Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, United States District Judge Congress has authorized the Department of Energy (“the DOE”) to offer direct financial support to the manufacturers of clean energy vehicles and related components. See 42 U.S.C. § 17013 (2012). In accordance with this statutory mandate, the DOE administers various loan programs, including the Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing (“ATVM”) Loan Program, which is designed to provide direct loans to manufacturers of energy-efficient vehicles. The DOE also administers the Section 1703 Loan Guarantee Program (“LG Program”), pursuant to which the agency guarantees loans for advanced technology projects that result in the avoidance or reduction of air pollutants. Plaintiff XP Vehicles, Inc. (“XPV’) is a now-dissolved California-based corporation that applied to the DOE in November of 2008 for an ATVM loan for the manufacture of a light-weight, energy-efficient sport utility vehicle. XPV partnered with Plaintiff Limnia, Inc. (“Limnia”), a Delaware-based corporation that developed an energy storage system to power XPV’s proposed vehicle. Limnia, too, applied to the DOE for loan assistance, seeking both an ATVM loan and an LG Program loan guarantee in February of 2009. The DOE denied both Plaintiffs’ loan requests, and XPV and Limnia have now filed a seven-count complaint against the DOE, its Secretary Ernest Moniz in his official capacity, former Secretary of Energy Steven Chu in his individual capacity, and former Director of the ATVM Loan Program La-chlan Seward in his individual capacity (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that the DOE’s decisionmaking process with respect to these loan programs was infused with cronyism and political favoritism and that their applications were denied unfairly and arbitrarily. In essence, Plaintiffs maintain that, instead of reviewing applications impartially and on the merits, Defendants used the ATVM Loan Program and LG Program to reward political patrons, in violation of the Constitution’s due process and equal protection guarantees and in contravention of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2012). Before this Court at present are two motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint: one from the DOE and Moniz (“the Official Capacity Defendants”), and one from Chu and Seward (the “Individual Capacity Defendants”). The Official Capacity Defendants make various threshold jurisdictional arguments, including sovereign immunity, lack of standing, and ripeness; on the merits, they argue both that XPV lacks the capacity to sue because it is a dissolved corporation and that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which, relief can be granted. The Individual Capacity Defendants adopt the Official Capacity Defendants’ dismissal arguments, and further argue that XPV’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations; that no Bivens action exists for the alleged constitutional violations; and that, even if a remedy did exist, Chu and Seward are protected by qualified immunity. As explained further below, this Court concludes that, although it does have jurisdiction over the claims Plaintiffs make in their complaint, all of XPV’s claims and most of Limnia’s claims must be dismissed in their entirety. XPV’s claims against the Official Capacity Defendants must be dismissed because, as a dissolved corporation, XPV does not have the capacity to sue for injunctive relief, and XPV’s claims against the Individual Capacity Defendants must be dismissed because no Bivens action exists that will permit XPV to recover monetary damages from those defendants. Limnia’s constitutional claims fail in a similar fashion, both because there is no Bivens action and also because Limnia has not alleged facts that are sufficient to state a constitutional claim. But Limnia’s two APA claims — which arise out of the denial of its ATVM loan application, on the one hand, and the processing of its LG Program application, on the other — survive the pending motions to dismiss because Limnia has adequately alleged that the DOE’s denials of Limnia’s ATVM Loan Program and LG Program applications were the result of arbitrary and capricious agency action in violation of the APA. Consequently, the Official Capacity Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and the Individual Capacity Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be GRANTED in full. A separate order consistent with this opinion will follow. I. BACKGROUND A. The DOE’s Implementation Of The ATVM Loan Program And The LG Program 1. The ATVM Loan Program In 2007, Congress enacted the Energy Independence and Security Act (“EISA”), Pub.L. 110-140, § 136, 121 Stat. 1492, 1514-16, with the express purpose of “movfing] the United States toward greater energy independence and security” and “increas[ing] the efficiency of products, buildings, and vehiclesL]” Id, at 1492. To this end, the EISA imposed heightened fuel economy standards, see id. § 102, and it also introduced several new financial assistance programs designed to further the objective of promoting the efficient use of energy resources, see, e.g., id. § 131 (providing grants to encourage the use of electric vehicles); id. § 135 (providing loan guarantees for the domestic manufacture of vehicle batteries). The Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing Loan Program — referred to throughout this opinion as “the ATVM Loan Program” — was one of these initiatives. See id. § 136. Under the ATVM Loan Program, the DOE provides a total of $25 billion in direct loans to the manufacturers of “advanced technology vehicles” and the “qualifying components” of such vehicles, so long as these manufacturers are engaged in certain eligible activities. 42 U.S.C. § 17013(d)(1). The EISA specifies that ATVM loan applicants must submit applications to the Secretary of the DOE, and that upon receiving such loan applications, “[t]he Secretary shall select eligible projects” using criteria listed in the statute. Id. § 17013(d)(2)-(3). Specifically, by statute, a successful “award recipient”— (A) is financially viable without the receipt of additional Federal funding associated with the proposed project; (B) will provide sufficient information to the Secretary for the Secretary to ensure that the qualified investment is expended efficiently and effectively; and (C)has met such other criteria as may be established and published by the Secretary. 