNE’s opening statement, its attorney argued that the patents are not limited to “very old-fashioned beepers that you used to clip on.” Id. at 183:6-7; id. at 183:17-18 (arguing that the claims are “not limited to a simple beeper-type device.”); id. at 184-1. GPNE’s counsel also elicited testimony from Dr. Dinan that the patents were not directed to “the same little Motorola beeper that I used to carry on my belt.” Tr. at 516:2; id. at 715:14-15 (“The Patent figures do not describe that little beeper that you put on your belt.”). GPNE does not cite to any testimony from Apple suggesting that the patents were limited to old-fashioned beepers. The testimony that GPNE does cite contrasts cellphones, cellular networks, pagers, and paging networks, which is proper for a jury to consider in evaluating whether the claims read onto the accused devices. For example, Apple’s counsel argued that “Apple’s phones are not pagers and they don’t work with a paging system,” id. at 211:10-11, and that “they [i.e., paging systems and telephone networks] operate in a completely different way,” id. at 215:19-20. Testimony highlighting the difference between the claims as construed and the accused devices is proper. As to GPNE’s second argument, GPNE argues that Apple’s arguments and evidence contradicted the Court’s prior orders on Summary Judgment and Claim Construction. GPNE JMOL Br. at 8-9. GPNE argues that in denying summary judgment of noninfringement, “the Court repeatedly rejected Apple’s argument that the term ‘node’ even when limited to a ‘pager’ capable of operating on a ‘paging system’ must exclude iPhones and iPads simply because they were not legacy beepers that operated on broadcast paging systems.” Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). The Court’s Order on Summary Judgment did not reject such an argument. GPNE’s evidence at summary judgment showed that a person of ordinary skill might consider a smartphone with multiple features to be a pager. Order on Summary Judgment at 10. Therefore, the Order on Summary Judgment properly found that whether the accused products “can be considered ‘pagers’ in addition to smartphones and tablets” was a question of fact for the jury. Id. GPNE’s JMOL arguments misconstrue the effect of the Court’s denial of Apple’s motion for summary judgment, and are exactly why courts typically exclude reference to prior orders under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 as presenting a substantial risk of jury confusion and unfair prejudice. See ECF No. 319 (Pretrial Order re: Motion in Limine) at 1-2; S.E.C. v. Retail Pro, Inc., No. 08CV1620-WQH-RBB, 2011 WL 589828, at *4 (S.D.Cal. Feb. 10, 2011) (granting motion in limine to exclude reference to summary judgment order). The Court’s Order on Summary Judgment did nothing more than find issues of fact for the jury. It did not resolve any fact-finding or issues of infringement in favor of GPNE. See Order on Summary Judgment at 10 (“Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the accused devices are “pagers” remains for resolution at trial.”). GPNE further faults Apple for arguing that the iPhone, which is obviously a phone, is not also a pager. Apple’s argument that the iPhone is not a combination pager-cellphone was entirely proper, as the Court’s prior rulings left that factual question of infringement for the jury. Appie’s support for its argument, including references to the prosecution history of the Asserted Patents, helped the jury to apply the plain and ordinary meaning of “node” to the accused devices, and thus was proper. See, e.g., Wahpeton Canvas Co., Inc. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1552 (Fed.Cir.1989) (affirming jury verdict of nonin-fringement as “[t]he jury had before it the prosecution history and testimony directed to” the absence of claim limitations in accused products). As to the “operates independently from a telephone network” aspect of the Court’s construction, the issue of fact for the jury was whether the GPRS and LTE networks could operate independently of the GSM network. See also Order on Summary Judgment at 8 (“The infringement question presented here, then, is whether a ‘pager’ can use GPRS and LTE systems.”). Apple never suggested that the accused devices were not nodes because the devices send voice or other data, such as text messages, over the GSM telephone network. Rather Apple presented evidence demonstrating that the GPRS and LTE data networks were not independent from the telephone networks. See, e.g., Tr. at 1145:2-18 (“Q: Do Apple products work on paging systems that operate independently from a telephone network? A: Not at all.”). Moreover, Apple was entitled to argue that regardless of whether