Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR., District Judge. Brenda Pippin and Grace Parker brought separate lawsuits under the Maine Human. Rights Act (MHRA) and Maine Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA), alleging that Boulevard Motel Corp. (Boulevard Motel), their former employer, wrongfully retaliated against them. Boulevard Motel has moved for summary judgment on the ground that each former employee’s claim falls under the “job duties” exception to. these Acts. Despite reservations about the scope of and policy behind, the “job duties” exception, the Court has applied the latest teaching from the First Circuit Court of Appeals, and having resolved issues regarding the disputed record, the Court concludes that there are no genuine disputes of material fact that require jury resolution on either claim and that Boulevard Motel is entitled to summary judgment on each. I. STATEMENT OR FACTS A. Procedural History On. March 21, 2014, Brenda Pippin and Grace Parker, former employees of Boulevard Motel, filed separate, simultaneous complaints in Cumberland County Superi- or Court for the state of Maine against Boulevard Motel. Decl. of Michelle Y. Bush Attach. 2 Compl. (ECF No. 3). They alleged that Boulevard Motel committed various violations of state and federal' law by terminating them. Id. Specifically, Ms. Pippin alleged (1) two counts of unlawful retaliation under the MHRA; (2) one count of adverse eihployment action for activity protected by the MWPA; and (3) gender discrimination in violation of the MHRA. Id. ¶¶ 17-34 (Pippin, 2:14-cv-00167-JAW) (Pippin). Likewise, Ms. Parker alleged the same three violations of law as Ms. Pippin, and also alleged (1) age discrimination in violation of the MHRA, and (2) age • discrimination in violation of the Age • Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Id. ¶¶ 17-48 (Parker, 2:14-cv-00169-JAVO (Parker). Boulevard Motel removed both cases to this, Court on April 22, 2014. Notice of Removal (ECF. No. 1). On May 2, 2014, Boulevard Motel filed its Answer to each Complaint. Answer to Compl (ECF No. 5). On January 13, 2015, the Plaintiffs moved to dismiss certain counts in each Complaint without prejudice. Am. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Count III, or in the Alt., Mot. to Dismiss Count III (ECF No. 23) (Pippin); Am. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Counts III-V, or in 'the Alt, Mot. to Dismiss Counts III-V (ECF No. 23) (Parker). The Court granted their motions on February 20, 2015, Orderon Mots, to Dismiss (ECF No. 31). Each Plaintiff now brings one count of whistleblower retaliation under the MWPA and one count of retaliation under the MHRA. On February 27, 2015, Boulevard Motel filed a motion for summary judgment as to both Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker with a supporting statement of material facts. Def’s Mot. for. Summ. J. (ECF No. 32) (Def.’s Mot); Def.’s Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 33) (DSMF). Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker responded to Boulevard Motel’s mbtion and its statement of material facts, and filed a. statement of additional. material facts on March 16, 2015. Pis. ’ Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 39) (Pis.’ Opp’n); Pis.’ Opposing Statement of. Material Facts (ECF No. 40) (PRDSMF); Pis.’ Statement of Additional Material Facts (ECF No. 40) (PSAMF). On March 26, 2015, Boulevard Motel filed a reply to Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker’s response and to their statement of additional material facts. Def.’s Reply in Support of Summ. J, (ECF No. 42) (Def.’s Reply); Def.’s Reply to Pis.’ Statement of Additional Material Facts (ECF . No. 43) (DRPSAMF). Finally, on June 4, 2015, the Court heard oral argument. Minute Entry (ECF No. 45). B. Factual Background 1. The Parties and the Plaintiffs’ Job Responsibilities Boulevard Motel Corp. was the owner and operator of the Comfort Inn Hotel in South Portland, Maine (“Comfort Inn”) in 2010 and 2011. DSMF ¶ 1; PRDSMF ¶ 1. Plaintiff Brenda Pippin was employed by Boulevard Motel as the Executive Housekeeper at .the Comfort Inn. DSMF ¶2; PRDSMF ¶ 2. Ms. Pippin worked at the Comfort Inn for over twenty-four years, though Boulevard Motel did not own or operate the Comfort Inn during that whole time period.' PSAMF ¶ 1; DRPSAMF ¶ 1. She worked initially as a housekeeper for two years, then in laundry for approximately three years, and then became Executive Housekeeper. Id. As Executive Housekeeper, Ms. Pippin was in charge of the housekeeping department and had responsibilities relating to hiring, firing, supervising and disciplining housekeeping employees. DSMF ¶ 3; PRDSMF ¶ 3. Ms. Pippin supervised Grace Parker and housekeeper Abinair Martin, among others. DSMF ¶ 12; PRDSMF ¶ 12. Plaintiff Grace Parker was employed by Boulevard Motel as the Assistant Executive Housekeeper at the Comfort Inn. DSMF ¶ 4; PRDSMF ¶4. Ms. Parker worked for the Comfort Inn for eleven years (starting in 2000), beginning first as a housekeeper and laundry aide before becoming Assistant Executive Housekeeper several years later. PSAMF ¶ 2; DRPSAMF' ¶ 2. As Assistant Executive Housekeeper, Ms. Parker had supervisory duties and was responsible for performing Ms. Pippin’s responsibilities when Ms. Pippin was not at work, including overseeing daily tasks of the housekeeping staff, except Ms. Parker was unable to hire, fire, or discipline housekeeping employees. DSMF ¶ 5; PRDSMF ¶ 5; PSAMF ¶ 3; DRPSAMF ¶3. Ms. Parker supervised Abinair Martin when Ms. Pippin was not at work, but Ms. Parker did not have the authority to fire or discipline Ms. Martin. DSMF ¶ 13; PRDSMF ¶ 13. 2. Sexual Harassment Policy and Training Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker each received annual training entitled, “Preventing Sexual Harassment Supervisor Version.” DSMF ¶ 6; PRDSMF ¶6. That annual training' instructed supervisors such as Ms. Parker and Ms. Pippin to immediately report employee complaints of sexual harassment according to the reporting structure outlined in company policy. DSMF ¶ 7; PRDSMF ¶7. Boulevard Motel’s sexual harassment policy contained in its employee handbook required that “any supervisor who sees or hears about-conduct that may constitute harassment under this policy must immediately contact the Property Manager or Sunburst Hospitality’s Corporate Human Resources Department.” DSMF ¶ 8; PRDSMF ¶ 8. Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker each received copies of the employee handbook. DSMF ¶ 9; PRDSMF ¶9. Boulevard Motel’s policy entitled, “Supervisor’s Role During Sexual Harassment Investigation Procedures,” required Ms. Parker and Ms. Pippin to report to human resources any employee complaints about alleged harassment. DSMF ¶ 10; PRDSMF ¶ 1Ó: , Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker each received a copy of the policy entitled, “Supervisor’s Role During Sexual Harassment Investigation Procedures.” DSMF ¶ 11;. PRDSMF ¶11. Boulevard Motel’s sexual harassment policy instructed that employees with complaints of harassment could bring them to their supervisor, the hotel manager, or human resources. DSMF ¶ 36; PRDSMF ¶ 36. 