Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge I. INTRODUCTION From 2000 through 2014, Plaintiff Rita Campbell was enrolled in the HealthExtras benefit program, which purported to provide her with group disability insurance coverage. Ms. Campbell now believes that the policy she paid for was illegal and worthless, and she has brought this putative class action on behalf of herself and similarly situated residents of the District of Columbia against seven companies that she believes contributed to and profited from the sale of illusory insurance policies. Ms. Campbell never submitted a claim for coverage and is no longer enrolled in the program, but she seeks to recover her premium payments and damages,, alleging;, that Defendants sold her insurance coverage that they never intended to honor, charged her premiums in excess of her contractual obligation, and failed to provide truthful information about the program. In her five-count complaint; Ms. Campbell asserts numerous violations of the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”), and she alleges that Defendants either breached their contractual obligations or, alternatively, that Defendants are liable for unjust enrichment, conversion, and money had and received. In their motions to dismiss, Defendants argue that Ms. Campbell lacks standing because her insurance policy was enforceable under D.C. law and she suffered no injury, that her claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, and. that in any event, she has failed to plead fraud with particularity and failed to state a claim for relief. Upon consideration of the motions to dismiss, and the memoranda in support thereof and opposition thereto, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS This case marks one of at least eleven closely related actions filed across the country seeking to recover premium payments and damages in relation to the HealthExtras benefit program (“the program”), which plaintiffs in each case allege was marketed and sold to them in violation of state law. This particular action focuses on allegations that Defendants advertised and purported to sell disability insurance' coverage through the HealthExtras benefit program to D.C. residents while violating D.C. insurance laws and without any intent to provide the paid-for coverage. |n 1999 or 2000, Ms. Campbell received marketing materials about the HealthExtras benefit program from Defendant HealthExtras, Inc., now known as Catamaran Health Solutions, LLC (“Catamaran”). See 1st Am. Cpmpl. ¶ 53, ECF No. 29. Catamaran had paid the actor Christopher Reeve to serve as the face of its marketing campaign, and it reached potential customers by entering into agreements with credit card companies that allowed Catamaran to access cardholders’ financial information and to send marketing flyers to selected cardholders along with their credit card statements. Id. ¶¶41, 47. Ms. Campbell expressed interest in the program, which included disability insurance packaged together with an dut of area emergency accident and sickness medical expense benefit. Id. ¶¶ 56, 66. As' a result, Catamaran mailed her a program description along with a letter advertising coverage in the form of a “$1,000,000 cash payment if you are permanently disabled due to an accident,” and “$2,500 a year in reimbursements for coinsurance and deductibles for healthcare expenses when you are travel-ling.” Id. ¶ 56. Ms. Campbell then enrolled in the program and agreed to pay premiums on a monthly or annual basis, with her premiums being charged to her credit card. Id. ¶¶ 60, 63. Catamaran’s Member Services subsequently sent Ms. Campbell an enrollment letter commending her for “hav[ing] armed [her]self with one of the most exciting and affordable- disability plans, found anywhere in America today.” Id. ¶61. The enrollment confirmation letter also bore Christopher Reeve’s picture and attributed to him the statement that “[because lives can change in an instant, as mine did, you should have the additional security for yourself and your family that HealthExtras can provide.” Id. Defendant Virginia Surety Company, Inc. (“Virginia Surety”) served as the underwriter for Ms. Campbell’s $2,500 medical expense benefit during the entire, period of her enrollment. Id. ¶ 68. Defendant National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (“National Union”) replaced non-party Federal Insurance Company as the underwriter of her disability insurance policy effective January 1, 2005. Id. ¶¶ 47(i), 67. Ms. Campbell also alleges that Catamaran effectively acted- as an underwriter for her -disability insurance policy as, .of July 2000, when it agreed with “at least one insurer” that Catamaran would “pay disability benefits to any person who does not qualify as permanently disabled, but who is .nonetheless unable to perform the material and substantial duties of such person’s regular occupation.” Id. ¶ 125. Because Catamaran was not a licensed insurance broker in the District of Columbia, the company paid “real licensed broker[s],” like Defendant Alliant Services Houston, Inc; (“Alliant Services”), to use their names on correspondence and program documents. Id. ¶ 58. The Program Summary ■ that Ms. Campbell received from, Catamaran identified Alliant Services’ corporate predecessor as the “Program Administrator,” and her payment notices, listed Alliant Services as the “Broker of Record.”; Id ¶9. , In 2004, Ms. Campbell received a “Description of Coverage” and “Accident Protection Plan Program Summary” for her disability policy series C11695DBG. Id. ¶ 70. The description of her- policy contained “extremely restrictive, conflicting and confusing terms and exclusions which renders any disability insurance ‘coverage’ virtually worthless to consumers and is in sharp contrast to ... representations made in the marketing material” she had previously received. Id. ¶¶ 70-75, 103-05. Specifically, Ms.- Campbell asserts that the policy exclusions contradicted Defendants’ marketing materials that had advertised “valuable protection,” “a $1,000,000 tax-free cash payment if you are permanently disabled due to an accident,” and a $1,000,000 payment “[ajfter 12 months of continuing ¡and . permanent disability caused by an accident — including the inability to work.” Id. ¶¶ 103-05. The materials that Ms. Campbell received in 2004 also stated that “if any conflict should arise between thé contents of this Description of Coverage and the Master Policy SRG 9540519 or if any point is not covered herein, the terms and conditions of the Master Policy will govern in all cases.” Id. ¶ 70, But Ms. Campbell claims that “she has never been provided a copy of Master Policy SRG 9540519,” and she suspects that “[w]hat little coverage escapes C11695DBG may be further trumped and negated by Master Policy SRG 9540519.” Id. ¶¶ 71, 76. Ms. Campbell notes that “[although the coverage description disclosed some limitations on the policy ... [no]. Defendants] disclosed ... [that] there was no intention to pay disability benefits that fell within the terms of coverage.” Id. ¶¶ 81-82. In fact, Ms. Campbell'claims, Catamaran, National Union, and Defendant American International Group, Inc. (“AIG”)1 developed the policies in question “with no intent to pay ever [sic] disability claims and the specific intent to deny any disability claims made by victims of the HealthExtras Scheme.” Id. ¶ 107. Public records show that an individual in California who was rendered a quadriplegic had his claim denied by National Union, and that another individual in South Carolina had his claim denied by National Union after he was rendered a paraplegic. Id. ¶ 111. “Upon information and belief,” Ms. Campbell further asserts that “there are thousands of these unfair and unconscionable denials which are not in the public record.” Id. ¶ 114. Although Ms. Campbell alleges that she was never provided with a copy of the governing Master Policy, on an unspecified date, she did receive the “Master Application for Blanket Accident Insurance Policy” for Master Policy 9540519. Master Application, Pl.’s Ex. B at 2-3, ECF No. 29-2. The Master Application is printed on letterhead naming National Union and Defendant AIG, doing business as AIG Group "Insurance Trust, (“AIG” or “the Trust”). 