the accused devices are phones, the devices did not have the properties that allow a pager to function on a paging system that operates independently from a telephone network. See id. Accordingly, GPNE’s suggestion that Apple’s arguments narrowed the claim scope in violation of the Court’s prior Orders mischaracterizes Apple’s arguments at trial. Third, GPNE argues that Apple improperly imported limitations into the claims and argued prosecution history disclaimer to the jury. GPNE JMOL Br. at 13. GPNE contends that Apple should not have been permitted to argue to the jury that the inventors distinguished between cell phones and pagers at the Patent Office. Id. GPNE points to testimony from Apple distinguishing cell phones and pagers, including arguments that “the inventors at GPNE told the patent office” that cell phones and pagers were different. Tr. at 215:23-216:3. The Court does not agree that the record citations to which GPNE points show that Apple argued prosecution history disclaimer to the jury. As discussed infra, the Court never held that cell phones and pagers necessarily overlap, only that they could overlap. Order ón Summary Judgment at 10. The inventors obviously recognized this in distinguishing the two and in separating their pager device and paging system from the telephone network. See, e.g., Tr. at 299:3-12 (Gabriel Wong testifying on how GPNE believed its invention was an improvement over prior art cell phones and pagers). Thus, Apple was entitled to argue that cell phones and pagers have different capabilities and characteristics based on the differences between paging systems and telephone networks, and that pagers and cellphones would be considered different to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. The trial transcript reflects that Apple used the patentee’s statements to the Patent Office to illustrate to the jury the differences between a cell phone and a pager at the time of the invention. Dr. Wilson explained how Gabriel Wong’s description of the invention corresponded to the functionality of pagers and paging systems. For example, Dr. Wilson explained how Gabriel Wong’s description of the invention as having “lower power consumption,!’ “points to a paging system rather than a cellular phone ... because cellular phones are always sending out information .... Pagers don’t do that, so the battery can last weeks.” Tr. at 1136:7-16. This was proper testimony to aid the jury in applying the claims to the accused devices. See Wahpeton Canvas, 870 F.2d at 1552. Indeed, the limitations that GPNE accuses Apple of importing into the claims, including that a pager has low data rates, high radiated power, long battery life, is lightweight, and uses simulcasting, come from the prosecution history of the Asserted Patents. See also ADX-320 (Dr. Wilson demonstrative listing differences between “paging system” and “cellular phone networks”). Specifically, Gabriel Wong’s Rule 131 Declaration to Patent Office lists the following characteristics of his paging, system: 1. Light Weight Majority of the weight in a portable system is battery, by reducing power requirement, we can achieve a lighter communication device. 2. Compact The size of a pager can be made smaller than cellular phone due to its simplify [sic] design in both the electronics and the size of the power supply needed. 3. Battery Lower power consumption. GPNECorp. 00000323. The Asserted Patents themselves also disclose the following paging system characteristics identified by Dr. Wilson: • Using FCC-allocated frequencies to communicate on a pager system. See ’492 Patent at 14:14-18. This is also found in Dr. Wong’s PTO submission. ECF No. 69-7 at GPNE-Corp. 00000314. • Transmitting at a high power range. The Asserted Patents disclose transmitting at 3 watts to 1000 watts. ’492 Patent at 14:16. Dr. Wilson testified that the high power transmission also goes to whether a pager can receive a message in an elevator or basement. Tr. at 1160:12-25. • Simulcasting a signal. Although the parties disputed the import of Figure 9 of the Asserted Patents, Dr. Wilson testified that simulcasting was a pager characteristic and Figure 9 showed a simulcasting system. Tr. at 1148:21-1149:12; 1158:1-17. In conclusion, Apple’s evidence aided the jury in applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “pager” to the accused devices. Although GPNE wished for a broader construction of node, the Court rejected the “device on a network” construction and limited node to “a pager with two-way data communications capability that transmits wireless data communications on a paging system that operates independently from a telephone network.” This construction resolved the dispute over the scope of “node” and allowed the parties to argue whether the accused devices fell within the claims. Apple won that debate, as shown by the jury’s verdict, and none of Apple’s arguments or evidence requires granting a new trial. 