42 U.S.C. § 17013(d)(3). Furthermore, under the DOE’s implementing regulations, an ATVM loan applicant must be “[a]n automobile manufacturer that can demonstrate an improved fuel economy” or “[a] manufacturer of a qualifying compo-nente,]” 10 C.F.R. § 611.100(a) (2015), and the regulations also require such applicants to provide, inter alia, a description of “the nature and scope of the proposed project[,]” which must include “key milestones and [the] location of the project” and a “detailed explanation of how the proposed project qualifies” for loan assistance, id. § 611.101. The DOE has adopted a two-step procedure for evaluating ATVM loan applications. First, the agency engages in “eligibility screening” — ie., it determines whether the application contains the required information; whether the applicant satisfies the eligibility criteria; and whether the terms of the requested loan comport with the applicable statutory requirements. Id. § 611.103(a). The regulations state in no uncertain terms that the DOE “can at any time reject an application, in whole or in part, that does not meet these [eligibility] requirements.” Id. If the application survives eligibility screening, the DOE will then move on to the second stage of the application process, which consists of a substantive merits review of the application. Id. § 611.103(b). The regulations establish that this review will be based on factors- such as the project’s “technical. merit” and whether the proposed loan conditions adequately protect the government investment by, providing sufficient security, priority of lien position, and percentage of the project to bp financed with the loan. Id. Significantly, the-regulations that govern the ATVM Loan Program also state that “[o]nly an Agreement executed by a duly authorized DOE Contracting Officer can contractually obligate the government to make a loan” under the program. Id. § 611.105(a).. And the regulations make clear that the “DOE- is not bound by oral representations made during, the Application stage, or- during any negotiation process.” Id. § 611.105(b). - 2. The LG Program The Section 1703 Loan Guarantee Program was established as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. See Pub.L. No. 109-58, § 1701-04, 119 Stat. 594, 1117-22 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16511-14). The statute is aimed at promoting new and improved technologies that “avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases[,]” 42 U.S.C. § 16513(a), and it authorizes the DOE to guarantee -loans for certain environmentally-friendly, energy-efficient projects, id. Among the categories of projects that are specified as qualifying for this loan program are “[hjydrogen fuel cell technology” and “production facilities for the manufacture of fuel efficient vehicles or parts of those vehicles, including electric drive vehicles[.]” Id. § 16513(b). Like the regulations that govern the ATVM Loan1 Program, the LG Program regulations set out a comprehensive but non-exhaustive list of “informátion and materials” that must be submitted as part of an application, including “[a] description of how and to what measurable extent the project avoids, reduces, or sequesters air pollutants and/or anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, ... [a] description of the nature and scope of the proposed project, ... [and a] detailed description of the overall financial plan for the proposed project[.]” 10 C.F.R. § 609.6(b). Moreover, similar to the ATVM. Loan Program, the regulations specify that “[o]nly a Loan Guarantee Agreement executed by a duly authorized DOE Contracting Officer can contractually obligate DOE to guarantee loans or - other debt obligations^]” id. § 609.10(a), and that the “DOE is not 'bound by- oral representations made” at any stage in the application process, id. § 609.10(b). However, unlike the ATVM Loan Program application process, the LG Program regulations require “[pjayment of [an] Application filing fee” as part of an ,LG Program application, and the regulations specifically state that the “DOE will not consider any Application complete” until the application fee is paid. Id. § 609.6(b)(2), (c). Moreover, LG Program applications that satisfy all of the applicable requirements are ultimately subjected to “a competitive process” in which all applications are evaluated according to a series of factors and compared to each other. Id. § 609.7(a)-(b). To facilitate this process, prior to accepting applications for a loan guarantee!! the DOE issues public solicitations for specific types dfi projects that it is loóking to support, and it entertains LG Program applications pursuant to that solicitation. Id. § 609.3(a). For example, Plaintiff Limnia submitted the LG Program application that is at issue in the instant ■ case in response to a DOE solicitation in June of 2008 for loan guarantee applications related to “projects in the United States that employ energy efficiency, renewable energy, and advanced transmission and distribution technologies[.]” U.S. Dep’t of Energy, DE-FOA-0000005, Loan Guarantee Solicitation Announcement .2 (2008) (“LG Solicitation Announcement”). The solicitation set a deadline of February 26, 2009, for any such applications, and noted that “[a]ll applicants must remit twenty-five percent (25%) of the application fee ... upon submission of their applications to [the] DOE.” Id. at 7. The solicitation also provided a schedule to determine the particular fee amount for each applicant, advising applicants “to make proper arrangements to assure that Treasury receives such fees on behalf of DOE by the dates specified[,]” and including instructions for the wire transfer. Id, at .9; see also id. at 59 (providing details for wire transfer). B. The Facts Of The Instant Case Plaintiffs’ complaint makes various assertions of fact regarding the circumstances surrounding the DOE’s consideration and processing of XPV’s ATVM loan application and Limnia’s ATVM Loan Program and LG Program applications. These allegations, many of which.are related below, must be accepted as true for the purpose of evaluating Defendants’ motions to dismiss. 1. XPV’s ATVM Loan Application XPV is a now-dissolved “green technology” company that applied for an ATVM loan in December of 2008, seeking to fund the research and development of “an advanced technology, family-friendly SIJV-style vehicle[.]” (Am. Compl., EOF No. 26, ¶¶ 1, 3,14.) XPV’s application asserted that its proposal fulfilled the requirements of the DOE’s ATVM Loan Program because XPV planned to used “polymer plastics and skinned expanded foam-pressure membranes to replace metal doors, body panels, hoods and roofs on a lightweight alloy frame[,]” and in so doing, XPV would' produce an extremely light-weight vehicle that was also safe in operation because it employed “wraparound, pre-deployed ‘airbag1 ” technology. (Id. ¶ 17.) According to the complaint, on December 2, 2008, Defendant. Seward — the director of the ATVM Loan Program at that point in time — “acknowledged receipt” of XPV’s application and “requested additional information[,]” which XPV provided. (Id. ¶22.) Then, on December 31, 2008, Seward allegedly sent a letter to, XPV indicating that XPV’s applicatiop was “substantially complete” (id. ¶ 22; Ex. 2 to Am. Compl., EOF No. 26-1, at 11), which led XPV. to believe that the DOE had deemed XPV a “qualified applicant” such that the agency “would begin processing XPV’s ATVM Loan Program application ... no later than the end. of December 2008, and that the review would take a matter of weeks, consistent with normal commercial lending practices” (Am.Compl. ¶¶ 23-24). Instead, XPV .alleges that its application was “‘set-aside’ in favor of applications from politically-connected government cronies [because] Defendants had ‘fixed’ the ATVM Loan Program process to benefit political donors” (id. ¶26), as explained further below. The complaint asserts that, beginning in the spring of 2009 — approximately four months after XPV submitted its ATVM loan application — XPV had a series of interactions with the DOE relating to the status of XPV’s ATVM loan application. First, Plaintiffs allege that, on April 23, 2009, the DOE’s Chief of Staff and Senior Investment