3. April 21, 2010: The Alleged Sexual Harassment Incident Witnessed by Grace Parker On or about April 21, 2010, Ms. Parker witnessed an incident between Ms; Martin and a maintenance employee, Randy Crab-tree. DSMF ¶ 14; PRDSMF ¶ 14. On that day, Ms., Parker was supervisor of the housekeeping department, including Ms. Martin, because Ms. Pippin was hot at work. DSMF ¶ 15;. PRDSMF ¶ 15. Ms. Parker was in the break room when she overheard Mr. Crabtree call Ms. Martin “nipples.” DSMF ¶ 16; PRDSMF ¶16. Ms. Parker then went outside with Ms. Martin and asked her if Mr. Crabtree had said what she thought she heard; Ms. Martin answered that he had. DSMF ¶ 17; PRDSMF ¶17. Ms. Murtip then told Ms. Parker that Mr. Crabtree had also stated that he heard that' Brazilian women have big nipples and asked Ms. Martin, who is Brazilian, to lift her shirt and show him her nipples so he could suck them. DSMF ¶ 18; PRDSMF ¶ 18. Ms. Parker told Ms. Martin that she needed to document everything and that they should go to Beth Landergren, Hotel General Manager. DSMF ¶ 19; PRDSMF ¶19. Ms. Martin responded that she wanted to wait for Ms. Pippin to return to work so they could go to Ms. Landergren together. DSMF ¶ 20; PRDSMF ¶ 20. 4. April 24, 2010: Brenda Pippin Returns to Work On or about April 24, 2010, when Ms. Pippin returned to work, Ms; Parker told Ms. Pippin that Ms. Martin had something to teh her. DSMF ¶ 21; PRDSMF ¶21, Ms. Martin, Ms. Parker and Ms. Pippin were having a lunch break when Ms. Martin told Ms. Pippin about the incident with Mr. Crabtree. DSMF ¶22; PRDSMF ¶22. Ms. Pippin told Ms. Martin that they needed to go talk to Ms. Landergren. DSMF ¶ 23; PRDSMF ¶ 23. 5. April 27, 2010: Brenda Pippin, Grace Parker, and Abinair Martin Speak with Beth Landergren; Ms. Landergren and Ms. Martin Report the Allegations to the Human Resources Department On or about April 27, 20Í0, Ms.- Pippin, Ms. Parker, and Ms. Martin went to talk to Ms. Landergren-. DSMF ¶ 24; PRDSMF ¶ 24. Ms. Pippin told Ms. Landergren that Ms. Martin' had an incident with Mr. Crabtree that she needed to tell to Ms. Landergren. - DSMF ¶ 25; PRDSMF ¶ 25. Ms- Martin then proceeded to describe to Ms. Landergren the incident with Mr. Crabtree that had occurred on or about April 21, 2010. DSMF ¶ 26; PRDSMF ¶ 26. Ms. Landergren said she “would, believe” Ms. Martin’s allegations if they had been directed toward another employee, Michael Cox, but not Mr. Crabtree, and she initially tried to dissuade Ms. Martin from pressing the matter by claiming Mr. Crabtree “doesn’t fit the profile” and commented “are you sure he wasn’t joking because he jokes around with everybody,” but Ms. Landergren then informed Ignacio Mello, Boulevard .Motel’s Human Resources Manager, about Ms. Martin’s allegations. -DSMF ¶27; PRDSMF ¶27; PSAMF ¶ 7; DRPSAMF ¶ 7. In her initial April 27, 2010 statement, Ms. Landergren reported that Ms. Martin’s “husband told her that she has to report and have something done about it. Her husband feels it is disrespectful and makes her feel badly about her body.” PSAMF ¶ 8; DRPSAMF ¶8. That same day, Ms. Landergren revised her initial statement in which she recounted her meeting with Ms. Martin, Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker. PSAMF ¶ 9; DRPSAMF ¶ 9. She stated that Ms. Martin told her what Mr. Crabtree had done to her, and that she (Ms. Landergren) said Mr. Crabtree “joked around with everyone.” Id. According to Ms. Landergren, Ms. Martin “immediately burst out crying” and asked why Ms. Landergren would allow this to go on so that she would have to be the one to get hurt and make a formal complaint? Id. Ms. Landergren stated that she then told Ms. Martin that Mr. Crabtree “jokes around” with everyone, and Ms. Martin was the only one who he offended. Id. Also on April 27, 2010, Ms. Parker assisted Ms. Martin in writing a statement of events to submit to Mr. Mello; Ms. Parker wrote on Ms. Martin’s statement “this is written by Grace Parker because Abinair Martin cannot spell and write English very well.” PSAMF ¶ 10; DRPSAMF ¶ 10. 6. April 29 and 30, 2010: Beth Landergren Speaks with Randy Crabtree Regarding Abinair Martin’s Allegations On April 29, 2010, Ms. Landergren had a meeting with Mr. Crabtree in which she outlined the allegations against him and asked for his response. PSAMF ¶ 11; DRPSAMF ¶ 11. The following day, Ms. Landergren had another meeting.with Mr. Crabtree to follow up on the previous day’s meeting about the allegations of harassment. PSAMF ¶ 12; DRPSAMF ¶ 12. 7.Approximately Early May 2010: Ignacio Mello Investigates Abinair Martin’s Allegations Mr. Mello arrived at the Comfort Inn approximately one week later to further investigate Ms. Martin’s ■■ allegations. DSMF ¶ 28; PRDSMF ¶28. While Mr. Mello was at the Comfort Inn, he interviewed witnesses and gathered statements, including meeting with Ms. Parker and Ms. Pippin. DSMF ¶ 29; PRDSMF ¶ 29. Ms. Parker told Mr. Mello what she had heard and that she had written a statement, which Boulevard Motel had requested. DSMF 1130; PRDSMF ¶30. Ms. Pippin also provided written statements at Boulevard Motel’s request. DSMF If 31; PRDSMF ¶ 31. Ms. Pippin never witnessed any of the behavior described by Ms. Martin or any other sexually inappropriate behavior by Mr. Crabtree. DSMF ¶ 32; PRDSMF ¶ 32. Ms. Martin submitted a statement in Portuguese with a translation by her son. DSMF ¶ 33; PRDSMF ¶ 33.. Mr. Mello told Ms. Parker, Ms. Pippin, and Ms. Martin “not to talk about [the harassment] at all” or they “would get written up or terminated.” PSAMF ¶ 14; DRPSAMF ¶ 14. Mr. Mello believed Ms. Martin should not have spoken to Ms. Landergren regarding the investigation after the initial report. PSAMF ¶ 15; DRPSAMF ¶ 15. 8.Beth Landergren is Removed from the Investigation Process Ms. Landergren was told by Mr. Mello that she was not to be involved in the investigation after Ms. Martin reported to him that she felt Ms. Landergren “was biased in the investigation and was taking Randy’s side.” PSAMF ¶ 16; DRPSAMF ¶ 16. 9.Boulevard Motel’s Investigative Findings and Subsequent Actions as a Result of Those Findings Following the completion of the investigation, Boulevard Motel determined that Mr. Crabtree had engaged in inappropriate conduct, as did Ms. Landergren during the investigation of Mr. Crabtree’s conduct, but nonetheless concluded that the incidents did not rise, to the level of unlawful sexual harassment. DSMF ¶ 34; PRDSMF ¶ 34. In Mr. Mello’s .view, Boulevard Motel took prompt and remedial .action in (1) responding to Ms. Martin’s allegations, (2) investigating the allegations, and (3) issuing discipline to Mr. Crabtree, which included a finding that he “exercised poor judgement, engaged in unprofessional and inappropriate workplace behavior, blurred the line between supervisor and friend, and that [he] may have violated Sunburst’s sexual harassment policy,” and he was provided a written warning requiring- him to complete additional harassment ' training. DSMF ¶35; PRDSMF ¶35. Despite Boulevard Motel’s conclusion that Mr. Crabtree’s conduct violated company policy but did not rise to the level of unlawful sexual harassment, Ms. Parker and Ms. Pippin believed Mr. Crabtree’s behavior to be a violation of law and company policy, as well as a health and safety risk to Ms. Martin and other employees at Comfort Inn South Portland. PSAMF ¶ 21; DRPSAMF ¶21. 