Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM & ORDER MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge: Plaintiff Sylvia Bowen-Hooks brings the above-captioned action against Defendants City of New York, Commissioner David Frankel, Sheriff Lindsay Eason, Chief of Operations Timothy LaRose, First Deputy Sheriff Oliver Pu-Folkes and Chief of Staff Peter Sammarco, alleging claims of race and gender discrimination, retaliation and creation of a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. (“NYSHRL”) and the New York State Constitution, the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. (“NYCHRL”), and violations of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Plaintiff also brings suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deprivation of due process and equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendants moved for summary judgment as to all claims. At oral argument the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s (1) Equal Pay Act claims, (2) race and gender discrimination claims under Title VII against all individual Defendants, (3) § 1981 claim for race discrimination against all individual Defendants sued in their official capacity, and against the City of New York, (4) § 1981 and § 1983 claims against Commissioner David M. Frankel, and (5) due process claim to the extent a due process claim was alleged. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs claims under federal and state law, and declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims under the NYCHRL which are dismissed without prejudice. I. Factual Background a. Plaintiffs duties in the Sheriffs Office Plaintiff is employed as a lieutenant in the Sheriffs Division of the Department of Finance (“Sheriffs Office”). (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 1; PI. 56.1 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff began working with the Sheriffs Office in 1986, and the Sheriffs Office became part of the Department of Finance (“DOF”) in 1995. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 3; PI. 56.1 ¶ 3.) Plaintiff was promoted to the position of lieutenant in 1997, after passing a civil service test and being selected from an eligible list. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 4; PI. 56.1 ¶ 4.) Plaintiff worked in an office in Manhattan between 1997 and 2004. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 12-15; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 12-15.) In 2004 Plaintiff was transferred to the office at 30-10 Starr Avenue in Long Island City, where she was assigned to the Scofflaw Tow Unit to work as a contracts manager until 2007, overseeing contracts between the DOF and private towing companies. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 17, 20, 25; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 17, 20, 25, 30; PL Dep. 34:2-10, 37:15-17.) According to Plaintiff, she was the only African-American female lieutenant, and the position of contract manager was an undesirable and burdensome position that previously had never been assigned to any lieutenant. (PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 26, 28, 36; PI. Dep. 37:25-38:7, 54:13-15.) She was not given any preparation to fulfill the responsibilities of the position, did not like the work, and voiced objections to her supervisor. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 23; PI. 56.1 ¶ 23; PI. Dep. 38:8-21.) In addition to her duties as contract manager in the Scofflaw Tow unit, Plaintiff was also assigned to work in other units, including working security detail for buildings beginning sometime after 2004, working as a lieutenant in the cigarette tax unit beginning in 2006 — her primary assignment — performing duties in the warrants unit under the title of “community coordinator,” assisting in the auction unit and the auto theft unit beginning in 2006, assisting sergeants assigned to other units if and when they required it, and assisting with personnel needs across multiple units as needed. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶20, 31-36; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 31-36; PI. Dep. 37:15-16, 50:15-53:10.) Plaintiff claims that having responsibilities spread across several units placed her at a disadvantage relative to the white male lieutenants, who were permitted to concentrate on just one unit, and that the additional responsibilities were given to her in or around June 2006, immediately after she filed an internal EEO complaint. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 38; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 38, 55; PI. Dep. 39:13-19, 40:21^11:14, 51:6-8, 61:12-21; Defs. Ex. D, Deposition of Timothy LaRose (“LaRose Dep.”) 43:2-3.) b. 2006 window covering incident According to Plaintiff, when she began working in the office at 30-10 Starr Avenue in 2004, all of the offices in the building had already been allotted to the white male lieutenants, leaving her as the only lieutenant who was not allotted an office. Plaintiff found and used a “tape room” off the main hallway as her office. (PI. Dep. 62:22-63:5, 218:14-220:4.) The door to this room had a window, which Plaintiff covered with opaque material. (PI. Dep. 63:5-6.) Plaintiff covered the window because she counseled deputies in her office, which required privacy, and because she occasionally changed in her office. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 70 (citing PL Dep. 220:23-221:16); PI. 56.1 ¶ 70 (citing PI. Dep. 62:22-25, 63:1-6).) Plaintiffs office was off the main hallway with ample foot traffic, whereas the offices of all the other lieutenants were either inside a larger room, or had solid wood doors. (PI. Dep. 217:21-219:6, 220:17-221:16.) In April or May of 2006, Sammarco began working in the office at 30-10 Starr Avenue as an Integrity Officer. (PI. Dep. 2:5-6, 223:4.) Sammarco observed that several offices in the building had material covering the windows on the doors, or the windows between the offices and hallways, and contacted Sheriff Eason inquiring about the covered windows. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 56, 58; PI. 56.1 ¶ 58; Defs. Ex. J, Deposition of Peter Sammarco (“Sammarco Dep.”) 63:25-65:2.) Sammarco did not believe this was a good business practice. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 58; PI. 56.1 ¶¶56, 58; Sam-marco Dep. 63:25-65:2.) On May 19, 2006, LaRose visited the office at 30-10 Starr Avenue and subsequently sent an email to two Undersheriffs requesting that the opaque material covering the windows be removed immediately unless there was a work-related justification for the windows to be covered. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 53; PL 56.1 ¶ 53; Defs. Ex. I.) According to Defendants, everyone removed their window coverings. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 60). According to Plaintiff, the other lieutenants all had solid doors and no windows into their offices, and they continued to close the doors when they needed privacy. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 60; PI. Dep. 64:14-19.) Plaintiff removed the cover from her office window, but after Sam-marco left the office at 30-10 Starr Avenue in 2007, Plaintiff again covered the window. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 60, 62; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 60, 62.) c. 2006 EEO complaint and EEOC charge According to Plaintiff, on May 22, 2006, she called the EEO Officer for the DOF, Annie Long, to complain about the directive, indicating that because she was the only female lieutenant in the building, the directive prevented her from enjoying her privacy like the “other bosses.” (PI. 56.1 ¶ 47; PI. Ex. B and Defs. Ex. C (“2006 EEOC charge”) at 2.) Plaintiff states that EEO Officer Long contacted management, although Plaintiff did not know precisely who, and the next day Long called Plaintiff to discourage her from moving forward with a formal EEO complaint. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 47, PI. Dep. 61:22-62:10, 65:1-19; 2006 EEOC charge at 2.) Plaintiff contends that the day after this conversation with the EEO Officer, Plaintiff was assigned additional duties working in other units. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 47.) Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC approximately three months later, on August 22, 2006, alleging race and gender discrimination in connection with the directive to remove the window coverings, (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 55; PI. 56.1 ¶ 55; 2006 EEOC charge), and in connection with being assigned “menial tasks” on May 23, 2006, (2006 EEOC charge at 2). Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter but decided not to sue at that time. (PI. Dep. 70:21-71:11.) In the 2006 EEOC charge, Plaintiff noted that three other offices were affected by the directive, two of which opened onto a smaller area with just a small number of staff, and one of which belonged to Sam-marco, but because those offices did not open onto a main hallway, the occupants of those offices did not have their privacy interfered with by the directive in the same way her privacy was affected. (2006 EEOC charge.) Plaintiff also noted that immediately after she had a conversation with the EEO officer in the Sheriffs Office, she was asked to take on the duties of another unit, and assigned menial tasks. (Id. at 2.) d. Performing Undersheriff duties Plaintiff claims that, in or about November 2007, Plaintiffs direct supervisor, Un-dersheriff Peter Talamo, retired, and Plaintiff took over some of his responsibilities including generating reports, signing time-sheets for the Firearms and Auto Theft unit, attending meetings and making decisions. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 136; PI. 56.1 ¶ 136; PI. Dep. 144:1-19.) Plaintiff performed these additional duties without a direct supervisor for the approximately seven months it took to find a replacement for Talamo. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 138; PI. 56.1 ¶ 137.) The work caused her to stay late “a couple of times like 20 minutes, a half an hour,” but she did not request overtime pay for these hours. (PL Dep. 146:14-18.) Nor did Plaintiff receive additional compensation for performing these additional duties. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 137.) Plaintiff was a Level 1 Lieutenant, while individuals with the title of Undersheriff were Level 2 Lieutenants. (Pl. Dep. 145:12-17; Oral Arg. Tr. 43:5-45:14.) Plaintiff made the same as or more than all other Level 1 Lieutenants, but did not make as much as a Level 2 Lieutenant who had the position of Under-sheriff. (Pl. Dep. 144:25-145:6.) Plaintiff claims that no other Level 1 lieutenant was subject to the extra duties of filling in for Undersheriff, and that all the individuals performing the work of an Undersheriff were making more money than her and were all males. (Pl. Opp’n Mem. 18-19.) Plaintiff acknowledges that the position of Undersheriff, which was a “Lieutenant Level 2” position, was attained by taking the civil service test. (Id. at 145:23-23, 187:10-17.) Plaintiff was aware of how civil service worked, and knew that they would not pay her more unless she was actually promoted to the position of Un-dersheriff. (Id. 148:17-21.) Plaintiff had not taken the civil service exam to apply for the position of Undersheriff. (Id. at 145:16-25, 148:17-21, 149:14-20.) The Un-dersheriff position remained open for several months because “they couldn’t decide whether they wanted to use the civil service list or choose somebody of their liking.” (Id. at 145:17-20.) Plaintiff did not apply for the position. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 137; Pl. Dep. 45:21-25.) e. Assignment to Kendra’s Unit In June 2009, the Cigarette Tax unit was disbanded. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 80; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 80; Pl. Dep. 72:21-73:17.) Plaintiff was transferred to “Kendra’s Unit,” which works with citizens with uncontrolled mental illness, and was moved to a different office at 30-10 Starr Avenue. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 81-82; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 81-82.) Plaintiff was given the title of “Administrative Lieutenant,” with the responsibility to perform administrative functions and provide additional supervisory coverage when the lieutenant with primary responsibility for the unit was not present. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 86; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 86.) Plaintiff claims that the title of administrative lieutenant had never existed before, and had never been given to any of the male lieutenants. (Pl. Dep. 82:22-25.) According to Plaintiff, Kendra’s Unit was a “voluntary” unit, and employees were assigned to it only when they requested the assignment but Plaintiff was assigned to the unit even though she had not requested assignment to this unit. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 81, 83; Pl. Dep. 77:11-20.) A document listing all the transfers within the Sheriff’s Office over a 3-year period indicates that Plaintiff requested a transfer to Kendra’s Unit. (Pl. Ex. K at 3.) Plaintiff claims that this document is “inaccurate.” (Pl. Dep. 77:13-16.) Plaintiff asserts that the transfer to Kendra’s Unit was “punishment” because the work was “just a repetition of the same thing of picking up mentally ill people.” (Pl. Dep. 89:2-18.) f. Transfers When Cigarette Tax unit was disbanded in June 2009, approximately one-quarter of the staff — 25 deputies and lieutenants — in the Sheriffs Office were transferred. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 80; Pl. 56.1 ¶80; Pl. Dep. 72:21-73:17.) Plaintiff was not aware that the Cigarette Tax unit would be disbanded and that the transfers would be taking place, and did not have an opportunity to request to be transferred to a unit closer to her home. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 79-81; Pl. Dep. 81:2-16.) Plaintiff had previously informed her supervisor, Talamo, that she would prefer to work out of the Queens Law Enforcement Bureau, located at the western edge of Queens, closer to her home, (Pl. Dep. 87:21-88:6), but Chief Ta-lamo was no longer with the Sheriffs Department at the time of the June 2009 Transfers, (Id. at 88:7-8). Plaintiff did not request to be transferred to the Queens location after she learned about the transfers in June 2009. (Id. at 88:9-19.) Plaintiff claims that as a result of the June 2009 transfers, several other lieutenants, all white males, transferred to, or remained in, a unit located in the borough closest to their home. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 87, 91-94 (citing Pl. Dep.); Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 91, 94 (citing Pl. Ex. K, Sherriffs Office Transfers from Jan. 1, 2008-Oct. 10, 2010).) Plaintiff did not know whether these lieutenants had requested the transfers. In January 2011, Plaintiff requested and was granted a transfer to the Queens Law Enforcement Bureau. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 95; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 95.) g. Discipline and scrutiny i. September 2009 meeting According to Plaintiff, in September 2009 several incidents took place illustrating a pattern of retaliatory disciplinary actions taken against her. On September 4, 2009, a meeting took place between Kendra’s Unit personnel, Sheriffs Office leadership, and personnel from the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“DOHMH”), which provides all of the funding for the Kendra’s Unit operations. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 96, 98-99; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 96, 98-99.) During the meeting, Plaintiff became involved in a verbal “back and forth” with Dr. Medina, an employee of DOHMH, during which Plaintiff raised her voice. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 101-108; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 101-103.) Sammarco, who was taking notes at the meeting, (Sammarco Dep. 40:22-41:7), included a summary of the exchange in the meeting minutes, (Pl. Ex. M (“September 4, 2009 Meeting Minutes”).) Sammarco’s characterization of the exchange made Plaintiff look bad, without providing the full context of the exchange and without indicating that Dr. Medina shared fault. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 108.) Plaintiff asserts that Sammarco did this in retaliation for Plaintiffs previous complaints of discrimination and harassment against Sammarco. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 103.) At that same meeting, after the staff from DOHMH left, Plaintiff was asked to fill in on field duty to replace a sergeant who had been injured, which Plaintiff declined to do. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 104-105, 108; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 104-105, 108; Pl. Dep. 97:7-10.) Plaintiff was “taken aback” and “shocked” by the request, and responded that she had been at the Sheriffs Office a long time, she was 50 years old, and she did not want to go into the field. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 105, Pl. 56.1 ¶ 105; Pl. Dep. 94:7-11.) According to Plaintiff, there were plenty of sergeants available who could have filled in for the injured sergeant. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 105-106; Pl. Dep. 94:20-95:1.) Plaintiff and First Deputy Pu-Folkes became involved in a “testy” verbal exchange in which Plaintiff raised her voice at Pu-Folkes. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 108; Pl. Dep. 97:11-12.) Plaintiff claims the meeting minutes inaccurately indicated that Plaintiff raised her voice at the Sheriff, rather than only at Pu-Folkes. (Pl. Dep. 97:15-18.) Plaintiff eventually participated in field duty two or three times, when another lieutenant, Lieutenant Zane, who normally was in the field with Kendra’s Unit, was not available. (Id. at 94:20-25, 99:13-24; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 109.) ii.Jewelry complaint Immediately after the September 4, 2009 meeting, Pu-Folkes had a conversation with Plaintiffs supervisor, Undersher-iff Doyle, regarding Plaintiff wearing jewelry while in uniform during the meeting, in violation of the Sheriffs Office code. (Sammarco Dep. 41:12-42:20; Defs. Ex. L, Deposition of Oliver Pu-Folkes, 19:6— 22:21.) Later that day, Plaintiffs supervisor, Undersheriff Doyle, had a discussion with Plaintiff about wearing jewelry while in uniform. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 114; PL 56.1 ¶ 114.) Doyle memorialized that conversation in a memorandum addressed to La-Rose on September 18, 2009. (Defs. Ex. M.) Plaintiff contends that she also received a counseling memorandum about wearing jewelry, however, this memorandum is not in the record, and Plaintiff could not say whether it had ever been placed in her personnel file. (PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 113, 118; PI. Dep. 114:16-21.) Plaintiff further contends that, although other male officers wear jewelry, they were only verbally reprimanded for their first infraction, while Plaintiff received a counseling memorandum for her first infraction. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 113.) On September 10, 2009, Supervisor LaRose sent an email to Doyle requesting him to “[pllease ensure that you include Lt. Bowen’s uniform infractions on September 4th” in a quarterly report. (PI. Ex. R, Email dated Sept. 10, 2009.) iii.Counseling memorandum regarding statements about age On September 8, 2009, Doyle had a discussion with Plaintiff about Sheriffs Office EEO policy, informing Plaintiff that her reference to her age at the September 4, 2009 meeting mistakenly suggested that age could be a qualifier for job assignments. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 114; PI. 56.1 ¶114; Defs. Ex. M.) Plaintiff received a related counseling memorandum from Doyle on Oct. 13, 2009. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 116; Defs. Ex. O (“Counseling Memorandum dated October 13, 2009”); PI. Dep. 114:21-23.) On September 30, 2009 Doyle received a counseling memorandum from First Deputy Pu-Folkes noting that, during the September 4, 2009 meeting, two of Doyle’s subordinates, Plaintiff and Lieutenant Zane, had expressed a “strong view that safety concerns justify making field assignments based on age as a qualifier,” and that Doyle had missed an opportunity to enforce the EEO policies and procedures of the Sheriffs Office by not correcting these misstatements. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 115; PI. 56.1 ¶ 115; Defs. Ex. N (“Memorandum to Un-dersheriff Doyle dated Sept. 30, 2009”).) iv.Directive to wear full uniform Plaintiff claims that in September 2009 she was ordered to wear her full uniform at all times, although it was the practice in the Sheriffs Office that officers who were not in the field “were allowed to be in civilian clothes], and I was allowed to be” in civilian clothes. (PI. Dep. 130:19-131:12.) Plaintiff claims that a “couple of weeks” after she was individually directed to wear her full uniform at all times, Defendants issued a directive requiring the rest of her unit to do the same. (PI. Dep. 137:7-24, 138:16-21.) On September 18, 2009 Doyle sent an email to Plaintiff and three other Lieutenants advising that, effective September 23, 2009, all unformed personnel were required to be in uniform five minutes after the start of their tour. (Pl. Ex. T, Email dated Sept. 18, 2009.) Shortly after that, another directive went out ordering all other units to be in uniform at all times. (Pl. Dep. 131:2-4, 134:20-135:6,137:7-22.) h.2009 EEO complaint On September 11, 2009, Plaintiff filed an EEO complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of age, gender, color, race and being a union delegate, and retaliation for filing a complaint, based on the actions of Eason, Pu-Folkes, and LaRose in asking her to perform the tasks of a sergeant. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 120, Pl. 56.1 ¶ 120; Defs. Ex. E and Pl. Ex. S.) Plaintiff wrote that “[s]ince I stated to management I didn’t want to do the job of a Sgt. I have been harassed by memos written to my supervisor about me from management causing me undue distress.” (2009 EEO Complaint.) i.2010 EEOC charge Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC on or about January 7, 2010, alleging race and gender discrimination, retaliation and a hostile work environment, (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 50, Pl. 56.1 ¶ 50), concerning an assortment of actions by Defendants, including (1) being subject to unfair discipline, (2) not being awarded discretionary pay, (3) being denied the opportunity for overtime pay, (4) not being transferred to an office closer to her home, (5) being subjected to excessive monitoring and criticism, (6) being “subjected to a hostile work environment whereby my authority as a Lieutenants is undermined, I am given menial tasks, subject to stalking,” and (7) not receiving awards, (Defs. Ex. F (“2010 EEOC charge”) at 2). j.Scrutiny of Plaintiffs supervisor Beginning in January 2010, Plaintiff began an eleven-month external course to train as a professional chef, and her supervisor allowed her to change the hours of her shift to 4:00 am to 12:00 pm to accommodate her course. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 39-40; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 39-40.) Four months into the start of her culinary program, Chief of Operations LaRose learned about Plaintiffs change in hours and told Plaintiffs supervisor that such a change of hours was “not acceptable.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 43; Pl. Ex. D and Defs. Ex. D, LaRose Dep. 26:10-30:24.) Plaintiff contends that this additional scrutiny and LaRose’s attempt to have her hours changed was inconsistent with the practice of the Sheriffs Office of allowing Undersheriffs to give their lieutenants their preferred shift hours, and of permitting other, male, lieutenants to work their preferred hours to accommodate child care, a second job, or other needs. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 45; Pl. Dep. 23:8-24:23.) Plaintiff continued on her 4:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. hours until her course was completed in November 2010, and then returned to her regular shift hours. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 44; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 44.) k.2010 window covering incident In August or September 2010, Sammar-co returned to the office at 30-10 Starr Avenue as Chief of Operations, and twice ordered Plaintiff to remove the covering from her window. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 64-65; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 65.) On December 8, 2010, Sam-marco emailed Plaintiffs supervisor, Doyle, noting that Plaintiff still had not removed the cover from her window and informing Doyle that if the cover was not removed by the end of the following day, Sammarco would seek charges against Plaintiff for disobeying an order. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 66; Defs. Ex. K.) According to Sam-marco, Plaintiff contacted Undersheriff Fueito to complain about the directive. (Sammarco Dep. 66:9-11.) On December 16, 2010, Fueito sent an email to the entire staff directing any staff with an enclosed office to keep their office door open, and permitting those who “are changing clothes or conducting sensitive agency business” to close the door or use other methods, such as window shades, to ensure privacy during that period of time. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 72; PL 56.1 ¶ 72; Defs. Ex. K and PI. Ex. I.) Plaintiff removed the cover from her window at an unspecified time. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 67; PI. 56.1 ¶ 67.) 1.Sexual harassment allegations According to Plaintiff, in 2006 Sammarco would walk past her office as many as 20 times per day, and “every time he went past my door, he had to look in. You know, like look. And then keep walking.” (PI. Dep. 225:5-11.) Plaintiff also claims that Sammarco would “stare” at her when she walked down a hallway, and would walk behind her in a “menacing” manner, (Id. at 226:2; Defs. 56.1 ¶ 73 (citing PI. Dep. 225:4-226:19, 227:8-228:8); PI. 56.1 ¶ 73), and that he “had a habit of staring at black women” and three other women in the office had also experienced Sammarco “staring” at them. (PI. Dep. 232:5-234:14.) “Sammarco [also] had a habit of being present at places where such presence was neither needed nor justified, as Sergeant Jefferson Rodriguez from the Warrants Unit complained about Peter Sammarco being present between sergeants for no reason during morning assignments.... Hence, not only Plaintiff, but several officers had problems with hostility and discomfort that Sammarco created at the Sheriffs Office.” (PI. 56.1 ¶ 59.) According to Defendants, Sammarco would walk through the building to review the work of personnel, where they are working and what they are doing. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 74 (citing Sammarco Dep. 55:17-56:12).) In November 2010, both Plaintiff and Sammarco were in the garage of the office at 30-10 Starr Avenue. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 75; PI. 56.1 ¶ 75.) According to Plaintiff, Sam-marco followed Plaintiff into the garage, and when she turned around, he stood “glaring” at her. (PI. Dep. 227:21-22, 228:15-20.) Sammarco continued to stand and glare at Plaintiff while she got into her truck and drove through the garage until she exited the garage. (Defs. 56.1 ¶75; PI. 56.1 ¶ 75; PI. Dep. 228:15-229:6.) According to Sammarco, he was looking for the deputy who was in charge of the fleet of vehicles, and when he could not find the deputy in the deputy’s office near the garage, Sammarco entered the garage, saw Plaintiffs truck driving out, and looked to see if the driver was the deputy he was looking for. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 76 (citing Sam-marco Dep. 71:6-72:15).) m.2010 EEO complaint On December 17, 2010, Plaintiff filed an internal EEO complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of color, gender and race, and sexual harassment and retaliation, based on Sammarco’s directive to remove the window covering, his practice of “glaring and peeking through windows at myself and other women,” and the incident in the garage. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 68; PI. 56.1 ¶ 68; Defs. Ex. H (“December 2010 EEO Complaint”).) n.Evaluations Plaintiff received an evaluation of “Good,” lower than “Superior” or “Outstanding” for each of the three years between 2002 and 2005. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 145-147; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 145-147.) For the 2005-06, and 2006-07 years, Plaintiff received a rating of “Superior,” just below “Outstanding.” (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 148-150; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 148-150.) For the 2007-08 year, when Plaintiff was without a direct supervisor for seven months, Plaintiffs evaluation was conducted by LaRose. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 139; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 139.) Plaintiff contends that La-Rose, who was stationed in Manhattan, infrequently interacted with Plaintiff, had little basis to formulate an evaluation, and simply copied the prior year’s evaluation by rating Plaintiff as “Superior.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 151; Pl. Dep. 152:18-20.) Plaintiff felt that the rating of “Superior” did not adequately reflect the additional work she had been doing while filling in as an Under-sheriff, and that it was not appropriate for LaRose, who had only seen her three times that year, to prepare the evaluation. (Pl. Dep. 152:18-20.) Plaintiff refused to sign the evaluation, noting that she had not had a supervisor, and that there was no adequate basis on which the evaluation could be based. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 151; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 151; Defs. Ex. R, Email from Plaintiff dated July 17, 2009.) The following year, 2008-2009, Plaintiffs direct supervisor, Undersheriff Schor, did not complete an evaluation for Plaintiff. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 152; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 152.) Plaintiff did not ask for one because none of the other lieutenants had to ask for their evaluations, rather, they were given their evaluation automatically. (Pl. Dep. 254:8-23.) For the 2009-10 year, Plaintiff received an evaluation with a final rating of “Superior.” (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 153; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 153.) The evaluation included an addendum dated August 30, 2010 from LaRose documenting that La-Rose had requested Doyle to incorporate three issues into Plaintiffs evaluation and, because Doyle refused to do so, LaRose was including the issues himself in his capacity as reviewer of the performance evaluations. (Pl. Ex. W, Plaintiff 2009-2010 Evaluation, at 4). The three issues were (1) Plaintiff misstating EEO laws at the meeting on September 4, 2009 when she commented that “she could not be required to perform' field work” since she was over 50 years old, (2) Plaintiff being “insubordinate” by raising her voice to Sheriff Eason at the same meeting, and (3) Plaintiff wearing jewelry at that meeting which was not in compliance with uniform requirements. (Id.) o. Overtime Overtime assignments in the Sheriff’s Office required pre-approval, and at times offers to work overtime were made by email to all staff or to all lieutenants in the Sheriffs Office. (PI. Dep. 201:19, 202:17-22.) According to Plaintiff, even when such an email was circulated, certain individuals had already been “pre-picked” to be offered the overtime assignments, and Plaintiff was never one of those individuals. (Pl. Dep. 203:25-204:1.) Plaintiff could not offer a specific time when such a pre-selection had taken place, or likely taken place. (Pl. Dep. 204: 3.) Plaintiff contends that one of the reasons she was not “pre-picked” in this manner was because she did not have a supervisor for seven months between November 2007 and May 2008. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 174.) While overtime assignments in the Sheriffs Office decreased by 74% between 2008 and 2009, (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 178; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 178), Plaintiff claims that other staff in the Sheriffs Office who were junior to her continued to receive overtime assignments, while she did not, but could not provide any specific information about anyone who received overtime, (PI. 56.1 ¶ 178; PI. Dep. 208:8-9). In September 2009 Doyle requested overtime for the entire Kendra’s Unit but LaRose denied the request. (PL 56.1 ¶ 175 (citing PI. Ex. Y, Emails dated Sept. 21, 2009 re: Overtime).) Plaintiff, like all officers in the Warrants Unit, received overtime in June 2010 at a time when the Warrants Unit was trying to use up its budget surplus prior to the end of the fiscal year. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 177 (citing PI. Dep. 205:12-19).) p. Union activity Plaintiff was on the board of her union and active as a lieutenant’s representative for the Sheriff’s Office. (PI. Dep. 213:7-10.) Sometime in late September or early October 2009, the union published a photograph of Pu-Folkes inappropriately dressed in a uniform that mixed his New York City Police Department attire with his Sheriffs Office regalia while on duty during a detail with the United Nations, giving the incorrect impression that he was a four-star officer with the NYPD. (PI. Dep. 209:5-211:11.) Shortly after the publication of that photograph, Plaintiff contends that she began to receive additional “attention” in the form of memoranda from LaRose to her immediate supervisor, Doyle, inquiring about Plaintiffs daily activities, how long it took her to complete certain tasks, and why Plaintiff was not involved in other tasks. (PI. Dep. 212:11-216:3.) II. Discussion a. Standard of Review Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Bronzini v. Classic Sec., L.L.C., 558 Fed.Appx. 89, 89, 2014 WL 943933, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 12, 2014); Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir.2013); Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 164-65 (2d Cir.2013); Redd v. N.Y. Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 174 (2d Cir.2012). The role of the court is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Disk Bd. ofEduc., 444 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A genuine issue of fact exists when there is sufficient “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, All U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment; “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. The court’s function is to decide “whether, after resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, a rational juror could find in favor of that party.” Pinto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir.2000). The Second Circuit has cautioned that “ ‘[wjhere an employer acted with discriminatory intent, direct evidence of that intent will only rarely be available, so affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination.’ ” Taddeo v. L.M. Berry & Co., 526 Fed.Appx. 121, 122 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir.2010)). b. 2006 EEOC right-to-sue letter Defendants argue that the allegations contained in Plaintiffs 2006 EEOC charge, for which she received a right-to-sue letter but did not bring a lawsuit, are barred as she did not file a suit within 90 days of receiving her right-to-sue letter. (Defs. Mem. 5 n. 3.) Defendants are correct. Plaintiffs failure to act on the right-to-sue letter she received from the EEOC charge in response to her August 22, 2006 charge of discrimination bars her from now bringing those claims as part of the instant action. A plaintiff must file a lawsuit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(l); see also Friedman v. Swiss Re Am. Holding Corp., 512 Fed.Appx. 94, 95-96 (2d Cir.2013) (“In order to pursue successfully a Title VII ... claim in federal court, a plaintiff must file his federal complaint within 90 days of receipt of his right-to-sue notice from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.... ” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e&emdash;5(f)(1))); Dawes v. City Univ. of New York, 193 Fed.Appx. 59, 60 (2d Cir.2006) (“A Title VII claimant must file his complaint not more than 90 days after receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.” (citing Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir.1994))); Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1996) (“In order to be timely, a claim under Title VII ... must be filed within 90 days of the claimant’s receipt of a right-to-sue letter.”). Plaintiff cannot “save” her claims regarding the acts that were the subject of her 2006 EEOC charge, and for which she received a right-to-sue letter, by including them in her 2010 EEOC charge, as a plaintiff may not bring claims “involving exactly the same facts” that comprised an earlier right-to-sue letter on which a plaintiff did not act. Lo v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 787 F.2d 827, 828 (2d Cir.1986) (per curiam). While Plaintiff’s receipt of the first right-to-sue letter in 2006 does not bar her from bringing claims based on Defendants’ subsequent conduct, she may not rely on those claims to “revive” the stale 2006 claims on which she chose not to sue. See Melie v. EVCI/TCI Coll. Admin., 374 Fed.Appx. 150, 152 (2d Cir.2010) (finding that “all of [plaintiffs] discrimination and retaliation claims ... were time-barred, except for the one claim presented in [plaintiffs] February 27, 2007 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge not previously presented in his September 25, 2006 EEOC charge.” (citing Lo, 787 F.2d at 828)). Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims brought in connection with these incidents are not considered here. c. Failure to exhaust Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with regard to events which took place during 2010. Plaintiff filed suit on December 22, 2010, alleging claims primarily based on her January 7, 2010 EEOC charge, for which she received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on September 22, 2010. However, Plaintiffs action is also based on conduct that occurred after Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge in 2010. The actions that took place subsequent to Plaintiff filing her January 7, 2010 EEOC charge are: (1) Plaintiff being singled out and targeted to comply with the window directive in 2010, (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 64), (2) the “garage incident” with Sammarco, (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 75-76), (3) Plaintiffs supervisor being reprimanded in approximately May 2010 for permitting Plaintiff to change her shift hours to accommodate a culinary arts course, (PL 56.1 ¶43), and (4) the comments appended to her 2009-2010 evaluation by LaRose in August 2010, (PL 56.1 ¶ 154). Because those events were not the subject of Plaintiffs January 7, 2010 EEOC charge and therefore not covered by the September 22, 2010 right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to claims related to those events. See Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 274 F.3d 683, 686 (2d Cir.2001) (“Exhaustion of administrative remedies through the EEOC is “an essential element” of the Title VII ... statutory scheme[ ] and, as such, a precondition to bringing such claims in federal court.”); Hewitt v. New York City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 535 Fed.Appx. 44, 45 (2d Cir.2013) (affirming district court finding that plaintiff “failed to administratively exhaust her Title VII retaliation claim by failing to include that claim in her administrative complaint”); Canty v. Wackenhut Corr. Corp., 255 F.Supp.2d 113, 117 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (“[W]hile the complaint alleges that a grievance was filed with the EEOC, it does not state that Canty obtained a right-to-sue letter. Thus, she has not demonstrated that she has exhausted her administrative remedies.”). Defendants raised Plaintiffs failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense in their Answer, (Docket Entry No. 14 ¶ 108), but they did not move to dismiss those claims based on Plaintiffs failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. Instead, Defendants addressed the merits of each of the unexhausted claims in their motion for summary judgment. The Court finds that Defendants have waived their objection to Plaintiffs failure to exhaust these claims. See Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 79 (2d Cir.2008) (addressing plaintiffs unexhausted Title VII claim on the merits where defendants did not raise, as an argument on appeal, Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust this claim through his EEOC filing); Francis v. City of New York, 235 F.3d 763, 766 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that the exhaustion requirement under Title VII is waivable, and that the defendants’ “long delay in attacking the sufficiency of plaintiffs administrative exhaustion clearly constitutes [such] a waiver”); Jordan v. Forfeiture Support Associates, 928 F.Supp.2d 588, 603 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (“[I]t is well established that ‘filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is ... a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.’ ” (quoting Francis, 235 F.3d at 767)); v. Mangia 57, Inc., No. 2012 WL 2319142, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2012) (“[B]ecause exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement, but simply a precondition to bringing a Title VII action, it can be waived by the parties or the court.” (citing Francis, 235 F.3d at 769)). d. Statutes of limitations i. Title VII claims Plaintiff is time-barred from all Title VII claims concerning conduct that took place prior to March 13, 2009. A plaintiff seeking to bring claims pursuant to Title VII must file a complaint with the EEOC or equivalent state agency within 300 days of the challenged conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Ragone v. Atl. Video at Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 125-26 (2d Cir.2010) (“[I]n states such as New York that have an agency with the authority to address charges of discriminatory employment practices, the statute of limitations for filing a charge of with the Equal Employment Commission is 300 days.” citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff filed her EEOC claim on January 7, 2010. (Compl. ¶ 8 and Ex. A; Defs. Mem. 5.) Therefore, all Title VII claims that are based on conduct that before March 13, 2009, 300 days prior to January 7, 2010, are time-barred. At oral argument counsel for Plaintiff argued that the Court should consider that took place prior to March 13, 2009, that were part of Plaintiffs hostile work environment and discrimination claims under the “continuing violation” to the 300-day limitations period. (Oral Arg. Tr. 12:16-23.) The continuing violation exception to the limitations period for Title VII complaints permits courts to consider “ ‘claims that the discriminatory acts were part of a continuing policy and practice of prohibited discrimination,’ where ‘one act of discrimination in furtherance of the policy occurred within the limitations period.’ ” Lugo v. City of New York, 518 Fed.Appx. 28, 29 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Valtchev v. City of New York, 400 Fed.Appx. 586, 588 (2d Cir.2010) and Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 220 (2d Cir.2004)). Under this exception, “if a Title VII plaintiff files an EEOC charge that is timely as to any incident of discrimination in furtherance of an ongoing policy of discrimination, all claims of acts of under that policy -will be timely even if they would be untimely standing alone.” Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 155-56 (2d Cir.2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted. Because “[a] hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice,’ ” the entire time period of the alleged hostile environment “may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability” if “an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period.” Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan (“Morgan”), 536 U.S. 101, 117, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002); see also McGullam v. Cedar Graphics, Inc., 609 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir.2010) (stating that, because hostile work environment claims occur “over a series of days or perhaps years,” the court may consider “the entire scope of a hostile work environment claim, including behavior alleged outside the statutory time period, ... for the purposes of assessing liability” (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105, 122 S.Ct. 2061)); Caravantes v. 53rd St. Partners, LLC, No. 09-CV-7821, 2012 WL 96474, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2012) (“A hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice’.... Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability.” (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117, 122 S.Ct. 2061)). Thus, in hostile work environment cases where there is a continuing violation claim, “if any act falls within the statutory time period,” the Court must “determine whether the acts about which an employee complains are part of the same actionable hostile work environment practice.” McGullam, 609 F.3d at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 120, 122 S.Ct. 2061; see also Raneri v. McCarey, 712 F.Supp.2d 271, 281 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“To defeat the statute of limitations by applying the continuing violation theory, the evidence must show that such a hostile environment was created prior to, and continued into, the [statutory time period].”). “However, the continuing violations doctrine does not apply to discrete acts of discrimination, ‘even if they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.’ ” Ugactz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 10-CV-1247, 2013 WL 1232355, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 102, 122 S.Ct. 2061). “[M]ultiple incidents of discrimination, even similar ones, that are not the result of a discriminatory policy or mechanism do not amount to a continuing violation.” Valtchev, 400 Fed.Appx. at 588-89; see also Emmons v. City Univ. of New York, 715 F.Supp.2d 394, 412 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (“The continuing violation doctrine only ‘allow[s] the inclusion of action whose discriminatory character was not apparent at the time they occurred’ and ‘is not intended to allow employees a second chance to bring stale claims once the statute of limitations has passed.’ ” (quoting Warren v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp. at Forest Hills, No. 03-CV0019, 2006 WL 2844259, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006), aff'd, 268 Fed. Appx. 95 (2d Cir.2008))). Actions that are “discrete” and “easy to identify,” such as “termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire ... constitute[ ] a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice,’ ” and cannot form the basis of a continuous and ongoing discriminatory practice that entitles a plaintiff to the continuing violation exception. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061. These prior acts may, however, be considered “as background evidence in support of a timely claim.” Id. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061; see also Coger v. Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 143 Fed.Appx. 372, 374 (2d Cir.2005) (“[W]e agree that National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, requires the consideration of facts, related to claims now untimely, as background to timely claims.”). Plaintiffs hostile work environment claims include a claim of sexual against Sammarco as well as a claim that she “has been subjected to a hostile environment whereby her authority as a Lieutenant is undermined and she is given menial tasks. (Compl. ¶ 22; 2010 EEOC charge at 2.) As to the sexual harassment claim against Sammarco, Plaintiff argues that “Plaintiffs claim[] with regard to [the] window-covering directive is not barred, because although the issues arose in 2006, the discrimination occurred in 2010 as well, after Peter Sammarco came back to work in the same building as Plaintiff.” (PI. Opp’n Mem. 8.) Contrary to Plaintiffs Sammarco’s acts of sexual that took place in 2006&emdash;namely, Sammarco’s leering and staring at her and passing by her office 20 times per day&emdash; cannot be considered part of the hostile work environment that created when he returned to office more than three years later. Sammarco was moved from his position at the office located at 30-10 Starr Avenue in mid-2007 and had little to no contact with Plaintiff until 2010. Plaintiff does not that any of the other individual were responsible for any sexual harassment during the three-year interval. Plaintiff cannot show that the hostile work environment allegedly caused by sexual harassment in 2006 was when there was undisputedly a period where no harassing acts were being committed. See Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 364 (2d Cir.2001) (“Not every sexual harassment claim will lend itself to a continuing violation theo14. ry”). The Second Circuit has rejected to allege two “phases” of sexual harassment, where a first phase of harassment by a particular defendant ended at a discrete point in time, and a second phase by that same defendant began two and a half years later, where the abuse was “qualitatively different,” with no of harassing conduct in between. Id.; see also McGullam, 609 F.3d at 78 (finding that one-year interval between harassing incidents, “rendered] less plausible the notion that the [incidents were] of a piece,” and declining to apply the continuing violation theory); Lucas v. Chicago Transit Auth., 367 F.3d 714, 727 (7th Cir.2004) (finding that a three-year gap between allegedly hostile acts precluded the application of continuing violation theory, noting that “the concept of suggests a critical limiting principle. Acts so discrete in time or circumstances that they do not reinforce each other cannot reasonably be linked together into a single chain, a single course of conduct, to defeat the statute of limitations.” (citation and alteration omitted)). Although Sammarco’s actions in 2010 may have been very similar to his actions in 2006, that similarity alone is insufficient to render continuous what is essentially two separate instances of alleged harassment separated by more than three years. His actions are precisely the type of discriminatory acts” that “are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061. In addition, to the extent that Plaintiff is relying on the incidents that arose in 2006 with respect to the covering directive that were a part of her 2006 EEOC charge as part of her claim of sexual harassment, they are barred from consideration by the Court because of Plaintiffs failure to sue within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter in connection with those claims. Plaintiff argues, without citation to any legal authority, that notwithstanding her failure to act on the 2006 right-to-sue letter, the continuing violation theory permits the Court to consider Sammareo’s 2006 actions as part of the continuing hostile work environment he created through 2010. Whether the continuing violation theory can revive claims that are otherwise time-barred by a plaintiffs failure to act on a right-to-sue letter has not been decided by the Second Circuit. However, the First, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits as well as several district courts have found that a plaintiff may not rely on the continuing violation theory to revive time-barred claims. See Loubriel v. Fondo del Seguro del Estado, 694 F.3d 139, 144 (1st Cir.2012) (“the existence of a continuing violation does not relax the requirement that a plaintiff file her judicial action within 90 days of the receipt of the EEOC’s right-to-sue notice”); Austion v. City of Clarksville, 244 Fed.Appx. 639, 648 (6th Cir.2007) (“The continuing violation doctrine ... does not relieve a plaintiff of the need to file an action within 90 days of receiving the right-to-sue letter.”); Gibbs v. Gen. Motors Corp., 104 Fed.Appx. 580, 582 (7th Cir.2004) (finding that plaintiff “cannot avail herself of the continuing-violation doctrine because she obviously believed that the time-barred acts were discriminatory when she filed EEOC charges in early 2001”); Wade v. Knoxville Utilities Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 461 (6th Cir.2001) (“The continuing violation doctrine ... does not relieve a plaintiff of the need to file an action within 90 days of receiving the right-to-sue letter.”); Brown v. Harts-horne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 926 F.2d 959, 962 (10th Cir.1991) (“the continuing violation theory does not eliminate the requirement that a plaintiff file a judicial action within ninety days of receipt of notice of the right-to-sue”), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Keeler v. Cereal Food Processors, 250 Fed.Appx. 857, 860 (10th Cir.2007); Woods v. Lancaster Indep. Sch. Dist., 834 F.Supp.2d 512, 517 (N.D.Tex.2011) (“The purpose of the continuing violations doctrine is to ensure claims that are “composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice’ ” are actionable. Here, the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter informed Woods that her claims were actionable [and] ... she failed to act. Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to extend the doctrine to accommodate this circumstance.” (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117, 122 S.Ct. 2061)); Felix v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 729 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1251 (D.Colo.2010) (“invocation of the “continuing violation” doctrine does not excuse an employee’s failure to commence suit within 90 days of receiving notice of the right to sue from the EEOC.”), aff'd, 450 Fed.Appx. 702 (10th Cir.2011). The Court agrees with the decisions of these courts and concludes that Plaintiffs continuing violation claim cannot revive her otherwise barred claim where she opted not to act within 90 days of her 2006 EEOC right-to-sue letter. Plaintiff’s second hostile work environment claim — that Defendants created a demeaning work environment — as pleaded and argued, is comprised solely of incidents that occurred in 2009. {See Compl. ¶¶ 26-29; 2010 EEOC charge at 4 (describing events during and subsequent to September 2009 under heading “Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation); PI. Opp’n Mem. 20-21; Tr. 79:24-81:8.) Accordingly, Plaintiff does not need to rely on the continuing violation theory to permit the Court to address the full breadth of her “demeaning work environment” work environment claim. The remainder of Plaintiffs claims, discrimination and retaliation, are comprised of discrete acts by Defendants that are not entitled to the continuing exception. See, e.g., Valtchev, 400 Fed.Appx. at 588-89 (continuing violation exception did not apply to discrete acts of defendants in denying a plaintiff and subjecting him to unfair Oyelola v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 12-CV-01685, 2014 WL 496880, at *9 (D.Conn. Feb. 5, 2014) allegations of being under-compensated, demoted, retaliated against, forced to work excessive hours, and denied all involve discrete acts of discrimination” and therefore did not.fall within the continuing violation exception); Pietri v. N.Y.S. Office of Court Admin., 936 F.Supp.2d 120, 134 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (denial of promotions, being subjected to disparate discipline and denial of transfer opportunities “are all discrete acts of discrimination and each incident ‘constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice’ ” (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, 122, 122 S.Ct. 2061) (additional internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court will consider these acts as background information context for Plaintiffs claims. See Davidson v. LaGrange Fire Dist., 523 Fed.Appx. 838, 839 (2d Cir.2013) (“Many of the specific discriminatory acts alleged fall outside of the 300-day statute of We consider these acts only as ‘background evidence’ in evaluating the merits of Davidson’s discrimination claims.” (citations omitted)). ii. The NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims Under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, the statute of limitations is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d); see also Sotomayor v. City of New York, 862 F.Supp.2d 226, 248-49 (E.D.N.Y.2012), aff'd, 713 F.3d 163 (2d Cir.2013). The limitations period is tolled during the of a complaint before an body. Ugactz, 2013 WL 1232355, at *6; see also DeNigris v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 861 F.Supp.2d 185, 192 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (“Claims brought under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, which is tolled for the period between the filing of an EEOC charge and the issuance by the EEOC of a right-to-sue letter.”); Wilson v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't No. 09-CV-2632, 2011 WL 1215735, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2011) (“Courts in this circuit have held that the statute of limitations applicable to claims under NYCHRL and the NYSHRL is tolled during the period in which the complaint is filed with the EEOC.”); Butler v. N.Y. Health & Racquet Club, 768 F.Supp.2d 516, 536 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (filing a complaint with the EEOC was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations on the state Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this case on December 22, 2010. The underlying EEOC charge was pending with the EEOC between January 7, 2010, and 22, 2010, or for 319 days, tolling the limitations period on Plaintiffs claims during that time. As a result, the claims that accrued after February 6, 2007, may be considered by the Court in assessing Plaintiffs claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. iii. Sections 1981 and 1983 The statute of limitations for claims brought under § 1983 is three years. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 517 (2d Cir.2013). The statute of limitations for claims brought under § 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, is four years. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004); see Morales v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 952 F.Supp.2d 433, 436 (E.D.N.Y.2013) ("The statute of limitations for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is also three years unless the claims arise out of a post-1990 Act of Congress such as the 1991 Amendments to § 1981 ... in which case the statute of limitations is four years."). Neither limitations period is tolled during the pendency of EEOC administrative proceedings. See Plumey v. New York State, 389 F.Supp.2d 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 465, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975) and Zangrillo v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 601 F.Supp. 1346 (S.D.N.Y.1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 2 (2d Cir.1985)); see also Caravantes v. 53rd St. Partners, LLC, No. 09-CV-7821, 2012 WL 96474 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2012) (applying Johnson to conclude that § 1981 claims of employment discrimination are not tolled by EEOC complaints). Accordingly, the Court considers Plaintiffs claims of discrimination brought pursuant to § 1983 that accrued after December 22, 2007, and Plaintiffs claims of discrimination brought pursuant to § 1981 that accrued after December 22, 2006. e. Discrimination claims-Title VII, the NYSHRL, § 1981 and § 1983 Plaintiff claims that Defendants discriminated against her on the basis of race and gender in violation of Title VII, the NYSHRL, § 1981, and § 1983. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating "against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Claims of disparate treatment under Title VII, the NYSHRL, § 1981 and § 1983 are assessed using the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-55, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72, 83-84 (2d Cir.2013) (discussing application of McDonnell Douglas framework to race discrimination claim). Under the framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742; see also Dowrich-Weeks v. Cooper Square Realty, Inc., 535 Fed.Appx. 9, 11 (2d Cir.2013); Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir.2010). A plaintiffs burden at this stage is “minimal.” Holcomb v. Iona Coll, 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742). If the plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742; Ruiz, 609 F.3d at 492. The defendant’s burden “is not a particularly steep hurdle.” Hyek v. Field Support Servs., 702 F.Supp.2d 84, 93 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). It “is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.’ ” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742). “If the employer is able to satisfy that burden, the inquiry then returns to the plaintiff, to demonstrate that the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination.” United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d at 102. To defeat summary judgment at this stage, “a plaintiff need only show that the defendant was in fact motivated at least in part by the prohibited discriminatory animus.” Henry v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 156 (2d Cir.2010); see also Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S.-,-, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2522-23, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (“An employee who alleges status-based discrimination under Title VII ... [must] show that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s decision.”). i. Pr