4.Apple Did Not Apply an Improper “Person on the Street” Standard to Claim Terms GPNE’s next argument is that Apple argued to the jury that the terms “pager,” “paging system,” and “telephone network” should be interpreted as understood by a layperson. GPNE JMOL Br. at 21. Apple argues that this argument was waived when GPNE failed to object to the testimony GPNE cites as the basis for GPNE’s argument. Apple further argues that GPNE actually introduced the “person on the street standard.” As a threshold matter, Apple is correct that it was GPNE’s expert Dr. Dinan who, on direct examination, first introduced a “person on the street” standard. Tr. at 515:25-516:2 (Dr. Dinan: “Well, of course if you go on the street and ask someone, “what is a pager?” they’re going to point you to the same little Motorola beeper that I used to carry on my belt.”). Dr. Dinan then presented further testimony on whether the accused devices were “pagers” that met the Court’s construction of “node.” Tr. at 554:1-17 (explaining that “In 1994, a person would consider a pager as a two-way data communication device”); id. at 563:1-9 (explaining that iPhones and iPads transmit and receive data). This testimony illustrated for the jury the difference, according to GPNE, between a “layperson” and a “person of ordinary skill” interpretation of the claims. On cross-examination, Apple’s counsel elicited further testimony from Dr. Dinan on the difference between a pager according to a person on the street and a node under the Court’s construction. Tr. at 664:9-17 (comparing DTX 361 (Motorola pager) to Court’s construction); Id. at 665:10-12 (comparing iPad to Court’s construction). GPNE did not object to this line of questioning, nor to Apple’s questioning on what “people” in 1993-1994 would have considered to be a pager. Id. 665:13-666:11. Moreover, the Court agrees with Apple that GPNE did not object to the testimony-cited in support of GPNE’s argument that Apple invited the jury to apply an improper standard to interpretation of claim terms. GPNE cites testimony from Dr. Dinan on cross-examination, where Apple questioned Dr. Dinan on whether “in 1993 or 1994 ... people would not have considered the iPad to be a pager?” See GPNE JMOL Br. at 21-22, citing Tr. at 665:10-667:23. GPNE made no objections to this testimony or line of questioning. See Tr. at 665:10-667:23 (showing GPNE made no objections). GPNE then cites to testimony that Apple elicited from non-technical witness, including GPNE’s- damages expert, Mr. Dansky, and Apple’s Senior Director of Product Marketing, Mr. Casanova, on whether the accused devices were “pagers.” GPNE JMOL Br. at 22, citing Tr. at 945-947 (Apple questioning Mr. Dansky on whether he considered the accused devices to be “pagers”); Id. at 1079-80 (Apple questioning Mr. Casanova on whether the iPhone 4 and iPhone 5 were pagers). Although GPNE now argues that this testimony encouraged the jury to interpret claim terms from the perspective of a “person on the street” instead of a person of ordinary skill, the record shows that GPNE did not object to this testimony. In addition to its “person on the street” argument, GPNE also contends that Dr. Wilson failed to apply the “ordinary meaning to one skilled in the art in light of the patent and file history from the time period of the invention.” Mot. at 21. At trial, Dr. Wilson testified that she reviewed FCC and ETSI standard setting documents -from beyond the 1993-1994 time-frame and referenced those documents. Tr. at 1160-61, 1169. GPNE objected to the FCC and ETSI documents on relevancy grounds, arguing that the standard setting documents post-date the patents, and thus are not relevant to the infringement analysis. In its motion, GPNE now argues that Dr. Wilson’s reference to the FCC and ETSI documents is proof that Dr. Wilson applied an improper standard to support her opinion that paging systems exclude cellular data networks. However, Dr. Wilson confirmed on cross-examination that she used the proper “person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention” standard in interpreting the claims. Tr. at 1266:2-6. Moreover, the Court overruled GPNE’s objections to the FCC and ETSI documents because the documents were relevant to the question of infringement, as evidenced by GPNE’s own reliance on similar FCC documents in GPNE’s summary judgment briefing. See Order on Summary Judgment at 10 (discussing GPNE’s evidence from the FCC). In sum, none of the testimony cited by GPNE in GPNE’s JMOL