10. Brenda Pippin and Grace Parker’s Understanding of Protocol and Procedure Ms. Pippin believes that ’Ms. Martin should have' brought her concerns about Mr. Crabtree to Ms. Pippin’s attention because Ms. Pippin was her boss. DSMF ¶ 37; PRDSMF ¶ 37. Ms. Pippin also believes that Ms. Parker should have told Ms. Pippin about Ms. Martin’s concerns because Ms. Pippin was Ms. Parker’s boss. DSMF ¶ 38; PRDSMF ¶38. Ms. Pippin agrees that she should have brought Ms. Martin’s report to Ms. Landergren’s attention. DSMF ¶ 39; PRDSMF ¶39. Ms. Pippin agrees that the .report about Mr. Crabtree’s behavior was made on Ms. Martin’s behalf and was Ms. Pippin’s report to make. DSMF ¶ 40; PRDSMF ¶ 40; Ms. Parker understood that, acting with some supervisory authority in Ms. Pippin’s absence, if an’ employee had a problem or’ needed to report something like sexual harassment he or she could and should report to her. DSMF ¶ 41;' PRDSMF ¶ 4l. Ms. Parker and Ms. Pippin performed their job duties as supervisors pursuant to Boulevard Motel’s policies in reporting Ms. Martin’s complaint of allegedly sexually harassing behavior up the chain of command. DSMF ¶ 45; PRDSMF ¶45. 11. Randy Crabtree and Beth Landergren Ms. Parker discussed with Ms. Martin her (Ms. Parker’s) belief that Mr. Crabtree and Ms. Landergren were involved in a romantic relationship before making reports of Mr. Crabtree sexually harassing Ms. Martin. PSAMF ¶ 4; DRPSAMF ¶ 4. Ms. Parker heard Ms. Landergren call Mr. Crabtree “sunshine” at work. Id. Ms. Parker believed Ms. Landergren and Mr. Crabtree flirted openly at work and spent personal time together outside of work. PSAMF ¶ 5; DRPSAMF ¶5. Although Ms. Pippin did not know whether Ms. Landergren and Mr. Crabtree had an affair, she also heard Ms. Landergren refer to Mr. Crabtree as “sunshine” at work. PSAMF ¶ 6; DRPSAMF ¶ 6. In addition, Mr. Mello was aware of allegations that Ms. Landergren and Mr. Crabtree were romantically involved. PSAMF ¶ 13; DRPSAMF ¶ 13. Mr. Mello asked Ms. Landergren and Mr. Crabtree if there was in fact a romantic relationship; they both denied having such a relationship. M On May 11, 2010, Ms. Landergren received Confidential Memorandum from Ned Heiss, Vice President of Operations, rebuking her for the way she handled the investigation and her inappropriate involvement therein. PSAMF ¶ 17; DRPSAMF ¶ 17. Mr. Crabtree also received a written reprimand from Mr. Heiss on May 11, 2010. M 12. Subsequent Events in 2010 On June 2, 2010, Ms. Pippin faxed a handwritten statement to Mr. Mello in which she relates Ms. Martin was still very upset, and felt that Ms. Landergren only cared about saving Mr. Crabtree, PSAMF ¶ 18; DRPSAMF ¶ 18. Also on June 2, 2010, Ms. Parker faxed a statement to Mr. Mello reporting a conversation she had with Veronica Connolly, a front desk employee: ‘Veronica said she had a feeling that if she didn’t go along with Beth about the Abinair- situation that she felt like she would be fired.” PSAMF ¶ 19; DRPSAMF ¶ 19. On July 8, 2010, Ms. Landergren responded to an email from Mr. Melló, in which he stated a need to hire a laundry person that would “be Supervisor (not Asst. Exec Hskpr) on two days, pay differential on those days but that person would not have managerial privileges (rip hiring or firing) but would.open and close the department, inspects rooms, etc., on the days Executive Housekeeper] is off.” PSAMF ¶ 20; DRPSAMF ¶20. Ms. Landergren’s response was “Ok, that’s.exactly what Grace does now.” Id. 13. 2011 Incident Involving Michael Cox In 2011, Ms. Parker witnessed another maintenance employee, Michael Cox, take his shirt off and approach the back, of another housekeeper. DSMF ¶ 42; PRDSMF ¶ 42. Ms. Parker reported the incident to Ms. Landergren. . DSMF ¶ 43; PRDSMF ¶43. Ms. Parker understood that reporting to Ms. Landergren what she had witnessed regarding Mr. Cox’s actions was consistent with the policy regarding supervisor responsibility for harassment. DSMF ¶ 44; PRDSMF ¶44. 14. Brenda Pippin and Grace Parker are Terminated in 2011 On or about February 23, 2011, Boulevard Motel terminated Ms. Parker’s employment purportedly for á critical offense: violation of the company’s ethics policy. DSMF ¶ 46; PRDSMF ¶46. On or about July 5, 2011, Boulevard Motel terminated Ms. Pippin’s employment purportedly for an accumulation of offenses per the company’s progressive discipline policy. DSMF ¶ 47; PRDSMF ¶ 47. II. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS A. Defendant’s Motion Boulevard Motel argues that the facts establish that Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker, as supervisors, “had a responsibility to receive and elevate reports of alleged sexual harassment” to upper management, and having done so, neither “made any reports that would be protected under the MWPA or MHRA.” Def’s Mot at 2. Specifically, it says [t]heir conduct in elevating Martin’s report falls into the “job duties” exception to the MWPA and MHRA, which has also been described as the “scope of employment” or “manager rule.” This exception limits the protection of anti-retaliation statutes to employees who step outside the- scope of their employment duties in reporting or opposing illegal practices in a manner not dictated by the strictures of their jobs. Id. at 5. Boulevard Motel explains that to prevail under the MWPA, Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker each “must prove that: ‘(1) she engaged in activity protected by the MWPA; (2) she experienced an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected Activity and the adverse employment action.’ ” Id. at 6 (quoting Walsh v. Town of Millinocket, 2011 ME 99, ¶ 24, 28 A.3d 610). Boulevard Motel Asserts that Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker fail under the first prong of the test articulated in Walsh, because the First Circuit recognized in Winslow v. Aroostook County, 736 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir.2013) “the job duties exception to the MWPA,” where the Winslow Court “concluded' that the plaintiff had not engaged in any protected activity when she followed her supervisor’s direction in reporting an alleged violation of law up the chain of command.” Def. ’s Mot at 6-7. Boulevard Motel directs the Court’s attention to several recent cases from this district that have upheld the Winslow holding: Harrison v. Granite Bay Care, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-123-DBH, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123668 (D. Me. June 30, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123665 (D.Me. Sept. 4, 2014), and Stark v. Hartt Transportation Systems, 37 F.Supp.3d 445 (D.Me.2014). Def.’s Mot. at 7-9. It also directs the Court’s attention to a recent Maine superi- or court case “reflecting an approach consistent with Winslow": Hall v. Mid-State Machine Products, No. 11-CV-068, 2013 WL 5510308, 2013 Me.Super. LEXIS 169 (Sept. 4, 2013). Def.’s Mot. at 9. In sum, Boulevard Motel argues “[i]t was unquestionably part of both Pippin’s and Parker’s job responsibilities to receive Martin’s report of alleged sexual harassment and to immediately handle it by elevating it to the appropriate management level.” Id. at 9-10. Turning to the Plaintiffs’ claims under the MHRA, Boulevard Motel asserts they each “must prove that she engaged in protected activity; her employer made an employment decision that adversely affected her; and that there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Id. at 10-11 (citing Doyle v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2003 ME 61, ¶ 20, 824 A.2d 48). Conceding that it has not found any caselaw from the Maine Supreme Judicial Court regarding “the scope of protection afforded by the MHRA anti-retaliation provision as applied to reports made by supervisors as part of their supervisory duties,” Boulevard Motel argues that the Court should look to analogous federal law for guidance; specifically, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. Id. at 11 (citing Watt v. UniFirst Corp., 2009 ME 47, ¶22 n. 4, 969 A.2d 897; Ramsdell v. Huhtamaki, Inc., 992 F.Supp.2d 1, 14-15, n. 19 (D.Me.2014)). According to Boulevard Motel, while the First Circuit has not established a “manager rule” or “job duties” exception to the anti-retaliation provision under Title VII, “it has previously stated that it assumes the manager rule would apply to retaliation claims brought under Title VII.” Id. (citing Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Mfg., Inc., 617 F.3d 39 (1st Cir.2010)). Thus, in Boulevard Motel’s view, “there is little doubt that the First Circuit would extend the exception it articulated in Win-slow to claims of retaliation under Title VII and the MHRA.” Id. at 12. Finally, Boulevard Motel instructs the Court to look for whether Ms. Parker or Ms. Pippin “ ‘cross the line from being an employee performing her job ... to an employee lodging a personal complaint.’” Id. (quoting Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 466 Fed.Appx. 781, 787 (11th Cir.2012)). In other words, it says the “question on summary judgment is whether the undisputed material facts could allow for a reasonable inference that plaintiffs were not performing their jobs as supervisors when they elevated Martin’s complaint, and that they had instead thrown off their supervisory mantles to pursue their own personal complaints adverse to the company.” Id. at 12-13 (emphasis in original). Here, it argues, “neither plaintiff can meet that burden.” Id. at 13. Boulevard Motel also believes that “Pippin and Parker’s apparent present day belief that the company came to the wrong conclusion regarding the alleged harassment has no bearing on whether they engaged in opposition protected by the MHRA.” Id. at 16. B. Plaintiffs’ Opposition Plaintiffs disagree with Boulevard Motel’s claim that Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker are not protected under the MWPA or MHRA because they properly reported Ms. Martin’s allegations “up the chain of command.” Pis.’ Opp’n at 2. Instead, they argue that their actions remain protected pursuant to the United States Supreme Court ruling in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee, 555 U.S. 271, 129 S.Ct. 846, 172 L.Ed.2d 650 (2009) and- the First Circuit ruling in Collazo, and they assert that “[t]he facts of this case can easily be distinguished from the facts of Winslow and align with recent- state and federal decisions on protected activity.” Pis.’ Opp’n at 2. First, Plaintiffs argue they “made several reports. Those reports — on their face— are protected under the MHRA and MWPA,” and the question then is whether an exception, applies. Id. at 9. As regards the MHRA, Plaintiffs contend there is no “job duties exception.” Id. Directing the Court’s attention to the Supreme Court ruling in Crawford, Plaintiffs say “[t]he Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision reversing the Sixth Circuit. It held that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII extends to people who speak out, not just on their own initiative, but when prompted by an employer’s internal investigation.” Id. at 10. Likewise, according to Plaintiffs, in Collazo, the First Circuit applied Crawford and “reversed summary judgment, holding that a supervisor who attends HR meetings with a subordinate to support her claims of sex harassment was engaged in protected activity under the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII.” Id. at 11 (citing Collazo, 617 F.3d at 42, 49). Quoting Judge Lipez in Collazo for the proposition that “an employer cannot be permitted to avoid liability for retaliation under Title VII simply by crafting equal employment policies that require its employees to report unlawful employment practices,” 617 F.3d at 49, Plaintiffs claim the “same analysis should apply in this case.” Pis:’ Opp’n at 11-12. In addition, they argue that “there are disputed facts regarding whether and to what extent Parker and Pippin ‘stepped outside their roles’ and took ‘action adverse to the company.’ ” Id. at 12. Plaintiffs characterize themselves as “housekeepers” as opposed to “personnel managers” and therefore, they were “‘stepping outside their roles’ as housekeepers and ‘took action adverse’ to the hotel.” Id. Turning to the job duties exception as it relates to the MWPA, Plaintiffs argue that their case is distinguishable from the one the First Circuit addressed in Winslow: Unlike the plaintiff in Winslow, Ms. Parker and Ms. Pippin were not making a report at the direction of their supervisor. In fact, Ms. Parker suspected her supervisor of having an affair with the same person accused of sexual harassment. Unlike Ms. Winslow’s experience with her supervisor (who took every step to correct the violation), Plaintiffs’ reports of serious sexual harassment allegations were met with immediate skepticism by Ms. Landergren____ Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could easily reach the conclusion that the reports were made over the objections of their supervisor, and therefore find that Plaintiffs “stepped outside their roles” as housekeepers and took action that was adverse to the hotel. Id. at 14 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs also contend that “Mr. Mello correctly removed [Ms. Landergren] from any part of the investigation as soon as he arrived in Maine. Ms. Landergren’s inappropriate personal involvement alone distinguishes this case from Winslow.” Id. at 15. Next, Plaintiffs assert that “Ms. Parker is not a supervisor.” Id. They say this is confirmed by the .July 8, 2010 email exchange between Ms. Landergren and Mr. Mello, “in which Ms. Landergren confirms that Ms. Parker lacks ‘managerial authority’ and cannot hire or fire employees.” Id. According to Plaintiffs, this is significant based on Supreme Court and First Circuit precedent, which establishes who a “supervisor” is. Id. (citing Vance v. Ball State Univ., — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2434, 2439, 186 L.Ed.2d 565 (2013); Velazquez-Perez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 753 F.3d 265 (1st Cir.2014)). In addition, they say that the question of “whether Ms. Parker or Ms. Pippin’s reports were part of their job duties is a question of fact.” Id. at 16. In short, they say “[i]t is up to the jury to determine whether the reports were protected.” Id. Plaintiffs also claim they made “health and safety” reports to Boulevard Motel, and therefore, “made reports that fall into both subsections 1(A) and 1(B) [of the MWPA] (protecting reports, of health or safety violations, conditions, or practices).” Id. at 16-17 (citing Levitt v. Sonardyne, Inc., 918 F.Supp.2d 74, 88 (D.Me.2013)). This, they say, is . significant because “[t]here are sufficient grounds to conclude that a report of sexual harassment constitutes a ‘health and safety’ report.” Id. at 17 (citing Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 21 F.Supp.2d 66 (D.Me.1998), aff'd in relevant part, 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir.1999)). Thus, Plaintiffs conclude that if the Court were to conclude that the job duties exception applied as to their claims under- subsection 1(A), them suit remains alive under subsection 1(B). Id. C. Defendant’s Reply Boulevard Motel contends that “[n]o reasonable jury could conclude that Parker had no duty to act in accordance with [its] policies and training” regarding reports of sexual harassment. Def.’s Reply at'2. It also accuses Plaintiffs of mischaracterizing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford, and says that the case’“stands only for the proposition that an employee can ‘oppose’ unlawful discrimination within the meaning of Title