1st Am. Compl. ¶ 77. The document , describes a policy with an effective date of September 2004, names the Trust as the policyholder, and includes policy riders and endorsements that list the policyholder as “HealthExtras” Id. ¶77. From these facts, Ms. Campbell concludes that the Trust was created by National Union, AIG, and' Catamaran. Id. “[U]pon information and belief,” Ms. Campbell further alleges that the corporate defendants issued a Master Policy to themselves that they did not disclose to group members; and that they “are in fact the alter-ego of’ the Trust. Id. at ¶¶ 73-74,- 77. ■ She asserts that the Trust is a “sham organization ],”• that it does not constitute a “group that was or is eligible to purchase group disability insurance under District of Columbia law,” and that the Trust was created so that Defendants could “avoid[ ] regulatory supervision and oversight.” id. ¶¶93, 95, 97. Defendants purported to sell group insurance so that they were able to issue a single, Master Policy to themselves. See id. ¶¶ 89, 93. Individual insureds were provided only with certificates of insurance that summarized their coverage terms and rights under the Master Policy, which Defendants did not provide. See id. ¶ 89. “Because there was no legitimate group, there was no one to look out for the interests of the persons paying for the purported disability coverage,” and policy-holders had “no mechanism for learning, short of becoming disabled themselves and being denied coverage, that the purported insurance coverage they .were being sold was illusory and worthless.” id. ¶¶ 45,100. Specifically, Ms. Campbell alleges that Defendants issued her policy in violation of D.C.Code § 31-4712, which forbids the issuance of group accident and sickness insurance policies without prior approval from the Commissioner of the D.C. Department of Insurance, Securities and Banking (“DISB”). id. ¶¶ 90-95.' She also claims that Defendants violated a number of DC. insurance regulations, including those prohibiting solicitation by credit card and forbidding the use of insurance premiums to pay rebates, id. ¶¶ 84-88. Ms. Campbell further alleges that Defendants’ marketing materials for the program failed to disclose that less than 15% of the premiums that she paid for disability coverage actually went to the underwriter, National Union, id. ¶¶ 79-80. As a consequence, she believes that “Moughly 80% of the insurance premiums paid to the HealthExtras [program] by the .Plaintiff has been collected by [Catamaran] and has not paid for insurance coverage or paid for anything that would benefit the Plaintiff,” id. ¶ 80. Ms. Campbell also complains that Defendants’ “direct mail advertisements did not disclose that the program was illegal, fraudulent and illusory, and that harsh exclusions limited almost all claims, or-that there was no intent to pay disability claims under the policy.” id. ¶ 112. On at least two unspecified dates, during the fourteen-year period that Ms. Campbell was enrolled in the program, her premiums were increased “without the approval of DISB,” and she was charged an amount that exceeded her contractual obligation without her authorization, id. ¶¶27, 65. On August . 1, 2012, Catamaran transferred Ms. Campbell’s disability policy to Defendant HealthExtras LLC, which thereafter “service[d], administer[ed], collected] and allocated] the premiums,” id. ¶ 1Í, until the benefit program was terminated at the conclusion of 2014, Notice of Policy Terminations, Pl.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 43-1. Ms. Campbell asserts that “each Defendant received money and profited from the illegal” program. 1st Am. Compl.H H7. Specifically, she alleges that Catamaran and HealthExtras LLC collected her premium payments, see id. ¶ 123, underwriters National Union and Virginia Surety and broker Affiant Services all received “nominal payments” to lend their names to the scheme, id. ¶¶ 131, 150, 157, and AIG, which developed and controlled the Trust named as the policyholder, “received a portion of the illegal insurance premiums paid by Plaintiff,” id. ¶ 147. In May 2014, a few months before her coverage was terminated, Ms. Campbell initiated this- putative class action by filing a complaint on her own behalf and on behalf of similarly situated residents of D.C.- who participated in the HealthExtras program. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. After Defendants filed motions to dismiss the matter, Ms. Campbell rendered the motions moot by filing a first amended complaint in August 2014. See generally 1st Am. Compl. Count I of the amended complaint asserts a claim of unjust enrichment based primarily on the allegation that Defendants profited from the sale of “illegal and void” coverage that was worthless to purchasers. id. ¶¶ 167-84. Count II alleges that Defendants breached the terms of their contracts and the duty of good faith and fair dealing by charging Ms. Campbell more than her contractual obligation and by selling HealthExtras policies while failing to reveal that they were “illegal and of little value.” id. ¶¶ 186-94. Count III is a claim of conversion premised on Defendants raising her premium' and charging her more than her contractual obligation. id. ¶¶ 196-200.' Count IV asserts numerous violations of the CPPA, id. ¶¶ 202-27, and Count V is a claim of money had and received also based on the unauthorized premium increases, id. ¶¶ 229-33. As relief, Ms. Campbell seeks a declaration that the disability policy is illegal, an award of actual damages, treble damages, statutory damages, and punitive damages, an injunction prohibiting Defendants frorh engaging in unlawful activities in D.C., and attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. Id at 60. She also seeks “restitution in the form of disgorgement of all revenues, earnings, profits, compensation and benefits which District of, Columbia residents have paid.... ” id. ¶ 184. Defendants now seek to dismiss all claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that Ms. Campbell lacks standing, that her claims are barred- by the applicable statutes of limitations, that she has. failed to plead fraud with particularity, and that she has.-failed to state a plausible claim for relief. III. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Rule 12(b)(1) The D.C. Circuit has explained that a motion to dismiss for lack of standing constitutes a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because “the defect of standing is a defect in subject matter jurisdiction.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C.Cir.1987). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the law presumes that “a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction....” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. E.P.A., 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C.Cir.2004) (“As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with an examination of our jurisdiction.”). It is the plaintiffs burden to establish that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d, 351 (1992). Because subject matter jurisdiction focuses on the Court’s power to hear a claim, the Court must give the plaintiffs factual allegations closer scrutiny than would be required for a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. See Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13-14 (D.D.C.2001). Thus, the court is not limited to the allegations contained in the complaint. Sep Wilderness Soc’y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 n. 10 (D.C.Cir.1987). Instead, “where necessary, the court may consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir.1992) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.1981)). B. Rule 12(b)(6), The Federal Rules of Civil' Procedure require that 'a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim” in order to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); accord-Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiffs ultimate likelihood of success on the merits; father, it tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a ■ claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416. U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). A court considering such a motion presumes that the complaint’s factual allegations are .true and construes them liberally in the plaintiffs favor. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.D.C.2000). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead all elements of a prima facie case in the complaint. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-14, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Bryant v. Pepco, 730 F.Supp.2d 25, 28-29 (D.D.C.2010). Nevertheless, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). This means that a plaintiffs factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are trué (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations' omitted). “Threadbare, .recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1987. A court need not accept a plaintiffs legal conclusions as true, see id. nor must a court presume the veracity of the legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In deciding a motion to, dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may take judicial .notice of facts litigated in a prior related case. See Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 879 F.Supp.2d 44, 49-50 (D.D.C.2012). Where a claim of fraud or mistake is ■alleged, the “short and plain statement” requirement of Rule 8(a) is joined by the “particularized” pleading standards of Rule 9. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The complaint must therefore “state the time, place and content of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented and what was retained or given up as a consequence of the fraud.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1278 (D.C.Cir.1994) (quoting United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1385 (D.C.Cir.1981)). Rule 9(b), in other words, “requires that the pleader provide the ‘who, what, when, where, and how’ with respect to the circumstances of the fraud.” Anderson v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 221 F.R.D. 250, 253 (D.D.C.2004) (quoting Di-Leo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir.1990)), IV. ANALYSIS A. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant tp Rule 12(b)(1) ■ Defendants first argue that this -matter must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because Ms. Campbell “fails to allege an injury-infaet to support Article III standing.” Catamaran’s Mot. Dismiss at 1-2, ECF No. 36. In short, Defendants claim that Ms. Campbell’s suit is premised on the hypothesis “that if she had become disabled and submitted a covered claim for benefits, Defendants would have wronged her by denying it.” Catamaran’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 14, ECF No. 36-1. Defendants argue that such “speculative, counterfactual” claims are insufficient to establish standing. Id. In response, Ms. Campbell asserts that she has adequately alleged three injuries in fact sufficient to establish standing: (1) she paid premiums for insurance that she would not have purchased “had she known that Defendants had no present intention to pay claims covered by such insurance,” (2)- she was debited “premiums higher than contractually permitted for the insurance product,” and (3) as to her CPPA claim, Defendants violated her statutory right’ “to truthful information from merchants about consumer goods and services that' are or would be purchased, leased, or received in the District of Columbia.” PL’s Opp’n at 55-57, ECF No. 43 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court considers each’ alleged injury in-turn. As Ms. Campbell readily acknowledges, to demonstrate standing, she must “have suffered an injury in fact ,.. which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 53 (citing Food & Water Watch v. EPA, 5 F.Supp.3d 62, 73 (D.D.C.2013)). Such a showing is part of “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,” so to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must have produced at least “general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When assessing standing at this stage of litigation, the Court will “accept the well-pleaded factual'allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences* from those allegations ih the plaintiffs favor,” but it will “not assume the truth of legal conclusions, nor ... accept inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 18 (D.C.Cir.2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of standing, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” and “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,-to state a claim of standing that is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Additionally, “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim-he seeks to press.” Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006). Ms. Campbell’s first alleged injury is premised on her having paid for an illusory insurance policy that Defendants did not intend to honor. PL’s Opp’n at 55; see also 1st-Am. Comply 82 (alleging that while “the coverage description disclosed some limitations on coverage under the policy, ... [none of the] Defendants] disclosed ... that there was no intention to pay disability benefits that fell within the terms of coverage.”). She argues that “because the HealthExtras Scheme was designed to deny all disability claims, through a list of undisclosed conflicts and exclusions maintained in a Master Policy the insureds are never shown, in reality the payment of premiums purchased only the contractual-right to file a legal action against Defendants .., not disability insurance.” PL’s Opp’n at 14. A review of Ms. Campbell’s complaint, however, reveals that her first assertion of injury is supported by mere conjecture, not by factual allegations that would render her alleged injury plausible. Significantly, Ms. Campbell never submitted a claim for coverage to Defendants or had a claim denied, and her complaint does not identify a single instance in which any insured had his or her claim denied on the basis of secret exclusions contained only in the Master Policy. Although Ms. Campbell now argues that if she had submitted a disability claim that it would have been denied because Defendants would have applied secret exclusions and restrictions from the Master Policy, according to her complaint, “she has never been provided a copy of [the] Master Policy,” she does not know what terms it contains, and 'her assertion of injury is premised on the possibility that the Master Policy “may further trump[ ] and negate[ ]” the coverage she purchased if it contained undisclosed exclusions or restrictions and if-Defendants used it to deny otherwise-covered claims. See 1st Am. Compl.1H(71, 75-76 (second emphasis added). Such conjecture cannot replace the type of factual allegations necessary to transform a speculative chain of possibilities into a plausible allegation of concrete,' actual injury in fact. Cf. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1148, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013) (finding no actual or imminent injury in fact where’ plaintiffs’ “theory of standing .relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities,” and they “merely speculate and make assumptions about whether their communications with their foreign contacts will be acquired”); Obama v. Klayman, No. 14-5004, 800 F.3d. 559, 569-70, 2015’ WL 5058403, at *9-10 (D.C.Cir. Aug. 28, 2015) (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part on other grounds) (holding that plaintiffs assertion that the government must have been collecting their phone records because the collection was large and plaintiffs used a big carrier was mere “conjecture” that fails to show “actual or imminent” injury in fact necessary to establish standing); Weaver v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 3:08-CV-00037, 2008 WL 4833035, at *3 (D.Nev. Nov. 4, 2008) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim for .lack of standing where the plaintiff alleged that she “paid premiums for a nonexistent policy,” because “one could not deem a policy nonexistent unless she were improperly denied benefits”), aff'd, 370 Fed.Appx. 822 (9th Cir.2010). Ms. Campbell protests- that this “precise argument has already been rejected in a related case.” PL’s Opp’n at 56 (citing Petruzzo v. HealthExtras, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-113-FL, 2013 WL 4517273 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2013)). In the Petruzzo opinion on which she relies, the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina was presented with nearly identical claims of deceptive trade practices, unjust enrichment, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing brought against many of the same Defendants and premised largely on the same alleged scheme: selling a HealthExtras disability insurance policy that was worthless and void under state law. See 2013 WL 4517273, at *1; see also Petruzzo v. HealthExtras, Inc., No.. 5:12-CV-118-FL, 2014 WL 2864814, at *2 (E.D.N.C. June 24, 2014) (describing subsequently amended complaint’s allegation that the policy was also worthless because it was subject to a master policy the plaintiff never received and contained “contradictions and exclusions which intentionally render the policy virtually worthless to purchasers”). The court considered North Carolina law and determined that because the plaintiff adequately alleged that the insurance policy issued to him never would have been approved by the state, he ^sufficiently alleged the cognizable injury of paying for a valueless insurance policy” that was void under state law. Petruzzo, 2013 WL 4517273, at *6. After the opinion was issued, however, the court received another motion to dismiss “raising new argument that plaintiffs lack standing to sue,” because a North Carolina statute expressly provided, that an insurance policy that violated the applicable state requirements nevertheless “shall be held valid but shall be construed as provided” by statute. Petruzzo v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., No. 5:12-CV-113-FL, 124 F.Supp.3d. 642, 644-45, 2015 WL 5042874, at *1 (E.D.N.C. May 22, 2015). The Petruzzo court thus determined that “Plaintiffs have suffered neither a concrete nor imminent injury, because the insurance policies supplied through enrollment in the Disability Benefit and Health benefit are valid and enforceable under North Carolina law, despite the alleged déficiencies.” Id. at 652, 2015 WL 5042874, at *7.. The court further explained that “plaintiffs never attempted to collect benefits under either policy,” and that under state law, even if they had, their, policies were “valid and enforceable by plaintiffs” until their enrollment in the program ended. Id. at 653, 2015 WL 5042874, at *8. It therefore dismissed all claims' against all defendants for lack of standing. Id. at 655-56, 2015 WL 5042874, at *10. In this Case; the D.C.Code section that Ms. Campbell alleges Defendants violated contains identical language to the North Carolina statute, dictating that nonconforming insurance policies issued in violation of the' statute “shall be held valid but shall be construed as provided in this section.” D.C.Code §' 31-4712(d)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, to the extent that Ms. Campbell asserts injury premised oh payments for a policy that was invalid and unenforceable due to violations of DC insurance laws, the argument clearly fails as a matter'of law.' See also In Chambers Order Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Waiserman v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, Pa., No. 2:14-CV-00667, at 3-5 (C.D.Cal. Oct. 24, 2014), EOF No. 84 (rejecting identical claim that plaintiff had standing because he purchased an invalid and illusory' insurance policy where state law deemed such policies valid and enforceable even if defendants were not licensed sellers and “created a sham trust to mask their dealings”). Ms. Campbell notes' that her claim of injury here is somewhat different than in Petruzzo, however, in that it is based not on the unenforceability of her policy under D.C. law, but on the fact that she would have been harmed by the enforcement of the policy as written due to the Defendants’ application of secret exclusions. Pl.’s Response at 2-3. But as discussed above, the complaint lacks factual allegations that, taken as true, would make such an assertion plausible rather than merely possible. See Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 19, 2015 WL 4772774, at *6 (holding that to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing,- a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim of standing that is plausible on its face” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also In Chambers Order, Waiserman, No. 2:14-CV-00667, at 4 (rejecting as “supposition” and “pure speculation” the allegation that “because the [HealthExtras program] defendants had no intention of paying out claims, they misappropriated [plaintiffs] money,” and holding that the alleged harm did not constitute injury in fact). Accordingly, the Court finds that Ms. Campbell’s allegation that the Master Policy may have contained undisclosed exclusions that she believes Defendants