Officer, Jason Gerbsman, notified XPV that its “substantially complete” application had “been assigned to both a technical eligibility and merit review team, as well as a financial viability analysis team[,]” and that “[t]he technical team is very close to finishing their evaluations on both eligibility and project merit, and the financial team will be launching a more detailed and interactive due' diligence phase of the XPV application review very soon.” (Id. ¶ 27 (alteration omitted).) This communication was allegedly followed by an offer of an in-person meeting to “discuss ‘next steps’ ” (id. ¶ 28); then, on May 28, 2009, Gerbsman purportedly met with an XPV representative, at which point Gerbsman allegedly told XPV that “‘everything looked good’ ” and that its application was “ ‘fully compliant and [had] passed technical review1 ” (id. ¶¶ 29). Furthermore, according to the complaint, the DOE also declined to provide XPV with the same types of “special assistance” with the application process that it gave XPV’s competitors during this period because, “as DOE staff put it, XPV’s application was so good that special assistance was unnecessary.” (Id. ¶ 31; see also id. ¶ 36 (alleging that the DOE staff made optimistic statements to XPV over a seven-week period beginning in June of 2009).) Notwithstanding the reassurances that members of the DOE staff allegedly provided to XPV during the application process, the DOE denied XPV’s ATVM loan request on August 21, 2009. (Id. ¶37.) The rejection letter, which Defendant Seward signed (and which XPV has filed as an exhibit to the complaint) asserted that the DOE was “not in a position to [make an] award [to] every eligible application[,]” and suggested that the XPV’s application did not pass the DOE’s merit review. (Ex. 3 to Am. Compl., ECF No. 26-1, at 13; see also Am. Compl. ¶38.) Seward further explained generally that “the program [must] choose applications that are mostly likely to use the limited loan proceeds in a way that will best achieve the goals of the program.” (Ex. 3 to Am. Compl. at 13.) XPV alleges that it immediately requested both a statement regarding the specific grounds for the agency’s denial of its application and a copy of the DOE’s merit review documents. (Am.Compl. ¶¶ 39, 40.) XPV also allegedly placed a phone call to the DOE within five days of the denial (id. ¶42); according to the complaint, the DOE staff person with whom the XPV representative spoke pulled the company’s application file and orally provided myriad reasons for the denial, none of which XPV believed was valid (id. ¶¶43-45). The complaint also alleges that, during this phone conversation, Defendant Seward entered the room and cut the conversation off abruptly, directing the staff person to tell XPV that the DOE would send a letter to XPV outlining more fully the reasons that its loan application was denied. (Id, ¶ 52.) The complaint alleges that no such letter was forthcoming. (Id. ¶ 53.) Thus, on September 21, 2009 — approximately one month after the denial letter issued — XPV sent the DOE a written request for reconsideration of the denial of its ATVM loan application. (Id. ¶ 54; Ex. 4 to Am. Compl., ECF No. 26-1, at 15.) In this written request, XPV pointed out that the reasons for the denial that the DOE staffer had provided on the phone were contrary to the information in XPV’s application (Ex. 4 to Am. Compl. at 15), and XPV also asked the DOE to respond to a list of fifteen specific questions pertaining to its review of XPV’s application (id. at 16-18). Approximately one month later, on October 28, 2009, Seward responded in writing to XPV’s reconsideration request, providing a more detailed explanation for the denial of XPV’s application. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55-63; Ex. 5 to Am. Compl., ECF No. 26-1, at 21.) The Seward letter did not claim that XPV had failed to meet any of the eligibility requirements set forth in the ATVM Loan Program’s regulations (Am. Compl. ¶ 64), and it thus seemingly addressed the merits of XPV’s proposal. Seward explained that XPV’s proposed technology “appeared from the application to be at a development stage and not yet ready for commercialization[,]” which was a “significant weakness[.]” (Ex. 5 to Am. Compl. at 21.) Moreover, the project’s “impact on fuel economy ... was determined to be weak”; the storage system for hydrogen was “unproven and potentially impractical for a consumer vehicle”; and the company’s “claims for reductions in petroleum use ... were deemed to be unrealistic!.]” (Id.) 2. Limnia’s ATVM Loan Application Limnia is a green technology company that, unlike XPV, is still in operation. (Id. '¶¶2-8.) Limnia filed a loan application through the ATVM Loan Program in February of 2009 to produce an “advanced technology vehicle energy storage system” — i.e., a vehicle battery. (Id. ¶68.) Limnia and XPV are sister companies, and Limnia’s proposed energy storage system was the power source for XPV’s proposed lightweight SUV. (Id. ¶¶ 3,12, 68.) The DOE rejected Limnia’s ATVM application on April 10, 2009, on the ground that Limnia’s energy storage system was a stand-alone charging station, not equipment to be installed in a vehicle, and thus was not a “qualifying component” under 42 U.S.C. § 17013(d)(1). (Id. ¶ 69; Ex. 6 to Am. Compl,, ECF No. 26-1, at 24.) Lim-nia requested reconsideration of this determination, noting that its energy storage system did, in fact, have to be installed inside a vehicle in order to be used, and that it actually was designed for this purpose. (Id. ¶70.) On May 13, 2009, the DOE rejected Limnia’s ATVM loan application for a second time, giving Limnia the same reason that it had proffered in the first denial. (Id. ¶71.) The DOE did, however, request further information from Limnia that would allow it to reevaluate Limnia’s application. (Id.; Ex. 8 to Am. Compl., ECF No. 26-1, at 30-31.) According to the complaint, Limnia responded to this letter on June 3, 2009, by providing the requested information and seeking reconsideration of its application once again. (Am.Compl. ¶72.) Plaintiffs allege that, as of the time the instant complaint was filed, the DOE had not responded to Lim-nia’s request for another review. (Id. ¶¶ 71-73.) 3. Limnia’s LG Program Application Around the same time that Limnia applied for an ATVM loan, it also applied for an LG Program loan guarantee, pursuant to the aforementioned solicitation that the DOE published in June of 2008. (Id. ¶ 77.) Plaintiffs allege that, prior to Limnia’s submission of its application in February of 2009, then-Secretary Chu had stated in a conference call that the graduated LG Program fees “were unduly onerous and burdensome[,]” and had “promised to waive the application fee.” (Id. ¶76.) Due to that representation, Limnia did not submit the fee (or any portion thereof) along with its LG Program application. (ZdL ¶ 77.) According to the complaint, on February 26, 2009 — the day of the application deadline — a DOE official called Limnia to warn that the DOE would not, consider Limnia’s application .without the fee. (Id. If 78.) Limnia was. unable to remit the fee by the midnight deadline (id. ¶ 79), and according to the complaint, the following day, another DOE official told Limnia that there were “a few days of flexibility’,’ to send in the fee, and promised to send written instructions for sending the fee (id. ¶¶ 80-81). That official allegedly never got back to. Limnia, despite Limnia’s best efforts to follow up. (Id.) Then, on April 9, 2009, the DOE sent Limnia an email informing Lim-nia that its LG Program application would not be considered because Limnia failed to pay the-required application fee. (Id. ¶ 82; Ex. 10 to Am. Compl., EOF No. 26-1, at 89.) 