VII even if the employee does not initiate the report. It does not stand for the proposition that mere participation in an internal investigation is enough.” Id. at 3. Boulevard Motel argues that, similar to the plaintiff in Brush, “Pippin and Parker were disinterested parties to another’s complaint. They did not engage in personal opposition, but simply facilitated Martin’s report to management and human resources as they were required by company policy and training.” Id. at 4. In addition, Boulevard Motel points out that even if subsection 1(B) of the MWPA were at play in this case (which it disputes), it says “the District of Maine has applied Winslow to alleged reports of unsafe conditions under subpart B of the MWPA” as well. Id. at 6 (citing Stark, 37 F.Supp.3d 445). III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Summary judgment 'is' appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “has the potential to change the puteóme of the "suit.” Tropigas de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 637 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir.2011) (quoting Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2010)). A dispute is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995)). Once this evidence is supplied by the moving party, the nonmovant must “produce ‘specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to ... establish the presence of a trialworthy issue.’ ” Triangle Trading Co., Inc. v. Robroy Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1999) (quoting Morris v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1994)). In other words, the non-moving party must “present ‘enough competent evidence’ to enable a factfinder to decide in its favor on the disputed claims.” Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 237 (1st. Cir.2002) (quoting Goldman v. First Nat’l. Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993)). The Court then “views the facts and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Ophthalmic Surgeons, Ltd. v. Paychex, Inc., 632 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir.2011). However, the Court “afford[s] no evidentiary weight to ‘coneluso-ry allegations, empty rhetoric, unsupported speculation, or evidence which, in the aggregate, is less than significantly probative.’ ”, Tropigas, 637 F.3d at 56 (quoting Rogan v. City of Boston, 267 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir.2001)); accord Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 325 (1st Cir.2009). IV. DISCUSSION A. The Maine Whistleblower Protection Act and the Maine Human Rights Act Under the MWPA, “[n]o employer may discharge ... or otherwise discriminate against an employee” due to: , A. The employee, acting in good faith, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports orally or in writing to the employer or a public body what the employee has reasonable cause to believe is a violation of a law or rule adopted under the laws of this State, a political subdivision of this State or the United States; B. The employee, acting in good faith, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports to the employer. or a public body, orally or in writing, what the employee has reasonable cause to believe is a condition or practice that would put at risk the health or safety of that employee or any other individual_ 26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(A)-(B). “The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has held that [subsection (1)(Á) ], when read alongside the rest of section 833, ‘unambiguously limit[s] the protection afforded by the [MJWPA to (1) employees (2) who report to an employer (3) about a violation (4) committed or practiced by that employer.’” Winslow, 736 F.3d at 30 (quoting Costain v. Sunbury Primary Care, P.A., 2008 ME 142, ¶ 8, 954 A.2d 1051). Pursuant to the so-called McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, Plaintiffs have an “undemanding task of demonstrating a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation.” Osher v. Univ. of Maine Sys., 703 F.Supp.2d 51, 64 (D.Me.2010). For a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case under the MWPA, she must show that “(1) she engaged in activity protected by the [MJWPA; (2) she experienced an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Walsh, 2011 ME 99, ¶24, 28 A.3d 610; see also Tripp v. Cole, 425 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir.2005). Similarly, under the MHRA, “[a] person may (not discriminate against any individual because that individual has opposed any act or practice that is unlawful under this Act or because that individual made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this Act.” 5 M.R.S. § 4633(1). As under the MWPA, Plaintiffs must first establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation by proving that “(1) [s]he engaged in protected conduct under the statute; (2)[s]he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected conduct and the adverse action.” Bishop v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 299 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir.2002); see also Doyle, 2003 ME 61, ¶ 20, 824 A.2d 48. As Boulevard Motel’s contention is a narrow one — that Ms. Parker and Ms. Pippin have failed to establish the first element of their prima facie cases under both statutes because of the so-called “job duties” exception — the Court’s analysis and discussion focuses exclusively on Boulevard Motel’s contention under that theory. B. The Job Duties or Manager Rule Exception 1. The MWPA In Winslow, the plaintiff was instructed by her supervisor to email him notes she took during an exit interview, which included that federal monitors believed “it was improper for [plaintiff] to report to the County [of Aroostook]” as opposed to the Local Area I Workforce Investment Board (LWIB). 736 F.3d at 25. Subsequently, she was instructed by her supervisor to circulate these notes to the Chairman and two co-Chief Local Elected Officials (CLEOs) of the LWIB. Id. Approximately two months later, without permission of her supervisor, the Chairman or the CLEOs, the plaintiff revealed certain information to “all of the LWIB members and ‘interested parties’ ” via email (the “Opportunity” email), believing that revealing this information was her responsibility as Executive Director, but in her supervisor’s view, she went beyond her authority and her conduct constituted insubordination. Id. at 26-27. After the plaintiffs supervisor met with her to discuss her actions, id. at 27, the LWIB held a board meeting approximately two weeks later at which time the plaintiff was told to provide all board members with her exit interview notes. Id. at 28. Nearly three weeks later, after a new entity was designated fiscal agent of the LWIB to satisfy concerns of the federal monitors, plaintiff was terminated from her employment, purportedly “because the County of Aroostook will no longer be involved with the administration of this program.” Id. at 29. Although this new entity advertised a similar position to that previously held by plaintiff and plaintiff applied for the position, she was not hired. Id. She filed suit under the MWPA. Id. Judge Singal granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Id. On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed and held that the plaintiff was not a “whistleblower” within the meaning of Maine law for several reasons. Id. at 31. First, “[i]t was the federal monitors who uncovered the ‘violation’ of the regulations, and not [plaintiff]. They also eventually published a formal report of their findings. It was the monitors who initially reported the findings to [plaintiffs supervisor]; [plaintiff] did not do so.” Id. Second, “it was [plaintiffs supervisor] who directed [plaintiff] to distribute the interview notes ... [and] [t]o the extent [plaintiff] communicated information, she did so as part of her job responsibilities, either under direct instructions from [her supervisor] or as to the ‘Opportunity’ email because she thought it was among her responsibilities to do so.” Id. at 81-32 (emphasis in original). In sum, the Winslow Court explained that, while “there may be exceptions, the usual rule in Maine is that a plaintiffs reports are not whistleblowing if it is part of his or her job responsibilities to make such reports, particularly when instructed to do so by a superior.” Id. at 32 (citing Capalbo v. Kris-Way Truck Leasing, Inc., 821 F.Supp.2d 397, 419 (D.Me.2011) and collecting cases from other circuits). Courts in this district have followed Winslow. For example, in Harrison, where the plaintiff was required under both her employer’s employment policy and Maine law to make reports of suspected abuse, neglect or exploitation to her supervisor and to the Department of Health and Human Services (making her a “mandated reporter”), Magistrate Judge Rich held that these reports could not be the basis for her MWPA claim. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123668, at *18-21. Although she argued that making such reports were not part of her “regular job duties,” id. at *19, the Harrison Court rejected this contention. Id. at *19-20 (“Winslow cannot reasonably be read to be limited to reporting that is a ‘regular’ job duty”). Furthermore, the Harrison Court observed that the plaintiff believed it was her duty to make these reports and all employees were required to make these reports regardless of job title., Id. at *20. Similarly, in Stark, where the plaintiff was required to “report his vehicle’s mechanical problems” to his. employer, both in writing and orally, Magistrate Judge Rich held these reports could not form the basis of a MWPA claim. 37 F.Supp.3d at 482. Furthermore, in Capalbo, cited with approval by the Winslow Court, the plaintiff was told “in writing and orally that he shared responsibility for monitoring his hours and that he was to notify his supervisor whenever he was -in danger of violating DOT regulations regarding the maximum hours of work.” 821 F.Supp.2d at 419. Having found that the plaintiff complied with these directives, the Capalbo Court held that the plaintiffs conduct was not “in opposition to an unlawful employment practice of’ his employer, and thus, was “not protected activity for purposes of the MWPA.” Id.; see also Hall, 2013 WL 5510308, at *7, 2013 Me.Super. LEXIS 169, at *19-22 (“Plaintiff cannot recover under MWPA for making a report that was within his normal job duties”). 2. The MHRA Although the Court assumes that the preceding analysis regarding ' the job duties exception under the MWPA would apply with equal force to the anti-retaliation provision under the MHRA, the parties have not supplied and the Court could not locate caselaw from the Mainé Supreme Judicial Court or First Circuit definitively declaring that the exception applies to the MHRA, However, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has instructed that its “construction of the MHRA and [M]WPA has been guided by federal law.” Currie v. Indus. Sec., Inc., 2007 ME 12, ¶ 13, 915 A.2d 400; see also Watt, 2009 ME 47, ¶ 22 n. 4, 969 A.2d 897 (“It is appropriate to look to analogous federal case law for guidance in the interpretation of > the Maine Human • Rights Act (MHRA)”). This Court has followed suit in the past. See Ramsdell, 992 F.Supp.2d at 14 n. 19 (“To the extent Plaintiff states her retaliation claim under state and federal law, the same analysis applies and the Court considers the state and federal claims concurrently without laying out a separate analysis of Plaintiffs MHRA claim”); Green v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 77, 52 F.Supp.2d 98, 109 (D.Me.1999) (“The analytical framework used in Title VII retaliation claims applies to MHRA retaliation - claims”); Higgins, 21 F.Supp.2d at 72 (same). . Under Title .VII, it is unlawful “for an employer to discriminate against, any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.'S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In the First Circuit decision of Collazo, the plaintiff argued that the district court should not have granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant because he brought forth sufficient evidence “he was terminated for opposing sexual harassment in the workplace, in violation- of Title VII.” 617 F.3d at 45-46. The defendant argued, among other things, that “Collazo’s conduct was not protected because it was done in furtherance of his supervisory responsibilities.” Id. at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted). In making this argument, the defendant relied on the First Circuit’s decision in Claudio-Gotay v. Becton Dickinson Caribe, Ltd., 375 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir.2004). Collazo, 617 F.3d at 48-49. In Claudio-Gotay, the First Circuit reasoned that for a plaintiff to make out a retaliation claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), “the employee must step outside his or her role of representing the' company” and take “some action adverse to the company.” 375 F.3d at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted). As explained by the Eleventh Circuit in the context of Title VII, “an employee must cross the line from being an employee ‘performing her job ... to an employee lodging a personal complaint.’ ” Brush, 466 Fed.Appx. at 787 (quoting McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486 (10th Cir.1996)). Rather than rule on the defendant’s argument definitively, the Collazo Court explained it “assume[s], without deciding the issue, that similar requirements apply in the Title VII context—that is, that to engage in protected conduct under Title VU’s retaliation provision, an employee must step outside his ordinary employment role of representing the company and take action adverse to the cpmpany.” 617 F.3d at 49. Even under such an assumption, however, the First Circuit held that the plaintiff met his burden that he engaged in protected activity, particularly because he “was not a personnel manager warning his company of potential harassment claims against it; instead, he was a Senior Process Scientist assisting a subordinate employee in filing a sexual harassment complaint.” Id. As a result,. the plaintiff “‘stepp[ed] outside’ his normal employment role as a Senior Process Scientist and took ‘action adverse to the company.’” Id. (quoting Claudio-Gotay, 375 F.3d at 102). Finally, the Collazo Court concluded its analysis of this issue by noting that “an employer cannot be permitted to avoid liability for retaliation under Title VII simply by crafting equal employment policies that require its employees to report unlawful employment practices.” Id. Guided by First Circuit precedent, this Court assumes that the job duties exception applies to the anti-retaliation provision of the MHRA for purposes of ruling on Boulevard Motel’s motion. Thus, the Court turns to whether a' genuine dispute exists as to whether Ms. Parker or Ms. Pippin were acting outside their ordinary roles and took action adverse to Boulevard Motel. C. Analysis 1. Brenda Pippin The evidence establishes