Full opinion text
OPINION MARK R. HORNAK, District Judge. These are a patent infringement, cases filed by Intellectual Ventures I LLC and Intellectual Ventures II LLC (“Intellectual Ventures,” “IV,” or “Plaintiffs”) against three separate groups of Defendants: the Erie Defendants, the Highmark Defendants, and the Old Republic Defendants (collectively “Defendants”). Now before the Court in these cases are Motions to Dismiss the respective Complaints filed by all Defendants. The Erie and Highmark Defendants have moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to one patent (the '581 Patent), Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 74, for failure to state a claim as to two patents (the '581 Patent and the '434 Patent) based' on allegations that the patents are directed to patent ineligible subject matter, and also for failure to state a claim or, alternatively, to require a more definite statement with regard to the alleged claims. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 46; Dkt. No. 14-1131, ECF No. 47. The Erie and Highmark Defendants have also moved to strike a declaration relied upon by Plaintiffs in support of subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 82. The Old Republic Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims against them, alleging that three patents (the '581 Patent, the '434 Patent, and the '002 Patent) are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, and have requested that the Court take judicial notice of certain documents submitted in support of their Motion. Dkt. No. 14-1130, ECF Nos. 30, 33. After reviewing the papers filed by all parties and the relevant law, and after extensive, day-long oral argument on April 14, 2015, the Court will grant the Motions to Dismiss for the reasons that follow. I. BACKGROUND The patents at issue in these suits are: (a) U.S. Patent No. 6,519,581 B1 (“'581 Patent”), entitled “Collection of Information Regarding a Device or a User of a Device Across a Communication Link,” (b) U.S. Patent No. 6,510,434 B1 (“'434 Patent”), entitled “System and Method for Retrieving Information From a Database Using an Index of XML Tags and Metaf-iles,” (c) U.S. Patent No. 6,546,002 B1 (“'002 Patent”), entitled “System and Method for Implementing an Intelligent and Mobile Menu-Interface Agent,” and (d) U.S. Patent No. 7,757,298 (“'298 Patent”), entitled “Method and Apparatus for Identifying and Characterizing Errant Electronic Files.” The Erie and Highmark Defendants have moved to dismiss infringement claims relating to the '581 Patent on the grounds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ infringement claims as to that Patent because Intellectual Ventures does not own the Patent and therefore lacks standing to assert infringement of it. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 74. They also argue that the '581 and the '434 Patents are not directed to patent eligible subject matter, and thus no viable legal claim as to those Patents can be stated in the Complaints. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 46; Dkt. No. 14-1131, ECF No. 47. Alternatively, they argue that all claims of direct and indirect infringement should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) or alternatively that this Court should order Plaintiffs to provide a more definite statement as to all such claims. The Old Republic Defendants challenge the '581, '434, and '002 Patents by arguing that each is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Dkt. No. 14-1130, ECF No. 30. II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS AS TO THE '581 PATENT Whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the instant action as to the '581 Patent is determined by the law of the Third Circuit because it is a procedural question “not unique to patent law.” Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Zur Forderung Der Wissenschaften E.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2013) cert. denied sub nom. Caret v. Univ. of Utah, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2819, 189 L.Ed.2d 785 (2014). “A motion to dismiss for want of standing is properly brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), because standing is a jurisdictional matter.” Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Third Circuit would categorize the challenge here as a factual one because it does not simply attack the sufficiency of the '581 Complaints, but rather attacks assertions supporting jurisdiction in those Complaints as factually inaccurate. Id. at 358. When factual challenges are lodged, a court is not bound to accept the truthfulness of the allegations in a complaint and may consider evidence outside the pleadings to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction. Id. It is a plaintiffs burden to prove that a court has subject matter jurisdiction. Mortensen v. First Fed. & Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977). If a plaintiff lacks standing when the suit is brought, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Aichele, 757 F.3d at 357. In the patent context, plaintiffs suing for infringement bear “the burden to show necessary ownership rights to support standing to sue.” Abbott Point of Care Inc. v. Epocal, Inc., 666 F.3d 1299, 1302 (Fed.Cir.2012). To successfully assert standing, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that it held enforceable title to the patent at the inception of the lawsuit” or the infringement claims will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 625 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed.Cir.2010). Patent assignments must be in writing, 35 U.S.C. § 261, and the writing “must show a clear and unmistakable intent to transfer ownership.” Univ. Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F.Supp. 1212, 1219 (E.D.Pa.1991) (citing McClaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 138 F.2d 493 (3d Cir.1943)). Courts interpreting assignment contracts to decide ownership matters look to state law to determine and apply the appropriate rules of interpretation. Abbott, 666 F.3d at 1302. A. The Contentions of The Parties The Patent Assignment (“Assignment Agreement”) at issue here contains a list of seventeen (17) enumerated “patents and patent applications” owned by AllAdvan-táge.eom and then states: Assignor [AJIAdvantage], does hereby assign unto the Assignee [Alset, Inc.], all right, including common law rights, title and interest in the United States of America, Canada, the European Union, and all other countries and jurisdictions of the world in and to said patents together with the goodwill of the business symbolized by said patents and applications and registrations thereof. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 76-1, at 5-6 (emphasis added). The Erie and Highmark Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims relating to the '581 patent, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because TV cannot carry its burden of showing ownership, and thus has no standing to sue. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 74. The Old Republic Defendants have joined that Motion. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 77. Defendants essentially contend that the assertions in Plaintiffs’ Complaints that “Intellectual Ventures I is the owner and assignee of all right, title, and interest in and to the '581 ... Patent! ] and holds the right to sue and recover damages for infringement thereof, including past damages” are not true. E.g., Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 1 ¶ 22. Specifically, those Defendants argue that the chain of title for the '581 patent consists of six (6) transfers, and that while certain transfers contained language that unequivocally included the '581 Patent or its application, the fourth transfer in the chain enumerated certain specific patents and applications subject to that transfer, but omitted the ’581 Patent or its then-pending application. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 75, at 9. Because a plain reading of the Assignment Agreement shows no conveyance of, or even an intent to convey, the '581 Patent or its application, Defendants contend the Court should not review any extrinsic evidence pertaining to that Agreement in support of ownership and should instead dismiss all claims pertaining to the ’581 Patent for want of subject matter jurisdiction. IV counters by arguing that in the first place, a presumption of validity applies to the Assignment Agreement because it was recorded with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), and Defendants have not met their burden of disproving ownership. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 81, at 8, 9. Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that the involved Assignment Agreement by its terms is sufficient to show a transfer of title to the '581 Patent’s application (the '858 application) for either of two (2) reasons. First, because the '581 Patent’s parent (the '983 Patent), was specifically listed in the Assignment Agreement, and because the '858 application was a direct continuation of that patent, the future patent right in the '581 Patent was contained within the '983 Patent, thus automatically bringing the application within the scope of “said patents” listed in the Assignment Agreement, at 11. Second, the fact that the Assignment Agreement transfers “goodwill of the business symbolized by said patents and applications and registrations thereof’ indicates an intent to transfer the '581 Patent’s application because the '983 (parent) Patent is listed, goodwill “includes the intellectual property itself,” and so the goodwill of the '983 Patent includes its continuation application. Id. at 13-14. Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue, the Court is required to at least provisionally accept extrinsic evidence to determine if the contract is susceptible to either party’s interpretation, id. at 16, and the extrinsic evidence illustrates the parties’ intent to transfer. The extrinsic evidence IV offers to prove intent to transfer the '581 Patent’s application through the Assignment Agreement from AUAdvantage to Alset is: (1) a Declaration of Paul Hurley, co-founder of the Assignee, Alset, Inc.; (2) an excerpt from the deposition transcript of Lisa Benado, the attorney who prosecuted the '581 Patent’s application; and (3) documents showing actions taken by the parties to the Assignment Agreement after it was executed. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 81-1-81-9. Defendants reply by arguing that the presumption of validity cited by Plaintiffs is purely ministerial and has no effect on the Court’s interpretation of what rights were transferred through the Assignment Agreement. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 84, at 7-8. As a result, they claim that Plaintiffs are simply wrong when they argue that Defendants must disprove intent to transfer ownership — rather, IV retains the burden of demonstrating ownership of the Patent to sustain jurisdiction of this Court. Id. at 8. Defendants further argue that there is no rule of law that automatically transfers related patent applications with their parent patents, and that the cases Plaintiffs cite in that regard are inapposite — in contrast, pending applications must be transferred by a written instrument in the same way as are patents. Id. at 9-11. Defendants also counter the suggestion that extrinsic evidence should be reviewed, saying that because the language of the Assignment Agreement is unambiguous, Plaintiffs should not be allowed to introduce such evidence when there is no language indicating a clear intent to transfer the patent at issue. Id. at 14-15. Lastly, the moving Defendants argue that even if extrinsic evidence is considered, the relevant factors do not tip in IV’s favor to demonstrate ownership. Id. at 16-18. B. The Rules of The Decisional Road As an initial matter, recording an Assignment Agreement which lists multiple patents and applications with the USP-TO does not create a presumption that a patent omitted from that express list of assigned property was in fact transferred. “While recording [a patent assignment with the USPTO] creates a presumption in [plaintiffs] favor if the validity of the Agreement is challenged, it has no bearing on the question of what substantive rights were actually transferred.” Clouding IP, LLC v. Google Inc., 61 F.Supp.3d 421, 431 n. 12 (D.Del.2014) reargument denied sub nom. Clouding IP, LLC v. AT & T Mobility LLC, No. 13-1342, 2014 WL 6466833 (D.Del.2014); see also 37 C.F.R. § 3.54 (“The recording of a document ... is not a determination by the Office of ... the effect that document has on the title to an application, a patent, or a registration.”). TV’s argument based on this principle simply does not hold water. The parties agree that whether an assignment of rights dealing with the ' '581 Patent application occurred is a matter of California contract law. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF Nos. 75, at 18-19; 81, at 8-9. However, their views diverge substantially on the question of what California law requires the Court to now do. California positive law requires that “[t]he language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity,” Cal. Civ.Code § 1638 (2015), and states that “[w]hen a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible,” id. § 1639. These statements read like the rules of contract interpretation in many other states by which courts preliminarily decide whether a contract is clear on its face and will accept parol (extrinsic) evidence if the contract’s terms are ambiguous. See Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of The Holy Ghost, 565 Pa. 571, 777 A.2d 418, 429 (2001) (“Only where a contract’s language is ambiguous may extrinsic or parol evidence be considered to determine the intent of the parties.”). However, California law adds a bit more spice to the contract interpretation recipe: while the familiar rule for many courts is that extrinsic evidence is wholly secondary, and should not be considered absent an ambiguity in the contract’s terms, California law seemingly requires courts to consider extrinsic evidence at least a little bit in the first instance, along with the contract text at issue, to determine whether the contract is open to ambiguity. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal.2d 33, 69 CaLRptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641, 645 (1968) (“[T]he meaning of a writing can only be found by interpretation in the light of all the circumstances that reveal the sense in which the writer used the words. The exclusion of parol evidence regarding such circumstances merely because the words do not appear ambiguous to the reader can easily lead to the attribution to a written instrument of a meaning that was never intended.”) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted); Wolf v. Superior Court, 114 Cal.App.4th 1343, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 649, 655 (2004), as modified on denial of reh’g (Feb. 19, 2004) (“[I]t is reversible error for a trial court to refuse to consider such extrinsic evidence on the basis of the trial court’s own conclusion that the language of the contract appears to be clear and unambiguous on its face.”). California has therefore developed a “two-step process” for courts to use in deciding whether to admit parol evidence: First the court provisionally receives (without actually admitting) all credible evidence concerning the parties’ intentions to determine “ambiguity,” i.e., whether the language is “reasonably susceptible” to the interpretation urged by a party. If in light of the extrinsic evidence the court decides the language is “reasonably susceptible” to the interpretation urged, the extrinsic evidence is then admitted to aid in the second step- — interpreting the contract. Wolf, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at 656 (internal citations omitted). Despite these broad statements, the extrinsic evidence offered must be “relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.” Pacific Gas, 69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d at 644. If the contract is not “reasonably susceptible” to the proposed construction, extrinsic evidence should not be admitted in any fashion. See Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 41 Cal.3d 903, 226 Cal.Rptr. 558, 718 P.2d 920, 925 (1986) (“While extrinsic evidence may be considered by a court as an aid in the interpretation of a written contract when it is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible, if the evidence offered would not persuade a reasonable man that the instrument meant anything other than the ordinary meaning of its words, it is useless.”) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alternations omitted); Parsons v. Bristol Dev. Co., 62 Cal.2d 861, 44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839, 842-43 (1965) (“Extrinsic evidence is ‘admissible to interpret the instrument, but not to give it a meaning to which it is not reasonably susceptible.’ ”). C. Interpretation of The Assignment Agreement In the context of this case, the Court concludes that the Assignment Agreement is not reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations, with or without the benefit of extrinsic evidence. The Assignment Agreement clearly and unambiguously points to the conclusion that the '581 Patent (or, as is more relevant, its application at the time of transfer) was not among the patents and applications transferred, and the proffered extrinsic evidence shows a bald effort to add the Patent to a list from which it is excluded. The Assignment Agreement is simply not “reasonably susceptible” to. that alternate interpretation. Curry, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d at 631; cf. Dow Chem. Co. v. Nova Chems. Corp. (Canada), 458 Fed.Appx. 910, 914 (Fed.Cir.2012) (interpreting Delaware law and finding no ambiguity in a contract attaching a schedule which expressly listed patents and excluded the one at issue; holding that a patent was never transferred and that interpreting the contract otherwise would have required reading the explicit list out of the contract). The Agreement, which is only two (2) pages in length, specifically lists fifteen (15) patent applications and two (2) issued patents owned by AllAdvantage, and then assigns “said patents together with the goodwill of the business symbolized by said patents and applications and registrations thereof’ to Alset. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 76-1, at 5-7. Absent a rule of law that implicitly transfers all continuations of existing patents automatically with their parent applications, the Court concludes from the face of the Agreement itself that the chain of title was broken with regard to the '581 Patent. With regard to Plaintiffs’ first proposed construction of the Assignment, that “said patents” does not actually mean the patents and applications expressly listed but instead means the patents and applications listed in addition to their continuation applications, the Court concludes that saying it is so does not make it so, and the Court simply cannot read that additional language into the Assignment Agreement without making it a wholly different agreement, and thus the document is not reasonably susceptible to the proposed interpretation. Patent applications, like patents themselves, “shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing.” 35 U.S.C. § 261. The Assignment Agreement here assigns the patents listed. It also assigns many patent applications, also specifically listed. Continuation or not, the Court cannot assume that a patent application meant to be conveyed would not be explicitly listed when fifteen (15) others are expressly included on the list. While the Court recognizes IV’s argument, supported by Attorney Benado’s deposition testimony that “[t]here’s no particular set of assignment language that is universal so there’s lots of ways of conveying title,” Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF Nos. 81, at 19; 81-3, at 8; see also Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1116-17 (Fed.Cir.1996), there do need to be actual words that would effect a “clear and unmistakable intent to transfer ownership,” Kligman, 762 F.Supp. at 1219 (citing McClaskey, 138 F.2d at 499). Without an automatic rule of continuation transfer by operation of law, the Court concludes that it is wholly unreasonable to view the Assignment Agreement as having transferred the '581 Patent or its application. 1. An “Automatic Transfer” Rule? IV does in fact contend that there is an áutomatie rule of transfer whereby continuation applications of existing patents move with their parent patents by operation of law when an assignment is executed. E.g., Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No, 81, at 11-13. Plaintiffs specifically point to Sections 201.07 and 306 the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) to advocate the view that “assignment of a parent patent automatically confers rights in direct continuations.” Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 81, at 12. While this argument is not without some passing facial logic, the Federal Circuit has explained that “[t]he MPEP sets forth PTO procedures; it is not a statement of law. Moreover, MPEP § 306 refers to a PTO requirement for issuing a patent from a CIP [continuation-in-part] application to an assignee; it does not alter the legal ownership rights in patent applications and issued patents.” Regents of Univ. of New Mexico v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1121 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 n. 10 (Fed.Cir.1995)); Atmel Corporation v. Information Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed.Cir.1999) (“[T]he courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction. They must reject administrative constructions ... inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement.”). Indeed, while some rights in future interests, such as express grants of “future inventions,” may trigger an automatic transfer of an interest, SiRF Tech., 601 F.3d at 1326, such a broad rule cannot govern this situation when the Agreement explicitly lists out each patent and application transferred, purports to transfer only “said patents” and omits one owned by the Assignor. TV’s argument in this regard misses the mark. There simply