4. Plaintiffs’ Allegations Regarding Political Favoritism And The GAO Report At the heart of the complaint is Plaintiffs’ contention that the various reasons the DOE provided for denying XPV’s and Limnia’s loan applications were “baseless pretexts” for political cronyism. (Am. CompU 118(i).) In a, nutshell, Plaintiffs assert that “[politics and political pressure infected [the ATVM and LG] programs, shaping, in whole or in part,, the judgment of the agency’s ultimate decision- makers, including Defendants Chu and Seward, their staffs, advisors and consultants.” (Id. ¶ 84.) Plaintiffs maintain that they became aware of the inequitable manner in which the agency was operating these loan programs in a variety of ways — and even pri- or, to the denials at issue. For example, according to the complaint, Plaintiffs first got wind of possible unfair dealing during a June 2009 conversation with an unnamed corporate executive, who allegedly said his company had “been ‘screwed over’ by DOE” and asserted that DOE employees were “playing favorites with government money.” (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.) Plaintiffs also allegedly watched as the DOE appeared to provide XPV’s competitors Tesla Motors, Inc. and Fisker Motors, Inc. “special assistance” with the application process — e.g., giving Fisker “extraordinary access to DOE staff time” and providing “offices and conference rooms in DOE’s headquarters at no charge” — while denying XPV these same resources. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.) Additionally, Plaintiffs claim that a member of Tesla’s board, who was also a “major campaign contributions ‘bundler’ for the White House[,]” was on “a key DOE advisory board” (id. ¶ 91), and another “accomplished campaign contribution ‘bundler’” was a “Tesla investor and advisor” who had a “primary role” in the DOE’s Loan Program Office (id. ¶92). According to the complaint, the political contributions of these two “patrons” purportedly resulted in Tesla’s “favorable treatment” by the DOE with respect to the loan application process (id. ¶ 93); therefore, Plaintiffs suggest that it was no wonder that the DOE ultimately “gave Tesla $465 million of taxpayer funds at an interest rate of 1.6% and on extremely favorable, below-market terms[.]” (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiffs also allege that similar preferential treatment was afforded to Fisker, a company whose “patrons” allegedly had made large donations to the Obama campaign and other Democratic causes. (Id. ¶ 100.) The complaint suggests that these donations effectively purchased political influence, which was allegedly a “material factor[ ]” in the DOE’s decision to grant an ATVM loan,to Fisker despite a litany of Fisker failures. (Id. ¶¶ 101,103-09.) Plaintiffs also point to a number of emails from DOE officials, and assert that this correspondence indicates that the DOE was under, political pressure to approve particular loan applications. (See id. ¶¶ 112-13.) For example, one email suggests that the DOE’s review of a loan applicant was sped up as a result of pressure from then-House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer. (See Ex. 19 to Am. Compl., ECF No. 26-1, at 200.) Another email indicates that the White House made an effort to encourage the DOE to hasten review of another loan application. ■ (See Ex. 14 to Am. Compl., ECF No. 26-1, at 189.) Plaintiffs claim that these and other emails demonstrate that “Defendants bent the rules for political fav.orites[.]” (Am. ComplV 113.) ' Finally, Plaintiffs insist that this anecdotal evidence of political favoritism regarding the DOE’s loan practices was confirmed in February of 2011 and March of 2012, when the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued two reports regarding the DOE’s implementation of the ATVM Loan Program and LG Programs. (See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Department of Energy: Advanced Technology Vehicle Loan Program Implementation Is Under Way, But Enhanced Technical Oversight And Performance Measures Are Needed (“GAO ATVM Report”), Ex. 11 to Am. Compl., ECF No. 26-1, at 42-80; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, DOE Loan Guarantees: Further Actions Are Needed to Improve Tracking and Review of Applications (“GAO LG Program Report”), Ex. 13 to Am. Compl., ECF No. 26-1, at 130-187.) The GAO ATVM Report, which is attached to plaintiffs’ complaint, concluded that the ATVM. Loan Program had successfully “injected significant: funds into the U.S. automqtive -industry” (GAO ATVM Report at 70), but the report also flagged two areas of concern: first, that the DOE lacked fhe necessary technical expertise to oversee the progress of companies that had received ATVM loans (id.), and second, that the DOE lacked certain “quantifiable performance measures[,]” particularly in the context of fuel economy standards (id.' at 70-71). Both of these GAO-identified deficiencies related to the back-end of the ATVM Loan Program— ie., they were concerns regarding the DOE’s monitoring of successful' loan applicants, rather than its selection of loan recipients in the first place. By contrast, the GAO’s LG Program report focused 'on implementation problems related to the application stage. The GAO noted that the DOE 'did not have access to consolidated data about past and present LG Program applications, which made it difficult for the DOE to review and identify problems within the application process. (GAO LG Program Report at 152-54.) Additionally, the GAO found that although the DOE had established a comprehensive process for reviewing and granting LG Program applications, that process had been applied inconsistently in practice. (Id. at 155.) For example, the GAO had reviewed the application process for a number of successful applicants, and it found that the agency’s actual application'review practices' differed in at léast one respect from the process outlined in the DOE’s LG Program guidance manuals in almost every case. {See-id. at 156-60.) The. GAO acknowledged the DOE’s eontention that these apparent inconsistencies were caused by out-of-date manuals and were not due to any error or intentional action on the part of DOE staff, but the GAO cautioned that the disconnect between the published review processes and the actual review practices could undermine the DOE’s assurance that all LG Program applicants are “treated ... consistently and equitably.” (Id. at 163.) The instant complaint seizes on the GAO’s critiques, repeatedly referencing the two reports and asserting that the GAO’s conclusions support Plaintiffs’ cronyism accusations. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 85-88, 110-11.) According to Plaintiffs, the problems that the GAO identified in the ATVM report in particular — e.g., the DOE’s lack of technical expertise and its use of inadequate performance measures in evaluating the performance of successful ATVM applicants — “facilitated the politicization of DOE’s loan programs.” {Id. ¶ 88.) And, in Plaintiffs’ view, the GAO’s LG Program report establishes that the DOE treated applicants inconsistently, by “favoring some [applicants] and disadvantaging others[.]” {Id. ¶ 111.) C. Procedural History Plaintiffs filed the initial complaint in the instant case on January 10, 2013; an amended complaint followed, on August 20, 2013. Plaintiffs bring seven claims for relief: two Fifth Amendment Due Process claims (one against the DOE and Muniz, ie., the “Official Capacity Defendants,” and another against Chu and Seward, ie., the “Individual Capacity Defendants”); two Fifth Amendment Equal Protection claims (also one against each of the two defendant types); and three APA claims (one brought by XPV related to the DOE’s processing of its ATVM loan application, and two brought by Limnia related to the agency’s consideration of each of its two loan applications). With respect to the four constitutional claims, Plaintiffs contend that the DOE’s failure to engage in a fair merits review of Plaintiffs’ applications and its improper consideration of political contributions and influence resulted in the deprivation of a constitutionally-protected property interest — the requested ATVM loans— and subjected Plaintiffs to discriminatory treatment, in violation of their Fifth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. (See id. ¶¶ 130-32, 145, 148; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 121-36 (Claim 1); id. ¶¶ 137-141 (Claim 2); id. ¶¶ 142-48 (Claim 3); id. ¶¶ 149-154 (Claim 4).) As noted, Plaintiffs make these constitutional claims against both groups of Defendants, requesting injunc-tive relief with respect to the Official Capacity Defendants and seeking $225 million in damages from the Individual Capacity Defendants for these alleged civil rights violations (id. at 32-33). As for the APA claims, Plaintiffs argue that the Official Capacity Defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously when the DOE denied XPV’s ATVM loan application (id. ¶¶ 155-60 (Claim 5)), Limnia’s ATVM loan application (id, ¶¶ 161-66 (Claim 6)), and Limnia’s LG Program application (id. ¶¶ 167-71 (Claim 7)). Plaintiffs allege that the DOE’s rejection of each application constituted “final agency action” for the purposes of the APA (id. ¶¶ 156, 162, 168), and that its decision making process was “impermissibly infected with political pressure, which shaped, in whole or in part,” the ultimate agency decision (id. ¶¶ 157, 163, 169). Plaintiffs seek an order declaring that their loan applications were wrongfully denied and directing the DOE to reconsider their applications. (Id. at 33.) On September 18,2013, Defendants filed two separate motions to dismiss — one on behalf of the Official Capacity Defendants and the other on behalf of the Individual Capacity Defendants. (See Official Capacity Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Off. Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 28; Individual Fed. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss & Inc. Mem. of Law (“Indiv. Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 27.) These motions seek dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendants’ first line of attack challenges this Court’s jurisdiction to reach the merits of a number of Plaintiffs’ claims. First, Defendants argue that, to the extent that Plaintiffs are attempting to recover monetary damages against a government agency or government officials in their official capacity, such damages are barred by sovereign immunity. (See Official Capacity Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Off. Defs.’ Mot. (“Off. Defs.’ Mem.”), ECF No. 28, at 19-20.) Defendants also argue that Limnia’s ATVM Loan Program claims (both the constitutional and the APA variety) are unripe (see id. at 23-27), and that both Plaintiffs lack standing to bring certain claims (see id. at 20-23, 27-28). With respect to the merits of Plaintiffs’ four constitutional claims, Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for a violation of their Fifth Amendment rights to due process or equal protection. (Off. Defs.’ Mem. at 30-33; Indiv. Defs.’ Mot. at 43-47.) Defendants also argue that XPV lacks the capacity to sue for injunctive relief. (See Off. Defs.’ Mem. at 28-29; Indiv. Defs.’ Mot. at 25 n.16.) And the Individual Capacity Defendants argue that Plaintiffs constitutional claims against them are barred by the statute of limitations (see Indiv. Defs.’ Mot, at 25-29); that a Bivens action (permitting the recovery of damages from public officials for constitutional violations) has not yet been established in this -context and should not be extended to encompass Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims (see id. at 29-31); and that, in any event, the Individual Capacity Defendants are protected from liability by qualified immunity (id. at 41-43). Finally, with respect to Plaintiffs’ APA claims in particular, the Official Capacity Defendants assert that there has been no final agency action with respect to Limnia’s ATVM loan application (see Off. Defs.’ Mem. at 29-30), and that Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a violation of the APA with respect to Limnia’s LG Program application (see id. at 33-35). This Court held oral argument on Defendants’ motions to dismiss on April 3, 2014, and it took the motions under advisement at that time. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Motions To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1) The defense of sovereign immunity'relates to a federal court’s jurisdiction, see Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C.Cir.2003); thus, a request for dismissal bn sovereign immunity grounds is properly evaluated under Rule 12(b)(1), see Mullen v. Bureau of Prisons, 843 F.Supp.2d 112, 116 (D.D.C.2012). Similarly, when a plaintiff lacks standing, or when the plaintiff s claims are not ripe, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is- the proper course. See Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“[T]he defect of standing is a defect-in subject matter jurisdiction.”); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 825 F.Supp.2d 142, 154 (D.D.C.2011) (“The issue of ripeness falls under Rule 12(b)(1).”). In response to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff bears the burden- of establishing - jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Moran v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 820 F.Supp.2d 48, 53 (D.D.C.2011) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)); Halcomb v. Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms of the U.S. Senate, 209 F.Supp.2d 175, 176 (D.D.C.2002). The court “may consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.” Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 104 F.Supp.2d 18, 22 (D.D.C.2000); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C.Cir.2005). Moreover, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint-and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, see Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C.Cir.2008), but it need not “accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual allegations[,]” Rann v. Chao, 154 F.Supp.2d 61, 64 (D.D.C.2001). Furthermore, “[.t]he court must -scrutinize the plaintiffs allegations. more closely when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than it would under a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F.Supp.2d 59, 65 (D.D.C.2011). B. Legal Standard On A Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint[.]” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Plausibility “is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant •has acted unlawfully.” Id. The plausibility standard • is satisfied “when the plaintiff pleads-factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “[W]hile ‘detailed factual allegations’ are not necessary, the plaintiff must provide ‘more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.’” Schmidt, 826 F.Supp.2d at 65 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937). In deciding whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally does not consider. matters beyond the pleadings, which differs from the court’s treatment of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), See Ward v. D.C. Dep’t of Youth. Rehab. Servs., 768 F.Supp.2d 117, 119-20 (D.D.C.2011). In the Rule 12(b)(6) context, the court only considers “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint,, or documents upon which the plaintiffs complaint necessarily relies[.]” Id. at 119 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court “must treat the complaint’s factual allegations — including mixed questions of law and fact — as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiffs favor.” Epps v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 719 F.Supp.2d 7, 13 (D.D.C.2010) (citing Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C.Cir.2003)). However, the court, need not accept as true inferences unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint or legal conclusions cast as factual allegations. See Browning, 292 F.3d at 242. III. ANALYSIS As explained above, XPV and Limnia allege that impermissible political' favoritism and cronyism infected the DOE’s implementation of the ATVM Loan Program and the LG Program, and resulted in the unwarranted and arbitrary denial or rejection of their respective loan applications in a manner that violated Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection and that also transgressed the APA. Defendants’ first line of attack against the advancement of these claims is a series of jurisdictional arguments. (See, e.g., Off. Defs.’, Mem. at 23-27 (asserting that Limnia’s ATVM Loan Program claims are unripe); id. at 27-28 (asserting that Limnia lacks standing to bring its ATVM Loan Program claims); id. at 20-23 (asserting that XPV lacks standing to sue for injunctive relief because it is a dissolved corporation).) For the reasons explained below, however, this Court concludes that none of the asserted jurisdictional roadblocks prevents the Court from reaching, the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. Nevertheless, the Court has determined that all of XPVs claims and most of Lim-nia’s claims must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for a variety of reasons. XPVs due process, equal protection, and APA claims against the Official Capacity Defendants must be dismissed because XPV is a dissolved corporation that lacks the capacity to sue for injunctive relief. In addition, XPV’s due process and equal protection claims against the Individual Capacity Defendants fail as a matter of law because no Bivens action is available for these alleged civil fights violations under the circumstances presented here, and as a result, claims for monetary dámages cannot be brought against these defendants. Limnia’s constitutional claims suffer a similar fate: the lack of a Bivens action requires dismissal of Limnia’s constitutional claims against the Individual Capacity Defendants, and the constitutional claims against the Official Capacity Defendants must be dismissed because Limnia fails to state facts that adequately support any such claim. However, this Court concludes that Limnia may proceed with its APA claims regarding the denial of both its ATVM loan application and its LG Program application because the. complaint contains allegations that, if true, are sufficient to establish that the Official Capacity Defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously in. handling those applications. A. This Court Has Jurisdiction Over The Claims In Plaintiffs’ Complaint When a defendant challenges a federal court’s jurisdiction, the court is obligated to consider the jurisdictional objections before reaching the merits of any claim. See Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 432 (D.C.Cir.2006) (“The first and fundamental question that we are bound to ask and answer is whether the court has jurisdiction to decide the case.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884))). As mentioned above, Defendants make several jurisdictional arguments in this case. Setting aside Defendants’ sovereign immunity argument (see Off. Defs.’ Mem. at 19-20)— the inapplicability of which was made clear when Plaintiffs’ counsel clarified during this Court’s hearing that monetary damages were not being sought against the Official Capacity Defendants — Defendants’ jurisdictional contentions are (1) that Lim-nia’s claims with respect to the administration of the ATVM Program are not ripe (see id. at 23-27); (2) that Limnia lacks standing to seek relief related to the denial of its ATVM loan application because it has not been injured by that denial (see id. at 27-28); and (3) that XPV lacks standing to bring claims for injunctive relief (see id. at 20-23). These jurisdictional arguments are unavailing for the reasons that follow. 1. Limnia’s ATVM Loan Program Claims Are Ripe The reasons that Defendants give for challenging on ripeness grounds the constitutional and APA claims that Limnia brings with respect to its ATVM loan application are easy to summarize: Defendants maintain, first, that because the DOE rejected Limnia’s application at the initial screening stage of the review process and did not consider the merits of Limnia’s ATVM application, Limnia’s claims regarding the DOE’s treatment of its application are not yet ripe — in other words, that any legal claims challenging the agency’s determination regarding an applicant’s ATVM loan application ripen only when the agency addresses the application’s merits (see id. at 25-27) — and second, that Limnia has requested that the DOE reconsider its denial of Limnia’s LG Program application, and that request is still pending before the DOE, so any attempt to challenge the DOE’s actions at this point is “incurably premature” (id. at 23-25). These arguments invite this Court to examine Limnia’s claims through the lens of the “ripeness” doctrine, which is a jurisdictional principle “designed ‘to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)). It is well established that, to determine whether or not a claim is ripe, a court must “evaluate (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision[,] and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n, 538 U.S. at 808, 123 S.Ct. 2026. The “fitness” prong is often the heart of the matter, and whether or not a claim is fit for judicial determination turns on three factors: “whether [the issue] is purely legal, whether consideration of the issue would benefit from a more concrete setting, and whether the agency’s action is sufficiently final.” Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 683 F.3d 382, 387 (D.C.Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, it is clear that the questions Limnia raises&emdash;i.e., whether the DOE’s rejection of its ATVM loan application violated the Fifth Amendment, and/or was arbitrary and capricious&emdash;are purely legal inquiries. See Atl. States Legal Found. v. EPA, 325 F.3d 281, 284 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“Claims that an agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law present purely legal issues.”); Beach Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 959 F.2d 975, 986 (D.C.Cir.1992) (holding that an equal protection claim presents a purely legal question). And Defendants cannot credibly contend that these legal issues would benefit from further development such that another setting would be more appropriate for the resolution of Liminia’s claims than this Court. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA 290 F.3d 377, 381 (D.C.Cir.2002) (finding a challenge to agency action ripe where “nothing would be gained by delaying review”); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474, 484 (D.C.Cir.1986) (finding a case not yet ripe because “it would be helpful to the court to see” the way in which the challenged rule “actually operates in practice”). Therefore, it is clear that what is actually animating Defendants’ ripeness argument with respect to Limnia’s claims is Defendants’ ardent assertion that the agency’s consideration of Limnia’s ATVM loan application has never reached the merits review stage and thus is not yet “final” (the third fitness factor). (See Off. Defs.’ Mem. at 26 (“At this stage, however, claims regarding Limnia’s ATVM loan application are not ‘sufficiently final,’ and therefore are not fit for judicial review.”).) Specifically, as mentioned, Defendants maintain that the “final agency action” factor of the ripeness inquiry is a hurdle that has not been cleared with respect to the agency’s treatment of Limnia’s ATVM application because the DOE has not made a decision on the merits of Limnia’s application and also because there is a pending motion for reconsideration of the DOE’s initial denial. (See id. at 23-27.) Thus, in' essence, Defendants’ argument requires this Court to address two related aspects of the DOE’s determination, each of which implicates the ultimate “final agency action” inquiry&emdash;first, has there really been cognizable agency “action” for ripeness purposes, if the DOE’s determination relates only to the initial (screening) stage of the loan application review process and not the. merits?; and if so, second, can the DOE’s action with respect to Limnia’s application properly be characterized as “final” given the fact that Lim-nia has requested further consideration by the agency? For the reasons that follow, this Court finds that the answer to both of these questions is yes, and it therefore concludes that Limnia has satisfied the final agency action factor of the ripeness test. a. The DOE’s Denial Of Limnia’s ATVM Loan Application Is Sufficiently Final Even Though The DOE Did Not Consider The Merits. Of That Application Defendants argue that the DOE’s decision to reject Limnia’s ATVM loan application is not “sufficiently final” because the DOE has not yet “conducted a substantive review of Limnia’s application.” (Off. Defs.’ Mem. at 26.) But ripeness doctrine does not require that an agency reach and determine the underlying merits of an application or petition&emdash;as distinguished from making a determination regarding initial eligibility criteria&emdash;so long as "the agency has made a final and unequivocal decision with respect to what it does review, such that its determination represents the consummation of the agency's. decision making process and establishes-, legal rights and obligations or fixes a legal relationship. See Nat'l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 250 (D.C.Cir.2014) (“An agency action is final only if it is both ‘the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process’ and a decision by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined’ or from which ‘legal con-sequencés wall flow.’ ” (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997))). An agency action reflects the consummation of the agency’s decision making process when the action'is “definitive[,]” Fourth Branch Assocs. (Mechanicville) v. FERC, 253 F.3d 741, 746 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting Cibar-Geigy Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C.Cir.1986)), and is not “tentative, open to further consideration, or conditioned] on future agency action[,]” City of Dania Beach, Fla. v. FAA, 485 F.3d 1181, 1188 (D.C.Cir.2007). Furthermore, it is clear beyond cavil that the rejection of a request for a government benefit — such a loan or a loan guarantee — “fixes some legal relationship” between a private party and the government. Meredith v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 177 F.3d 1042, 1047 (D.C.Cir.1999); see also Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Canada, 53 F.Supp.3d 1, 19-20 (D.D.C.2014) (noting that denial of a permit application constitutes final agency action). The DOE’s denial of Limnia’s ATVM loan application plainly satisfies these requirements, notwithstanding the fact that, according to the complaint, the denial occurred at the initial stage of the DOE’s application review process. Plaintiffs allege that .the DOE first rejected Limnia’s application for an ATVM loan on April 10, 2009 (see Am. Compl. ¶ 69), based on the agency’s allegedly mistaken determination that Limnia’s “proposed project cannot, as a matter of law, be funded under th'e Program” because it is a component that “do[es] not appear to be designed for installation in an advanced technology vehicle” (Ex. 6 to Am. Compl. at 24-25); After Limnia requested reconsideration and provided additional documentation, the DOE sent Limnia a letter dated May 13, 2009, in which the agency stated that “the additional information has not changed our determination that your proposed project cannot, as a matter of law, be funded under the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Incentive Program[.]” (Ex. 8 to Am. Compl. at 30.) In this samé correspondence, the agency asked' Liminia for more information (id. at 31; Am.' Compl. ¶ 71),' which Limnia apparently provided, but the additional material apparently failed to satisfy the DOE’s staff — more than two years later, in October of 2011, the agency “sent Limnia a letter ... stating that Limnia’s application was [nevertheless] not substantially complete[,]” (Ex. '5 to Pis.’ Off. Opp’n, ECF No. 30-6, at 2). Then, continuing the saga, the DOE sent yet another letter to Limnia the following year, on October 23, 2012, in which the agency stated that .it had reviewed additional documents and information; and had found once again that Limnia’s application “is not substantially complete as required” by the applicable regulations. (Id.) The agency further reiterated' its obviously cemented position regarding the status of Limnia’s application in March of 2013, when it sent yet another letter to Limnia providing “clarification on the deficiencies that rendered Limnia, Inc.’s ATVM[ Loan Program] application not substantially complete.” (Ex. C to Off. Defs.’ Mem., EOF No. 28-1, at 8.) This Court finds that all of these letters and statements plainly constitute a final decision of the DOE rejecting Limnia's ATVM loan application for the purpose of the ripeness doctrine. The DOE stated in no uncertain terms in its letter of April 10, 2009, that it had “carefully reviewed” Lim-nia’s application and had “determined” that the proposed project was not eligible to receive an ATVM loan “as a matter of law.” (Ex. 6 to Am. Compl. at 24.) Furthermore, the agency also apparently determined that Limnia’s application was not substantially complete; and it stated that the DOE would “take no further action with respect to your application until such time as you have submitted an application that is substantially complete.” (Ex. 5 to Pis.’ Off. Opp’n at 2.) The series of letters from the DOE to Limnia provide no indication that the DOE’s determination regarding the status of Limnia’s application is at all tentative or open to any further reconsideration; indeed, the most recent correspondence unmistakably pushes the ball into Limnia’s court, suggesting steps that Limnia might take “[t]o aid in completing” its application, and thereby clearly indicating that the agency would not proceed to . continue to evaluate its submission otherwise. (Ex, C to Off. Defs.’ Mem. at 8.) .... To the extent that- Defendants' here are suggesting that the DOE’s determination that Limnia’s submission was “not substantially complete” is not tantamount to a final,' substantive denial of Limnia’s loan request (Off. Defs.’ Mem. at 26), they have two problems — first, the mandate that this Court must construe the facts alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs to the extent those allegations are consistent with evidence presented means that, at least for the purpose of the instant motion to dismiss, it must be presumed that the DOE did, in fact, “carefully review[ ]” Limnia’s application as it expressly stated it had done (Ex. 6 to Am. Compl. at 24), and that the agency “denied” that application for the substantive reasons expressed in its letters. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 69; Ex. 6 to Am. Compl. at 24-25; Ex. 8 to Am. Compl. at 30-31.) Second, and perhaps even more important, Defendants have not provided, this Court with any reason to draw any distinction between an initial completeness determination, on the one hand, and a substantive decision to deny an ATVM loan application (e.g., for lack of eligibility or on the merits), on the other — and no reason is apparent, given that a rejection for lack of completeness and a substantive denial of an ATVM loan application are both the end of the road from the applicant’s standpoint and have the same practical effect on the applicant’s rights. To find otherwise, as Defendants would have this Court do, would be to presume that there is some jurisdictional significance to the agency’s decision to deny a loan application on the merits, as opposed to rejecting the application on some other ground that is antecedent to a merits determination, when federal courts routinely consider challenges to agency determinations regarding antecedent matters such as an agency’s own ability bo reach the merits of a particular dispute. See, e,g., Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Rea, 12 F.Supp.3d 8, 14-15 (D.D.C.2013) (reviewing Patent and Trademark Office decision that the agency could not review plaintiffs request for reconsideration because it was untimely filed); Adirondack Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, No. 11-cv-313, 2012 WL 285142, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2012) (holding that an agency’s finding that it lacks jurisdiction “constitutes final agency action, and it is properly before this Court”). In short, Defendants fail, to' identify a single case' that supports distinguishing between the DOE’s decision regarding the completeness of Limnia’s application and a substantive decision on the merits as far as final agency action is concerned, and this Court sees no good reason to draw any such line, especially when the evidence indicates that the DOE considered • Lim-nia’s application numerous times and repeatedly expressed its determination that (for whatever reason) the proposed project would not be funded. Thus, the mere fact that the DOE apparently did not base its rejection on the merits of Limnia’s application is not determinative of the ripeness issue; regardless, in light of the allegations and evidence presented, the DOE’s unequivocal rejection of Limnia’s ATVM loan application was a “final” action on the part of the agency. b. The Fact That Limnia Requested Reconsideration Of The DOE’s Detemni- ' nation Regarding Its ATVM Loan . Application Does Not Render Lim-nia’s Challenge Unripe Undaunted, Defendants raise another finality objection as part of their ripeness challenge: they' maintain that there is no final agency action because Limnia has requested reconsideration of the agency’s decision and, according to the complaint, that request is still pending; therefore, the claims that Limnia has brought here are “incurably premature[J” (,See Off. Defs.’ Mem. at 23; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 70-73 (alleging that Limnia repeatedly requested reconsideration of the DOE’s initial determination that its project was ineligible for funding, and that “Defendants never responded” - to Limnia’s second reconsideration request).) A line of D.C. Circuit case law does stand for the proposition that a request for reconsideration requires a litigant to wait for the agency to act before that litigant is permitted to file suit, see Clifton Power Corp. v. FERC, 294 F.3d 108, 110 (D.C.Cir.2002), and this doctrine holds that, even if the agency completes its. reconsideration before the litigant’s lawsuit is heard on the merits, the premature lawsuit cannot proceed — hence, the “incurable” part of the incurably premature doctrine, see TeleSTAR, Inc. v. FCC, 888 F.2d 132, 134 (D.C.Cir.1989) (“We hold therefore that when a petition for review is filed before the challenged action is final and thus ripe for review, subsequent action by the agency on a motion for reconsideration does not ripen the petition for review or secure appellate jurisdiction.”); see also Pen Peninsula Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, No. 00-1079, 2000 WL 1225776, at *1 (D.C.Cir. July 11, 2000) (expressly referring to “[t]he incurably premature doctrine”). However, it is far from clear that this doctrine applies to the sort of agency decision making at issue in this case. And even if the incurably premature doctrine is applicable to the instant circumstances, this Court concludes that that doctrine does not render Limnia’s ATVM Loan Program claims unripe for the very simple reason that the record in this case clearly demonstrates that the DOE completed the requested reconsideration before Limnia filed the complaint at issue here. Specifically, as noted above,- the DOE first rejected Limnia’s ATVM loan application on April 10, 2009. (Am. Compl. ¶ 69; Ex. 6 to Am. Compl. at 24-25.) Limnia responded by asking for an explanation and reconsideration. (Am.Compl. ¶70.) In response to this, the DOE affirmed its decision but gave Limnia the opportunity to submit additional information and to request reconsideration (Ex. 8 to Am. Compl.