that Ms. Pippin was the Executive Housekeeper during the events in question. She was in charge of the housekeeping department and had responsibilities relating to hiring, firing, supervising and disciplining housekeeping employees. Among those she supervised were Ms. Parker and Ms. Martin. See Section I.B.1, supra. Like Ms. Parker, Ms, Pippin received annual training entitled, “Preventing Sexual Harassment Supervisor Version.” That annual training instructed "supervisors such as Ms. Pippin to immediately report employee complaints of sexual harassment according to the reporting structure outlined in company policy. Ms. Pippin, received Boulevard Motel’s policy entitled, “Supervisor’s Role During Sexual Harassment Investigation Procedures,” which required her to report to human resources any employee complaints about alleged harassment. See Section I.B.2, supra. On April 24, 2010, Ms. Pippin learned of the Martin-Crabtrée incident from Ms. Martin. Ms. Pippin told Ms. Martin that they needed to go talk to Ms'. Landergren. On April 27, 2010, Ms. Pippin ■ told Ms. Landergren that Ms. Martin had an incident with Mr. Crabtree that she needed to bring to Ms. Landergren’s attention. See Section I.B.4-5, supra. When Mr. Mello arrived at the Comfort Inn in early May 2010, he met with Ms. Pippin. Ms. Pippin also provided written statements at Boulevard Motel’s request. See. Section I.B.7, supra. Ms. Pippin believes that Ms. Martin should 'have brought her concerns about Mr. Crabtree to Ms. Pippin’s attention because Ms. Pippin was her boss. Ms. Pippin also believes that Ms.'Parker should have told Ms. Pippin about Ms. Martin’s concerns because Ms. Pippin was Ms. Parker’s boss. Ms. Pippin agrees that she should have brought Ms. Martin’s report to Ms. Landergren’s attention. Furthermore, Ms. Pippin agrees that the report about Mr. Crabtree’s behavior was made on Ms. Martin’s behalf and was Ms, Pippin’s report to make.. See Section I.B.10, supra, ■ On June 2, 2010, Ms. Pippin faxed a handwritten statement to Mr. Mello in which she relates Ms. Martin was still very upset, and felt that Ms. Landergren only cared about saving Mr. Crabtree. See Section I.B.12, supra. a. The MWPA For Ms. Pippin to overcome the job duties exception as regards her MWPA claim, she must show there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether her role in reporting Ms. Martin’s allegations were “part of ... her job responsibilities to make such reports, particularly when instructed to do so by a superior.” Winslow, 736 F.3d at 32. Ms. Pippin argues that Winslow is distinguishable from the facts of this case because (1) Ms. Parker believed Ms. Landergren was having an affair with Mr. Crabtree; (2) unlike the supervisor in Winslow, Ms. Landergren was skeptical of Ms. Martin’s allegations; and (3) “Ms. Landergren’s inappropriate personal involvement alone distinguishes this case from Winslow.” Pis.’ Opp’n at 14-15. The Court disagrees that these facts present a difference sufficiently meaningful to distinguish Winslow. Even assuming Ms. Landergren was skeptical of Ms. Martin’s allegations and Ms. Landergren acted inappropriately during the investigation process, these points do not affect the Court’s analysis of the job duties exception. Ms. Pippin also argues that “Ms. Parker and Ms. Pippin were not making a report at the direction of their supervisor.” Id. at 14. Caselaw provides, however, that an employee may be required to make a report by some other mechanism, such as by an employee 'written policy or perhaps even by law, and need not be directed by their supervisor for the job duties exception to trigger. See, e.g., Harrison, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123668, at *18-21 (all employees required to make reports to their supervisor and Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to employment policy and Maine law); Stark, 37 F.Supp.3d at 481 (“It is undisputed that Stark was required, pursuant to Hartt’s Position Objective and Responsibilities Policy, to check his equipment daily by doing a pre-trip inspection, report any unsafe equipment or working conditions to his supervisor, and report any needed repairs or special maintenance to the Maintenance Department”); Capalbo, 821 F.Supp.2d at 419 (plaintiff was told “in writing and orally that he shared responsibility for monitoring his hours and that he was to notify his supervisor whenever he was in danger of violating DOT regulations regarding the maximum hours of work”). Here, Boulevard Motel’s policy clearly instructed a supervisor such as Ms. Pippin to report allegations of sexual harassment to upper management, and she admitted during her deposition that it was her job to bring Ms. Martin’s complaint to Ms. Landergren’s attention. It is also factually inaccurate for Plaintiffs to claim they made no reports at the direction of their supervisor or employer. When Mr. Mello arrived at the Comfort Inn, he met with them and gathered statements from Ms. Pippin and Ms. Parker, which had been requested by Boulevard Motel. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Pippin, the Court concludes there is no genuine dispute of material fact that it was part of her job responsibilities to make the reports she made, and thus, summary judgment is proper as regards her MWPA claim because the job duties exception applies. Ms. Pippin was more than just a “housekeeper.” Her initial report to Ms. Landergren was required of her under Boulevard Motel’s policy entitled, “Preventing Sexual Harassment Supervisor Version.” Ms. Pippin agreed that she should have brought Ms. Martin’s complaint to Ms. Landergren’s attention. See Winslow, 736 F.3d at 32 (“she thought it was among her responsibilities to do so”). Her subsequent meeting with Mr. Mello and submitted statement requested of her by Boulevard Motel are no different from the plaintiff in Winslow. Id. (“To the extent [plaintiff] communicated information, she did so as part of her job responsibilities ... under direct instructions from [her supervisor]”). Even if Ms, Pippin’s initial report was part of her job responsibilities, Ms. Pippin argues that her second report, the June 2, 2010 fax to Mr. Mello, was protected under the MWPA. It is true that Ms. Pippin sent a fax to Mr. Mello on June 2, 2010 relaying that Ms. Martin was still upset and that Ms. Martin felt that Ms. Landergren only cared about saving Mr. Crabtree. The chronology is important. Ms. Pippin (along with Ms. Martin and Ms. Parker) reported the incident-to Ms. Lan-dergren on April 27, 2010. Mr. Mello arrived at the Comfort Inn to perform his investigation on or around May 6, 2010 (one week after Ms. Landergren met with Mr. Crabtree). Mr. Heiss, Vice President of Operations for Sunburst Hospitality Corporation, issued the results of the internal investigation on May 11, 2010. PSAMF ¶ 17; DRPSAMF ¶ 17. It was on June 2, 2010, weeks after the May 11, 2010 investigative report, that Ms. Pippin faxed a handwritten statement to Mr. Mello saying that Ms. Martin was still upset and that Ms. Martin felt that Ms. Landergren only cared about saving Mr. Crabtree. This chronology confirms that Ms. Pippin’s fax of June 2, 2010 only reiterated that Ms. Martin was still upset and raised her view that the internal investigation was not performed properly because she felt Ms. Landergren was improperly influencing its outcome, Although the Court could not locate caselaw dealing with this precise question under Maine, law, other courts have ruled that statements relaying criticism of an internal investigation are not “protected activity” within the meaning of Title VII. Brush, 466 Fed.Appx. at 786 (“Quite simply, Brush’s disagreement with the way in which Sears conducted its internal investigation into Mrs. Doe’s allegations does not constitute protected activity.... [C]ertainly internal investigations alone do not constitute discriminatory practices”); Entrekin v. City of Panama City, Fla., 376 Fed.Appx. 987, 994 (11th Cir.2010) (“Title VII does not, however, establish requirements for an employer’s internal procedures for receiving sexual harassment complaints, or even require that employers must have an internal procedure for receiving such complaints”). In Brush, the Eleventh Circuit observed that protected activity under Title VII represents “a plaintiff’s opposition ... to a practice made unlawful by Title VII. Since there is no evidence of Brush’s opposition to any unlawful practice here, it follows that Brush can support no claim under Title VII.” 466 Fed.Appx. at 786 (internal punctuation omitted). Likewise, to establish a prima facie case under the MWPA, Ms. Pippin needs to show that she engaged in activity protected by the MWPA. However, as in Brush, to the extent she is stating in this fax either her disagreement or Ms. Martin’s disagreement with the internal investigation conducted by Boulevard Motel, this is not protected activity, especially because Ms. Pippin was not the victim of the alleged harassment. See id. (“Brush was neither the aggrieved nor the accused party in the underlying allegations. Instead, she was one of the Sears employees tasked with conducting the internal investigation. As such, her claims relate not to Mrs. Doe’s allegations, but instead to the procedures of the internal investigation conducted by Sears”). Ms. Pippin makes one final argument in hopes of saving her claim under the MWPA. She says that if the Court were to conclude that her claims under subsection 1(A) are barred by the job duties exception, then it is saved under subsection 1(B) because she made “health and safety” reports to Boulevard Motel. Pis. ’ Opp’n at 1617. In other words, she argues that activity that falls under subsection 1(B) is immune from the job duties exception. Id. at 17. ’ The Court makes several observations. First, Ms. Pippin’s Complaint speaks in terms of subsection 1(A) as opposed to subsection 1(B). Compare Compl. ¶ 18 (“Plaintiff, acting at all times in good faith, reported to her employer what she reasonably believed were violations of state laws or rules____”), with 26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(A) (“The employee, acting in good faith ... reports orally or in writing to the employer ... what the employee has reasonable cause to believe is a violation of a law or rule adopted under the laws of this State — ”). There is no similar reference to subsection 1(B) in Ms. Pippin’s Complaint. Second, assuming it is proper for Ms. Pippin to raise this argument without moving to amend her Complaint, the Court nonetheless rejects her contention that the job duties exception is inapplicable. It is true that the Court has previously recognized that subsection' 1(B) “speaks in broad terms, covering any ‘condition or practice that would put at risk the health or safety of [the plaintiff] or any other individual.’ ” Levitt, 918 F.Supp.2d at 88 (quoting 26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(B)). The Court has also suggested that a plaintiff who complains “about allegedly unsafe and illegal conditions, including his harassment by other employees” may constitute protected activity within the meaning of either subsection. Higgins, 21 F.Supp.2d at 71-73 (“Many of Plaintiffs alleged complaints relate to potentially illegal or unsafe conditions and therefore may constitute protected conduct under these subsections of the MWPA cited above”). At the same time, the plaintiff in Higgins was complaining about alleged sexual harassment aimed at him (i.e., he was the victim of the harassment). Furthermore, Winslow did not differentiate between subsections for purposes of applying the job duties exception to the MWPA, rather, it said “the usual rule in Maine is that a plaintiffs reports are not whistleblowing if it is part of his or her job responsibilities to make such reports, particularly when instructed to do so by a superior.” 736 F.3d at 32. The Court will not differentiate between subsections in concluding that the job duties exception applies to Ms. Pippin. See Stark, 37 F.Supp.3d at 484 (“Even accepting, as [plaintiff] asserts, that Hartt did not reasonably promptly correct reported mechanical deficiencies about which he had safety concerns, he does not demonstrate that he engaged in protected conduct for purposes of the MWPA”) (emphasis added). In' sum, the Court concludes that summary judgment is proper as regards Ms. Pippin’s retaliation claim under the MWPA. b. The MHRA Addressing Ms. Pippin’s retaliation claim under the MHRA, as the Court assumes that Maine law would mirror federal law, including the assumption made by the Collazo Court that the job duties exception applies to Title VII, for Ms. Pippin to overcome the job duties exception as regards her MHRA claim, she must show there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she “stepfped] outside [her] ordinary employment role of representing the company and [took] action adverse to the company.” Collazo, 617 F.3d at 49. Said another way, she must have been acting as “an employee lodging a personal complaint.” Brush, 466 Fed.Appx. at 787 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ms. Pippin argues that the Supreme Court ruling in Cranford stands for the proposition that “the anti-retaliation provisión of Title VII extends to people who speak out, not just on their own initiative, but when prompted'by an employer’s internal investigation.” Pis.’ Opp’n at 10. In Crojioford, the Supreme Court considered whether the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII “extends to an employee who speaks out about discrimination not on her own initiative, but in. answering questions during an employer’s internal investigation.” 555 U.S. at 273, 129 S.Ct. 846. In holding that it does, the Crawford Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning that Title VII “demands active, consistent opposing activities to warrant ... protection against retaliation.” Id. at 275, 129 S.Ct. 846 (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, the Crawford Court stated: There is, then, no reason to doubt that a person can “oppose” by responding to someone else’s question just as surely as by provoking the discussion, and nothing in the statute requires a freakish rule protecting an employee-who reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question. Id. at 277-78,129 S.Ct. 846. Crawford, however, did not address the job duties exception, nor did it purport to eliminate the exception. To the extent Ms. Pippin argues tiiat Crawford extinguished the job duties exception or made it inapplicable under Title VII, the Court finds this argument unavailing. In Collazo, the First Circuit relied on Crawford in concluding that the plaintiff “opposed” the alleged sexual harassment. 617 F.3d- at ■46-49. At the same time, the First Circuit also “assume[d], without deciding the issue”- that the job duties exception would apply to the -anti-retaliation provision under Title VIL Id. at 49. This is significant. There would have been no need for the First Circuit to “assume” that the job duties exception applied under Title VII if Crawford had done away with the exception. Oth