briefing introduced error regarding the proper interpretation of the claims. Instead, the testimony shed light on the factual question of whether the accused devices met the claim limitation “node.” The bulk of Dr. Dinan’s testimony involved comparing the asserted claims to the GPRS and LTE standards, which is an issue of fact for the jury. Dr. Wilson’s testimony involved comparing the claims to the accused devices. In support of her testimony, Dr. Wilson relied on documents from standard setting bodies, on which GPNE also relied, and on FCC documents to aid her in comparing the accused devices to the claims as construed. This was proper testimony for the jury to consider in doing its infringement analysis. Finally, any error in Apple’s trial presentation was cured by the jury instructions, which as discussed infra, instructed the jury to apply a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention standard. Final Jury Instructions. at 23. The Court must assume that the jury followed the instructions, and so any error as to the testimony elicited about a layperson’s understanding of the claim terms was harmless. Deck v. Jenkins, 768 F.3d 1015, 1034 (9th Cir.2014) (“[A] jury is presumed to follow a judge’s instructions. This is true even when a party provides contrary instructions.”) (citation and quotation omitted). 5. The Court Properly Instructed the Jury GPNE’s final argument as to node is that the Court failed to properly instruct the jury when the Court did not include GPNE’s requested jury instructions. GPNE JMOL Br. at 23-24. GPNE raises three points: (1) the Court erred in declining to include a supplemental instruction on “node”; (2) the Court should have instructed the jury to consider the entire file history of the Asserted Patents prior to deciding infringement; and (3) the Court’s instruction did not tell the jury to apply plain and ordinary meaning to terms within a construction, i.e., “pager.” Turning to GPNE’s first argument, GPNE requested the following instruction: The Court’s construction does not prohibit a “node” from being both a pager and a telephone.- A pager could transmit certain communications on a paging system that’ operates independently from a telephone network while engaging in other types of communication on the telephone network. 580 (GPNE JMOL Reply Br.). Third Amended Joint Proposed Jury Instructions at 25; Dkt. No. - 505 at 1. As discussed supra, the Court’s construction of “node” adopted at Markman was correct. GPNE’s further instructions on “node” would have expanded the Court’s construction without providing any additional clarity to the jury. More specifically, GPNE’s first sentence, to instruct the jury that a “node!’ can be both a pager and a telephone, was unnecessary as Apple did not suggest that if the accused devices included both telephone and pager components the devices could not infringe. Instead, Apple argued that the accused devices would not be considered “pagers” by one of ordinary skill in the art, and that the accused devices did not operate independently of a telephone system. See GPNE JMOL Opp. at 23. GPNE’s second sentence, to instruct the jury that “[a] pager could transmit certain communications on a paging system that operates independently from a telephone network while engaging in other types of communication on the telephone network” was duplicative of the Court’s construction, which already specified that a pager operates independent from a telephone network. Furthermore, the jury heard extensive testimony on how the GPRS and LTE networks interact with other networks. See, e.cg., Tr. at 692-69, 1277-84. It was not necessary to further instruct the jury as to what “operates independently” means. As discussed infra, Apple presented substantial evidence that the GPRS and LTE networks do not operate independently from a telephone network, which was evidence on which the jury was entitled to rely in finding noninfringement. Accordingly, neither of GPNE’s requested instructions was necessary to correct an improper argument about the scope of the term “node,” and any error in failing to give the requested instructions was harmless. “A jury verdict will be set aside, based on erroneous jury instructions, if the party seeking to set.aside the verdict can establish that those instructions were legally erroneous, and that the errors had prejudicial effect.” Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 641 (Fed.Cir.2011) (quoting NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2005), abrogated on other grounds by Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed.Cir.2012) (en banc)). Here, as GPNE has not shown a prejudicial effect from the instructions, the Court will not set aside