is no legal rule mandating that every time a parent patent is assigned, that patent’s continuation application automatically follows. Rather, that “automatic transfer” would have to be based on the agreement of the parties, and generally includes language that transfers all future rights in an invention or an idea, rather than just a patent itself. In Bellehumeur v. Bonnett, a party made a statement to the USPTO that common ownership existed in a partnership “because he believed that under Section 306 of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure that by assigning the parent patent to RHI Partnership, Bellehumeur and his co-inventors also assigned all the rights to any continuation patent applications.” No. 00-863, 2006 WL 6635952, at *4 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 21, 2006) aff'd, 219 Fed.Appx. 991 (Fed.Cir.2007). The Bellehum-eur Court then explained that “[d]uring the trial after remand, [the ■ party] conceded that his interpretation of Section 306 was in error, and that RHI Partnership did not own the '870 application by virtue of the assignment of the '410 patent.” Id. The court later noted that while the party “acted negligently in failing to fully research the factual background regarding the assignment of the '410 patent and the legal effect of an assignment of a parent patent on continuation applications,” there was no intent to deceive, as was required by the question involved in that case. Id. at *5. That opinion was issued after the Federal Circuit remanded the case in the first instance. In the Federal Circuit’s initial (unpublished) opinion, that court wrote: [T]he January 1, 1996 assignment only assigns the invention claimed in the issued '410 patent, and the pending counterpart foreign applications. It lists no continuing or related domestic applications based on the '410 patent. At oral argument, Bellehumeur’s counsel conceded that the '161 patent was not expressly mentioned in the January 1, 1996 assignment. Because patent rights must be transferred by written instrument, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000), any alleged intention by the named inventors of the '410 patent to transfer rights to the '161 patent is ineffective and is insufficient to establish Bellehumeur’s standing. Bellehumeur v. Bonnett, 127 Fed.Appx. 480, 484-85 (Fed.Cir.2005). The Federal Circuit does not appear to have adopted a rule automatically transferring continuation patent applications with their parent patents in written agreements, and the Court declines to adopt such a rule here. In the absence of such an automatic transfer rule, no amount of extrinsic evidence or argument can demonstrate that the Assignment Agreement is “reasonably susceptible” to IV’s proposed interpretation that the phrase transferring “said patents,” when included after an express list of patents and applications, also included an application omitted from that list. 2. Does The Assignment of Goodwill Save The Day? TV’s second argument, that the phrase “goodwill of the business symbolized by said patents and applications and registrations thereof’ encompasses the '581 Patent’s application, is similarly unavailing. For this proposed interpretation to be potentially reasonable, the '581 Patent’s application would need to be included in the definition of “goodwill.” That the Agreement states the “goodwill of the business” is “symbolized by said patents ...” is unhelpful to IV because it follows the same legal fallacy as the previous argument: if only the “said,” or listed, patents are transferred, and there is no automatic rule of law that transfers child patent applications along with their parent patents, then the “goodwill of the business symbolized by said patents” refers to the goodwill associated with those said patents only and not unenumerated others. The remaining part of the phrase, “... said patents and applications and registrations thereof’ again only references the applications and registrations of the listed (“said”) patents. With regard to Plaintiffs’ argument that the '581 Patent’s application is necessarily part of the “goodwill” of its parent patent (the '983 Patent) because it is the same intellectual property underlying the parent patent whose goodwill is being transferred, Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 81, at 13-14, the Court has not discerned, nor has IV pointed to, any legal authority which treats pending patent applications synonymously with a general notion of “goodwill.” See id. at 13-14 (asserting that the '581 Patent’s application is “necessarily included” in the definition of goodwill without citation to authority). Instead, TV only argues that the “goodwill” term is similar enough to language conveying all interest in an “invention,” which other courts have interpreted as conveying future rights. Id. at 14. While a patent application is a form of intangible property, as is goodwill, the argument that the two are the same thing simply does not comport with a reasonable understanding of the term. See generally Weston Anson, The Intangible Assets Handbook 7 (ABA Section of Business Law 2007) (explaining the differences between finite-lived intangible assets like patents and copyrights and those that are indefinite-lived, such as goodwill and many trademarks). While recognizing that this case does not arise in the tax context, it is also notable that in tax matters, patent rights are treated as distinct from “goodwill.” Compare 26 U.S.C. § 197(d)(1)(A) with 26 U.S.C. § 197(d)(1)(C)(iii); see also id. § 167(g) (6) (distinguishing depreciation deduction method allowed when dealing with “patents” rather than other intangibles); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 554-56, 113 S.Ct. 1670, 123 L.Ed.2d 288 (1993) (generally remarking on the differential treatment afforded patents and other intangibles over the years). Similar interpretive concepts underlie the principles that courts are not to apply general provisions when a matter is more specifically dealt with in the same enactment, Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228, 77 S.Ct. 787, 1 L.Ed.2d 786 (1957), and a more specific statute (or here, body of law), should govern over a more general one, Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974) (a general statute will not be held to have repealed by implication a more specific one unless there is “clear intention otherwise”). Patent rights are considered separate and apart from other similar intangible property rights governed by distinct bodies of law, such as copyrights and trademarks, whereas goodwill more appropriately defines those intangible assets which are not already accounted for in other categories of assets. The Court therefore cannot conclude that the Assignment Agreement is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation urged by IV, that the “goodwill” phrase includes the '581 Patent or its then-pending '858 application. Further, even if patent applications could be construed as intangible assets included in the definition of “goodwill” (since the Assignment Agreement suggests the parties agreed that goodwill can be “symbolized by” them), they run into the same problem as with the “said patents” argument: the “patent applications” referred to as part of the goodwill are not the continuation patent applications of each listed patent, but the applications of those listed patents themselves. 3. The A voidance of Illusory Contracts IV also argues that the Court should not “ ‘read [the Assignment Agreement] to render a provision or'term meaningless or illusory.’ ” Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 81, at 13 (quoting Walker Digital, LLC v. Expedia, Inc., 2014 U.S.App. LEXIS 24712, at *10 (Fed.Cir. Dec. 30, 2014)). The Court agrees, and therefore concludes that it cannot read the Agreement in such a way that would make “said patents” and their “goodwill” essentially interchangeable terms (since according to IV, “goodwill” includes the intellectual property itself), thus rendering one or the other of them meaningless. That Plaintiffs argue the '581 Patent’s application could fit within the categories of both “said patents” and “goodwill” proves the point. As one California Court of Appeals has written, with regard to release agreements with an insurance company: Appellants urge us to interpret the plain language in their release agreements discharging respondents from “any and all claims, demands, actions and causes of actions” to mean “all claims except claims for bad faith, unfair practices or violations of the Insurance Code.” Under the circumstances presented here, we decline to rewrite appellants’ release agreements to include a concept they failed to enunciate at the time they accepted the terms of the settlement with their insurer. Edwards v. Comstock Ins. Co., 205 Cal.App.3d 1164, 1167, 252 Cal.Rptr. 807 (Cal.Ct.App.1988). Similarly in this case, Plaintiffs urge the Court to read the phrase “said patents” to mean “said patents and an additional patent application,” and/or the phrase “goodwill symbolized by said patents and applications and registrations thereof’ to mean “goodwill symbolized by said patents and at least one additional patent application” or “goodwill, which includes patents and patent applications themselves and is symbolized by said patents as well as any continuation applications of said patents.” The Assignment Agreement is on its face not reasonably susceptible to such proposed constructions, since they are in reality alterations or amendments. 4. Consideration of a “California Quantity” of Extrinsic Evidence Neither the terms of the Assignment Agreement, nor the extrinsic evidence offered by IV, allow the Court to accept Plaintiffs’ proposed interpretation of the Assignment Agreement. That proposal essentially boils down to this: (1) Alset meant to negotiate an agreement that included the '581 Patent’s application; (2)(a) Alset forgot, when negotiating an agreement that explicitly lists every patent and application being conveyed, to include any reference to the '581 Patent’s application, or alternatively, or (2)(b) Alset did not believe it needed to list that application, because it mistakenly believed that transfer of the parent patent would effect a transfer of the continuation child application; and as a result, (3) this Court should somehow read the '581 Patent’s application into the Assignment Agreement because that was the subjective intent of one party to the Agreement. Offered in support of those premises is (i) the declaration of Alset’s co-founder saying he meant to own the '581 Patent’s application by virtue of this Agreement. But as the moving Defendants point out, that Declaration does not aid the Court in understanding All Advantage’s intent as the assignor of rights. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 84, at 16. And even if it did, the language in the Agreement is not “reasonably susceptible” to that interpretation. Pacific Gas, 69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d at 644; Curry, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d at 631. Also offered in support is (ii) the deposition testimony of Lisa Benado, the attorney who prosecuted the '581 Patent’s application. But the Court again agrees with Defendants — her recollection is based on what she believed her client’s intent to be, not AllAdvantage’s. The expressed intent of one party to an Agreement is not conclusive as to the other party’s intent. Lastly, IV offers (iii) evidence of actions taken after the parties executed the Assignment Agreement: (1) a Revocation of Prior Powers of Attorney, Power of Attorney by Applicant and Notification of Change of Fee and Correspondence Address filed in the prosecution of Patent Application No. 09/844/858 [the '581 Patent’s application]; (2) a copy of the '581 Patent, which issued on February 11, 2003; (3) a copy of a Terminal Disclaimer filed in the prosecution of the '581 Patent’s application; and (4) a copy of a fee transmittal form filed with regard to the '581 Patent’s application. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF Nos. 81-5-8. All of this evidence assertedly speaks to Alset’s belief in its ownership, and that it held itself out as the owner of the '581 Patent after executing the Assignment Agreement. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court simply cannot conclude that the Assignment Agreement is reasonably susceptible to an interpretation, by its terms, that it conveyed ownership of the '581 Patent’s application. Had Plaintiffs provided evidence of AllAdvantage’s intent aside from its decision to do nothing to assert a further ownership interest (which is admittedly, not nothing), this might be a closer call. But even under California’s wide-ranging “at least take a look at the parol evidence” rule, the evidence offered must be relevant to a reasonable interpretation of the plain terms of the Agreement — it cannot be only relevant to a request to insert further language into the written document. Even conditionally accepting and reviewing the extrinsic evidence offered by Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that it does not provide a reasonable alternative interpretation to the plain terms of the contract. Thus, the contract cannot be deemed ambiguous, and the extrinsic evidence is not admissible to aid in further interpretation. Additionally, some extrinsic evidence more firmly supports Defendants’ position than Plaintiffs’. For one thing, Mr. Hurley’s Declaration, while stating he intended to obtain by this acquisition all assets he held in a different company, also states that he negotiated a previous assignment in the '581 Patent’s chain of title. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 81-2, at ¶4. That previous assignment, negotiated by Mr. Hurley, specifically lists as part of the assets transferred, both the '983 Patent (’581 Patent’s parent) and the '858 application (’581 Patent’s application). Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF No. 76-4, at 8. Mr. Hurley did not seem to believe that transfers of parent patents automatically conveyed their child applications at that prior time, so why now? Moreover, Defendants point to the fact that the Assignment Agreement “expressly transferred three family applications of the '983 patent by name and patent number,” but did not include the '581 Patent’s application. Dkt. No. 14-220, ECF Nos. 75, at 10; 84, at 13. Those child patent applications must have been considered separate property that needed to be included in order to be transferred, or why would they be listed? After appropriately considering the extrinsic evidence within the perhaps unique context of California law, along with the language of the Assignment Agreement, the Court concludes that the Agreement is not reasonably susceptible to any of IV’s proposed interpretations. The relevant Assignment Agreement does not transfer the '581 Patent or its application. Thus, there was a break in the chain of ownership of the '581 Patent. This means that IV lacks standing to assert patent infringement claims based on it and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate its claims of its infringement. All such claims relating to the '581 Patent will therefore be dismissed without prejudice. III. PATENT-INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER CHALLENGE Some iteration of this part of the case is being litigated daily (if not hourly) in federal courts across the country. In the wake of Alice Corp. Party Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 189 L.Ed.2d 296 (2014), the proverbial motions practice floodgates have opened and participants in patent actions who are charged with infringing software or other computer-related patents have moved at various procedural stages for rulings that the asserted patents are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 101. Such litigants often attempt to frame patents at issue in the broadest terms available, analogizing the claims to age-old methods of organizing human activity which lack any inventive concept in attempts to bring the claimed subject matter within the scope of the Supreme Court’s conception of unpatentable subject matter. And, as it turns out, many courts have agreed with them in the time since the Supreme Court decided Alice. Parties asserting infringement, hoping to save their cases and pursue their infringement contentions, argue that (1) the pleading stage is too early to consider whether the subject matter is patent eligible because there has not yet been discovery or claim construction; (2) representative claims are insufficient to assess patents under § 1Ó1 and courts undertaking the task must instead perform a claim-by-claim analysis; (3) a presumption of validity attaches to patents because the USPTO has approved them; and relatedly, (4) the standard for judging the issue is too high — clear and convincing evidence — for early adjudication. On substantive grounds, they also attempt to frame their patents as claiming solutions to computer-specific problems with no “brick and mortar” analogs in order to show they are similar to claims upheld by the Federal Circuit post-AZice. All of these eligibility arguments dejour are presented in this case, at least to some extent, and the Court will address them as appropriate here. Because many of the arguments made both by IV and the Defendants revert to and then rely on first principles of § 101 jurisprudence, the Court concludes that it is necessary to consider the development of that ease law at some length. A. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal when a complaint fails to allege facts “sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible- claim for relief.’ ” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). Withstanding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim requires plaintiffs to “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elementfs].” Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir.2014). Assessing a complaint at the Motion to Dismiss stage requires courts to accept all “well-pleaded facts as true,” but legal conclusions warrant no deference. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677, 129 S.Ct. 1937). B. Patent Eligibility Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101 35 U.S.C. § 101 authorizes the grant of a patent to anyone who “invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof....” One exception to these general categories has been the focus of a great deal of litigation. That exception sounds simple: “Maws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2354. Specifically at issue here is whether the claims of three Patents involved here fall into the “abstract idea” category, and if they do, whether they contain sufficient limitations to transform them into claims for patent-eligible subject matter. So what exactly is an abstract idea? And what types of limitations are required to transform an abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter? The Supreme Court has instructed the lower courts to apply the following general framework: (1) Are the claims at issue “directed to a patent-ineligible concept” a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea)? (“Alice Step One”) If no, the claims are patent eligible. If yes, then courts are to ask: (2) “[C]onsider[ing] the elements of each claim both individually and as an ordered combination,” are there “additional elements” which present an “inventive concept” that “transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application” by demonstrating it is “significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself ” ? (“Alice Step Two”) Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Claims which yield a “yes” answer to both questions are patent eligible, as are those which generate a “no” answer to the first question. Claims which yield a “yes” to question one, but a “no” to question two are not patent eligible. Abstract ideas, a concept relevant to the first step, may be “preexisting, fundamental truth[s]” such as mathematical equations, and also encompass “method[s] of organizing human activity” or “longstanding commercial practice^]” like intermedi-ated settlement or risk hedging. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2356. It is important for courts to avoid overgeneralizing when conducting this inquiry, but they must also be cautious of hypersensitivity to technical language, as the inquiry is one of discerning the heart of the patented invention/true nature of the claim. Id. at 2355-57; Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 714; Accenture Global Services, GmbH v. Guidewire Software, 728 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed.Cir.2013); see also Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo (U.S.) Inc., No. 12-01065, 2015 WL 4203469, at *6 (D.Or. July 9, 2015) (“The first step of the Mayo/Alice analysis essentially requires the Court to ask: what are the claims generally trying to achieve?”); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.Supp.3d 1167, 1173 (C.D.Cal. 2014) (“Courts should recite a claim’s purpose at a reasonably high level of generality.”). “This task is difficult, especially with regard to computer software. Because software is necessarily intangible, accused infringers can easily mischaracterize and oversimplify software patents.” Enfish, 56 F.Supp.3d at 1174 (quoting Oplus Techs. Ltd. v. Sears Holding Corp., No. 12-5707, 2013 WL 1003632, at *12 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 4, 2013), which states that “[a]ll software only ‘receives data,’ ‘applies algorithms,’ and ‘ends with decisions.’” (emphasis in original)); see also Enfish, 56 F.Supp.3d at 1171 (“A basic truth is that algorithms comprise computer software and computer codes.”). The second step requires more than stating the abstract idea and adding the words “apply it,” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2357, and must include additional features that amount to more than “well-understood, routine, conventional activity,” Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1298. Preemption concerns are a central factor, as the second step is geared toward weeding out claims that would monopolize, or preempt, use of the abstract idea itself through artful drafting. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2357. C. Relevant Supreme Court Precedent Through Alice In order to assess the patent eligibility of the patents at issue here and to address the parties’ enthusiastic arguments in those regards, it is necessary to place them in the context of the evolved legal principles applicable to the task. In Gottschalk v. Benson, the Supreme Court held that a patent claiming a mathematical formula, which could be performed either by the human mind or by a computer, was drawn to patent-ineligible subject matter because it attempted to patent one of the “basic tools of scientific and technological work.” 409 U.S. 63, 67, 93 S.Ct. 253, 34 L.Ed.2d 273 (1972). Drawing its analysis from numerous prior cases, a particularly salient explanation came in its description of Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 24 L.Ed. 139 (1876). The patent at issue in that case claimed a process for manufacturing improved-quality flour. Benson, 409 U.S. at 69, 93 S.Ct. 253. As the Court reasoned in Cochrane: If one of the steps of a process be that a certain substance is to be reduced to a powder, it may not be at all material what instrument or machinery is used to effect that object, whether a hammer, a pestle and mortar, or a mill. Either may be pointed out; but if the patent is not confined to that particular tool or machine, the use of the others would be an infringement, the general process being the same. Id. at 70, 93 S.Ct. 253 (quoting Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787-88). The Court went on to explain that “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.” Id. at 70, 93 S.Ct. 253. The Court also made plain its concerns regarding pre-emption: “The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer, which means that ... the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.” Id. at 71-72, 93 S.Ct. 253. Similarly, in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978), the Court held that a patent claiming “a formula for computing an updated alarm limit” during catalytic conversion processes in the petrochemical and oil refining industries is not patent eligible. Id. at 586, 98 S.Ct. 2522. The patent’s inclusion of “post-solution activity” (in the form of automatically adjusting the alarm limit after implementing the formula) was insufficient to render the claims patent eligible, because then “[a] competent draftsman could attach' some form of post-solution activity to almost any mathematical formula” and preempt its use. Id. at 590, 98 S.Ct. 2522. The Court held that “a claim for an improved method of calculation, even when tied to a specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter under § 101.” Id. at 595 n. 18, 98 S.Ct. 2522. The Court contrasted the claims in Benson and Flook with those at issue in Diamond v. Diehr to there hold that a “process for curing synthetic rubber which includes in several of its steps the use of a mathematical formula and a programmed digital computer is patentable subject matter.” 450 U.S. 175, 177, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981). The process there at issue addressed a specific problem in the tire production industry — tires had previously been under-cured or overcured because there was no way to measure the temperature inside a press without opening it. Id. at 177-78, 101 S.Ct. 1048. The patented process provided for constant measurement of the temperature inside the mold, such measurements being automatically fed into a computer which used a mathematical equation to calculate the cure time and signal the computer to open the press at the optimal time. Id. at 179, 101 S.Ct. 1048. Unlike the claims at issue in Benson and Flook, which essentially purported to patent mathematical formulas themselves, the Court concluded that while the process in Diehr “admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, [it] do[es] not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation.” Id. at 187, 101 S.Ct. 1048. Instead, the Court recognized that “[i]t is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.” Id. 187, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (emphasis in original) (collecting cases). The Diehr Court also stressed the importance of considering the invention as a whole rather than dissecting its claims. Id. at 188, 101 S.Ct. 1048. In addition, the Court described Flook as standing for the proposition that use of a mathematical formula (or other abstract idea) cannot be patented even if its use is limited to a “particular technological environment.” Id. at 191, 192 n. 14, 101 S.Ct. 1048. The Supreme Court’s consideration of patent eligibility issues next came in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010). In Bilski, the claims purported to patent “both the concept of hedging [or protecting against] risk and the application of that concept to energy markets.” Id. at 609, 130 S.Ct. 3218. Aided by the analysis in Benson, Flook, and Diehr, the Court held that the involved patent application was drawn to the fundamental economic concept of “hedging,” and that the patent claims lacked patent eligibility because allowing such a patent “would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.” at 61112. Moreover, the claim limitations did no more than import “token post-solution components” or attempt to “limit[ ] an abstract idea to one field of use” — both of which the Court found insufficient in Flook. Id. at 612, 130 S.Ct. 3218. Further, the “entire Court agree[d] that while the machine-or-transformation test is reliable in most cases, it is not the exclusive test” to determine patent eligibility. Id. at 613, 98 S.Ct. 2522 (Stevens, J., concurring). Then, in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012), the Court unanimously held that process claims drawn to aiding doctors in determining the adequate dosage levels of certain drugs on autoimmune disease patients by applying natural laws were not patent eligible. Id. at 1294. Explaining that claimed steps implementing the laws of nature must be more than “well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field” to render them patent eligible, the Court held those at issue failed to do so, as they broke down to nothing more than directing the process to those who could administer the drugs and instructing that they “(1) measure (somehow) the current level of the relevant metabolite, (2) use particular (unpatentable) laws of nature (which the claim sets forth) to calculate the current toxicity/inefficacy limits, and (3) reconsider the drug dosage in light of the law.” Id. at 1299. The Mayo Court also explained that “to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the words ‘apply it.’ ” Id. at 1294. Most importantly, the Court set out a two-step inquiry outlined above which courts must undertake when considering patents under § 101. The Court also described language in Bilski, explaining that while the machine-or-transformation test does not “trump[ ] the Taw of nature’ exclusion,” the test may be “an’ important and useful clue’ to patentability.” Id. at 1303 (quoting Bilski, 130 S Ct. at 3225-27). Finally, in Alice, a unanimous Supreme Court applied its holdings in these cases and held patents which “disclose a computer-implemented scheme for mitigating ‘settlement risk’ ” ineligible for patent protection. 134 S.Ct. at 2351. Alice emphasized the twin concerns which underlie patent law: (1) pre-emption and (2) protection. Id. at 2354-55. As to the former, the Alice Court explained that if a patent’s claimed subject matter would essentially grant a monopoly over the “basic tools of scientific and technological work” (ie., laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas), further innovation may be impeded. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2354. As to the latter, the Court instructed that the abstract ideas/laws of nature/natural phenomena exclusion must be carefully construed “lest it swallow all of patent law.” Id. Since “[a]t some level, all inventions embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply” these excluded categories of subject matter, courts assessing claims against § 101 must “distinguish between patents that claim the building blocks of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into something more, thereby transforming them into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). The Alice Court concluded that (1) the claims at issue there were drawn to an abstract idea, intermediated settlement, id. at 2355, and (2) the claims included no “inventive concept sufficient to transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application,” id. at 2357 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). With regard to its conclusion at Alice Step One, the Alice Court analogized the idea of intermediated settlement to patent claims struck down in previous cases, reiterating that mathematical formulas (like Benson’s “algorithm for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary form” and Flook’s “mathematical formula for computing ‘alarm limits’ in a catalytic conversion process”) and “fundamental economic, practicefs]” (such as Bilski’s “basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk”) are the types of abstract ideas which are not patent eligible. Id. at 2355-56. While the Court explicitly declined to “delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category,” it easily concluded the claims were within the same category of business practices as those in Bilski. Id. at 2357. At Alice Step Two, the Alice Court concluded that the claims recited nothing more than instructions to “implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer” because the steps directing a computer to “create electronic records, track multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions” are “purely conventional” tasks performed by computers. Id. at 2359. Recognizing that the Alice Step Two inquiry incorporates the Court’s pre-emption concerns, the Court reasoned that using a computer to “obtain data, adjust account balances, and issue automated instructions” did not change the analysis, as those functions are all “well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry.” Id. The Court distinguished Diehr from Benson, Flook, and Mayo, explaining that the mathematical equation in Diehr was not patented on its own, but was instead used “in a process designed to solve a technological problem in ‘conventional industry practice.’ ” Id. at 2358. The Court further counseled that neither adding a generic computer along with the words “apply it,” nor “limiting the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment,” will transform an abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter, id., but claims which “purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself’ or “effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field” may withstand scrutiny. Id. at 2359. D. The Post-Alice Legal Landscape Shortly after the Supreme Court ruled in Alice, the Federal Circuit decided Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed.Cir.2014). In Digitech, the court of appeals held that method claims “describ[ing] a process of organizing information through mathematical correlations” which was “not tied to a specific structure or machine” claimed an abstract idea. Id. at 1350. The court described the claim as “a process of taking two data sets and combining them into a single data set, the device profile.” Id. at 1351. The abstract idea, a “process of gathering and combining data that does not require input from a physical device,” could not withstand scrutiny under § 101 because it had no further limitations that would cover less than “any and all uses of a device profile.” Id. The Federal Circuit explained that “[w]ithout additional limitations, a process that employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to generate additional information is not patent eligible.” Id. In buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed.Cir.2014), the Federal Circuit held the claims there at issue were directed to the abstract idea of “creating a contractual relationship — a transaction performance guaranty,” id. at 1355 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), which used a computer without “pur-portfing] to improve the functioning of the computer itself,” id. at 1354 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Concluding that the claims “do not push or even test the boundaries of the Supreme Court precedents under section 101,” the Court of Appeals easily analogized the claims to the basic business practices the Supreme Court had invalidated in other cases. Id. at 1354-55. The court also referenced the concern that expansive patents will create a preemption problem that discourages innovation, id. at 1352-53, and noted that the exclusions from patent protection for laws of nature and abstract ideas apply even if a law or idea is narrow, id. at 1353. Then, in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed.Cir.2014), cert. denied sub nom. Ultramercial, LLC v. WildTangent, Inc., — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2907, 192 L.Ed.2d 929 (2015), the Federal Circuit addressed (at the motion to dismiss stage) a representative claim directed toward a method whereby consumers can watch copyrighted media products for free over the Internet in exchange for viewing an advertisement when the advertiser pays for the content. Id. at 712. The case had a long history of appellate review and in its third opinion, the Federal Circuit held that a representative claim’s “ordered combination of steps recites an abstraction-an idea, having no particular concrete or tangible form,” and that “[although certain additional limitations, such as consulting an activity log, add a degree of particularity, the concept embodied by the majority of the limitations describes only the abstract idea of showing an advertisement before delivering free content.” Id. at 715. Specifically addressing the machine-or-transformation test and holding it not satisfied, the Federal Circuit also stated that “[ajny transformation from the use of computers or the transfer of content between computers is merely what computers do and does not change the analysis [and is insufficient].” Id. at 717. The Federal Circuit has also held ineligible four (4) patents which had been asserted against banks based on check deposit software in Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed.Cir.2014). On appeal from a grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the panel unanimously held that patent claims which “generally recite a method of 1) extracting data from hard copy documents using an automated digitizing unit such as a scanner, 2) recognizing specific information from the extracted data, and 3) storing that information in a memory” were patent-ineligible. Id. at 1345. The court concluded that the patents were directed toward the “abstract idea of 1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a memory,” id. at 1347, and went on to explain that those concepts are “undisput-edly well-known” and performed by humans in general and banks in