would have used to deny any claims, had she made them, does not constitute the type of concrete, particularized, actual injury that supports Article III standing, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear such a claim. This does not end the mattery however, for although Ms. Campbell argued that her first asserted injury “forms the basis of the transaction at issue and many of the claims raised,” PL’s Response at 3, her allegation regarding paying for an illusory policy is only one of three alleged injuries in this case. She also argues that she has standing to bring all of her claims on the grounds that Defendants .charged her premiums in excess of her contractual obligation on at least two occasions, and she asserts that she has standing to bring her CPPA claim because Defendants violated her statutory right to truthful information about consumer goods and services. PL’s Opp’n at 55-57. Defendants do not appear to challenge the adequacy of either of these alleged injuries for standing purposes, and the Court agrees with Ms, Campbell that unauthorized charges and allegedly material misrepresentations about the program constitute injuries in fact for standing purposes. See In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d 39, 47 (D.C.Cir.2014) (holding that plaintiffs may recover mistaken overpayments via an unjust enrichment claim); D.C.Code § 283901(c) (“This chapter establishes an enforceable right to truthful information from merchants about consumer goods and services that are or would be purchased, leased, or received in the District of Columbia.”); see also Grayson v. AT & T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 249-50 (D.C.2011) (“[T]he deprivation of a statutory right to be free from improper trade practices may constitute an injury-in-fact sufficient to establish standing, even though the plaintiff would have suffered ho judicially cognizable injury in the absence of the statute.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Accordingly, because Ms, Campbell’s theories of injury premised on unauthorized premium charges and violations of the CPPA are sufficient to establish standing as to each of her claims, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). B. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) Defendants next argue that Ms. Campbell’s complaint must be dismissed in its entirety pursuant, to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state claim. Collectively, Defendants maintain that: (1) Ms. Campbell’s claims are time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, (2) she has failed to plead fraud with particularity as required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and (3) she has failed to; allege sufficient factual matter that, taken as true, states a plausible claim for relief as required by Rule 8. The Court begins with the question of whether Ms. Campbell’s claims are untimely. 1. Statutes of Limitations In a motion to dismiss joined by all Defendants, Virginia Surety argues that all of Ms. Campbell’s claims, with the exception of the money had and received claim, are barred by applicable three-year statutes of limitations. Virginia Surety Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 12-19, ECF No. 38-1. Defendants argue that because the limitations periods began to run on all of Ms. Campbell’s claims at the time of the injury or breach, her claims accrued in 2000 when she purchased coverage based on Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations, or alternatively, in 2004 when she admits to having received actual 'notice that the Trust was the policyholder, that a list of restrictive exclusions limited her coverage in a manner contrary to Defendants’representations, and that her coverage was subject to the terms of the undisclosed Master Policy. Id. at 13-16. Defendants contend that Ms. Campbell’s claims thus expired no later than 2007,' and to the extent that her claims are premised on unauthorized premium increases on unspecified dates, her “lack of transparency does not rescue her conversion claim from the statute-of limitations.” Id. at 16 n.6. Ms. Campbell disputes Defendants’ timeliness arguments, arguing both that the limitations period did not begin to run until shortly before she filed her complaint and that various tolling doctrines apply. PL’s Opp’n at 61-72. She maintains, for example, that the continuing tort doctrine would toll the limitations period as to all of her claims because Defendants’ “long-running. campaign of misinformation” and their charging of her credit card “ceased months after she filed her initial complaint.” Id. at 63-66. Ms. Campbell next asserts that her claims of conversion and breach of contract and the duty of good faith and fair dealing are also timely brought under the discovery rule, because the 2004 description of coverage that she received did not put her on notice “of the involvement of all of the defendants in the Scheme or the distribution of portions of her premium payments to Defendants other than HealthExtras.” Id. at 63-70. As to her CPPA claim, Ms. Campbell' contends that bécause she continuously renewed her policy through 2014 “pursuant to‘ Defendants’ misrepresentations, omissions, and false impressions,” because the Defendants continuously charged her the wrong -amount, because she still has not received a copy of the Master Policy, and because she was not aware until filing her complaint that Defendants violated certain insurance-related regulations and that the Trust was not a valid group, the limitations period for the claim did not begin to run until shortly before she initiated this suit. Id. at 70-72. It is well-established that “[b]e-cause' statute of limitations issues often depend on contested questions of fact, dismissal is appropriate only if the complaint on its face is conclusively time-barred.” Bregman v. Perles, 747 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C.Cir.2014); see also Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“[C]ourts should hesitate to dismiss a complaint on statute of limitations grounds based solely on the face of the complaint.”). From the face of Ms. Campbell’s complaint, however, the Court is unable to determine whether her claim's are, in fact, time-barred. ’ As to Ms. Campbell’s claim that she was charged greater-than-authorized premiums, she does not specify when between 2000 and 2014 those charges occurred, leaving open the possibility that such acts occurred within three years of the filing, of her complaint. Drawing all inferences in Ms. Campbell’s favor,, it. is also possible that Defendants continued, unbeknownst to Ms. Campbell, to misrepresent the validity of the group, and the percent of. premiums that- would go towards insurance, to obscure the .interrelationships between Defendants, to falsely imply that they were licensed insurance companies, to misrepresent the identity of the insurer and underwriters, and to violate DC insurance regulations through 2014. Defendants may ultimately prove correct in their assertion that the allegedly unauthorized premium increases occurred more than three years before the filing of Ms. Campbell’s- complaint, or that she was on notice of the facts giving rise to her claims more than three years before filing this suit. But because the Court cannot determine such, matters conclusively from the face of the complaint, the motion to dismiss all claims as untimely must be denied. The Court therefore finds that dismissal of Ms. Campbell’s claims on statute of limitations grounds at this time would be improper. See de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 714 F.3d 591, 608 (D.C.Cir.2013) (holding that if a plaintiffs potential “rejoinder to the affirmative defense is not foreclosed by the, allegations in the complaint, dismissal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage is improper” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Floyd v. Lee, 968 F.Supp.2d 308, 326 (D.D.C.2013) (holding that where it was “not clear from the face of the complaint” when the event triggering the limitations occurred, “the court need not decide what would follow from the conclusion” that the limitations period began on a particular date). Accordingly, the Court proceeds, to consider Defendants’ final argument in favor of dismissal: .that each of Ms. Campbell’s claims must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for either failure to state a plausible claim for relief under Rule 8 or for failure to plead fraud with particularity under Rule 9. 2. Unjust Enrichment (Count I) Ms.- Campbell’s complaint asserts three common law claims, the first bf which is for unjust enrichment,- as an alternative to her breach of contract claim. Specifically, Ms. Campbell asserts that Defendants have received and retained the benefit of her premium payments unjustly because they sold her insurance that was illegal, void, and worthless under D.C. law, see 1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 166-84, and that on two occasions, Defendants charged her,, increased premium payments in excess of her contractual obligation and without authorization from her or from DISB. In their motions to dismiss, Defendants first argue that Ms. Campbell’s unjust enrichment claim fails- as a matter of law because D.C.Code § 31-4712 explicitly states that even if Defendants failed to comply with § 31-4712’s requirements when issuing Ms. Campbell’s policy; the policy would nevertheless be valid, enforceable, and construed to comply with the law. Catamaran’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 11-14. They also contend that § 31-4712 expressly exempted group policies from its requirements until April 8, 2011, such that there was no violation when Ms. Campbell’s policy was issued. Id. at 10-11. Thus, Defendants conclude that Ms. Campbell’s allegation that her policy was illegal, void, and worthless, fails as a matter of law. Additionally, as to the allegation of unauthorized charges, Alliant Services argues that the claim fails because Ms. Campbell does not allege that it “received any premium payments directly from Plaintiff.” Alliant Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 8-9, ECF No. 35-1. Under D.C. law, “[u]njust enrichniént occurs when: (1) the .plaintiff conferred a benefit on the defendant; (2) the defendant retains the benefit; and (3) under the circumstances, the defendant’s retention of the benefit is unjust.” Fort Lincoln Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. Fort Lincoln New Town Corp., 944 A.2d 1055, 1076 (D.C.2008) (quoting News World Commc’ns, Inc. v. Thompsen, 878 A.2d 1218, 1222 (D.C.2005)). “In such a case, the recipient of the benefit has a duty to make restitution to the other person____” 4934, Inc. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 605 A.2d 50, 55 (D.C.1992) (citing Restatement (First) of Restitution § 1 cmt. c (1937)). A claim that unjust enrichment occurred is context-specific,. and will require consideration of “the particular circumstances giving rise to. the claim” that the retehtion of a given benefit is unjust. Peart v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 972 A.2d 810, 813-14 (D.C.2009). The first circumstance that Ms. Campbell argues makes Defendants’ retention of her premium payments unjust is the fact that the policy she paid for was illegal, void, and worthless under D.C. law. See 1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 169-82 (alleging that Defendants marketed insurance that was illegal under D.C.Code § 31-4712, and that she conferred a benefit on Defendants “without knowledge that the purchased coverage was illegal and void”). In effect, she argues that she paid for valid and enforceable insurance coverage that she did not receive. But as Defendants aptly point out, even assuming that Ms. Campbell is correct in alleging that Defendants’ issuance or renewal of her policy violated the requirements of § 31-4712, her conclusion that this rendered her policy void arid worthless such that her contracted-for payment's should be returned to ' her is foreclosed by the plain language of § 31-4712(d)(2), which states that policies issued in violation of the provision are valid and enforceable. ■ Accordingly, the Court finds that, to the extent that Ms. Campbell claims' that Defendants unjustly retained her premium payments because the policy they sold her was void, illegal, or unenforceable, she has failed to state a plausible claim for relief. Ms. Campbell also argues, however, that Defendants were unjustly enriched on two occasions when they received and detained higher-than-authorized premium payments. PL’s Opp’n at 25., She alleges — albeit vaguely — that on two occasions, Defendants charged her credit card ■ for premium payments in excess of the authorized amount. Affiant Services argues that Ms. Campbell’s failure to allege that she made a direct payment to Affiant Services constitutes a failure to state a claim, but neither of the cases it cites in support of this assertion holds that a benefit unjustly retained must have been directly conferred to state a claim of unjust enrichment. See Edwards v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 24 F.Supp.3d 21, 29 (D.D.C.2014) (holding that where complaint did not clearly allege the benefit wrongfully retained, and where allegations of retention lacked factual support and were premised on the existence of a contractual agreement that foreclosed an unjust enrichment claim, the claim must be dismissed); Minebea Co. v. Papst, 444 F.Supp.2d 68, 186 (D.D.C.2006) (holding that unjust enrichment claim premised on the paid-for purchase of a patent portfolio failed where all parties consented to the purchase, substantial consideration was paid, and no direct benefit was ccinferred to the purchaser). To the contrary, a number of decisions from this Cóurt have expressly held that a benefit indirectly conferred on a defendant can support an unjust enrichment claim. See, e.g., JSC Transmashholding v. Miller, 70 F.Supp.3d 516, 523 n. 5 (D.D.C.2014) (holding that the theory of unjust enrichment can apply to payments conveyed to a defendant through a third-party intermediary); U.S. ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc., 685 F.Supp.2d 129, 142 (D.D.C.2010) (holding that where party was an “indirect' recipient” of payments and retained those payments in. circumstances alleged to be unjust, plaintiff had adequately alleged a claim of unjust enricment); Ca de Lupis v. Bonino, No. 07-01372, 2010 WL 1328813, at *12 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2010) (“The defendant mistakenly asserts that because the -actual agreement ... was with a third party and conferred no benefit to him, he. cannot be held liable.”). Ms. Campbell alleges generally that “each Defendant received money and profited from the illegal” program, 1st Am. Comply 117, and she specifically asserts that Catamaran and HealthExtras LLC collected her premium payments, see id. ¶ 123, underwriters National Union and Virginia Surety and broker Alliant Services all received payments to lend their names, to the scheme, id. ¶¶131, 150, 157, and AIG, which developed and . controlled the trust, “received a portion of the illegal insurance premiums paid by Plaintiff,” id. ¶ 147. Taldng these factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Ms. Campbell’s favor, the Court finds that she has adequately alleged that she conferred a benefit on Defendants when they collected and shared her premium payments. This leaves the Court with the question of whether Ms. Campbell has plausibly alleged that Defendants’ retention of this benefit was unjust under the circumstances. According to Ms. 1 Campbell’s complaint, although she “agreed to pay premiums,” on at least two occasions, her “credit card and bank accounts were debited for an increased premium amount [she] did not authorize and was not authorized under District of Columbia law and therefore [she] had [her] personal property or money unlawfully taken.” 1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 60. To the extent that Ms. Campbell alleges that Defendants charged her more than they were authorized by her or by D.C: law, she has plausibly‘stated that Defendants’ retention of the unauthorized portion of her premium payments was unjust. See In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d at 48 (explaining that where a party agrees to be billed one amount, but is then intentionally overcharged, the party can bring an unjust enrichment claim to recover the amount of his overpayment). Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss Ms. Campbell’s unjust enrichment claim for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 3. Conversion (Count III) Ms. Campbell’s second common law claim alleges that Defendants have appropriated her money for their own use and- have exercised dominion and control over the premium amounts charged to her that exceeded her contractual obligation and fell outside the terms of her agreement to pay premiums. 1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 196-200. Defendants argue that this conversion claim must be dismissed because it is impermissibly based on an alleged breach of contract, Ms. Campbell fails to plausibly allege that all Defendants agreed to freeze her premium rates indefinitely, and she does not allege that Defendants exercised control over a specified, identifiable fund of money that belongs to her. Catamaran Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss. at 21-22. Additionally, Alliant Services argues that Ms. Campbell has not plausibly alleged that it, as opposed to the other Defendants, actually debited, her credit card for unauthorized increases, Alliant Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 11, and National. Union and AIG argue that she has failed to allege that National Union “ever increased the premium it charged for the coverage it provided,” National Union Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 2-3, ECF No. 37-1. To state a claim for conversion under D.C. law, a plaintiff must allege ‘“(1) an unlawful exercise, (2) .of ownership, dominion, or control, (3) over the personal property of another, (4) in denial or repudiation of that person’s rights thereto.’ ” Johnson v. McCool, 808 F.Supp.2d 304, 308 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting Gov’t of Rwanda v. Rwanda Working Grp., 227 F.Supp.2d 45, 62 (D.D.C.2002)); see also Baltimore v. District of Columbia, 10 A.3d 1141, 1155 (D.C.2011). “Generally speaking,, conversion applies to chattel; however, ‘[m]oney can be the subject of a conversion claim if the plaintiff has the right to a specific identifiable fund of money.” . McNamara v. Picken, 950 F.Supp.2d 193, 194 (D.D.C.2013) (quoting Cannon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 926 F.Supp.2d 152, 176 (D.D.C.2013)); see also Darcars Motors of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 379 Md. 249, 841 A.2d 828, 833 n. 3 (2004) (“As a general rale, money, i.e., currency, is not subject to a claim of conversion unless the plaintiff seeks to recover specific segregated or identifiable funds.”). “A cause of action for conversion, however, may not be maintained to enforce a mere obligation to pay money.” Curaflex Health Servs., Inc. v. Bruni, 877 F.Supp. 30, 32 (D.D.C.1995). The Court’s inquiry as to whether Ms. Campbell has plausibly alleged a claim of conversion begins and ends with the question of whether Ms; Campbell has alleged facts showing that Defendants exercised control over a specific and identifiable fund of money that constitutes her personal property. In support of their position that Ms. Campbell has not so alleged, Defendants rely primarily on Cannon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., which rejected a claim of conversion premised on allegations that the defendants had charged the plaintiff a premium payment to which they were not entitled because the plaintiff did not “articulate a right to any specific identifiable fund of money.” 926 F.Supp.2d 152, 176 (D.D.C.2013). Defendants also analogize Ms. Campbell’s case to that of Fichen v. AMR Corp., where this Court rejected a claim of conversion premised on. the alleged taking of frequent flyer miles, reasoning that the miles “amounted to credit with the airline,” and as such, could not be the subject of a conversion claim. 578 F.Supp.2d 134, 143 (D.D.C.2008) (reasoning that because conversion extends “only to intangible rights identified by a tangible document that is converted ... a plaintiff may bring a suit for conversion of a promissory note ... but not for conversion of a debt” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, Defendants argue that overcharges or unauthorized charges to a credit card cannot support a conversion claim because such allegations do not call for the return of specific money. See, e.g., Scott v. Rosenthal, No. 97cv2143, 2000 WL 1863542, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20* 2000) (holding that allegation that defendant made unauthorized purchases on plaintiffs’ credit card showed that through the defendant’s “wrongful action [plaintiffs] have incurred a debt to third parties,” and that “[w]hile they might recover for such a claim on the ground of unjust enrichment .,, they may not in conversion”); Macula v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., No. 1:07 CV 1545, 2008 WL 3874686, at *5 (N.D.Ohio Aug. 14, 2008) (holding that where “Plaintiffs merely claim that they are entitled to a refund or credit for an overcharge,” they have failed to state a claim for conversion). Ms. Campbell concedes that District of Columbia courts require a plaintiff alleging conversion of money to establish a “right to a specific identifiable fund of money,” but she notes that the phrase “remains undefined in the District of Columbia,”'and that other courts accept ‘ allegations that converted sums were ‘identifiably the plaintiffs property or that the defendant was obligated to segregate such money for the plaintiffs benefit.’ ” Pl.’s Opp’n at 34 (quoting Scholes Elec. & Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fraser, No. 04-civ-3898, 2006 WL 1644920, at *5 (D.N.J. June 14, 2006) (unpublished)). Thus, she concludes that the money she paid for insurance was “specifically and identifiably her property,” as it was “deducted from her credit card on a monthly or yearly basis, without Plaintiffs consent and without the requisite regulatory approval,” and that “[i]n such a situation, a conversion claim against the insurer should be permissible.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 34. •Ms. Campbell’s brief offers no discussion or refutation of the: authorities upon which Defendants rely. See id. at 33-34. She does not explain how her claim of unauthorized premium payments is distinguishable from the'allegation found' inadequate to support a claim of conversion in Cannon, nor does she offer any developed argument to undermine Defendants’ assertion that a credit card charge cannot serve as the basis for a conversion' claim. In Scholes, the unpublished' opinion on which Ms. Campbell’s argument relies, the District Court of New Jersey held that where a plaintiff alleged that defendants wrongfully retained funds owed to him for work that he had performed, he failed to state a claim for,'- conversion. under New- Jersey law because “the funds at issue were not sufficiently segregated or identifiable to be considered Plaintiffs property.” 2006 WL 1644920, at *6 (explaining that the relevant contracts did not require that funds owed to the plaintiff be segregated upon receipt). The case thus offers no support for Ms. Campbell’s position that Defendants’ allegedly unauthorized; charges to Ms. Campbell’s credit- card can support a claim for conversion. In light of Ms. Campbell’s failure to evqn 'attempt to distinguish. her case from the precedents relied upon by Defendants, or to cite any authority indicating that an excessive credit card charge can provide a basis for 'a claim of conversion, the Court will dismiss Ms. Campbell’s conversion claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a-claim. See Fraternal Order of Police/Dep’t of Corr. Labor Comm. v. Williams, 268 F.Supp.2d 45, 48 (D.D.C.2003) (dismissing claim where “Plaintiffs have failed to distinguish these precedents or to point to any basis for this Court to come to any different, conclusion”); see also Stephenson v. Cox, 223 F.Supp.2d 119, 122 (D.D.C.2002) (“The court’s role is not to act as an advocate for the plaintiff and construct legal arguments on his behalf in order to counter those in the motion to dismiss.”). 4. Money Had and Received (Count V) Ms. Campbell’s third and final equitable claim is for money had and received. Like her unjust enrichment and conversion claims, this claim is also predicated on -the allegation that Deféndants charged her unauthorized premium payments over and above her contractual obligation. See 1st Am. CompLIffl 229-33; PL’s Opp’n at 30. Defendants argue that the claim must be dismissed because it depends on an agreement not to increase her premium costs, and such an agreement has not been adequately alleged. Catamaran Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 23. They also argue that because Ms. Campbell Could have told her credit card issuer not to make the allegedly unauthorized payments, she has not shown that she should recover the overpayments “in equity and good conscience.” Id. Alliant Services further asserts that Ms, Campbell’s money had and received claim is “duplicative of her unjust enrichment claim, and must fail for the same reasons,” and that she cannot recover premium payments “in equity and good conscience” when she received the enforceable coverage she bargained for. Alliant Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 12-13. In the District of Columbia, “[w]here one person receives money that in equity and good conscience belongs to another, an action will lie for money had and received.” Credit Lyonnais-N.Y. v. Wash. Strategic Consulting Grp., Inc., 886 F.Supp. 92, 93 (D.D.C.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Hillyard v. Smither & Mayton, Inc., 76 A.2d 166, 167 (D.C.1950)), Like a claim for unjust enrichment, a claim for money had and received is a quasi-contract claim, and “is founded on the principle that no one ought unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another.” Hillyard, 76 A.2d .at 167; see also Credit Lyonnais-N.Y., 886 F.Supp. at 93- (explaining that “[t]he equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment is very similar” to a claim of money had and received); Bates v. Nw. Human Servs., Inc., 466 F.Supp.2d 69, 102 (D.D.C.2006) (analyzing claim of money had and received as a claim for unjust enrichment). Defendants’ first argument in favor of dismissal posits that because Ms. Campbell’s claim is premised on an allegation that Defendants charged her premium payments in excess of her contractual obligation, and because she has not identified the material terms of the contract in question, she has failed to plead- facts supporting-.an inference that the unauthorized payments should be returned to her “in equity and good conscience.” Catamaran Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 23. The Court disagrees. Defendants do not assert that Ms. Campbell’s money had and received claim is subject to Rule 9(b)’s particularized pleading requirement, and while her claim would no doubt, be strengthened had she included the specific dates and amounts at issue, her conaplaint clearly alleges that on two occasions, Defendants increased her premium payments and charged her credit card for a greater amount than she had authorized. 1st Am. ComplJ229. She identified the Defendants who collected her premium payments directly, and those Defendants who allegedly received a portion of the payments indirectly. See idlfll 123, 131, 147, 150, 157. Taking Ms. Campbell’s factual allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, the Court finds that she has stated a plausible claim for money had and received by alleging that Defendants charged her in excess of the amount authorized for her premium payments, and that the excess payments received by Defendants “in equity and good conscience” should be returned to her because they were not authorized. Although Defendants argue that Ms. Campbell could have told her credit card issuer not to allow the payments in question, it is unclear ■ from the face of the- complaint when Ms. Campbell knew or reasonably should have known of the excess charges, and in any case, it would be inappropriate for the Court to assess the equitable merit of Ms. Campbell’s claim at this stage of the litigation; it is enough for the time being that she has alleged facts that, if true, state a plausible claim for relief. The Court also rejects Alliant Services’ argument that because Ms. Campbell received an enforceable insurance policy, Defendants’ retention of the premium payments in question could not be unjust. As Ms. Campbell notes, the basis of her claim is that she was charged for premium payments that were not authorized by her or DISB. Pl.’s Opp’n at 30, Accordingly, the fact that Ms. Campbell received, the benefit of her bargain as to those payments that were contractually authorized does not prevent her from seeking to recover contractually-unauthorized payments in equity. See In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d 39, 46 (D.C.Cir.2014) (holding that existence- of a contract did not bar plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim where contract did not, permit the charge in question, which “was instead an extra-cont